

DEBATER
A EUROPA

25

jul-dez 2021

EUROPE OF THE CENTER
AND THE PERIPHERIES

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EDIÇÃO

Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra

Email: imprensa@uc.pt

URL: http://www.uc.pt/imprensa_uc

Vendas online: <http://livrariadaimprensa.uc.pt>

INFOGRAFIA

Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra

ISSN Digital

1647-6336

DOI

https://doi.org/10.14195/1647-6336_25

[HTTPS://IMPACTUM-JOURNALS.UC.PT/DEBATEREUROPA](https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/debaterEUROPA)

[HTTP://DEBATEREUROPA.EUROPE-DIRECT-AVEIRO.AEVA.EU/](http://debaterEUROPA.EUROPE-DIRECT-AVEIRO.AEVA.EU/)

SETEMBRO, 2021

CENTRO DE ESTUDOS INTERDISCIPLINARES
DA UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA - CEIS20

CENTRO DE INFORMAÇÃO EUROPE DIRECT DE AVEIRO

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DEBATER A EUROPA

Periódico do CIEDA e do CEIS20, em parceria com GPE e a RCE.

N.25 jul/dez 21 – Semestral

ISSN 1647-6336

Disponível em: <http://www.europe-direct-aveiro.aeva.eu/debatereuropa/>

<https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/debatereuropa>

DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/1647-6336_25_0

NOTA DE ABERTURA

Desde 2009 a AEVA assumiu, através do CIEDA, o compromisso de manter a publicação da Revista Debater a Europa, publicação semestral, em suporte exclusivamente digital, numa política de acesso aberto.

A Revista tem como finalidade primordial "analisar, questionar, problematizar e debater temáticas candentes da nossa realidade de hoje, na Europa" (<https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/debatereuropa/about>) pelo que o CIEDA foi o parceiro institucional especializado tendo como tema central a "Europa" e como missão o debate, reflexão e divulgação de temáticas europeias.

Com a reestruturação dos Centros de Informação Europeia afigura-se adequado o estabelecimento de novas parcerias institucionais de prestígio no âmbito europeu, que cumpram uma função legitimadora relativamente à temática central da revista, garantindo que a publicação da AEVA continua a cumprir a sua missão com o respaldo de instituições estatutariamente ligada às questões Europeias.

Ana Ribeiro, AEVA

OPENING NOTE

Since 2009 AEVA assumed, through CIEDA, the commitment to maintain the publication of the Journal *Debater a Europa*, a biannual publication, exclusively online and open access.

The main purpose of the Journal is to "analyse, question, problematise and debate burning issues of our reality today, in Europe" (<https://impactum-journals.uc.pt/debatereuropa/about>) and CIEDA was the specialised institutional partner, having as its central theme "Europe" and its mission the debate, reflection and dissemination of European themes.

With the restructuring of the European Information Centres it is appropriate to establish new partnerships with prestigious institutions in the European context, which fulfil a legitimising function in relation to the central theme of the Journal, ensuring that the AEVA publication continues to fulfil its mission with the backing of institutions statutorily linked to European issues.

Ana Ribeiro, AEVA

Editorial

Europe of the Center and the Peripheries

Associated with a perception of development and underdevelopment of countries in the global market, the concepts of center and periphery in the European Union (EU) remain both present and abstract. By evoking the “center-periphery” model, Member States such as Germany, France or Italy would be part of the “center”, while others – particularly those in Southern and Eastern Europe – would be included in the “periphery”, being subject to the decisions taken by the center.

This view, embedded in the realist doctrine of International Relations, as opposed to a model of Europe based on solidarity and cooperation between states and peoples, is important for a general understanding of the European Union, and in particular of regional development. Indeed, at the heart of the EU itself is the objective of promoting the economic integration of its Member States, as well as the aim of economic convergence between states and regions.

The consecutive rounds of enlargements, which have widened the disparity in development between the Member States and, more recently, the sovereign debt crisis, have renewed the “center-periphery” paradigm. Although the concept and debate about a “two-speed Europe” isn’t new, nor peaceful, among Member States, in reality there are a number of different “Europes” (Schengen, Euro) coexisting in the EU, and a central directory of states, which takes the major decisions on deepening European integration.

The “Europe of the Center and the Peripheries” thematic issue gathers a selected number of accepted papers for the VIII Europe in the World Annual Meeting (Lisboa, 16-17 April 2020), which had the financial support of the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation’s Scientific Community Support Fund (FCT-FACC). Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, for the first time, the meeting did not take place, but nevertheless this thematic issue is a tangible result of it.

The issue has five articles ranging from the discussion on the future of Europe, enlargement and security, the quality of governance, and Europeanization, to housing policies in EU Member States.

The European Union is a forum of permanent discussion about its own future. Taking stock of that, Isabel Baltazar’s article focus on the discussion on

how to conciliate the union with a two or several speed Europe. Having the 2017 Rome Declaration as a starting point, she examines how the EU has been able to conciliate its unity around fundamental values with policy adjustments, and argues that throughout the history of the European integration process it has been possible to reconcile solidarity with responsibility.

A set of two articles centers on the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy, between the EU and the partner countries, aiming at strengthening and deepening the political and economic relations between the EU and the six partner countries, while also supporting sustainable reform processes in those countries.

Valeria Caras's article focuses on the relationship between the EU and the EaP countries, going beyond the center-periphery and external governance models and using the theory of linkage and leverage to analyze the interactions between both parties and also Russia, an important player in the region. She concludes that not all EaP countries have the same linkage with the EU: whereas Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have stronger links with the EU, Belarus and Armenia are closer to Russia, and Azerbaijan is in between.

Ana Paula Tostes and Yasmin Renni choose one of the EaP countries, Moldova, to analyse its Europeanization's dynamic. They look at the regulations, laws and amendments to law implemented by the Moldovan Government as assessed in the Association Implementation Reports, and come to the conclusion that, in a top-down perspective regarding economic cooperation and trade, Europeanization in Moldova occurs without significant trouble, but that regarding corruption EU's influence is more limited.

Geopolitics, security and bordering issues matter to the European Union. In conjunction with the Eastern Partnership, the EU has also a strategy for the Western Balkans which includes, in the medium to long term, another enlargement round. Marco Cruz's article assesses the connection between EU enlargement and the establishment of security communities, as well as the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Western Balkans, and the way the EU has had an impact in those countries namely through the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. He, then, argues that the EU's indecision towards the enlargement to the Western Balkans' countries contributes to other foreign players to take action in the region.

Finally, on a completely different subject, Gonalo Antunes and Caterina Di Giovanni address the housing policies in Portugal and Italy, two EU Member States, but one from the periphery and the other from the center. By examining the theoretical discourse on housing and the housing policies in both countries, they determine that, in fact and despite their different paths on this subject, it's not possible to draw a clear division and that a "between peripheries" scenario is applied to this case-study.

All together, these five articles contribute to the dissemination and discussion of important topics that are part of the European Union and/or Member States current debate, although in different degrees, and *Debater a Europa* journal also fulfils its aim and provides a forum for such an academic outreach.

Maria Fernanda Rollo
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro
Isabel Maria Freitas Valente
Alice Cunha
(eds.)

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The European Union is at a crossroads: An Europe of different speeds? A study of the history of European unity

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“The United States of Europe does not
constitute a dream: they already exist within our
mentality, within our soul”.

Ortega y Gasset (21. 11. 1930)

Abstract

This study presents the history of European unity in the contemporary period and how the European federation project was being presented for the constitution of the United States of Europe. Then the way to a European Union with one voice, in the history of European integration, in a sovereignty shared by the States, not always uniting all the members, in the same integration, posing the question of a Europe at different speeds. At European crossroads, it is not always possible to reach an understanding among all nations, on how to achieve this European Union. It is here that the question arises of a Europe at various speeds, in which some states agree to further deepen, and others, or due to the lack of possibility of convergence, for economic reasons, as in the case of the Euro, are left out of certain integration policies. However, what we want to reflect on is that the process of European construction maintains its unity around its fundamental values, although policies can adjust to concrete situations, which do not invalidate their essential nature, ends and objectives, or that is, despite these different “speeds”, depending on the situation and the will of the states, the project itself always maintains the European Union as a whole.

Keywords: Europe, Union, Integration, History

Resumo

Este estudo apresenta a história da unidade europeia no período contemporâneo e como o projeto de federação europeia foi sendo apresentado para a constituição

dos Estados Unidos da Europa. Depois o caminho para uma União Europeia a uma só voz, na história da integração europeia, numa soberania partilhada pelos Estados, nem sempre unindo todos os membros, na mesma integração, pondo a questão de uma Europa a várias velocidades. Nas encruzilhadas europeias, nem sempre é possível chegar a um entendimento entre todas as nações, sobre a forma de concretizar essa União Europeia. É aqui que surge a questão de uma Europa a várias velocidades, em que alguns Estados acordam para um maior aprofundamento, e, outros, ou por falta de possibilidade de convergência, por razões económicas, como no caso do Euro, ficam de fora de certas políticas de integração. No entanto, o que queremos refletir, é que o processo de construção europeia mantém a sua unidade em torno dos seus valores fundamentais, embora as políticas possam ajustar-se a situações concretas, que não invalidam a sua natureza, fins e objetivos essenciais, ou seja, apesar dessas “velocidades” diferentes, consoante a situação e vontade dos estados, o projeto em si mesmo, mantém sempre a União Europeia como um todo.

Palavras-Chave: Europa, União, Integração, História

Europe has faced many crossroads throughout its history. In Contemporary History, even before the process of European construction, peace between nations was under many threats and it was difficult to find a European balance, often only achieved after the first war. Peace has always been the great objective for establishing European Unity and guaranteeing European hegemony vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It was always in times of war that nations became aware of their mortality, in the famous expression of Paul Valéry, “We civilizations now know that we are mortal”, uttered in 1919, in the tumult of the ashes of the First World War¹.

Before, in the previous century many figures were reflecting too, on the European situation, namely Andrade Corvo, in the work *Perigos*, where he analyzes the European conflicts and the need for understanding between nations. At these crossroads, as at present, whenever there is a European crisis, Europe rethinks its identity and the need to preserve peace through a union between states, to survive and also to rise as a whole in the face of threats external. For this reason, crises have been an opportunity for growth in European projects and a moment for deepening them.

It is evident that at European crossroads, it is not always possible to reach an understanding among all nations, on how to achieve this European Union. It is here that the question arises of a Europe at various speeds, in which some states agree to further deepen, and others, or due to the lack of possibility of convergence, for economic reasons, as in the case of the Euro, are left out of certain integration policies. However, what we want to reflect on is that the process of European construction maintains its unity around its fundamental values, although policies can adjust to concrete situations, which do not invalidate their essential nature, ends and objec-

¹ VALÉRY, Paul, (1871-1945), *La Crise de l'esprit* (1919)

tives, that is, despite these different “speeds”, depending on the situation and the will of the states, the project itself always maintains the European Union as a whole.

The Rome Declaration signed by the 27 states in March 2017 (the United Kingdom no longer participated), aimed at a “united” Europe, but at “different rates and intensities”. But what does this mean? Is it possible to have a united Europe with countries that can decide whether or not they want to adopt certain policies? Are we moving to a different Europe, at two or several speeds? But, on the other hand, the declaration focuses very much on one word: “unity” and that “European unity started out as the dream of a few and became the hope of many. Then, Europe became one again”. The solution in question is to act together, at different rates and intensities when necessary, advancing all in the same direction, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later to ensure an indivisible and indivisible Union. How to reconcile this “union” with a Europe at two or more speeds is the question under analysis and reflection. A question that is always present in the history of Europe, even before any process of European integration in terms of integration.

Europe has always been an object of reflection for politicians, historians and intellectuals, motivated by political, economic or social issues. The issue of exacerbated European nationalisms has always endangered European peace and hegemony. Europe was in danger that needed to be taken care of. For this reason, Europeans sought to point out ways and find solutions to conflicts that seemed to have no end. And, in one way or another, they all found a solution to the need to unite Europe. It will be in this context that, in several voices, we hear the apology of the *United States of Europe*.

However, despite the recognition of the need for unity in Europe, the solution found was never that of European federalism, but only of sharing sovereignty in terms of the Union’s political issues, which always raise the problem of lack of consensus and a Europe with one voice. It is here that we are faced with a European crossroads, where the path often seems to point to a Europe at various speeds and at different rates. However, this solution would have nothing to do with the essential objectives that governed the creation of the European project, nor with the thinking of its founders. The future of the European Union depends on the return to the principles and values that were at its origin: this is the solution for the moments of crossroads that it had, and will have, ahead, and which demand a “de facto solidarity” in crises and that these be the moment of reflection on its past and future, and the opportunity for growth with one voice in the European Union.

European Dangers

João Andrade Corvo is a good example of reflection about the response to “European dangers”. In his work *Perigos* he makes a profound analysis of the European

situation, realizing that Europe is changing, foreseeing continued conflicts between the nations that want to dominate it. The will to power of the European potencies is so strong that there are imminent dangers for the smaller nations: “In the midst of universal danger, the danger for the small nations is immense. Where strength alone dominates, the weak are sacrificed to the brutal greed of the strong”.² What to do? He replies: “It is time for the truth to be heard, so that social dissolution does not quickly bring Europe to a dark time of fierce violence and barbarism.

Let all of us run to support law, social morals and truth. When the dangers are so many and so great, let us, the Portuguese, also look at our interests. Let us also proclaim our rights and show that we are aware of our duties and the strength to fulfill them”.³ At the time, it was necessary to resolve the war between France and Prussia, a conflict that shook the civilized world.

Europe will have to recover its past and to wish to retain its roots as a civilization. For this reason, it is necessary to avoid the creation of empires that absorb the small nations, without which this Europe will lose its identity. The European spirit cannot be mutilated. For this, it needs to move away from a policy of domination and to preserve the small states, all united to preserve the European greatness: “All the great nations, appreciating their interests with the moral elevation, that it is the duty of the strong to keep in their resolutions and in their acts, they must work effectively and efficiently for peace, and for giving Europe a political constitution based on law and justice, which ensures, as far as possible, the peace, prosperity and freedom of the peoples ”.⁴

No European state can remain indifferent to the war of others, all losing with the dangers that threaten the civilization of freedom and law. For this reason, the task of an England is great, and it will not be able to watch, indifferently, the ruin of France, which would lead to the ruin of Europe itself. The United States of America are not themselves indifferent: they embrace Europe from East to West, allying themselves with Russia and democracy. But the war continues. One empire threatens to succeed another empire. The glorious France of the past is crushed by powerful Germany. Threatened Turkey; Austria in danger, the whole of Europe seems to be falling apart. But there was still a way out: by freedom and democracy. João Andrade Corvo ends with a warning:

“Looking anxiously at the fall of empires, the disasters and anxieties of the peoples, the violence of passions, the blind fury of ambitions and the omnipotence of force, the world disbelieves the power of reason and the authority of law. The world frightened

2 CORVO, João Andrade - *Perigos*, p. 3.

3 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 4.

4 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 146-147.

measures the greatness of the dangers that surround it and threaten it. The moral foundations of society are deeply lost; and if human conscience does not wake up and does not oppose, eternally and freely, the eternal laws of justice to the abuses of force, civilization will have to go through a long and painful trial, before entering a new era of progress and freedom”.⁵

To solve all the “dangers”, would it be necessary to reach the United States of Europe? Or to the peace between nations, in a Europe at various speeds?

The United States of Europe

Sebastião de Magalhães Lima would be, among us, a singular figure. Firstly for defending European peace, for which the United States of Europe would greatly facilitate. And, above all, for spreading the work of Charles Lemonnier⁶, precisely entitled United States of Europe, in a Portuguese version of his authorship⁷. Writing in 1872, and presented in Portugal two years later, that work synthesizes well the central axis of the European problematic. The introductory pages start from finding evidence: no one wants war, but war exists. Everyone is guilty. Governments and the governed try to avoid it, on the one hand, but they contribute to maintaining it. Everyone writes about it. Politicians, philosophers, poets, economists and moralists try to find reasons for the war and solutions for peace. However, the war remains:

5 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 162.

6 Charles Lemonnier has been a great supporter of sansimonism since 1829, and for this reason he abandoned teaching philosophy at the College of Loreze, in order to preserve, according to himself, all freedom of thought. After obtaining a Doctor of Law degree in 1834, he stayed in Bordeaux for twelve years, continuing to write. He returns to Paris and participates in the founding of the *Revista Religiosa e Científica*, which shortly afterwards would be suspended, also continuing to spread Saint-Simon's ideas. He was present at the Congress of peace and freedom, held in Geneva (1867) under the presidency of Garibaldi, becoming one of the main founders of the League of Peace and Freedom and editor of the *United States of Europe*, organ of the League. In addition to numerous political, legal, economic and philosophical writings, we must highlight the works *Determining the foundations of a federal organization in Europe* (1869) and *the Social Question* (1871), both important in the context of the Lausanne Congresses. The work *United States of Europe* (1874), appears after occupying the vice-presidency of the League.

7 LIMA, Sebastião de Magalhães - *Os Estados Unidos da Europa. A morte de dois inimigos: episódio da guerra franco-alemã*.

We were unable, as we wished, to compare the version of Magalhães Lima with the original, although we tried it at the National Library, in Lisbon and Paris. We only know that there was a periodical with the name of *Estados Unidos da Europa* (1867) precisely under the direction of Charles Lemonnier. However, we were able to ascertain that Sebastião Magalhães Lima's “work” is not, in itself, a version of the *Estados Unidos da Europa* de Charles Lemonnier, but a translation. The original is entitled: *Les États-Unis d'Europe*, Paris, Place des Victoires, 1872. Despite the lack of originality, its disclosure in Portuguese is still interesting, as well as the possible contacts between both, as it seems to be evident that both authors knew each other well, a fact demonstrated even by the inclusion of unpublished pages of the second edition in another work, *O Livro da Paz*.

“At the time we write; the world still retreats in horror, due to the struggle between France and Germany. The two nations, whose agreement was to found peace and freedom in Europe, ignominiously revolved themselves in the blood of their children: one swollen of having achieved a shameful victory, the other not breathing anything but revenge”.⁸

The work begins with an analysis of the great plan of Henry IV, so called by Sully, for being the first attempt to create a European federation, of peoples and governments. It would be a Christian Republic, under the tutelage of the Pope, and there would be freedom of religion, commerce and inner independence. However, Lemonnier considers that Henry IV has forgotten the essential: universal peace would have to be based on the inviolability of the human person and not on interest. The abbot of Saint-Pierre’s project also did not serve Europe. It seemed even more fragile than the previous one because it was less favorable to freedom and justice. It proposes a confederation of all sovereign states, but disconnected from the idea of social evolution, and that geographic and political Europe does not change. If a simple treaty can unite European powers, it cannot, however, merge those nations. States are neither homogeneous nor supportive to the point of losing their historical, political and cultural identity. As such, they can come together for a common purpose, but not be merged. This is evident and this has been overlooked by the Abbot de Saint-Pierre. Lemonnier notes:

“The different powers are allied, it is true, they hire, they come together under a simple treaty, but they do not really merge into the same body, they do not form a new organization. We can see here a just position and not a real union. None of the powers are disarmed; none explicitly renounces the right to peace and war; above each and every one there is no stronger, independent power that can exercise effective and coercive action”.⁹

In conclusion, and according to Lemonnier, the project lacked homogeneity of interest and organization, the effective disarmament of each member of the confederation and the formation of a higher government that integrated finance and armies. However, the project recognizes the potential of establishing the foundations of the United States of Europe. It would be Kant’s turn. Living in a time of modernity, your ideas for Europe will also be new. According to Lemonnier, while the abbot of Saint-Pierre lived in an old world regulated by an old policy, Kant was the son of

8 *Idem*, p. 1.

9 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 7.

the revolution and, for this reason, he did not submit, like the previous author, to the weight of the theological and feudal tradition; he managed to combine the strength of his genius with modernity and make sense of the revolution. He understood well what the Enlightenment was like, how this exit from the minority, and would make this majority fertile:

“Kant alone had the strength of genius, as well as the living light of a right conscience: better than others, he understood and fertilized the idea of revolution. Kant witnessed the end of the century in which the abbot of Saint-Pierre had known only a weak and tenuous beginning. From the back of his Koenigsberg office, he saw the long phalanx of philosophers walk, whose path presented the surprising spectacle of a new world that was then rising”.¹⁰

Facing the new times, he knew how to find new solutions to the conflicts that insisted on continuing; the concern was to end the war, which would only be effective if it was based on something superior to the treaties themselves, which could be revoked at any moment. Thus, to international law, other reasons would have to be added that go beyond the coercive domain. Hence the relevance of the *Foundations of Metaphysics of Customs*: to show that in addition to the legislative reason there was a moral reason, more profound and, therefore, the foundation of that. For that philosopher, political ideas should be subordinated to moral ideas and that only in this way would peace, a *Perpetual Peace* be possible. In this way, universal and unwavering peace between peoples would be founded on justice. Preparing this theory, the pamphlet entitled *Philosophical attempt on a project of perpetual peace* appeared earlier. Perpetual, or even temporary, peace seemed to be late.

War seemed to be part of human nature. Peace treaties were precarious, as precarious justice was achieved. In order to unite peoples, it would be necessary to go beyond pure legality or the mere desire to imitate united nascent peoples, such as the United States of America or the Swiss Confederation. It was necessary to go further, that is, to descend to the deepest level, which consisted of finding moral foundations for peace. It was in human consciousness and not in history that the way would be found. The European federation could only be reached by morality. A universal moral translated into republican practice by the motto - Freedom, Equality, Fraternity. Living according to the principles of morals a federation of peoples would be possible, united by the same fundamentals, living for the same purpose. Thus, without abandoning the feelings of homeland and patriotism, they would feel, at the same time, united to all peoples in a cosmopolitan experience that, much, could

10 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 19.

contribute to true peace. A federation of peoples united by the same principles: this is the solution found by the moral philosopher.

To find a way out for the European crisis, let us remember Saint-Simon. The politician who also sought, in 1796, a Project of Perpetual Peace; the reorganization of European society; need and means of bringing together the different peoples of Europe in a single political body, guaranteeing their national independence. According to that author, the united Europe of medieval Christianity had been lost since Westphalia. From then on, wars continued and peace was precarious. For this reason,

“the only way to establish lasting peace in Europe is to bring peoples together into a single organization. (...) All European nations should be governed, each by a National Parliament, thus contributing to the formation of a general parliament, whose mission would be to decide on the common interests of all European society. In a word, Europe would have the best possible organization, if all the nations it contains, being governed, each by a parliament, recognized the supremacy of a general parliament, placed above all national governments, and invested with the power to judge their strife. Observing this formula, which is moreover very clear and precise, there would be nothing left for us to outline the constitution of a European Parliament”¹¹

Criticizing the hereditary principle of European royalty and defending the autonomy of different peoples, Lemonnier also had doubts about the feasibility of a European parliament. So I was looking for another solution for the establishment of a European federation.

A notable experience was the establishment of the *Peace Society* in England, similar to what happened in America. A peace founded on religious principles that could not, therefore, admit war. However, this organization proved not to work in times of war, as it did in 1855, between France, England and Russia. He continued his efforts, calling for a *Congress for Peace* during the Paris exhibition and for the publication of his communication agency *The Messenger of Peace*, in addition to other writings seeking to demonstrate the need for Peace in Europe. Other European congresses would all take place with the same purpose. The year 1867 would be decisive in terms of Projects for Peace. In Havre the *Union of Peace* would appear at the initiative of M. Santallier; In Paris, the international and permanent Peace League was formed and in Genoa, during one of these Congresses for Peace, the International League of Peace and Freedom was born. The first was largely due to one of the founders, Frederico Passy, who, at the same time, broadcast it in the newspaper *O Tempo*. Established on May 3 of that year, it continued the objectives of the

11 Saint-Simon, *Projecto de Paz Perpétua*, p. 24.

London Society, but, removing all social issues, it focused exclusively on defending peace. For that, names such as Miguel Chevalier, Arlés Dufour, Padre Jacinto, Martin Paschoud and Izidoro contributed a lot. Providing great services to Europe, however, it failed to realize that without constituting an international legal status and based on the freedom of peoples, it would make little progress in its objectives. Characterized by political neutrality, the League would attract many supporters, especially from the bourgeoisie, propagating the great principles of independence, justice and mutual respect of nations, advocating the arbitration of conflicts instead of violent measures of war. This movement would grow and become the *Society of Friends of Peace*.

To continue the idea of the United States of Europe, they would come out right after the first Peace Congress, two issues of what would become a regular periodical in favor of European unity¹². Its title could not be more explicit - *United States of Europe* - and was, in practice, the organ of the international League of peace and freedom, with the main objective of preparing the creation of the future United States of Europe.

Other league congresses were, however, taking place¹³. Proclaiming the dangers of standing armies, the need for social reforms based on freedom, the need for separation between Church and State, the desire to form a European republican federation and the recognition of women's human, economic, civil, social and political rights. Within the scope of the United States of Europe project, the third congress, in Lausanne (1869), under the presidency of Victor Hugo, should be highlighted, whose main purpose was to establish the foundations of a European federal organization.

The objective of the league would be peace, a peace that should go from the individual to the universal, a peace linked to the values of freedom, equality and fraternity; shared values in that European federation that the league dreamed of creating. These did not absorb the individual homelands, but would unite those homelands in a universal republic¹⁴.

12 The newspaper *United States of Europe* first in November and December 1867, in Berne, and later, from January 6, 1869, it would have a regular periodicity, leaving in that Swiss city every Sunday, written in two languages, French and German, under the direction of mr. Vogt. After a subsequent interruption of nine months, it would become a monthly bulletin, this time having the city of Genoa as its publication place, directed by Barni and written in French. It would have another interruption in October 1870, being resumed in 1872, this time with departure on Thursday. This newspaper could be subscribed to Rue Des Savoises, n. 35, in Genoa, for the annual amount of eight francs. Interestingly, in Portugal it could also be found or signed at Livraria Internacional, em Lisboa, Rua do Arsenal n.º 96.

13 The following should be mentioned: after the first, in Genoa from 9 to 12 September, followed by Berne from 22 to 26 September 1868; in Lausanne from 14 to 18 September; In Bale on 18 July 1870 and again in Lausanne from 25 to 29 September 1871. It should be noted that the fourth congress was scheduled for Zurich in September of that year, but because of the war it was not only anticipated, but also moved to Bale.

14 Within this spirit of universal brotherhood, Arnaud Goegg, one of the founders of the league, acted, going to ask the United States of America for help in building the United States of Europe ... (1872).

Finally, the last chapter of the work applauded by Magalhães Lima is about the “United States of Europe”. Idealized by Mazzini, proclaimed on the political scene by Victor Hugo, they were then explained and justified by Charles Lemonnier. Using the American example, it showed how all of its thirty-six states maintained their individuality even though brought together in one body - the federation. All were united by the federal bond that gave them identity. But they all lived according to their particular interests, although they had common interests defended by a general government. Transporting this federal model to Europe what would happen?

Here is the paradigmatic example of how it would be possible to form the *United States of Europe*. Like the Americans, each state would retain its identity, being only united by the federal bond that would unite them internally and externally. But each one, in addition to preserving their individuality, would also maintain their specific interests, putting only what was in the general interest in common. This was, moreover, the meaning of the recommended federalism, which, uniting, did not eliminate the sovereignty of its states. Charles Lemonnier explains well how the United States of Europe could follow the American model:

“Let us now transport thought, in view, as you can see, of the numerous changes required by the differences in places, customs and traditions, let us transport the political constitution from America to Europe, the outline of which we have just outlined. Instead of the particular States, whose union forms the United States of America, let us think of the main nations of Europe - France, Germany, Italy, England, Spain, Austria, Greece, Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Portugal; - suppose that these nations or some of them, such as Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium, England and Portugal establish a federation similar to the American federation. Suppose further that each of these nations, graduating its full autonomy, its independence, its government, its interior administration, consents to form a general European government, which would be entrusted with the administration of the general and common interests of the federation, of such that, instead of the United States of America, we have the United States of Europe. We will talk about the difficulty of execution later. For now, we should all understand the morality and greatness of such enterprise”.¹⁵

The United States of Europe was presented as a difficult project to carry out. However, his model was taken to its ultimate consequences: a single army, freedom of trade, a true economic, social and political union. Everyone would win. Financial resources would be saved and nations would be united by common interests. Naturally,

15 *Idem, ibidem*, pp. 37-38.

peace would be a result of that union, and thus the federated nations would gain in the happiness and wealth of their people. However, many obstacles still remain. The European federation would encounter obstacles linked to dynastic, clerical interests, popular ignorance and national pride. The former, subjecting the people to divine law, made them dependent on a power that did not serve the interests of the peoples; contrary to modern law in which only conscience should be sovereign and expressed its will through universal suffrage, in the old right - divine right - sovereignty was real or imperial. Thus, he considered the heredity of power contrary to the interests of the peoples that could only be served by a republican government. But this historical-political path would take a long time and, consequently, the United States of Europe would also be distant.¹⁶

However, there was another obstacle to the achievement of the *United States of Europe*: national pride. The establishment of the European federation encountered this problem, which was confused with an illusory patriotism. This patriotic fanaticism would end up preventing the European federation in the name of a love for the country, not realizing that the federation sought to unite the interests of its people, preventing the greatest danger - war. A European government would make its people much more united in causes and cautious in disunity, aware that they would cause damage to all those involved in the European federation. An economy of scale, a single court, common social purposes with reduced costs, would be some of the immediate benefits of the United States of Europe. Finally, in conclusion, such a political undertaking was a utopia but, for that very reason, capable of becoming a reality:

“And at what distance, the reader will say, are we in this sublime utopia?

We can boldly assert that we are as far away as we want. It is up to each of us to transform utopia into reality. Let us not leave the neighbor to care. We understand your need at least. If we have explained ourselves well, the reader must see that the principle on which the foundation of the United States of Europe is based is the same principle as the republic, which is nothing more than the application of morals.

Without the teaching of the United States of Europe, there can be no education. without making this principle germinate in all hearts, justice is impossible, not only for our workers, but for our teachers, as well as for our servants. The United States of Europe is the continuation of the revolution, not the French revolution but the Euro-

16 Charles Lemonnier is, like Magalhães Lima, a staunch Republican. Therefore, it is not surprising that the idealization that he makes of the United States of Europe can only be associated with the combination of republican states. For this reason, and referring, for example, to the English case, he hopes that the still European monarchies will become republics so that they can later be constituted into a European federation. For this reason, he is aware of the delay of this project in becoming a reality although he eventually admits that a European union between republican and monarchic nations will be possible, but always in the hope of change ...

pean one from 1789 to 1791. Nothing will be done in the future that is not first preceded by the United States of Europe. The freedom, the fraternity, the emancipation of women, etc. depend on them. etc. Working for ignorance, tyranny, dynasties, servitude, error, we work against them. They shine in the future, beside the light. Depart from darkness and walk uprightly”.¹⁷

Enlightening words that were enough by themselves and make us realize that, after all, the *United States of Europe* might not be a utopia. Only from the rhetorical point of view did the author consider them so. In practice, I already saw them started in European revolutions and, little by little, built on small, but important, concrete achievements. Without canceling nationalities or patriotisms, the European federation is building its foundations. At the base was universal suffrage. The European federation could start when only two republican nations came together. That would be the principle of the United States of Europe. It seemed that the project by Charles Lemonnier, defended and presented by Sebastião de Magalhães Lima was concluded. However, other pages would also follow, brought first by Portugal to Portugal. Interestingly, we went to find them in one of his works *The Book of Peace*¹⁸ precisely at its end. A hasty reading would not even notice this last chapter entitled “The United States of Europe”, as it appears somewhat disconnected from the rest of the work. But its pages are there and say they are unpublished in the second edition of that French author’s work. This gives us the conviction of the importance attributed by Magalhães Lima to that “utopia” on the one hand, and, on the other, how he communicated with its author, to the point of being able to present the latest “news” of the project.

Instead of the previous follow-up, there was some originality in Portuguese. Two quotes appear at the beginning, the first by Magalhães Lima: “*E pluribus in unum* (many in one). This was the noble currency of the United States of America and this will be the formula of the future States of Europe”.¹⁹ Pierre Leroux’s second: “Humanity existed virtually before the nations and will exist after them; that is why the purpose of nations is to constitute it”.²⁰

Lemonnier’s pages present the essential conditions for the constitution of a federation, referring to and appreciating the projects of Lorimer and Bluntschli. The first condition for forming a federation would be the will of the governments of nations and their citizens. Only free membership can make it solid and long-lasting. Then harmonize the constitutions that would provide the appropriate federal bond between nations, always in the perspective that it was possible to improve them to

17 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 47.

18 LIMA, Sebastião de Magalhães - *O Livro da Paz*.

19 *Idem ibidem*, p. 219.

20 *Ibidem*.

better adapt to their peoples. Lorimer seemed to follow, without knowing, the ideas of Saint-Simon and the International League of Peace and Freedom. *It presents a treaty in which all states will be invited to take part.* By reducing the national forces of each state, an international government would be established. For his part, Bluntschli admitted a European constitution that integrated the rights of peoples and that states could develop freely. He did not agree with Lorimer on the idea that there is a European people, similar to the American or the Swiss. True political union would not be possible in peoples who wished, above all, to assert their nationality. Criticizing this position, Charles Lemonnier considered that it was in the republic and for the republic that the peoples came together and could form a European federation. The federated republics are the first step in the constitution of the United States of Europe and a united European people.

But it was not only for the work *United States of Europe* that Sebastião Magalhães Lima would divulge that idea. European unity running through all of his work, almost always explicitly, but sometimes in a hidden way, which only the connection between ideas allows to unveil. This absent presence was also a doctrinal way of “preaching” a political gospel that often uses other expressions to mean the same, as is the case of the aforementioned work *O Livro da Paz*.

That book, not at all peaceful in the political debate, came to disclose a basic republican ideology, whose doctrinal principles were based on the ideas of Peace and Freedom, which ultimately led to these *United States of Europe*. The title itself is illuminating, as is the preface signed by Émile Arnaud, president of the League of Peace and Freedom, which reveals the close relations between these intellectuals. Sebastião de Magalhães Lima was aware of the problem in question and participated in it. Proof of this are also the letters received from writers and publicists of the time, which he presents in the referred work. This was, moreover, dedicated “to the most sacrificial memory of Charles Lemonnier, the great and devoted friend of peace and justice, intemperate apostle of the federation and glorious evangelist of the *United States of Europe*”.²¹

The book of Peace, offered, dedicated and consecrated to Charles Lemonnier, is, in our view, the result of that author’s reading and translation of the *United States of Europe*. It would be, now, the Portuguese version of the French work, which is to be disseminated, but also to adapt to the national case. Its preface proves this thesis; signed by Émile Arnaud who seems to act as a bridge between the two nations, uniting them for the ideal and for men who wish to see it real. He recognized that Sebastião de Magalhães Lima had used the work of Charles Lemonnier as a political catechism, disseminating it not only in Portugal but in Spain, still as a university

21 *Idem, ibidem*, dedicatória, p. 5.

student. Thus, he wished to put into practice the ideal of the United States of Europe by Carlo Cattaneo and the United Peoples of Europe by Victor Hugo, a first stadium of the United Peoples of Humanity. A policy of peace:

“this is the policy of Emanuel Kant, Victor Hugo, Charles Lemonnier, Aurélio Saffi, Luís Ruchonten, and this is also the policy of Pi y Margall, Salmeron, Zorrilla, Teófilo Braga and Magalhães Lima. We would like it to be the same for our readers, and for that very reason and thanks to them - that of the whole of Europe!”²²

In the *Episodes of My Life*, this politician went further and even aspired to a kind of United States of the World, a world that needed to come together to serve humanity, in a universal fraternity: “The continents fraternize. Europe is America, and America is Europe. The Pan-Lusitanism! Confederation between like-minded peoples will be a logical result of evolution that is already on the horizon as the only rational solution that events will impose.”²³ According to the motto “Peace for freedom and for the love of justice”, the United States of Europe would be built, that is, the federative principle would be put into practice.

The Post-World War I European Crossroads

It was during the period between the two world wars that the old dream of European unity gained meaning and opportunity. The whole history of Europe was borne in mind the idea of the unity of Europe, contrasting with its geographical irregularity. The common historical foundations, convert the old continent into that already advocated in Homer, as «Europé» - the one who sees in the distance - and, therefore, visualizes a community of culture and civilization. In the absence of geographical unity, there is thus a spiritual unity that characterizes it, despite the diversity of its peoples. The war of 1914-1918 would be so tragic for Europe, that thinkers like Dante or Victor Hugo would once again be remembered, who in their genius dreamed and transmitted the idea of European unity, at the limit of this «Extraordinary Nation» that I would even call it the United States of Europe.

The European crisis was a fact. To this evident material crisis there was another one, no less relevant, as Paul Valéry recalled: «La Crise de l'esprit»: “Nous autres, civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles”.²⁴ Coudenhove-Kalergi, calling for the union of the peoples of Europe, and, interestingly, received

22 ARNAUD, Emile - *Preface to the work of Sebastião de Magalhães Lima*, p. 9-10.

23 *Idem, ibidem*, p. 29.

24 VALÉRY, Paul - *Variété I*. Paris: Gallimard, 2002, p. 13.

with much more enthusiasm than today his “Message”, in which he conveyed the need for real European unity, through the institution of a “Union Paneuropeia ‘, develops this idea in a work published in the following year (1923), entitled PANEUROPA, dedicated to the youth of Europe, showing, once again, the perception that European unity could only result if it was the will of its citizens. He said that “The great historical movements were first utopias only later realities”. Are utopias the engine of History?

A book that would inspire Men of State and would be highly praised by figures such as Aristides Briand, French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Honorary President of the Pan-European Union. In this regard, we can read in the preface his words: “I am deeply sympathetic to the efforts of a union that aims to awaken in the different nations of Europe, the awareness of their historical, intellectual and economic solidarity, and to orient it towards a path of closer approximation, guarantee of peaceful development²⁵”. Amery in the same sense declared that the solution of the political and economic problems of the world could only be obtained through the positive integration of historical and geographical boundaries. Always the conviction that a new crisis could only be avoided «by creating a United Empire», the result of a common history and culture.

The Post-World War II European Crossroads

After the Second World War, a new crisis, even bigger than the first, happened, to the point of being described by María Zambrano as “La Agonia de Europa”.²⁶ Europe’s decline has come to show all the hidden resentments in victorious history. In order for Europe to rebuild itself, it was necessary to recover its identity. Jean Monnet’s *Memories* also remain a current work, to view crises as an opportunity to advance the European project. Monnet was aware that he was not just bringing states together and the need to unite men from common interests. As he claimed, nothing was possible without men, nothing was lasting without institutions. The economy appeared as the great engine and today the weight of this economy in the European project has to be rethought, otherwise it will become a super market of national interests and collapse.

It is astonishing how Winston Churchill in his famous speech at the University of Zurich, delivered on 19 September 1946, was a milestone in relaunching the idea of European unity, and maintaining its relevance:

“I am going to say something that will surprise you. The first step towards the recreation of the European family has to go through a partnership between France

25 KALERGI, Coudenhove, PANEUROPA, Madrid : M. Aguilar, 1928, p.3.

26 ZAMBRANO, María - *Agonia de Europa*.

and Germany. Only in this way will France be able to regain its customary leadership in Europe. Europe cannot be reborn without a spiritually large France and a spiritually large Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, to materialize, will make the material strength of a single state less important. The first step is to create a Council of Europe”.²⁷

Words that sound like a prophecy for our day. To be successful, Jean Monnet chose to write, in April 1950, a document in which he prepared the essentials of the May Declaration. It was clear to Jean Monnet that governments did not want any sovereignty surrenders and that it was illusory to pretend to create complete European integration. Thus, the only solution would be to create an institutional building in a slow but concerted manner, only in specific areas, which would not jeopardize major transfers of sovereignty. An outdated crisis?

Europe would not be built all at once, it would be done through “concrete achievements”, creating, first of all, “de facto solidarity”. Europe was on its way with Schuman’s revolutionary proposals, based on the fundamental principle of delegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive domain. Cooperation between nations, however important, did not solve anything. It was necessary to merge the interests of the European peoples and not merely to maintain the balance between these interests. It was the beginning of a long and agglutinating process of uniting European men, creating institutions that served their common interests. The “United States of Europe” had already started. The principle would always be the same, whether between two, six or twenty-seven nations.

From Nice to Lisbon

It is in moments of European stalemate that the expression of an Unidentified Political Object (OPNI) takes on meaning, to designate the political nature of the European Union. In this regard, mention is made of one of these moments, at a meeting of the European Council, to discuss the Treaty of Lisbon, on 11 and 12 December 2008, when a roadmap is emerging to come out of the impasse. But is it possible to invent unity in diversity?

For Eduardo Lourenço “no Treaty solves Europe’s problems, it can help, but it does not. And now, with this crisis, we are in a waiting state”. This thinker defends that, “the problem is not rooted in the Treaty of Lisbon, but when the first leads, from France and Holland. With that, other European countries began to meditate

27 Churchill’s speech on September 19, Zurich, 1946.

and found that they could not be so enthusiastic either. The bad time was the Treaty of Nice, things did not go well. But people forget that national traditions are very strong”.²⁸ European political weaknesses are as strong as are their geographical vagueness, which makes their history difficult to write in a sense of unity. Eduardo Lourenço considers that “If *Europe* ever existed, it was during the Roman Empire. Afterwards, there was a so-called political and theological entity, called Christianity and with the first distances two sides emerged.²⁹ The Orthodox East and the Roman West. And these are the two visions to which the North and the South of Europe were added later”.³⁰ However, in addition to the genuine lack of European unity, political pragmatism has worked, especially in times of crisis: “paradoxically, this economic crisis was the first positive sign at this stage in which we are marking a step. Europe, in response to a crisis coming from outside, from America, has surprisingly reacted with a certain coherence and a certain organicity. And this is a sign that seems to me to be one of the best in recent years.”³¹ Despite these reactions caused by the events, the history of the European Union has shown that “in political terms there is no head for Europe because there is no European Union in that sense”.³²

But, after all, “What is Europe? Nothing”.³³ The perplexity of Eduardo Lourenço’s response reveals the essence of the European problem: his lack of identity. Interestingly, this lack of identity is resolved when we find ourselves outside Europe. The essayist says:

“I am very European, like all of us. We all are, more than we know, but only when we find ourselves facing, or in the middle, of a culture that is not European. This non - identity, this virtual identity, made up only of denials, is a privilege, an extraordinary one, a promise of the future. It means that other peoples will be able to share our non - identity: all those who do not believe in the selfish claim of themselves, which is the virus of history.

Non - identity is fantastic. It is an opening place. That is why I do not envy people so much that they do not know they are. We do not know what we are and that is the true identity of man, said Socrates. The essence of Christianity does not contradict this: the supreme being is neither physical nor tangible. But if God is neither physical nor tangible, but an area of infinite freedom, it cannot be used as an excuse to exercise violence against others”.³⁴

28 LOURENÇO, Eduardo, LOURENÇO, Eduardo - “O que é a Europa? Nada”. *Courrier International*. N° 75. p. 14,.

29 *Idem, Ibidem.*

30 *Idem, Ibidem,*

31 *Idem, Ibidem.*

32 *Idem, Ibidem.*

33 *Idem, Ibidem*

34 *Idem, ibidem.*

In view of the evidence that we are European, especially if we are outside Europe, or when our “common European home” is threatened, the History of Europe is taking place between idealized projects and achievements, mainly due to the need to respond to events that they demand, above all, to safeguard peace, and to find a “European spirit” in past history, capable of supporting the European present and future. Just as the European continent can be easily seen from Asia or America, so the history of Europe has shown an internal unity whenever threatened from the outside. Eduardo Lourenço remembers this, albeit with limitations, which show the absence of a single voice that represents Europe before the world:

“Europe cannot give an effective answer to the immediate problems of the world, because, even if it believes it to be such, it is not the recreation of the Roman Empire. Europe is always revisiting Rome. This was the paradigm that no nation has succeeded in imitating. And it is the matrix of the European Union, however, the best Roman films continue to be made in Hollywood, which shows that Europe does not believe in the threat of Islam. We were Christ’s militia in the Counter-Reformation, we dreamed we were the Quixotes of the world when we went to the East and America, we invented the nation. We are now nothing more than a set of dissatisfied and contradictory nations, heirs to a wild and violent past, forged in a permanent civil war. What is Europe? Nothing”.³⁵

Despite the difficulties of writing a History of Europe, which shows an intrinsic unity in the European project, the ideal that has driven European construction continues to make sense. The seventy years of European construction have shown that the small steps method has worked, despite the stalemate caused, precisely, by trying to overcome the economic dimension that has served as the engine for the history of this European integration community. The greatest difficulties have arisen whenever thinking about the political deepening of the union, which is particularly sensitive when the Constitution is pronounced. The European Constitution would have a happier ending in Lisbon, as it appears that a Treaty continued the normal course of its history.

However, many European initiatives continue to show that the Europeanist ideals of the twenties of the twentieth century are still waiting for their realization. The “United States of Europe” is not yet visible, but the recent history of the European Union shows the awareness of deepening the European project.

We continue to question European fate. Old Europe continues to look to its enigmatic future. Not content with his past, it continues to dream of his return to

35 *Idem, Ibidem.*

the hegemonic role in the world, or, of being a kind of super-Europe that feeds the European imagination. Often on the brink, Europe continues its march, finding “in-extremis” the possible solution for the life of an integration project. Many moments show the disintegration of a more ambitious project. The Europe of civilization and culture is far from the calculations of European politicians. The European dream is yet to come true. Far from its realization, it seems that Europe has gone in the opposite direction of that cultural Europe. Economic Europe is easier to achieve and has shown its success story, fleeing the madness of Europe - an idea that, it seems, a past without a future: an Europe without the strength to dream or (re) remember that Roman Empire that is far away to achieve.

Europe needs to re-exist, to be born from the utopia yet to be realized. Europe’s view of itself is the moment to exist and assume its destiny. An Europe that is a leading actor in world history and politics. Finally, an Europe that returns to its universalizing and civilizing vocation.

The Rome Declaration and the relaunch of the European project

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the treaties of Rome, on March 25, 2017, the heads of state and government of the European Union met in Rome, to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. It was a moment to reflect on the state of the Union and to rethink the future of the European integration process and the question of a Europe at various speeds was considered. President Donald Tusk in this regard reminded the founders of this project and that it would not be in his mind, a Europe at various speeds. At the Campidoglio ceremony, he said: “At that time, our predecessors did not speak at various speeds or imagine any way out - despite all the tragic circumstances of recent history, they put all their faith in the unity of Europe”.³⁶

This unity in Europe, as we will see below, has always been a goal of the whole process of European integration, which includes a unity of states and a unity of their peoples that, at crucial moments like this, millions of people do not cease to manifest themselves in support from the European Union. This is the meaning we have to consider when we speak of “Union”: in order to exist a true union, there must be a common supranational interest, far beyond a super economic market. And it is this “Union” that has sustained Europe’s past and fuels its future. This is the meaning of Tusk’s words when he says that “The European Union is not syn-

³⁶ *A Declaração de Roma. Declaração dos 27 Estados-Membros e do Conselho Europeu, do Parlamento Europeu e da Comissão Europeia.* In www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/meetings/european-council/2017/03/25.

onymous with slogans, nor with procedures, nor with regulations. Our Union is a guarantee that freedom, dignity, democracy and independence are no longer just dreams, but our daily reality ”.³⁷ In fact, European unity started out as the dream of the few and became the hope of many. And here we have come to this union that is the strength of hundreds of millions who, across Europe, reap the benefits of living in an enlarged Union that can overcome all disagreements and focus on the common interest of all. In the Rome Agenda, there was a commitment to work for a safe and secure Europe; a prosperous and sustainable Europe; a social Europe and a stronger Europe at world level. The motto of Donald Tusk remained in memory: “Europe as a political entity will be united, or it will not be. Only a united Europe can be sovereign over the rest of the world ”.³⁸ For him, World War II is not an abstraction, because his hometown of Gdansk, built for hundreds of years by Poles and Germans, Dutch, Jews, Scots and French, in March 1945, was reduced to ashes, destroyed by Hitler and Stalin, he was 8 years old. The Fusion Treaty lived, when the Community established a Single Council and a Commission and also the first elections to the European Parliament. The West was the bulwark of a free and unifying Europe, a Europe of dignity, democracy, fundamental values, unity and not Europe at two speeds, lived behind the iron curtain; the founders never spoke of this Europe at different rates, but of a united and cohesive Europe, sailing through waters never sailed before. So he asks now:

“Tell me then, why should we lose confidence in the goal of the unit? Just because this is already our reality? Or because we are fed up and tired? Europe as a political entity will be united, or it will not be. Only a united Europe can be a sovereign Europe in relation to the rest of the world. And only a sovereign Europe guarantees the independence of its nations, guarantees freedom for its citizens. Europe’s unity is not a bureaucratic model. It is a set of common values and democratic norms. It is not enough today to appeal to unity and to protest against the various speeds. It is much more important that we all respect our common rules, such as human rights and civil liberties, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, balance of powers and the rule of law. This is the true basis of our unity ”.³⁹

The Union after Rome must be, more than ever, a Union that shares the same principles, a Union of External Sovereignty, a Union of Political Unity. This is the legacy of the founders of European integration 60 years ago. This Declaration went

37 *Idem, Ibidem.*

38 *Idem, Ibidem.*

39 Speech by President Donald Tusk at the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. In www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/press/press-releases/2017/03/25/tusk-ceremony-rome-speech.

in the right direction, pointing to “different rhythms and intensities”, but a common European construction. At this crossroads, it became clear that the European priority cannot be “more Europe” or greater integration, in the sense of “ever-closer union”, with areas of integration and others of cooperation, in concentric circles, of different integration, where in a at the central level are the current 19 members of the euro, at a second level, the remaining members who have not joined the euro, allowing intermediate levels for those who do not want to adopt greater integration or the move to the central level, who meet the requirements that serve as the basis for the common currency. Another level would be openness to countries that, not wanting to be part of the European Union, want to participate in the Single Market, accepting its rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. And at a fourth level, they would be those countries with a simple free trade agreement with the European Union, in forms of collaboration in the areas of defense and security, which could include the United Kingdom, Turkey, the western Balkan countries and in the near future, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia.

What European project for today?

At present, many continue to think about Europe and reflect on the European project, always as an unfinished work, and, for some, it is no longer a project. It is suffering from a crisis, because the leaders are not believed, an ideal and an ideology are lacking to drive and guide action. As for achievements, we have lived in a patch-work and resigned ourselves to speeches of vain rhetoric, to bewildered initiatives, to measures that only serve the interests of some. There is a lot of talk about refounding Europe, but without the effective participation of citizens. Europe has not been carrying out its real project, either internally or internationally. On the other hand, their own errors of institutionalization and refoundation, make many sing a Requiem for Europe.

What have we done and what are we going to do after this Pandemic? The answer can only be to return to the original project for Europe of its founders:

“Europe must conceive a soul. Europe must become a Guide for Humanity again. Europe is not against anyone. United Europe is a symbol of the universal solidarity of the future. Before Europe becomes a military alliance or an economic unity, it will have to be a cultural unity in the fullest sense of the word. The unity of Europe will not be achieved, neither solely nor mainly, through European institutions; its creation will follow the evolution of spirits”.⁴⁰

40 SCHUMAN, Robert - *Pour L'Europe*, p.53.

It is urgent to return to this Europe. Europe's current challenges in responding to the Pandemic are the European Union's great ordeal. First, it looked like an out of tune concert, with controversial statements by the Dutch Finance Minister. Wopke Hoekstra ruler who imposed more blockages on the claims of Italy and other countries of the South (such as Portugal and Spain), proving that the mutualisation of debt between EU countries through the "Coronabonds", presented as the solution to the economic crisis derived from the Coronavirus, it was not possible. On 9 April, the Eurogroup was finally able to reach agreement on a loan package of more than € 500 billion to face the Covid-19 pandemic.

Then, it is worth mentioning the German Federal Constitutional Court's Agreement of 5 May, violating European Union law and its relations with the EU Court of Justice in various ways, which brought to the debate issues of the greatest importance on integration European Union and its relations with the Constitutions of the Member States. The participation of a State in the European Union implies limitations on its sovereignty. Since the Schuman Plan in 1950, it has become clear that there would be supranational power for states that limits their sovereignty. Much has been discussed about the so-called Unidentified Political Object, an expression of Jacques Delors for the EU. This remains a problem for the Union that is far from the prophetic United States of Europe. However, it was an opportunity to reveal the exemplary attitudes of the President of the Commission and the German Chancellor, and to move forward in taking favorable positions for the European project.

And we come to the speech by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, at the European Parliament's 27th May plenary session on the European Union Recovery Package, the point of arrival for a path of months of negotiations. It is a historic landmark and a sign of life for the European Union. It is the return of the Franco-German engine and reflects above all a profound change in the German political sphere. Macron and Merkel's proposal on Europe's economic recovery from the pandemic takes up the Franco-German axis, first with De Gaulle and Adenauer, then between Kohl and Mitterrand and now with Merkel and Macron. The Franco-German axis is still alive and Europe owes it a lot. The Corona aid plan (€ 500 billion) proposed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French Head of State Emmanuel Macron is a joint effort for European cohesion.

The European debate has lived through many fallacies that have become true and have forgotten the essentials of the European project. We have always heard of the European crisis and it was from these critical moments that Europe was rebuilding itself, either economically, from the Marshall Plan, or politically from the Winston Churchill Discourse. Europe's current challenges, in order to react to the Pandemic, are challenges of a health and economic crisis, never before experienced and for which quick and firm solutions are needed that show the real virtuality of the European

project. It is now proof that the Union exists and that it has learned the lessons of the past. It took a joint action of the 27 states, for a common problem. There could be no better barometer to measure the vitality of the European project and how to reconcile the will of the 27 States for the common good of the Union. The watchword is “Solidarity”. European Values are once again at the center of European construction and the future is one of hope. It has been proven that the European Union cannot continue to live on economic interests, underpinned by legal treaties. Is very little. We need to return to the roots of European construction, to its foundations. We are facing the greatest test of the European Union, to carry out Jean Monnet’s preview: “The roots of the Community are now strong and extend on European soil. They survived the bad seasons and can withstand seasons of the same kind”.⁴¹

In the 21st century, we continue to talk about a world crisis, and we feel the “foggy night” that Edgar Morin speaks of: “The world is in the night and in the fog, which also cover Europe. We have already said: we do not know if the subjugated half Europe will be freed, if the free half Europe will be subjugated, if Europe will finally be marginalized, vassalized, helvetized, hellenized, atomized”.⁴² Everything is uncertain, and all plans can fail. The crisis is, after all, a sign of life. Always in the uncertainty of the future, but in the conviction that “a new metamorphosis of Europe has begun”. This metamorphosis of Europe is caused by the crisis that generates a new Europe. We never know that Europe is going to be born, but we know that a change is underway. Europe has lived and survived several crises. Is not the crisis the engine for European construction? “No one is able to say today what form Europe will take in the future, as the change that will result from the change is unpredictable. Tomorrow is another day ... The difficulties of each day are enough”.⁴³

Finally, it is worth mentioning the European Council from 17 to 21 July 2020, which turned out to be a success, in the words of the President of the European Commission, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen, in a joint communication with Charles Michel, President of the European Council, after the extraordinary meeting of the European Council. It is worth highlighting Angela Merkel’s fundamental role in the four-day negotiations and how she managed to revitalize Europe and show her ability to act and the validity of her project:

“A common criticism of Europe is that our reactions are too weak, too slow. This proves the opposite. At the end of April, the European Council instructed us to draw up a recovery package. Today, just two months later, we have the NextGenerationEU instrument, which has the approval of the European Council.

41 MONNET, Jean - *Memórias*, p. 615

42 MORIN, Edgar - *Pensar a Europa*. Lisboa: Publicações Europa-América, 1988, p.168.

43 MONNET, Jean, p. 616.

In EU history, this is an absolute record for a new budgetary instrument. And NextGenerationEU is impressive in its size, with more than 1.8 billion euros. This is more than 5% of EU-27 GDP. Europe still has the courage and imagination to think big!”⁴⁴

We have reached a historic moment for Europe that, once again, showed that European unity was at its origin, that whenever necessary, reacts and shows the foundations of its founding project, whenever it experiences a crisis, this time, one of the most serious economic and public health crises. Although the negotiations were difficult, once again, Europe knew how to face the difficulties, reconciling solidarity with responsibility. Solidarity because the 27 countries are united by Next Generation EU, and responsibility because they want to take the crisis as another growth opportunity, laying the foundations for a modern and more sustainable Europe and Europe’s recovery will be green because the budget will boost the European Ecological Pact and accelerate the digitization of the European economy. Finally, it should be noted that, unlike other crises, Member States have not opted for an intergovernmental solution, entrusting the European Commission to Europe’s recovery. As Ursula von der Leyen said, “Europe as a whole now has a great opportunity to emerge stronger from the crisis. Today, we have taken another historic step that we can all be proud of. (...) Today we are taking a big step towards recovery”.⁴⁵

Final considerations

Europe’s current challenges are an opportunity to rethink the European project, and they show how crises are the engine for European construction, because they demand concrete and effective responses to problems that cannot be postponed and compromise the lives of citizens and the union States. The EU has voted resolutions to combat the economic destruction created by the necessary post-virus containment measures. These measures will lead to a strengthened Europe after this great crisis, as, incidentally, has always happened in the history of the unity of Europe and the process of European construction. Jean Monnet, a businessman with pragmatic action, always said that “People only accept change when they are faced with the need, and only recognize the need when there is a crisis”.⁴⁶ This moment is that need to solve a health and economic problem that caused a crisis.

This essay intended to reflect on Europe as a project, presented after the first great world conflict and continued after the Second World War. If, at first, Euro-

44 Opening address by President Ursula von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Charles Michel after the extraordinary European Council meeting of 17-21 July 2020”.

45 *Idem, Ibidem.*

46 MONNET, Jean - *Memórias*, p. 614.

pean unity was nothing but a solution for a Europe in Crisis, made concrete by the presentation of a European Federal Project within the Society of Nations, without an effective realization, after the second great conflict, the European project was effectively initiated, also under the circumstances. And now, we are experiencing another great moment in the history of the European Union, another “war”, but one that demanded, like the other two moments, that Europe show the strength or fragility of its Union, and, how it organized to respond to this test of fire.

The look that was intended to be seen was a look of continuity in the European project throughout the 20th and 21st century, despite the historical circumstances being different, and the solutions found to resolve European crises are conditioned by the political circumstances and political decisions of the different actors. But, far beyond the concrete time, there remains a timelessness of that old Europe that (over) lives from the Crises. It is necessary to know the history of the European project, in order to visualize a guiding thread that is repeated, and that is why it is essential to revisit the great figures of European construction, the visionaries of Europe who (still) wait for the time to accomplish their European dream.

The *Berlin Conference*, entitled *Giving a soul to Europe*, was the recognition of that European spirit, following the signers of the *Florence Appeal*, convinced that after the economic and monetary unity, the time for European thought to speak out had arrived. To build a politically united Europe, first of all, it was necessary to spread a strong thought about Europe.

Europe needs a soul and, for some, a face that represents Europe and that responds to Henri Kissinger when he asked: “If you call Europe, who answers?”. But also, very curiously, Europe has two images: the image of itself, an image of crisis, perhaps, of growth, and an image that others have of itself: seen from the outside, Europe almost looks like the Promised Land, or at least as a place of peace, culture, civilization and prosperity. Europeans are tired of Europe and non-Europeans want Europe and look at it as a long history, of all humanity, a paradigm of culture and the cradle of civilization. The solution seems to be to transfer the image of non-Europeans to Europeans. Create European awareness among Europeans. History, as recalled by Jacques Le Goff, shows that throughout Europe, from Scandinavia to Greece and Portugal, there are fundamental traits of the same culture and political Europe, which “Eurosceptics” prefer to ignore in the name of an economic Europe. Undoubtedly, this common European economy is important for creating a weight comparable to the United States and China. However, United Europe cannot be supported only for materialistic reasons, otherwise the end result will be little more than a large economic zone, which can be as quick to build as its destruction.

Europe is at a crossroads. Which way to go? Some think there is more Europe. Others believe that there is less Europe. Everyone is looking for a future for Europe.

European construction can only continue if it is based on an idea, in addition to all economic or legal achievements, that guarantees it a future. You have to have confidence in the future. Big things come little by little. As Jean Monnet recognized, the roots of the community were already strong in his time, and he believed that one day the *United States of Europe* would come true. I did not want to anticipate the future considering the unpredictable change. He lived in the present: “tomorrow is another day ... The difficulties of each day are enough”. That tomorrow has already arrived and politicians have finally realized that it is necessary to “give Europe a soul”. Robert Schuman was already aware of this need for Europe to conceive a soul and to return to being a symbol of universal solidarity. Political Europe continues to be this “interesting utopia”, as acknowledged by Eduardo Lourenço, although it is also the “house of impotence”, but isn’t utopia the anticipation of the future?

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 Opening address by President Ursula von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Charles Michel after the extraordinary European Council meeting of 17-21 July 2020”.

Eastern Partnership: between linkages with the EU and Russia

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Abstract

This work analyses the relationship between the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries which includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. We propose to move beyond the center-periphery and external governance models which presume the hierarchical, power-based relations. The specific conditions of the region require us also consider Russia's role in the region as well as local factors of the Eastern Partnership countries which can challenge EU integration. The theory of linkage and leverage is used to analyze the complex interactions between the EU, Eastern Partnership countries, and Russia. The Eastern Partnership Index demonstrates that Eastern Partnership countries have rather intensive linkages with the EU, especially Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The resource revenues allow Azerbaijan to be less dependent on both Russia and the EU, but its trade relations are closer to the EU. While Belarus and Armenia have more intensive linkages with Russia and Russia's leverage for these two states is more powerful.

Keywords: EU, Eastern Partnership, linkage, and leverage, EU neighborhood

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a relação entre a União Europeia e os países da Parceria Oriental, que inclui Azerbaijão, Arménia, Geórgia, Bielorrússia, Moldávia e Ucrânia. Propomos ir além da abordagem do centro-periferia e dos modelos de governança externa que pressupõem as relações hierárquicas e de poder. As condições específicas da região exigem que consideremos também o papel da Rússia na região, bem como os fatores locais dos países da Parceria Oriental que podem desafiar a integração na UE. A teoria de ligação e alavancagem é usada para analisar as complexas interações entre a UE, os países da Parceria Oriental e a Rússia. O Índice da Parceria Oriental demonstra que os países da Parceria Oriental têm ligações bastante intensas com a UE, especialmente a Ucrânia, a Moldávia e a Geórgia. As receitas dos recursos naturais permitem que o Azerbaijão seja menos dependente da Rússia e da UE, mas as suas relações comerciais

estão mais próximas da UE. Embora a Bielorrússia e a Arménia tenham vínculos mais intensos com a Rússia, a influência da Rússia nesses dois Estados é mais poderosa.

Palavras-chave: UE, Parceria Oriental, ligação e influência, vizinhança da UE

Introduction

After the Big Eastern enlargement in 2004 EU integration has changed its nature. EU builds partnerships with its border regions, integrates them in the EU market, and tries to share democracy, good governance, and its values. However, it is a new type of integration - the integration beyond conditionality¹ when the well working in the Eastern Enlargement case reform incentive scheme does not fit well to countries that lack membership perspective and are included in the sphere of Russia's influence too.

After the Eastern Enlargement, a new project - European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched, which was the first attempt of the EU to provide neighboring states a different type of cooperation than the membership in the EU. ENP implies the design of an Action Plan regularly monitored by the EU for each participating country². ENP also has several priority sectors for collaboration as security, governance, economic and social development, migration and mobility, job creation, energy, and climate change (The European Neighbourhood Policy). ENP includes a wide range of the countries in the South and East borders of the EU which are heterogeneous and are on different steps of the EU integration. Thus, we are going to focus only on the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy which was formulated as a separate part of the ENP in 2009 after the summit in Prague and includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EaP presumes cooperation in the same fields as ENP and is an important instrument for these countries to deepen integration with the EU.

In this paper, we argue that this new type of integration also requires a new theoretical framework for the analysis. The traditional center-periphery model and external governance model are hierarchical, based on the power and structure frameworks that do not presume that integration can be more flexible and changeable. We propose to apply the theory of linkage and leverage developed by Levitsky and Way to the EaP case since this theory presumes that role of both external and local actors

1 LAVENEX, Sandra - "A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality?".

2 GÄNZLE, Stefan - "Externalizing EU governance and the European neighbourhood policy: towards a framework for analysis", p.7.

matters and there can be several external actors in the region. This theory allows us to consider the complex relations between the EU, Russia, and EaP countries. The paper is structured as follows: the first part describes the traditional approaches on EU relations with the other countries focusing specifically on the EaP case; the second part presents the theory of linkage and leverage and cases' analysis.

Traditional approaches to EU relations with EaP countries

EU interests in the cooperation with third countries are usually connected with the border security and simplification of economic relations³. It is considered that the main goal of the ENP, as well as EaP, is to provide security to the EU citizens on the borders (from terrorism and migration), reinforce the borders rather than integrate states to the EU⁴. According to Dimitrova, this feature of the borders to present mistrust of insiders towards outsiders illustrates the state-centric paradigm of the borders which are seen essential for state sovereignty, power, and hierarchy. However, the security and mistrust issues are more connected with the Southern partners from where flows of the migrants are coming. In this sense, the EaP area is more secure for the EU. The EaP countries are rather treated through periphery, imperial, colonial frontier geostrategy and external governance frameworks which emphasize the desire of the EU to change the neighborhood and to keep it as a buffer zone.

Thus, one of the most widely applied models is a center-periphery model where the EU is modeled as the center and EaP region as a periphery. According to Bosse, this model presumes the spatial and social construction of the region where the center expands its power to the periphery⁵. The EaP region is particularly seen as a periphery, argues Bosse, because Russia is excluded from this partnership, and the region is often called a "common neighborhood" of two big actors as EU and Russia. Furthermore, based on Wallerstein's neo-Marxist concept the EaP can be called semi-periphery or a buffer zone⁶. Marchetti and co-authors argue that this policy has quite a hybrid nature and its documents reveal the clear distinction between insiders (EU members) and outsiders (EU neighbors)⁷. However, as the authors notes

3 BUSYGINA, Irina - *Russia–EU relations and the common neighborhood: Coercion vs. authority*, p.64.

4 DIMITROVOVA, Bohdana – "Remaking Europe's Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy", p.9.

5 BOSSE, Giselle - "The Eastern Partnership and the disintegration of Eastern Europe: The end of the region-building project?", p.99.

6 SCHUMACHER, Tobias; MARCHETTI, Andreas; DEMMELHUBER, Thomas – "The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy Routledge. The European Neighbourhood Policy", p.132.

7 *Idem*, p.134.

the semi-periphery model presumes that the EaP countries are more developed and committed to the EU norms than their Southern neighbors.

The EaP integration also matters in the EU bordering. Browning and Joenniemi outline models of the European geopolitics and several EU borders geostrategies. As such, there are three models of the European geopolitics: Westphalian, Imperial, and Neomedieval. The Westphalian model presumes that the power from the center is blurred to the borders and the EU is portrayed as a unified actor with its border regime, currency, and security policy⁸. In the Imperial model, the power is distributed from the center to the borders with different degrees. The Neomedieval model presumes that the power is no longer located in one center in Brussel, but it is regionalized through different networks⁹. Browning and Joenniemi also refer to Walter's distinction of the borders geostrategies which helps them to construct a theoretical explanation. Thus, there is the network geostrategy which presumes that the role of the borders is declining, and the free movement of goods, people, and services should be implemented. The other geostrategy is called march which refers to the creation of the security buffer zone. One more strategy is the colonial frontier meaning that the area beyond a frontier should be transformed according to the desire of the inside¹⁰. Moreover, the last strategy is limes which differs from the colonial frontier in the sense that there should be a limit of the transformation of the outside. According to the authors, in the ENP case, the EU applies the imperial vision while geostrategies are mixed and should be analyzed in detail. The desire of the EU to create from the ENP a buffer zone coincides with the march and limes geostrategies¹¹. Moreover, the EU tries to outline the "ring of friends" where friends are perceived as foreigners in the "hierarchy of otherness"¹². However, as Browning and Joenniemi note, the EU also has the vision to transform the ENP, spread its norms and institutions which coincides with the colonial frontier geostrategy. This strategy presumes that ENP should adopt to insider's behavior and only after meeting all the conditions outsiders can become "friends" as authors note. Furthermore, it is also important to distinguish between the Eastern and South regions of the ENP. As such, the EaP is closer to the EU in geographic, institutional, and values sense and is not seen as a threatening region rather it can become an insider¹³. Thus, as Browning and Joenniemi emphasize, the colonial frontier geostrategy that presumes the transformation of the outside in line with the inside makes more sense for the

8 BROWNING, Christopher S.; JOENNIEMI, Pertti - "Geostrategies of the European neighbourhood policy", p.522.

9 *Idem*, p. 525.

10 *Idem*, p.529.

11 *Idem*, p.532.

12 *Idem*, *Ibidem*.

13 *Idem*, p.537.

EaP countries. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that in the cooperation with “outsiders” EU always faces a security-stabilization dilemma – a trade-off between the transformation of the region and maintenance of the undemocratic stability. It also should be noted that the colonial frontier geostrategy has a close meaning to the external governance theory which is the most often applied in the studies of the EU relations with other countries and which also presumes hierarchy and non-inclusion.

External governance can be defined as “a transfer of the rules and EU norms to non-EU countries”, that is, how effectively the EU transfers its rules and regulations and how they are adopted by third countries¹⁴. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier note, the approach is characterized by asymmetric relations, a hierarchy of communication structures, and a high level of bureaucratization¹⁵. According to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig¹⁶, hierarchical governance is implemented mainly through legislation, strict adoption of the *acquis*, and regular monitoring of its implementation. This framework also presumes the conditionality approach when the EU encourages or punishes third states for progress or rollback from the democratic course. Conditionality is a power relationship between the EU and its neighbors, based on “common goods” offered by the EU as a free market, common currency, and freedom of movement¹⁷.

Last but not least, Korosteleva argues that the EaP (as ENP) policy itself is designed in a special way to cover with the notion of “partnership” the actual distinction between “self” and “other”¹⁸. According to her, a partnership is just used as an alternative to the membership for the EaP countries. In this case, there are not “shared values” for both the EU and EaP area and they are not equal partners, rather outsiders should act as “norm-takers” from the EU¹⁹. Thus, not even it is hard to call the EU and EaP equal partners in terms of the size of their economies and political role on the international arena, it is also hard to call them partners because only one actor should adopt western values and institutions. In the absence of the presumed partnership, as Korosteleva outlines, the traditional external governance approach is applied.

Overall, the relations between EU and its neighbors including EaP countries are usually analyzed through the center-periphery, external governance, imperial frameworks that presume the strict hierarchy, relations of power, and dominance of

14 BOSSE, Giselle – “The EU’s relations with Moldova: governance, partnership, or ignorance?”, p.1292.

15 SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank; SEDELMEIER, Ulrich – “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, p.669.

16 LAVENEX, Sandra; SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank - “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics”.

17 BUSYGINA, Irina - *Russia–EU relations and the common neighborhood: Coercion vs. Authority*, p.62.

18 KOROSTELEVA, Elena A., “Change or continuity: Is the Eastern Partnership an adequate tool for the European neighbourhood?”.

19 *Idem*, p.246.

the external actor. In this paper we propose to go beyond these models and think about EU-EaP relations are interconnected, shaped by many linkages where all of the involved actors play a role.

Beyond the center-periphery model to the linkage and leverage

From the theoretical point of view, the widely used theory of the external governance and conditionality approach are a lot criticized. For example, conditionality is considered to be effective only if there is the prospect of membership in the EU²⁰. Membership perspective is a kind of credible commitment when countries are ready to hold transformations for future membership. At the same time, Association Agreements (AA) used for the EaP countries are not such a powerful tool²¹. Concerning this issue, other theoretical frameworks should be applied in the EaP case.

In this paper, we propose to apply the theory of linkage and leverage developed by Levitsky and Way to the EaP case. The theory presumes that are different economic, political, social, organizational, and cross-border ties between a country and EU or the USA which can be used by the international actor to influence the democratization of this country (Levitsky, Way 2006, 379)²². The geographic location of a country matters a lot since international actors tend to build more linkages with the neighbors. Having many linkages with the West enables governments to be accountable for their actions. Levitsky and Way argue that Western partners immediately will take attention if governments roll back from the democratic course. Thus, having intense linkages it became risky for governments to violate the Western-sponsored course. Moreover, in this case Western actors can interfere in the internal situation gaining the support of NGOs²³. Moreover, small and dependent on international donor countries are more vulnerable to the pressure from outside than those countries with the rich resources²⁴. However, linkages and leverage with the US or EU can be undermined by the other regional actor which also invests resources in a country²⁵.

In the case of EaP countries, such an actor is definitely Russia. EaP states are also post-Soviet states with Russian minorities living there. Russia actively appeals to the shared history and language issue in its policy towards these states. EaP states are

20 BÖRZEL, Tanja A.; SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank – “Coming together or drifting apart? The EU’s political integration capacity in Eastern Europe”.

21 *Idem*, p.279.

22 LEVITSKY, Steven; WAY, Lucan A. - “Linkage versus leverage. Rethinking the international dimension of regime change”, p.379.

23 *Idem*, p.384.

24 *Idem*, p.382-383.

25 *Idem*, p.383.

members of the patronized by Russia regional organizations as Commonwealth of Independent States, Eurasian Economic Union, and Customs Union. Contrasting to the EU, Russia would like to hold the loyal authoritarian leaders in power and its influence is not aimed to democratize or improve the governance in EaP countries (Ambrosio 2016)²⁶.

Thus, having actually two unbalanced centers in the EaP the center-periphery model is hardly applicable. These centers are not symmetric since some of the EaP countries have closer or weaker ties with one of them which is demonstrated in the case study part. Rather the relations between EU, Russia, and EaP countries are very interlinked and linkages with one actor can be used against the other. Moreover, the EaP countries themselves can shape the configuration of linkages. Local governments can use the interlinked resources offered by the EU and Russia to push their own interests²⁷. The local conditions of these countries are also crucially important since they are deriving points for the certain EU and Russia's strategies in the region.

From the practical point of view, several important steps illustrate the close linkages between the EU and EaP as well as Russia and EaP.

First, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia have AA with the EU since 2014 which presume "enhanced political association, increased political dialogue and deeper cooperation on justice and security issues with the EU" (The European Council)²⁸. Moreover, as part of the AA, these three countries entered a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) which is aimed to reduce trade barriers and improve trade relations. Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia also have been granted a visa liberalization regime to the EU which made it is easier to travel to the EU for the citizens of these countries. The last fact also shows that the EU does not treat the Eastern partners the same as the Southern which are mostly seen as non-secure regions from where immigrants arrive. Furthermore, there is also the Eastern Partnership Index which is designed to measure the integration of the EaP through the density of the linkages between the EU and the EaP. According to its data, Ukraine on average for 2018 has 0.66 out of 1 linkage with the EU, Georgia has 0.71, Moldova 0.71, Armenia 0.5, Belarus 0.45, and Azerbaijan 0.47²⁹. Trade integration is very dense because the EU is the main trading partner for Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and the second-largest partner for Belarus and Armenia³⁰. Moreover, there is high mobility,

26 AMBROSIO, Thomas - *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union*.

27 DELCOUR, Laure - "'You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink': the EU's and Russia's intersecting conditionalities and domestic responses in Georgia and Moldova", p.490.

28 EUROPEAN COUNCIL. n.d. Eastern Partnership. Accessed February 23, 2020. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/>.

29 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development".

30 *Idem, Ibidem*.

including academics and students between the EaP and EU especially for Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia which have 1, Armenia which got 0.75 and less for Belarus 0.63 and Azerbaijan 0.5³¹.

In contrast, membership in CIS, Eurasian Economic Union, and Custom Union does not intensify linkages between Russia and EaP so deeply as with the EU. Rather there is a high dependency on Russian gas in all EaP countries except Azerbaijan, economic relations, and cultural linkages (history and Russian-speaking minorities)³². Russia often uses the energy leverage to push on EaP countries since it is the main exporter of gas for these states.

Thus, based on linkage and leverage theory which allows considering different actors and interlinked relations between them we propose to study each of the cases - Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Armenia closely.

Georgia

Georgia, together with Moldova and Ukraine, entered into an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014, as well as the agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Zones in 2016 (European Commission)³³. In 2017, Georgian citizens were also granted visa-free entry to the EU (European Commission)³⁴. According to EaP Index, Georgia is also a leader in linkage dimension (0.71/1)³⁵.

Nevertheless, Georgia is faced with many challenges to complete all AA conditions. One of them is an extremely polarized society and the polarization of elites. For example, the ruling party, the Georgian Dream Party - Democratic Georgia, founded by businessman B. Ivanishvili, experienced serious resistance from the president and part of civil society when changing the constitution and moving to the parliamentary system³⁶. Moreover, the opposition, the media, and society are extremely polarized. There are anti-Western and xenophobic moods in the country that advocate the preservation of Georgian identity and fear its destruction during Western integration³⁷. As for the country's ties with Russia, they are of a dual nature. On the one hand,

31 *Idem, Ibidem.*

32 CAMERON, David R.; ORENSTEIN, Mitchell A. - "Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its» Near Abroad», p.6.

33 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. n. d. "Georgia. EU-Georgia Relations". Accessed October 15, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/georgia_en.

34 *Idem, Ibidem.*

35 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.22.

36 *Idem, p.62.*

37 *Idem, Ibidem.*

after the 2008 war and the occupation of the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, relations with Russia sharply worsened and most Georgians see Russia as an aggressor country and the main threat to state's security³⁸. This frozen conflict and the ethnolinguistic polarization of society create obstacles to reform. On the other hand, Georgia, being a resource-poor country, continues to be very dependent on Russian oil and gas, and the export of its goods to Russia. After the Georgian Dream Party came to power, in 2012 Russia lifted the trade embargo that has been in force since 2006, investments from Russia poured into Georgia and tourism has been growing. As for GDP growth indicators, GDP per capita almost doubled in Georgia between 2009-2018, seeing a decline only in 2014, after which it continued to grow again³⁹. According to the World Bank, no other EaP country has achieved such economic growth since the EaP was launched. However, Georgia continues to belong to the group of countries with incomes below the average⁴⁰, which makes it a rather poor country dependent on energy and economic linkages with Russia. Russia can use its leverage to pressure Georgia to stop democratic, pro-Western movements.

Moldova

From the signing of the Eastern Partnership initiative until 2017, Moldova has been named the leader in reform and cooperation with the EU having 0.71 on linkage dimension⁴¹. However, the country has lagged behind due to the constitutional crisis of 2009-2016, which affected the efficiency of the government and which was resolved through direct presidential elections and the victory of the pro-Russian candidate I. Dodon⁴². Direct presidential elections were held, although Moldova is a state with a parliamentary system and indirect presidential elections since 2000⁴³. According to Way, Moldova is the most democratic country from the

38 JAM NEWS - "The survey reveals the Georgians view of Russia as the biggest threat", 2018. Accessed November 25, 2019. <https://jam-news.net/survey-reveals-georgians-view-russia-as-biggest-threat/>.

39 WORLD BANK – "GDP per capita (current US\$), 1960-2017", 2017. Accessed November 30, 2019. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pc.ap.cd>.

40 WORLD BANK - "Country and Lending Groups", 2020. Accessed November 25, 2019. <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups>.

41 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development". *Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum*, 2017. Accessed November 25, 2019. http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP_Index_2015-16_0.pdf.

42 GÄNZLE, Stefan – "Externalizing EU governance and the European neighbourhood policy: towards a framework for analysis". In a presentation at the *Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association*. UBC, Vancouver on. Geohistory. 2018. Moldovan Politics: Presidential Crises 2009-2018 (2008). Accessed February 10, 2020. <https://geohistory.today/moldovan-presidential-crises/>.

43 ROPER, Steven D. – "From semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism: Regime change and presidential power in Moldova", p.120.

CIS. Way believes that Moldova is characterized by “pluralism by default” when there is not so much democracy in the country as pluralism of opinions and rivalry of elites. The fact is that society in the country is historically bipolar, ethnically, and nationally divided into pro-Russian and more pro-Romanian⁴⁴. This division led in the 90s to the war on the Nester river, when the territory of Transnistria declared independence and is now under the patronage of Russia, being a frozen conflict. Furthermore, ethnolinguistic separation creates the basis for geopolitical separation, expressed in conflicting positions of support for European integration or membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Thus, according to recent population surveys, 48% of the country’s citizens support the country’s entry into the Eurasian Economic Union (where it subsequently received observer status), and 40% of EU membership (Moldova.org). Polarization also undoubtedly affects conflicts among elites. I. Dodon, being a popular pro-Russian politician, with virtually no authority in the parliamentary system of Moldova, was several times temporarily removed from power by the decisions of the Constitutional Court after he again refused to sign decrees on ministers elected by parliament⁴⁵. He also called for a referendum on the dissolution of parliament and the expansion of presidents’ rights⁴⁶. The president is trying in every possible way to improve Moldova’s relations with Russia, regularly making visits to Russia and strengthening the country’s dependence on this external actor. He has already achieved observer status for Moldova in the Eurasian Economic Union and is working hard to resume trade relations between countries that have worsened after Russia imposed a trade embargo.

Belarus

Least of all controlling corruption and the rule of law, Belarus is the most politically stable state of the Eastern Partnership⁴⁷. Belarus is an authoritarian state and is often called “the last dictatorship in Europe” in the literature⁴⁸. Since 1994, the country has been ruled by authoritarian leader A. Lukashenko. Way believes that

44 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

45 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - “Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development”. Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2017. Accessed November 25, 2019. http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP_Index_2015-16_0.pdf, p.42-43.

46 *Idem, Ibidem*.

47 WORLD BANK - “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2014”, 2016. Accessed February 10, 2020. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.

48 BOSSE, Giselle; KOROSTELEVA-POLGLASE, Elena - “Changing Belarus? The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership”. *Cooperation and conflict*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836709102736>. 44(2) (2009) 143-165., p.144.

he managed to create such a stable authoritarian regime due to a number of local factors specific to the country. Unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Belarus is not such a heterogeneous ethnically state⁴⁹. The country is dominated by Russian national identity and most Belarusians know both Belarusian and Russian⁵⁰. This factor facilitates not only governance. Moreover, Lukashenko was able to consolidate the regime, manage the centralized control over the economy, which helped him to prevent the emergence of influential and wealthy oligarchs who could resist him⁵¹. The external factor of Russian influence also plays an important role in maintaining the country's undemocratic regime. Korosteleva with a co-author believes that relations with Russia have always been a priority for Belarus than a partnership with the EU. Geopolitical borders were shifted towards the West only when Belarus needed to get something from Russia⁵². The fact is that Belarus receives Russian gas at the lowest price and then resells it on the world market⁵³. High resource revenues not only make Belarus the most dependent on Russia but also allow Lukashenko to buy elites' loyalty, ensure economic growth in the country, and stability while controlling the economy, media, and preventing democratization. In this case, perhaps the Russian influence and oil revenues, as well as the undemocratic regime, represent the most serious obstacle to the EU's influence on Belarus. Linkages with the EU are quite low for Belarus – only 0.45/1⁵⁴.

Ukraine

The crisis of 2014, the war in the Donbas, and the annexation of Crimea seriously affected Ukraine's political stability. These events also weakened relations between Ukraine and Russia, leading to sanctions on both sides, Russia's non-recognition of new political power in Ukraine and active negative rhetoric against each other in the media. Being an important territory on the way of Russian gas to Europe, Ukraine also significantly reduced its dependence on gas from Russia, trying to reorient to the European energy market⁵⁵. Weakened linkages with Russia

49 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

50 *Idem, Ibidem*.

51 *Idem, Ibidem*.

52 BOSSE, Giselle; KOROSTELEVA-POLGLASE, Elena - "Changing Belarus? The limits of EU governance in Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership", p.155.

53 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

54 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.22.

55 WOLCZUK, Kataryna – "Managing the flows of gas and rules: Ukraine between the EU and Russia", p.130.

strengthened Ukraine's dependence on the EU. Having an AA with the EU, Ukraine today receives the biggest material support from the EU, support groups for the country are created (European Commission)⁵⁶, and Ukraine has become a leader in implementing EU norms and standards⁵⁷. As in the case of Georgia, in 2017, citizens of Ukraine were granted visa-free entry to the Schengen zone; economic integration with the EU was strengthened; trade turnover between Ukraine and the Union was growing⁵⁸. Despite the rapprochement with the EU, Ukraine remains a poorly governed country, and the reasons for this lie not only in the situation in the Donbas. Way notes that Ukraine is a very ethnically polarized country. The western part of the country was historically closer in Europe, it was Western Ukrainians who for the most part participated in the Maidan when President Yanukovich wanted to postpone the signing of the long-planned Association Agreement with the EU⁵⁹. The eastern part is populated by the Russian-speaking population, who feel their unity with Russia. Influential clans of Donetsk brought to power Yanukovich⁶⁰. This heterogeneity is used for political purposes, to mobilize the population in support of a particular candidate or political course⁶¹. Way writes that although this polarization had an impact on the development of pluralism in Ukraine and prevented the emergence of a consolidated authoritarian regime, it also negatively affects the weakness of state's potential and parties, facilitates the prosperity of corruption, which affects the poor quality of governance. Thus, due to the many critical junctures of 2014-2015 Ukraine now actively intensifies linkages with the EU but also preserving energy, economic and cultural linkages with Russia.

Armenia

This state of the Caucasus region is ahead of other EaP countries except for Georgia, in terms of state accountability⁶². Unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Armenia is not ethnically polarized, and a single national identity is a powerful tool for mobilization⁶³. The unity of the Armenians can be explained by many historical problems,

56 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. n. d. Ukraine. Accessed February 10, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine_en.

57 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.18.

58 *Idem*, p.36.

59 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

60 *Idem*, *Ibidem*.

61 *Idem*, *Ibidem*.

62 WORLD BANK - "Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2014", 2016. Accessed February 10, 2020. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.

63 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

in particular, as Way notes, the presence of the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan. However, conflicts among elites and clans who do not want to carry out many transformations are also an obstacle in relation to the EU. However, in connection with the events of the Velvet Revolution, there is a possibility of democratization and reform⁶⁴. It is worth noting that, unlike Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Armenia did not sign an AA with the EU. Russia insisted on canceling the signing of this agreement, granting Armenia membership in the Customs Union⁶⁵. In general, linkages between Armenia and Russia are stronger than those of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, and Russia remains one of the main trade partners of Armenia⁶⁶.

Azerbaijan

The regime in the country is a consolidated authoritarianism, with the lowest, after Belarus, indicators of democracy, freedom of the media, and independence of the courts from all countries of the EaP⁶⁷. However, the country has the highest economic growth and economic development in general which makes it least dependent on the external actors⁶⁸. The fact is that, unlike all the cases we have studied, Azerbaijan is a resource-rich country and the least dependent on Russian gas supplies. The state is not a member of any union patronized by Russia, and relations with Russia are built only through bilateral agreements. Azerbaijan's main trading partner is the EU, where Azerbaijan also exports its gas⁶⁹. Last but not least, president Aliyev who came to power in the 1990s, managed to consolidate the regime into an authoritarian direction, putting key members of his family on key posts⁷⁰. The authoritarian nature of the regime as well as resource revenues make the country less vulnerable to both EU and Russia leverages. Azerbaijan has only 0.47/1 linkages with the EU mainly in trade and citizens mobility⁷¹.

64 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.70.

65 BÖRZEL, Tanja A.; LEBANIDZE, Bidzina - "The transformative power of Europe" beyond enlargement: the EU's performance in promoting democracy in its neighbourhood", p.30.

66 CAMERON, David R.; ORENSTEIN, Mitchell A. - "Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its» Near Abroad», p.28.

67 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.83.

68 *Idem*, p.88.

69 *Idem*, p.86.

70 WAY, Lucan - *Pluralism by default: Weak autocrats and the rise of competitive politics*.

71 LOVITT, Jeff (ed.) - "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016: Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development", p.22-23.

Conclusion

In this paper we presented that relation between EU and its neighbors is frequently analyzed through the center-periphery model and its deviations as external governance and imperial frameworks. All these models presume that the external actor as the EU is in the position of power, it sets rules of the game and pressure on the periphery. We have not a goal to challenge the power relations since they take place due to the institutional and legal constraints of EU integration. However, on the example of the Eastern Partnership countries, we demonstrated that other theoretical frameworks can be applied to study relations between the EU and its neighbors. The theory of linkage and leverage allows us to consider all the complex relations between actors leaving space for the local factors of the EaP countries. Moreover, it is especially useful in regions where more than one center exists. In the EaP case, linkages between these countries and the EU as well as with Russia can overlap creating complex interactions. Thus, this theory can be applied to further research EU integration.

Regards to the cases, the EaP Index demonstrates that the EaP countries have intensive linkages with the EU, especially Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. However, the way to democratization and reforms presumed by the Association Agreements is challenged by the local factors of the countries and linkages with Russia. All the EaP countries except Azerbaijan and partially Ukraine are very dependent on Russian gas which is a powerful pressure instrument of Russian foreign policy. Moreover, economic ties with Russia are very dense in the case of Armenia and Belarus while cultural ties between Russian speaking minorities and Russia are most sensitive in Moldova and partially in Ukraine. The oil revenues in Azerbaijan make the country less vulnerable to external pressure. Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are mainly interested in economic ties with the EU while Belarus and Armenia have more intensive economic linkages with Russia.

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The Europeanization dynamic in the Republic of Moldova

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Resumo

A iniciativa política que visa aprofundar e reforçar as relações entre a UE e a Moldávia insere-se no contexto da Parceria Oriental, lançada em 2009 no âmbito da Política Europeia de Vizinhança. Este artigo visa identificar as vias de Europeização da Moldávia, considerando as tensões envolvidas na alternativa de cooperação e modelo para sociedade civil, instituições, políticas e economia, representada pela União Econômica Eurasiática. A Europeização ocorre de forma diferente no caso de países fora da UE, especialmente no caso das novas democracias que têm a UE como parceiro externo relevante. Tendo como ponto de partida a Agenda de Associação do Acordo de Associação, este artigo visa analisar as evidências da Europeização na Moldávia, observando os regulamentos, leis e alterações à lei implementados pelo Governo da Moldávia, conforme avaliado nos relatórios de implementação. A contribuição conceitual de Gawrich et al. (2009), assim como dados de diferentes fontes como o Banco Mundial e pesquisas selecionadas são utilizados nesta investigação. Espera-se contribuir com a criação de um modelo de análise que possa ser aplicado em outros casos e promover uma comparação do potencial impacto da Europeização nos países vizinhos da UE.

Palavras-chave: União Europeia; Parceria Oriental; Moldávia

Abstract

The policy initiative which aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the EU and Moldova is in the context of the Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009 within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The article aims to identify avenues of Europeanization of Moldova, considering however the tensions involved in the alternative of cooperation and modelling civil society, institutions, policies and economy, that is the Eurasian Economic Union. Europeanization works differently in the case of countries outside the EU, especially in the cases of new democracies having the EU as a relevant foreign partner. Departing from the Association Agenda of the Association Agreement, this paper aims to analyse the evidences of Europeanization in

Moldova by looking at the regulations, laws and amendments to law implemented by the Moldovan Government as assessed in the Implementation Reports. The conceptual contribution of Gawrich et al. (2009) will be useful, as well as data from different sources such as the World Bank and selected surveys. We expect to contribute by creating a model of analysis that can be applied in other cases and promote a comparison of the potential impact of Europeanization on the EU's neighbours' countries.

Keywords: European Union; Eastern Neighbours Partnership; Moldova

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is committed to the stability, development, and prosperity of former soviet countries. As countries geographically close to the EU, it has been of the EU's interest to support their development since the transition towards democracy. EU cooperation and financial support are linked to certain conditionalities, which Lavenex and Schimmelfennig¹ call EU's external governance, but for Gawrich et al.² the same phenomenon is seen as an external dimension of Europeanization.³ Europeanization consists of the phenomenon of the EU influencing other States and political spheres by sharing and spreading its routines, norms, values and institutions and also being influenced by them (*top-down* and *bottom-up* dynamics).⁴

The EU has developed over time an external dimension that puts it as an agent of democracy promotion and values' sharing. As for its neighbours, the case is even more so. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig⁵ believe this EU's external influence in its neighbours has evolved into a new third model since the European Neighbourhood Policy's creation, with functional cooperation between the administrations as another axis of EU's democracy promotion and value's sharing.

According to Gawrich et al.⁶, we can distinguish three dimensions of Europeanization research when reviewing the early 1990s' literature: i) *Membership Europeanization*, which refers to the impact of the EU on its member-states (current members); ii)

1 LAVENEX, Sandra; SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank - "Concentric circles of flexible 'EUropean' integration: A typology of EU external governance relations".

2 GAWRICH, Andrea; MELNYKOVSKA, Inna; SCHWEICKERT, Rainer – "Neighbourhood Europeanization trough ENP. The Case of Ukraine".

3 For further detail on Europeanization e. g. Börzel & Risse, 2000, 2003; Börzel, 1999, 2002, 2003; Featherstone & Kazamias, 2001; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; and Dyson, 1999.

4 Shortly, the top-down Europeanization process has been understood mostly by the impact and influence of EU's ideas, policies, institutions, norms, etc. toward the member-states, or even sub-national agencies and actors. On the other hand, bottom-up Europeanization can be defined as the "reorientation of a (sub-) national actor's champ d'activité towards supranational institutions, politics and/or policy-making" of the EU (McCauley 2011).

5 LAVENEX, Sandra; SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank.

6 GAWRICH, Andrea; MELNYKOVSKA, Inna; SCHWEICKERT, Rainer – "Neighbourhood Europeanization trough ENP. The Case of Ukraine", p.5.

Enlargement Europeanization, related to countries in the accession process and candidate countries (perspective members); and iii) *Neighbourhood Europeanization*, for those without membership perspective, also considered “EU’s neighbouring ‘outsiders’”.

We can identify Europeanization dynamics as a modernization⁷ mirror for former soviet countries. Geopolitics is the major factor in the European motivations. Located between the EU and Russia, the EaP’s countries can be considered strategic neighbours for the EU’s borders. Domestic economic structures of each EaP country have translated into different responses to the adaptation and adoption of cooperation and compatible policies and reforms regarding EU’s expectations. Thus, the bilateral relations with these countries have evolved at different paces.

In this article we intend to focus on Neighbourhood Europeanization, more specifically we look for concepts, theoretical constructions and data selection for Moldova. However, the large view of the contribution is to introduce a model to be applied to the six Eastern neighbours: Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine.

We consider the European Neighbourhood Policy⁸ (ENP) and the agreements within its framework as a *top-down* Europeanization process. The ENP is an EU foreign relations instrument for developing countries, including those in the neighbourhood willing to be closer to the EU. The ENP follows a blueprint for enlargement, as a response to the European Security Strategy (ESS). In 2003, the European Commission presented a new framework for relations with the Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Since the new policy was launched, the privileged neighbours started to create mutual commitments to build common values and actions for reaching a good governance, rule of law and the promotion of economic and democratic principles.

The ENP process is supported by an Action Plan (AP) prepared for neighbouring countries that are not in the EU’s enlargement agenda. The APs introduced specific degrees of goals in different countries in order to implement ENP’s policies. The APs would draw on a common set of principles and bilateral relations to contribute for regional and sub-regional cooperation to reinforce efforts to meet the objectives of the ESS. In this sense, different impacts of Europeanization can be found in the neighbours, especially if we consider the “neighbouring outsiders”.⁹ Thus, we have to consider each country individually to assess some measures of success of this initiative, particularly in light of the 10 years of the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

The EU contribute with financial assistance to the ENP’s countries as to promote reforms and adjustments, influencing policies, institutions, laws (political,

7 SPRUDS, Andris – “Introductory Remarks”.

8 The ENP is an EU programme for its South and Eastern neighbours to foster stabilisation, security and prosperity.

9 The EU’s neighbouring where there is no immediate accession perspective (GAWRICH, Andrea et al. 2009, p. 5).

economic, institutional, etc.) and enhancing their local and national transformation towards a democratic model in line with the EU's.

The ENP's policies are valuable for both the EU's and its neighbours' priorities in a variety of sectors, like key areas for stability: Democracy Promotion, Justice and Home Affairs, and Economic Cooperation and Trade. Thus, the adoption of EU-aligned regulations and norms and the institutional adaptation to accomplish the ENP policies can be observed as a measure of a *top-down* Europeanization.

Public surveys can help identify the *bottom-up* Europeanization process. Public opinion reveals when citizens' perception can be seen as a way of explaining the proper functioning of EU's institutions and standards, usually without the use of coercion mechanisms in the European daily life. Positive perceptions empower EU institutions and impact their effectiveness. That because compliance matters. In other words, the less a rule requires strength and coercion mechanisms to be obeyed, the more effective it is. Such effectiveness, however, depends on the extent to which this standard is recognized by the society that must respect it as legitimate.

The article enlightens the impact of the EaP after one decade of it. The result is a preliminary effort to create a series of variables and a set of data about Moldova's case, but looking at providing analytic instruments for studying other EaP countries.

Gawrich et al.¹⁰ draw on the concept of Europeanization to analyse EU's influence and rule transfer in the case of countries with no membership perspective. According to them, the lack of an ascension perspective potentially limits EU's leverage and effectiveness in exerting its influence and promoting its values and changes. This article's hypothesis is that Europeanization is a large phenomenon surrounding the integration region. The different levels of impact¹¹, however, could be measured as a function of the interests of a given country to build strong links with EU norms and values. Considering the case of the former soviet countries, especially when there is no perspective to become an EU member-state, the harmonization of laws, norms, the learning process from EU's institutions and democratic model is a decisive reference for the development of the new democracies from Eastern Europe.

Methodology

Exadaktylos & Radaelli¹² contribute to the debate on research design and causal analysis in European integration by considering the Europeanization as a sub-field to be

10 GAWRICH, Andrea; MELNYKOVSKA, Inna; SCHWEICKERT, Rainer – “Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP. The Case of Ukraine”.

11 BÖRZEL, Tanja A.; RISSE, Thomas - “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”.

12 EXADAKTYLOS, Theofanis; RADAELLI, Claudio M. 2009 - “Research Design in European Studies: The case of Europeanization”.

acknowledged. Once the EU exists, there is a new phenomenon to be explored not only regarding its member-states, but also in the neighbourhood outside of the EU's borders. Whether or not Europeanization, EU's existence has an impact on the neighbouring outsiders.

Thus, even "countries outside the EU are also going through the same process of change—for example, because they are part of the global process of diffusion" (see Saurugger 2005; Levi-Faur 2004, *apud* Radaelli 2000), as well as around a strategic geopolitical zone for the EU.

The EU has enlarged over time, and its member-states have been experiencing changes along the European integration. The EU introduced an innovative legal system, institutions, norms and laws, a new monetary system and a new citizenship. Thus, there is a large debate on the EU's impacts on social and political issues. Throughout the integration process, discussions about the designation of the phenomenon as a process of "Europeanization" emerged. Besides the discussion on the concept's formation, Börzel & Risse suggest a theoretical framework considering two types of research design, called *top-down* and *bottom-up* models of the EU spreading its values, norms, institutions, policies, and ideas.

In other words, at the same time we can focus on the phenomenon of European integration influencing the national level of the society and politics, there is a circular movement in this matter. National actors, political elites, civil society groups, policies, ideas and structures can also influence EU politics, policies, and structures.

Gawrich et al. consider three distinct phases and dimensions of Europeanization research, where each new dimension draws on and adds to the previous one¹³: *Membership Europeanization* (the impact of the EU on member-states); *Enlargement Europeanization* (the impact of the EU on countries with a clear EU-membership perspective); *Neighbourhood Europeanization* (the impact of the EU on "outsiders", countries with no immediate accession perspective).

As to assess Neighbourhood Europeanization in Moldova, this article firstly draws upon the ENP's Association Agreement (AA) and implementation reports as to trace the advances made in promoting change in Moldova by EU initiatives. More specifically, this paper will analyse four reports representative of the relationship between the EU and Moldova under construction: 'European Neighbourhood Policy in the Republic of Moldova Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions'; the 'Progress Report on the Implementation of the Republic of Moldova – EU Association Agenda' and the 'Association Implementation Report', covering the 2014-2017 period. We will look at regulation and law changes (approved and adopted laws) outlined in the reports, as well as cooperation actions as evidence of Moldova's alignment with EU norms and strategies. This can be assessed as an

13 GAWRICH, Andrea; MELNYKOVSKA, Inna; SCHWEICKERT, Rainer – "Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP. The Case of Ukraine", p.5.

indicator of *top-down* Europeanization in Moldova. That because the EU uses the prospect of further cooperation and strengthening of economic relations as a means of promoting harmonization with EU norms and regulation.

We make use of Gawrich et al. concept for a qualitative analysis of Europeanization through ENP when distinguishing three dimensions of ENP's policies: Democracy Promotion; Justice and Home Affairs; Economic Cooperation and Trade. Democracy Promotion comprises the agenda items related to rule of law, civil society, human rights and fundamental freedom, while Justice and Home Affairs involves foreign and security policy and cooperation on justice, freedom and security. Finally, Economic Cooperation and Trade regards topics like employment, consumer protection, taxation, sectorial items, public health, research and innovation, technical regulations, standards, intellectual property rights and competition.

Secondly, we look at the variations in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as a proxy of policy improvements in the three dimensions of the ENP's policies. The aggregate indicators combine sources in six dimensions of governance as follows:

- Voice and Accountability: combines data sources to capture the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence: assesses the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.
- Governance Effectiveness: reflects the quality of public services and the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
- Regulatory Quality: assesses the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
- Rule of Law: captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
- Control of Corruption: assesses the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the "capture" of the State by elites and private interests.

The WGI are aggregated indicators based on different data sources that collect the views of a large number of enterprises, citizen and expert survey respondents in

different countries, including Moldova. WGI's six dimensions relate to Gawrich et al. three dimensions and can be grouped within it. Given that these indicators are estimates based on a pool of governance indicators, year-to-year changes are difficult to assess and typically quite small, thus, we opted to include the estimates as follows: 1996, the WGI's first year and pre-EU policies; 2003, when ENP was launch; 2005, creation of AP for Moldova; and the 2009-2017 period.

These analyses will assess indicatives of *top-down* Europeanization. However, by analysing public opinion data from 'EU NEIGHBOURS east' project annual report on Moldova, a *bottom-up* perspective of Europeanization in Moldova can be drawn upon from the population's perception and information on the EU.

Since the EU is a result of regional integration, it is not built on mechanisms and strategies of popular participation that characterize democratic processes. It is in fact a model of cooperation between States that was initially supported by intergovernmental agreements according to rules of Public International Law. Considering the EU has achieved an unparalleled social and political integration by becoming a *polity*¹⁴, it is expected that it would accurate its *democratic deficit*, even *ex-post*. Not only because of the importance of the Union's legitimation, but also because democratic recognition implies the ability of its rules and policies to impact social behavior.

We start from the assumption that if public opinion data is positive in relation to the EU, its policies, standards, regulations and institutions are strengthened – the EU becomes thus more effective. In other words, perception data that reveals a good assessment of the EU's role, a positive view of being part of the EU, a representative capacity of its institutions, or if there is a perception of confidence or support towards EU's institutions, reveal an ability to make EU's policies more effective.

Institutions and norms work best when they are best evaluated, perceived as representative, fair and legitimate. The positive perception signals the EU is empowered and, as a consequence, greater compliance with EU's rules and policies are expected.

Compliance has a fundamental role in preventing the application of sanctions resulting from non-compliance with the norms and policies. An important concept here is the effectiveness of the norms. According to jurists as Bobbio¹⁵, a norm is more effective the less it needs to use its coercion and force mechanisms to be applied. Thus, prevention and compliance are the best mechanisms for recognizing the effectiveness of EU's standards.

The selected responses from the public opinion report assess the population's recent opinion on the EU and the values associated to it, but also reflects the heterogeneity within Moldova – which is corroborated by census data.

14 HIX, Simon - *The Political System of the European Union*.

15 BOBBIO, Norberto - *Teoria da Norma Jurídica*.

This article intends to develop a model of analysis for assessing the Europeanization in Moldova, both *top-down* and *bottom-up*. Once the model is developed and tested in the case of Moldova, it may be applied to the other EaPs Countries. EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours have been intensifying since the EaP, making it relevant to look deeper.

Results: Looking for evidences of Neighbourhood Europeanization in Moldova

A few failures and successes can be identified from a comparative analysis. In this paper we focus on the case of Moldova to design a model of analysis that could be a reference for other observations. Data and variables considered to analyse Moldova's case of Europeanization can be applied to other EU neighbouring outsiders countries.

The spreading of EU's values, norms, institutions, policies, and ideas might take place in several different ways. As Montesano et al.¹⁶ put it, within the framework of the ENP, Europeanization regards the ability of the EU to make use of its 'normative' clout as a mean to foster stability and development in target countries of its interest.

Both EU's concern to create a surrounding neighbourhood of well-governed countries to the East and South of its borders and the ever-closer proximity of Moldova to the EU's borders with the Eastern enlargements drove the increase of EU's interest in Moldova. According to Montesano et al. the inclusion of Moldova in the ENP in 2003 and the EU-Moldova AP from 2005 are evidence to that. These initiatives were further developed with the EaP policies from 2009 and coming to the signature of an AA and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).¹⁷

From 2009 to 2017 the relationship between the EU and Moldova has deepened and widened in scope. New areas of cooperation, a larger alignment in democracy promotion and trade and investment initiatives summarized in certain events can be considered milestones of this intensification: the start of Autonomous Trade Preferences (2009); the start of EU/UNDP Confidence-Building Measures programme (2009); the AA/ DCFTA negotiations (started in 2010); Moldova joining the Energy Community (2010); the beginning of EU-Moldova Visa Liberalisation Dialogue (2010); the entry into force of the visa free regime for short stays (2014); the conclusion of AA/DCFTA and provisional application (2014); the replacement of the ENP AP by the Association Agenda (2014); the suspension of EU budget support after bank frauds (2015), and the AA fully into force (2016).

16 MONTESANO, Francesco; VAN DER TOGT; Tony; and ZWEERS, Wouter - The Europeanisation of Moldova: is the EU on the right track?, Clingendael Report, 2016.

17 From the EaP countries, only Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine have such type agreements with the EU.

The EU-Moldova relationship has already surpassed purely cooperation, including economic integration and deeper political cooperation. Evidence of that is the AA signed in 2014 and encompassing the AA/DCFTA, which according to the EU represents a qualitative step forward in EU-Moldova relations (EEAS 2015). As the signature and entry into force of the AA implied the establishment of an institutional framework and required mechanisms for its implementation, the Association Agenda replaced the ENP AP as the guideline to the EU-Moldova relationship. The spread of the EU model in a top-down orientation can be identified by the exportation of EU policies, institutions, norms and values towards Moldova.

Top-down impacts of Europeanization in Moldova

The Association Agenda foresees a number of domestic adjustments to EU directives and standards. Wolczuk¹⁸ highlights the key instrument in achieving the AA's set goals of political association and economic integration with the EU is legal approximation. For the partner country this means taking on extensive, binding commitments to align its laws and institutions with the *acquis* in order to stimulate political and economic development and institutional modernization.¹⁹

The analysis of the implementation reports indicates the changes promoted by Moldova's Government to harmonize and approximate its domestic norms with the EU's, as well as the improvement in cooperation.²⁰ By looking at the regulations, laws and amendments to laws taking place in the 2014-2017 period, it was possible to identify changes in the three elected dimensions. As expected, the pressure to comply with the Association Agenda for the implementation of the AA and the DCFTA certainly speeded up Moldova's normative alignment with the EU. In fact, most of the law and regulations adopted regard the economic cooperation and trade dimension. This dimension involves a lot of sectorial improvements, as well as harmonization of standards necessary for accessing EU's internal market. An important part of the DCFTA is aligning Moldovan trade-related laws to selected EU legislative acts (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019).

18 WOLCZUK, Kataryna - "The Development of an Institutional Framework for the Implementation of the Association Agreements in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: a comparative perspective."

19 The *acquis communautaire* is the set of norms and laws, substantive rules and policies – all which composes the EU Community Law system.

20 When assessing the reports, we considered cooperation examples the implementation of dialogue and working groups, trainings with external support or upon external orientation, valuation visits from the EU, access to information from European sphere (e.g. database access) and actions defined as improvement in the bilateral or multilateral cooperation of Moldova and the EU and its member-states.

Table 1. Approved and adopted laws and regulations under the three dimensions²¹

		DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS	ECONOMIC CO- OPERATION AND TRADE RELATED
Implementation of the ENP in the Republic of Moldova Progress (2014) and recommendations for actions	Laws and amendments to laws:	07	04	30
	Regulations:	-	-	01
	Cooperation efforts:	07	06	14
Progress Report on the Implementation of the Republic of Moldova– EU Association Agenda (Sep. 2014– Mar. 2016)	Laws and amendments to laws:	10	03	50
	Regulations:	08	02	29
	Cooperation efforts:	04	21	19
Association Implementation Report on Moldova 2016	Laws and amendments to laws:	04	03	13
	Regulations:	-	-	01
	Cooperation efforts:	01	02	04
Association Implementation Report on Moldova 2017	Laws and amendments to laws:	06	03	17
	Regulations:	01	-	05
	Cooperation efforts:	01	05	06

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the Implementation of the ENP in the Republic of Moldova Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions; Progress Report on the Implementation of the Republic of Moldova – European Union Association Agenda and the Association Implementation Reports on Moldova (2016 and 2017).


By looking at the governance indicators for Moldova, it is possible to note that ten years after the first available data (1996-2005) all estimates presented a

21 The five priority areas of the AP and AA were grouped within Gawrich et al. (2009)'s three dimensions from as follows: democracy promotion includes the topics in the political dialogue and reform priority area; justice and home affairs comprises foreign and security policy and cooperation on justice, freedom and security; economic cooperation and trade comprises the topics of similar name.

deterioration, signalling the country's sensitive condition.²² The creation of an AP for Moldova within the ENP does not seem to have significantly improved the country's governance in any aspect until the EaP in 2009. However, when comparing the latest data available with 2005 and 2009 numbers, it is possible to note significant improvement in most of the categories, evidencing the country's progress following closer cooperation and integration with the EU.

The graphics below present the estimates from the six WGI indicators for the 2007-2017 period with a trend line (dotted line) in order to better illustrate the indicators in the past decade.

Graphic 1. Voice and Accountability, 2007-2017



Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.


Graphic 2. Political Stability and No Violence, 2007-2017



Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.


22 See Appendix - Estimates for the table with estimates.

Graphic 3. Government Effectiveness, 2007-2017




Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.

Graphic 4. Regulatory Quality, 2007-2017




Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.

Graphic 5. Rule of Law, 2007-2017



Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.

Graphic 6. Control of Corruption, 2007-2017



Source: World Bank, WGI, 2019.

Most indicators present a positive trend for the period assessed in the graphics, except for the Political Stability and No Violence indicator, which fluctuated a lot over the period and shows a flat trend; and the Control of Corruption indicator, which presented a negative trend. These are aspects in which Moldova has been having difficulty in implementing and promoting change according to the implementation reports analysed.

Control of Corruption is a problem Moldova has not yet managed to efficiently tackle, which reflects in this indicator's evolution over time. Conversely, the ups and downs of Political Stability and No Violence indicator may reflect the country's attempts to implement reforms in this area following EU's indications in the AP and Association Agenda during the last decade. Also, there is a connection between political stability and the issues the country has faced regarding corruption, which may have jeopardized some of its improvements. The 2017 estimates indicate that control of corruption and government effectiveness have the weakest governance indicators, having a significant space for improvement.

Bottom-up impact of Europeanization in Moldova

The *bottom-up* Europeanization can be defined as the influence and impact understood from the reorientation of a (sub-)national actor's *champ d'activité*²³ towards EU institutions, policies, politics, values and the perception of the EU phenomenon.


We consider that the increase of the good evaluation and positive perception of the EU's institutions, economy and politics correspond to a way to legitimate the

23 McCauley, Darren - "Bottom-up Europeanization Exposed: Social Movement Theory and Non-State Actors in France".

EU. The conviction that the law and institutions represent the people and reflect justice promotes compliance and effectiveness. Thus, a *bottom-up* Europeanization can be assessed from the analysis of perception data, if they reflect a good evaluation, a positive vision and attitudes facing the EU influence in their countries and societies.

According to the survey's data, around half of Moldovan citizens have a positive image of the EU, representing an increase when compared to the previous year's report.

Figure 1. The EU's Image in Moldova



Source: 3rd wave Annual Survey Report for Moldova, 2018.

However, significant differences were found within most socio-demographic groups, reflecting the country's heterogeneity. Of the 48% that have a positive image of the EU, 95% are native Romanian speakers, 61% are young citizens, 75% classify as highly educated citizens and 62% reside in the centre of the country. Ethnic diversity is a significant feature of Moldova's population, as Table 2 illustrates, with different geopolitical orientations (Russia-led and Western-led), which in its turn reflects on the public perception of the EU.


Table 2. Ethnic structure of the population in Moldova - 2004 and 2014 censuses

	Persons		as % to the total		as % of total population that declared ethnicity	
	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014
Total population	3 383 332	2 804 801	100,0	100,0	x	x
<i>Population that declared ethnicity including</i>	3 369 312	2 754 719	99,6	98,2	100,0	100,0
Moldovans	2 564 849	2 068 058	75,8	73,7	76,1	75,1
Ukrainians	282 406	181 035	8,4	6,5	8,4	6,6
Russians	201 218	111 726	5,9	4,0	6,0	4,1
Gagauzs	147 500	126 010	4,4	4,5	4,4	4,6
Romanians	73 276	192 800	2,2	6,9	2,2	7,0
Bulgarians	65 662	51 867	1,9	1,8	1,9	1,9
Gypsies	12 271	9 323	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,3
Other ethnicities	22 130	13 900	0,7	0,5	0,7	0,5
<i>Population that not declared ethnicity</i>	14 020	50 082	0,4	1,8	x	x

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, 2014.

The AP and the AA are embedded in values. When it comes to values, the percentage of Moldovan citizens who have heard of the EU tend to associate all the values in the query with the EU, according to the survey's report, as follows:


Figure 2. Values strongly (or very strongly) associated with the EU and three most important personal values



Source: 3rd wave Annual Survey Report for Moldova, 2018.

The three most important personal values appointed for most of the respondents happen to be key topics in the Moldova-EU relations, strengthened over time with the AA and the DCFTA. Nonetheless, the most important personal value for 47% of the Moldovans is the absence of corruption, which is only strongly associated with the EU for 50% of the interviewees.


Figure 3. Opinion on the statement: “The EU fosters the preservation of traditional values in our society”



Source: 3rd wave Annual Survey Report for Moldova, 2018.

While over half of the respondents agree the EU fosters traditional values in Moldovan society, most respondents seem to be unsatisfied with the way democracy works in Moldova (81%). Nonetheless, there has been an improvement in the public satisfaction with democracy in Moldova since 2016. Even though it is not possible to establish a causal relation, the repercussions in society of the AA, which entered into force in 2016, may have been captured by the public opinion survey. Further improvements should be expected in the years to come.

Figure 4. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Moldova



Source: 3rd wave Annual Survey Report for Moldova, 2018.

The analysis of the public opinion survey prompts further connections related to identification with the EU. As Cram²⁴ puts it, conscious or explicit identification with the EU may also emerge in the latent political community as the EU becomes a meaningful presence for its citizens. The deepening in EU-Moldova relations beyond purely cooperation has also reflected in the population's perception and identification with EU's norms and values, as Figure 2 shows. The attachment and identification of the European public with the EU gives to its policies, norms and institutions legitimacy and compliance – and that is particularly true for the case of the neighbouring countries.

Also, it is important to note that a growing identification with the EU opposes the Russian identification still very present in the country.²⁵ Cram²⁶ states that to appreciate functional benefits, individuals must experience those benefits and for identification to occur they must relate those experiences and benefits to the level of authority concerned. The amounting of EU's actions in Moldova and cooperation between member-states and the country have certainly increased the reaped experiences and benefits by the population.

Discussion

The neighbourhood matters for the EU. Considering the former soviet countries, there is a strong influence from the EU regarding the geopolitical situation of the Eastern countries. EU's influence in the Eastern countries can be seen as a win-win game in the region. The EU spread its norms, institutions and compromises on the one hand; while on the other hand, the Eastern countries are benefited by the improvements in their economy, stability, democracy and external relationships.

Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the Europeanization measured by the *top-down* and *bottom-up* aspects in the case of Moldova. When more direct benefits are involved, the pace of change increases. EU's trade importance in Moldova grew after the episodes of Russia's sanctions against Moldova in 2014.²⁷ Back then, Russia had been Moldova's main trade partner, but the AA/DCFTA changed that. Thus, *top-down* Europeanization seems to occur without significant trouble in the economic cooperation and trade dimension.

24 CRAM, Laura - "Does the EU Need a Navel? Implicit and Explicit Identification with the European Union".

25 Given the ethnic differences, as previously mentioned.

26 *Idem, Ibidem.*

27 CALUS, Kamil - "Russian Sanctions Against Moldova. Minor effects, major potential".

Corruption is still a major issue in Moldova, and EU's influence in matters related to it is more limited. The WGI Control of Corruption indicator shows a deterioration trend from 2007 to 2017, indicating that despite EU's influence and the AA, benefits have not been reaped yet.

When it comes to democracy promotion, not coincidentally human rights and rule of law were the most important values identified by the survey respondents. Deutsch et al.²⁸ refer to a 'double process of habit-breaking', that is, the process through which citizens, exposed to the benefits available from a new level of governance, can start to break the habit of allegiance to the existing political unit. Thus, we could argue the more citizens are exposed to an EU-touched environment, the more the recognition that EU's values, norms and actions might coincide with the existing expectations. The expectations' fulfillment also promotes the legitimation of EU's institutions.

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28 DEUTSCH, Karl et. al - *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*.

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APPENDIX – Estimates

	VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY		POLITICAL STABILITY AND NO VIOLENCE		GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS		REGULATORY QUALITY		RULE OF LAW		CONTROL OF CORRUPTION	
	E	SD	E	SD	E	SD	E	SD	E	SD	E	SD
1996	0,02	0,24	0,01	0,41	-0,22	0,18	-0,07	0,31	-0,12	0,20	-0,44	0,28
2003	-0,49	0,15	-0,13	0,30	-0,67	0,20	-0,45	0,18	-0,52	0,18	-0,85	0,17
2005	-0,55	0,16	-0,40	0,31	-0,75	0,18	-0,46	0,16	-0,36	0,15	-0,67	0,14
2009	-0,30	0,14	-0,59	0,27	-0,56	0,22	-0,13	0,17	-0,44	0,14	-0,70	0,15
2010	-0,06	0,13	-0,38	0,26	-0,66	0,21	-0,10	0,17	-0,36	0,13	-0,67	0,14
2011	0,05	0,13	-0,05	0,25	-0,62	0,21	-0,08	0,16	-0,33	0,13	-0,62	0,14
2012	-0,03	0,12	0,05	0,23	-0,57	0,21	-0,10	0,17	-0,32	0,13	-0,61	0,13
2013	-0,07	0,12	0,00	0,24	-0,41	0,20	-0,07	0,17	-0,37	0,13	-0,75	0,13
2014	0,01	0,13	-0,16	0,20	-0,42	0,21	0,02	0,18	-0,25	0,14	-0,85	0,13
2015	0,03	0,13	-0,33	0,21	-0,65	0,22	-0,07	0,17	-0,35	0,14	-0,91	0,13
2016	-0,02	0,12	-0,30	0,21	-0,61	0,20	-0,11	0,17	-0,49	0,15	-0,95	0,13
2017	-0,03	0,13	-0,24	0,21	-0,51	0,20	-0,04	0,18	-0,41	0,14	-0,80	0,12

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on World Bank's WGI, 2019. E=estimates ranging from approximately -2.5(weak) to 2.5(strong) governance performance; SD=standard errors. Reasons for the selection of the years: 1996-the first year available; 2003-ENP creation; 2005-created an ENP AP for Moldova; 2009-EaP was created with impact on the intensification of relations between EU-Moldova.

The European Union and the creation of the new security periphery: the case of the Western Balkans

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) enlargement went through strong processes of Europeanisation that, apart from revealing the regulatory power of the EU, reflect its ability to transform the identity of those countries candidates to membership. Considered as one of the most important and successful instruments of foreign and security action, the succeeding enlargement policies to the East, particularly those of 2004 and 2007, represented a significant contribution for the establishment of an extended security community. An assessment on the countries of the West Balkans is presented, since their processes of accession to the EU now extend for more than a decade. The undeniable geopolitical and geostrategic significance, shown throughout history by the risks of spreading the internal conflicts across the European borders, make this region one of the most vital of the EU's periphery, to its security. In spite of this significance, the current "enlargement fatigue", motivated largely by the lack of consensus amongst member-states, drives away the countries of the Balkans from veering towards the EU, thereby rendering them more susceptible to the influence of foreign players, particularly that of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. In that context, it is argued that the EU, by setting aside the enlargement politic to the countries of the West Balkans, gives a deeply negative sign to the region, moving them away from the criteria established for the europeanization processes reached so far, and as a consequence, placing themselves under de influence of foreign players, circumstances which jeopardise the stability in the EU periphery.

Keywords: European Union, West Balkans, European Security, Europeanization.

Resumo

O alargamento da União Europeia (EU) tem sido acompanhado por intensos processos de europeização que, além de relevarem o poder normativo da União

Europeia, são o reflexo da sua capacidade em transformar a identidade dos países candidatos à integração. Sendo considerada como dos mais importantes e bem-sucedidos instrumentos da ação externa e de segurança da União Europeia, as sucessivas políticas de alargamentos a leste, em particular as de 2004 e 2007, contribuíram para a criação de uma extensa comunidade de segurança. Nesse âmbito, são analisados os países dos Balcãs Ocidentais, cujos processos de adesão à UE se estendem há mais de uma década. A inegável importância geopolítica e geoestratégica, demonstradas ao longo da história pelos riscos de contágio da conflitualidade interna atravessarem as fronteiras europeias, fazem da região uma das mais vitais da periferia da UE. Apesar desta importância, a atual fadiga de alargamento, motivada em grande parte pela falta de consenso político entre os Estados-membros, afasta os países dos Balcãs do rumo de aproximação à UE, tornando-se mais permeáveis às influências de atores externos, em particular da China, da Rússia, da Arábia Saudita, do Irão e da Turquia.

Neste contexto, o abandono da política de alargamento da UE aos países dos Balcãs Ocidentais constitui um sinal profundamente negativo para a região, levando-os a afastarem-se dos critérios definidos nos processos de europeização alcançados até ao momento e, por consequência, a entrarem na esfera de influência de atores externos, circunstâncias que são desfavoráveis à estabilidade na periferia da União Europeia.

Palavras-Chave: União Europeia, Balcãs Ocidentais, Segurança da Europa, Europeização

Introduction

The European Union (EU) evolution is closely associated with the integration and development among its members reached in several areas, namely political, economic and social. Regardless of the discussions involving the autonomy of each member state towards the European institutions and vice-versa, explained by the different theories of European integration, the advances accomplished in several areas are obvious and they've been integrated on the several revisions of the original Treaty. Besides the integration, EU's development can be seen through the growth of member-states, presently with 27 member-states, translating into broader geographic and cultural influence.

Sharing rules and values regarding democracy, the rule of law, good governance and observing human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities, is a fundamental pillar of the European identity¹ projected both internally and internationally representing a major part of the EU's normative power², in the relation with other players, particularly with States that are in the process of joining the EU.

1 MOLE, Richard C. M. - *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics*, p.160.

2 MANNERS, Ian - "Normative power Europe reconsidered"; DIEZ, "Normative Power as Hegemony".

When it comes to the relation with these States, Hooghe, Marks and Lavenex³ emphasize that the EU's political guidelines for the accession process, are meant to export its governance model, by conveying a set of values, regulations and specific decisions of the European institutions, to the decision making processes and national policies of the candidate States, at different levels. The ability of the EU to transform those entities, through the so-called "europeanization processes", has been therefore, central when dealing with matters related with the EU's enlargement and the making of a new periphery.

The enlargement to the eastern European countries, in 2004 and 2007, which included countries that were once part of the Soviet bloc, namely Poland, one of the largest member states, in terms of area, has opened a profound arguing about the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing an enlargement policy to new states, since a sort of "enlargement fatigue" has been identified related to the enlargement process to new member states⁴. A poll conducted by the Eurobarometer in 2018, points that a considerable portion of European citizens (46%) does not endorse the enlargement to other states, against 44% who do. However, the number of citizens having an opposite opinion regarding the enlargement policy is increasing, since the value in 2017 was 44% (an increase of 2% in just one year). This trend is more obvious in 11 of the member states, particularly in Austria (69% "against"), Germany (63%) and Finland (62%). In opposite direction, Spain (67%), Lithuania (66%), Poland and Romania (both with 65%) are those countries which stand by the integration of new states into the EU⁵.

Recently in Strasbourg, the French President Emmanuel Macron made public his reluctance towards the pursuit of the enlargement policy, by asserting that the EU needed to improve its own governance before admitting new member states. Macron yet justified his statement with concerns regarding migration, specially the one that comes from Albania, since the Albanian community is the second largest applying for asylum in France, emphasizing that it would be impossible for him to justify opening negotiations with that country to his fellow citizens, given those circumstances⁶. On the other hand, Hungary⁷, Italy⁸, Austria⁹ and particularly, Germany¹⁰, uphold the

3 HOOGHE, Liesbet; MARKS, Gary - *Multi-level governance and European integration*; LAVENEX, Sandra - "EU External Governance in Wider Europe".

4 ANASTASAKIS, Othon - "The EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans", p. 365; STEFANOVA, Boyka M. - *The European Union and Europe's new regionalism*, p. 80; KHAZE, Nina Markovic - "European Union's enlargement fatigue: Russia's and China's rise in Southeast Europe?"

5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION - "A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans", p.25.

6 FOUÉRIÉ, Erwan - "Macron's "Non" to EU Enlargement".

7 HUSZKA, Andrew - "Hungary".

8 FRONTINI, Andrea - "Italy".

9 ALGIERI, Franco - "Austria".

10 ADEBAHR, Cornelius; TÖGLHOFFER, Theresia - "Germany".

enhancement of political efforts towards the enlargement to the West Balkans region, a process that is currently ongoing¹¹, expressing the importance of that region to the EU, namely in what relates to security matters. Recently, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, claiming a geopolitical urgency, underlined the importance of speeding up the process of enlargement to the countries of the West Balkans, specially to the Republic of Northern Macedonia and to Albania¹².

History and the constant threat of ethnic conflicts in the West Balkans are traditionally related with the influence that these problems have in Europe's security¹³. Some member states have also showed their concern with the high levels of corruption and transnational organized crime, as well as migrant fluxes from the region¹⁴. These concerns with the security environment are referred in several strategic documents. In 2003, the EU Security Strategy identified a number of threats coming from the West Balkans, namely heroin traffic and women's sexual exploitation, crimes perpetrated by organized crime networks. In this document, the risk for the European security related to "collapsing states" in the region, is also pointed out¹⁵. Within the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, references are made, once more, to the challenges for the EU, regarding safety in the West Balkans, emphasizing migration, energetic security, terrorism and organized crime. In face of these challenges, the Global strategy refers, the EU "will continue to develop anti-terrorism cooperation, in the matter of respect for human rights"¹⁶.

Apart from the challenges posed by security related issues, the geostrategic and geopolitical characteristics of the Balkans, have also to be addressed. The region "is pivotal between three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa (...) as a crossroad of cultures and, historically, of disputes between empires"¹⁷. Given that position, the West Balkans experience the influence, apart from that of the EU, of other foreign players. Russia stands out, with a foreign policy for the region that is very dynamic¹⁸, but also China with economic interests, through the "belt and

11 MACDONALD, Alastair - "Western Balkans Need EU Path to Prevent New Wars".

12 BURCHARD, Hans von der - "Merkel: Albania, North Macedonia should get green light for EU talks".

13 GOMES, Teresa - "A democratização dos Balcãs: O caso da Macedónia", p. 69.

14 ZENELI, Valbona - "A European Future for the Balkans?"

15 COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN UNION - "Secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy", p.6.

16 EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION - "Share Vision, common action. A stronger Europe: a Global Strategy for European Union's foreign and security policy", p.16.

17 PEZARAT CORREIA, Pedro - *Manual de Geopolítica e Geoestratégia - Análise Geoestratégica do Mundo em Conflito II*, p.245.

18 MULAL, Muhidin; KARI, Mirsad - "The Western Balkans Geopolitics and Russian Energy Politics".

road initiative”¹⁹, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, all of them, with political and religious (ideological) interests in the West Balkans²⁰.

Bearing all this, the present article shows that there is an intimate relationship between the enlargement policies and changes operated by the EU on candidate states, having in the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria” their regulatory framework, and secondly, to point that the withdrawal of the West Balkans countries from the perspective of joining the EU, may have deep negative consequences for the EU security, making the region more prone to the intervention of other foreign players, namely Russia, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The paper is organized in three chapters, apart from the introduction and the conclusion. So, in the first chapter the relation between the enlargement process and the establishment of the so-called security communities. On the second chapter, the importance of the West Balkans for the EU is assessed, both in terms of security and geopolitics. Thirdly, the most meaningful relations between the EU and the countries of the West Balkans, with an emphasis in the changes at political and security level, that were implemented, under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) are addressed. Finally, an insight on the motivations of foreign players is given; when feasible, the main challenges posed by their presence, are also addressed. As an outlook, the main challenges for the EU in the West Balkans are presented, as an outcome of the purposes, intentions and influence that the foreign players have in order to achieve those same purposes.

Europeanization and the creation of the security communities

The concept of Europeanization, being a rather recent theory, is intimately associated with the enlargement processes²¹. Initially, the word was applied referring to the governance concurrence models within the member states²² and to the processes of transformation of domestic policies of those states by the EU²³. Bélanger²⁴ defines Europeanization as “part of the greatest project of creating a new political and legal European order”, hence it is essential to consider the political motivation of

19 TONCHEV, Plamen - “China’s Road: into the Western Balkans”.

20 VRAČIĆ, Alida - “Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans”.

21 RISSE, Thomas - “A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities”, p.3; LARSEN, Henrik - *Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU*, p. 22.

22 RISSE, Thomas - “A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities”, p.3.

23 LADRECH, Robert - “Europeanization and political parties: Towards a framework for analysis”, p. 387.

24 BÉLANGER, Marie-Eve - “Europeanization as a Foundation of the European Construction”, p.29.

the Europeanization, via the intersubjective creation of an European political space. For the quoted author, the European order is established by means of the Europeanization, being the essence of it, the enlargement of the political community, in a geographic sense.

Therefore, Europeanization is about the relation established between the European institutions and the states, through new sets of rules, regulations, procedures and structures that the member states have to embed in their own internal structures and regulations²⁵. The concept of Europeanization, related to foreign policy is implemented since the post-Cold War period, in order to establish the relationship between the EU and countries from Central and Eastern Europe, that initiated their accession processes, at the time. Since then, Europeanization was made mandatory to the candidates (and potential candidates), regarding the introduction of legislation, setting political priorities e reforms on the administration²⁶.

The so-called Copenhagen criteria, set in 1993 by the European Council, translate most of the Europeanization processes related to candidate countries, thus establishing that requirements laid down must be met, at a political level (human rights, rule of law, consolidated democratic institutions, respect and protection of ethnic minorities), economic (a market economy that really works and the ability to face competition and markets of the EU) and legal (ability to observe the duties arising from the accession, including the ability of an effective implementation of the rules and regulations which are part of the body of established Community law and adhering to objectives of a political, economic and monetary union).

Relating to candidate countries, the Europeanization is a process of structural transformation²⁷, having both the institutions and players a central part in these processes²⁸. This transformation represents, according with Borzel and Risse²⁹, an opportunity presented by the EU for the implementation of a “(re)socialization” and learning of the candidate countries. To support that transformation process, the EU uses incentive policies (comprising funding) that set the basis of a compliance policy, meaning, more funding requires more transformation (*more for more*)³⁰.

25 KALIBER, Alper - “Europeanization in Turkey”, p. 38.

26 CELATA, Filippo; COLETTI, Raffaella, p.19; OLSEN, Johan P. - “The Many Faces of Europeanization”.

27 OLSEN, Johan P. - “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, p.921; FEATHERSTONE, Kevin; KAZAMIAS, G. A. - *Europeanization and the southern periphery*, p.3.

28 COMAN, Ramona; CRESPI, A. - “Still in Search of Europeanization: From Limited to Structural Change?”, p.56.

29 BORZEL, Tanja; RISSE, Thomas - “When Europe Hits Home”.

30 GRABBE, Heather - *The EU's transformative power*; ELBASANI, Arolda - “Europeanization travels to the Western Balkans: enlargement strategy, domestic obstacles and diverging reforms”, p.5.

A recent paper by Licínia Simão³¹, a Portuguese researcher, draws a framework for the EU enlargement to the Southern Caucasus region. The author connects this movement with the need to create the so-called “security communities”, correlating the existence of “rogue states” in the vicinity of the EU with security issues inherent to those circumstances, therefore motivating the EU to “Europeanize” those countries, by means of a “peaceful change”³².

Karl Deutsch and other authors³³ specifically addressed the concept of the “security communities”, stating that its establishments pose a “real assurance that its members won’t fight between themselves, seeking to solve their disputes by means other than conflict”³⁴, thus creating a sort of “non-war community”³⁵. Besides, they state that establishing those communities allows the members to develop and deepen common values and identities, and institutions and dialogues that will integrate, peacefully, the views of the several states.

Related to this subject, the works of Mole³⁶ must be highlighted; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’s accession to the EU was analysed, identifying the changes in those countries’ security identities, aiming to counter Russia’s influence in that region; also, Rieker³⁷ addressed the way the EU affects the national security identities of the four largest Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). The latter author shows how the different stages of the accession process, post-cold war, had had an influence on the way those countries addressed their national security, underlining that the speed and features of those changes varied among these states, due to a combination of different connections with the EU and different traditions of their security policy.

The creation and enlargement of the EU, as it happens with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is thus seen as one of the most relevant examples of establishing security communities, while an enhanced instrument of cooperation, fostering interrelationships between the member states. By means of the enlargement, the EU produces a positive integration dynamics with other states, in order to develop common expectations and producing changes in security policies.

31 SIMÃO, Licínia - *The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy towards the South Caucasus Expanding the European Security Community*.

32 *Idem*, p.27.

33 DEUTSCH, Karl; et al. - *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, p. 6.

34 *Idem*, p. 5.

35 WAEVER, Ole - “Insecurity, Security and A security in the West European Non-War Community”.

36 MOLE, Richard C. M. - *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics*, p. 164.

37 RIEKER, Pernille – “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security”.

The geopolitical context of the West Balkans

Deriving from its geography, the West Balkans have been, throughout the history, one of the main stages in the feuds between major powers. Geopolitically, this sub-region has always been an important frontier between regions (Europe and Middle East, Europe and Asia), cultures and religions (Catholics, Christian Orthodox and Muslims). Huntington defined the region as one of the “fracture lines” of the “clash of civilizations”³⁸. This is also pointed by Bobic³⁹, arguing that the Balkan’s peninsula, due to its geopolitical configuration, establishes the connection between Western Christianity, Oriental Orthodoxy and the Islamic world.

Figura 1 – Países dos Balcãs Ocidentais



Fonte: www.GISreportonline.com

Brzezinski⁴⁰ has also emphasized the importance of the region, stating that it is a significant strongpoint for securing Eurasia’s control. Years later, the author underlines that the “Achilles heel” of the XXI century, geopolitically speaking, is the area that he designates as the “Global Balkans” – the strip of land of Eurasia, going from the Balkans to Central Asia, defining it as “unstable and a source of crisis”⁴¹. The geopolitical value of the West Balkans was also emphasized by Federica Mogherini, former responsible for the EU’s diplomacy; during a visit to Serbia, she highlighted the relevance of that sub-region to the EU’s stability, referring to it as a “geopolitical chessboard”, where

38 HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. - *O choque de civilizações*.

39 BOBIC, Marinko – “Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans”, p.88.

40 BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew - *The Grand Chessboard*.

41 BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew - *Strategic vision*, p.135.

several players, like Russia⁴², play an ever more active part, by means of their economic interests as well as their cultural bonds to the peoples of the West Balkans.

Apart from the influence that all the formerly mentioned players have in the region's stability, in the context of Europe's security, the West Balkans pose a potential threat, not in a military conventional sense, but regarding human (ins)security, since poor life conditions drives the natives from several of those regions to seek for a better life, elsewhere⁴³. In recent years, millions of refugees from Syria, Iraq and countries so far apart as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Libya, Southern Sudan and Yemen have reached the fringes of Europe, many of them passing through routes that cross the West Balkans, crossing the north of Greece, and passing through Albania, Serbia e Macedonia⁴⁴.

Regarding terrorism, the region has experienced a strong connection to fundamentalism and to the process of Islamic radicalization in particular. We have to bear in mind that during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (between 1992 and 1995), several hundreds of elements coming from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria and other regions from the Muslim world, also including veterans of the Afghani *Jihad*, fought in what they regarded as a holy war against the Christian Serbs. Although most of those fighters had left the region after the end of the conflict, their ideological influence remained in some areas⁴⁵.

Cultural diversity in the region has been signalled as one of the reasons for the exacerbation of the region's instability. If by one hand, Albania can be considered comparatively homogeneous, with very few minorities, on the other hand, in the Republic of Northern Macedonia, 42% of the population is made of minorities. The same can be noticed regarding Montenegro, with 33,6% and Serbia, with 34,5%. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is even more complex, where there are almost 2M Muslims, 1.364.000 Serbs, 752.00 Croatians, amongst other cultures and ethnicities⁴⁶. As a result of this diversity, most minorities have constantly sought to break the link with their adoptive states⁴⁷.

At a political and social level, high rates of poverty and corruption are known to facilitate the arising of severe crisis in almost every countries. Referring to the corruption in the area, Koinova⁴⁸ stresses that it is a legacy of a confluence of factors,

42 Upon arrival at the Serbian Parliament, Mogherini was booed by members of the radical Serbian nationalist party, who chanted: "Serbia! Russia! We don't need the European Union! (cit in RIEGERT, 2017).

43 BOBIC, Marinko - "Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans.", p. 98.

44 LILYANOVA, Velina - "The Western Balkans Frontline of the migrant crisis".

45 PREZELJ, Iztok - *The fight against terrorism and crisis management in the Western Balkans*.

46 SMIRNOVA, Nina; YASKOVA, Alla - "The Balkans and the Mediterranean policy of Russia", p. 275.

47 LESS, Timothy - "Western Balkan six on their path to EU membership?".

48 KOINOVA, Maria - *Ethnonationalist Conflict in Post communist States: Varieties of Governance in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Kosovo*, p.183.

reaching from the antagonism inherited by the states, after the ruling of the Ottoman Empire, to corrupt social relations during the communist period and to the effects of the international economic embargo to the former Yugoslavia, during the wars that led to its obliteration. Besides, the author emphasizes, corruption has been used by governments has a “strategic weapon” to maintain power and influence the states policies, conditioning minorities in order to serve the purposes of different players (both foreign and domestic). Apart from identifying the historical background of corruption, Mankoff⁴⁹ also approaches the way some of the leaders from West Balkans’ countries have reintroduced ethnic nationalism, in order to divert their population’s attention from corruption schemes, taking advantage of the ethnic tensions legacy and the conflicts that marred the region, back in the XX century’s nineties.

The decade of 1990 was one of the bloodiest periods in the Balkans’ history, with hundreds of thousands of victims, dead, wounded, displaced and refugees⁵⁰, which led to the intervention of the international community, evolving the NATO, the United Nations (UN) and the EU, in order to restore stability. The priority given to other parts of the globe, by successive American Administrations, specially to the Middle East, since the terrorist attack on 9/11 (2001), has made the US influence in the region, almost negligible. For De Vivo⁵¹, this option of the USA was much influenced by the enhancement of the EU’s intervention in the region, together with the cooperative relation established with Turkey. In spite of this apparent neglect, the region is still of interest for American companies, highlighting the contribution given by Americans in the defence and security sectors, namely providing training for military and security forces of most of the countries on that area, activities that are combined with defence equipment sales⁵².

Regarding Russia, the connection that Moscow maintains with most of the West Balkans is motivated by historical and cultural affinities with Slav communities⁵³. This affinity with the Orthodox Slavs has developed a feeling of protection from Russia⁵⁴. Beyond the interferences in matters related with security, deriving from geographic vicinity, Russia is engaged in securing free passage through the Bosphorus Strait, into the Mediterranean⁵⁵, thus assuring its presence in the area, namely in the Adriatic, using

49 MANKOFF, Jeffrey - *Russian Foreign Policy*.

50 There is still no precise data on the number of victims of the former Yugoslavia conflict, with different organisations revealing significantly different figures. In a report presented on the conflict The International Center for Transitional Justice, account of at least 140,000 dead. In <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Justice-Facts-2009-English.pdf>.

51 DE VIVO, Diana - “The Balkan chessboard: Russia’s ruble diplomacy and EU interests”.

52 SULKU, Mehmed - *Political Relations Between Turkey and Albania in the Post Cold War Period*, p.51.

53 DE VIVO, Diana - “The Balkan chessboard: Russia’s ruble diplomacy and EU interests”.

54 BECHEV, Dimitar – “The Influence of Russia and Turkey in the Western Balkans”.

55 SMIRNOVA; YASKOVA - “The Balkans and the Mediterranean policy of Russia”, p.268.

Montenegro as Host nation⁵⁶. In face of the geopolitical and geostrategic relevance of the West Balkans, the EU's enlargement to the countries in the region is seen by Russia as a potential threat to its interests and influence. Therefore, Moscow's diplomacy have been engaged in refraining countries from the West Balkans, from adhering the organization⁵⁷, fearing the enlargement's impact in the whole of the post-soviet area⁵⁸.

Another of the players that has a keen interest in the area, is Turkey. As Russia, the Turkish connection, and that of the Gulf States, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, is due to the cultural relations with the near nine million Muslims of the West Balkans, which make them the majority of the Albanian population, in Kosovo and in Bosnia. During the war on Bosnia, Turkey secretly delivered weapons to the Bosnians, in spite of the UN's embargo⁵⁹ ⁶⁰.

Sustained by the connections (permanent) of geography, history and culture, Turkey uses *soft power* instruments in order to assert itself in the West Balkans⁶¹. The establishment of the *Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency* (TİKA) has given a major contribution for the development of Turkey's strategy. Related to this, the construction and restoring Mosques in several countries in the area, including the building of the greatest Mosque in the region, in Tirana (Albania), deserves to be considered. The establishment, in 1996, of the *South-East European Cooperation Process* (SEECP)⁶², which aims to promote stability, security and cooperation among member states (Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldavia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia) by promoting mutual dialog and multi-level cooperation in all areas of interest, is another of the opportunities for Ankara to establish its influence. Bobic and Lami⁶³ argue that the Turkish influence in the West Balkans has aroused great concern in Europe and America, regarding Ankara's ambition to re-establish the sphere of influence of the late Ottoman Empire.

For the EU, Turkey could be a countervailing power to Iran and Saudi Arabia's influence in the region, that promotes a broader islamisation in the area. However, the ever more distancing of Turkey from the West and from the possibility of joining the EU, has risen fear in Brussels towards Erdogan's, *Justice and Development Party* (AKP) pro-Islamic and undemocratic policies⁶⁴.

56 BOBIC, Marinko – "Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans", p.102–3.

57 VAN DEN BERG, Hans Bastiaan – "Russia, Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina", p.43.

58 SAMORUKOV, Maxim – "Russia's Tactics in the Western Balkans. Carnegie Europe Report".

59 BOBIC, Marinko – "Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans", p.100.

60 LAMI, Blendi – "Geo-culture as a Turkish foreign policy tool for influence in Albania", p.35.

61 *Idem*, p.29.

62 In: <https://www.rcc.int/pages/111/south-east-european-cooperation-process--seecp>

63 BOBIC, Marinko – "Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans", p.99; LAMI, Blendi – "Geo-culture as a Turkish foreign policy tool for influence in Albania", p.31.

64 BOBIC, Marinko – "Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans", p.101.

Unlike other players, whose geographic vicinity emphasizes the security dimension, China's presence in West Balkans countries, besides being relatively recent, has in its essence, economic motivations. During the wars that followed the collapse of former Yugoslavia, China took a neutral stand and endorsed the decisions of the UN's Security Council. Beijing's diplomacy was, however, rather displeased when the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed during NATO's operation in 1999, against Serbia⁶⁵. Economically, Chinese investment on countries from the West Balkans has been rising, particularly in Serbia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding Serbia, from 2012 to 2014, the increase in the investment rate, has reached two digits, funding major projects in infrastructure and energy⁶⁶.

Geopolitically, China's economic and commercial links with the West Balkans are a major contribution to the "New Silk Road", providing maritime and land access of Chinese products to the European market. *Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations* has recently conducted an assessment on the "New Silk Road", highlighting the strong investment made by Beijing in infrastructure on the West Balkans and on the Black Sea. The authors point out that the Chinese power to transform specific sectors such as energy and transportation, is tremendous⁶⁷.

Figura 2 – Transport infrastructure and Chinese investment in western Balkans



Fonte: www.GISreportonline.com

65 TONCHEV, Plamen – "China's Road: into the Western Balkans", p.2.

66 ANASTASAKIS, Othon; DREZOV, Kyril; KONESKA, Cvete – "Written evidence - Othon Anastasakis, Kyril Drezov and Cvete Koneska"; TONCHEV, Plamen – "China's Road: into the Western Balkans", p.2.

67 BASTIAN, Jens – "The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the "Balkan Silk Road"", p.39; VOJVODIC-MEDIC, Filip – "How to Live with China in the Balkans".

These economic relations have been accompanied by a number of diplomatic initiatives by China, being the liberalization of the visa program, a sound example. Serbia and Macedonia's Foreign Offices (and also those of Greece and Hungary), have accelerated the visa procedure in the respective diplomatic delegations in Beijing⁶⁸.

In 2012, China developed an initiative known as "16 + 1"⁶⁹, meant to promote Chinese cooperation with 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including West Balkans countries, namely Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina⁷⁰. This initiative, apart from strengthening the political and economic relation with the countries of the West Balkans, is also a facilitator for the establishment of Chinese language learning centres, in that region⁷¹. In spite of this engagement, and unlike Russia, China appears to have no interest in moving away the countries of the West Balkans from joining the EU, since that very same process, favours their commercial and cooperation interests, due to the easy access to the European markets, if the enlargement occurs⁷².

Chinese increasing influence is the motto that German diplomacy uses to try to accelerate the countries of the West Balkans' integration into the EU, by establishing, on an early stage, the so-called "Berlin process" and, in 2017, through its enhancement (Berlin Plus), which is meant to increase funding to countries interested in infrastructure and other development projects⁷³. Therefore, the German Chancellor is very sensitive to the geopolitical issues of the region, having shown mistrustful towards Chinese influence, and has even alerted not only for the economic, but also political interference of Beijing in the region⁷⁴.

West Balkans geopolitical context is extremely complex, resulting from several players that have an influence on the region, their multiple interests (usually conflicting) and sensitive, due to the permanent exploitation of cultural issues, especially those related to religion.

The power of the EU in the West Balkans

The date that the EU opened negotiations with most of the countries of the West Balkans, is already distant. In 1999, the EU launched the Stabilization and

68 BASTIAN, Jens – "The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the "Balkan Silk Road"", p.39.

69 Informação disponível em: <http://ceec-china-latvia.org/>. [Acedido 07 de fevereiro de 2020]

70 VUKSANOVIC, Vuk – "The Unexpected Regional Player in the Balkans: China".

71 BASTIAN, Jens – "The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the "Balkan Silk Road"", p.39.

72 VUKSANOVIC, Vuk – "The Unexpected Regional Player in the Balkans: China".

73 METUSHAJ, Mirela – "Geopolitics of Albania in the Balkans after NATO Membership", p.401.

74 SEKULARAC, Ivana; BACZYNSKA, Gabriela – "EU woos Western Balkans but is coy on membership. Reuters world news".

Association Process (SAP)⁷⁵, which is the mainframe for the relations between the EU and the countries of the West Balkans (European Parliament, 2018). The EU's initial approach regarding the integration to the West Balkans was made public for the first time, in June 2000, at the European Council held at Feira (Portugal), defining that integration, to be as broad as possible for the West Balkans, adding that those countries "are potential candidates to join the EU" (Council of European Union 2000: point 74).

In 2003, at the European Council in Salonica (Greece), the EU has reiterated its "determination to endorse totally and effectively the European approach of the West Balkans' countries, who will become an integrant part of the EU, once the Copenhagen criteria are met" (Council of European Union 2000: point 40). In this council, EU Ministers adopted a new agenda for the West Balkans, which included five key elements: enhancement of measures to consolidate peace and promote stability and democratic development; greater integration with the EU through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP); greater cooperation in the fight on organized crime pertaining Justice and Internal Affairs (JAI); economic development; increase of support to reconciliation and strengthening cooperation.

From that date onwards, the political dialogue between the EU and West Balkans' countries has included issues regarding foreign policy and common security⁷⁶. In June 2008, the European Council explicitly made a reference to the adhesion, by conveying its "full support to the European approach of the West Balkans' countries", taking into account "the robust progress on economic and political reforms and by meeting the mandatory conditions and requirements (...) all of the potential candidates in the West Balkans should reach the status of candidate" (Council of European Union 2008: point 52). In February 2018, the European Commission released a new strategy for the West Balkans, announcing that two countries (Montenegro and Serbia) were able to join the EU until 2025.

The possibility of joining the EU has been beneficial for the security in the West Balkans, especially by solving conflicts amongst states of that region, having the EU taken a significant role as intermediate. As examples of this, the establishment of an agreement between Montenegro and Serbia regarding borders, and the restrain-

⁷⁵ The Stabilisation and Association Process is the strategic framework for supporting the progressive approximation of the Western Balkan countries to the EU. It is based on bilateral contractual relations, financial assistance, political dialogue, trade relations and regional cooperation. Contractual relations take the form of Stabilization and Association Agreements (EEA), which provide for political and economic cooperation, as well as the creation of free trade areas with the countries concerned. On the basis of common democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, each EEA establishes permanent cooperation structures. The Stabilization and Association Council, which meets at ministerial level every year, oversees the implementation and implementation of the agreement.

⁷⁶ PHINNEMORE, David – "The Stabilization and Association Process: a framework for European Union enlargement", p.25.

ing of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU has also been fundamental to alleviate the differences about the border, between Kosovo and Serbia, Greece and Albania; also on the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church, that brought tension in the relations of Montenegro and Kosovo with Serbia⁷⁷.

The prospect of integrate the EU was also significant for the resolution of the conflict between the Albanian Liberation Army and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 2001. The signature, on August the 13th of that year of the Ohrid Framework Agreement⁷⁸ put an end to violence in Macedonia, in the same year the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU was signed. Recently, the EU gave a major contribution to solve the dispute that for decades, opposed Greece to the Republic of Northern Macedonia, because of the previous designation of the Republic (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The political agreement achieved between both parts was motivated, largely to the possibility of the Republic of Northern Macedonia to join the EU⁷⁹.

Apart from the improvement in the relations between the countries of the region, the EU has sought to alter the policies followed by those countries, in order to promote a political dialogue regarding foreign policy, security and defence of the EU, in line with the EU statements, and taking part of whatever actions, sanctions e restrictive measures to be agreed upon. As an example, it is important to highlight the active part of Albanian contingents in Crisis Management Missions in the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), namely EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EUTM in the Mali. The country has also volunteered to contribute with military personnel for the EU Battle Groups, in 2024. The involvement in police and military actions of the EU, equally extends to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Republic of Northern Macedonia. Since 2017, two Bosnian military take part in the EU's training mission in the Central African Republic. Contingents from Bosnia and Herzegovina also take part in UN and NATO missions in Congo, Mali and Afghanistan⁸⁰.

Over the years, internally, West Balkans' countries have, been "seduced" by the EU to implement changes to their legal system and institutions, in compliance with European norms, particularly relating to matters regarding security and defence. It is important to stress the changes enforced by Albania that, in February 2019, adopted a new national strategy for small arms calibre control and light weaponry, for

77 HUSZKA, Beáta - *The Power of Perspective*.

78 Framework Agreement. Macedonia, 2001. Disponível em: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/framework_agreement_ohrid_130801_en.pdf.

79 Sobre este assunto ver CRUZ, A "nova" República da Macedónia do Norte: significado Geopolítico e Geoestratégico. Disponível em: <https://cidium.ium.pt/docs/artigos/56amjln6fxssgwgwg.pdf>.

80 EUROPEAN COMMISSION – "Bosnia 2019 Report", p.170.

2019-2024. The country as also signed the regional roadmap for a solution regarding illegal weapons possession, unauthorized use and small arms and ammunition trafficking in the West Balkans. As also enforced, a wide set of measures related to arms control by Police Forces, in line with the EU compulsory requirements. We can also notice the enforcement of these measures by the rest of the countries in the region, pertaining arms control⁸¹. The progresses made in other areas are also noticeable: justice and fundamental rights; freedom and security; press and education, amongst other examples, which reflect the EU's ability to transform.

Therefore, accession processes have been one of the main drivers of progress in the West Balkans. The outlook of joining the EU, encourages the states to implement reforms in several sectors, from politics, to economy, but specially related to security and defence⁸².

The enlargement fatigue and security consequences

The EU played a significant role in solving ethnic conflicts and bilateral challenges in the region. However, the limits of its influence were also made clear⁸³, largely motivated by the lack of political consensus between the member states regarding the entrance of new members, as if caused by a sort of “fatigue” towards the enlargement, and that has been delaying the negotiation and accession processes. During these last few years, the EU has been engaged in handling domestic problems, caused by the 2007 financial crisis, by the abandon of the Union by one of the more important member-states, the United Kingdom, by the management of the relations with the USA and with the Russian Federation, especially after Crimea's annexation (2014), e above all, in trying to deepen the political integration, as a way to overcome severe constraints to its decision making process.

As a result of this “internal crisis”, the identity transformation process of the West Balkans' countries has been rather slackened. From the West Balkans side, the stifling to the EU intervention has increased, being patent the progressive lack of commitment of the several states in implementing reforms in the security sector demanded by the EU⁸⁴. Apart from the elites, who increasingly resist the demand for liberal reforms in their respective countries, also the population have shown opposition to any reforms whatsoever that impair the basic social contract, given the

81 EUROPEAN COMMISSION – “Albania 2019 Report”, p.96.

82 HOUSE OF COMMONS – “Global Britain and the Western Balkans”, p.5.

83 HUSZKA, Beáta - *The Power of Perspective*.

84 BALKANS POLICY RESEARCH GROUP – “A decade after EULEX: a new approach to improve the rule of law in Kosovo”.

recent experience of Croatia and Greece, where joining the EU has coincided with economic recession, social unrest and massive migration⁸⁵, having as a consequence the increase in the overall suspicion regarding the EU process⁸⁶.

In face of this context, lately, there very few developments regarding the accession criteria to the EU. Difficulties have been reported in the transposition of European proposals regarding interagency coordination and cooperation, of the legal and police structures, which has jeopardized the ability to fight terrorism, organized crime (in particular, the one connected with arms and drug trafficking) and the borders control.

The relation between the countries of the region has also not improved, in spite of the progresses already achieved. The tensions between Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have been made clear, with this latter state imposing 100% tariffs on all imports from the former⁸⁷. These relations are still based in political and cultural affinities amongst the different players, with the EU unable to achieve the expected impact in the improvement of those relations. Besides, and regarding foreign and security policies, the alignments are still motivated at large by the traditional geopolitical alliances. The Commission highlights this issue on the several reports on the progress of the accession process, pointing Serbia as maintaining that alignment with Russia and Venezuela, instead of complying with the EU recommendations⁸⁸.

The impairment of the progress in the accession and the consequential retirement of the West Balkans from the prospect of joining the EU, increasingly nurture the idea that the region may become one of the biggest security problems for the EU, notably terrorism and organized criminality, and also the possibility of the states fall under authoritarian regimes⁸⁹, resistant to European ruling power e very opened to outside players influence, and look with apprehension the outlook of integration into the EU as posing restrictions to their geopolitical aspirations.

Related with security matters, apart from the illegal migration, terrorism and drug trafficking, and of a trajectory leading to the arising of new forms of nationalisms and unstable governments, instability in the region will have a profound impact on European borders, as History showing that the consequences can be very serious. From 2012, resulting from several incidents, hundreds of convicts escaped imprisonment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, most of them still with its

85 LESS, Timothy – “Western Balkan six on their path to EU membership?”.

86 ANASTASAKIS, Othon; DREZOY, Kyril; KONESKA, Cvete – “Written evidence - Othon Anastasakis, Kyril Drezov and Cvete Koneska”.

87 EUROPEAN COMMISSION - “Kosovo Report”. Brussels: European Commission, 2019, p. 54.

88 EUROPEAN COMMISSION - “Serbia Report”, Brussels: European Commission, 2019, p. 92.

89 KHAZE, Nina Markovic – “European Union’s Enlargement Fatigue: Russia and China Rise in Southeast Europe”, p.49.

whereabouts unknown. Some sources state that over 1.000 foreign fighters from the region have left for the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. Although some progress has been made by the states of the region, regarding antiterrorism laws, radicalization is still a major concern⁹⁰.

An escalation of the instability would jeopardise the EU role in the region, impairing even more the possibility for the West Balkans countries to comply with the requirements necessary to achieve the status of member-state. Only the possibility of joining the EU will keep the West Balkans on the track, and able to resist pressure from the outside. Therefore, it is mandatory that accession deadlines be established, with achievable objectives, for each one of those countries. As an example, Montenegro has moved forward more significantly than its peers, but after 54 months has only been able to conclude 3 of the 33 chapters of the negotiation process with the EU. Likewise, Serbia has only concluded 2 chapters, and another 21 still have to be initiated. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Kosovo, are not even candidates to the accession, 15 years after EU leaders agreed upon the enlargement to the West Balkans⁹¹.

For these deadlines and objectives to be reached, the EU must also find a political consensus so that the current internal difference regarding the enlargement to the West Balkans might be overcome. In spite of each of the 27 member states might have divergent interests, with the countries closer to the eastern border being more favourable, given the fear that they may be the first ones to be harmed by an increase in insecurity, unlike those which are further apart, for whom the entry of more states can make the decision making processes more complex, besides altering the quota system of the Community's budget, it is mandatory to define a European vision. Beside these issues, the political and social fears regarding the integration of culturally distinct cultures, especially in religious practices, seem obvious. This may have been the main reason for the successive postponement of Turkey's accession to the EU, situation that led to the degradation of the relations and the distancing between Ankara and Brussels.

Serbia's President, Aleksander Vučić, is being focused in his country's accession to the EU, since he believes this is the best way to the political and economic revival of the country. This is significant because Vučić has dampening Serbian nationalism in order to assure European good will. The risk is that, if the enlargement is kept on hold, Vucic can be politically influenced to uphold the Serbian nationalism, or himself promote a change on his policy – something which is plausible taking into account his hard-line attitude, back in the nineties⁹². So, the region

90 BRITISH COUNCIL – “Written evidence British Council”.

91 LESS, Timothy – “Western Balkan six on their path to EU membership?”.

92 LESS, Timothy – “Western Balkan six on their path to EU membership?”.

is affected by a new phase of instability, with democratic regimes immersed in a profound crisis of values, with states all over the region being captured by internal and foreign interests, together with the repeated tensions between states and the rising of nationalism. All the countries in the region experience high levels of corruption and increasing levels of poverty. Unemployment amongst youths is at one of the highest rates in the world⁹³.

Bearing these vulnerabilities, the region's permeability to the intervention of foreign players, particularly that of Russia, whose relation is composed of many features: political and diplomatic, historical and cultural, energy and economic interests, soft power (including cultural, educational and religious cooperation), information operations and infiltration of the local media, connections with politicians, military and Intelligence cooperation⁹⁴. Moscow's regime thus seems to be willing to do whatever it can to upset the West Balkans path towards stability and democracy, this being verified by the support given to the attempt of *coup d'état* in Montenegro, in 2016, and the reports on Russian attempts of supplying weapons to militia groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁹⁵.

In Macedonia, since the beginning of the political crisis in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its influence, causing inter-ethnic tensions. In Serbia, concerns about freedom of the Press are worsened by the influence of Sputnik Magazine⁹⁶ (*Sputnik Srbija*), the source of news which is more often quoted in the country, and that has been spreading to other countries in the West Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia and Montenegro)⁹⁷. Anti-westerns and pro-Russian remarks have significantly increased, and along with it, the strengthening of the "pan-slav/orthodox solidarity". In Bosnia, Russia has supported destabilising activities and anti-Dayton agreements, of political leaders from the *Republika Srpska* (RS). That included the illegal referendum, in 2015, about the celebration of a RS national day. In February 2018, stories in the Bosnian press about weapons acquisition to the country's Police Force, nurtured the fear of an increased Russian influence, as well as the visit to the RS, of a Russian motorbike gang called "Night Wolves", in March⁹⁸.

This interference of foreign players has influenced, in several ways and intensities, the stability of the countries of the West Balkans, questioning the present role of the EU in the region e especially, endangering the developments achieved.

93 BRITISH COUNCIL – "Written evidence British Council".

94 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE – "Written evidence Foreign and Commonwealth Office".

95 HOUSE OF COMMONS – "Global Britain and the Western Balkans", p.7.

96 <https://sputniknews.com/>.

97 ASSENOVA, Margatita – "Russia's International Broadcasters".

98 FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE – "Written evidence Foreign and Commonwealth Office".

Conclusion

Issues related with security, are abreast with those related with economy and made the solid foundations for the establishment and strengthening of the EU, as a relevant political entity. The achievements accomplished in the scope of security and defence, which can be seen in actions taken under the Common Security and Defence Policy make unlikely a violent conflict between member states.

The EU enlargement policy has made a clear contribution to the reinforcement of its international status, and to the establishment of a real security community. Through this, the EU has sought to “Europeanise” structures both in member states and also in candidate states, in line with the regulations and values that make for the European identity. The success of the implemented measures was particularly clear in the post-Cold War period, by transforming authoritarian political systems into liberal democracies.

The political, economic and security crises that have been affecting the EU and its member states have profoundly changed the European view on the enlargement of the security community, integrating new states, in particular those of the West Balkans, to whom was promised a possibility of accession. The commitment made, and the positive economic outlook of the integration, has made possible significant changes in the relationship between the states of the region, which is historically very tense, and in each country internal structures (political, economic, legal, military and constabulary).

In addition, the possibility of integration, allowed realigning the geopolitical orientation of the region, by making these states less prone to suffer influence by foreign players.

These last years, have been characterised by setbacks in the Europeanisation processes, as a result of the “enlargement fatigue”. The lack of consensus between member states, backed by domestic public opinion, which tend to see the integration of the West Balkans’ countries as a threat to their security, especially coming from organized crime, mass migration and profound cultural clash, has restrained the developments once achieved.

The void of power brought by European indecision and created by the absence of a clear political commitment with the region, thus leading to the reforms “fatigue” and setbacks in the region, opened space for the interference of foreign players, preventing the possibility of enlargement of the European security community, considered to be one of the most successful foreign and security policies of the EU, making it harder to implement in the West Balkans. Security challenges identified by the most sceptical ones, regarding the enlargement, may be severely increased, if the EU ceases to have any influence in the area. In addition to the escalation of

quarrels between the states of that region, the surge of transnational organized crime organization's influence, radicalisms and extremisms, besides nationalisms rooted in ethnic matrixes, can pose a serious security challenge for the Europeans, one that only the enlargement of the periphery in general, and of the security communities in particular can assist in mitigate.

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Housing policies in Portugal and Italy: a center-periphery discussion?

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Abstract

This study analyzes the housing policies enacted in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century in Portugal and Italy to understand whether the comparison between the two countries' housing domains reflects a divide between the “center” and the “periphery,” or, on the contrary, can be observed as “between peripheries.” This article stems from a comprehensive literature review on the topic, which is divided into a theoretical discourse on housing, a general European housing scenario, and a historical and contemporary framework of housing policies in Portugal and Italy. The literature review seeks to identify the economic and sociocultural singularities of the two countries through official laws and statistical data. Within a fundamentally theoretical comparative observation, this work aims to identify whether Italy and Portugal are contrasting realities within the housing domain—that is, with housing characteristics typical of the center (Italy) or the periphery (Portugal)—or represent two similar realities that integrate the peripheral context of Europe.

Keywords: Portugal, Italy, Housing policies, European Studies

Resumo

Este artigo analisa as políticas de habitação promulgadas na segunda metade do século XX e no início do século XXI em Portugal e na Itália, de modo a perceber se a comparação entre os domínios habitacionais dos dois países reflete uma divisão entre o “centro” e a “periferia” ou, pelo contrário, pode ser considerada como “entre periferias”. Este artigo resulta de uma ampla revisão da literatura sobre o tema, sobre o discurso teórico sobre a habitação, o panorama geral da habitação europeia e um quadro histórico e contemporâneo das políticas habitacionais em Portugal e na Itália.

A revisão da literatura pretende identificar as singularidades económicas e socioculturais dos dois países por meio de legislações oficiais e dados estatísticos. Através de uma observação comparativa fundamentalmente teórica, este trabalho visa identificar se Itália e Portugal são realidades contrastantes no domínio da habitação, ou seja, com características habitacionais típicas do centro (Itália) ou da periferia (Portugal), ou se representam duas realidades semelhantes que integram o contexto periférico da Europa.

Palavras-chave: Portugal, Itália, Políticas habitacionais, Estudos Europeus

Introduction

The debate of the eighth annual “Europe and the World” meeting is based on the theme “Europe of the Center and the Peripheries,” which pertains to the existence of a “two-speed Europe” where the “center” moves faster than the “peripheries” rather than a unified continent that moves at the same pace.

Central Europe is generally made up of countries including Germany, France, and Italy, which, together with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (“*Blue Banana*”), were the founders of the European Economic Community.¹ The “peripheries” in Europe refer to the southern countries, including Portugal, and Eastern Europe; these areas normally have a lower per capita gross domestic product and are subject to decisions made by the center.

However, this subdivision does not apply to all fields: firstly, Europe does not have authority in all subjects, but some economic and political options are exclusive to the national competence; secondly, some sectors overturn the idea that certain countries are always part of the center or the peripheries. Being national authority, welfare studies—and specifically housing studies—provide an example of where these subdivisions do not apply.

Starting from research already developed by the authors and based on a comparative housing analysis in Portugal and Italy,² the objectives of this paper are to understand the housing policies adopted in Portugal and Italy placed within a European framework and to interpret the current housing dynamics in the post 2008 crisis period to propose future perspectives.

The paper is divided into three parts: i) the general discourse of housing, viewed as a fundamental right, as a “wobbly pillar” of the welfare state, and as a specific model in Southern Europe; ii) an examination based on the main housing

1 BRUNET, Roger (dir.) - *Les villes Européennes: Rapport pour la DATAR*.

2 DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Social housing in Portugal and Italy: methodological issues and empirical inferences of a comparative study”; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Lessons from Corviale: from the critical factors of Public Housing Plans towards a methodology for urban regeneration”; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Housing policies beyond numbers: a comparative study in Portugal and Italy”.

characteristics of the 27 European countries to identify whether the division between the center and the periphery still makes sense in the housing sector; and iii) a comparison among housing policies in Portugal and Italy, performed from both a historical and contemporary point of view through a brief genealogy of the housing policies and ending with the current problems after the 2008 crisis.

Through an analysis of publicly accessible literature and statistical data, this study aims to execute a systematic comparison of the policies of both countries to answer the following research question: are Italy and Portugal countries of the center or of the peripheries when we analyze the housing field?

The purpose of this paper is not to demonstrate which of the two countries has been more successful, but rather to understand how the countries are situated within the European framework and to learn from the comparison between the two. This approach allows to contribute theoretically to the literature of comparative housing studies in Southern Europe, which is less studied compared to Northern Europe and is often considered “a semi-peripheral region and not at the fore-front of international interest and discussion”.³

The general discourse of housing

The “right to housing” is outlined in several international protocols, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 that serves as a common ideal to be achieved by all nations. The Declaration refers to the right to housing in Article 25: “1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”

In addition to the 1948 Declaration, the right to housing is included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, which was signed by 170 parties, including Portugal (signed in 1976 and ratified in 1978) and Italy (signed in 1967 and ratified at 1978). It refers to housing in Article 11, which states: “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (...).”

Along with these protocols, other international pacts denote the right to housing, such as the 1965 European Social Charter (from the Council of Europe), which was revised in 1996, and which Portugal and Italy both signed and ratified.

3 BARGELLI, Elena, HEITKAMP, Thorsten (eds.) - *New developments in Southern European Housing*.

In looking at similar legislation in the European Union, we can highlight the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which came into effect with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The charter includes the right to housing in Article 34, which highlights a reducing view and relates to social exclusion, social security, and social assistance: “3. In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources (...).”

Regarding national fundamental laws, there are important differences between Portugal and Italy. Contrary to Italy, the right to housing is cited in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (1976) in Article 65, which states that “Everyone has the right for himself and his family to have an adequately sized dwelling that provides hygienic and comfortable conditions and preserves personal and family privacy.” The Portuguese Constitution not only ensures the right to housing, but it also directly refers to the support of “housing cooperatives,” “local communities,” and “self-construction,” among other similar structures. This constitutional assurance is often viewed as progressive and avant-garde from the political perspective.⁴ However, as we observe in the following sections, the promise of the right to housing in the Portuguese Constitution does not mean that housing policies have been a complete success.

In Italy, the right to housing is not explicitly stated in the Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948); for example, Article 47 only refers to the encouragement of home ownership, asserting that “(...) The Republic promotes house and farm ownership and direct and indirect shareholding in the main national enterprises through the use of private savings.”

Thus, a clear distinction is made between the value placed on the right to housing in the two countries’ fundamental laws: while in Portugal the right to adequate housing for families is defined, in Italy it seems that home ownership is the only form of access to housing that is promoted by the State.⁵

In recent decades, the right to housing has been identified as an important concept to guarantee decent housing to a population, especially in the context of the welfare state.⁶ As Bengtsson⁷ suggests, the right to housing can be understood through two interpretations: i) “selective” housing policy, in which the State takes a relatively reducing position, and ii) “universal” housing policy, in which the State assumes

4 FARHA, Leilani - *Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context*.

5 DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca; ANTUNES, Gonalo - “Housing policies beyond numbers: a comparative study in Portugal and Italy”.

6 BRATT, Rachel; STONE, Michael; HARTMAN, Chester - *A right to housing – foundation for a New Social Agenda*; JONES, Colin.; MURIE, Alan - *The right to buy: analysis and evaluation of a housing policy*.

7 BENGTSSON, Bo - “Housing as a social right: Implications for Welfare State Theory”.

several policies to contribute to accessible housing. In examining the fundamental laws, we could posit that the Portuguese Constitution takes a more universal approach to housing policy and the Italian Constitution a more selective one. Nonetheless, as we will see, the intentions outlined in the fundamental laws and the policies created to achieve them do not always have a linear connection.

The right to housing is implemented within the housing policies of each country and according to the welfare state system in particular, which aims to guarantee social rights and services in health care, public education, social security, and access to housing. As opposed to other welfare fields, housing is considered the “wobbly pillar of welfare,” as it is the sector with less national investment and is subordinate on the neoliberal and market logic.⁸

As we have mentioned, public action in housing can be classified as either “universal,” in which the government regulates the market to allow access to housing to all income groups, or “selective,” which intervenes on the poorest and most vulnerable segment of the population. These general approaches are specifically articulated through welfare regimes and systems⁹ which are well explained in the most famous taxonomy of Esping-Anderson¹⁰. However, this taxonomy is outdated and inadequate for this study due to the fact that it is based on the study of 1980s societies and considers only quantitative parameters—namely, the relationship between the State and the market based on income maintenance systems—paying little attention to qualitative indicators and sociocultural data.

For this reason, the housing literature on Southern European countries is more in line with our study.¹¹ This literature describes a fourth regime for these countries in which the concept of (extended) family has a fundamental influence on housing access and production. Through the family is possible to undertake housing self-promotion linked to rural self-construction tradition in order to maintain and to protect one’s own property and to provide houses for family members as well as a second home for the holidays. This policy was buoyed by the weak legal control of land use; the absence of a large sector of social policies; and the large, irregular, and informal job market, which highlights the significant difference among the overprotected and the

8 TORGESEN, Ulf - “Housing: the Wobbly Pillar under the Welfare State”; MALPASS, Peter; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy and practice*; MULLINS, David; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy in the UK*; LOWE, S. - *The housing debate*.

9 KEMENY, Jim - “Comparative housing and welfare: Theorising the relationship”.

10 ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gosta - *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

11 ALLEN, Judith; BARLOW, James, LEAL, Jesús; MALOUTAS, Thomas; PADOVANI, Liliana - *Housing and welfare in Southern Europe*; ALLEN, Judith - “Welfare regimes, welfare systems and housing in Southern Europe”; BARGELLI, Elena, HEITKAMP, Thorsten (eds.) - *New developments in Southern European Housing*; BARGELLI, Elena, HEITKAMP, Thorsten; SIMÓN-MORENO, Héctor; VARELA, Carmen (eds.) - *Housing policy and tenure types in the 21st century. A Southern European Perspective*.

underprotected. Since young people are often underprotected, the family intervenes, becoming the true third actor in access to housing aside from the State and the market.

In addition to the work-home relationship, housing is in synergy with other dimensions of welfare such as the social security system. Those who own a house are able to save more for old age in the long term than those who do not, as the low pensions in these two countries would not cover the expense of renting a home. Therefore, homeownership is recognized as a secure and long-term investment for the current family economy and for old age.¹²

As stated in the introduction, comparative housing studies of the Southern European countries are less thorough compared to those of Northern Europe. In addition to the aforementioned studies, we can refer to the recent series titled “Southern European Housing”¹³ and the research of Di Felicianantonio and Aalbers¹⁴—which is based on the correlation between the fascist-dictatorial regimes in Spain and Italy—to explain the historical roots of neoliberal housing policies and of homeownership to reinforce the social order.

Further recent studies compare Southern European countries with other developed countries from a different point of view: in fact, the purpose of the comparisons is not to identify who is “lagging behind” but to demonstrate how each country can learn from the others¹⁵ or to explain through a theoretical lens the difference in housing systems based on the Kemeny’s theory of rental systems¹⁶.

The center and peripheries of European housing

Although the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees access and rights to housing, there is no common policy for housing across Europe; instead, housing policies are considered an autonomous responsibility of the member states. This means that since the 1990s, many of the European Union structural funds have focused on holistic issues related to housing and cities, aiming to contribute to economic, social, and territorial cohesion with support for projects

12 CASTLES, Francis G.; FERRERA, Maurizio - “Home ownership and welfare: Is Southern Europe different?”.

13 BARGELLI, Elena, HEITKAMP, Thorsten (eds.) - *New developments in Southern European Housing*; BIANCHI, Ranieri - *Residential tenancies and housing policy in Italy*; BARGELLI, Elena, HEITKAMP, Thorsten; SIMÓN-MORENO, Héctor; VARELA, Carmen (eds.) - *Housing policy and tenure types in the 21st century. A Southern European Perspective*.

14 DI FELICIANTONIO, Cesare; AALBERS, Manuel B. - “The Prehistories of Neoliberal Housing Policies in Italy and Spain and Their Reification in Times of Crisis”.

15 VARADY, David P.; MATOS, Fátima - “Comparing public housing revitalization in a liberal and a Mediterranean society (US vs. Portugal)”.

16 ALVES, Sónia - “Poles Apart? A Comparative Study of Housing Policies and Outcomes in Portugal and Denmark”.

involving the revitalization and regeneration of urban spaces; the construction of collective equipment and infrastructure; and rehabilitation interventions related to energy efficiency, thermal comfort, and business models¹⁷. More recently, Allegra et al.¹⁸ argue that while the European Union has no formal in the housing sector, it has influenced national housing policies. Based on the Portuguese case, the authors state that housing policies are subordinate to the European Union's urban policy agenda.

Several comparative studies on housing policies claim that a “two-speed Europe” exists.¹⁹ Several European countries, including the founders of the European Union, took a very active role after the Second World War in the construction of public housing and support for affordable housing created by housing cooperatives and private companies. However, since the 1970s and the decline of the welfare state, these financial supports have decreased dramatically.²⁰ Some countries that invested more in the construction of public housing began a widespread sale of these houses, as was the case under the “right to buy” policy implemented in the United Kingdom during the Margaret Thatcher administrations.²¹ To a certain extent in these cases, the State shifted from active and broad-based behavior to a neutral stance and compromised minimally with the (im)balances of the housing market.²²

As we discuss in the following section, Portugal did not have a strong policy for public housing until 1970. Conversely, Italy actively participated in housing construction policies after the Second World War, but in the last decades of the 20th century it was one of the countries that sold the most public housing.

Currently, according to data from Housing Europe (Housing Europe 2015, 2017, 2019), the countries that have the most social housing (affordable housing in general) are the Netherlands (30%), Austria (24%), Denmark (20.9%), the United Kingdom (19%), and France (16.8%). In turn, the figures for the countries of Southern Europe are relatively similar among them: Italy (3%), Spain (2.5%), Portugal (2%), Malta (0%), Cyprus (0%), and Greece (0%). The similarity between Southern European countries

17 GUERRA, Isabel – “Europa e políticas habitacionais – mudanças em curso”; ANTUNES, Gonalo - *Políticas de habitação 200 anos*.

18 ALLEGRA, Marco; TULUMELLO, Simone; COLOMBO, Alessandro; FERRÃO, JOÃO - “The (hidden) role of the EU in housing policy: the Portuguese case in multi-scalar perspective”.

19 ALLEN, Judith; BARLOW, James, LEAL, Jesús; MALOUTAS, Thomas; PADOVANI, Liliana - *Housing and welfare in Southern Europe*; BALCHIN, Paul (ed.) - *Housing policy: an introduction*; BALCHIN, Paul (ed.) - *Housing policy in Europe*; OXLEY, Michael; SMITH, Jacqueline - *Housing policy and rented housing in Europe*.

20 MALPASS, Peter; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy and practice*; HUGHES, David; LOWE, Stuart - *Public sector housing law*; BULLOCK, N Nicholas - *Building the post-war world*; MULLINS, David; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy in the UK*; LOWE, Stuart - *The housing debate*; LUND, Brian - *Housing politics in the United Kingdom*.

21 PAWSON, H.; MULLINS, David - *After council housing: britain's new social landlords*; FORREST, Ray; MURIE, Alan - *Selling the welfare state: the privatisation of public housing*.

22 BRAMLEY, Glen; MUNRO, N. G. M.; PAWSON, Hal - *Key issues in housing: policies and markets in 21st century Britain*.

can be observed not only in social housing stock but also in rates of homeownership (Italy 71.9% and Portugal 74%) and the rental market (Italy 14.8% and Portugal 17%). Although the countries of Southern Europe are commonly associated with homeownership, several countries in Eastern Europe have higher values of owner-occupied houses due to their contemporary political and economic history, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 – Housing in Europe. Data: Housing Europe (2017)

	Owner occupied (%)	Private rent (%)	Social rent, cooperatives and similar affordable housing (%)	Other (%)
Austria	54	18	24	4
Belgium	64.8	27.8	6.5	1.2
Bulgaria	87	10.5	2.5	-
Croatia	89.4	3	1.8	5.8
Cyprus	68.6	18.8	-	12.6
Czech Republic	55.9	22.4	9.4	12.3
Denmark	49.5	28.8	20.9	-
Estonia	82	7.3	1.7	9
Finland	64	19	13	4
France	57.9	23	16.8	2.4
Germany	45.4	50.7	3.9	-
Greece	73.9	20.8	-	5.3
Hungary	92	4	4	-
Ireland	67.6	20.6	8.7	3.1
Italy	71.9	14.8	3.7	9.6
Latvia	80.9	19.1	-	-
Lithuania	89.4	10.6	-	-
Luxemburg	73.2	21.7	5.1	-
Malta	76.45	19.86	-	2.75
Netherlands	60	10	30	-
Poland	75.4	0.8	23.8	-
Portugal	74	17	2	7
Romania	98.2	-	1.8	0.3
Slovakia	90.5	3	6.5	-
Slovenia	77	3	6	14
Spain	77.1	13.8	2.5	6.5
Sweden	62	19	19	-
United Kingdom	63.1	19	17.6	-

As noted by BRAGA, Michela; PALVARINI, Pietro, 2013, p.9, “[t]aking the share of social rental stock as a percentage of total housing stock as a crude indicator indicates that Netherlands, Austria and Denmark have the highest incidence (...) compared to the EU average (8.3%), whereas Eastern and Mediterranean countries have stocks of social housing below 5% of the total, and Greece and Latvia none at all.”

Italy and Portugal: past and current housing models

As stated in the previous section, Portugal and Italy are very similar in their “housing numbers”; specifically, both exhibit low percentages of social housing stock and rented houses and a high percentage of homeownership. These characteristics confirmed the welfare regime of Southern European countries—discussed in the first section—in which family plays an important role while the State encourages mortgages and tax relief for access to homeownership.

However, two countries with similar “housing numbers” may still differ in certain characteristics that become recognizable with an in-depth case study analysis. Specifically, through our case study we identify some relevant differences by analyzing past and current events.

According to Tulumello et al.²³, instead of following a linear and taxonomic approach, a genealogical perspective allows us to analyze the main sociopolitical dynamics of events. Therefore, the historical comparison between Italy and Portugal is subsequently developed through a brief genealogy of housing policies defined as occurring before the 2008 crisis or after the 2008 crisis.

Historical path until 2008 crisis

The history of housing policies in Italy and Portugal can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century to the demand for workers’ housing and their poor housing conditions.

The first Italian provisions can be traced back to 1903 with the creation of the public body for social housing (*Istituto Case Popolari*) and 1919 with the first law for the “*Edilizia popolare ed economica*” (economic and popular houses). In Portugal, the timeline is nearly contemporaneous, as the first law for the construction of “*Casas Económicas*” (economic houses) was introduced in 1918, which included, for the first time, the definition of social housing. In the early years of the 20th century in Italy and during the First Portuguese Republic (1910-1926), the housing policies created did not alleviate the existing housing problems.

After the end of the First World War and throughout the 1920s, the rise of nationalism occurred across Europe: a fascist dictatorship began in Italy in 1922 and in Portugal in 1926. This period was characterized by the manifestation of power in all its forms and the housing policies served to support the dictatorship itself, as the houses were mainly allotted to the lower-middle classes of workers in the regimes.

While the housing situation was fairly similar in the two countries during the first decades of the 20th century, the second post-war period brought about notable differences. Portugal did not participate in the Second World War, and this factor, together with the extension of its dictatorship, comprises its main dissimilarity with Italy in historical, political, and cultural terms of housing. The dictatorship in Italy ended with the conclusion of the Second World War, and its democratic republic was consequently established in 1946. Meanwhile, the Portuguese dictatorship continued

23 TULUMELLO, Simone; FERREIRA, Ana Caterina; COLOMBO, Alessandro; ALLEGRA, Marco; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Comparative planning and housing studies beyond taxonomy: a genealogy of the special program for rehousing (Portugal)”.

until 1974. Thus, after the Second World War, Italy began a path to democracy, to an open market, and to economic integration with other Western European countries; all of these factors, supported with the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, as Portugal as left behind in the sealed dictatorship that would only end in the 1970s.

The Italian post-war period was characterized by the establishment of the democratic republic, by the physical and economic reconstruction, and by strong demand for housing due to the extensive migration from the countryside to the cities because of job growth. In this period, a series of instruments were approved, thus representing the “golden age” of the State investment in housing: the INA-CASA plan in 1949, whose architectural choices were used as examples throughout Europe; the PEEP (*Piano di Edilizia Economica e Popolare*) in 1962, which expropriated areas for the construction of a large public housing neighborhoods²⁴; and the GES-CAL fund (*GESione CAse per i Lavoratori*) in 1963, intended to guarantee a steady stream of money designated for public housing construction.

Although the construction of houses increased dramatically, the public stock was quickly lost due to policies of privatization, alienation, and homeownership purchase. According to Balchin²⁵, “a total of 800,000 social-rented dwellings were built between 1951 and 1970 and 850,000 dwellings were privatized in the social sector in the same period.” The 1970s and 1980s were characterized by the decentralization of authority from the state level to the regional level; this movement included the housing sector and resulted in the first signs of the decline of public housing. According to Padovani²⁶, 1980 marked a turning point for the decline—in opposition to the three previous decades—in the number of new houses built, the decrease in withdrawals from the housing stocks, and the statistical increase of second homes. This period of neoliberal policies began in the 1980s and increased in the 1990s through the regeneration policies that coordinated initiatives and public and private investments; the privatization and alienation of public housing; and the abolition of the GESCAL fund in 1998, and thus of the only cash flow that guaranteed a continuous investment in housing at national level.

At the beginning of the 2000s, the long process of decentralization that had begun in the 1970s finally ended. This time period also saw the reform of IACPs and, after years of inaction, a revival of housing policies due to the significant rise in housing prices and the slow growth of household incomes.²⁷

24 DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Lessons from Corviale: from the critical factors of Public Housing Plans towards a methodology for urban regeneration”.

25 BALCHIN, Paul (ed.) - *Housing policy in Europe*, p.159.

26 *Idem*, p.205-207.

27 BALDINI, Massimo - *La casa degli italiani*.

During the dictatorship in Portugal, several housing policies were implemented (such as “*casas económicas*,” “*casas renda económica*,” and “*casas de renda limitada*,” among others); however, these types of housing policies were corporatist, and the programs were mainly aimed at the middle class with the intention of supporting the regime itself, leaving the poorest populations unprotected.²⁸ The post-revolution period (1974–1976) brought about experiments which, although developed in a short time, produced progressive and direct participation policies that are utilized as examples in the present day (as in the case of *Serviço de Apoio Ambulatório Local*).²⁹

Between 1976 and 1986, Portugal went through a period of “democratic normalization” until it joined the European Economic Community. During this period, housing policies were largely incoherent and produced no visible practical results.³⁰ After 1986, the year in which Portugal entered the European Economic Community, housing policies stabilized until the end of the 20th century. Table 2 shows the total State expenditure between 1987 and 2011, which is the period between Portugal entering the European Economic Community and the beginning of the Troika’s financial program.

**Table 2 – Allocations executed in the Budgets 1987–2011.
Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 48/2015.**

Instrument	Executed	
	Amount (€)	%
Home loan interest subsidies	7 046 685 145	73.3
Rehousing programmes	1 353 426 012	14.1
Incentives to let	803 874 566	8.4
Building renovation programmes	166 594 609	1.7
Social Security rent benefit	29 223 491	0.3
Direct action programmes	193 944 373	2
Housing Development Contracts	13 868 736	0.1
Total for housing policies	9 607 616 934	

The data illustrates that the home loan interest subsidy consumed 73% of the public effort in the housing sector; this was the most important instrument used by successive governments to guarantee the constitutional right to housing. This kind of

28 SERRA, Nuno - *Estado, território e estratégias de habitação*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo; SOARES, Nuno Pires; JULIÃO, Rui Pedro; LÚCIO, José - “Políticas de habitação social precedentes a Abril de 1974”; ANTUNES, G. - *Políticas de habitação 200 anos*.

29 PORTAS, Nuno – “O processo SAAL: entre o Estado e o poder local”; CEREZALES, Diego - *O poder caiu na rua – crise de Estado e acções colectivas na revolução portuguesa 1974-1975*; BANDEIRINHA, José - *O processo SAAL e a Arquitectura no 25 de Abril de 1974*; PINTO, Pedro - *Lisbon rising: urban social movements in the portuguese revolution - 1974–75*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Política de habitação social em Portugal: de 1974 à actualidade”.

30 FERREIRA, António Fonseca - *Por uma nova política de habitação*; FERREIRA, António Fonseca - *Livro branco sobre a política da habitação em Portugal*; SILVA, Carlos Nunes - *Política urbana em Lisboa: 1926-1974*; SERRA, Nuno - *Estado, território e estratégias de habitação*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - *Políticas de habitação 200 anos*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Política de habitação social em Portugal: de 1974 à actualidade”.

instrument is created with the middle class in mind, helping that target group have access to homeownership.

Table 2 also shows the social housing programs only used 16.4%, allocating 16.1% to public rehousing programs and 0.1% to controlled-cost housing programs (supporting housing cooperatives and private companies). This indicates that in this period, the State preferred to directly support Portuguese families (with home loan interest subsidies) rather than invest in social housing.

In terms of rehousing programs, the most important was the *Programa Especial de Realojamento* (Special Program for Rehousing), created in 1993 for the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. The Special Program for Rehousing was the most striking rehousing program in the history of housing in Portugal; it allowed rehousing for the population that lived in slums, building around 35,000 public dwellings.³¹ Several authors also suggest³² that the nation's entry into the European Economic Community was a decisive factor in the creation of a large-scale program for the demolition of slums in the Portuguese metropolitan areas. As previously stated, the Special Program for Rehousing allowed for the construction of around 35,000 dwellings, which were owned by the municipalities. The public housing stock built in the 1990s brought new challenges for Portuguese municipalities, particularly regarding the management of the buildings and population and because many of the new public housing neighborhoods had a high concentration of low-income populations.

After 2008 crisis and current issues

Because housing policy has been neglected over the past two decades in Italy, the 2008 crisis worsened an already-critical housing scenario, further weakening the sector. In 2008, a new policy package was implemented with the aim of creating an integrated system of real estate funds with public and private capitals. Private and non-profit operators started to build social housing projects at the local level, although the results were almost irrelevant nationally and were only concentrated in some regions. Since one of the relevant consequences of the crisis was evictions for people who lost their jobs, a national fund for innocent defaulting tenants was

31 CACHADO, Rita- “O Programa Especial de Realojamento – ambiente histórico, político e social”; ANTUNES, Gonalo - *Políticas de habitao 200 anos*; ANTUNES, G. - “Política de habitao social em Portugal: de 1974 à actualidade”; TULUMELLO, Simone; FERREIRA, Ana Caterina; COLOMBO, Alessandro; ALLEGRA, Marco; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Comparative planning and housing studies beyond taxonomy: a genealogy of the special program for rehousing (Portugal)”.

32 SERRA, Nuno - *Estado, territrio e estratgias de habitao*; ANTUNES, Gonalo - *Políticas de habitao 200 anos*; ANTUNES, Gonalo - “Política de habitao social em Portugal: de 1974 à actualidade”.

created in 2013 to support households in the process of being evicted for arrears, especially in large municipalities with housing problems³³

In 2016, the FEDERCASA (*Federazione Italiana per le Case Popolari e l'Edilizia Sociale*, or Italian Federation for Popular Houses and Social Housing) noted that the public stock in Italy corresponds to about 760,000 dwellings, distributed unevenly between Northern, Central, and Southern Italy, as the majority is owned in the north (44% of the entire stock). According to Baldini and Poggio³⁴, the current public housing situation is dramatic, and it is close to collapse. As demonstrated in Table 3, the state expenditure for housing policies is extremely low: less than 1% of the total expenditure was allotted to housing between 2014 and 2017. With scarce state investment in housing, the regions and municipalities were left alone to struggle with an increased demand for housing and an ancient public stock that needed to be restored.

Table 3 – Italy State Expenditure on housing (% of GDP)

Instrument	(mln €)			
	2014	2015	2016	2017
Various funds for housing renovation, rental houses, innocent defaulting tenants, loans for buying first home, etc.	405,54	418,95	424,95	150,22
Tax deductions for energy efficient	1.993,00	1.989,00	2.151,00	2.112,00
Tax deductions for building renovation	12.965,00	11.030,00	12.464,99	12.391,00
Total housing policy resources	15.093,54	13.437,95	15.039,95	14.635,22
GDP	1.621.827,20	1.652.085,40	1.689.747,60	1.724.954,50
Housing policy resources/GDP (%)	0,93	0,81	0,89	0,85

Source: FEDERCASA.

After the Troika's intervention ended in 2014, the Portuguese housing market changed significantly. In summary, in 2012, changes were made to the legislation of the urban rental market, which liberalized the market and facilitated evictions.³⁵ At the same time, the growth of urban tourism and short-term rentals created a new scenario in the center of metropolitan areas.³⁶ In addition, there was an increase in the interest that Lisbon and Porto aroused in international real estate markets and investors. The combination of these factors, among others, made access to housing very elusive in the center of metropolitan areas, leading to changes in the social fab-

33 BALDINI, Massimo; POGGIO, Teresio - "The Italian housing system and the global financial crisis"; POGGIO, Teresio; BOREIKO, Dmitri - "Social housing in Italy: old problems, older vices, and some new virtues?"; BIANCHI, Ranieri - *Residential tenancies and housing policy in Italy*.

34 BALDINI, Massimo; POGGIO, Teresio - "The Italian housing system and the global financial crisis".

35 ANTUNES, Gonalo - "O arrendamento em Portugal desde meados do sculo XIX: pequena sntese".

36 RIO FERNANDES, Jos; CHAMUSCA, Pedro; MENDES, Thiago; CARVALHO, Lus - *O Porto e a Airbnb*; RIO FERNANDES, Jos; CHAMUSCA, Pedro; MENDES, Thiago; CARVALHO, Lus - *A Airbnb em Portugal*; RIO FERNANDES, Jos; CHAMUSCA, Pedro; MENDES, Thiago; CARVALHO, Lus; GAGO, Ana - *Lisboa e a Airbnb*.

ric of the regions.³⁷ Some authors associate this process with the financialization of housing and the gentrification processes that are taking place not only in Portugal but throughout Europe.³⁸ In 2017, a State Secretariat for Housing was created to politically answer to the growing pressure in the real estate market. This State Secretariat was established at the end of the same year as the *Nova Geração de Políticas de Habitação* (New Generation of Housing Policies), which is a package of reformist housing policies. Since then, new housing policies have been created between 2018 and 2019, namely new rehousing policies (*Primeiro Direito* and *Porta de Entrada*) and instruments to support the household's access to the rental market (*Programa de Arrendamento Acessível*). However, given their recency, the practical results have not yet been observed. In 2018, the *Instituto da Habitação e Reabilitação Urbana* (Housing and Urban Renewal Institute) presented the “*Levantamento nacional das necessidades de realojamento habitacional*” (national survey of rehousing needs). This survey identified 25,762 families living in “patently unsatisfactory situations,” especially concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon (54%) and Porto (20%).

Currently, the public housing stock in Portugal corresponds to 120,000 units belonging to municipalities, autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira), and the central government; they house around 113,000 households and 270,000 individuals (2.5% of the Portuguese population). The 120,000 public housing units represent 2% of the national housing stock.³⁹

Conclusion and future perspectives

The right to housing has earned prominence in the second half of the 20th century, as it has been included in international charters and protocols, in national fundamental laws, and as part of the welfare state. However, international literature has been questioning why the right to housing is absent from the discussion on the welfare state, unlike social policies on health and education.⁴⁰ Although housing is a vital part of human dignity and survival, there is no consensus on its integration into the typical measures of the welfare state, even in the countries that have invested the most in this domain.⁴¹

37 SEIXAS, João; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Tendências recentes de segregação habitacional na Área Metropolitana de Lisboa”.

38 SANTOS, Ana Cordeiro - “Financeirização do Estado, política de habitação e subsídios à especulação”; SANTOS, Ana Cordeiro (coord.) - *A nova questão da habitação em Portugal*; MENDES, Luís - “Gentrificação, financeirização e produção capitalista do espaço urbano”.

39 INE - *Inquérito anual à habitação social*.

40 LOWE, Stuart - *The housing debate*.

41 MALPASS, Peter; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy and practice*; MULLINS, David; MURIE, Alan - *Housing policy in the UK*; LOWE, S. - *The housing debate*.

In this work, we intended to demonstrate that, in examining housing policies, it is not possible to draw a clear division between the “center” and the “periphery” in the cases of Portugal and Italy. On the contrary, with the analysis, it’s possible to observe a “between peripheries” scenario.

Italy is frequently analyzed as a central country in Europe, having been one of the founders of the European Union and having led the process of democratization after the Second World War. As we have observed, it was also one of the countries that invested the most in the construction of public housing called “*Trente Glorieuses*.” However, in the following decades, the housing policies adopted followed a path of neoliberalization, with the alienation of a substantial part of the public housing stock, the liberalization of the housing market, and minimal intervention by the State.⁴²

The history of housing in Portugal followed a different path, but the results are relatively similar from a quantitative point of view. In Portugal until 1974, the public housing policies experience was marked by the corporatist model; throughout the dictatorship and during the democratic period, housing policies did not have a long-term strategy. The most significant support of the State was for the purchase of a home, which stemmed from a neoliberal perspective of market provision, banks, and real estate investors. The construction of substantial public housing only occurred in the 1990s. At the same time, recent studies claim that housing policies in Portugal have undergone a liberalization trend in the last decades, specifically after Portugal joined the European Economic Community in 1986 and later during the last Troika intervention.⁴³

Currently, Italy and Portugal present very similar statistical data in regard to (low) public housing stock, (low) rental markets, (high) homeownership, and (high) rates of second homeownership, among other related indicators. However, this evolution followed distinct timeframes, as we emphasized in this article. Although the two countries maintain very different courses of action in their housing policies⁴⁴, the result appears to be similar. Even today, these different approaches are visible from an institutional perspective: while Italian housing policies are generally managed at

42 BALDINI, Massimo - *La casa degli italiani*; BALDINI, Massimo; POGGIO, Teresio - “The Italian housing system and the global financial crisis”; BIANCHI, Ranieri - *Residential tenancies and housing policy in Italy*; POGGIO, Teresio; BOREIKO, Dmitri - “Social housing in Italy: old problems, older vices, and some new virtues?”.

43 MENDES, Luís - “Gentrificação, financeirização e produção capitalista do espaço urbano”; SANTOS, Ana Cordeiro (coord.) - *A nova questão da habitação em Portugal*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - *Políticas de habitação 200 anos*; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Política de habitação social em Portugal: de 1974 à actualidade”; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “O arrendamento em Portugal desde meados do século XIX: pequena síntese”; SEIXAS, João; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Tendências recentes de segregação habitacional na Área Metropolitana de Lisboa”.

44 DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “Social housing in Portugal and Italy: methodological issues and empirical inferences of a comparative study”; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca; ANTUNES, Gonçalo - “Housing policies beyond numbers: a comparative study in Portugal and Italy”; ANTUNES, Gonçalo; DI GIOVANNI, Caterina Francesca - “As políticas de habitação no Sul da Europa. Comparando Portugal e Itália”.

the regional level, in Portugal the responsibilities are allocated to the municipalities (there are no administrative regions in Portugal).

More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has thrown the housing market into uncertainty, largely because the changes that occurred between 2014 and 2020 in Portugal and Italy were based on foreign investment and the growth of urban tourism. The pandemic has brought new challenges to societies and housing policies. In the future, it would be valuable to have a holistic view of the right to housing, urban spaces, and the right to the city, which enhances the quality of life and decent housing conditions for all.

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