Academic and Peripatetic Views on Natural and Moderate Passions and a Case of Intertextuality in Plutarch

An example of intertextuality in Plutarch and Cicero shows the use of a common source stemming from the treatise On Grief of the Academic philosopher Crantor. The use made of this source in both authors reveals a line of reasoning advocating the natural character and utility of certain passions. The advocacy of the natural character of passions is further connected in both Plutarch and Cicero to the normative ideal of ‘moderation of passions’ (metriopatheia) and is contrasted to the Stoic ideal of ‘absence of passions’ (apatheia). This may be further linked to a Plutarchan hermeneutical approach which conflates Academic and Peripatetic ethical views for the sake of constructing an alternative to the Stoic approach towards the elimination of passions. This strategy, which has its starting point in passages in Cicero which draw on Antiochus, is indicative of the way Plutarch connected Platonic and Aristotelian/Peripatetic authority in the domain of ethics in order to answer to Stoic positions in ethics which he found unpalatable. Key-Words: Plutarch, Cicero, Metriopatheia, Apatheia, Ethics.


1
. Crantor in the Con so la tio ad Apollo nium and Tus cu lanae Dispu ta tio nes The consolatory let ter to Apollonius, which has come down to us in the Plutarchan corpus 1 , contains a collection of quotations from famous poets and other accounts which all contribute to the theme of consolation for evils that befall humans. One of the multiple sources that Plutarch uses are also the philosophical views on the passions from the Academic philosopher Crantor, a member of Plato's Academy before its skeptical turn 2 . Among them is a fragment of Crantor which is quoted at the beginning of the treatise: μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν" φησὶν ὁ ἀκα δημαϊκὸς Κράντωρ, "νοσή σα σι δὲ παρείη τις αἴσθησις, εἴτ' οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων εἴτ' ἀποσπῷτο. τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγ γίγ νε ται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τε θη ριῶσ θαι γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοι οῦ τον ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχήν. (Cons. Ap. 102d7d12 3 ) May we not become ill," says Crantor of the Academy, "but if we are ill, may some sensation be present in us, whether one of our members be cut off or torn out. For this insensibility to pain comes to human beings only at a high price; for in the former case, one may assume that one's body has been brutalized, but in the lat ter case one's soul.
In the above passage, Crantor advocates the value of experiencing bo dily pain, pre sumably because the ability to experience 1 The treatise has been rejected as spurious on stylistic grounds, see e.g. R. Volk mann, Commentatio de Consolatione ad Apollonium pseudoplutarchea, Halle 1867, a verdict which is adopted by many modern scholars, cf. e.g. Pohlenz, 1909, pp. 1519. However, Hani, 1972, makes a case for the authenticity of the treatise and defends the view that the stylistic peculiarities of Cons. ad Apoll. are due either to the fact that the treatise was written in haste or constitute the preliminary notes for a consolatory work (p. 42). A further argument for the treatise's authenticity is that it makes reference to the concept of 'moderation of passions' (metriopatheia), which is prominent in a Plutarchan treatise (De Virtute Morali) whose authority is not questioned. Focusing on the latter concept, I will treat the Cons. ad Apoll. as Plutarchan material. 2 Poh lenz, 1909, p. 16 suggests that the consolatory work which has come down to us un der the name of Plutarch wholly depends on Crantor's On Grief and attempts in pp. 1519 to offer a reconstruction of the latter. For a refutation of Pohlenz's view and the idea that we find in Cons. ad Apoll. only scattered fragments of Crantor's work, see Hani, 1972, pp. 4647. BoysStones, 2013, advocates the more broadly Platonic character of the major consolatory themes which appear in the work and reads it as an attempt to offer an 'ethical pedagogy' on the basis of the Platonic dialogues Alcibiades, Gorgias and the Phaedo, as exemplified in the late Platonist Olympiodorus' reading of Plato. 3 I adopt here the punctuation of Mette, 1984, p. 17. bodily pain is in dispensably linked to the ability to experience pleasure as well. Appli ed to the soul, this alludes to the importance of experiencing psychic passions as indispensable indicators of values which consti tute human happiness. The hu man condition, according to this view, necessarily involves the expe rience of passions but the latter may also be indispensable for reaching a higher state of human existence. The quo tation is supplemented by a line of reasoning advocating the natural basis and corresponding utility of the passion of grief 4 . Thus, it is argued that the 'the pain and pang felt at the death of a son comes from a natural starting point of grief (φυσικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λύ πης), over which we have no control (οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν)' 5 . The idea is embedded into a short polemic against unknown oppo nents (apparently the Stoics) who 'extol a harsh and callous lack of passions' (τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν), however such a state is 'both impossible and un pro fitable' (ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν) 6 .
The impossibility of eradicating pas sions is premised in the text both on the idea that passionate feelings do not me rely depend on us, i.e. on our reason, but have an independent source in the human psyche but also on what may be called a 'functional' explanation, according to which passions serve a particular pur pose and human utility (as suggested by the use of the word συμφέρον). With regard to the latter, the author draws attention to the detrimentary effects that an elimination of passions would have for human life. Thus, a total lack of passions would amount to the impossibility of experiencing states such as the 'good will' (εὔνοια), which results from the reciprocal exchange of friendly affection (φιλία) among human beings 7 . Such, however, it is further stated, 'it is necessary to preserve above all else' (ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασῴζειν ἀναγκαῖον), suggesting that it is an indispensable part of the human condition 8 . Accordingly, the state of apa theia is connected in the quotation of Crantor to the idea of a 'brutal' (θη ριῶ δες) and, in Plutarch's words, a 'harsh' (ἄτεγκτον) soul, which does not befit the image of the noble person.
Crantor's views, as found in Plu tarch's consolatory treatise, are mirro red, with almost verbatim equi valents, in the third book of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations which is devoted to the discussion of passions 9 . There, Crantor's views are not embedded into a consolatory epistolary context (as in the case of Plutarch) but feature in a dialectical exercise on the nature and value of passions. Thus, in an exchange between the two interlocutors represented in the manuscripts by the letters A. and M. (in all probability standing for Antiochus and Marcus sc. Tullius Cicero) the latter attributes to his interlocutor the view that grief befalls even the sage 10 . The position is contrasted to the Stoic one, whereas Cicero assumes in the debate the role of the Academic sceptic who opposes the two camps in order to examine the extent to which each position approximates the truth 11 . As a rationale for the position that grief will befall even the sage, Cicero puts into the mouth of his character the same fragment that we encounter in Plutarch's Cons. ad Apoll. in a Latin translation. The passage reads as follows: There is some sense in what Crantor says, who was one of the most eminent members of our Academy. 'I cannot by any means', said he, 'agree with tho se who extol some kind of in sensibility (indolentiam). Such a thing is neither possible, nor beneficial (quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet In Cicero's restating of Crantor's views the polemical remark for those (sc. the Stoics) who praise 'insen sibi lity' (indolentia), which, however, 'nei ther can nor should exist' (quae nec po test ulla esse nec debet) is attributed explicitly to Crantor himself. The phrase mirrors the Plutarchan ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν and suggests that passions are, on the one hand, dependent upon a source which is not entirely under rational control, and, on the other hand, that they serve a 'functional' role, which suggests that they should not be eliminated. Cicero offers a further variation to Crantor's views by differentiating between two diffe rent undesirable effects that result from insensibility in the case of the body and the soul (thus referring to stupor in the case of the body and inmanitas in the case of the soul), whereas Plutarch refers to both as a form of 'brutalising', making use of a single verb (τεθηριῶσθαι).
Cicero, similarly to Plutarch, con nects the quotation from Crantor to a theory of 'natural' passions. Thus, reporting Crantor's view he states that 'it is nature that causes grief' suggesting that (to a certain extent) we cannot help but surrender to this passion 13 . In line with this, the words of Crantor in Tusculan Disputations 3.12 are prefaced by a reference to the 'tender and sensitive' aspect of our soul, which by nature (natura) is prone to be shaken by distress (est natura in animis tenerum quiddam atque molle, quod aegritudine… quatiatur) 14 . This position is, however, attacked by Cicero with polemical re 12 nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime' inquit 'adsentior is qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. Nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore.' 13 Tusculan Disputations 3.71: natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat. 14 One may compare to these ideas another fragment from Crantor, part of his consolation to a certain Hippocles for the death of his children, which Plutarch cites at Cons. ad. Apoll. 104c115. There (104c915) we find the idea that the mortal seeds participate in the portion of evil which is allocated to humans upon birth and which is responsible for the lack of natural power (ἀφυΐα) of the human soul, as also for diseases of the body and other calamities: ἥ τ' ἄδηλος αὕτη τύχη πόρρωθεν ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἠκολούθηκεν οὐδ' ἐφ' ἑνὶ ὑγιεῖ, φυομένοις τε μίγνυταί τις ἐν πᾶσι κακοῦ μοῖρα· τὰ γάρ τοι σπέρματα εὐθὺς θνητὰ ὄντα ταύτης κοινωνεῖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἐξ ἧς ἀφυΐα μὲν ψυχῆς, νόσοι τε καὶ κήδεα καὶ μοῖρα θνητῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἡμῖν ἕρπει." This seems to chime well with the Plutarchan view that the origin of the passions is to be found in the 'soul itself', i.e. the precosmic soul, which is the source of irrationality and evil, see Opsomer, 2012, pp. 31617.
Cicero also picks up on the theme of the functional role of passions which emerges from Crantor's fragment, albeit offering us more ample examples to illustrate the case. In his presentation of the 'Peripatetic' view on passions at Tusculan Disputations 4.4346, he discusses the way grief is ordained by nature for the sake of great utility (non sine magna utilitate a natura… constitutam), so that one may be pained at the rebuke or punishment or disgrace for wrongdoings 16 . By suffering bites of conscience, it is argued, one is aware of the value of right conduct. Again, fear of laws, poverty, disgrace, death or pain leads, according to this line of argument, people to adopt a more careful conduct of their lives, directing their decisions towards the right kind of values 17 . The passage ends in a way reminiscent of the language in Crantor's fragment by stating that 'it is neither possible nor necessary' (nec posse nec opus esse) to extirpate passions 18 . In the less rhetorical context of Plu tarch's treatise De virt. mor. one may find Plutarch's preoccupation with the idea of the 'right measure' of passions, as also an attempt to present it as a fundamental tenet of both the Academy and the Pe ri patos 23 . Although metriopatheia it self is a post Aristotelian term 24 , it seems applicable to a central idea found in Aristotle, namely that virtue of character is a kind of mesotēs (apatheia) cannot be sustained. The commendable kind of apatheia turns out to be identical to the Academic (and Peripatetic) ideal of metriopatheia. This seems to result from the ambiguity of pathos as relating to both a neutral and an excessive state. 20 Plutarch refers at Cons. ad Apoll. 113b913 to the 'barbarian' practice of mutilating parts of one's body in order to gratify the dead as a passionate exaggeration which departs from the 'moderation of passions which is according to nature in such cases' (ἀπαρτώμενοι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις μετριοπαθείας). 21 See Mette, 1984, p. 34 Metriopatheia is thus a more apt term to refer more generally to the idea of limitation and ordering, which seems to be applicable to both the traditions of the Academy and the Peripatos 27 .

Metriopatheia in
In De virt. mor. the idea of putting the right measure to passions is embedded in to a larger context, which highlights the way this view corresponds to a dua listic psychological model which differs fundamentally from the Stoic one. Throughout the treatise, Plutarch sees a fundamental agreement between Plato and Aristotle in that they both allow for the existence of a passionate part in the human soul, which should be subject to control rather than be eradicated 28 . This is compatible with Plutarch's dominant Platonist orien tation. Thus, the treatise shows how the moderation of passions corresponds to Platonic cosmological considerations about measure and limit as a principle of order. Accordingly, Plutarch refers to Pla to's Timaeus and the double nature of the soul involving both a nonrational and a rational element (imposed by the Demiurge on the original soul), re pre sented by the circles of the 'same' and the 'different' 29 . This is followed by 25 Nicomachean Ethics 2.1106b1618: λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. 26 On the differences between the metriopatheia ascribed by Cicero to the Peripatetics and the actual Aristotelian position see also Graver, 2002, p. 164. 27 Plutarch uses both terms metrion and meson at De prof. virt. 84a: ἡμῶν δὲ δεῖται μέν πως τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω περικοπῆς, εἰ μέλλομεν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι καὶ μέτριον. One may note that there are some Platonic passages, which seem to anticipate the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mean, see e.g. Politicus 284eff.: Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῖμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικήν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη, ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνοντες, ἓν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχυτῆτας πρὸς τοὐναντίον μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων. 28 As Dillon, 1983, p At the same time, Plutarch resorts in particular to Aristotelian material to make a case for the moderation of passions 31 . He makes thereby use of the etymological derivation of ēthos (character) from ethos (habit), which prefaces Aristotle's discussion of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics 2.1 32 . The connection of metriopatheia with a dualistic moral psychology seems further to fit with the Aristotelian position that rationality supplements, directs and organizes passionate and motivational forces but does not substitute them. The latter still remain a necessary condition for virtuous action and provide orientation for reason to process into fullfledged reasons for action. Plutarch refers in this context to the way judgment (krisis) needs impulse in order to bring about actions 33 .

Ploutarchos, n.s., 15 (2018) 59-74
reason like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, willingly receptive of mo deration and propriety 35 . By contrast the selfcontrolled person while she directs her desire by reason, yet does not do so without pain, but resists, being full of internal struggle and turmoil 36 . Reference to the Platonic simile ends with the idea that selfcontrol is not a virtue in the absolute sense but 'less than virtue' (ἔλαττον ἀρετῆς) 37 , which is reminiscent of the Aristotelian rejection of a virtue of egkrateia, the latter being characterised as a 'middle state' between virtue and vice 38 .
The reference to specifically Aristo telian views on moral psychology con clu des at De virt. mor. 443c with the statement that reason does not aim at completely eradicating passion but on imposing on it 'some limit and order' (ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν). The subsequent remark that 'it is neither possible nor better (i.e. more expedient)' (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτ' ἄμει νον) to eradicate passion completely is again reminiscent of the phrase 'both impossible and unprofitable' (ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν), which we encountered in the Cons. ad Apoll. The passage ends by defining moral virtues as 'due proportions and mean states' (συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας) which connects the Aristotelian idea of a 'mean state' with the mathematical ideal of 'proportion' (symmetria) 39 . Later on in his treatise, Plutarch alludes to his ideas about the 'original soul' as the source of movement (and the origin of passions) by making explicit reference to the way reason limits the 'passionate movement' (παθητικὴν κίνησιν) and brings about in the irrational part of the soul the moral virtues which are mean states between deficiency and excess 40 .
views in his discussion about the nature of moral virtue. To be sure, Plutarch's primary philosophical allegiance is a Pla tonic one. He is a pioneer of Pla to nic exegesis in the way he reads Plato in his On the Creation of the Soul according to the Timeaus (De An. Procr.), attempting to establish unity and consistency among the dialogues, while also doing justice to the aporetic character of Platonic philosophy. However, his exegetical stance also grants him considerable freedom with re gard to Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition as well. That is, even if Plato is recognized as the supreme philosophical authority, and as the originator of phi losophical truth, there is still room to ac com modate specifically Aristotelian, or more generally Peripatetic views, into his philosophical expositions. It seems that this is particularly the case in ethics, where Aristotelian/Peripatetic views may seem to systematize and develop in a more elaborate way Platonic insights 41 .
The origin of the hermeneutical stan ce which permits the connection of Pe ripatetic ideas with the exposition of Academic philosophy may be detected in Cicero as well and, in all probability, reflects the teaching of Cicero's teacher Antiochus of Ascalon, the first one to turn to a dogmatic reading of Plato in the first century BCE. Thus, in Varro's (the spokesperson of Antiochus) expo sition of the 'old Academic' system of philosophy in the second edition of Cicero's Academic Books, we find a similar attempt to present a unified system of doctrines for both the Academy and the Peripatos. A positive attitude towards the passions and an accommodation of them in the ideal of virtue is one of the points which are included in the fundamental doctrines of the 'Old Academy'. Thus, in a passage which contains the main headings of 'old Academic' views on ethics, passions are presented as 'natural' and in the same breath it is stated that the 'ancients' en dor sed a psychological dualism which placed desire and reason in different parts of the soul; to this, Varro contrasts Zeno and his view that passions are voluntary and (merely) an outcome of judgments 42 . Even though the strategy of 'coopting' 41 For the way Aristotle, as the founder of the Peripatetic philosophical tradition, functions as a 'privileged ally' for the 'Platonist' Plutarch and his attacks against other schools (especially in De Virtute Morali), see Roskam, 2009, pp. 4142. Cf. Opsomer, 2012. For a further analysis of Plutarch's endorsement of the idea of Platonic and Aristotelian 'harmony' (especially in the case of ethics), see Karamanolis, 2006, pp. 115123. As Roskam, 2009, p. 2829 argues, however, Karamanolis does not do justice to the 'auxiliary' role that Aristotle's doctrines have for the elucidation of Plato's views. Becchi, 1990, p Aristotelian or Peripatetic ideas to convey the views of Plato (or, in the case of Antiochus, those of the old Academy as whole) is similar in both Plutarch and Antiochus, one should not overlook that there are crucial differences between the two thinkers with regard to their philosophical identity and their approach towards Plato's authority 43 .
A last example from Plutarch's treatment of the topic of the moderation of passions suggests that his views, while aiming at conveying the (uni fied) tradition of the Academy and the Paripatos, developed in close interac tion with the Stoic positions on the passions as well. This may be seen in the way Plutarch endorses what one may call a cognitive explanation for ex cessive passions, which, contrary to their 'natural' counterparts, are reproa chable and do not befit the sage. Thus, Plutarch argues explicitly that, in the case of excessive grief, passio nate excessiveness results in the soul by vir tue of a 'bad belief in us' (ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίγνεσθαι δόξης) 44 . Whe reas this excessive passionate reac tion should be dismissed as 'injurious and base' (βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον) and 'not befitting the noble man' (σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον), one should not disapprove of a 'moderation of passions' (metriopatheia) 45 . Although laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur. For a discussion of the passage see also Bonazzi, 2009, pp. 4647. 43 Antiochus' identity is more inclusive since he identifies himself as an '(old) Academic', whereas Plutarch identifies himself as a Platonist. For the peculiar approach of Antiochus towards Platonic authority see Tsouni, 2018. 44 For a parallel see Aspasius' In EN 44.2024 Heylbut, where πάθος is described as 'an irrational movement of the soul owing to a supposition of good and bad' (πάθος εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον δι' ὑπόληψιν κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ  see Brunner, 2014, pp. 199202. 45 Cons. ad Apoll. 102d27: τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναί φημι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίγνεσθαι δόξης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο the passage fails to refer explicitly to the way in which such moderation is effected, we may assume that this role is played by (right) reason, which holds the passionate impulses 'within bounds'.
It is suggestive that the concession that reproachable passions are due to false beliefs seems to derive from con siderations coming from the Stoic camp 46 . Thus, Cicero, reporting a Stoic line of reasoning at Tusculan Disputations 3, entertains the view that the belief (opinio) that one should mourn in an excessive way brings about 'deep grief' (gravis aegritudo) 47 . The Stoic position considers passions as states of a single psychological aspect, which the Stoics identify with the leading part of the soul (hēgemonikon), which in humans is utterly rational. What underlies all passions according to the Stoic view is merely a rational impulse guided by a false judgement, which takes hold of the soul becoming strong and overpowering 48 . The ideal for the Stoic sage is to entertain no false beliefs and corresponding passions, a state captured by the word apatheia.
Further, by exploiting the ambiguity of the word pathos in its Academic/Peri patetic use (both as something which can be excessive and reproachable but also as something which can be natural and within bounds), Stoics polemically identified all the uses of pathos with its negative version. The implication of this strategy, most prominent in Ciceronian passages which dia lectically advocate the Stoic position, was the claim that the idea of moderate passion makes no sense, since passions are inherently excessive 49 . This sparked reactions of the type recorded in Plutarch, who stresses that excessive passions, μὲν ἐατέον ὡς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον, τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον. 46 Cf. Dillon, 1983, p. 511. 47