Silencing Plato’s Text. On Plutarch’s III Platonic Question

Among Plutarch’s Moralia, the Platonicae Quaestiones are ten exegetical exercises on both contradictory and obscure passages of text by Plato. In the third quaestio (1001c-1002e), Plutarch examines a theoretical problem related to the similarity of the “Divided Line” (Resp. 509d6-511e5), i.e. whether the sensible segment is “greater” (meizon, 1001d) than the intelligible one, or vice versa. In briefly summing up the content of the Platonic similarity, Plutarch surprisingly leaves out Plato’s reference to the “criterion” which should mark the difference between the upper and the lower segments of the line: the sapheneia (Resp. 511e: ὥσπερ ἐφ ̓ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν). How are we expected to understand this “silence”? My purpose is to demonstrate that Plutarch’s omission is voluntary, since this is meant to provide the quaestio with a more original, step-by-step analytical development, along with a clearer solution. Plutarch’s initial silence gives him the opportunity to accurately argue against any quantitative or materialistic reading of the word meizon. Any interpretation of Plato’s ontology which reduces the intelligible dimension to an “elementary” level (i.e. to one based on elachista) should be rejected. The difference between the sensible segment and the intelligible one (and, hence, the superiority of the latter over the former) has to be described in ontological terms. But sapheneia had this precise meaning in its original Platonic context: so, its omission at the very beginning of the quaestio turns out to be of use to Plutarch in order to guide the reader gradually towards the solution of the zetema. Key-Words: Omission, Plutarch, Plato, Ontology, Divided Line.


ISSN 0258-655X
Ploutarchos, n.s., 16  The objective of this paper is to deal with a philosophically remarkable case of Plu tarchean silence. The text I will be comment ing on is the third Pla tonica Quaestio, pre su mab ly a scholastic exercise 2 , which exten si vely tackles an exegetical pro blem related to Plato's Republic. What I hope to demonstrate is that the omis sion that can be detected at the very be gin n ing of the Quaestio is necessary for the Quaestio itself to be settled and de velo ped. That is why, at the end, I will suggest that such a silence might be con si de red as voluntary by Plutarch -or, at least, as one which Plutarch could not be una ware of.
2 Let's start with Plato's very own words. At 509d ff. of Stephanus' edi tion, Socrates compares the two genres of "what is visible" and "what is intelligible" (ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, νοη τόν) to the sub-segments of a di vid ed segment of line 3 : You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligi-1 This paper was read for the first time at the annual meeting of the International Plutarch Society of North America, which took place in Logan and Park City in 05.2019. I am so grateful to the organizer, Professor Fran Titchner, for her kindness and hospitality, to the scholars who took part in the discussion and to Professor Fronterotta for reading the first version of this paper. I would like to dedicate this paper to Mara, for everything she says and does. 2 For other interpretations of the nature of these notes, see H. Cherniss, 1976, 2 ff.;F. Romano, 1994;J. Opsomer, 1996 and2010. 3 On this topic, see Y. Lafrance, 1987 andN.D. Smith, 1996; more recently, see M.H. Yang, 1999;F. Trabattoni, 2010;F.F. Repellini, 2010 andR. Netz, 2003;A.P.D. Mοurelatos, 2012;M. Migliori, 2006;R. Foley, 2008;F. Ferrari, 1999 andY.H. Dominick, 2010. (Resp. 511e: ὥσπερ ἐφ ̓ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος με τέχειν). Come dovremmo interpretare questo "silenzio"? Il mio obiettivo è dimostrare che l'omissione di Plutarco potrebbe essere volontaria, poiché mira a conferire alla quaestio uno sviluppo argomentativo più originale, graduale e analitico, nonché una risoluzione più perspicua. In particolare, il silenzio iniziale di Plutarco gli offre l'op por tunità di argomentare accuratamente contro qualsiasi interpretazione quantitativa o ma terialistica del termine meizon. Qualsiasi lettura dell'ontologia platonica riduca la di mensione intelligibile a una realtà "elementare" (cioè, a una basata su elachista) deve essere rifiutata. La differenza tra il segmento sensibile e quello intelligibile (e, pertanto, la superiorità del secondo rispetto al primo) deve essere posta in termini ontologici. Ma la sapheneia aveva esattamente questo significato nel suo contesto platonico di pro venienza: quindi, la sua omissione al principio della quaestio si rivela funzionale, per Plutarco, a guidare gradualmente il lettore/allievo verso la soluzione dello zetema. ble." "I do." "Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections (ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα) and cut each section again in the same ratio (πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον) the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order (τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου) , and then, as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity (καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα), you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images etc. (trans. after P. Shorey) As Socrates makes clear, the two sub-segments are unequal 4 : γραμμὴν δί χα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα. Therefore, given that these sub-segments represent the ontological genres of "the visible" and "the intelligible" mentioned above, these latter ones too should be considered to be "unequal". But that is not all. For, Socrates says that the two sub-segments need to be divided in turn "according to the same ratio" (ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον) 5 . That is to say -one should conclude -even the "parts" of each subsegment are required to be "unequal".
At this point, one might ask what the unequal length of the two sub-segments exactly means and implies. Since they represent two ontological genres, as is made clear by Socrates himself (see τέμνε ἑκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα […] τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου), one could wonder, first of all, which of the two sub-segments -and hence, genresis to be deemed as "bigger" 6 . Moreover, a legitimate doubt could arise also as far as the precise terms of such a primacy are concerned. To state it more clearly, Socrates is somehow expected to identify the criterion according to which each subsegment/genre can be described as being, so to speak, "bigger" or "smaller".
As a matter of fact, through the means of Socrates, Plato seems to tell us what this criterion could be. For, once the second subdivision has been made, Socrates rather abruptly alludes to σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ, "clearness and absence of clearness", as to potentially adequate parameters to evaluate the relationship both between each part of every sub-segment and the other part, and between each subsegment and the other; as Socrates himself puts it, "[…] as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity etc. (καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα κτλ.)".

Ploutarchos, n.s., 16 (2019) 57-68
However, a problem arises as to what such a "clearness" (and its absence) might precisely mean -mainly as far as the visible and the intelligible genres are concerned. Now, in light of the very end of the sixth book of the Republic, I think these criteria are to be read as being both ontologically and veritatively revealing. In other words, σαφηνείᾳ and ἀσαφείᾳ are likely to mark a difference in the degree of being -and, analogously, in the degree of truthfulness 7 -of the components of both the intelligible and the visible realm. As a consequence, the kind of knowledge related to each and every part of the divided line reaches a degree of "clearness" which varies in accordance with the truth peculiar to each ontological class. As Socrates puts it, "they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality (ὥσπερ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας […] μετέχειν)". So, the difference in length of each sub segment might be thought to allude to the difference in truth and being which characterizes each ontological class: […] assume these four affec tions occurring in the soul (τέττα ρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνό μενα λαβέ): intellection or rea son for the highest (νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω), discursive rea so n ing for the second (διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ); assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-think ing or conjecture (τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰ κα σίαν), and arrange them in a pro portion, considering that they par ticipate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reali ty (τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσ περ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας με τέ χει, οὕτω ταῦ τα σαφηνείας ἡγη σάμενος με τέ χειν). (trans. after P. Shorey, slight ly modifi ed) 3 Let's now turn to Plutarch. At the beginning of the Quaestio, when he sums up the similitude of the divided segment of line, he seems to be rather accurate in his introductory sketch. The whole passage is worth mentioning: In the Republic, he likens the sum of things to a single line that has been divided into two unequal segments; again divides into two in the same ratio each of the two segments, that of the visible class and that of the conceptual (ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, τοῦ παντὸς ὥσπερ μιᾶς γραμμῆς τετμημένης ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνων ἑκάτερον τμῆμα εἰς δύο ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὸ τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένος καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου), and, having made four in all, declares first of the intelligible segment that of the primary ideas, second the mathematical (τέτταρα τὰ πάντα ποιήσας, τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ πρῶτον ἀποφαίνει τὸ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἴδη, δεύτερον τὸ μαθηματικὸν), and first of the perceptible segment the solid bodies and second the semblances and images of these (τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ στερέμνια σώματα, δεύτερον δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα τούτων). Also to each of the four he assigns its own peculiar criterion 8 (κριτήριον ἑκάστῳ τῶν τεττάρων ἀποδίδωσιν ἴδιον): intelligence to the first, and thought to the mathematical segment, and to the perceptibles belief, and conjecture to matters of images and semblances (νοῦν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ τῷ μαθηματικῷ, τοῖς δ᾽ αἰσθητοῖς πίστιν, εἰκασίαν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας). (trans. after H. Cherniss) Before moving on, a few pe cu lia rities deserve to be highlighted and commented on. First of all, it is "the universe" (τοῦ παντὸς) that pro ves to be represented by the whole segment of line (τοῦ παντὸς ὥσπερ μιᾶς γραμμῆς τετμημένης). This, it seems to me, implies that the line does in clude whatever "is", regardless of its pontential ontological eminence; that is to say, it ends up including the Idea of the Good 9 too. But there is also another aspect which is worth pointing out. The in telligible objects corresponding to the upper half of the intelligible sub-segment, i.e. the Ideas, are described as "prima ry" (τὸ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἴδη). It goes without saying that, should there be some "primary" intelligible objects, there have to be some "secondary" ones as well; as is made clear soon after, these latter are to be identified with the mathematical entities (διάνοιαν δὲ τῷ μαθηματικῷ). Now: one could not help but notice that, at the very least, the terminology (but presumably the resulting hierarchy as well) cannot be im mediately traced back to Plato. On the con trary, it proves to be peculiar to the Pla tonic tradition 10 .
Soon after this, in Plutarch's text two pivotal questions arise, which are likely to require a carefully and deeply meditated answer: What, then, did he have in mind when he divided the sum of things into unequal segments (τί οὖν διανοηθεὶς εἰς ἄνισα τμήματα τὸ πᾶν ἔτεμε)? And which of the segments is larger, the intelligible or the perceptible (πότερον τῶν τμημάτων, τὸ νοητὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητόν, μεῖζόν ἐστιν)? For he has not made it clear himself (αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε). (trans. after H. Cherniss) As is evident, we are now presented with the same questions we posed a few minutes ago when reading Plato's 8 On this term and its history, see G. Striker, 1996. 9 On this hotly debated topic, see now M. Vegetti, 2017/2018. 10 See H. Cherniss, 1976, 38 ff.

ISSN 0258-655X
Ploutarchos, n.s., 16 (2019) 57-68 own words. But, unlike Plato, Plutarch does not provide us with any clue as to which might be the answer. For, there is a striking silence, a surprising omission in Plutarch's summary: no mention at all happens to be made of "clearness" and "absence of clearness". Actually, there is not even a trace of any criteria of the kind of those which were alluded to in the Republic, and seemed to be considered there as the possible means to draw a comparison between each part of the divided segment and the other.

4
At this point, one should consider the reason for such an omission to occur, and whether this is to be deemed as voluntary by Plutarch, or if, nevertheless, it is one Plutarch could not be unaware of. I think that there is only one way to try to find a solution: giving a brief yet precise account of the answer Plutarch himself pro vides us with at the very end of the Quaestio. For, only by understanding what, according to Plutarch, is the right clue for explaining the alleged "re ti cence" of Plato's text (see αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε), one will also be given the opportunity to appreciate the real signi ficance of the initial omission.
So, which is the "bigger" sub-segment of the divided line? And -what is even more important -what does "bigger" exactly mean here? Plutarch extensively deals with these questions throughout the Quaestio. Firstly, he tests the possibility that the "bigger" subsegment is the sensible one; later on, in the second and last half of the text, he puts the other "candidate", i.e. the intelligible, under scru tiny. In all this, the main difficulty the reader needs to tackle is the fact that the author does not explicitly declare the theoretical option he sides with. Hence, be fore continuing the examination, a her meneutic criterion needs to be established -at least, should Plutarch's own position be detected. As a matter of fact, the scholars, and especially professor Opsomer 11 , have been drawing attention to a trend in Plutarch's Quaestiones: when not clearly stated otherwise, the solutions favoured by the author are likely to be the final ones. As a consequence, also in the third Platonica Quaestio scholars usually read the second half of the text as the core of Plutarch's thought, thus concluding that, according to him, it is the intelligible which is somehow "preeminent" 12 . Besides, the arguments previously employed to argue in favour of the "majority" of the sensible are actually defective. For, each of them mirrors a wrong conception of the relationship between the intelligible and the sensible realm, in so much as each of them is likely to exploit quantitative or materialistic criteria, or a markedly "continualist" approach 13 . For example, at 1001d we 11 See J. Opsomer, 1996 and2010. 12 See L. Napolitano Valditara, 1992;F. Ferrari, 1999. 13 An example of argument mirroring a continualist approach is represented by the following passage (1001f1002a): ἔτι τῶν εἰδῶν νόησιν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ περικοπῆς σώματος ἐπάγει, τῇ are told that the sensible sub-segment is "bigger" than the intelligible one because the "substance" of the latter is "contracted into something little and pure (εἰς βραχὺ συνηγμένη καὶ καθαρόν)". As is rather undisputable, a corporeal consistence is necessary for a substance to be described as "concentrated" (συνηγμένη) into some thing "narrow" (βραχὺ): On the face of it the perceptible segment would seem to be larger (δόξει δ᾽ αὐτόθεν μὲν εἶναι μεῖζον τὸ αἰσθητόν), for the indivisible and invariably identical being of the intelligibles is narrowly and purely concentrated (ἡ γὰρ ἀμέριστος οὐσία καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα τῶν νοητῶν ἐστιν εἰς βρα χὺ συνηγμένη καὶ καθαρόν), whe reas the perceptible was provided by the dispersed and erratic being of bodies [ἡ δὲ σκεδαστὴ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ περιπλανὴς τὸ αἰσθητὸν παρέσχεν]. (trans. after H. Cherniss, slightly modif.) Anyway, the problem with this kind of arguments can be summed up as follows: it is illegitimate to draw a comparison between two ontological classes through the means of a criterion which doesn't properly suit both of them. But, according to Plutarch, should "bigger" ever be understood in strict ly physical terms, one would be end up exploiting exactly that kind of ina dequate criterion (see 1002b, 1002d): To the contrary, however, one might say first that, in comparing <the> perceptibles with the intelligibles, we are in a way putting mortal things on a level with the divine (πρὸς δὲ τοὐναντίον εἴποι τις ἂν πρῶτον ὅτι συγκρίνοντες τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς τρόπον τινὰ τὰ θνητὰ τοῖς θείοις ἐξι σοῦ μεν), for God is among the in telligibles (ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς) 14 .

5
It is now time to return to the omission of σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ at the very beginning of the Quaestio. Is it possible to identify the exact reason why Plutarch could choose to be silent about these criteria? I think that it is, mainly in light of the development of the Quaestio itself. First of all, given the structure of the text, it seems reasonable to think the following: the communicative aim of Plutarch, when writing this text, was likely to be that of gradually showing how improper it would be to compare intelligible and sensible objects on the basis of a quantitative or materialistic parameter, or even adopting a con tinualist approach. But, were such an objective to be reached, it would be counter-productive for Plutarch to mention a proper criterion (like the ontological one of "clearness") from the very beginning of the text. For, in that case, Plutarch should have immediately explained what that 15 Here it is possible to detect a sign of Plutarch's polemic against Xenocrates, if as I believe the allusion is to Xenocrates' "minimal parts"; on the matter, see M.I. Parente, 2006, 9 ff. and 4748; as another example of this criticism, see Procr. an. 1022e: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀμέριστος οὐσία καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα μὴ μικρότητι, καθάπερ τὰ ἐλάχιστα τῶν σωμάτων, νοείσθω φεύγουσα τὸν μερισμόν· τὸ γὰρ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ καθαρὸν αὐτῆς καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀμερὲς εἴρηται καὶ ἀμέριστον. I set out to elaborate on the philosophical relationship between Plutarch and Xenocrates (and Speusippus) in an other paper.  16 : i.e. how not to draw inferences in order to describe the intelligible objects. And maybe it is not by chance that some of the mistakes Plutarch condemns were presumably made by an authoritative Plato's follower, one Plutarch often criticises: I mean Xenocrates 17 . So, in light of all this, the initial omission could be deemed as also polemically pregnant 18 , since it is functional to the gradual and hence impressive demonstration of the inadequateness of Xenocrates' philosophy.

Ploutarchos
Now: is this silence the product of a voluntary omission? Or does Plutarch simply rely on an already written Quaestio, where the omission was present? In my opinion, it would be not cautious to definitively side with one of these options, as we lack a definitive piece of evidence on the matter. Nevertheless, there are at least two aspects which should be taken into account. First, Plutarch and the other Middle Platonists used to "tamper" with the texts of the sources they quoted -Plato included 19 . This makes it all the more probable that Plutarch simply eliminated the reference to σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ from his text. But, even if he did not tamper with Plato's words on his own -maybe because he relied on an already available material -, he could not help but directly revise the source. For, Plutarch had a philological and firsthand approach to -along with a deep knowledge of -Plato's dialogues 20 . So, it is possible to conclude that, at the very least, Plutarch could not be unaware of the omission present in his introductory summary. But, as a matter of fact, he must have realised that such a silence could turn out to be unexpectedly useful.