Introduction

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Guest Editor

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The 2022 triennial meeting of the International Plato Society will be held at the University of Georgia, in Athens, GA, and will be the first in the United States. In preparation for this event, incoming president, Edward C. Halper, proposed a series of joint sessions with the American Philosophical Association. These sessions are a way to acquaint the American philosophical community with the work of the Society. The papers in this volume were presented at sessions of the Eastern Division (January 2020) and the Pacific Division (originally scheduled for April 2020). That these articles started life as presentations constrained by time explains why some are as short as they are.

In "Socrates and Thrasymachus on Perfect and Imperfect Injustice," Roslyn Weiss forcefully argues for a thesis that challenges the orthodox interpretation of justice in the *Republic*. Orthodoxy holds that Socrates'

account of justice in Book 1 is, at best, a preliminary effort, aimed at Thrasymachus; the fuller account, from Books 2-4, is what the reader should take as the authentic account. Weiss argues, to the contrary, that, in Book 1, Socrates correctly identifies justice and injustice as other-regarding. Thus, an individual is just or unjust because of the way she treats others; justice and injustice for a city are analogously other-regarding. What is called justice and injustice in Books 2-4 are an internal arrangement of parts of the soul whose function is not, in itself, other-regarding; at best, these are moderation and immoderation and are only necessary conditions for justice and injustice.

In "Self-Instantiation and Self-Participation," Michael Augustin returns to the issue of forms as self-instantiating. He argues that the so-called structuring forms of Being, Oneness, Identity, Difference, Likeness, and

Unlikeness must be self-instantiating. Each must have the property of which it is the essential nature; e.g., Being must have being. Although one might argue that it is the nature of such forms to be self-instantiating, the best way to explain self-instantiation in each case is by self-participation; each form instantiates itself because it participates in itself.

Thomas Tuozzo offers a novel reading of the notion of existence for forms in "Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato's *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6)." The fifth hypothesis states that the one is not. Taking the one to be a form, Tuozzo argues that the being denied of the one is spatial-temporal instantiation; the hypothesis considers a case where the form is not, as a contingent matter of fact, instantiated at some time and place. Later, in the deduction, when Parmenides says that the one participates in being in a way, this claim means that the one *is* in the condition of not being instantiated, although it could very well cease to be in this condition. The motion, generating and perishing that the deduction attributes to the one refer, Tuozzo argues, to the one form's passage from the condition of being instantiated to that of not being instantiated.

Renato Matoso begins with a problem in interpretating the Divided Line in the *Republic*. He attributes the problem to reading the passage through the lens of the widely accepted notion of Degrees of Reality. Vlastos famously argued that this idea is preferable to what he claimed to be the incoherent idea of Degrees of Existence. However, Matoso offers a way of understanding degrees of existence that is meant to overcome the objection. An original and, e.g., its image in a mirror differ in degrees of existence because the existence of the latter is so dependent on the former that it can be said to have a lesser degree of existence. This notion of dependent existence also has negative implications for the Two World view. Finally, he shows that this idea solves the original problem of interpreting the Divided Line.

In "*Philebus* 23c-26d: *Peras*, *Apeiron*, and *Meikton* as Measure," George Rudebusch reviews the problems with some current interpretations of the concepts Bound, Unbounded, and Mix. Then using the notion of scale, from abstract measurement theory, he offers a way of understanding these three concepts that resolves these problems. A scale is defined by a domain of items and the relations among them; it is an arrangement of related pairs of items in a graded array. Scales differ depending on the kinds of relations found among the items. In a partial scale, items are related anti-symmetrically and transitively; for instance, pairs of cities on rivers in the Mississippi Watershed, related by being downstream from one another, form a partial scale. The Unbounded, e.g., hotter and colder, can be represented as a partial scale without an upper or lower limit. The Bound is a set of equality relations and proportions that, when added to the Unbounded, produce a ratio scale; when pairs in the Unbounded are divided by intervals and are then related by equality or proportion, they form a ratio scale. The Mix of Unbounded and Bound can be represented as a ratio scale with appropriate bounds.

Liu Xin addresses methodology in "On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato's and Aristotle's Methods of Division." She starts with the Stranger's division of constitutions in the *Statesman* (291c-292b, 301a-303b). There constitutions are divided, first, according to the number of rulers—one, few, or many—yielding monarchy, rule of the few, rule of the many. Then the Stranger

adds legal-illegal, yielding six constitutions altogether: kingship-tyranny, aristocracy-oligarchy, democracy (legal)-democracy (illegal). If this division were a single *diairesis* (vertical division), 'legal-illegal' should be a sub-differentia of the differentia 'number of rulers.' However, 'legal-illegal' is not a sub-differentia of 'number of rulers.' According to Liu, this problem is due to the mistake of taking the division to be a single *diairesis*. Instead of a single *diairesis*, there are two independent but parallel divisions, associated with one another. The first divides constitutions according to the number of rulers and the second according to legality. Then the two parallel divisions are crossed, making a 3 x 2 chiasmus (cross-division), which yields the six constitutions. The distinctions among *diairesis* (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division) are more clearly found in Aristotle's method of division, which Liu then explicates, in a way that clarifies Plato's use of them.