

Justice, Koinonia and Unity: *Phaedo*, *Republic* and *Parmenides*

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ABSTRACT

Thus far, scholarly research has paid little attention to the relationship between justice, koinonia and unity in Plato's works. This is despite the fact that this relationship is already mentioned in *Gorgias* 507e6–508a3—even though the passage makes no reference to the theory of forms. In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate how this relationship is established in the realm of forms. First, I examine the so-called intellectual biography of the philosopher in the *Phaedo* (95e–102a). This passage introduces community (κοινωνία) and presence (παρουσία) as alternative ways to understand how things participate in forms. However, by the end of the dialogue the exact nature of this kind of participation remains unclear (100d5–6). Nevertheless, the *Phaedo*'s discussion of previous views on the cause of being, generation, and destruction suggests a single

teleological cause that connects and holds everything together (99c5–6). Secondly, I demonstrate that the relationship between koinonia and justice within the realm of forms is fundamental to Plato's *Republic*, even though this relationship is considered just as a paradigm (500c–501e) and therefore not explicitly discussed. Thirdly, I demonstrate that the *Republic*'s concept of justice is employed in the *Parmenides* to clarify the function and structure of the forms. This model of justice enables us to favour the conception of participation as *koinonia*, thereby rejecting the so-called model of immanence, namely, the view that forms are present in that which participates in them. Finally, I illustrate how the model of justice, present in the third deduction of *Parmenides* II (157b–159b), contributes to the exploration of the koinonia between the One and the principle of plurality.

Keywords: Justice, Koinonia, Unity, Plato

SUBLATING THE HYPOTHESES IN THE *PHAEDO*'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Any¹ enquiry into first causes and principles in Plato must begin with the *Phaedo*. This is because the dialogue not only poses the question of the cause of being, generation and destruction for the first time, but also investigates it using a unique method. The theory of forms is presented as a hypothesis in need of a further account, which must be adequate or sufficient (ικανόν). This account is *hikanos* to the extent that it requires no further account, and can therefore be understood as a first principle. In this section, I argue that the hypothesis of the forms—together with its sufficient account—is presented as an alternative to other hypotheses. These hypotheses are examined and refuted in their original meaning, while acknowledging their valuable aspects. Plato would call this an *elenchos* and an *anairesis*² of these hypotheses.³

This refutation begins by examining the hypothesis of the investigation into nature, which can essentially be described as a materialist conception of causes encompassing the efficient and the material cause. Socrates refutes this hypothesis by highlighting its inherent contradictions: (a) when a single fact is considered the cause of opposing phenomena (96d, 99e–101a) or when it is considered the cause of a phenomenon opposing the fact itself (101a8–b2), and (b) when two opposing facts are presented as causes of the same phenomenon (97a–b, 101b–c). Setting aside the controversy surrounding the meaning of ‘συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ’ in the description of the method of hypothesis, I believe that this refutation provides a good example of how to determine whether conclusions drawn from a single hypothesis (ἐκ τούτων, τὰ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης

ὁμηθέντα) are compatible with one another, and to what degree. Furthermore, I also believe that the principle of non-contradiction plays a crucial role in this endeavour.⁴ The way in which Socrates proceeds shows that he indeed sees the notion of cause operative in the investigation of nature not only as a hypothesis⁵ with contradictory conclusions, but also as incompatible with the Platonic theory of forms. It is indeed impossible to consider both the material preconditions of a phenomenon and the forms as causes in one and the same sense.

Anaxagoras’ notion of *nous* is the second alternative hypothesis.⁶ If one seeks the cause of something, one must establish what is best for it (97c–d). Socrates expected Anaxagoras to demonstrate what is best for each thing and what is good for all things in common (98b). However, rather than proceeding according to this teleological cause, which Socrates considers in accordance with his own mind (κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ), Anaxagoras appeals to the same material causes as the physicists. However, neither the former refutation nor this disappointment leads to a complete denial of the respective hypotheses. On the contrary, these procedures culminate in the *anairesis* of the hypotheses in question. Socrates rejects them as real causes, instead assigning them a new meaning within a more comprehensive alternative theory. Socrates’ decision to accept his death sentence is a prime example of this. Indeed, his decision is based on choosing what seems better to him, regardless of the fact that, without his body, he would be unable to do either. The material cause is therefore regarded solely as a condition without which the true cause—i.e. the teleological one—cannot be effective as such (ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ’ εἴη αἴτιον, 99b3–4). Taken together, but not separately, they are able

to provide a sufficient explanation for the phenomena (Horn 2011, p. 137). As we shall see, this is an essential aspect of the Platonic principle theory.

To determine what is best for each thing necessarily requires an enquiry into the common good for all things (98b). That which is good and necessary is conceived as that which binds and holds everything together (99c). This kind of good is considered a power (δύναμις) with the exceptional ability (δαιμονίαν ἰσχύν) to arrange everything in the best way (99c). As Socrates says, his inability to discover the nature of a cause of this kind—a teleological cause—by himself or to learn it from someone else (τῆς τοιαύτης, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει) led him to undertake a second journey to find this cause (Dorter 1982, p. 120–127; Horn 2011, p. 138–139; Gerson 2020, p. 53–54). Therefore, it is not the *nous*, but that power, which he is looking for. During this search, he takes refuge in the *logoi* (99e5).

It is precisely at this point that Socrates explicitly refers to the method of hypothesis as an indirect approach to finding a cause that binds and holds everything together. As his own, strongest (ἑρρωμενέστατον, 100a) and presumably most reliable (ἀσφαλέστατον, 100d) hypothesis, he proposes his theory of forms, that is: 1) ‘a beautiful, itself by itself, is something, and so are a good and a large and all the rest’ (100b). The answer to the question about causes follows from this: 2) Everything that is to be regarded as beautiful, apart from beauty itself, is beautiful because it participates in the form of beauty; ‘and the same goes for all of them’ (100c5–6) (Benson 2015, p. 201). Both sentences are consistent with each other. Material causes, on the contrary, are incompatible with the theory of forms, unless they are subordinated to the forms. Nevertheless, three points should be noted: First, this

theory is presented as ‘nothing new’ (οὐδὲν καινόν), and even as most familiar (100a9–10). Second, beauty, goodness, and largeness are listed together (100b6–7).⁷ Third, the precise meaning of participation, as either presence or community (εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία, 100d5), remains unclear.⁸

If we are to make sense of the second part of the method in question, the first two points seem important to me. I will consider the third point in the context of the *Republic* and the *Parmenides*. The method aims to verify the hypothesis itself. In order to do so, one must resort to another superior hypothesis, until one attains something ‘adequate or sufficient’ (*hikanon*, 101d). In fact, Plato is ambiguous on a couple of things. What does he mean by “higher hypothesis”? What is something *hikanon*? If we wish to use this method to further our search for the cause, the first point justifies referring to other passages in the *Phaedo*.

Phaedo 74d–75b describes the close relationship between a general teleology and the theory of forms, including the issue of participation (Chen 1992, p. 198, n. 9). In contrast to the completely determined nature of the forms, sensible beings are considered deficient (ἐνδεῖ, 74d6, e3).⁹ This is why they strive (βούλεται, *Phd.* 74d9, ὁρέγεται 75a2, b1, προθυμεῖται 75b7) to attain the intrinsic perfection of the forms. This striving introduces different degrees of assimilation to the property which the form realises absolutely. In this sense, the form is also the good for the things that participate in it. Therefore, every form is a kind of regional good.¹⁰ In any case, goodness is an essential property of the forms, although they are not identical with it (103e–104a).¹¹ They are essentially good, but they are not the form of the Good, although they ‘bring forward’ goodness in

the same way that the form of three ‘brings forward’ the form of oddness, and hotness ‘brings forward’ fire (104d, 105b–c) – a clear case of κοινωνία τῶν γένων (Mesquita 2018, Zehnpfennig 1991, p. 202, n. 170). They all presuppose the common good. This establishes a hierarchy in the intelligible realm, correcting the original conflation between the good, beauty, and largeness. Specifically, the good that binds and holds everything together is now associated with the forms – the regional goodness – in a teleological manner. Therefore, this new theory, which also incorporates all the aforementioned conceptions of the cause, is more subtle (κομψοτέραν) than the initial theory of forms. Compared to the ignorant (ἄμαθῃ), this new theory attains a supposedly superior kind of certainty (ἄλλην ἀσφάλειαν, 101d).

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN JUSTICE AND THE COMMUNITY OF FORMS IN THE *REPUBLIC*

The *dynamis* of the good that binds and holds everything together corresponds to the Form of the Good, which is qualified in the *Republic* as being beyond essence in terms of value and power (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δύναμις, 509b9) (Lisi 2018, p. 240–243). As in the *Phaedo*, Plato introduces here a hierarchy of all beings, with the Form of the Good at the top (518c9, 526e3, 532c6). However, the structure of the *Republic* shows a way towards the good which is fully determined by the conception of justice as doing one’s own (τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν) in a political or in a personal sense. If this conception is to be understood as a real definition of justice, it must be fundamentally and universally

valid, that is, also in the intelligible realm. And so it is, since this realm is conceived as the paradigm of justice. Thus, Socrates says of the philosopher that,

he sees and contemplates things that are set in a regular arrangement and are always in the same condition – things that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it at one another’s hands (οὔτ’ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ’ ἀδικοῦμενα ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων), but remain all in order according to reason/the ground (κατὰ λόγον) – (transl. Bloom, slightly modified).

Since each of these domains – the political, the personal and the intelligible – represents a just order, they are all composed of a plurality governed by a ruling principle – the philosopher king, the rational soul and the Form of the Good respectively – that binds and holds them together as a unity.¹² A just order also implies that its members are necessarily related to each other and work together. But whereas the philosopher must imitate the eidetical order as accurately as possible for a human being in order to serve as a mediating demiurge of goodness in the private as well as in the public sphere (500c–d), justice is, by virtue of its nature, intrinsic to the realm of forms. This realm must be a cosmos which is organized according to reason and, therefore, according to the ground or first principle, the Form of the Good. As a paradigm of political and personal justice, the intelligible realm necessarily constitutes a community of forms, identical to the one which is introduced already in *Republic* V 476a5–8:

The same logos applies to just and unjust, good and bad and all the forms: each is in itself one, but because they

appear all over the place, through their community with various actions and bodies and with one another, each appears as many (transl. Bloom, modified).¹³

Both passages complement each other.¹⁴ Nevertheless, one might be inclined to enquire whether this community of forms, as briefly described above, effectively constitutes an order κατὰ λόγον. Let's consider this further.

First, as in the *Phaedo*, in the *Republic* the Form of the Good is also equated with other forms. However, the equation in the *Republic* becomes clearly more provocative by the mention of forms of evil and injustice (cf. Gutiérrez 2011, p. 137-152). For how could the Form of the Good be the cause of being and essence of these forms? That Socrates is aware of such a contradiction is clear if we consider *Republic* II 379b15-c7 where he says that the good cannot be the cause of everything, so that we must look for other causes of evil (cf. Szlezák 2003, p. 120). An attempt to avoid this contradiction by considering the form of evil as 'unqualifiedly bad' (White 1979, p. 41; Krämer 1997, p. 202) just displaces the problem, for, in this case, taking this form to be the cause of evil would still imply that the Form of the Good is the indirect cause of evil. To sum up, from the standpoint of reason and the ground, the assumptions that the Form of the Good is one among other forms, and that it is the cause of evil require significant correction. Socrates puts the argument in a nutshell by saying in book IV, ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας: there is just one kind of excellence and unlimited kinds of evil (445c5-6).¹⁵ In contrast to *arete*, the unlimited kinds of evil cannot be reduced to one form of evil.¹⁶ *Mutatis mutandis* this is also the case for injustice. Is it possible that Socrates has forgotten all this?

No way. For in book X he argues that evil is corruptive and destructive, whereas the good contributes to the preservation and promotion of everything (608e4-5). Provided this were the case, is the assumption in 476a meant as a didactic provocation of Socrates' interlocutors?

This becomes evident only after having considered the Form of the Good. For, as argued at the beginning of *Republic* V, although what has been said is right (ὀρθῶς), it is deficient (φαυλῶς), since it requires grounding (λόγου δεῖται, 449c7-8) (Gutiérrez 2009, p. 91; Szlezák 1985, p. 286). The dialectical ascent to this logos takes three steps according to the metaphor of the threefold wave (τρικυμία, 472a4). Each wave represents a step higher in this *anabasis* (457b7, c4-5, 472a3-4, 473c6-7). And each step refers to the notion of justice to build up a pertinent hypothesis for the treatment of its respective subject (Gutiérrez 2009, p. 113-120; 2016, p. 12-32). Thus, in order to consider the shared function of man and woman, Socrates takes the coincidence of *physis* and *ergon* as a hypothesis (453b). As to the community of women and children in the second wave, he uses as hypothesis-ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, 462a2-the unifying force of justice as the greatest good and the corrupting power of injustice as the greatest evil for the polis (462a9-b3). As for the feasibility of the ideal polis, he makes use of the coincidence of philosophy and political authority as the hypothesis (473d), which in turn points to the essence of philosophy (472a-480a) as a higher hypothesis (Benson 2015, p. 208-236, Gutiérrez 2009, p. 115-120; 2016, p. 15-32; 2017, p. 109-129). It is precisely here, during this biggest and most difficult wave (472a), that we find both passages mentioned above: the one on the community of forms (476a) and the one on their rational and just order (500c). All this leads us to raise some questions. How can we

make sense of a form of evil and of injustice if the power of injustice weakens each being's power to fulfil their natural function (351e–352a)? Or, further, if the greatest good for the polis is its unity free of contradictions, while sedition represents the greatest evil? Or, how to make sense of a form of evil, if we seek to put an end to evil in our cities and for humanity as a whole (473d)? The threefold wave, however, comes to an end (οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν, 502c9) without providing an explicit answer to these questions, but with an essential hint to the connection of nature and function, to the uniting power of justice, and to the intrinsically rational and just order of the intelligible realm. In what follows, though, I would like to consider another aspect of this passage.

As Franco Ferrari (2000, p. 374–376) has extensively demonstrated, the purpose of *R.* 476a is not, contrary to widespread opinion, to postulate a separation between the intelligible and the visible. Considering the forms' eternal identity, the passage should rather be interpreted as presenting the dialectics between each form's unity of being (αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι) and the plurality of its manifestations (τῇ δὲ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον). Indeed, we are concerned with the community of forms not only with bodies and actions, but also with each other (ἀλλήλων). In this sense, the forms' φαίνεσθαι is an essential trait of their being. This *phainesthai* is inherent to intelligible being since that what intelligible being *virtually* is and remains in its unity manifests at the same time as a plurality. It manifests itself as the multiple instances participating in it—for example, the form of virtue appears as the forms of justice, wisdom, moderation and courage; and these again as the just, wise, moderate and brave actions—or

as the attributes of any carrier—for instance, beauty in the beautiful things. Nevertheless, intelligible being remains identical to itself. This dialectics can only be grasped within the framework of justice as doing one's own or fulfilling one's own function (τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν). However—as in the *Phaedo*—this implies a hierarchy of forms¹⁷ in which inferior forms are manifestations of superior forms, and, eventually, of the Form of the Good. All of them are similar to the good (ἀγαθοειδῆ). This is why the Form of the Good ought to be regarded as the highest form in terms of power, as the cause of the being and the essence of all forms (509b6–7) and, as the cause of all that is right and beautiful (πάντων ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, 517c2). However, if unity is an essential feature of the forms, being manifestations of unity, they must presuppose the form of unity (Ferrari 2000, p. 389, Horn 1997, p. 311–312). Thus, this form of unity should be identified with the Form of the Good—in agreement with the Aristotelian reports of the unwritten doctrines.¹⁸ And each of its intelligible manifestations consists—like justice—in a perfect unity that comes to be out of plurality (παντάπασιν ἓνα γεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, *R.* 443e1–2). This also explains why the intelligible realm constitutes an intrinsically just order in which every part fulfills its own function. In spite of this, in the *Republic* Socrates does not address these issues. Furthermore, the question remains: What role could the form of evil or the form of injustice play in the realm of forms? Is it at all possible for division and dispersion, destruction and corruption to come out of unity?

As we know, in *Republic* V Socrates defers the examination of political and personal injustice. It is only when the just order of the intelligible realm has been connected to the Form of the Good as its ground and princi-

ple, that we can understand the rectification of *Republic* 476a: ‘Consideration and judgement shall proceed, in this way, according to reason/to the ground’—Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἂν οὕτω γίγνοιτο ἢ τε θεά καὶ ἡ κρίσις (545c6–7) (Gutiérrez 2003a). Measured against this ground, Kallipolis is right (ὀρθή) and good (ἀγαθή) (449a), whereas the unjust souls and constitutions are deficient (ἡμαρτημένα), that is, they fail to reach their goal, which is justice and the good (544d). The emergence of deficient types of constitutions and people is explained by the substitution of the common good by other, particular goods: Timocracy is defined by the desire for privileges and honour (φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι, 548c5–7, 550b5–7, 581a9–10), oligarchy aims at accumulating wealth (555b9–10), democracy seeks to attain absolute freedom (562b9–10), and tyranny strives for unlimited power (573c3–5). Unity decreases and plurality increases step by step.¹⁹ While the just polis and the just person participate at the highest degree in the form of justice (ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ἢ καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ, 472c1–2), the multifarious types of injustice result from decreasing degrees of participation in the form of justice. Why should we then posit forms of evil and injustice in the realm of forms? This question leads back to the issue of the first cause of evil. As Socrates announces in book 2, the *Republic* keeps silent on this matter (Szlezák 2003, p. 120).

FROM THE IMMANENCE MODEL TO THE JUSTICE MODEL IN *PARMENIDES*

Bearing this in mind, we can claim that Plato intended to ground a unified cosmos. This cosmos, as we learn from the wise men

in the *Gorgias*, holds heaven and earth, gods and men together as a whole through community and friendship—κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλίαν—, orderliness, temperance and justice: “That is the reason why they call the whole of this world by the name of *kosmos*, not of disorder nor dissoluteness” (*Gorg.* 507e6–508a3, transl. Lamb). This is also the reason why Plato posits that nature as a whole is kindred (ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης, *Men.* 81a). Even if forms are not explicitly mentioned in the *Gorgias*, there is a similar connection between *koinonia* and justice as the one explicitly attributed to the divine paradigm in the *Republic*. However, in the *Gorgias* the main subject is not eidetical justice, but rather political and personal justice.

Conversely, the platonic *Parmenides* uses the notion of justice to discuss the function of forms, thereby introducing a more fundamental kind of *koinonia*. This, in turn, enables us to relate the causal function of the form of the Good with the notion of unity. In addition to introducing the One as first principle, the *Parmenides* also refers to a kind of material cause. Therefore, even admitting that the *Parmenides* is one of the most obscure Platonic dialogues, it is possible to discover in it some essential hints regarding both the theory of forms and the theory of principles of the unwritten doctrines.²⁰ This is the way I understand *Parmenides* 159b–c: “For all things have been mentioned, once the one and the others are mentioned” (πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν τό τε ἓν καὶ τᾶλλα) (transl. Gill & Ryan).²¹ In other words, everything that is can be reduced to the One and the Others than the One. Of course, one may object that this passage belongs to the Fourth Deduction, where the One and the Others are considered as absolutely separate (159b–c). If they were entirely separate (χωρίς) from each other,

there would not be nothing besides them, since according to Zeno's and Gorgias' tenet, everything that is must always be somewhere (Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι που δεῖ τό γε ὄν ἀεί, *Prm.* 151a4–5; 145e1: μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὄν οὐδὲν ἄν εἴη; vgl. 138a–b, 159c).²² This position guides the discussion in the dialogue to some extent. According to this tenet, the One itself must be in the Others, or the forms in their participants. This is what I call the immanence model.²³ If the principles are separate from each other, it is impossible for the Others to participate in the indivisible One, and for the One to be present in the Others—either as a whole or as parts: “In no way, then, are the others one, nor do they have any oneness in them” (159c–d) (transl. Gill & Ryan). There could not be anything besides them. If this were the case, the principle's being and nature would also have to be separate from its appearance and function. This would contradict the views held in the *Phaedo* (99c9–d1) and the *Republic* (509b8), and render the One and the Others (and forms) powerless, that is, they would not be principles. This separation is unacceptable owing both to the content and the form of the dialogue.

Let us first consider the form, i.e. the dialogue's structure and its dramatic action. As Proclus points out, Athens—in middle between Jonia and Elea—is point where the defenders of multiplicity –the philosophers coming from Clazomenae—and the defenders of unity—Zeno and Parmenides (*In Prm.* 559–661) meet;²⁴ that is, the meeting point between multiplicity and unity. The fact that the first group meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the agora is noteworthy. From there, they go to the house of Antiphon, who ‘lives close by in Melite.’ And then, again, they go to the house of Pythodorus, ‘outside the city wall in the Kerameikos.’ This is where Zeno and

Parmenides are staying. Socrates and others have come there because they were eager to hear Zeno read his book. The defenders of multiplicity travel from the meeting point of the multitude (the *agora*) to the meeting point of a selected group of philosophers. This movement clearly represents an *anabasis* comparable to that of the Cave Allegory. In the course of this displacement, the defenders of multiplicity find Antiphon, a friend of horses, engaging a smith to work on a bridle. Horses and bridles are examples of the living beings and the artefacts mentioned in the Divided Line at the level of *pistis*. Furthermore, going beyond the city wall to reach the house of Pythodorus may be understood as entering the intelligible realm. In this house Zeno reads his book and Socrates introduces his hypothesis. As Socrates and Parmenides point out, Zeno's difficulties remain within the sensible realm, while the Socratic hypothesis pretend to distinguish and lastly separate the sensible from the intelligible (129a–130b; 135d–e). As usual in the dianoetical procedure, Socrates takes the forms as principles, but Parmenides shows him the self-contradictory consequences that follow from this hypothesis.

During Zeno's lecture, Parmenides remains outside of the house. I take this to be a reference to the separation of the principles and its consequences: whether all is one (εἰ ἓν ἐστι = ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν) or many (εἰ πολλὰ ἐστιν), if the principles are taken as entirely separate from each other, many absurdities and contradictions ensue (128d). It is with this Parmenides, who remains outside the house during Zeno's lecture, that the young Socrates shares his understanding of forms. The young Socrates conceives each form as a separated absolute unity (εἰ ὁ ἕστιν ἓν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἓν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι, 129 b7–8; cf. 137c4–5).

Moreover, his understanding of participation leads to unsolvable difficulties: each form loses its unity and becomes an indefinite plurality. Socrates' account of participation is contradictory; his attempt to mediate between unity and multiplicity is unsuccessful. Both unity and multiplicity remain powerless (133e, 134d–e). He can think of no alternative (131a4–5).²⁵

Parmenides' entrance into the house represents unity acting on multiplicity. Up to this point there has been no mention of the principle of multiplicity, however, only five members of the group are called explicitly by their names: Parmenides, Zeno, Pythodorus, Socrates and Aristoteles; the remaining two are left unnamed. As J. Klein suggests, this could be an allusion to the principle that according to the reports of the unwritten doctrines is called *aoristos dyas* (Klein 1985, p. 286–287). The purpose of the dialectical exercise recommended by Parmenides to the young Socrates is to show the interaction between unity and this principle, not to posit their separation, which would abolish their condition as principles. This is how I understand Zeno's remarks regarding Parmenides' proposed task: μή γάρ οὐ φαῦλον ἢ ὃ λέγει (136b5). Translations into English say: 'For there is a great deal in what he says' (Fowler), '...is no light matter' (Sayre) or 'thing' (Allen), 'it won't be easy' (Gill & Ryan). In any case, as Szlezák (1985) has shown, what is not φαῦλον is τιμώτερα, that is, it is of higher value and brings us closer to the principles (Gutiérrez 2003).

Under the assumption that the second part of the dialogue should be taken as an instruction (διδάξαι, 135b2), and an example of one of the many paths leading to the truth and to insight, the dialectical exercise should fulfil the so-called dialectical requirement. We have witnessed the same procedure in the *Phaedo*. Thus the exercise can in no way begin

with the First Principle –as in the Neoplatonic interpretation (Halfwassen 1992, p. 302–307). It should begin with the Eleatic hypothesis, which in any case seems to coincide with the hypothesis proposed by Socrates –εἰ ὁ ἔστιν ἓν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὐτὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἓν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι (129b7–8); εἰ ἓν ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἓν (137c4–5) (O'Brien 2007). The One of the First Deduction excludes all multiplicity and relation. As such, it is limitless (ἄπειρον), has no figure and is nowhere (137c–138a). In this point Parmenides/Plato follows Melissus.²⁶ If the One is nowhere, according to Zeno's/Socrates' position, it is not and it is not one (141e). Consequently, it is neither thinkable–there is no knowledge, opinion or even perception of it–nor communicable–there is no name nor account of it (142a).²⁷ This is exactly the position held by Socrates' fictitious objector in the first part of the dialogue, who denies the being, knowability, and communicability of Socratic forms (135a, 133b). Under consideration of this sophistic position, the Platonic Parmenides uses the First Deduction to draw the contradictory consequences of the Eleatic and Socratic hypotheses (Palmer 1999, p. 116–117, Gutiérrez 2003, p. 132; Brémond 2019). Nevertheless, Parmenides leaves room for an eternal being (141e9–10) (Wahl 1926, p. 57). In other words, he only denies the temporal being of the One.

According to the immanence model, there is nothing different from the One and the Others–neither forms nor participants in them. Moreover, the One is not (since, according to the First Deduction, this would be contradictory).²⁸ Furthermore, the Others are not, since, firstly, if the One is but the Others are entirely deprived of the One, the Others would be completely indeterminate (Fourth Deduction), and secondly, if the One

is not, there would be nothing at all (Eight Deduction).²⁹ The complete separation of the One and the Others in the Fourth Deduction results in them losing their power and therefore their condition as principles. Consequently there is nothing besides them. This should serve to demonstrate the uselessness of the immanence model: it does not work at all! Yet, the Second Deduction still seems to make use of the immanence model:

Isn't this necessary too, that there be nothing outside the one and the others? - No doubt. - But surely what is must always be somewhere. -Yes. - Then won't that which is in something be in something greater as something less? For there is no other way that something could be in something else. - No, there isn't. - Since there is nothing else apart from the others and the one, and since they must be in something, must they not in fact be in each other - the others in the one and the one in the others - or else be nowhere? - Apparently. - So, on the one hand, because the one is in the other, the other would be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one would be less than the others, since it is contained. On the other hand, because the others are in the one, by the same argument the one would be greater than the others and they less than it. - So it seems (151b) (transl. Gill & Ryan)

If the One and the Others are everything there is—as in the Fourth Deduction—, Parmenides must be referring here to the principles.³⁰ However, in contrast to the Fourth Deduction, the present (Second) Deduction admits the

reciprocal immanence of the One and the Others. This implies the possibility of a resultant third. However, the immanence here is clearly understood in the sense of spatial location: 'For there is no other way that something could be in something else.' As a condition of being, this immanence implies that the One and the Others are both greater and smaller at the same time. Therefore, immanence is contradictory. When Socrates concedes the possibility of participation in the form as a whole or in a part of it, he understands participation precisely in this way, as if the form were spatially present in the participants: τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι (131a8). Consequently, the form loses its unity and becomes as many as participants there are—either as individuals or as parts of them, just like it would happen in the case of sensible things. In any case, Socrates can think of no other way of understanding participation (131a).³¹

It is worth noting that in the passage quoted above an alternative model appears—what I call the model of justice (150a–d) (Gutiérrez 2022). However, I will first discuss the immanence model. Let us consider the One and the Others as possible carriers of properties, for example, let us consider the One and the Others to be bigger or smaller than each other. Neither of them will be carriers of these properties just on account of being what they are, their *ousia*. The One will not be bigger or smaller on account of being one; nor will the Others be bigger or smaller on account of them being others. Besides being what they are, they must have (ἔχειν) these properties, or these properties must be added to them (προσεῖναι), come into them (ἐγγίγνεσθαι) or be in them (ἐνεῖναι). This presupposes the existence of the properties in question, which, as pure determinations or forms (εἶδη), mutually exclude and oppose each other (149e8–9).

Now, this understanding of participation as addition, incoming or being in the carriers leads us back to the mereological alternative and, consequently, to the same difficulties of the first part of the dialogue. If, on the one hand, smallness comes into a single carrier as a whole, it either stretches equally throughout the whole of it, or it contains it, thus becoming equal to it or larger than it. If, on the other hand, smallness comes into a part of the carrier, we will face the same alternative: it either becomes equal or bigger than the carrier. In any case, smallness will do the jobs of largeness and equality, but not its own: *πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς* (150a7–8). We have here a clear case of *polypragmosyne* or injustice, which is not possible in the intelligible realm. In sum: smallness would never be in any being, nor would anything be small except smallness itself (150b). *Mutatis mutandis* this would also have to be the case for largeness, so that smallness and largeness would only be possible in relation to each other. Consequently, they would not have any power (*dynamis*) over appearances; “in relation to the one” – that is, to any carrier whatsoever – they would not have the power to exceed any one, nor to be exceeded by any one, this would only be possible “in relation to each other” (150d). Thus, the model of immanence leads to exactly the same conclusion as the biggest puzzle of the first part of the dialogue (133d). Strangely enough, it is here that the model of justice appears for the first time.

The passage requires that smallness and largeness should each fulfil their own function. Thus, according to the model of justice, every form should act in consonance with their own nature/*ousia*. This intrinsic harmony between nature and function is justice. At the same time, by doing their own-*prattein*

ta heautēs – every form also contributes to the harmony of the whole. From the perspective of the whole, this harmony is *sophrosyne* (cf. *R.* 432a5–b1 and 433a1.b1; *Phaedr.* 247c–e). This is the reason why the form of the Good cannot be identified with the totality of the intelligible, as it does, for example, Ferrari (2023, p. 50). Now, as it often happens in Plato, this is not always stated explicitly. We find an example of this already in the Second Deduction, when thinking (*διάνοια*) distinguishes the One itself from Being. In this case, if Being is something and the One itself is something different, it is not by being one that the One is different from Being, nor by its being being that Being is other than the One. This is rather a result of difference and otherness fulfilling its function (143b). In this way, the model of justice enables every form, as an efficient cause, to produce the same effects (*ταῦτα ποιήσει*) in different carriers without losing its unity. Thus understood, the model of justice – and, by now we should probably add, of *sophrosyne* – corresponds to the above mentioned dialectics between the unity of being of every Form and its multiple appearances or manifestations.³² Consequently, it successfully substitutes the model of immanence. But it is not until the Third Deduction that Parmenides clearly applies the model of justice to the relation between the principles.

The Third Deduction examines the affections of the Others, if the One is: *Τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἔν ἐι ἔστιν* (157b6). The affections of the Others are precisely produced by the *prattein*, or – in the terms of the *Sophist* – by the *dynamis tou poiein* of the One.³³ In contrast to the Fourth Deduction, in the Third one, Parmenides mentions something different (*ἕτερόν τι*) from the One coming to be (*γίγνεσθαι*) in the Others (*ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = τοῖς ἄλλοις*) due to the community

of the One and the Others (ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων). First of all, this is a One without parts. It is an absolute One (παντελῶς ἓν, 157c4), the only one which is one without sharing in anything else (νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν ποῦ, 158a5).³⁴ This is precisely the quality this One shares with the form of the Good. They alone are absolutely by themselves. Now, this One produces something else in the Others, but it does not go itself in to them, since it is out of the community of the One and the Others (ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων) that something different comes to be. The only possible product of this community is multiplicity, more precisely, the multiplicity of the forms. Since each of them is one, they limit and determine each other. This is how the whole realm of forms comes to be. As such, the One is not just the cause of the unity of the intelligible realm as a whole, but also of the unity of its parts, the forms. The forms as such receive their limit and determination (πέρας) from the One. And again, this function of the One corresponds exactly to the function of the form of the Good as cause of the being and essence of the forms (τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, *R.* 509b6–7).

Indeed, since the forms are, and they are what they are, each one of them limits itself from the others by its own being, while at the same time contributing to determine others and receiving determinations from others. In a certain sense they are completely what they are due to their reciprocal interaction and mutual affection (*Soph.* 247e–248c). As such, every single form (μῖα τινὸς ἰδέας) is conceived as a certain unity (ἑνὸς τινος) and a whole (ὅλον), that is, as a complete and perfect one composed of all its parts (ἐξ ἀπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός) (157e1). Precisely because of its completeness and perfection, it is neither

to be identified with its parts nor reducible to them, but rather presupposed by them (Harte 2002, p. 131–134; Migliori 1990, p. 309). On the contrary, its parts, understood as intelligible or sensible parts, must partake of the eidetic whole and, because of this, also of the One. This One is the one principle which unites and sustains everything. In this way, we arrive at the same position we had already deduced from *Republic* 476a and 500c. The intelligible realm is just not merely because doing one's own is essential to the forms, but because every part of it, every single form, and the whole realm share the same structure as justice: παντάπασιν ἓνα γεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, *R.* 443 e1–2.³⁵ It has become a perfect one out of its many parts. Justice binds all the forms together: πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσαντα. This is why the intelligible realm is a cosmos *kata logon*. Since this is the paradigm of justice, if the material conditions are given, it also manifests itself in the soul and the city. As long as the philosopher assimilates to it and imitates it, she will become a demiurge of justice and *sophrosyne*, and of all the civic virtues in public and private life (500d).

While the One is the cause of limit, the nature of the Others produces unlimitedness (ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειριάν, 158d6). However, we must take into account that even before the complete separation of the One and the Others in the Fourth Deduction, the Third Deduction speaks of their separation (ἀφελεῖν [...] ἀφαιρεθῆναι), although only as a separation by thought and thought alone (διανοία, 158c2–3). In reality, they cannot be separated, for, if they were separated, there would be nothing (158b4). That is why Parmenides uses the verb *metalambanein* in order to refer to a logical condition before participation. The result of this thought experiment is not πλήθος, a multitude or multiplicity, but

πλήθη, multitudes or multiplicities, ἐν οἷς τὸ
 ἓν οὐκ ἔνι (158c1), in which oneness is not
 present, that nature which itself by itself is
 different from the form.³⁶ The examination
 of this nature departs from its effects, since
 ‘the very least we are able to subtract’ (ἀφελεῖν
 ὡς οἰοί τε ἔσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον) (158c2–3) or
 ‘whatever we see of it’ (ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰ
 ὀρωμεν), is always ἄπειρον πλήθει, indefinite
 multitude (158c5–7).³⁷ Itself by itself it seems
 to be pure indetermination. But the examina-
 tion of this nature presupposes the agency of
 the One as cause of oneness, since otherwise
 we could neither think nor speak of the small-
 est part. This also means that we should not
 understand the genesis of forms literally, but
 rather as an analysis of their structure as
 unities composed of multiple elements. This
 corresponds to the community of *peras* and
apeiron, which can ultimately be reduced to
 the interaction between two principles. Using
 the language of the *Phaedo*, the One would
 be the cause (*aitia*), the Others, that without
 which the cause could not act as a cause (99b).
 Since without the Others, the One could
 not produce oneness, without indetermined
 multiplicity, there would be no multiplicity.
 The community or encounter of both princi-
 ples, not their being in each other, produces
 effects similar to their respective natures .
 Therefore, the justice model clearly prevails
 over the immanence model, overcoming its
 problematic consequences. Furthermore, the
 justice model also enables us to observe the
 connection between the function of the One
 and the function of the form of the Good
 as cause of the being and essence of forms.
 Considering Aristotle’s reports regarding the
 Platonic unwritten doctrines in *Metaphys-
 ics* A 6 988a12–15, we could also raise the
 question whether there is any connection
 between the nature of the Others as cause of

apeiria and the cause of evil. The examina-
 tion of the unjust constitutions of souls and
 regimes seems to confirm this. There is an ad-
 ditional hint in this direction in *R.* X 609a–b
 (Gutiérrez 2011). There, Socrates speaks
 about the evil that destroys and corrupts, and
 about the good that preserves and benefits.
 Furthermore, he adds, nearly everything has
 its special, congenital evil (σύμφυτον ἑκαστω
 κακόν, 609a3; ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς κακίας, 609c6;
 τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, 609a2). However, in the
 case of soul, it cannot be destroyed by its
 own congenital evil, even though this evil
 can prevent soul from doing its own job and
 achieving its *aretē*, its excellence. If not as
 an efficient cause, at least as a condition *sine
 qua non* of evil, this congenital evil could be
 related to the indefinite nature of the Others
 of the *Parmenides*. Having arrived at this
 standpoint, we are likely better equipped to
 fully answer Glaukos challenge concerning
 the power of justice and injustice in the soul.

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- 3 The philosophical autobiography is presented as a search for the cause of being, coming into being, and passing away (95e8–9, 96a8–10, 97b3, 97c7). It names three stages on the path to investigating causes: 1.) examining the proposals of Ionian natural philosophy on the question of causes (96a–97b); 2.) Anaxagoras's doctrine of nous as a proposal (97b–99c); 3.) the doctrine of forms as his own proposal on this question (99c–102a) (cf. B. Zehnpfennig 1991, p. 196, note 134). As it is usual with such autobiographies, it is written from the perspective of the present time of its composition, i.e., even though Socrates introduces the hypothesis method for the first time on his “second sailing,” all three proposals are treated and examined as hypotheses for solving the question of causes. Socrates explicitly presents his second sailing as part of this investigation: τὸν δεῦτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν, 99c9–d1. In contrast to the materialistic conception of causality in the investigation of nature, the doctrine of forms is regarded as the strongest and most reliable logos. The fact that ἀναίρεσις is not explicitly mentioned does not mean that it is not present in the matter. Dorter 1982, p. 138 rightly refers to Hegel and Fichte, but does not mention ἀναίρεσις.
- 4 Cf. *Rep.* IV 436b–437a. As Ch. Kahn pointed out: “He has a clear notion of logical contradiction”, Kahn 1996, p. 316; cf. p. 316 n. 33, p. 309, n. 26. See also Bloom 2017.
- 5 Cf. Dorter 1982, p. 132–138; Rowe 1993, p. 246. On the controversy about this point see Horn 2011, p. 140–141. See also Kahn 1996, p. 315: “It is clear that if Plato has a reasonable method in view, what he means by ‘accord’ is stronger than logical consistency and weaker than logical entailment.”
- 6 *Phd.* 97b: καὶ ἔδοξε μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἰτίον, καὶ ἡγησάμεν, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ.
- 7 Gerson distinguishes a “coordinate Form of the Good from the superordinate Idea of the Good”, Gerson 2020, 53 and n. 52.
- 8 *Phd.* 100d5–6: εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπῃ †προσγενομένη. Leaving the text unmodified (προσγενομένη referring to παρουσία and κοινωνία) would certainly turn out to be problematic; it could prove more likely to read προσγενομένου (connected to ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ, cf. Rowe 1993, p. 243, ad 100d4). However, the type of relationship would remain unspecified in this case. On the other hand, according to the conjecture of Wittenbach, προσασγορευομένη, only the designation of this relationship would be left open (cf. Burnet 1972, 1911, *ad loc.*). On this assumption, one might be inclined to ask whether or not the designation corresponds to the relationship.
- 9 Cf. Chen 1992, p. 195: “This is the general teleology which forms the metaphysical part of the theory of Ideas in the middle dialogues. It is applied to all perceptible objects. The teleology of inanimates

ENDNOTES

- 1 This paper was read at a conference dedicated to the memory of Jens Halfwassen in the Internationales Wissenschaftszentrum Heidelberg (1–3. 12.2022). It will also be published in German in a Festschrift edited by Christoph Poetsch. I'd like to thank Alexandra Alván and Rodrigo Ferradas for the translation.
- 2 See *Rep.* 533c: “Then,” I said, “only the dialectical way of inquiry proceeds in this direction, destroying the hypotheses (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρῶνσα), to the beginning itself in order to make it secure” (transl. Bloom).

- (sticks and stones) in the *Phaedo* is only a special form illustrative of the general theory.” For detailed information and discussion of the opposing view, see Chen 1992, p. 195–200.
- 10 This becomes even clearer when one considers not only the properties of a being, but also its coming-to-be, for Socrates asserts that every being becomes what it is “by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates” (101c) (transl. Fowler). Since this *ousia* is the respective Form, it must also be understood as the good for that which participates in it.
 - 11 In 103e, the significant difference between the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) and something else that is not that form but always has the *morphē* of that form (ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκεῖνου μορφὴν αἰεί, ὅτανπερ ᾗ). This form is the essential characteristic of something, since it presupposes the corresponding form, but is not a form in itself. If one applies this distinction to the relationship between the form of the good and other forms, one may use the term ἀγαθοειδῆ (cf. *R.* 509a3). Proclus distinguishes between the good in us, the form of all good or the good in itself, and another kind of good that is beyond being and essence, in *Rep.* I. 269, 15–270, 10. On the passage in *Phaidon*, on the correction of the phrase “immanent ideas,” and on the use and meaning of the “occupation metaphor,” see Frede 2011, p. 147–151.
 - 12 This suggests that the form of the Good should be understood not as something absolutely beyond being, but as something belonging to it.
 - 13 Καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκάστον.
 - 14 The link between these two passages (476a and 500c–d) is ignored by interpreters who, like Cordero 2016 and Marmodoro 2021, p. 7, still believe that Plato’s middle period was unaware of the connections between forms. They do not understand that the κοινωνία τῶν εἰδῶν is an essential part of Plato’s project in the *Republic* (cf. Gutiérrez 2022; on the subject in the *Phaidon*, see Mesquita 2018). Cordero mentions the passage 476a once (Cordero 2016, p. 168), but it does not seem to be of importance to him. Ferrari 2000, p. 365–391 is essential in this regard.
 - 15 Socrates’ last three arguments in Book I—the argument of *pleonexia* (349d–350d), the argument of cooperation (350d–352d), and the argument of function and arete (352d–354b)—are important in this regard: in the argument about cooperation, it is even said that the very bad and unjust need a measure of justice in order to perform their deeds (352c), and in the argument about the coincidence of function and arete, it is interestingly claimed that the ears would perform their function poorly if they were deprived of their arete: στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, 153c.
 - 16 For the idea that there is a form of injustice see Hellwig 1980.
 - 17 *Rep.* 485b5–7: καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς [ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰεί οὐσης], καὶ οὔτε μικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμωτέρου μέρους ἐκόντες [τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων] ἀφίενται.
 - 18 However, even though he does this carefully as a conjecture, Ferrari ultimately understands the Form of the Good as the totality of the intelligible world (“la totalità del mondo intelligibile”), Ferrari 2023, p. 50. Without going into the details of this matter, I would just like to point out 1) that if the good as a form is subject to the same logic as other forms, it must exclude its opposite or any multiplicity and, as a result, be absolutely simple; 2) but since the good, unlike other forms—which are only fully determined through their communion with and negation of other forms—is determined and recognizable solely through itself (*R.* 534b3–6, 505a2–4), it lacks nothing and is virtually everything through its unity.
 - 19 *R.* 462a: “Isn’t the first step towards agreement (ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας) for us to ask ourselves what we can say is the greatest good in the organization of a city—that good aiming at which the legislator must set down the laws—and what the greatest evil; and then consider whether what we have just described harmonizes with the track of the good for us and not with that of the evil? [...] Have we any greater evil for a city than what splits it and makes it many instead of one? Or a greater good that what binds it together and makes it on?” Of course, this refers to justice and injustice, but ultimately to the cause of all that is right and beautiful, to the form of the Good (517c2). See Gutiérrez 2003a, Krämer 1959, p. 102. Blössner overlooks this connection completely: “Da Platons Beweggründe und die von ihm verwendeten Kriterien für Auswahl und Reihenfolge der schlechten Ordnungen im Text selbst offenbar nicht zur Sprache kommen, obliegt es dem Interpreten, sie vermutungsweise zu rekonstruieren”, Blössner 1997.
 - 20 In doing so, I take the One of the first deduction as an absolutely separate and isolated One, which expresses the Eleatic conception of Oneness corresponding to the young Socrates’ conception of the forms; I understand the existing One of the second deduction as a designation of everything that is, whether sensible or intelligible; in the third deduction, this whole is, so to speak, reduced to its principles, so that the consequences for those other than the One are drawn depending on whether they participate in the One or not; the fourth deduction draws the consequences for those other than the One when they are absolutely separate from the One.
 - 21 Considering that unity is an essential property of forms, one could identify this One with the form,

- and the others with sensory things. See, for example, K. Sayre, who also refers to the connection with the aporiai of participation in *Parmenides* I. And yet, as Sayre himself notes, *Parmenides* I speaks of participation in a part of the forms, whereas here we are talking about the true One (τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἓν), which has no parts (159c5, K. Sayre 1996, p. 294–296). Despite everything, the reference to the connection with the critique of participation is undoubtedly correct. See also *Prm.* 151*1–3: Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μὴδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἐνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; -Πῶς γὰρ οὐ. I intend to return to these passages in a coming paper On the interaction of the One and the Many in the *Parmenides*.
- 22 Cf. MXG 979b25: μηδαμοῦ δὲ ὄν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη; vgl. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII. 70. MXG mentions Zeno as the source of this idea (vgl. Diog. Laert. IX 72 = DK29B4). Wahl already thought that “le Parménide est une imitation de l’œuvre de Gorgias, au moins dans la première hypothèse. Mais de ce non-être de Gorgias, Platon fera sortir l’être”, (Wahl 1926, p. 57). And Calogero: “der ‘Parmenides’ [sei] im Grunde nichts anderes als eine Erneuerung der Schrift ‘Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος’”, Calogero 1970, p. 241. More recently, Palmer asserts: “Thus Plato in the First Deduction presents a certain sophistic appropriation of Parmenides and gives Parmenides himself the opportunity to repudiate it”, Palmer 1999, p. 117, cf. 114–115. And Brémond defends the thesis that: “Platon y présente un pastiche d’une partie du traité de Gorgias Sur le Non-être, et reprend à travers lui la critique de l’éléatisme post-parménéidien principalement représenté par Mélissos”, Brémond 2019, p. 63, cf. 79.
- 23 This model is very clearly rejected by Plato: *Smp.* 211a8: οὐδὲ που ὄν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινι, *Tim.* 52b3–5: πρὸς δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐκ ἐπινοοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι που τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ’ ἔν γῇ μήτε που κατ’ οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι.
- 24 On the idea of using a “topographia metaphysica as a vivid reflection of his [Plato’s] own ontology,” see Poetsch 2019, 161–167; on the structural analogy between the *Parmenides* and the Divided Line, see Gutiérrez 2003; 2017; 2019. In the last contribution, I show that the *Republic* also follows the structure of the Cave Allegory. The objection according to which this allegorical interpretation is anachronistic or Neoplatonic because Plato himself rejected such interpretations fails to recognize that he reject the use of allegory just in relation to children: ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷος τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μῆ, *Rep.* 378d6–7. Männlein-Robert is right to complain about the widespread underestimation of what is, after all, a “relevant [...] räumliche und festive Setting des (berichteten) Hauptgesprächs mit Parmenides und Zenon”, Männlein-Robert 2022, p. 275. Against Allen’s rejection of the philosophical relevance of geographical locations see Forcignanò 2022, p. 92. After all, as this author thinks, “the *Parmenides* is a literary composition and what it evokes is more relevant than mere historical facts”, Forcignanò 2022, p. 93.
- 25 *Prm.* 131a4–5: Οὐκοῦν ἦτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; Καὶ πῶς ἂν;
- 26 Melissus DK30B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7. Cf. Brémond 2019, p. 64–72.
- 27 Brémond asserts rightly: “Il faut noter que lorsque Platon en est arrivé à la conclusion que l’un n’est pas ni n’est un, il a atteint son objectif: l’hypothèse de départ de l’unité s’est montrée auto-contradictoire et justifie un nouvel examen. L’ajout du fait qu’il ne puisse y avoir ni nom, ni science, ni opinion de l’un est donc du point de vue de l’argumentation superflu. Cela se justifie en revanche pour renvoyer aux trois conclusions de Gorgias”, Brémond 2019, p. 77. Cf. Palmer 1999, p. 111–117.
- 28 According to Halfwassen, this judgment presupposes that the law of contradiction also applies without restriction to the theory of the One (Halfwassen 1992, p. 277). In contrast, I believe that this objection suffers from a *petitio principii*: it presupposes the interpretation of the One in the first deduction as “transcending the alternative of being and non-being” (Halfwassen 1992, p. 277). At the same time, the conclusion of the deduction must be noted: “– Is it possible that these things are so for the one? – I certainly don’t think so” (142a6–8), for then one might say: ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται. The emphasis here is not so much on Aristotle’s opinion, but rather on the fact that Parmenides himself persuaded him to agree with him. Aristotle is the youngest member of the group and, as such, the one who is least likely to interfere or cause difficulties (πολυπραγμονοῖ) (137b6–7). The logos that ultimately matters is the sophistical or Socratic appropriation of the Eleatic arguments.
- 29 Cf. Halfwassen 2001, p. 73: “Positiv gewendet besagt das, dass auch die Vielheit selber noch Einheitscharakter haben muss, um überhaupt als Prinzip konzipiert werden zu können.”. He mentions rightly Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1087b9–12, 1088a15. Cf. Szlezák 2019 (1987), p. 223–224.
- 30 In 149c, the Others than the One (τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός) are neither One nor share in it; the One, for its part, is only One. Cf. 146d3–5 and 147a3–6. On the contrary, Sayre 1996, p. 214–215 thinks that “Parmenides’ concern in the present argument is with a pair of factors – the one and things other than the one – that not only have spatial location, but also relate to each other as larger and smaller [...] this final stage seems to be concerned with things one and other in a common sense.”
- 31 Even though some of the subsequent Socratic proposals are, in a sense, heading in the right direction—I am thinking in particular of the day as

- an image (131b) and the conception of the form a paradigm existing in nature (φύσει) (132d)–, they fail in the face of Parmenides' objections.
- 32 Recently, Spinelli has attempted to rescue the immanence model. He argues that 1) Plato does not call on the reader to deny the divisibility and immanence of forms, but rather to reflect on "the fact that ideas have a dual nature, on account of which they are, depending on the perspective, both divisible and indivisible, both separate from things and immanent in them" (Spinelli 2022, p. 223). Furthermore, he distinguishes 2.) three types of divisibility: a) a "dialectical" one, which concerns the relationship of forms to thinking; b) an 'ontological' one, for the relationship of forms to other forms; c) a "phenomenal" one, for the relationship of forms to sensory things, p. 226. However, on the first point, I can say that I do not consider the talk of a dual nature of forms to be fortunate; it is too reminiscent of the talk of a doubling of the world. Instead, I would refer to the passage from Republic 476a that I mentioned and to the connection between being and the appearance of forms there. He mentions the relevant passages on the types of divisibility. As an example of "ontological" divisibility, he cites *Prm.* 144b1–2, which speaks of the distribution of being among all beings. In doing so, he does not seem to pay attention to the fact that this distribution is a result of a separation from the One in itself and from being through thinking (διαβολή) in the existing One (143a7). This would call into question his distinction between "dialectical" and "ontological" divisibility. According to his interpretation, "the noetic forms have two modes of manifestation: on the one hand, as ἀμέριστα, in their purity, uniqueness, and separation from things; on the other hand, as μέριστα, divisible and 'distributed' among the sensible things to which they are inherent," p. 226–227. The talk of two modes of manifestation seems to correct that of a dual nature. But then one would have to ask whether the forms themselves or their mode of manifestation "inhabit" the sensible things. These would then be better understood as properties, as Spinelli mentions shortly before: "The passages mentioned describe the forms as they manifest themselves in a specific, extraordinary way, i.e., in the philosophical contemplation of their pure essence (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, *Smp.* 211b1, *Phd.* 66a2, 78d6, 83b1, 100b6). However, this does not exclude the possibility that the same entities manifest themselves in everyday experience in a different way, i.e., as properties of a thing," p. 226. One would certainly agree with this, but how then could one speak of a "dual nature of forms"? According to my interpretation, it would be better to say that φαίνεσθαι is anchored in the being of forms, which in turn is very reminiscent of the traditional φύσις. On the whole problem, cf. Devereux 1994, p. 63–90; see there the interpretation of expressions such as τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος (*Phd.* 102d7) and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν (103b5), which Spinelli considers to be the main witnesses of immanence. Regarding the interpretation of *Prm.* 144b1–2, I tend to agree with Migliori 1990, p. 138.
- 33 In Gutiérrez (2024), I discussed the model of justice in connection with the conception of being as δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν/δρᾶν from Sophistes 247e–248c, 254c5. After all, this δύναμις is the basis of the community of forms and of all koinonia in general. To attribute a δύναμις τοῦ πράττειν to the One means that it still belongs to the realm of being, even if, unlike other forms, it is simple: only the form of the Good/One is determined by itself (for more on this, see Gutiérrez 2017, p. 192–196). F. Ferrari rightly refers to the "necessità di focalizzare l'indagine intorno al bene sulla nozione di causa, spostando così l'attenzione dalla questione della sua essenza (ousia) a quella della sua azione, cioè della dynamis che esso esercita," Ferrari 2023, p. 324. However, I believe that the connection between εἶναι/φαίνεσθαι and φύσις/ἔργον should not be ignored.
- 34 Zekl rightly points out: "Sein (Identität der reinen Bestimmung mit sich selbst) und Teilhabe (Prädikation im Urteil unter Verwendung von 'ist' als Kopula) sind zu unterscheiden", Zekl 1972, p. 164, n. 221. If it is completely identical with itself, this One differs from the One of the first deduction. Cf. Migliori 1990, p. 310, n. 16.
- 35 Proclus already noticed it: "Of Justice, finally, let us say that it is the cause of the Forms performing their proper functions; for by justice each remains in its own station and does what is incumbent upon it. Greatness does not make small, nor smallness confer preeminence, nor does likeness separate derivatives from primary beings, nor unlikeness bring together and unite; but each of the Forms discharges its own function, carries on its own activity, reflects upon itself, and belong to itself", Proclus, In Parm. 855 (transl. Morrow & Dillon). See the only, but extremely important comment I found in the literature on this subject: "Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit gibt es bei Platon also gewissermaßen in zweierlei Fassung: als einzelne Idee und als ideelle Struktur des ganzen Ideenbereiches. Da das ›Material‹, an dem die Idee der Gerechtigkeit hier ›erscheint‹, die ewigen Ideen sind, ist auch diese ihre erste Manifestation vollkommen; ja, im gewissen Sinne vollkommener als die Einzelidee, weil das, was in dieser nur allgemeines Programm ist – das Tun des Seinigen –, in der Gerechtigkeit des ganzen Ideenreiches auch bereits ›konkret‹ erfüllt ist. Da jenes Reich nicht räumlich ist, hängen sie beide unmittelbar zusammen, ›spiegeln‹ sich und wirken ineinander, ohne jedoch ineinander zu verfließen", Schwabe 2001, p. 230.
- 36 Cf. Aristoteles, *Metaph.* I 6, 987b33, XIV 5, 1092a25–25. See Szlezák's cautionary statement: "As long as we only look to the Parmenides, we cannot

arrive at the concept of the aoristos dyas. But if we already know from other texts how we are to think of the initially puzzling idea of an indefinite dyad, then we find quite a bit that corresponds to it in the *Parmenides*”, Szlezák 2019, p. 613.

- 37 This reference to Anaxagoras DK59 B1, B2, B3 brings to mind the manner in which the material cause of natural science is assimilated in the *Phaedo*.