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SUMMARY

EDITORIAL

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A new volume of PLATO has seen the light, after the generous dedication by the two Assistant Editors, prof. Renato Matoso and prof. Luca Pitteloud, as well the precious help received by the members of the Board. I would very much like to thank referees and revisers, as well as the International Plato Society, which holds the Journal as one of its most important windows to the world. PLATO 19 arrives in the very week of the most awaited Paris XII Symposium Platonicum on Plato's Parmenides. The volume starts with **Smith**'s paper on the dialectical methods in *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, arguing for a unity of these methods as relevant to Platonic education. **Blyth'**s paper is willing to draw attention to later academic interpretation of Plato's depiction of Socrates as a sceptic. In the third and last paper of the volume, **Swanson** focuses in a fairly long and elaborated essay on the final scene of the *Euthydemus*, arguing that its curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art.
As a way of enhancing the debate within our Society and beyond, this volume decided to offer four excellent **Books Reviews** of works related to Plato and platonic scholarship. Candiotto offers an insightful review of **Brisson** most recent book, *Platon:L'écrivain qui inventa la philosophie*. dedicated to the study of Plato's life as an introduction to his very philosophy. Schultz's reviews of **Destrée & Edmond III** edited book on *Plato and the Power of Images* highligths the volume to anyone interested in the tension within Plato's dialogues between describing the power of images as something harmful and wretched and using the power of images in various occasion within philosophical discussions. **Notomi** offers us a small piece on on why japanese is still the main language of Japanese scholarship. I strongly believe these same observations are similarly valid for others regions and languages and I sincerely hope that these few lines can start a debate on this very important issue. On this note, Notomi's piece is followed by an ensligh review of the very first monograph ever written in Japanese on Plato's Laws: The Rule of Law and the Philosophy of Dialogue: A Study in Plato's Dialogue Laws, by **Maruhashi**. And while we are all heading to Paris, let's take the opportunity to once again express our deepest gratitude to the Coimbra University Press for the precious publishing management of our journal.

Cambridge, July 2019

PAPERS

Dialectical Methods and the Stoicheia Paradigm in Plato's Trilogy and *Philebus*

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ABSTRACT

Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* exhibit several related dialectical methods relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in *Theaetetus*, bifurcatory division in *Sophist* and *Statesman*, and non-bifurcatory division in *Statesman*, related to the 'god-given' method in *Philebus*. I consider the nature of each method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον) paradigm, used to reflect on each method. At issue are the element's appearances in given contexts, its fitness for communing with other elements like it in kind, and its own nature defined through its relations to others. These represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic student inquiring into the sources of knowledge.

Keywords: method, metaphysics, epistemology, ontology

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I. INTRODUCTION

While Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* dialogues bear clear narrative and dramatic kinships, the relationship of the philosophical methods depicted in each is unclear.[1] The two-day period of discussion in which the dialogues are set begins with Socrates' maieutic inquiry into the views of the young mathematician Theaetetus and concludes with the Eleatic Stranger's diairetic account of the statesman as a determinate moment in the care for the human community. This dramatic procession raises many questions, such as those of why Plato chose to link together dramatically these dialectical exercises, whether and how one method or dialogue acts as a proleptic anticipation of another, and what sense, if any, we can make of their unity.[2]

In what follows, I seek to offer the beginning of an answer to these by arguing that Plato's trilogy exhibits a series of related methods of inquiry into the sources of knowledge, representing a set of dialectical exercises relevant to a Platonic education and the increasing philosophical maturity of the student.[3] These methods include the maieutic method depicted in the *Theaetetus*, the method of bifurcatory division initiated in the *Sophist* and partially continued in the *Statesman*, and the method of non-bifurcatory division employed by the Stranger in the second half of the *Statesman*.[4] Since the Stranger does not make the aim of this final method clear, I will here consider it with reference to the method of inquiry described in the *Philebus* and referred to in the literature as the 'god-given method.'[5]

It is difficult to track these large shifts in limited space. To understand these methods and their relation to one another, we will here follow the guidance offered by the paradigm of *letters* or *elements* (στοιχεῖα) in each instance.[6] Plato frequently has his primary interlocutors make epistemological moves with reference to letters, including in key moments in the *Republic*, and the speakers draw on this paradigm in the dramatic moments in the near vicinity of each methodological change in the trilogy.[7] Thus the letter paradigm offers a fixed point of orientation for considering the nature of each of the three methods.[8] At issue in these changes are, among other things, the notion of the element as part, its role in composing a whole, its recognizability as such, its appearances in given contexts, its fitness for communing with other elements like it in kind, and its own nature as defined by its relations to others like it in kind.

Ultimately, I argue that the methodological changes in the trilogy map onto three senses of account (λόγος) through which knowledge is attained. These roughly correspond to the three senses of account at issue late in the *Theaetetus* (*Theait.* 206 d 1 - 208 d 9). In his final definition of knowledge, Theaetetus hypothesizes that knowledge is "true opinion with an account" (Plat., *Theait.* 201 c 8.)[9] Socrates then considers three possible senses of 'account,' which, I argue, correspond to the methodological moves made throughout the dialogues composing the trilogy. The first type of account Socrates considers is that in which one makes "one's thought apparent vocally by means of words and verbal expressions […] like reflections upon water or in a mirror" (Plat., *Theait.* 206 d 1-4). This type of account is closely related to the maieutic method in the *Theaetetus*, insofar as the task in maieutic is to externalize the internal by reflecting thought in an account, exposing it in its nature and presenting it for scrutiny. At issue in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* will be the latter two types of account that Socrates identifies. The second is the account that entails "being able, when questioned about what a thing is, to give an answer by reference to its elements" (Plat., *Theait.* 206 e 10 – 207 d 2), which will be at stake in the non-bifurcatory divisions of the *States-*

man. The third, "being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things" (Plat., *Theait.* 208 c 8-9), anticipates the aim of the Stranger in practicing bifurcatory division in the *Sophist* and early *Statesman.*[10] I suggest that these three types of account represent three stages of inquiry for the student of Platonic philosophy inquiring into the sources of knowledge and her means of noetically grasping them with reference to parts constitutive of wholes and co-constituted by other parts like them in kind.

II. MAIEUTIC IN THE *THEAETETUS*

In the *Theaetetus*, the interlocutors seek a satisfying account of knowledge through Socrates' familiar question and answer process. Socrates here acts in the role of the midwife, and he reflects on the maieutic method (Plat., *Theait.* 149 a 1 – 151 d 5) by describing it as helping the interlocutor to make progress by "discovering and bringing forth many beautiful things themselves out of themselves" (Plat., *Theait.* 150 d 5-9).[11] This corresponds to Socrates' later consideration of one sense of account as making "thought apparent vocally by means of words and verbal expressions […] like reflections upon water or in a mirror" (Plat., *Theait.* 206 d 1-4). He describes the 'birthing' process as leading to the subsequent test of the result in terms of its truth or falsity (Plat., *Theait* 150 c 1-5). In these ways, the maieutic method entails externalizing the internal by submitting the internal to an account, and hence to scrutiny. With these goals in mind, Socrates limits his involvement to helping to give birth to the ideas of Theaetetus, rather than revealing his own.[12] Thus Theaetetus is responsible for the hypotheses that direct the discussion, while Socrates is responsible for unpacking the entailments of each hypothesis. In other words, Socrates uses the maieutic method as a means of assisting the interlocutor in the production of the account already implicit in the interlocutor's own thinking.

The maieutic method used in the dialogue contrasts with a discussion of mathematical knowledge early in the text. This discussion points beyond itself to the next step necessary after maieutic, although the interlocutors will not take it up until the dramatically later dialogues. In his discussion of mathematical powers (Plat., *Theait.* 147 d 3 – 148 b 4), Theaetetus describes his goal of understanding the oneness inherent in many mathematical objects and accounting for the objects with reference to this oneness. This is what he calls the attempt to "gather together [the powers in question] into some one [term], [to] which we could address our speech".[13] In other words, Theaetetus' goal in this mathematical study is to understand many in terms of their sameness, or to account for the one inherent in many. But Theaetetus ultimately fails to find a way to turn this mathematical method of gathering and sorting into an account of the means by which knowledge is attained.

The maieutic method is useful insofar as it acts as a propaedeutic to more systematic studies. The seeming *aporia* inherent in the dialogue's conclusion is in fact provocative of further considerations, and suggests ways in which Socrates' three conceptions of 'account' anticipate the turns taken the next day in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*.[14] The key to allowing the *aporia* to provoke further studies lies in considering the moves that Socrates and Theaetetus make after hypothesizing that knowledge is "true opinion with an account". Here we will consider the letter paradigm, which arises in the context of spelling and the recognition of syllables and letters as one of several examples that

Socrates and Theaetetus take up in seeking to understand the senses in which a thing can be known.[15] Socrates asks Theaetetus to consider the spelling of his own name (Θεαίτητος) and establishes that knowledge of the spelling of Theaetetus' name is easily demonstrated by one who is able to lay out the letters of the name in its correct order. He asks Theaetetus, though, to consider the case of the person who can spell 'Θεαίτητος' but misspells 'Θεόδωρος', replacing the theta with a tau (Plat., *Theait.* 207a 8 – 208 c 3). Socrates demonstrates that this misspelling of the second name shows that the speller in fact did not *know* how to spell 'Θεαίτητος', but instead merely had the *right opinion* regarding the spelling, since the speller could not reproduce the spelling of the same first syllable ('Θε-') in the new context of a second name. This invokes the senses of right opinion and knowledge at play in Socrates' description of the divided line analogy in the *Republic*, where 'right opinion' is guided by partial or mediated access to the source and 'knowledge' entails a direct noetic grasp of the source.

Socrates' observation here points to latent positive content in the conclusion of the *Theaetetus*. Knowledge of a thing, here the spelling of the name 'Θεαίτητος', entails the recognition of the major component parts of the thing in all of their manifestations. In other words, grasp of the object of knowledge sought here, the name, has only occurred when the name's syllables, and the letters that compose them, are recognized in every instance. Knowledge, we thus have learned, entails an account of the sameness inherent in the constitutive elements of wholes, which are themselves both a one (as a whole) and many (as comprising elements). That is, 'Θε' is a one, in that it is one thing that can be known, and hence an object of a sort of knowledge. But it comprises parts, 'Θ' and 'ε', and hence is many; recognition of it thus requires an understanding of its parts.

The maieutic method entails treating each entity as a whole. In other words, to give birth to one's thinking into an account entails beginning with a given concept, articulating it, and interrogating the structure of the concept as it has appeared from out of one's pre-discursive thinking. This in itself is valuable, because things manifest themselves to us as unified singulars (ones) that require deeper analysis to be captured in their essentiality, or, in other words, captured in an account of their manifold being (insofar as they are many). It furthermore entails a process of developing and examining the account, testing it for strengths and weaknesses before allowing it to be assessed as a true insight or a wind egg. But the maieutic method stops short of offering a means of proceeding from the given entity *qua* the unified whole in which it presents itself into an account of the thing *qua* complex object structured by determinate elements. An employment of it does not clarify the ways in which these elements commune with other elements that are outside of it and like it in kind. Because the maieutic method does not have a mechanism by which sameness and difference between things can be accounted, it has shown itself to be insufficient for attaining knowledge in the strictest sense and hence to serve as a proleptic exercise for further studies.

We see this when we consider that the answer to the question, 'How does one spell the name "Θεαίτητος?"', cannot be ensured to derive from knowledge and not right opinion in the senses that Socrates distinguishes in the divided line analogy in the *Republic*. Knowledge of the spelling of the name 'Θεαίτητος' is only attained when each of the component parts is understood in its own nature. The speller who cannot recognize the elements in other settings, as in the case of the same letter

and same syllable in the different setting of the name Θεόδωρος, has not grasped the nature of the elements in the initial instance. Hence the speller has neither knowledge of the elements nor of the whole. Likewise, one who knows the individual letters composing the name does not have knowledge of the spelling of Theaetetus' name until she can order the letters properly relative to an understanding of the nature of the name.[16] Put differently, Theaetetus is unable to apply the urge to assimilate many into oneness through an account in the case of non-mathematical objects of knowledge in the manner in which he gathered together the mathematical powers into oneness. If he is to make progress in the next day's investigation, Theaetetus will need a means of doing this. In these ways, the letter paradigm points to the next step necessary toward a more robust and exhaustive account of the source of knowledge.

III. BIFURCATORY DIVISION IN THE *SOPHIST* AND *STATESMAN*

In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger becomes heir to Socrates' discourse from the preceding day. In this change, the role of the midwife is replaced by that of the dialectician. The maieutic method entails the midwife (e.g., Socrates) aiding the interlocutor in the production of the account already implicitly operative in the interlocutor's own thinking. An important shift happens here insofar as the Stranger's methods, bifurcatory and non-bifurcatory division, are oriented by receptivity. That is, the move from maieutic to diairesis entails a refocusing of the direction of the inquiry from the midwife supporting the productive interlocutor to the interlocutors receiving and accounting for the nature of the world.[17] This is reflected in the shift of focus from the first to the second and third senses of account in the *Theaetetus*, which are oriented around the account-giver in the first instance and the nature of the object in the second and third instances.

In the *Sophist,* the interlocutors seek to disclose the essence of the sophist, as well as the paradigmatic example of the angler, through bifurcatory division. This entails splitting the proposed kind in two, always keeping to the right hand part of the section and holding fast to the community to which the kind belongs until stripping away all of the kind's common features and leaving it in its indwelling nature (Plat., *Soph.* 264 e 9 – 265 a 1).[18] Hence, in the paradigmatic example, the angler is divided relative to binary halves before being shown to be the expert in getting, and specifically the manipulative hunting of animals, and specifically wetland-dwelling fish, who strikes by hooking in daylight from below (Plat., *Soph.* 221 b 3 – c 2). Reflecting on method elsewhere, the Stranger describes bifurcatory division as entailing the isolation of "one form extended everywhere through many things" by establishing difference among objects through taking up a single one (e.g., hunting) as a coherent, immediately intuitable whole.[19] This whole is then divided into parts (e.g, hunting by night and hunting by day) that are themselves further divisible. In doing so, the whole is disclosed with reference to the binary halves that compose it, and its essence is articulated through an account of the halves in which it is has a share, discarding those in which it does not.

Elsewhere in the *Sophist*, the paradigm of letters again arises to signal reflection on the method at hand and anticipate ways in which its method of accessing the sources of knowledge is in some sense insufficient (Plat., *Soph.* 253 a 1-9). In the dialogue's central digression, the Stranger considers the need for accounts of

the elements themselves, with reference to the ways in which a given element is or is not fit for blending with other elements. The Stranger argues that master of the art of spelling knows, for example, that some letters are fit by nature to blend with others (e.g., 's' and 't'), that some letters are necessary for 'binding' all letters together (i.e., vowels), and that some letters require others for their instantiation and cannot be voiced on their own (i.e., the mute consonants). In other words, knowledge of the parts of the word entails more than recognition across instances, as in the case considered in the *Theaetetus*, but rather the deeper account of the nature of each part.

The need for blending of elements for self-instantiation is analogous to the insight that forms require one another for their own instantiation. The five great kinds – being, motion, rest, sameness, and difference (Plat., *Soph.* 251 d 6 – 256 c 9) – are required in all instances, and only by partaking in some combination of these great kinds can any form present itself to discourse.[20] That is, in their discursive intelligibility all forms require being *to be* themselves, sameness insofar as they are self-same, difference (e.g., non-being, which the Stranger establishes as a form of difference at Plat., *Soph.* 257 b 3 – 259 b 7) insofar as they are not other forms, etc.[21] Thus, the interdependence of a form on other forms has been established, at least in a preliminary way that will require elucidation later.

The reflection on letters helps illuminate what bifurcatory division can and cannot accomplish. Like the maieutic method in the *Theaetetus*, bifurcatory division allows distinct wholes to manifest themselves as unities to be understood. Unlike the maieutic method, bifurcatory division allows a thing to be disclosed with reference to its elements. In this way, this method has begun to fulfill the promise articulated by Socrates in the *Theaetetus* to deliver an account by which true opinion could be oriented. This is related specifically to the third kind of account Socrates considers in the *Theaetetus*: "being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things" (Plat., *Theait.* 208 c 8-9). In other words, this account is useful insofar as it discloses the form under investigation with reference to its participation in *difference*.[22]

But the consideration of letters and the identification of the great kinds suggest the need for developing further methods by which knowledge can be established. Bifurcatory division lacks a means of yielding an understanding of the nature of the object *qua* parts and wholes and their fitness for combination. Such an account, as the analogy of letters shows, would go beyond simply displaying the elements in their order, and entails a further inquiry into their constitution with reference to the character of the parts composing them as a whole.

We should be concerned that the elements themselves have not, in all instances, been fully disclosed in their nature upon their division. For example, we can say of 'animal hunting' that it constitutes half of the notion of 'hunting', but little else. If we seek a robust account of the ways in which a given element lends itself to communing with other elements, we need to know more about the nature of the element itself. In this way, the goal of knowing the whole with reference to a full account of its parts has not been fulfilled and the account is incomplete.

Furthermore, as bifurcatory division continues into the *Statesman* and the object of knowledge changes from the sophist to the statesman, the divisions become less precise. With Socrates the Younger replacing Theaetetus as the Stranger's interlocutor, the Stranger initially makes clear that he will proceed in the manner of the previous dialogue at Plat., *Polit.* 258 b 1-8. But

in the initial division in which the interlocutors seek an account of the statesman, the bifurcatory method (Plat., *Polit.* 258 b 1 – 267 a 3) causes the interlocutors to falter, forces digressions, and ultimately leads to a 'joke' (Plat., *Polit.* 266 c 1).

Starting at Plat., *Polit.* 258 b 1, the initial bifurcatory division of the statesman begins in the manner of the *Sophist* before Socrates' the Younger's disproportionate division of animals into human and non-human animals (Plat., *Polit.* 262 a 4-7) causes the Stranger to reflect on the proper method of proportionate division and the philosophical value of cutting in two (Plat., *Polit.* 261 e 1 – 264 b 8). When the bifurcatory division continues, the Stranger makes the sudden and jarring suggestion that there are in fact two possible paths (Plat., *Polit.* 265 a 4-7), both of which yield confusing and unsatisfying 'diagonal' motion. When the ultimate results entail the statesman "running around with the herd" and "having kept up in the race with the one among men who for his part is the most excellently trained for an easily managed life," the Stranger deems that the divisions have yielded a "laughable" account (Plat., *Polit.* 266 b 3 – c 1).

IV. NON-BIFURCATORY DIVISION AND THE 'GOD-GIVEN METHOD'

The Stranger will soon (at Plat., *Polit.* 287 b 3) alter his method of division in the pursuit of the statesman in response to the laughable account. The groundwork for the shift begins to be laid in the preceding myth of ages. In the myth, the Stranger describes the current state of the cosmos, in which the care for human community is no longer the job of the gods, but instead is that of the human community itself. Hence the paradigm that the Stranger then begins to draw upon is 'care' (ἐπιμέλεια, Plat., *Polit.* 276 d 1-4), and specifically care for the human community.[23]

The guidance of the care paradigm will ultimately help the Stranger to come to the final account of the statesman. Prior to this, the Stranger leads Socrates the Younger through a digression on dialectic that informs the change of method leading to the final account.[24] He considers the value of paradigms in inquiry with reference to letters and their ability to help young learners of spelling find their way from the known to the unknown, stating that recognizing letters brings young learners back

> …first to those cases in which they were correctly judging these same letters, and, while leading them back, set[s] alongside them the ones not yet recognized, and by throwing them side by side to indicate that there's the same similarity and nature in both intertwinings, until the letters that are truly judged have been shown as juxtaposed with all the ones about which there's ignorance, and having been shown, thereby becoming paradigms, bring it about that each one of all the letters in all the syllables is always addressed on the same terms with itself: as other when it's other than other letters, and same when it's the same (Plat., *Polit.* 278 a 8 – c 1).

The Stranger concludes that in this way a paradigm through which an object can be known is derived "when what is the same in something other that's sundered from it is correctly judged;" this allows the learner to bring to completion "one true opinion about each of them as about both together" (Plat., *Polit.* 278 c 3 – 5). This suggests steps beyond those indicated in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, as the Strang-

er here discusses letters as a means of passing from opinion to knowledge through study of the unknown with reference to the known. That is, the nature of the unknown is here described as accessible by means of the known, suggesting the ways in which an understanding of the known letter guides the learner into an understanding of the nature of that which is presently unknown.

With these notions established, and following the guidance of the care paradigm, the Stranger proceeds to divide in a non-bifurcatory manner. He says little about this new method, stating only that they will now "divide limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal, since we don't have the power to do it by two," cutting "with an eye to the number nearest" (Plat., *Polit.* 287 c 3-6). In other words, the process of dividing will no longer yield binaries, but instead will make the number of cuts appropriate to the thing being cut. The notion of 'limbs' suggests that these divisions will be in response to the specific nature of the thing being divided, instead of the uniform bifurcatory cuts.

The exact nature of the final inquiry into the statesman (from 287 c 9 to the dialogue's conclusion at 311 c 5) has been debated.[25] I follow the interpretation worked out by Mitchell Miller in a series of articles in which Miller interprets the set of final divisions as a non-bifurcatory diairetic account of the form of care for the human community in fifteen cuts, each an independent moment within the spectrum of care bounded on each end by those arts attending to the material and spiritual needs of the community. These include the seven productive (or indirectly responsive) arts related to the *material* life of human community: producers of (1) raw materials, (2) tools, (3) containers, (4) vehicles, (5) defenses, (6) amusements, and (7) nourishment (Plat., *Polit.* 287 c 9 – 289 c 2). These are followed by the one productive and directly responsive art, (8) slavery (Plat., *Polit.* 289 c 3 – d 1). Finally, by this interpretation the Stranger identifies the seven directly responsive arts attending to the *spiritual* life of the human community: (9) merchants and traders, (10) heralds and clerks, (11) priests and diviners, (12) rhetoricians, (13) generals, (14) adjudicators, and finally, (15) the statesman (Plat., *Polit.* 289 e 2 – 290 e, 303 b 9 – 305 e 5).

This interpretation hinges on an understanding of the middle term, (8) slavery, as entailing a mix of indirect and direct care, insofar as slaves are both goods and agents, and both passively used to meet needs *qua* possession and actively engaged in the human community *qua* human agent.[26] In this way, the division is neither bifurcatory nor trifurcatory, but instead yields a unified spectrum bounded by these two distinct poles. In other words, each art is situated relative to the material and spiritual needs in care for the human community to different extents, and the balance between a given art's care for material and spiritual needs positions it relatively among the others.

Importantly, this has yielded an account of these elements insofar as they are constituted by *one another* in their mutual relations to the two extremes of the material and spiritual needs of the human community by which they are defined. In this way, the non-bifurcatory division undertaken here has yielded a spectrum, where each point represents an instance of limit, the identity of which is defined by the points of limit elsewhere on the same spectrum. Each of these points of limit thus indicates a ratio between, at the far end, concern with the material life of the city, and on the near, concern with the spiritual life of the city, with slavery positioned at the midpoint where the two extremes are in balance. This maps on to Socrates' second type of account from the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates had described the account in which one is able

to answer the question of what a thing is "by reference to its elements" (Plat., *Theait.* 206 e 10–207 a 2).

The Stranger says little about his intentions in changing methods midway through the *Stateman*. A consideration of the "god-given method" that Socrates describes in the *Philebus*, which seems to describe a process of coming upon knowledge through means similar to the non-bifurcatory divisions in the *Statesman*, will help to give content to the method and also to use the letter paradigm to reflect on these dialectical methods in one more important way.[27] At Plat., *Phil.* 16 c 8 – 17 a 4, Socrates speaks in praise of the 'finest way' of investigating by means of a "gift of gods hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire".[28] Socrates explains:

> …whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to plurality before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. […] Nowadays the clever ones among us make a one, haphazardly, and a many, faster or slower than they should; they go straight from the one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates. It is these [intermediates], however, that make all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in dialectical or only in eristic discourse. (Plat., Phil. 16 d 1 – e 2, 17 a 1-5).29

Let us note several similarities between Socrates' opaque account here in the *Philebus* and the Stranger's non-bifurcatory division in the *Statesman*. First, Socrates says again here that the goal when using this method is to understand the whole with reference to twoness, threeness, or any number appropriate to the nature of the thing under investigation, as was the case in cutting the sacrificial animal with an eye to the number nearest. Second, the claim that "whatever is said to be consists of one and many" has "limit and unlimitedness" maps directly onto the structure of care for the human community that the Stranger articulated in the *Statesman*. For there, care for the human community was shown to be *one* (care) and *many* (a set of fifteen determinate moments). Furthermore, care for the human community was shown to be *unlimited* (insofar as it entails an unlimited dyadic spectrum between care for the material life and spiritual life of the city) and yet also have *limit* (the fifteen determinate points within that spectrum in which the conditions of the spectrum generate intelligible moments of care).[30] In other words, care is one and many, and unlimited and limited. Furthermore, Socrates' emphasis on "the intermediates" (τὰ μέσα, Plat., *Phil.* 18 c 3 – d 1) echoes the key move in the Stranger's analysis of care; for there the Stranger moved from the analysis of productive arts to directly responsive arts upon identifying their midpoint, slaves, which clarified the two poles of the unlimited dyadic spectrum. In this way, the Stranger's account was able to rise to the level of true "dialectic" (Plat., *Phil.* 17 b 6 and Plat., *Polit.* 285 d 5).[31]

We can do some work to understand this new method by considering Socrates' examples in the *Philebus*. Socrates helps his interlocutors Protarchus and Philebus to grasp this method through two examples: the scale of musical tones and the discernment of vocalic sounds that are represented independently by letters (Plat., *Phil.* 17 b 3 – 18 d 2). Here he initially notes that "the sound that comes out of the mouth is one […] but then it is also unlimited in number;" thus "if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds there are and what their nature is, that makes every one of us literate" (Plat., *Phil.* 17 b 4-7). In the case of musical sounds, the one of the form 'tone' is defined with reference to each pitch residing on that tone. Thus, an understanding of (e.g.) C sharp is attained with reference to C (as a lower tone) and D (as a higher tone). Understanding C and D, thus, entails understanding C flat (B) and C sharp, and D flat and D sharp, respectively. In this way, knowledge of tones as determinate points of limit along the indeterminate spectrum of tones entails understanding each of the many in its nature, and the ways in which each nature proceeds from the nature of the spectrum and its defining points on this spectrum.

In the case of tones, Socrates moves from the one (tone) to the many (the number of tones instantiated on the tone spectrum). In his second example, that of the vocalic sounds creating letters, Socrates describes the discovery of the letter spectrum by the Egyptian Theuth (Plat., *Phil.* 18 b 6 – d 2) as an example of proceeding from the many (vocalized sounds) to the one (the vocalic sound spectrum).[32] Socrates explains that Theuth discovered

> that the vowels in that unlimited variety are not one but several, and again that there are others that are not voiced, but make some kind of noise, and that they, too, have a number. As a third kind of letters he established the ones we now call mute (ibid).

That is, Theuth divided vocalic sounds into three categories: the voiced, the unvoiced but sounded, and the mutes. These he then subdivided based on the number appropriate to the kind of each. Here the spectrum is bounded on the one side by voiced letters (the vowels), the intermediate letters that are unvoiced but sounded, and the mutes.

Importantly, Socrates notes that Theuth "realized that none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of [the letters], taken by itself without understanding them all" (Plat., *Phil.* 18 c 8 – d 2). In other words, a letter is only understood in its nature when the co-constitutive parts like it in kind have been understood in their own natures. Thus the method of non-bifurcatory division has provided a way of understanding each element in its nature with reference to the other elements that situate it and define its character as such. And the consideration of this distinction with reference to letters points to an important takeaway regarding the method when we return our attention back to the account of care for the human community. For this suggests that something like material production of raw goods is understood *only when it is apprehended with reference to* the other points that constitute its being on its particular spectrum. In other words, no one determinate moment of care *is* without the other determinate moments by which it is co-constituted; likewise, it cannot be *known* in the fullest sense prior to being understood in its context within the spectrum of care. Thus, analyses of, e.g., the letter Eta, or C natural, or the art of producing raw goods, will fail when they are conducted only with reference to these elements *as such*. Instead, it is only when these elements are understood as points

of limit within their co-constitutive many and the one that comprises the many can the elements be known and analyzed.

V. CONCLUSION

To conclude and take stock of where our investigation of these methods has taken us, let us review our steps with reference to the notion of the letter. In the consideration of the *Theaetetus* we encountered the provocative suggestion that one only *knows* the spelling of a word (e.g., 'Θεαίτητος', or, more precisely, the first syllable of this word, 'Θε') if one recognizes its component parts when they appear elsewhere (e.g., the appearance of the first syllable in the name 'Θεόδωρος', or, more precisely, both parts composing the many that is the one syllable 'Θε'). We saw that in the *Sophist* the Eleatic Stranger both seeks to understand with reference to structure and argues that knowledge of a concept (here a letter) entails an account of the further concepts (letters) like in kind with which the element is fit to mix. In the *Statesman*, the Stranger indicates the ways in which known letters can direct the learner toward not-yet-known letters by allowing the learner to begin to grasp the nature of the unknown through its fitness to combine with other known elements like it in kind. This process further reveals previously concealed aspects of the known to the learner as well, insofar as it draws out newly revealed aspects of the known element's nature. In the account of the 'god-given method' in the *Philebus* with reference to its application in the non-bifurcatory division in the *Statesman,* we saw that Socrates uses letters to explain that knowledge of a concept (letter as vocalic sound) is derived only when its situation among all the other concepts (i.e., the other letters) to which it owes its composition has been understood. Our knowledge of the constitutive structure of the form has provided insight into the being of the form as a one and as a many, both limited and unlimited. This understanding of the one as subjected to both an unlimited plurality and a limited many through the imposition of limit represents a further nuance offered by the dialectical methods that unfold over the course of the trilogy. The unity of these methods that has emerged from our consideration of these methods can act as a provocation towards further considerations of the Platonic education, and aid in the turning of our souls from becoming to being as Socrates describes in the central books of the *Republic.*[33]

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NOTES

1 The three dialogues take place in a two-day period, probably in spring 399 BCE as argued at Nails 2002, 320. The trilogy is situated definitively within Socrates' life by Socrates' mention of his plans to meet the summons of Meletus later on the day of the *Theaetetus*, setting the dialogues in the months before his trial. It bears noting that the exchange depicted in the *Euthyphro*, set outside of the King's Archon's court, occurs between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* and *Statesman* on the following day. For a discussion of the dramatic and philosophical connections between the *Euthyphro* and this trilogy, see Wiitala 2014, *passim*. Furthermore, it has been argued that the *Cratylus* might also have been set on the day of the trial, e.g. by Sallis 1996, 225-230. Others, e.g. Nails 2002, 312-313, argue that the *Cratylus* is in fact set some two decades prior. In any event, we should notice that the conclusions and apparent *aporia* of other dialogues, including at least the *Euthyphro* and maybe the *Cratylus*, give further context to the progress made between the *Theaetetus* and the *Statesman*. I will not develop this point here, but it should be remembered that philosophical methods are employed here under the dramatic backdrop of Socrates' impending trial and execution, including that the philosopher had not properly been differentiated from the sophist by the citizens of Athens. Thus the methods are given a political and historical framework as well.

2 For a general overview of proleptic in Platonic dialogues, see Kahn 1988, *passim*, but especially 541-542 and 547-549.

3 This is not a claim about Plato's development, but instead a claim about the relationship between dialogues independent of the chronology of their composition. I generally take it that Plato's dialogues are intended as pedagogical exercises for students of the academy, not expositions of doctrines, and hence assume that these methods are intended for pedagogical purposes.

4 In this paper I follow Ambuel 2007 38-39, and Miller 2016, 6 in reading *only* division, and not 'collection and division' as is often named in the literature, at play in *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Sayre 2006, 36-37 offers a helpful discussion of the terminology and the absence of 'collection' (*sunagōgē*) in 'titular' references to division in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* (i.e., Plat., *Soph.* 235 c 8 and 253 d 1; Plat., *Polit.* 284 a 4 – 5 and 286 d 9). Miller argues that 'collection and division' is a term imported from the *Phaedrus* (Plat., *Phaid.* 266 b 4-6) and not clearly at play in the "Eleatic" dialogues. Ambuel argues that collection cannot be at play in the *Sophist* due to an unresolved ambiguity between appearance and reality. Other commentators have argued that collection is at play in the *Sophist*; see, e.g., Bluck 1975, 33-40, Notomi 1999, 2 fn. 75, and Ionescu 2013, *passim*. Cornford and Klein each hold middle positions, as Cornford argues that collection is not at play in the method of the interlocutors but is nonetheless exhibited throughout the movement of the text (Cornford 1935, 171), while Klein holds that each articulation of the preceding divisions counts as a collection (Klein 1977, 14ff).

5 E.g., in Miller 1990, *passim*.

6 Other discussions of the role of letters in the dialogues include Gómez-Lobo 1977, Miller 1992, Notomi 1999, Gill 2006, Sanday 2015a, and Smith 2018.

7 For example, Socrates situates his city-soul analogy in the *Republic* with reference to small and large letters (Plat., *Rep.* 368 c 7 – d 7) and its grammatical aspect with reference to the recognition of letters (Plat., *Rep.* 379 a – d).

8 For the interpretation of Platonic paradigms that I follow, see Sanday 2017, *passim*, and Smith 2018. For the conflicting view that the notion of paradigms changes in different dialogues, see Gill 2006, *passim*.

9 Theaetetus describes this account in hazy terms, and Socrates later characterizes it as a 'dream' (Plat. *Theait.* 201 d 9), suggesting that the definition derives from a hazy and pre-discursive source. For a thorough account of the implications of this account's 'dreamlike' status, see Burnyeat 1970, *passim*. For the influential challenge (given in 1952 but unpublished until 1990) to the view that knowledge of forms could be at play in the dream theory, see Ryle 1990, *passim*. Ryle's view is rebuked by Lesher 1969, *passim* and Miller 1992, especially 87-90.

10 Other commentators have also suggested that Socrates' dismissal of his descriptions of 'account' are not as definitive as they might initially seem. Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, and Desjardins 1981, 11, both argue that these definitions foreshadow elements in the "Eleatic" dialogues. Miller 1992, especially 94-104 and Miller 2016, especially 321-322, also discusses the ways in which the final two senses of 'account' in the *Theaetetus* correspond to the methodology in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*.

11 *Theaetetus* translations taken from Sachs unless noted otherwise. Consistently throughout this paper I replace 'articulation' with 'account' in translating 'λόγος'. I follow Fine 1979, *passim* in interpreting Plato's use of 'λόγος' as stronger than that entailed merely by the English 'statement'. For further discussion of interpretations of 'λόγος' in Plato's writing, see Burnyeat 1990, 136-149.

12 Snyder 2016, *passim* has recently done work to show that Socrates' midwife role in the *Theaetetus* entails Socrates' use of epistemic failure to increase the efficacy of his methodology. Snyder argues that the bi-product of this experience is creating, within his interlocutors, wisdom regarding the use of this method to generate a sort of provocative *aporia* (Snyder 2016, 8). These points are helpful to consider the positive gains of this method, that is, the important step of *aporia* that acts as a provocation toward further investigations.

13 With minor alterations to Sachs's translation. In this way, Theaetetus demonstrates that he has not made the final step of knowledge of mathematical objects to knowledge of forms described in the middle books of the *Republic*.

14 As mentioned above, commentators who have argued this include Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, Desjardins 1981, 11, Miller 1992, especially 94-104 and Miller 2016, especially 321-322. For a helpful discussion of the *Theaetetus*' 'ending well,' see Haring 1982, *passim*.

15 Spelling is at issue in various ways throughout this passage, but is discussed explicitly at Plat., *Theait.* 202 e 7 – 204 a 9, 206 a 3-8, and 207 a 8 – 208 c 4.

16 Here I am using my own example of moving from parts to whole to maintain the letters example. Socrates' analogous example at Plat., *Theait.* 207 a 4 is the description of the wagon as "wheels, axle, box, poles, crossbar". For without an account of the inner-workings of these parts, we have merely a heap of parts, or a heap of letters in my example.

17 Whether division entails discovery or demonstration has been a debated subject since antiquity. Crombie 1963, 2:382 articulates an influential argument that the method is concerned with demonstration, not discovery. Here I follow Ionescu 2013, *passim*, who argues that division entails discovery (acquisition) and can take up objects of knowledge ranging from images to forms, corresponding to the objects of knowledge discussed in the divided line analogy.

18 *Sophist* and *Statesman* translations are taken from the Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem editions, with minor modifications noted.

19 This explanation comes in the midst of the Stranger's description of what exactly the dialectician discerns, from Plat. *Soph.* 253 d 5 – e 3, which has been notoriously divisive among commentators. Here the Stranger says that the diairetic dialectician "…has an adequate perception of one form (εἶδος) extended everywhere through many things, each of which lies apart, and also many forms which are other than one another and are embraced by one external to them; again, he perceives one unified form composed of many wholes as well as many forms marked off as entirely apart. But to know this is to know how to discern, according to kind, where each is able to commune and where not" (Plat., Soph. 253 d 7 – e 3, substituting 'form' for Brann, et al.'s term 'look' in translating 'εἶδος', to use the term consistently with previous renderings above.) These lines have been interpreted as (i) a description of collection (d 5 – 7) and division (d 7 – 9) respectively, as by Cornford 1953 and Sayre 2006; (ii) an anticipation of the discussion of the five greatest kinds, as by Gómez-Lobo 1977; (iii) as something of a hybrid (albeit earlier) version of (i) and (ii), as by Stenzel 1964; and (iv) as pointing both to non-bifurcatory division (d 5 – 7) and bifurcatory division (d 7 – 9), as by Miller 2016. I remain agnostic on this issue here due to spatial limitations, but suggest that my interpretation does not hinge on a commitment or lack thereof to any of these lines of interpretation.

20 It bears noting that the Stranger does not claim that this list of five great kinds is exhaustive. It is possible that there are others. Plato's character Parmenides in his eponymous dialogue describes likeness, unlikeness, oneness, and multitude (Plat., *Parm.* 129 d 2 – 130 b 8) in such a way as to suggest that these kinds are co-constitutive of forms in a similar way; but I lack the space to develop this connection here. For more on this possibility, see Miller 1986, especially 176-185, and Sanday 2015a, especially 154-165. Regardless of the list of great kinds, the important takeaway here is that structure of a given form requires its participation in other forms, and an understanding of a given form requires an account of the ways in which its nature requires participation in other forms.

21 For a discussion of the senses in which forms have been understood to be in motion and a novel interpretation of the communing of forms as the sense of motion, see Wiitala 2018, *passim*.

22 The value of bifurcatory division in Platonic education has been debated. Crombie 1963 and Ryle 1966 both argue that the method is valuable only to philosophical amateurs, while Brown 2010, 168 argues that although the method is unsuccessful in the *Sophist* (since sophistry is not a *techne* but is instead amorphous) it remained a viable method for students in Plato's academy. For discussions of the value of non-bifurcatory division and its relevance to Platonic metaphysics, see Miller 1999, Ionescu 2014, and Ionescu 2016.

23 For more on the ways in which the myth of ages prepares the way for the digression on method (Plat. *Polit.* 277 a 2 – 287 b 2) and the role of the care paradigm in the subsequent non-bifurcatory division, see Ionescu 2014, especially 42-45, and Ionescu 2016, especially 95-99. For more on the role of paradigms in the dialogue, see Sanday 2017, *passim* and Smith 2018, *passim*.

24 For more on the components of this digression – the notion of paradigm, the paradigms of care and the weaver, and the notion of due measure – and their role in allowing for the change of method, see Smith 2018, *passim*.

25 Miller articulates his view in depth at Miller 1990, 343-346, and expands upon it further in a 1999 article reprinted at Miller 2004, 141-161. Of the numerous differing interpretations of this passage, noteworthy are Goldschmidt 1947, *passim*, who holds that the passage has a bifurcatory structure, and Ackrill 1970, *passim*, who argues that some divisions throughout *Sophist* and *Statesman* exhibit a non-bifurcatory structure.

26 Miller 1990, 345 discusses slavery and its position in the spectrum composing care for the human community in more depth.

27 For more on the connection between the final, non-bifurcatory division and the god-given method, see Miller 2004, 141-161, Ionescu 2014, *passim*, and Ionescu 2016, *passim*. For a broad and helpful overview of the notions of science, method, and truth at play in the *Philebus*, see Harvey 2012, *passim*.

28 *Philebus* translations taken from the Frede edition.

29 The exact nature of this method has been debated. For the view that the 'god-given method' entails both collection and division, see Benson 2007, *passim* and Fletcher 2017, especially 184-191.

30 For a discussion of the distinction between 'unlimited' in this technical sense and its usage elsewhere in the dialogue, see Sanday 2015b, 367 f.11.

31 At Plat., *Polit.* 285 d 5, the Stranger asks Socrates the Younger whether the analysis of the statesman is for the pursuit of knowledge of the statesman only, or the pursuit of skill in dialectics more broadly. Socrates the Younger picks the latter.

32 The relationship between the types of investigation indicated by the tones and letters example has been controversial. Hackforth 1945, 26 understands the two as fundamentally unified by an initial intuition into the unity of the object of inquiry. Harte 2002, 204 offers helpful discussion of the sense in which the imposition of structure upon tone provides the tone scale with its identity. For the interpretation of this passage as marking the distinction between the 'learning procedure' and 'discovery procedure' in the 'god-given method,' see Fletcher 2017, especially 188-189.

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Plato's Socrates, Sophistic Antithesis and Scepticism

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ABSTRACT

In some Platonic dialogues Socrates apparently shares significant characteristics with contemporary sophists, especially a technique of antithetical argumentation. Since sophists anticipated later Academic philosophers in arguing antithetically and a resultant form of scepticism, then, with Socrates' repeated claims to ignorance, Plato's depiction of him arguing antithetically suggests later Academics could plausibly appeal to Plato for evidence that Socrates and he were sceptics, as it seems they actually did.

Keywords: Plato, Socrates, Sceptics, Sophists, antithesis.

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Later members of Plato's school, those we collectively call Academic sceptics, claimed consistency with both Socrates and Plato.[1] Several scholars in recent years have traced and interpreted the limited evidence for this ancient sceptic interpretation of Plato, and evaluated it more or less positively.[2] Moreover some scholars have advanced in their own names sceptic interpretations of both Socrates and Plato.[3] While it seems to me that the truth about Plato overall is more complex (although in a sense consistent with this view),[4] here I want to draw attention to another kind of support for the interpretation of Plato's depiction of Socrates as a sceptic, from the evidence of fifth century BC sophists.

I will argue that Socrates, in some Platonic dialogues concerned with both individual sophists and the nature of knowledge, shares significantly in a range of characteristics belonging (or at least attributed by Plato) to several sophists, including, significantly, a technique of antithetical argumentation.[5] Moreover independent evidence suggests some sophists anticipated the later Academic philosophers not just in arguing antithetically but also a form of scepticism, and that among these sophists antithetical argumentation probably led to their scepticism. Thus, in conjunction with Socrates' repeated claims to ignorance in the dialogues, in this sophistic context Plato's depiction of him arguing antithetically suggests that later Academics could indeed quite plausibly appeal to Platonic dialogues for evidence that Socrates was a sceptic.

I will initially restrict the detailed case to the plausibility of a sceptical interpretation of the Socrates presented by Plato in the *Protagoras, Hippias Minor, Gorgias, Meno, Lysis* and *Theaetetus*, and Plato as the author of these. The justification for focusing on these dialogues is merely that, on the basis of the evidence I shall discuss, the sceptical interpretation seems to me the most plausible for them individually and together, in virtue of their shared characteristics, although it is not meant to imply that they form an exclusive group, nor to deny the relevance of evidence from other dialogues.

Quite a number of other dialogues do not exhibit a predominance of either antithetic argumentation or Socratic refutations, but instead more or less systematically supported claims, often implicitly at least attributable to Socrates, or another main speaker, although certainly those of Socrates are often hedged about with warnings that they are only his beliefs (e.g. *Meno* 98a-b, *Rep*. 6.506c-e), or merely the implications of the current argument in a given dialogue (cf. *Crito* 46b, *Phaedo* 107b, *Rep.* 3.394d), or occur in highly rhetorical contexts (e.g. *Symp.* 211c-212a; *Phaedr*. 245c-57b).[6] Thus, finally I shall consider a problem for an Academic sceptic interpretation of Plato's Socrates, the problem of his belief statements, and present as briefly as I can an evaluation of some possible ways later Academics might most plausibly reconcile this significant common feature of many dialogues with a sceptical interpretation of Plato overall.[7]

ACADEMIC ARGUMENTATION AND SOCRATES

One argumentative technique that undeniably connects Plato's Socrates explicitly with the sceptical Academy is dialectical refutation. Cicero refers to Socrates' use of this against the sophists at *Fin.* 2.2, where he then reports that Arcesilaus (c.316-c.240 BC), who is said to have initiated the sceptic turn in the Academy when he became its scholarch (c.265 BC), revived this technique, which was no longer in use in his own day. Yet later in the same work Cicero shows that Arcesilaus also engaged in extended speeches designed to counterbalance an oppos-

ing dogmatic position (*Fin.* 5.10). As *Acad.* 1.45 puts it, he argued against everyone's opinions,

> so that when equally weighty arguments were found for contrary positions on the same subject, it was easier to withhold assent from either position (trans. Inwood and Gerson).

A.A. Long, who regards Arcesilaus as the originator of the conception of Socrates as a sceptic,[8] also states,

> Arcesilaus in effect was the founder of Greek scepticism, as a methodology for demonstrating that every claim to knowledge or belief could be met with a counter-argument of equal strength.[9]

In the following I aim to raise doubts about this claim.

Long rightly distinguishes between the production of arguments on either side of a case and arguing the opposite case to an opponent, noting that more reliable sources do not report Arcesilaus to have argued both sides of a case himself.[10] This was subsequently the practice of the later Academic scholarch Carneades (214-129/8 BC), who notoriously spoke publicly on successive days for and against the view that justice is intrinsically beneficial to the agent, while on the Athenian embassy to Rome in 155 BC.[11] Moreover Cicero, who used reports of these speeches in *De republica* Bk 3, structured most of the works of his retirement around this principle.[12]

Long himself acknowledges that Arcesilaus could justifiably claim to be practicing Socrates' own technique of refutation, and observes that the techniques of argument *contra*, or both *pro* and *contra*, owed something to the rhetorical tradition—that is, ultimately, to the sophists.[13] Yet as I shall show below, both the latter techniques seem also to be found repeatedly in Plato.

This will then raise the question of motive. A speech directed against another speaker's position might be considered in intention just *eristic*, or again *refutatory*, that is, designed to achieve either a merely verbal victory in the one case, or a seriously meant change of mind in the opponent. But a refutation, in the latter case, might aim at either the opponent's or audience's adoption of the opposite case (as formally also in a *reductio ad absurdum*, for instance), or merely the realisation of ignorance (as similarly in Socrates' dialectical refutations); the aim is then *aporetic*.

This recognition of ignorance (as apparently in many Socratic refutations) might involve the presupposition that neither foregoing case is correct, so motivating the search for a new account of the matter (*zetetic scepticism*), or if no further alternative seems possible, the presupposition will be that one or other of the two opposed foregoing cases must be correct and the other not (i.e., a *dilemma*), in which case either further inquiry is again required (again, *zetetic scepticism*), or the abandonment of either all opinions or just claims to certain knowledge (*ephectic scepticism*, *epochê*).[14] In what follows I will aim to locate sophistic, Socratic and Academic scepticism within these contours, and, with some further adjustments, trace their deeper similarities.[15]

SOPHISTIC ANTILOGY AND SCEPTICISM

Clearly fifth century sophists realised two things about speeches: firstly, that they can be more or less persuasive, and secondly that there is always a speech that can be made for the opposite case.[16] In the *Clouds* Aristophanes

presents the Right and Wrong Speeches as living teachers in Socrates' school.[17] Thus it was common knowledge by the late 420s BC that some sophists were teaching that every argument is opposed by another, and it is the power of persuasion, not the truth of a case, which determines which argument wins a case. Diogenes Laertius (9.51) states that Protagoras was the first to declare that there are two mutually opposed arguments on any topic, while Aristotle reports that Protagoras promised to make the weaker argument stronger (*Rhetoric* 1402a14-6). Plato's *Apology* 18b-d, 19b-c, has Socrates claiming this was the popular belief about himself as a result of the *Clouds*.[18]

The *Clouds* demonstrates that the popular perception was that one case is naturally right, while the sophists unscrupulously teach people to win with the naturally weaker, or unjust, case. But it seems Protagoras went further, drawing a conclusion that went beyond merely eristic or refutatory reasoning. If we depend on our own judgment to discern the truth, and if our judgment is subject to persuasion by *logos*, then we cannot ever affirm as a fact that one case is naturally right or wrong. All we know is that one appears right to us, and the other appears right to someone else. That seems to be the meaning of the famous fragment from Protagoras' book *Truth* which is quoted in Plato's *Theaetetus*:

> Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.[19]

Protagoras, and perhaps also Antiphon,[20] thus seem to deny that there is any objective truth to a matter. There are only the appearances, and so, according to Protagoras presumably, what appears true to me *is* true for me, and what appears true to you, even if it is the opposite, *is* true for you. This at least is the way Socrates interprets Protagoras both in the *Theaetetus* (152a, 161c) and *Cratylus* (285e-386a). Note that Socrates' subsequent depiction of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* (166d-167d) as aiming to improve people by changing the way things appear to them, while implying that the latter's own rhetorical *practice* was indeed eristic-refutatory, does not contradict the proposal here that he recognised the *proto*-sceptical implication that no speech can be naturally right or wrong, since it presupposes just that.[21]

Fragment 4 from Protagoras expresses aporetic scepticism about the gods.[22] We can see this as another application of the same principle. If human *logoi* cannot attain any objective truth, it might seem that we can be assured what the truth is by the authority of the gods, communicated in prophecies and oracles, and the many famous mythical poems inspired by the Muses. But Protagoras denies knowledge of the gods as a source of truth. We cannot even say whether they exist or not, and if they do, what they are like. Thus, we cannot appeal to the gods in order to justify the assertion that there is any objective truth behind appearances.[23]

Gorgias fr.3 (*On What is Not*) demonstrates that the early fifth century philosopher Parmenides' putatively demonstrative logic can be reversed to produce the opposite conclusion.[24] His aims here, in principle, might be either merely eristic-refutatory, or perhaps something more (aporetic and so sceptical). But a refutatory aim seems to be excluded, since if Gorgias were to believe his own conclusion, that would involve him in self-contradiction (claiming to communicate comprehensibly a truth about what is and is not that, he argues, is incomprehensible and incommunicable). Assuming that Gorgias has a serious purpose then, he must be taken to aim to show that we cannot decide reasonably between his own and Parmenides' conclusions. This would not amount to claiming

to know whether there is any truth, but just to show that we in fact do not know it, by demonstrating that even a very carefully reasoned philosophical *logos* has an equally plausible opposite.[25] Thus I suggest both Protagoras and Gorgias are evidence for sophists recognising philosophical implications in the equipolence of antithetical speeches, while Gorgias most clearly seems to have thought that these implications are sceptical.

SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS IN PLATO

I aim to show that Socrates in Plato can very plausibly be seen as characterised by the same features, and so as anticipating Academic scepticism. First I will consider here some other characteristics in Plato's depictions of, and references to sophists that are apparently shared by Socrates, since these indirectly support, by association, the contention that Socrates might seem, to a sceptical reader of Plato, to share also in sophistic scepticism, since they demonstrate the extent to which Socrates' interests and practices are depicted generally as *formally* isomorphous with those of the sophists.[26]

It might seem bizarre to argue that Socrates is portrayed in Plato as like a sophist. Today philosophy is a distinct discipline, in a tradition deriving from Plato and Aristotle, whereas the sophists are often identified with a different discipline, rhetoric; we regard both Aristophanes and later Aeschines (*In Tim*. 173) as reflecting popular ignorance when they call Socrates a sophist. But this is entirely anachronistic. Xenophon (*Mem*. 1.2) calls the presocratic philosophers sophists, and at least since Kerferd (1981) the famous sophists have been recognised as contributing to the philosophical study of language, morality, and the polis.

Admittedly Plato distinguishes philosophy from sophistry,[27] yet his distinction cannot be one of discipline. The sophists claim expertise in the very things that interest Socrates.[28] Nor can the distinction be simply between the theoretical and the practical life (as in the *Gorgias* 484c-488b Socrates and Callicles initially seem to agree), since Socrates concludes by claiming himself to be the only true politician in Athens. Perhaps the best commentary on Plato's view is what Aristotle implies (*Metaph*. 4.2, 1004b25-6), that a sophist is not serious either about goodness or knowledge, including self-knowledge; in other words, according to Plato and Aristotle, the sophists' motives are generally merely eristic (notwithstanding the conclusions reached above from their own works about Protagoras and Gorgias). But this is an individual failing, and does not distinguish the formal features of their intellectual practices from those of Socrates.

Beginning with the least important for this purpose, these formally similar features include, first, the use of myth. Compare, for instance, Protagoras' great myth (*Prot*. 320c-323a), Hippias' reported use of epic mythology as a teaching tool (*Hippias Min*. 363a-c), and Gorgias' *Helen* with the myths Socrates expounds in *Gorgias* (493a-494a, 523a-527d) and his mythical introduction of recollection (*Meno* 81a-e), not to mention the closing myths of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

Secondly, in all such cases myths spoken by Socrates are used to advance moral doctrines. But Plato characterises the sophists as concerned with virtue: *Meno* 89e-92e depicts Socrates as proposing to an incredulous Anytus that Protagoras and others teach virtue; in the *Protagoras* that sophist himself claims to teach people to be better householders and citizens, not objecting when Socrates identifies this as the art of politics, and the product as virtue, going on to argue that virtue can be taught and

that he is the best teacher (318b-328d). Hippias also lectures on virtue (*Hipp. min*. loc. cit., cf. *Hipp. mai*. 283c-e).

Of course, the case in the *Gorgias* is more complicated. Initially Gorgias himself happily propounds that the province of his art is speechmaking about right and wrong (454b-455a), although it takes Socrates' own art to convince him that he would always teach morality to his students if necessary (460a-461a, cf. 459dff.). In the *Meno* Gorgias seems to be reported to be a moral sceptic: he does not claim to teach virtue, only speechmaking (95c), and perhaps he is behind Meno's paradox implying the impossibility of successful inquiry (80d). Nevertheless, on Socrates' account in the *Gorgias* sophists, who only differ insignificantly from rhetoricians (465b-c, 520a) are 'professional teachers of virtue' (519c, e), although in doing so they are mere imitators of legislation (in defining right and wrong). Socrates by contrast claims that he himself is the only true politician in Athens (521d), thus that he is what the sophists and rhetoricians are mere wheedling imitations of: he is like the good rhetoricians Callicles had mistakenly thought led Athens in the past (503a-504e, cf. 521a).

So here Socrates is explicitly compared and contrasted with the sophists and rhetoricians: his words aim to do what the sophists ought to do. Note though that the *theoretical* contrast is not made in terms of dialectical or rhetorical techniques, nor in terms of Socrates knowing what the sophists do not, but rather his willingness to confront people rather than flatter them (*loc. cit.*). Admittedly there is a *practical* contrast in dialectical ability, but this, I shall argue, merely confirms that Socrates, *qua* philosopher, is portrayed as the ideal to which sophistry aspires, not its antithesis. If so, this is all so far consistent with the view that Socrates anticipates the Academic sceptics.

My third point of comparison concerns the conception of sophists as failing to teach, i.e., to produce understanding, rather than merely conviction. This is the view of rhetoric Gorgias is led to admit (*Gorgias* 454b-455a) and it recurs in the *Theaetetus* (201a-c), in each case the difference being made by requirements of addressing a large group. In the light of the *Gorgias*' image of the sophistic orator as a flatterer aiming only at pleasure not the truth, we tend to assume that the implication here is that the sophist convinces by deliberately deceiving, a view encouraged by Aristotle's collection and analysis of *Sophistic Refutations*. But the only clear model in Plato of sophists deliberately engaging in logical deception is that of the clowns Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who differ markedly from the important sophists Plato depicts.

It is in fact Socrates who most often provokes the reader's suspicion that his argumentation is deliberately flawed. Numerous arguments in the *Gorgias* (475c-d, 477a, 489b, 496e, 497e-499b) and *Protagoras* (331a-e, 350c-351b) can easily be construed this way.[29] But the implication would be that the conclusions Socrates reaches, for instance with Polus and Callicles, are not his own knowledge, at least not for the reasons given, but perhaps no more than beliefs he regards it beneficial for his interlocutors to adopt.[30] In this respect, then, Socrates would not be so different from a sophist, even if we assume his aims are not merely eristic. But perhaps, further, Plato presents such arguments to provoke further critical inquiry by the reader. Such a zetetic intention, too, is consistent with Academic scepticism, as I will show.

Fourth, there is mode of discourse. Admittedly Socrates seems to be presented, particularly in the *Gorgias* (447a-c, 448d-449c) and *Protagoras* (329a-b, 334c-335c, 336b-d, 337e-338a) as distinguishing himself by his preference for dialectical question and answer from the soph-

ists' tendency to launch into an extended oration; again at *Gorgias* 471d-472c he differentiates the method of refutation Polus' oratory applies from that of dialectic.[31] But in practice the difference is less than this suggests. Undoubtedly Socrates is demonstrated to be better at dialectic than the sophists, but Plato portrays him as better at oratory also. Distinguishing in the texts between a speech and a dialectical question or answer is a relative matter, but in relation to context I count nineteen long speeches by Socrates in the *Gorgias* and at least nine in the *Protagoras*. The longest in the *Gorgias*, his mythical peroration (523a-527e), is longer than Callicles' great speech on natural justice (482c-486c), while in the *Protagoras* Socrates' extended interpretation of Simonides' poem (342a-347a) is only outrun by Protagoras' immense discourse on the teachability of virtue (320c-328d).

Most of Socrates' other discourses in these dialogues are protreptic to dialectic, just as Protagoras' speech aims to recruit students, while at *Gorgias* 519d-e, concluding a speech begun almost three Stephanus pages earlier because Callicles refused to continue answering, Socrates admits this has turned him into a popular orator, acknowledging that he can speak without someone to answer. Even in the *Theaetetus* Socrates is given four long speeches (including one on behalf of Protagoras, 156c-157c, and the digression, 173c-174a and 174a-177b).

Moreover, both Gorgias and Polus are presented as advertising their willingness to answer questions, not merely make speeches,[32] and the same is true of Protagoras, who is even reported to teach brevity.[33] Protagoras agrees unwillingly to ask questions, but is not very skilled (*Prot*. 338c-339d). On the other hand, although no more skilled, Polus (*Gorgias* 462b-463d), followed by Gorgias himself (463d-e), is much more willing to attempt to question Socrates. It is unnecessary here to discuss the *elenchus* in detail, since it is no more than a tool a sophist too would use if he could, and any given application produces only a negative conviction, not knowledge, while knowledge as a cumulative result of refutations (for instance) is not anything Socrates ever claims.[34]

Thus, the differences in verbal technique between Socrates and these sophists are not in genre but differences in preference and skill. In summary, Socrates outshines the other sophists in each genre of discourse, according to Plato. He is the ideal sophist (not a flatterer, but what a flatterer imitates).

I turn finally to Socrates' possession of two features of the sophists adduced from their own fragments and other reports, that is, their concern with antithetical speeches and their scepticism, most conspicuous in the case of Gorgias.

SOCRATES' USE OF ANTILOGY

That antithetical argumentation is a sophistic practice is implicitly recognised at *Gorgias* 456a-457c, where Gorgias boasts of his ability to make the worst case stronger, that is, to defeat the expert in debate, an unmistakably eristic capacity. But although this implies that Gorgias could argue either side of a case, that is not yet arguing both. The clearest example of Socrates himself putting up equal and opposite cases is in the *Meno*, where he first argues (a) that virtue is teachable by the method of hypothesis (87a-89c), then (b) that virtue is not teachable, on the basis of the absence of experts (89c-96c), given that (i) Anytus denies the sophists teach it, (ii) Athenian gentlemen cannot teach their sons virtue, and (iii) supposed experts disagree on whether it can be taught.

Here it is natural to hesitate, rather than assume that Socrates too has eristic purposes. Perhaps the doctrine of correct belief (*orthê*

doxa, 96e-98c) is meant to reconcile the positions (a) and (b) above, by revising the implications of the former, (a), since what is beneficial (including virtue) need not then be knowledge, but only correct belief. It might seem paradoxical that Socrates states that one of the few things he does actually *know* is that correct opinion differs from knowledge (*Meno* 98b): but this is essentially just a logical distinction, between temporary and permanent states of mind (97d-98a); Socrates explicitly admits that he is only 'conjecturing' (*eikazôn*, 98b) in his interpretation of this distinction, including the guess that correct belief can ever become knowledge.[35] Nor does he argue that correct belief can be taught, as would be required if the distinction between that and knowledge were to succeed in reviving the claim (a) that virtue is teachable. In any case even the revised implication of the *Meno* remains sceptical: no knowledge of virtue is in sight. This kind of scepticism seems clearly zetetic, given Socrates' ultimate point, that only by finding the definition of virtue will it be possible to decide whether it is teachable (100c).

In the *Gorgias* Socrates leads Gorgias to opposite conclusions and self-contradiction (461a vis-à-vis 457a-c), and thereafter, faced with the articulate positions of Polus and Callicles puts up his own position opposed to both of them. Whether it can be said he refutes their positions (as opposed to just the men themselves)[36] depends on evaluation of the strength of his arguments, which have been criticised, as noted above. Thus, it is possible to see Socrates here as seeking to induce *aporia*, and so further inquiry, by presenting the opposite position merely to undermine the assumption of knowledge (particularly since he does not claim to know that his own position is the truth).

In the *Protagoras* at 361a-c Socrates notes that by the end of this dialogue he and Protagoras have exchanged positions on the teachability of virtue. Socrates, who initially denied it, now argues that virtue is knowledge, whereas Protagoras, who claimed to teach it, now (360d) refuses to continue assenting to Socrates' argument. This also seems clearly construable as a case of Socrates arguing both opposite positions. As in the *Meno*, he presents his motive as zetetic at 361c: the confusion will lead to further inquiry into the definition of virtue, as a prerequisite for establishing its attributes (e.g., teachability or the opposite). Again, this is quite consistent with Academic zetetic scepticism, given that the definition is as yet unknown.

Finally, the *Theaetetus* presents us with a systematic exploitation of the technique of antithetical argument, as Socrates first expounds and then refutes position after position.[37] Here, superficially at least, Socrates' motive seems to be dispositive refutation: certainly the effect is not immediately to create indecision as to whether a proposed position, in each case, or its refutation, is correct (rather the refutation is taken dramatically at least, as successful). Nevertheless, the overall aim is clearly deliberately aporetic, and implicitly zetetic (perplexity will lead to further inquiry): his repeated reformulations suggest that it has never been clearly shown that the resources of any position have at any point been completely exhausted (even when Socrates gives up on it). Thus the implication of the antithetical argumentation in *Theaetetus* is indeed a form of scepticism.[38] The *Lysis* has a similar structure, and, apparently, aim.[39]

SOPHISTIC AND SOCRATIC SCEPTICISM

As previously mentioned, the only hint of Gorgias' scepticism in the dialogues (as opposed to his *On What is Not*) would be his implied responsibility for the *Meno*'s paradox of

inquiry and the report there that he declined to teach virtue (95c), which would seem to be ephectic; on the other hand he is also reported there to have taught Meno the doctrine that virtue is relative to social role (71e-72a, 73a). Nevertheless, it seems more likely that the latter is not meant by Plato to express a positive doctrine, for instance an objective functionalism (as in Aristotle), but a poorly conceived, epistemologically motivated, anti-essentialism. This would be a negative dogmatism, rejecting the possibility of a definable object of knowledge, as is perhaps similarly Protagoras' doctrine of the relativity of the good in nature (*Prot*. 334a-c). If this is correct, given the inconsistency with the other evidence of Gorgias' ephectic scepticism, and Protagoras' proto-sceptical relativism, these particular claims would seem in context to be merely eristic.

The case for treating Plato's Socrates as a sceptic, and therefore Plato as promoting scepticism, requires a longer discussion. Firstly, the passages of antithetical argumentation identified in the series of Plato's dialogues discussed above display Socrates' adoption, and apparently Plato's recommendation, of an aporetic-zetetic form of scepticism. This, then, is to be contrasted in purpose with the apparently ephectic scepticism of Gorgias, and the proto-sceptical relativism of Protagoras, but in each case the implication of opposed speeches is functionally similar: fundamentally it implies an absence of objective truth, either in principle (Protagoras), generally in fact (Gorgias), or at least presently, in the case of Socrates, motivating further inquiry.

Nevertheless, in other dialogues' various statements of the theory of forms we seem to see a non-refutatory Socrates, an idealist metaphysician, presented in Plato. Yet even so, I shall argue, it is not clear that the position cannot be reconciled with at least some recognised forms of Academic scepticism, precisely because the forms are only proposed as possible objects of knowledge, and never claimed to be known.[40] This requires an account of the status of belief in the zetetic scepticism of Plato's Socrates.

But first we should be clear that the sceptic Socrates cannot be denied at least some role in Plato. I need not survey here all the professions of ignorance in the Socratic dialogues. Perhaps the only important point that needs to be made is that in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates claims his position is tied down with arguments of iron and adamantine (509a), he nevertheless denies he knows the facts of the matter, and allows that someone younger and more forceful than Callicles might be able to untie these bonds.[41] Again, although the interpretation of this is more controversial, at the end of the final argument of the *Phaedo* (107a-b) Socrates agrees with Simmias' doubts on the general grounds of human fallibility and suggests the argument needs further investigation, despite himself being presently convinced.[42]

ZETETIC SCEPTICISM, BELIEFS AND *EPOCHÊ*

This brings us to the depiction of Socrates claiming to hold beliefs in Plato, and the doctrine of correct belief (*orthê doxa*) in the *Meno*. These together might seem to be the main stumbling block for the case that there is a significant line of descent linking antithetical argumentation and scepticism from the sophists, *via* Plato's Socrates, to the later Academy. Someone could object that, if the Academic sceptics claimed philosophical consistency with Plato's Socrates, they must have been wrong, on the grounds that there is no evidence in the dialogues that Socrates espoused the goal of *epochê*, suspension of assent (*sunkatathesis*), that is, the avoid-

ance of opinions or beliefs (*doxai*), the terms in which our sources often characterise Academic scepticism.[43]

Nevertheless, as a preliminary to facing this problem, note two points which suggest strongly that Academic sceptics self-consciously adopted a zetetic form of scepticism directly from the presentation of Socrates in Plato's dialogues. At *Acad.* 1.45, where Cicero reports that Arcesilaus went that one step beyond Socrates in not even claiming to know that he knew nothing, he explains the motive for *epochê* as that there is nothing more disgraceful than for cognitive assent to outrun knowledge and perception.[44] While this is clearly phrased in Stoic terms, nevertheless it states a motive for scepticism quite consistent with Socrates' avowals: not just the desire for truth, but also the avoidance of the 'most shameful kind of ignorance', thinking you know what you do not.[45]

Secondly, even where later Academics, e.g. Cicero, apparently following Clitomachus' interpretation of Carneades' philosophy, treat *epochê* as an Academic requirement, nevertheless the motive for scepticism, and the response it generates, remain quite consistent with Socrates' zetetic ideals and practice. Cicero at *Acad.* 2.7-8 characterises sceptics as always continuing to search for the truth, while not assuming they know what they do not know; at 2.65-6, claiming to report Arcesilaus, he argues that the motive for *epochê* is that precisely because the wise person loves the truth the most, he hates error the most. This commitment to investigation (*zetêsis*) then implies that Academic sceptics must make a practice of seriously *considering* possible beliefs, and thus that while they argue one or other side of a case, in any instance, they at least hypothesize for the time being that a given belief is true.

Three kinds of explanation of Socratic belief claims seem possible here for an Academic sceptic who appeals to Plato's Socrates as an antecedent. Firstly, as would follow from the immediately preceding point, a sceptic could treat Socrates' positions in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* as ironically adopted counter-positions designed to undermine his interlocutors' assumptions of knowledge, respectively, that the immoral use of rhetoric is worthwhile, and that death is necessarily evil, and thus not expressing Socrates' or Plato's own committed beliefs. This might possibly have been the view of Arcesilaus, at least under some constructions of the limited evidence for the latter. Yet alone that does not explain the *Meno*'s doctrine of correct belief, nor the frequency with which the theories of forms and of the immortality of the soul arise in the dialogues.

Alternatively, the Academic sceptic could deny that the requirement for *epochê* was really a necessity within such a philosophy: one prominent, although disputed, modern interpretation of Academic scepticism treats *epochê* as only an embarrassing dialectical result foisted by Academic interlocutors on the Stoics.[46] Yet, while in that case Academics themselves would not be prevented from holding beliefs, this interpretation faces certain difficulties, not least for Arcesilaus.[47]

Thirdly, an Academic sceptic who adopts *epochê* (in the Socratic sense of recognition of ignorance), must still rely on what is reasonable (Arcesilaus),[48] or convincing appearances (Carneades)[49] in practical life; that requirement could be taken to allow for extensive reflection about what is good, as the goal of practical life, and its preconditions and circumstances.[50] A significant distinction here is between interpreting *epochê* as (i) refraining from all beliefs, and (ii) only from knowledge claims (see Cicero *Acad.* 2.104), which would allow beliefs to be adopted self-consciously as mere beliefs, without assuming they *must* be true.[51] Let us call

self-consciously held beliefs *conjectures*.[52] Conjectures in this sense (unlike most unreflective beliefs, i.e. *doxai*) would not be mistaken assumptions of knowledge, and so need not be the subject of *epochê* by an Academic sceptic.

Admittedly the support for such a view seems stronger in the case of Carneades and his followers and successors,[53] than the earlier Arcesilaus, who may not have thought it consistent with his own sceptical stance to even work out a *theory* as to how the former could be reconciled with this aspect of Plato's dialogues;[54] it is quite possible that Arcesilaus did no more than systematically maintain *epochê* himself, as his own radicalised interpretation of Socrates' regular acknowledgements of his ignorance, and attempt to refute or undermine the knowledge claims of others, again modelled on Socrates in Plato, while neither affirming nor denying any claims about the content of the dialogues. Nevertheless, at least in subsequent stages of the Academy, this third approach might have been seen by readers of the dialogues to allow a sceptical Socrates in Plato to hold beliefs of a certain kind more widely, including a theory of forms and of the immortality of the soul.[55] While this is not explicit even for Carneades, there are reasons to think that in order to adopt even certain perceptual appearances as convincing, he would have to admit that he also adopted certain intellectual appearances together with them.[56]

The doctrine of correct belief in the *Meno* suggests an explanation for such a state of mind, but of course in any given situation the believer cannot (by definition) *know* a belief is correct (cf. *Republic* 506c); consequently, it must be possible for him or her to recognise that the belief may *not* be correct (since *qua* belief, it does not satisfy a satisfactory criterion for knowledge), and so to hold the belief only *as* a belief, that is, as a conjecture.

Accordingly I propose, as at least plausible, that, if and when sceptics in the later Academy read and discussed Plato's dialogues,[57] it would have been consistent for them to adopt (in a weak sense) such a fallibilist account of the status of the philosophical doctrines they found there.[58] This plausibility, I suggest, also has support in the generally complex literary and non-demonstrative characteristics of the dialogues and is consistent with the positive claims about the origin of knowledge made within them.[59]

CONCLUSION

The pattern of antithetical argument by Socrates in Plato, once recognised is hard to miss, and the antecedents in sophistic practice are unmistakable. Clearly Plato works to demonstrate dramatically that, by contrast with Socrates' zetetic purpose, the motives of sophists are insincere, and in that sense merely eristic. On the other hand, we have independent evidence of serious reflection in some of their own fragments that suggests a proto-sceptic inference by Protagoras to the impossibility of any objective truth in *logos*, and adoption of ephectic scepticism by Gorgias. Given the connection of antithetical argument with scepticism in the sophistic context in which Socrates' philosophy emerged, and the ubiquity of Socrates' disavowals of knowledge in Plato and repeated use of this technique, it is not hard to see how plausible the view of Socrates as a sceptic would seem to the subsequent Academy.

Moreover, the attempt made here to explain how later Academic sceptics could reconcile this with the depiction of Socrates advancing beliefs in the dialogues has more general implications for our reading of Plato. It seems that what have regularly, since later antiquity, been taken as his firm doctrines might be consistently accounted

for, from an Academic perspective, as conjectures consistent with Socratic scepticism. In that case, perhaps our tendency is mistaken to think that Plato's fundamental aims in any given dialogue are doctrinal. Perhaps the pursuit of wisdom by examination of conjectures advances in a less straightforward way than merely by adoption and justification of these as doctrines.

But one final admission. While the *Meno*'s distinction of correct belief from knowledge does not seem to undermine a sceptical interpretation of that dialogue, and even metaphysical theories look like they can be accounted for as zetetic sceptical conjectures, nevertheless the *Lysis* 216c-e and *Symposium* 202a-e each introduce the conception of an intermediate between two contrary extremes. This is a logical move which suggests, at least, that Plato was not satisfied with a form of reasoning restricted to antithesis. Just as in the *Meno* the doctrine of recollection and the method of hypothesis break free from the negative dogmatism of Meno's paradox, so the doctrine of the intermediate suggests that Plato viewed the negative implications of antithetical logic as undesirable for the pursuit of truth. But that is not to say that this new conception guarantees its attainment. Nor is it to back down from the case, firstly, that Plato certainly depicts Socrates as using antithetical argument in the dialogues I have discussed, to stimulate sceptical inquiry, and, secondly, that it is at the very least still plausible today to consider apparently firm Platonic doctrines throughout the dialogues, in the way later Academic readers might well have, to be meant by the author just as reasonable conjectures consistent with, and in the service of, zetetic scepticism.

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NOTES

1 See, e.g., Cicero *Acad.* 1.44-6, 2.74, *De or.* 3.67. (Contrast with Academic scepticism the view of Antiochus, Cic. *Acad.* 1.17-18, that while Socrates, according to works by his followers, including Plato, was consistently sceptical but praised virtue, Plato himself taught a doctrine he shared with Aristotle and the Stoics.)

2 Bonazzi 2003, ch.3 (evaluation pp.132-6), Tarrant 2000, 10-16 and 58-61 (evaluation p.59) and Ioppolo 1986, 40-54 (evaluation pp.45-9); see also Ioppolo 1995, 91 and 108-15, Annas 1994 and Woodruff 1986. For a positive evaluation of Plutarch's later 'metaphysical scepticism' as an interpretation of Plato see Bonazzi 2015, 97-115.

3 See Vogt 2012, who does not discuss my concerns here, Frede 1992, and cf. briefly Miller 2015, 146-7, 159-60 with n.38, and 170-77 (Miller adopts a stringent conception of scepticism based on 'withholding assent': see by contrast below); while Hankinson 1995, 84, calls 'the figure of Plato Scepticus … bizarre'; see also Shields 1994.

4 Perhaps today the scholarly norm is no longer to think of Plato's dialogues exclusively or determinatively in terms of three stages of his own intellectual development (in which case the same character Socrates would fail, bizarrely, to be a unified point of philosophical reference throughout the dialogues): for a brief pointed discussion see Rowe 2006. This is not to deny that Plato introduces ideas and beliefs not explicitly attributable to the historical Socrates (although the latter, from the point of view of scholarship, is no more than an ideal object of historical knowledge), but rather to entertain the possibility that Plato perhaps does this in *all* dialogues featuring Socrates — nor to deny that Plato entrusts some of his most important ideas to other speakers, particularly in the dialogues convincingly shown to be late, but rather to suggest tentatively that even here perhaps nothing philosophically significant is affirmed as (putatively) *demonstrably* an unequivocal claim to knowledge, rather than at best a reasonable or convincing belief. Moreover if Plato can be said to depict wisdom, this is perhaps to be recognised rather in the point of view, aims and strategies of his primary speakers than exclusively in the content of what they say.

5 For the ancient sceptic claim that Platonic dialogues depict Socrates as arguing antithetically see esp. Anon. *Prolegomena in Platonis philosophia* 10.16-20, referring to *Lys.*, *Euthyd.* and *Charm.*, with Bonazzi 2003, 63, 93-5 and cf. 130-1, Tarrant 2000, 12 and Annas 1994, 327-30; cf. also Long and Sedley 1987, i.448. On antithetical arguments in Favorinus (ap. Galen *Opt.Doctr.* = fr.28 Barigazzi 1966, 179-90) see Ioppolo 1993, 188.

6 Another kind of argument has often in modern scholarship been taken as self-evidently presenting Plato's own firm doctrinal commitments, for instance, the recollection argument at *Phaedo* 73b-77a, and in particular that for the theory of forms (74a-e) and immortality of the soul (75e-77a). Yet that interpretation in this case requires all the following assumptions, (i) that Socrates, who only asks questions, would himself give the same answers in every case as Simmias does, (ii) that Plato, who does not write anything in his own voice means us to think that Socrates, who elsewhere claims not to know anything important, in this argument expounds Plato's own positive position, (iii) that it is irrelevant that the argument's extremely paradoxical conclusion concerning the soul is subsequently admitted to depend partly on a previous less plausible result (77a-e), (iv) that the following comparison with a charm (77e-78a; cf. *Charm.* 156d-157d, *Rep.* 10.608a) is not meant to imply that the argument aims primarily at psychic therapy (of fear of death), rather than certainty, (v) that it is irrelevant to the reliability attributed to it that it is next replaced by other arguments (78b-81a), (vi) and even objections and profound doubts (85a-88d, 91c-95e), and (vii) similarly that these doubts ultimately require a completely new start (95eff.), which introduces an explicitly hypothetical method (100a-c), in which

the theory of forms is just that hypothesis, and not affirmed as knowledge. Bear in mind that the overall plausibility of the given interpretation of the recollection argument here is the net plausibility of all these independent assumptions: if they each had a probability of 90%, the resultant probability that the recollection argument here presents Plato's firm doctrinal commitments would be below 48%; this merely indicates the general effect of combining separate assumptions. In any case, this shows that that interpretation cannot really be taken as self-evidently correct.

7 For other suggestions regarding possible Academic sceptic interpretations of individual dialogues see esp. Bonazzi 2003, 80 (on *Phaid*.) and 133-4 with ns.111 and 112 on *Parm*. (following Glucker 1978, 40-8), *Soph*., *Polit*., *Leg*. and *Tim*.; Tarrant 2000, 12-16 and 58-9, on, respectively, *Tim*., *Meno*, *Theait*., *Phil*., *Soph*., *Polit*., *Gorg*., *Crito*, *Phaid*., *Rep*., *Leg*., *Menex*., *Crat*., and *Parm*.; Schofield 1999, 329-330 on *Phaid*., *Meno*, *Lys*. and *Parm*.; and Long and Sedley 1987, i.449 on *Meno* and *Tim*.

8 Long 1988, 157-8; cf. similarly Ioppolo 1995, 90, commenting on the historical importance of this interpretation of Socrates.

9 Long 1986, 431. Similarly Ioppolo 1993, 45 and 189-90 with n.24, and Glucker 1978, 33 n.79 (cont'd pp.34-5),who denies the influence of Plato on Academic sceptic antithetical argumentation, with references to earlier discussion.

10 Long 1986, 444-7: Cic. *Fin*. 2.2 and Plut. *St. rep*. 1035f-1037c, contra D.L. 4.28.

11 Cicero *De re publica* 3.8, from Lactantius *Div. inst*. 5.15 Migne; Quintilian 12.1.35; cf. Philodemus *Acad.Ind*. col. 31.1-3 and Numenius ap. Eusebius *PE* 14.8.2, and Ioppolo 1986, 209-10.

12 See Bonazzi 2003, 130-1 (and cf. pp.63 and 93-5) on the centrality of antithetical argumentation to Academic scepticism, and cf. Cic. *Acad*. 2.7-8 and 60.

13 Long 1986, 446-7 and 449 respectively. The view that Arcesilaus learnt antithetical argumentation and scepticism during his early study with Theophrastus (cf. D.L. 4.22, 29, Numen. ap. Eus. *PE* 14.6.4, Philodemus *Acad.Ind*. col. 15.3-5), since it was practiced by the Peripatetics (Cic. *Tusc*. 2.9, *Fin*. 5.10, *De or*. 3.80, 107), for which see Ioppolo 1986, 150 (and cf. p.52) is rejected by Krämer 1971, 6-8 and 11-13; in fact Arcesilaus did not argue both sides of a case, while Cic. *Fin*. 5.10 distinguishes Arcesilaus' technique from Aristotle's, and the Aristotelian practice is likely to have come from the Academy in any case.

14 See Cicero *Acad*. 2.104, discussed below. Restriction of *epochê* to knowledge claims might allow self-consciously fallible theorising; this seems to be the position of both Cicero (himself), Plutarch and Favorinus, for instance, and to some degree Philo of Larissa, who seems to have attributed it also to Carneades. See Ioppolo 1993, 192-5, who with Donini 1986, 213, distinguishes Favorinus from Philo of Larissa on the grounds that the latter had no metaphysics. (Cicero's views of this kind seem to be adopted from Antiochus.)

15 For a partly similar conception of types of scepticism see Stewart 1990, ch.2, and contrast the kind of analysis in, e.g., Hankinson 1995, ch.2. Most treatments of ancient scepticism I have seen omit any such discussion, although on zetetic scepticism as such cf. Bonazzi 2003, 12, Tarrant 2000, 13, and Ioppolo 1986, 124-5 and 159.

16 On the whole I accept here the view of Cole 1991 and Schiappa 2003, that the fifth century sophists did not teach an analytical art of rhetoric (something only developed in the following century), but just a practice of speechmaking. Certain parts of Cole's position have been challenged by Usher 1992 and 1999, only to the extent of broadening his definition of what counts as sophistic rhetoric, i.e., including a non-theoretical division of speeches into parts and assembly of paradigmatic passages in circulated texts, and treating as historical the reports that rhetoric, in this sense, was founded by the Sicilians Corax and Tisias.

17 See Aristophanes *Clouds*, e.g., 112-18, and esp. 889-1104.

18 Compare also the contemporary *Dissoi Logoi* arguing antithetically on a range of issues, and Antiphon's *Tetralogies*. Of course this tradition has a background in the agonistic scenes of tragedy, from the middle of the fifth century, and old comedy, and is also represented by Thucydides' use of antithetical pairs of speeches.

19 Protagoras fr. 1 = *Theait*. 151e-152a = *Crat*. 385e-386a = Sextus Empiricus *M*. 7.60.

20 Antiphon (fr.1 = Galen *In Hipp. de off. med*. 18b.656.13-15 Kühn) seems to make the same point in a slightly different way: 'If you realise these things, you will know that there exists for it (*the mind*) no single thing of those things which the person who sees farthest sees with his vision, nor of those things which the person whose knowledge goes furthest knows with his mind' (trans. Freeman). The text is unsound but this apparently means that when we perceive with our eyes, or think with our minds, we take ourselves to be perceiving or understanding things that are objectively true, but what we see or know is not something independently real at all. Unfortunately the fragment does not give us his reasons for claiming this.

21 For a connection between the concept of 'proto-sceptical' ideas and arguments, as such, and Protagoras' relativism, see Lee 2010, 14, 19-22, and 26-9.

22 Protagoras fr.4 = D.L. 9.51.

23 Cf. *Theait*. 162e.

24 Gorgias' *On What is Not* exists in two versions (DK B3 = S.E. *M*. 7.65-87, and [Aristotle] *Melissus Xenophanes Gorgias* 979a-980b: see Hett 1936, 496-507).

Gorgias' *Helen* (esp. 8-15) again takes the point of view that appearances are all-powerful, although it does not imply immediately that we have no access to truth when we are not being assailed by emotive rhetoric. The implications of *On What is Not* are that even in the absence of such manipulation, *logos* still has no reliable access to truth, since by arguing in the same explicitly rational manner that Parmenides does, Gorgias can reach the opposite conclusions with just as much internal plausibility.

25 Cf. Wardy 1996, ch. 1, esp. 21-24.

26 The comparisons made by Woodruff 2006 touch incidentally on some of the points made here, but do not develop the deeper similarities and differences I discuss.

27 Nevertheless Taylor 2006 argues that by the time he wrote the *Sophist* Plato had come to a different conception of philosophy, as methodical acquisition of knowledge, and did interpret Socrates as a sophist (the 'noble sophist' of 226b-231b, by contrast with deceptive sophists).

28 See below regarding the *Gorgias* on sophistry as 'flattery' (*kolakeia*), and an imitation of lawmaking, as rhetoric is of justice (together, then, of statesmanship and morality, Socrates' interests).

29 Cf. Glucker 1978, 50 on fallacious arguments in the *Gorgias* with further refs. at n.131. The *Lysis* and perhaps the *Phaedo* among other dialogues might well seem most plausibly to involve deliberate fallacies, given the way earlier arguments in each of these dialogues are rejected and superceded by others on the same topic while each ends in statements of uncertainty.

30 This is not exactly the same point as that of Annas 1994, 316-22, that many of Socrates' arguments are *ad hominem*, not relying on premises he necessarily accepts himself, and merely designed to demonstrate to a respondent problems with the latter's beliefs. As Shields 1994, 362 observes, Socrates does often propose and gain assent to 'common sense' moral beliefs in a way that seems designed to recommend them to his interlocutors, and then persuade them to accept certain implications of these; nevertheless I do not adopt Vlastos' view that Socrates has developed a body of 'elenctic' knowledge to be differentiated from certain knowledge (Socrates never makes such a distinction). I suggest rather that, like a sophist, he inculcates useful beliefs, at least in those he cannot lead to a thoroughly reflective philosophical disposition.

31 Polus produces the audience as the speaker's witnesses, Socrates, his opponent himself.

32 Gorgias: *Meno* 70b-c, cf. *init*.; *Gorgias* 447c-448a, 449b-c, 458d, and Polus: *Gorgias* 462a.

33 *Protagoras* 329a-b, 334e-335a; cf. *Theait*. 167d.

34 On sceptic interpretation of Socrates' use of elenchus cf. Woodruff 1986, esp. 28-34, and for a more general, short and penetrating discussion of Socrates' method in relation to his acknowledgement of his ignorance and his beliefs see Weiss 2006, 243-53, and similarly on Plato's intentions Frede 1992.

35 Certainly other more epistemologically sophisticated dialogues such as the *Theaetetus* (187a-210b), *Republic* (476d-480a, 509d-518d) and *Timaeus* (27d-29d), might suggest opinion cannot become knowledge, since it has an ontologically different kind of object. While, on the other hand, the objects of mathematical opinions do seem to be forms (*Republic* 6.510d-e), as far as mathematical comprehension goes these are apparently merely hypothetical ('ideal') objects, not grasped by direct awareness, and so not known, or capable of being known, by mathematics itself; cf. Blyth 2000, 31.

36 For this distinction see, e.g. Frede 1992, 211.

37 In the *Theaetetus* Socrates first expounds his interpretation of Protagoras' theory (152a-160e), presents popular objections (161c-162c), answers these objections on behalf of Protagoras (162d-e), presents further 'controversialist' arguments against Protagoras (163b-164b), defends Protagoras against such controversialism with a speech on his behalf (164c-168c), presents serious objections: self-refutation and the objectivity of benefits and future events (169d-172b and 177c-180b), restates Heracliteanism as undermining the latter objection (179c-d), refutes the grounding of knowledge in Heracliteanism (181c-183c), and refutes the Protagorean definition of knowledge (184b-186e). Thereafter facing the definition of knowledge in terms of judgment he presents three conundrums showing false judgment is not possible (189a-190e), explains false judgment in terms of the image of a block of wax (191a-195b), shows the block of wax does not explain false judgment about numbers (195b-196c), explains this in terms of the image of an aviary (197a-199c), shows the aviary explanation does not work (199c-200c), and refutes the definition (200c-201c). In response to the definition in terms of an account he then reports his dream according to which an account is a complex of names (201c-202d), refutes the implied definition (202d-206b), and proposes and refutes three further interpretations of what an account is in the definition (206d-210b).

38 This is not to deny that the dialogue does suggest some positive proposals, but for the status of such things (proposed beliefs) in a Socratic scepticism, see further below.

39 In the *Lysis* Socrates argues that only those are friends who both love one another (212b-d), then that an unresponsive beloved is a friend (212d-213a), yet next refutes this too (213a-c); he argues that friends are alike (214a-b), then refutes this (214b-215c); he argues that friends are different (215c-216a), then refutes that (216a-b); he argues that what is neutral befriends the good because of the bad (216b-218c), then rejects the bad as the cause (218c-221d); he argues what is akin is the object of

friendship (221e-222a), then argues against it, as interpreted (222b-d).

40 Although tempting, perhaps, it seems too speculative to state, as most recently Miller 2015, 170 does, that for Socrates in Plato (even in the *Phaedo*) the immortality of the soul and the theory of the forms are beliefs of a special order, being 'conditions of the possibility of philosophy'; while no dialogues definitively contradict these beliefs, many are more explicitly sceptical (e.g. *Apology* 29a, cf. 40c-41c, and *Parmenides* 129a-135c, respectively).

41 Cf. Long 1988, 158, who follows the interpretation of this by Vlastos 1985, 20-2, which I reject here, on the grounds that Socrates never distinguishes two different kinds of knowledge ('elenctic' and 'certain'), and moreover makes no significant claim to any kind of moral knowledge. See Wolfsdorf 2004, where, following a comprehensive analysis of putatively relevant passages, Wolfsdorf demonstrates by reference to context that none of the six surviving genuine claims to ethical knowledge that Socrates does make in the so-called early dialogues has any doctrinal significance. Wolfsdorf does not extend his analysis to the scattered claims to non-ethical knowledge he also collects, but it seems likely they would fall to the same kinds of explanation, i.e., that they are *ad hominem*, and of no epistemological significance; cf. also Tarrant 2006.

42 Xenophon (*Mem*. 1.1.12-15), after reporting that Socrates regarded natural philosophy as of secondary importance to ethics and politics, alleges that Socrates drew the sceptical conclusion that the former was beyond human ability, on the grounds that its exponents disagreed on both procedure and doctrine, in addition regarding it as of no practical use (on the relation of the this passage to Academic scepticism see Long 1988,153 and 157). While Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedo* affirms the importance of the question of the immortality of the soul (as part of natural philosophy) and the value of pursuing it (see especially the discussion of *misology* 88c-91c) he is in a sense even more sceptical than Xenophon allows (esp. 1.1.13), by not claiming to know that the answer is beyond human understanding (and cf. *Timaeus* 28c). Although the historical Socrates is not my topic, it seems here that Xenophon's own suppositions have coloured his account of Socrates.

43 See Shields 1994, and Bett 2011, 333-4. Socrates is not portrayed by Plato as seeking to produce *epochê* as a result of equipollent antithetical cases (cf. *Republic* 7.538d-e), but rather further inquiry: see below. Cicero certainly reports it as the Academic sceptic view that in Plato 'nothing is stated definitely (*adfirmatur*) and on many topics both sides of the case are argued' (*Acad*. 1.46). On the other hand the Pyrrhonist sceptic Sextus Empiricus (*P.* 1.221-3, 225 and *M*. 7.141-4) argues that Plato was a dogmatist; cf. Woodruff 1986, 24 n.3.

44 On Socrates in Plato as a model for Arcesilaus see Cooper 2006 (e.g., p.181), Bonazzi 2003, 122-5, Tarrant 2000, 58 with n.18, Schofield 1999, 328-30, Ioppolo 1995, 90, 93-4 and 97-108, Annas 1994, Long 1988, 156-60 and Ioppolo 1986, 21, 44-6 and 182-4. Woodruff 1986, 26-7, 31-4, regards Socrates' claim to knowledge of his ignorance, which he thinks is inferred from the refutation of all proposed definitions, as the greatest challenge to a sceptical interpretation of his philosophy; he proposes to reconcile this with scepticism on the basis that it is self-knowledge, not knowledge about a subject of definition. It seems more likely to me that Socrates' ability to refute the definitions of others, and even their reformulations of his own ideas (cf., e.g., Nicias' definition of courage in *Laches*) derives from his knowledge of his ignorance, not *vice versa*. Cf. Bett 2006, 305, and Sakezles 2008 on the form and extent of Socrates' claims in the *Apology*, and see below here.

45 E.g., *Apology* 29a-b, on thinking death is an evil, without knowing what it is.

46 For Arcesilaus see, e.g., Striker 1980, 60, Couissin 1983, 33-5, and Couissin 1929, 390-2 and 396, and cf. Long 1986, 442 and 445; for Carneades, e.g., Brittain 2001, 77, and Couissin 1983, 46-51. This view is opposed systematically by Ioppolo 1986, and cf. Maconi 1988; for further references see Bonazzi 2003, 101-3 with n.17.

47 There are reports of Arcesilaus being committed to *epochê*, either just personally, as a habit or attitude, or even (in some sense) advocating it: as a personal attitude, e.g., Thorsrud 2009, 50, Brittain 2008, Pt. 6, Cooper 2006, esp. 182-3, Long 1986, 488, Ioppolo 1986, 62-3 (also 13, 26 with n.70, 29-34, 57-9, 64-9 and 158) and even Couissin 1983, 39; as a position Arcesilaus advocated: Hankinson 1995, 75-83, Sedley 1983, 11. 13 with n.19 and p.21 with n.66, and Shields 1994, 349-50, who cites what he claims is evidence that Arcesilaus himself asserted that the wise man should maintain *epochê* (D.L. 4.28, 4.32, S.E. *P.* 1.232 and Plut. *Adv. Col*. 1120c); yet Shields' evidence seems to me more like a later writer's interpretation of Arcesilaus' motives, so as to explain his practices, rather than a report of anything he said himself. Moreover Shields 1994, 346-7, misrepresents the implications of Arcesilaus' reported denial (Cic. *Acad*. 1.44-5, although not supported by Philodemus *Acad.Ind*. col. 20.2-4 or Cic. *De or.* 3.67-8), that one could even know that one knew nothing, which would be inconsistent with Shield's claim (and cf. Hankinson 1995, 85-6, and Annas 1994, 338-40) that Arcesilaus asserted two 'second order' propositions (that everything is undiscerned, and thus one should maintain *epochê*), since *Acad*. 1.44-5 makes clear there is no limitation on the scope of the primary 'denial' (and thus that it is not to be treated itself as a protected 'second order' knowledge claim). Moreover Cicero reports

the propositions Shields focuses upon in indirect discourse, but this is consistent with their being originally an interpretive explanation of Arcesilaus' practice. Cooper 2006, 180-7, in any case argues that these 'propositions' amount not to any specific cognitive commitments, but just a pre-cognitive (my term) commitment to reason itself.

48 S.E. *M*. 7.158 (but cf. Plut. *Adv. Col*. 1122a-e); see e.g. Hankinson 1995, 89-91, and Couissin 1983, 35-41 (arguing that reference to *to eulogon* is a consequence for the Stoics alone, although used dialectically by Arcesilaus to explain his own rational decisions), rejected by Ioppolo 1986, 121-45 and 161-2; cf. Brittain 2001, 270-2, and Woodruff 1986, 24, 29 and 32.

49 On Clitomachus' view, where 'what is convincing' (*pithanon*) does not lead to assent, only a weaker acceptance, see, e.g., Thorsrud 2009, 80-2, Tarrant 1985, 20 and 41, and Striker 1980, 67-9, 73 with n.49, 76-9 and 82-3; on the view of Philo and Metrodorus (where the *pithanon* does produce assent), see, e.g., Brittain 2001, esp. 102-5, Tarrant 1985, esp. 12, and Striker 1980, 55 and 74. On the debate see also Bonazzi 2003, 104-7.

50 Glucker 1997 is a careful study of Cicero's evidence on this point.

51 See Cic. *Acad*. 2.148, *adsensurum autem non percepto, id est opinaturum, sapientem existumem, sed ita ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi possit* (the words of a follower of Philo, but they could be restated in Clitomachean terms); cf. Bonazzi 2003, 106, Schofield 1999, 335-6, Long and Sedley 1987, 460 and Ioppolo 1986, 196-7 and 208-9. Thus the implied definition of *epochê* by Bett 2006, 298, as 'withdrawal from definite belief' is prejudicial, and affects his evaluation (pp.305-6) of the plausibility of treating Socrates as a sceptic. Couissin 1929, 392-7, applies the distinction at Cic. *Acad*. 2.104 to Arcesilaus, not just Clitomachus (i.e. Carneades), to whom alone Cicero attributes it.

52 Cf. the use of *eikazôn* (*Meno* 98b1).

53 See, on Clitomachus' interpretation (whereby the wise maintain *epochê* regarding knowledge claims, but in some sense adopts beliefs), e.g., Striker 1980, 62, and Couissin 1929, 392, and on Philo's interpretation (whereby the wise give full assent to beliefs) cf. Couissin 1929, 395; see further with references Bonazzi 2003, 104-7.

54 Cf. Bonazzi 2003, 126-9, who notes, following Annas 1994, 335, that a systematic interpretation of Plato would only have become necessary at the time of Philo's dispute with Antiochus over the history of the Academy; also Tarrant 2000, 60.

55 Cf. Glucker 1978, 39-47 (although I remain unconvinced by his speculations regarding the forger of the *Second Epistle*); but note also his comment on Carneades and Plutarch (p.289), and cf. p.292 n.128.

56 Ioppolo 1993, 197 with n.53, restricts Carneades' acceptance of the *pithanon* to actions, citing Cic. *Acad*. 2.94 and 98, but this is reductively misleading: note the references to the result, in the two higher grades of conviction (S.E. *M*. 7.180-3), as a belief (*pistis*), or decision (*krisis*), in the latter case resulting from scrutiny (*dokimazein*), taking into account actual and possible circumstances, including, e.g. in the example of Menelaus and Helen, antecedent beliefs, *pisteuein*. Cf. Bonazzi 2003, 105 n.25, citing Cic. *Acad*. 2.32, *et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo*.

57 For modern discussions of the importance of Plato for Academic sceptics see references in Bonazzi 2003, 119-21 with ns.69, 70 and 75. I agree with Bonazzi that in-house critical discussion of the plausibility of theories in the dialogues is probably the origin of the garbled reports of secret Platonic doctrines taught by sceptic Academics: see Cic. *Acad*. 2.60, S.E. *P*. 1.234, Augustine *C. Acad*. 3.38, Numen. ap. Eus. *PE* 14.6.6 and 14.8.12-14, with Glucker 1978, 301-6, and see now also Vessoli 2016. The evidence is rejected by Tarrant 2000, 59 with n.22, and Ioppolo 1986, 35 with n.45

58 If this does not seem adequate to the methodological principles of late dialogues which either refer to or employ the method of collection and division (especially *Phaedrus*, *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*; *Parmenides* is methodologically unique), here I can only adumbrate the response that (a) the method of division is not clearly employed successfully or completely in any dialogue, and so its legitimacy and authority are left to be established, if anywhere, elsewhere, while (b) the results reached by other means in those dialogues are in some respects obscure and in others are not presented as of any more epistemically secure status than theories about forms or the soul.

59 Esp., e.g., *Republic* 6.511b-d, 7 *passim*, *Phaedrus* 275c-276a.

Socratic Dialectic between Philosophy and Politics in *Euthydemus* 305e5-306d1

ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.

Hesiod, *Theogony* 27-8.

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ABSTRACT

In the final scene of the *Euthydemus*, Socrates argues that because the art of speechwriting merely partakes of the two good arts philosophy and politics, it places third in the contest for wisdom. I argue that this curious speech is a reverse eikos argument, directed at the speechwriters own eikos argument for the preeminence of their art. A careful analysis of the partaking relation reveals that it is rather Socratic dialectic which occupies this intermediate position between philosophy and politics. This result entails that Socrates' peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and its practitioner only partially wise.

Keywords: Euthydemus, partaking argument, rhetoric, sophistry.

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INTRODUCTION: THE PARTAKING ARGUMENT (305E5-306D1)

In his final address to Crito in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates improvises an elaborate deduction (305e5-306d1) for the claim that the art of speechwriting comes in third place, after philosophy and politics, in the contest for wisdom (σοφία). As Socrates explains, the basis of this poor showing is that speechwriting and its practitioners merely stand between and partake (μετέχειν) of philosophy and the art of politics. This curious speech (hereafter 'the partaking argument') has received virtually no serious attention in the scholarly literature.[1] Its neglect is no doubt due to its apparently unserious nature: the argument as stated is obviously unsound; its premises are cryptic; and it utterly fails to clarify for Crito the real distinction between true and false educators (306d-307a). Indeed, Myles Burnyeat has suggested despairingly that in the face of these facts, we must conclude that Socrates is portrayed by Plato in this passage as *guying* the sophists: the obscurity of the argument and its apparent logic-chopping nature is meant to evoke and parody the eristic argumentation of the brothers Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.[2]

In my view, this interpretation is deeply mistaken. While Socrates' argument is admittedly both obscure and playful, his final speech in the dialogue conceals a completely serious claim about the nature of Socratic wisdom which is also crucial to our understanding of the *Euthydemus* as a whole. The serious claim is that it is neither speechwriting nor sophistry but rather Socratic dialectic that lies between and partakes of philosophy and the political art. This thesis entails in turn that Socrates' peculiar art is only a part of philosophy, and that its practitioner is only partially wise.

My defense and explanation of this claim is organized into four sections. I begin in section §1 by extracting the following initial gloss of the partaking relation from 305e5-306d1: an art X is a partaker of another art Y just in case the end at which X aims is identical to the end at which Y aims; but since X only partially shares in the relevant components that constitute Y, X will only imperfectly achieve the common end at which both X and Y aim. I then turn to consider a salient difference between the partaking argument of the *Euthydemus* and Socrates' remarks on rhetoric and sophistry at *Gorgias* 462-465. The *Gorgias* explains the defects of these (so called) arts in terms of their imitation or imposture of true arts; the partaking argument by contrast attributes the inferiority of an art to its being a mere partaker of good arts. I explain this difference by pointing to the dialectical context of the partaking argument. The partaking argument replies to the following λόγος of the 'speechwriters' (οἱ λογοποιοί): anyone who partakes 'μετρίως' of both philosophy and politics is more likely to be successful in both private and public life than one who is wholly immersed in either of these arts (305d7-e2). Socrates observes in an aside to Crito that the speechwriters maintain this position 'εἰκότως' (305d7), though it is 'plausible rather than true' (εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν, 305e5-6). I argue that what Socrates means by this is that their defense falls into a class of rhetorical argument known as the εἰκός argument, or the argument from likelihood. Socrates thus refrains from dismissing the speechwriters' art as a mere imitation of a good art only because in the immediate dialectical context he responds to the speechwriters' λόγος in kind: his opponent's defense is an εἰκός argument; the partaking argument is a 'reverse εἰκός argument'.

In section §2 I defend this claim by briefly explaining the nature and function of εἰκός ar-

guments in the rhetorical tradition. By drawing on recent work in the scholarly literature, I explain that εἰκός arguments are arguments from 'likelihood' because they are grounded in the social expectations of the audience. I conclude this section by explaining the technique of the 'reverse εἰκός'. This is a method of overthrowing one εἰκός argument by means of another which reverses the likelihood of the former's conclusion.

On the basis of this account I turn in section §3 to the analysis of two near doubles of the speechwriters' λόγος: Isocrates 10.5 (the fifth paragraph of his *Helenae encomium)* and *Gorgias* 485a3-e2. I demonstrate that both passages are εἰκός arguments. I infer that the speechwriters' λόγος in the *Euthydemus* is therefore an εἰκός argument also. I then demonstrate that Socrates' partaking argument is a reverse εἰκός argument. The reversal involves three basis steps. First, it takes over the speechwriters' premise that anyone who partakes μετρίως of both philosophy and politics is more likely to succeed in life than one who is wholly immersed in these arts. Next, Socrates points out that insofar as men are likely to be *benefitted* by either philosophy or politics, both of these arts must be *good* things. But if that is so, then it is after all more *unlikely* that the speechwriters and their art will reap the fruits of wisdom: they will place third behind philosophy and politics. The social conviction to which this claim is εἰκός or congruent is that having less than the whole of two goods is less beneficial than having their wholes.

Socrates' appropriation of the εἰκός argument is successful from one point of view: as a piece of rhetoric, the partaking argument is actually more persuasive than the argument it reverses. However, precisely because Socrates responds to his opponent by reversal, his inference must leave in place the speechwriters' starting point that they stand between and partake of philosophy and politics. But this is not something that Socrates genuinely believes.

In section §4 I explain why Socrates rejects the speechwriters' assumption. If rhetoric or its practitioners partake of philosophy and politics, and the latter are good arts, rhetoric will turn out to be a *partially good art*. The same will follow for eristic. (For there is abundant evidence in the *Euthydemus* that the sophistic duo will defend their superiority in wisdom along precisely the same lines as the speechwriters' λόγος.) However, a causal thesis regarding goodness and wisdom which Socrates and Cleinias discovered in the first protreptic episode entails that the good-making component of a good art is wisdom, and the bad-making component of a bad art is ignorance. It follows that if rhetoric partakes of philosophy and politics, rhetoric and its practitioners are *partially wise*. (The same follows for eristic and its practitioners.) However, as our analysis of partaking in section §1 reveals, a necessary condition of X partaking of another art Y is that X aims at the same end as Y. But there is abundant evidence in the *Euthydemus* that Socrates takes both rhetoric and eristic to aim at pleasure; and pleasure is not the end of either philosophy or politics (rightly conceived). It follows that neither rhetoric nor eristic partakes of philosophy and the political art. I argue that the proper relation that obtains between the former and latter pair of arts is *imitation*, not *partaking*. I provide a rigorous definition of each relation that explains why this is so. (To anticipate: knowledge of an art Y by another art X is not required in order for X to imitate Y since an imitating art (or pseudo-art) does not aim at the same end as its object of imitation.)

In section §4 I draw two main conclusions from my analysis of the partaking argument. The first is that Socrates' appropriation of a rhetorical mode of argument conforms to my

definition of imitation. Thus both eristics, rhetoricians, and Socrates are imitators. However, the air of paradox of this result is removed once it is seen that Socrates and his protreptic rivals do not imitate the same things: the sophists and the speechwriters ignorantly imitate philosophy and the political art; by contrast, Socrates (in the partaking argument) imitates the art of the rhetorician.[3] Moreover, while the sophists and speechwriters partake of neither philosophy nor politics, the relation that Socrates and Socratic dialectic bear to philosophy and politics *is* partaking. This entails that Socrates is *partially wise*. I explain the proper sense we must attach to the claim that Socratic dialectic is a mere partaker of both philosophy and the political craft.

My second conclusion regards Socrates' purpose in 'performing' the partaking argument in the first place. I argue that he does so for Crito's benefit. Crito is deeply attracted to the 'plausibility' of the speechwriters' defense: it is congruent with his social convictions as an Athenian gentleman. Socrates purposefully declines to disabuse Crito of the belief that it is rhetoric, and not Socratic dialectic that stands between philosophy and politics. But he enjoins Crito to work out for himself the nature of philosophy ('the thing itself', αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 307b6-c4). It follows that the epilogue of the *Euthydemus* returns both Crito and the reader to the central problem of the dialogue: the discrimination of the sophist, rhetorician, and philosopher.

§1 IMITATION, PARTAKING, AND TRUTH-LIKENESS

By way of a first step toward the explanation and defense of these claims, we must begin by noting the dramatic context of the partaking argument within the epilogue of the dialogue. At the commencement of the epilogue (304b6-305b3), Socrates concludes his rehearsal of his encounter with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus and addresses Crito once again directly, repeating the suggestion he made in the first outer frame (272b-d) that Crito should join him in making himself a pupil of the eristic pair. Crito demurs: while he is a lover of listening (φιλήκοος) to arguments, he cannot imagine himself ever employing the brothers' distasteful mode of refutation (304c6-d2). He then relates an uncomfortable encounter he had with a man who, like Crito, had been in the audience of the inner dialogue. Crito tells Socrates that this unnamed person ---who he says has a high opinion of himself as a speechwriter---declared 'philosophy' a worthless activity, and roundly condemned both the sophists for their mode of conversation as well as Socrates for subjecting himself to a pair of men 'who care nothing about what they say, but just snatch at every word'.[4] Crito continues that, while in the face of this attack on 'philosophy' he attempted to defend the activity as a charming (χαρίεν, 304e6) thing, he nevertheless agrees with the critic that Socrates deserves reproach for publicly putting himself at the disposal of such worthless practitioners of it (cp. 306e3-307a2).

In response to Crito's qualified endorsement of the speechwriter's condemnation of the foregoing discussion, Socrates inquires not after the *identity*, but the specific *occupation* of the man:

> T1: Crito, men like these are very strange. Still, I don't yet know what to say in return. What sort of man was this who came up and attacked philosophy? Was he one of those clever persons who contend in the law courts, an orator? Or was he one of those who equip such men for battle, a writer of the speeches which the orators use? (305b4-305e4).

Crito replies forcefully that to his certain knowledge, the man is definitely *not* an orator (Ἥκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, 305c1)—he thinks he has never appeared in court---but he is reputed to be 'a clever man and clever at composing speeches' (δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους συντιθέναι, 305c3-4). To which Socrates responds:

> T2: Now I understand---it was about this sort of person that I was just going to speak myself. These are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus describes as occupying the marches between the philosopher and the statesman (μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ). They think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they not only are but also seem to be so in the eyes of a great many, so that no one else keeps them from enjoying universal esteem except the men occupied with philosophy (οἴονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους). Therefore, they think that if they reduce the reputation of these men to the appearance of no worth, then indisputably and immediately and in the eyes of all they will carry off the prize of reputation in wisdom. For they think that they are in truth the wisest, but whenever they are caught in private conversation (ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις), they think they are cut short by Euthydemus and his set. They think of themselves as very wise---likely (εἰκότως) enough; for they think they engage moderately in philosophy, and moderately in politics as well (μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολτικῶν), on a quite likely ground (πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου)---for they think they partake of both to the extent that is needed (μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει), and keeping clear of risk and conflict, that they reap the fruits of wisdom. (305c5-305e2)[5]

There is nothing in this initial exchange between Crito and Socrates to indicate a lack of seriousness on Plato's part toward the content of what is said. On the contrary, Crito's observation that the speechwriter is not also an orator seems designed to make some kind of thematic connection with a crucial premise Socrates employed in his second protreptic demonstration earlier in the dialogue (288d-293a). This was the claim that the knowledge that will benefit us and make us happy must be a kind of knowledge which combines making and knowing how to use the thing which it makes (289b4-6). (Cp. 289d2-290a5, wherein Socrates explains at length why the λογοποιοί are thereby eliminated as possessors of the knowledge in question.) Crito's remark is also surely meant to recall the fact that prior to their acquisition of the art of eristic, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus similarly used to teach the composition of speeches for the law courts without practicing oratory themselves (272a).

We would of course like to know a great deal more about the original context of Prodicus' description of speechwriters in T2. Did his observation arise in the course of one of his famous semantic distinctions?[6] Was one of the words thus distinguished σοφία (wisdom) or σοφιστής (sophist)? Is the interesting metaphor of the μεθόρια (borderland or marches) between philosophy and politics Prodicus' own, or is it a Platonic gloss?[7] However, we have no reason to suppose that Socrates is not being serious simply because of his reference to Prodicus. For the manner in which Socrates develops Prodicus' point is perfectly consistent with things Plato states with utter conviction elsewhere.[8] It seems

safe to suppose therefore that Plato simply uses Prodicus (as he occasionally does) to introduce a topic or theme the sophist has treated unintelligently and superficially so that Socrates may develop it intelligently and in earnest.[9] We have then no reason to expect that Socrates adopts a sophistic guise when he responds as follows to Crito's follow-up question:

> T3: And so, Socrates, do you think there is anything in what they say? For surely it can't be denied that their argument (λόγος) has a certain plausibility (εὐπρέπειαν).
>
> Plausibility is just what it does have, Crito, rather than truth (Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν). It is no easy matter to persuade (πεῖσαι) them that either men or any other things which are between two things and partake of both, where they are composed from a bad thing and a good thing, are better than the one and worse than the other (ὅσα μεταξύ τινοιν δυοῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἀμφοτέροιν τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται); and that in the case where things are composed from two good things which do not aim at the same thing, they are worse than both with respect to the end for which each of the two of which they are composed is useful (ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὅ ἄν ἑκάτερον ᾖ χρηστὸν ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη); while if things compounded of two bad things which do not aim at the same thing are in the middle, these alone are better than either of those things of which they have a portion (ὅσα δ' ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συντεθέντα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντοιν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἐστίν, ταῦτα μόνα βελτίω ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων ἐστίν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσιν). Now if philosophy is good, and so is political activity, and each aims at a different end, and those partaking of both of these things are in the middle (εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρα, οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν), then these men are saying nothing---for they are inferior (φαυλότεροι) to both---but if one is good and the other bad, then they are better than the practitioners of the latter and worse than those of the former (εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους); while if both are bad (κακὰ ἀμφότερα), there would be some truth in what they say, but otherwise none at all. Now I don't suppose they would agree that both [philosophy and politics] are bad, or that one is bad and the other good; the fact of the matter is that these men while partaking of both are inferior to both with respect to each end for which either politics or philosophy is of value (ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους εἰσὶν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἥ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἐστόν), and that whereas they are in truth in third place (τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ) they seek to be regarded as being in first (ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι). However, we ought to forgive them their ambition and not be angry, though we should still judge such men to be what they are. After all, we should be glad of any man who says something of any good sense, and who labors bravely in its pursuit. (305e3-306d1)

T3 is the partaking argument in full. Now this argument certainly does seem unsound

as it stands. Why should we think for example that anything that is between two good things and partakes of both is necessarily worse than the two good things for which either is useful? What is the relevant sense of 'betweenness'? What is the relevant relation of 'partaking'? Is a 'spork'---an eating utensil with a spoon-like concavity at one end and tines at the other---worse than either a spoon or a fork for conveying food to the mouth? Even more counterintuitive is the claim that anything that partakes of two 'bad' things is necessarily *better* than the two evils of which it has a share. Do the whites of two spoiled eggs make a relatively healthier omelet than that composed from the two rotten wholes? Is a new breed of dog that is produced from two breeds that have turned out *not* to be useful for the purpose for which they were bred necessarily better at the end---hunting, companionship—with respect to which the original breeds have proved failures?

However the argument improves if its scope is restricted (as Socrates suggests it is) to arts or activities and their practitioners.[10] In that case Socrates argues the critic of philosophy would concede (albeit grudgingly) all of the following (implied clauses and premises are in brackets):

(1) If an art and its practitioners lie between and partake of a good art and a bad art, then they are worse than the good art but better than the bad art [with respect to the end for which either of the latter arts is useful].
(2) If an art and its practitioners lie between and partake of two good arts which do not aim at the same thing, then they are worse than either good art with respect to the end for which either of the latter arts is useful.
(3) If an art and its practitioners lie between and partake of two bad arts which do not aim at the same thing, then they are better than the two bad arts of which they have a share [with respect to the end for which either bad art is useful].
(4) Speechwriting and its practitioners lie between and partake of two arts, viz., philosophy and politics, which each aim at a different thing.
(5) [If an art and its practitioners lie between and partake of two other arts, then the two other arts are either both good or are both bad, or one is good and one is bad].
(6) Neither philosophy nor political activity is bad.
(7) Therefore, Speechwriting and its practitioners lie between and partake of two good arts, viz., philosophy and politics, which each aim at a different thing. (By 4, 5, & 6).
(8) Therefore, Speechwriting and its practitioners are worse than either philosophy or politics with respect to the end for which either of the latter arts is useful. (By 2 and 7).
(9) Therefore Speechwriting and speechwriters come in third place in the contest for wisdom behind philosophy and politics. (By 8; and implicitly (?) by 1 and 3, as providing the definitions of coming in 'second' and 'first', respectively, relative to pairs of arts of which an art partakes and stands between).

The restriction seems licensed by the preceding reference to the contenders, true and false, for the reputation of wisdom and their various activities or arts: philosophers and philosophy (305c7, d8), sophists and eristic argument (τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι, 305d6-7), speech-

writers and speechwriting, and statesmen and politics (305c7, d8). We may then ask what Plato means by one activity or art being between (μεταξύ, 306a2) two others, and, while 'partaking of' or 'sharing in' (μετέχοντα, a3) these two others, coming off better or worse with respect to 'the end for which each of the other two is useful' (a3-4).

Here we are naturally drawn to *Gorgias* 462-465 to look for helpful clues. In a manner that is reminiscent of T3, Socrates there observes that true arts and their false counterparts are said to be 'close to each other'---so much so that rhetors and sophists are 'mixed up in the same area and about the same things (ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες) so that they don't know what to make of themselves, and other people don't know what to make of them' (465c4-7). He famously articulates an elaborate comparison of the epistemic status of the crafts of politics (legislation and justice) and 'body-care' (gymnastic and medicine) with their false images (the flattering 'knacks' of sophistry, rhetoric, cosmetics, and cookery, respectively). At 464c1-3 he states that 'Each member of these pairs—medicine with gymnastics, justice with legislation, shares with the other, insofar as they are both about the same thing (ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσὺνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ); nevertheless they differ from one another in some respect (ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσίν τι ἀλλήλων).' It would seem that the *Gorgias* then endorses the following claim:

> (G) If two arts X and Y share in each other, then X and Y are concerned with the same subject.

In the case of medicine and gymnastics, the common subject will be 'body-care', or more generally, the body; in the case of legislation and justice, the common subject will be politics, or more generally, the soul. It is clear however that sharing in common (ἐπικοινωνοῦσι) in this sense does not capture the relevant notion of sharing (μετέχοντα) in our text; for pairs of activities or arts are not therein said to be sharers or partakers of *each other*, but of still other activities or arts they are said to lie 'between' (μεταξύ). Moreover, Socrates' inference in T3 will not go through if either good arts partake of their bad (or inferior) partakers, or bad (or inferior) arts partake of a better art that lies between *them*. This suggests that the partaking relation in the *Euthydemus* is not symmetric: outliers will not be partakers of the arts which lie between them. But if that is so, philosophy and politics (rightly conceived) are not partakers of speechwriting and sophistry.

What this seems to show is that we have overlooked Socrates' allusion to 'the ends for which each art is useful' (Premise 2) or the end at which each art 'aims' (or is 'πρός', 306a5, a7, b3, c4). His argument invites us to define the various arts in question teleologically, in terms of these ends. A *good* art therefore—like philosophy or politics, rightly conceived—neither lies between nor partakes of any other art; its own internal economy or constitution is sufficient to achieve the end at which it aims.[11] Given the ordinary sense of 'μετέχειν' and its cognates, Plato is also probably assuming that if X partakes of Y then X is not identical to Y (and so the partaking relation is irreflexive. Or put another way: one art cannot 'partake' of another as a whole, but only in part).[12] In that case if an art X is a partaker of another art Y the end at which X aims is identical to the end at which Y aims; but since X only partially shares in the relevant components that constitute Y, X will only imperfectly achieve the common end at which both X and Y aim. (An inference that is

supported by Socrates' language of composition or constitution, συνετέθη, συντεθέντα, 306a6-7.) This interpretation of the partaking relation in turn allows us to make sense of the related notion of 'betweenness'. It will obviously not be sufficient for an art A to lie between two others B and C that A is πρὸς neither B nor C (or their respective ends). For in that case, all other arts besides philosophy and politics (e.g. fly-fishing) will lie between philosophy and politics. What Socrates must mean is that an art A lies between two others B and C just in case A satisfies the two conditions of being a partaker of B and a partaker of C.

On this interpretation, T3 emerges as an intelligible counterargument to what Socrates has described in T2 as the conceit of those dwell in the borderlands between philosophy and politics. What Socrates first tells us in T2 is that the occupants of the marches between the philosopher and statesman include the speechwriters; however he also implies that the latter *misidentify* the teachers of eristic debate of the Euthydemus variety as philosophers.[13] Since the eristics in Socrates' estimation are not philosophers but contend with the speechwriters for the laurel of wisdom, Socrates implies that the sophists are co-occupants with the λογοποιοί of the μεθόρια between true philosophy and the true political craft. What Socrates tells us next in T2 is that the latter of these combatants have an argument for their supremacy in wisdom. The speechwriters say they possess or do both philosophy and politics in moderation (μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολτικῶν, 305d8): they partake of both *only* to the extent that is needful (μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, 305e1). In the immediate context the implication of this remark is that their eristic rivals do *not* practice such moderation. In the eyes of the critic Crito encountered earlier, Euthydemus and his crew are not 'partakers' of philosophy, but 'philosophers', fully immersed in the eristic program of 'chattering about worthless things', 'snatching at every word' and teaching others to do so (304e-305a).[14]

Socrates' complex response in T3 is a counter to the speechwriter's argument for their supremacy in wisdom. If the speechwriter concedes that both philosophy and politics are *good*, Socrates' reply is that it is true of *any* art that lies between and partakes of two arts that are truly good that that art and its practitioner share merely a portion of the components that are constitutive of the truly good arts. Since, as Socrates implies, the speechwriters *wrongly* suppose that they have an *adequate* share (μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, 305e1) of both philosophy and politics, the speechwriters themselves admit that they are mere partakers of those constitutive features of both philosophy and politics that enable these arts to fully realize their respective ends. Similar considerations will apply if the speechwriters retreat either to the position that philosophy and politics are both bad, or that one is bad and the other is good. (Ironically, they will only come out winners if they admit that they partake of two bad arts (3); but it is implied that they will never admit this, 306b7-c2.)

While T3 is aimed at the speechwriters' argument, it is important to note that Socrates insists that his response applies with full generality to *all* arts and practitioners (καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, 306a1-2). In the context of a three-way competition with his protreptic rivals, this can be no accident. For the claim entails that Socrates would be prepared to level the same argument against Euthydemus and Dionysodorus if the eristic duo attempted to defend their own supremacy in wisdom along the same lines as the speechwriters. But there is evidence elsewhere in the dialogue that they would do precisely this. For example, the soph-

ists reveal that they used to teach how to fight in armor and 'all the things a man ought to know to be a good general' (273c5; cp. 271d). They also used to teach the composition and delivery of speeches for the law courts (272a, 273c7-9). They now treat both of those things as 'sidelines' (παρέγοις, 273d3). In that case it is likely that they would characterize themselves as in possession of the political craft to the extent that is needful for any Athenian gentleman. As for their possession of 'philosophy', we are told a number of times that they have acquired their new skill in eristic combat with amazing speed.[15] This is small wonder; for it is clear from the behaviour of the sophistic duo that they are philosophical magpies: any bright shiny paradox, plucked from its philosophical context (Protagoras' thesis that false belief is impossible, 286c; Socrates' own belief in the Forms 300e-301b, or the doctrine of recollection, 293b-296d, 301e) is liable to show up in their nest of fallacies. While the term 'moderately' (μετρίως) scarcely seems to describe anything that the brothers do in the dialogue, from their own perspective they have rapidly acquired only what is needful to engage in 'philosophy' well.[16]

It would seem therefore that Plato has planted several clues in the dialogue that T3 constitutes a relevant riposte to *both* occupants of the μεθόρια between philosophy and politics: if either speechwriters or eristics defend their supremacy in wisdom on the ground that they partake of philosophy and politics to the extent that is needful, then there is nothing in what they say (306b7); for mere partakers do not grasp the whole of the constitutive features in virtue of which both philosophy and politics, rightly conceived, are able to fully realize their respective ends.

Seen in this light, a nearly unintelligible stretch of argumentation seems to reassert itself as a mere reformulation of things Plato says elsewhere about rhetoricians and false philosophers. Thus the *Gorgias* speaks of rhetoric as an image of a part of the political art (ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολτικῆς μορίου ἴδωλον, 463d2), and of both sophistry and rhetoric as species of flattery (κολσκευτικὴ) which impersonate (ὑποδῦσα) and pretend to be (προσποιεῖται) the true crafts of legislation and justice which always aim at the best (ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον) (464c3-d1).[17] The *Republic* similarly employs the language of imitation to describe the souls who consort unworthily with philosophy, whose thoughts and opinions are capable of producing not true wisdom, but only sophisms (Cp. 491a1-2: τὰς μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς; cp. 496a5-9: τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, ποῖ' ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τι καὶ δόξας; ἆρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως [ἄξιον] ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον.) Evidently what the *Euthydemus* does differently is to speak of the deficiencies of certain activities not in terms of their imitation or impersonation of true arts, but in terms of their partial sharing in or partaking of constitutive aspects or components of true crafts, in this case philosophy and politics, respectively.

While this discontinuity between the *Euthydemus* and other dialogues is noteworthy, we might set it aside as an intertextual problem in order to pursue more pressing questions which bear upon an analysis of our passage: What is it for one art to 'partake' of the constitutive components of another? What are the components of philosophy and the political art that make up the internal economy of each? What is the 'good making' component (or set of components) that makes each of these arts *good*? If an art lies between and partakes of two good arts, does that mean the intermediate art is *partially* good?

However it is apparent that Socrates' critique of the speechwriters' λόγος as 'εἰκότως' (T2) and 'εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἤ ἀλήθειαν' (T3) introduces a perspective from which he thinks their argument is exposed as a mere *likeness* of the truth. For these expressions suggest that Socrates critiques the speechwriters' self-conception as *like* the truth, or as *likenesses* of the truth, without the reality. But if that is so, then Socrates does turn out to denigrate rhetoric by means that are in doctrinal alignment with the *Gorgias* and other dialogues in the corpus where (as we have noted above), false pretenders to wisdom are derided as mere imitators of true arts. In that case the question arises why Socrates does not pursue this line of attack in the partaking argument itself. Since an answer to this question is crucial to our understanding of that argument, we must address Socrates' evaluative asides to Crito in T2 and T3 before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the partaking argument.

T3 begins with Crito's query whether the speechwriters' λόγος that they are wisest is εὐπρέπειαν (plausible). The speechwriters' λόγος as related by Socrates in T2 is that they are wisest because they have only partaken of philosophy and politics to the extent that is needful (μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει, 305e1). Socrates replies archly that plausibility is indeed what this argument does have, *rather than truth* (Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἤ ἀλήθειαν, 305e5-306a1). In this line Socrates critiques his rivals from the perspective of 'true' philosophy by introducing an antithesis between mere plausibility and the truth. However in T2 Socrates emphatically (εἰκότως, 305d7; πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου, 305e1) asserts that the speechwriters' ground for deeming themselves wisest is a *likely* one. This assessment is surely offered as a comment on the speechwriters' own *self-assessment* of their position ('their position is likely, as *they* would say'). Thus Socrates' arch observation responds from the perspective of philosophy to the speechwriters' perspective on their own λόγος as one that is maintained 'εἰκότως'.

So much is fairly clear. However on the interpretation I aim to defend, this shift in perspective carries with it a subtle shift on Plato's part between two senses of the participle ἐοικώς / εἰκός on which the adverb εἰκότως is based: in T2 Socrates employs the term in a sense that Plato well knows is deeply rooted in the rhetorical tradition. As Manfred Kraus has persuasively argued, in this traditional sense εἰκός arguments

> '[…] make their claim acceptable to the audience by pointing out a certain coherence and congruence of the speaker's own narrative with the audience's pre-established set of convictions, i.e. their ordinary everyday experience, their moral values, intellectual knowledge, emotional predispositions and behavioural habits. The speaker's line of argument must thus be adapted to what the audience themselves would feel or do in similar circumstances, or with how they know (or may reasonably assume) the person in question, or his or her friends or relatives, or else similar characters would tend to feel or act in similar situations and under similar conditions. This adaptation to anticipated audience response certainly is what is expressed by the sense of fittingness and appropriateness semantically conveyed by the word εἰκός. If the argument fits with the audience's own convictions, it establishes common ground, to which it may further appeal.'[18]

In essence, the warrant of an εἰκός argument is grounded in what most people believe.

This doxastic sense of the term is also reflected in Crito's question to Socrates at 305e3-4: does Socrates think there is anything to the speechwriters' argument? It certainly seems to have a certain plausibility (εὐπρέπειαν). Crito's question suggests that he feels the pull of the speechwriters' defense: it is εἰκός---it is like to or 'fits' with his *own* convictions and life experiences as an Athenian gentleman.[19] However in his riposte to Crito, Socrates introduces an *antithesis* between that which is either εἰκός or has εὐπρέπεια and the 'truth'; given the antithesis, the 'truth' invoked by Socrates must be objectively or ontologically independent of what most people believe.[20] Such an antithesis between τὸ εἰκός and ἡ εὐπρέπεια on the one hand and the 'truth' on the other bears a distinctively Platonic ring which is alien to the rhetorical tradition which Socrates critiques. That which is 'εἰκός' in this Platonic sense is a *likeness of* or *like* the truth, where the latter is conceived as an objective reality ontologically independent from belief. Plato employs the term 'εἰκός' and its cognates in this sense in many passages in the corpus.[21] But some familiar passages from the *Phaedrus* are most relevant to the interpretation of his riposte to Crito in T3:

> T4: Well these people say that there is no need to be so solemn about all this and stretch it out to such lengths. For the fact is, as we said ourselves at the beginning of this discussion, that one who intends to be an able rhetorician has no need to know the truth about the things that are just or good or yet about the people who are such either by nature or upbringing. No one in a law court, you see, cares at all about the truth of such matters. They only care about what is convincing (τοῦ πιθανοῦ). This is called the 'likely' (τὸ εἰκός), and that is what a man who intends to speak according to art should concentrate on. Sometimes, in fact, whether you are prosecuting or defending a case, you must not even say what actually happened, if it was not likely (μὴ εἰκότως) to have happened---you must say something that is likely (τὰ εἰκότα) instead. Whatever you say, you should pursue what is likely (τὸ εἰκός) and leave the truth aside: the whole art consists in cleaving to that throughout your speech. (272d2-273a1)[22]
>
> T5: No doubt you've churned through Tisias' book quite carefully. Then let Tisias tell us this also: By 'the likely' (τὸ εἰκὸς) does he mean anything but what is accepted (τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν) by the crowd?' (273a6-b1)

In T4 Plato introduces a contrast between τὸ εἰκός and the truth. In T5 he glosses 'τὸ εἰκός' in a sense that is genuinely grounded in the rhetorical tradition as that which is acceptable to most people. However in T6 Plato introduces a new gloss of 'τὸ εἰκός' which is (as many commentators have recognized)[23] alien to the tradition of which the Sicilian rhetorician Tisias was a founder:

> T6: 'Tisias, some time ago, before you came into the picture, we were saying that people get the idea of what is likely (τὸ εἰκός) through its similarity to the truth (δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς). And we just explained that in every case the person who knows the truth knows best how to determine similarities (τὰς ὁμοιότητας). So, if you have something new to say about the art of speaking, we shall listen. But if you don't, we shall remain convinced by the explanations we

> gave just before: No one will ever possess the art of speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the sorts of characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kinds, and to grasp each single thing firmly by means of one form.' (273d2-e4)

Here Plato interprets 'εἰκός' in terms of likeness or verisimilitude to the truth. The groundwork of this transformation was laid earlier in 262a-c, the argument to which Socrates alludes in T6:

> T7: Therefore, if you are to deceive someone else and to avoid deception yourself, you must know precisely the respects in which things are similar and dissimilar (τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα) to one another. […]. And is it really possible for someone who doesn't know what each thing truly is to detect a similarity (ὁμοιότητα)---whether large or small---between something he doesn't know and anything else? […]. Clearly, therefore, the state of being deceived and holding beliefs contrary to what is the case comes upon people by reason of certain similarities (ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν). […]. Could someone, then, who doesn't know what each thing is ever have the art to lead others little by little through similarities (διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων) away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape this being done to himself? […]. Therefore, my friend, the art of a speaker who doesn't know the truth and chases opinions instead is likely to be a ridiculous thing---not an art at all (γελοίαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται)! (262a5-c3)

On the interpretation of Socrates' riposte I am defending, we find a precisely similar thought-pattern between T2 and T3 in the *Euthydemus*. That is, a conception of εἰκός arguments as trafficking in that which is acceptable to most people is succeeded by a critique of such arguments in terms of their mere verisimilitude to a 'philosophical' notion of a mind-independent, objective reality.

But if that is so, why does Socrates suddenly drop this line of attack and improvise the complicated partaking argument that constitutes his response to his protreptic rivals in T3? Why does he not (as in the *Gorgias*) proceed to inveigh against their arts as mere imitations of true crafts and their products as mere likenesses of the truth? I suggest the answer is quite simple: Socrates informs us that the partaking argument is meant to *persuade* his rivals (πεῖσαι, 306a1), not to alienate them.[24] In that case Socrates seeks common ground with his opponent; though he aims at refuting their λόγος, he will do this from within their own conceptual scheme. Moreover, Socrates is no doubt aware that Crito---as the loyal but proper Athenian mediocrity that he is---shares in this conceptual scheme.[25] Indeed, the partaking argument seems designed to disenthrall Crito from his attraction to the speechwriters' λόγος. I suggest this is why in the remainder of T3 Socrates comes to grips with the speechwriters' partaking argument with a 'counter' partaking argument of his own. As Socrates is well aware, Crito is not currently in any condition to 'detect similarities' between true and false philosophers on the basis of knowledge of realities.[26] Thus it will not do to denigrate the speechwriters as mere impersonators of wise men; indeed such a tactic might run the risk of alienating Crito as distastefully begging the question against the speechwriters' claim to supremacy in wisdom.[27] Finally, it is clear that Socrates' partaking argument is

a *counterargument* in the sense that he uses his dialectical opponents' premises against them: it is the speechwriter who introduces the relation of partaking and the concept of having a partial share of arts; Socrates takes over the relation of partaking and inverts it to his own advantage, involving his opponent in his own downfall in the process.

For all these reasons, Socrates does not appeal to the notion of verisimilitude in the philosopher's sense in his elaborate response to his protreptic rivals in T3. On the contrary: Socrates is responding to his opponent *in kind*. The speechwriter's argument is an εἰκός argument (in the speechwriter's sense), employing εἰκός premises; Socrates' counter is a 'reverse' εἰκός argument, as well as a self-conscious *imitation* of the speechwriters' mode of argumentation. In between these two performances Socrates tells us in his riposte to Crito (305e5-306a1), and speaking from the perspective of 'true' philosophy, that the speechwriter's εἰκός argument has plausibility rather than truth.

If that is so, then the notion of the imitation or impersonation of an art or its practitioners does make its way into the partaking argument after all, albeit in a delightfully unexpected way: Socrates does not accuse his protreptic rivals of imitating good arts; he rather imitates *their* doing this very same thing himself. In the next section (§2) I will defend this claim by briefly explaining the nature and function of εἰκός arguments (including reverse εἰκός arguments) in the rhetorical tradition. On the basis of this account I will then argue (in section §3) that two near doubles of the speechwriters' λόγος in T2---Isocrates 10.5 (the fifth paragraph of his *Helenae encomium)* and *Gorgias* 485a3-e2---are εἰκός arguments. The comparison of these near doubles to the speechwriters' λόγος will justify my claim that the latter is also an εἰκός argument; an analysis of these doubles will also justify my identification of the partaking argument as a reverse εἰκός argument.

The interpretative benefits of this latter identification going forward will be twofold. First, this finding will supply a firmer footing to my claim that Socrates guys not the *sophist* in T3 but the *speechwriter*. Thus we may ignore analyses of T3 which deride the argument as eristic, on all fours with the howlers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. Second, because Socrates responds to his opponent by reversal, his argument must leave in place the speechwriters' assumption that they stand between and partake of philosophy and politics. However this is not something that Socrates genuinely believes. In section §4 I explain why Socrates rejects the speechwriters' assumption. If rhetoric or its practitioners partake of philosophy and politics, and the latter are good arts, rhetoric will turn out to be a *partially good art*. The same will follow for eristic. (For there is abundant evidence in the *Euthydemus* that the sophistic duo will defend their superiority in wisdom along precisely the same lines as the speechwriters' λόγος.) However, a causal thesis regarding goodness and wisdom which Socrates and Cleinias discovered in the first protreptic episode entails that the good-making component of a good art is wisdom, and the bad-making component of a bad art is ignorance. It follows that if rhetoric partakes of philosophy and politics, rhetoric and its practitioners are *partially wise*. (The same follows for eristic and its practitioners.) However, as our analysis of partaking in section §1 reveals, a necessary condition of X partaking of another art Y is that X aims at the same end as Y. But there is abundant evidence in the *Euthydemus* that Socrates takes both rhetoric and eristic to aim at pleasure; and pleasure is not the end of either philosophy or politics (rightly conceived). It follows that neither rhetoric nor eristic partakes of philosophy and the political art. The

proper relation that obtains between the former and latter pair of arts is *imitation*, not *partaking*. In section §4 I provide a rigorous definition of each relation that explains why this is so.

§2 ΕἸΚΟΣ ARGUMENTS IN THE RHETORICAL TRADITION

Ancient sources differ with respect to the origin of εἰκός arguments in the rhetorical tradition. However their invention is generally associated with the legendary founders of rhetoric, the Sicilians Corax and Tisias.[28] Aristotle attributes the following stock example of an εἰκός argument to a handbook composed by Corax:

> T8: If the accused is not open to the charge – for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault –the defense is that he was not likely (εἰκός) to do such a thing. But if he is open to the charge – i.e. if he is a strong man – the defense is still that he was not likely (εἰκός) to do such a thing, since he could be sure that people would think he *was* likely (εἰκός) to do it. (*Rhet* II 24, 1402a17-20)

Plato seems to attribute a very similar argument to Tisias:

> T9: No doubt you've churned through Tisias' book quite carefully. Then let Tisias tell us this also: By 'the likely' (τὸ εἰκὸς) does he mean anything but what is accepted by the crowd (τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν)? […] And it's likely it was when he discovered this clever and artful technique that Tisias wrote that if a weak but spunky man is taken to court because he beat up a strong but cowardly one and stole his cloak or something else, neither one should tell the truth. The coward must say that the spunky man didn't beat him up all by himself, while the latter must rebut this by saying that only the two of them were there, and fall back on that well-worn plea, "How could a man like me attack a man like him?" The strong man, naturally, will not admit his cowardice, but will try to invent some other lie, and may thus give his opponent the chance to refute him. (*Phaed*. 273a6-c4)

These examples illustrate a feature of εἰκός arguments that both Plato and Aristotle condemn.[29] This is their reversibility: in the scenario in question, a fight has occurred between a weaker and a stronger man. The question is who is guilty of assault (as opposed to merely defending himself)? The weak man argues that since he is weak, he is not likely to have assaulted a stronger man. The strong man seizes upon the likelihood of the weak man's argument and reverses this in the minds of the audience: precisely because a strong man is likely to have appeared capable of such an assault, he is not likely to have assaulted the weak man. Plato appears to ascribe the exploitation of such 'reverse' εἰκός arguments to Gorgias as well as Tisias:[30]

> T10: And Tisias and Gorgias? How can we leave them out when it is they who realized that what is likely (τὰ εἰκότα) must be held in higher honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear great and great things small […]. (*Phaed*. 267a6-8)

Aristotle for his part associates Protagoras with the invention and teaching of arguments such as the 'weak man' and its reversal:

> T11: This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse ar-

> gument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud; the εἰκός it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic. (*Rhet*. II 24, 1402a23-27)

Isocrates also appears to have a low opinion of the inventions of Corax and Tisias, obliquely identified in the following passage as the authors of the 'so-called arts of oratory':

> T12: [19] Now as for the sophists who have lately sprung up and have very recently embraced these pretensions, even though they flourish at the moment, they will all, I am sure, come round to this position. But there remain to be considered those who lived before our time and did not scruple to write the so-called arts of oratory. These must not be dismissed without rebuke, since they professed to teach how to conduct law-suits, picking out the most discredited of terms, which the enemies, not the champions, of this discipline might have been expected to employ— [20] and that too although this facility, in so far as it can be taught, is of no greater aid to forensic than to all other discourse. But they were much worse than those who dabble in disputation; for although the latter expounded such captious theories that were anyone to cleave to them in practice he would at once be in all manner of trouble, they did, at any rate, make professions of virtue and sobriety in their teaching, whereas the former, although exhorting others to study political discourse, neglected all the good things which this study affords, and became nothing more than professors of meddlesomeness and greed. (*C. Soph*.).[31]

It is important to notice however that of the three, it is only Aristotle who classifies the reverse εἰκός argument as eristic. Plato by contrast does not supply Euthydemus or Dionysodorus with εἰκός arguments (reversing or otherwise), but with sophisms which Aristotle would classify as violating certain principles of syllogistic reasoning and contradiction (e.g. apparent refutations which are homonymous, or which employ the illicit adding or dropping of qualifications to predications). This difference may be explained by the fact that the stock reversing arguments with which Aristotle was familiar were entertaining sophistic antilogies used for the purpose of exercise and training rather than for public consumption in the court room or Assembly.[32] Such arguments are grist for the analytical mill of Aristotle, the taxonomist of fallacy.[33] Insofar as Plato attacks the same arguments on logical grounds, his analysis stops at the observation that two arguments for contradictory conclusions cannot both be sound.[34] This suggests that Plato's hostility to εἰκός arguments is more epistemic than logical in its ground. Indeed this is no doubt why he deems them to be so dangerous. The sophistic antilogies on which orators in training cut their teeth do not win conviction in the real world. But the εἰκός argument that is intended for public consumption has a capacity to reverse opinion in the public domain where questions of polis management and justice hang in the balance. As Plato quite correctly observes in T5, this is because they appeal to what appears to be 'likely' to the audience in the absence of their knowledge of the truth.

It is crucial to note that the 'likelihood' to which Plato correctly maintains εἰκός arguments appeal has nothing to do with statistical probability. This is clear from a passage in the

Rhetoric to Alexander, a treatise which reflects the pre-Aristotelian tradition of rhetoric which Plato criticizes.[35] The author (who is often identified with Anaximenes of Lampsacus) identifies seven types of 'warrants (or proofs: πίστεις) derived from words or actions or persons themselves' (7.2. 1-3): εἰκότα, παραδείγματα (examples), τεκμήρια (marks or proofs), ἐνθυμήματα (enthymemes), γνῶμαι (maxims), σημεῖα (signs), and ἔλεγχοι (refutations). The term 'εἰκός' is unfortunately standardly translated as 'probability', as in Forster's rendering of Anaximenes' definition of this term:

> T13: It is a probability (Εἰκὸς) when one's hearers have examples in their own minds of what is being said. For instance, if any one were to say that he desires the glorification of his country, the prosperity of his friends, and the misfortune of his foes, and the like, his statements taken together will seem to be probabilities (εἰκότα); for each one of his hearers is himself conscious that he entertains such wishes on these and similar subjects. We must, therefore, always carefully notice, when we are speaking, whether we are likely to find our audience in sympathy with us (εἰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας συνειδότας ληψόμεθα) on the subject on which we are speaking; for in that case they are most likely (εἰκός) to believe what we say. Such, then, is the nature of a probability (τὸ εἰκὸς).[36] (7.4.1-5.1)

But this translation is highly misleading for two reasons. First, it is anachronistic. As Ian Hacking has demonstrated, a frequency based conception of probability only emerged in the 17th century in the Western world.[37] Second, the concept of statistical probability cannot be captured by the semantic range of the Greek terms τὸ εἰκὸς / εἰκότα. This range is limited to the following four senses: 1) to be similar; 2) to seem 3) to befit and 4) to be likely---a sense which is associated only with the participle εἰκός.[38] And indeed it is clear from the definition above that the 'examples present to the mind' upon which the orator relies cannot be intended to underwrite objective statistical probabilities (e.g. 'the accused was the friend of the murdered man, and friends wish their friends well; therefore it is statistically improbable that he was guilty of his murder'). What they support rather is the similarity or 'fit' between a major premise which the orator needs and his auditors' subjective convictions regarding the way people behave or the way events occur under similar circumstances (e.g. 'the accused was the friend of the murdered man, and friends wish their friends well; therefore he is not similar to one who would kill the murdered man').

This makes perfect sense given the contentious contexts (political or judicial) in which orators appealed to such shared convictions. As is clear from Anaximenes' extended remarks on the subject (chapters 7 and 14), the εἰκός argument was generally used where no compromise was possible between parties to a dispute (e.g. the defendant is either guilty or not guilty) and where their disagreement could not be settled by eye-witnesses or other direct evidence (e.g. written documents).[39] In such a context of complete *dissensus*, the orator attempts to align his narrative with the audience's conception of 'the way things are' in order to reach common ground.[40]

If that is right, then εἰκός arguments are modes of reasoning which employ a logic of comparison as opposed to a logic of probability. This thesis has recently been defended by David Hoffman in an exhaustive survey of 'εἰκός' and cognate expressions in Homer's *Odyssey*, Aeschylus, Herodotus, Antiphon, Lysias,

Thucydides, and Isocrates. The results of this study suggest that these terms are introduced to justify two broad classes of judgements, both of which are grounded in an original core sense of 'to be similar':[41]

Class (1) concerns judgements about the appropriateness of an action: 'a social actor behaves appropriately or 'befittingly' when he or she acts in a way that is *like* or *similar to* what is expected.' This first class in turn is divisible into four semantic fields:[42] (i) The befitting according to custom. Here the speaker compares the actual conduct of certain persons to the way people behave by custom or habit.[43] (ii) The befitting according to justice, wherein the speaker compares specific events under consideration to an ideal conception of 'the way things should be'.[44] (iii) The befitting according to character and/or social status. Here the speaker compares the actual conduct of agents in a case to the conduct that is dictated by their character or social standing or role.[45] (iv) The befitting according to circumstance, in which the speaker compares what has actually happened in the particular case under discussion with what generally happens in similar circumstances.[46]

Class (2) comprises judgements about whether an event has happened or whether an account is true. Here the logic of comparison is invoked to support a claim such as the following: an event's alleged occurrence or an account *resembles* or is *similar to* what is known to be true. Arguments in this second class thus involve judgements of truth-likeness or verisimilitude. However, as Hoffman rightly points out, such judgements of verisimilitude do not involve a comparison to a 'Platonic' notion of the truth as that which is ontologically independent of social convictions or expectations.[47] On the contrary: Class (2) judgements of verisimilitude are grounded in judgements of social expectation and opinions about the way things are:

> 'Social expectations, because they have nearly the force of truth, have a large role to play in judgements of verisimilitude. They often define a "profile" against which accounts are compared. If the characters and events of a courtroom account seem typical in that they describe events that the audience would expect under the circumstances, then the narrative is *eikos*, and apparently true. It "fits the profile". If the characters and events are strange and atypical, then the narrative is not *eikos*, and apparently false. It does not fit the profile.'[48]

Now it will be important for my analysis of Isocrates 10.1-5 and *Gorgias* 484c-485e in section §3 to note that εἰκός arguments in Class (1) may blend imperceptibly with those in Class (2). That is, an argument wherein it is claimed that an agent acts or does not act in a way that is *befitting* to what is socially expected may sometimes be indistinguishable from an argument in which it is claimed that events or actions fit or do not fit with what an audience would expect under the circumstances. This convergence is evident for example in Lysias 24.15-17:

> T14: He says that I am insolent (ὑβριστής), savage, and utterly abandoned in my behaviour, as though he needed the use of terrifying terms to speak the truth, and could not do it in quite gentle language. But I expect you, gentlemen, to distinguish clearly between those people who are at liberty to be insolent and those who are debarred from it. For insolence is not likely (εἰκός) to be shown by poor men labouring in the utmost indigence, but by those who possess far more than the necessaries of life; […] For the wealthy purchase with their money escape from

> the risks that they run, whereas the poor are compelled to moderation by the pressure of their want.49

In the case in question a poor disabled pensioner is accused (among other things) of having the insolence to ride a horse (in fact he only borrows it from a friend on occasion). Lysias argues on his behalf that it is not like a poor invalid to be hubristic. The argument appeals simultaneously to the fact that hubris is not *befitting* such a socially vulnerable individual, as well as to the *unlikelihood* of his cheating on his pension: since he is not *like* a hubristic person, he is not *likely* to be a sponge on the state.

A second example of the same phenomenon returns us to Socrates' protreptic rival Isocrates. In the following passage from *Against Euthynus* Isocrates argues for one Nicias who is prosecuting Euthynus for failure to return in full a large deposit of money; Euthynus claims to have returned the whole deposit. Contrary to his usual practice, Isocrates speaks for his client in court because the latter is inept at public speaking; a fact which Isocrates exploits in an εἰκός argument:

> T15: I think that you all know that malicious prosecution is most generally attempted by those who are clever speakers but possess nothing, whereas the defendants lack skill in speaking but are able to pay money. Well, Nicias is better off than Euthynus, but has less ability as a speaker; so that there is no reason why he should have proceeded against Euthynus unjustly. No indeed, but from the very facts in the case anyone can see that it is far more likely (εἰκὸς) that Euthynus received the money and then denied having done so than that Nicias did not entrust it to him and then entered his complaint. For it is self-evident (δῆλον) that it is always for the sake of gain that men do wrong.[50] (*Euth*. 5-6)

Isocrates argues that Nicias is a wealthy and plain spoken Athenian gentleman; hence he does not fit the profile of a malicious prosecutor. Euthynus inversely fits the profile of one who would exploit the wealthy and inarticulate. Hence Euthynus is at once more *like* and *likely to be* an embezzler than Nicias is to be a false accuser.

Finally we may note that the foregoing analysis of the 'straight' εἰκός argument sheds considerable light on the strategy of the 'reverse' εἰκός. If the weak man's argument of T8 and T9 is anything to go by, εἰκός arguments that lend themselves easily to reversal involve a weighted comparison of two likelihoods; for the conclusion of the weak man is properly construed as the claim that since he is small and the strong man is large, it is *more likely* that the strong man assaulted him than that he assaulted the strong man. To tip the scales of this conclusion in his favor, the strong man slides to his side of the scale the weak man's claim that a large man is likely to have assaulted a weak man; but he adds to this a new likelihood, viz., that insofar as he is likely to have assaulted the weak man, he is likely to be suspected of having done so. Thus both the weak man and its reversal are governed by a logic of comparison which is grounded in social expectation. We may display this property of both arguments in the following reconstruction:

> Weak Man:
> Since x is weak >> **x is not like one to assault a stronger man** >> it is unlikely that x assaulted a stronger man y.
> Since y is strong >> **y is like one to assault a weaker man** >> it is likely that y assaulted a weaker man x.

C: Since x is weak and y is strong >> it is more likely that y assaulted x than it is that x assaulted y.

Strong Man Reversal:
Since y is strong **y is like one to assault a weaker man** >> it is likely that y assaulted a weaker man x.
Since it is likely that y assaulted a weaker man x >> **y is like one to be suspected of assaulting a weaker man** >> y is likely to be suspected of assaulting a weaker man.
Since y is likely to be suspected of assaulting a weaker man >> it is unlikely that y assaulted a weaker man.
C: Since x is weak and y is strong >> it is more likely that x assaulted y than it is that y assaulted x.

In the above reconstruction I use the symbol '>>' to indicate the weak implication that seems characteristic of εἰκός arguments. I am also assuming that the weak man and its reversal are fused or mixed cases of Case (1) and Case (2) εἰκός arguments. (I have put appeals to convictions regarding the 'befitting' in bold, and appeals to what is likely to be the case in regular font.) If this reconstruction captures the 'logic' (such as it is) of the weak man's reversal, it would seem that a necessary condition of an εἰκός argument's being *reversible* is that it involves a weighted comparison of likelihoods. This suggests that *reversibility* is a merely formal notion, not a normative one. For the strong man is clearly invalid by ordinary standards of logical implication: whatever we think of the validity of the argument it reverses, this is neither preserved nor enhanced by reversal. However it does not follow that a reversing argument is necessarily less congruent with an audience's social expectations than its target. Whether it is or not will depend entirely on the degree of plausibility of the premises it exploits. For example, there might be certain societies (perhaps the U.S.A. is now one such) which would regard an inarticulate plutocrat as precisely fitting the profile of a man with powerful friends in the polis against whom a poor but clever man would not dare to trespass. A reversal of T15 which exploits this premise may be found much more persuasive to the general public than Isocrates' appeal to the rectitude of those who are poor in speech but wealthy.

This brief excursus into the origin, nature and function of the εἰκός argument in the rhetorical tradition of the 5th century B.C.E. and beyond is of course radically incomplete. However my aim in this section has not been to provide a complete analysis (whether historical, philological or philosophical) of the εἰκός argument. I have rather attempted to identify the basic properties of this mode of argument that are most relevant to the demystification of the partaking argument in the epilogue of the *Euthydemus*. To that end we may tally up these properties as follows:

1. Εἰκός arguments are used in a context of absolute disagreement in order to reach common ground between the parties to a dispute.
2. They make their claims acceptable to an audience by establishing a congruence between a major premise which the speaker needs and the standing convictions of the audience (their ordinary experiences, moral values, common knowledge, shared emotional or behavioural dispositions).
3. They attain this congruence by employing a logic of comparison in two basic ways: either the orator claims that an agent acts (does not act) in a way that fits with what is socially expected; or he argues that events or actions fit (or do not

fit) with what an audience would expect under the circumstances, given the set of their social expectations.
4. These two strategies may be combined in the same εἰκός argument.
5. Εἰκός arguments are liable to be 'reversed' by an opponent in contexts of weighted comparisons of likelihoods.

To this list we may add that it is not a necessary condition of an argument's being an εἰκός argument that the expressions εἰκός / εἰκότα or cognate expressions actually be employed in the inference. There are many examples in the orators where the speaker (having employed the terminology of εἰκός elsewhere) avoids the term, either for stylistic reasons (e.g. the avoidance of repetition) or where the argument is particularly weak. In such 'implicit' εἰκός arguments the speaker employs alternative linguistic formulations to establish congruence between the audience's expectations and his argument. These include future less vivid constructions (if X should happen, then Y would happen), the potential optative, and counterfactual conditionals.[51]

§3 Εἰκός VS. Εἰκός: THE PARTAKING ARGUMENT AS SOCRATIC IMPERSONATION

In this section I will argue that two near doubles of the speechwriters' λόγος in T2--- Isocrates' *Helenae encomium* 5 and *Gorgias* 485a3-e2---exhibit the basic properties of the εἰκός argument we have identified in section §2. This finding will confer warrant on my claim that the speechwriters' λόγος in T2 is an εἰκός argument also. On the basis of that conclusion I will then argue that in responding to the speechwriter, Socrates quite self-consciously employs the technique of the reverse εἰκός argument.

I begin with Isocrates 10.5. This argument concludes the following opening salvo of the *Helenae encomium*:

> T16: [1] There are some who are much pleased with themselves if, after setting up an absurd and self-contradictory subject, they succeed in discussing it in tolerable fashion; and men have grown old, some asserting that it is impossible to say, or to gainsay, what is false, or to speak on both sides of the same questions, others maintaining that courage and wisdom and justice are identical, and that we possess none of these as natural qualities, but that there is only one sort of knowledge concerned with them all; and still others waste their time in captious disputations (τὰς ἔριδας) that are not only entirely useless, but are sure to make trouble for their disciples. [2] For my part, if I observed that this futile affectation had arisen only recently in speeches (τοῖς λόγοις) and that these men were priding themselves upon the novelty of their inventions, I should not be surprised at them to such degree; but as it is, who is so backward in learning as not to know that Protagoras and the sophists of his time have left to us compositions of similar character and even far more overwrought than these? [3] For how could one surpass Gorgias, who dared to assert that nothing exists of the things that are, or Zeno, who ventured to prove the same things as possible and again as impossible, or Melissus who, although things in nature are infinite in number, made it his task to find proofs that the whole is one! [4] Nevertheless, although these men so clearly have shown that it is easy to contrive false statements on any

> subject that may be proposed, they still waste time on this commonplace. They ought to give up the use of this claptrap, which pretends to prove things by verbal quibbles, which in fact have long since been refuted, and to pursue the truth, [5] to instruct their pupils in the practical affairs of our government and train to expertness therein, bearing in mind that to opine with a view to likelihood about useful things is far preferable to exact knowledge of the useless, and that to be a little superior in important things is of greater worth than to be pre-eminent in petty things that are without value for living.52 ([5] καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐν αἷς πολιτευόμεθα, τοὺς συνόντας παιδεύειν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τούτων γυμνάζειν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πολὺ κρεῖττόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολὺ διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν.)

As commentators have recognized, the 'others' in section [1] who maintain the unity of courage and justice with wisdom defend a thesis associated with the historical Socrates (or Socrates and Plato).[53] In the balance of [1]-[4] Isocrates takes the eristic faddists down a notch by pointing out that their paradoxes (e.g. that false speaking is impossible) are nothing new: their teaching is just Protagoras and Gorgias warmed over.[54] In section [5] he calls a pox on the houses of both: to opine plausibly or with a view to likelihood (ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν) about useful things is much better than to exercise exact knowledge (ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι) of things useless to practical living; likewise, to excel even in a small way in important things (μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις) is better than to be preeminent (πολὺ διαφέρειν) in petty things that confer no advantage to one who would make his way in the 'real' world.[55] The similarity of this argument to the speechwriters' defense in T2 while not exact is unmistakable:

> [T2] They think of themselves as very wise---likely (εἰκότως) enough; for they think they engage moderately in philosophy, and moderately in politics as well (μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολτικῶν), on a quite likely ground (πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου)---for they think they partake of both to the extent that is needed (μετέχειν γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει), and keeping clear of risk and conflict, that they reap the fruits of wisdom. (*Euthyd*. 305d7-e2)

Isocrates does not employ the concept of partaking (μετέχειν) in T16. It is clear however that the notions of 'ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν' as *opposed* to knowing, and excelling 'μικρὸν' as *opposed* to excelling completely are conceptually isomorphic to that of having a partial share of some item.[56] If that is so we may diagram this isomorphism between Isocrates' argument and T2 as follows:

The argument is addressed to any Athenian gentleman, or any prospective pupil of Isocrates. The upper blue arrows represent this person's partial share of Useful Things and Important Things. Isocrates does not say that these sets of things are not identical; nor does he tell us what these things are. However in the context and given what he says elsewhere about his

educational program, he would probably identify these with the γνῶμαι (maxims), ὑποθῆκαι (counsels), and παραδείγματα (examples) of the leading poets, lawmakers, and princes of the past, which Isocrates describes himself as gathering up, bee-like, from far and wide, as a treasury (ταμιείου) of useful things (χρείαν).[57] We might describe this store-house of wisdom as occupying the tier above the pupil; alternatively it is the poets, etc. who do so. Such men are wise: they do not merely have a share of Useful and Important Things, but are masters of these topics as a whole. Likewise, Isocrates' protreptic rivals (Socrates/Plato and the eristics) occupy and do not merely partake of the bottom tier below the pupil's intermediate position. The bottom two arrows represent a sentiment that is only implicit in [5] but which Isocrates states explicitly elsewhere. This is that one must merely partake of the output of his protreptic rivals, i.e. one must study them in moderation: an Athenian gentleman may sharpen his mind if he reads their paradoxes as a young man; any deeper immersion runs the risk of sinking him to the level of the exact knowledge of things useless on the one hand and preeminence in pettifogging on the other.[58]

One salient difference between T2 and T16 is that the latter argument, unlike the former, is not explicit on the question of the proper stance one must take to the art of politics and its teachers. But this stance is implied if it is assumed that the upper tier includes the utterances of wise statesmen or poets (etc.) pronouncing on wise rule. Moreover, it is probable that those whom Isocrates attacks for wasting their time on 'captious disputation' (τὰς ἔριδας, [1]) are in fact rhetoricians who have caught the eristic fad. (Note that he complains that eristic has infected 'τοῖς λόγοις' [2], so this phrase cannot refer to eristic argumentation itself; but neither can 'τοῖς λόγοις' refer to Socratic argumentation, since Isocrates does not confuse Socrates with the eristics).[59] In that case we might suppose that Isocrates conceives of 'Important Things' as the art of politics (as he conceives of it) and as opposed in his scale of value to pettifogging rhetoric. Alternatively, we might patch in Isocrates' implicit attack on Corax and Tisias in T12 to fill in his stance toward the art of politics. For as Isocrates asserts there, these inventors of the art of rhetoric, although 'exhorting others to study political discourse (τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους, [20]), neglected all the good things which this study affords'. His present complaint is directed at their equally neglectful descendants: rather than exhorting men to the study of sage political discourse as they should, the practitioners of rhetoric are distracted by the perennially shiny toys of eristic paradox. But anyone who has even a partial share of the former would be better off than someone who has distinguished himself in knowledge of the latter.

Now that we have established the similarity of T16 to T2, it is short work to demonstrate that the former is an εἰκός argument. Isocrates ostensively levels this argument at his prospective pupils. But these may certainly include the recruits of his protreptic rivals; hence it is wielded in a context of absolute disagreement between parties to a dispute. (As in T2, there can be only *one* school or mode of instruction that claims *first* place in the contest of wisdom.) He attempts to demonstrate the superiority of his art to this audience by establishing a congruence between its standing convictions or social expectations and his two major premises: (i) likely conjecture about useful things is far preferable to exact knowledge of the useless; (ii) to be a little superior in important things is of greater worth than to be pre-eminent in petty things that are without value for living. A single conviction of his audience---an 'example present in their own minds of what is being said'---is congruent with

both premises. This is that it is better to have a share of a good thing than it is to have the whole of a bad or useless thing. It is arguable that this conviction, applied to the domain of the arts under consideration, taps into the audience's intuitions regarding what is socially acceptable or befitting. (It is ill befitting a gentleman to immerse himself in the studies which Isocrates denigrates.) However it is equally arguable that this conviction raises its expectations regarding what is *likely to happen* to anyone who follows the path of immersion in arid Academic or eristic studies, as well as what is likely to happen to someone who partakes of the more useful or important counterparts of these arts. If that is right, then Isocrates' argument shares properties 1-4 of the εἰκός argument we set down in the conclusion of section §2.

That the argument satisfies the necessary condition of being reversible (property 5) is clear because it involves a weighted comparison of two likelihoods. The only question that remains is whether Isocrates explicitly describes T16 section [5] as an εἰκός argument. He does not. However, Isocrates' entire argument is a self-advertisement for learning to opine plausibly, or with a view to likelihood (ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν). By indulging in this self-referential description of his preferred mode of speech, Isocrates promotes his wares; by avoiding the explicit description of his present argument as εἰκός, he manages to suppress any suggestion that his argument is not up to the epistemic snuff of the Academy. In that case his speech falls into the class of the implicit εἰκός argument. For (as noted in section §2) it is not a necessary condition of an argument's being an εἰκός argument that it explicitly employs the term 'εἰκός'.

I turn now to *Gorgias* 485a3-e2. Here we may be brief, since this argument is more nearly an exact double of the speechwriters' defense in T2:

T17: But I think that the most correct thing is to have a share (μετασχεῖν) in both [philosophy and politics]. It is fine to have a share in philosophy far enough for education (ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν), and it is not shameful for someone to philosophize when he is a boy. But whenever a man who's now older still philosophizes, the thing becomes ridiculous (καταγέλαστον), Socrates. I'm struck by the philosophizers most nearly the way I'm struck by those who mumble and act childishly. I mean---whenever I see a child, when that kind of dialogue is still fitting for him (ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι), mumbling and being childish, I enjoy it; I find it charming (χαρίεν), suitable for a free citizen (ἐλευθέριον), suiting (πρέπον) the age of a child. And whenever I hear a child speaking a clear dialogue, I find it unpleasing; it annoys my ears; and I find it fit for a slave instead. But whenever someone hears a man mumbling, or sees him act childishly, he finds it ridiculous, unmanly (ἄνανδρον), deserving a beating. Well, philosophizers strike me the same way too. For when I see philosophy in a young boy, I admire it, I find it suitable (πρέπειν), and I regard him as a free man, and a non-philosophizer as un-free, someone who will never expect anything fine or noble from himself (καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος). But when I see an older man still philosophizing and not giving it up, I think this man needs a beating, Socrates. For, as I was saying just now, this person is bound to end up being unmanly, even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city centre and the public squares where the poet says men win good repu-

> tations (ἀριπρεπεῖς). He is sunk away out of sight for the rest of his life, and lives whispering with three or four boys in a corner, and never gives voice to anything fit for a free man, great and powerful (ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι).[60]

This passage contains a complex comparison between children, men and practitioners of philosophy young and old: lisping lads stand to lisping philosophers as free spoken gentlemen stand to speechifying babes. However this comparison supports a claim which is doubled in T2: the man who would achieve distinction and power in the city should only have a share (μετασχεῖν) of both philosophy and politics. Nor does the similarity between Callicles' argument and T2 end there. In remarks introductory to T17 (484c-e), he has conceded condescendingly to Socrates the sentiment that he repeats in T17: philosophy is a charming thing (φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, 484c5-6). The same half-compliment is paid to philosophy by the socially conscious Crito in his confrontation with the Isocratean figure at *Euthyd*. 304e6-7. As Callicles is quick to add however, philosophy's charm is contingent on its being consumed in moderation (μετρίως, 484c6-7) and when young. Given Callicles' assertion in T17 that the same limitation should be observed towards the political art (484d7), his stance toward both arts is stated in virtually the same language as the speechwriters' defense in T2 (μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολτικῶν, *Euthyd*. 305d8). Finally, we note that Callicles has pointed out the prospects of any philosopher who has neglected to master the mode of speech (τῶν λόγων, 484d3) necessary to become fine and good and well respected (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον, d1-2) in the city:

> T18: For indeed they turn out inexperienced in the laws of the city, and in the speech (τῶν λόγων) they should use in meeting men in public and private transactions, and in human pleasures and desires; and altogether they turn out entirely ignorant of the ways of men. And so whenever they come to some private or political business, they prove themselves ridiculous, just as politicians, no doubt, whenever they in turn come to your discourses and discussions, are ridiculous. (*Gorg*. 484d2-e3)

The passage vividly recalls Socrates' account in T2 of the petulant reaction of the speechwriters whenever they are refuted in private conversation: they defensively blame it on 'Euthydemus and his followers' (*Euthyd*. 305d6-7). The sentiment brings the cultured Isocrates' estimation of the value of philosophy uncomfortably close to that of the *Übermensch* Callicles: to the extent that philosophy should be pursued at all, this will be for the social benefits it confers on the student--including the avoidance of ridicule. If Socrates refutes you, accuse him of arguing like a sophist (*Gorg*. 497a6) if that will help you save face.

Callicles' argument for the 'correct' approach to the study of philosophy and politics may be diagrammed as follows:



The arrows represent the partaking of an Athenian gentleman in the share of philosophy and politics by means of which he shall become καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον in the city. From the context it is clear that Callicles conceives

this partaking to involve partaking of modes of speech (τῶν λόγων) or discourse (διαλέγεσθαι) proper to philosophy and politics, respectively. He does not tell us whether he thinks Socratic discourse exhausts the modes of discourse he would classify as belonging to 'philosophy'. It is true that in the immediate context he is intent on persuading Socrates of the inefficacy of the latter's preferred mode of discourse (no doubt he has the elenchus in mind). However, as we have just noted above, elsewhere in the *Gorgias* Callicles accuses Socrates of arguing like a sophist (497a6); so it is probable that he conceives of the class of 'philosophical' discourse as extending more widely than Socratic conversation.[61] Callicles also does not tell us what modes of discourse belong to 'politics'. However, in the immediate context he is pointing out the political dangers to which Socrates is exposed as a result of his ignorance of speech that is 'likely and persuasive' (εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν, 486a2-3):

> T19: Now Socrates, I'm quite friendly towards you. And so I find you strike me now as Amphion struck Zethus in Euripides, whom I recalled just now. For indeed, the sorts of things come to me to say to you that Zethus said to his brother: 'Socrates, you are careless of what you should care for; you twist this noble nature of your soul into a childish shape; you could not make a speech correctly to the council of justice, nor seize anything likely and persuasive, nor propose any daring resolution to help another' (οὔτ' ἄν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἄν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἄν καὶ πιθανὸν ἄν λάβοις, οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο). (485e2-486a3)

Thus it is certain that Callicles conceives the mode of speech proper to 'politics' as including the 'εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν'. Callicles' argument then is that by following a program of moderate immersion in the modes of discourse proper to philosophy and politics (so conceived), a man may outstrip a fellow citizen who is sunk like a sour water plant in the still pools of either study. A man of action---the 'free and manly citizen'---will 'move on to *greater things* and leave philosophy behind' (ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν, 484c4-5).

Now it is clear that Callicles' argument satisfies the first five criteria of the εἰκός argument we set down in Section §2. His argument is obviously mounted in a context of absolute disagreement with Socrates. He attempts to turn Socrates to his own position by establishing a congruence between a major premise he employs and (what he hopes to be) Socrates' shared standing convictions. This premise is that it is *better* to study philosophy and politics in moderation than to be immersed in either study. The conviction that he hopes Socrates will find congruent with this premise he does not articulate. As I shall point out momentarily, it is precisely the same omission in T2 which Socrates seizes upon in the partaking argument. Is the social ground of Callicles' inference the idea that it is better to have shares of two *good* things rather than the whole of two *bad* ones? That would align his argument more closely with that of Isocrates in T16. But then, Callicles has made no mention of 'bad things' in his comparison. Or is he arguing that it is better to have shares of two *good* things rather than their *wholes*? (But why is that obvious?) Callicles has neglected to tell us whether he thinks philosophy or politics are *good*; he has only conceded that the former is χαρίεν (484c5-6). This instability in his position aside, it is clear that his argument satisfies the first two criteria of the argument from likelihood.

That his argument is ripe for reversal is evident as it involves the weighted comparison of likelihoods. (The citizen who merely partakes of philosophy and politics is more likely to succeed than the citizen who goes the total immersion route.) It is equally clear that his argument combines the strategies of the Class (1) and Class (2) εἰκός argument: his denigration of the philosopher is saturated with expressions that highlight his socially *unbefitting* status; at the same time, he aligns his narrative of the philosopher's social descent with what his audience would *expect to happen* to a citizen under *similar* circumstances. Finally, while Callicles does not describe his argument as 'εἰκός' in so many words, the entire drift of his remarks is that Socrates has neglected to learn how to speak *as Callicles does*, viz., to 'seize on the εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν'. To this observation we may add that Callicles does employ a formulation (the potential optative) that is characteristic of the 'implicit' εἰκός argument at 486a1-3. There can be no doubt therefore that Callicles' address to Socrates is cast in the mold of the εἰκός argument.

Now if both T16 and T17 are εἰκός arguments, the speechwriters' defense in T2 of which the former are near doubles is unquestionably an εἰκός argument also. In that case we are at long last in a position to grasp the full significance of Socrates' remark that the speechwriters maintain their conceit that they are wisest 'εἰκότως' (*Euthyd*. 305d7).

We are also at last in a position to appreciate that Socrates' rebuttal to his protreptic rival is a reverse εἰκός argument. As in any reverse εἰκός, the argument targeted for reversal involves a weighted comparison of likelihoods. In T2 (as in Callicles' argument), this is the speechwriters' conclusion that they (and their pupils) are more likely than their protreptic rivals (and *their* pupils) to 'reap the fruits of wisdom' (305e2). We may imagine that these 'fruits' are (as in Callicles' argument) to become καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον.[62] To reverse this argument in proper εἰκός fashion, Socrates first slides to his side of the scale the εἰκός premise that underwrites his opponent's conclusion. This is the claim that anyone who partakes μετρίως of both philosophy and politics is more likely to attain the end in question than one who is wholly immersed in these arts. Next, Socrates adds to this likelihood another: insofar as men are likely to be *benefitted* by either philosophy or politics, both of these arts must be *good* things. (This is the implication of Socrates' observation that his opponent will surely *not* deny that both philosophy and politics are good, 306b7-c2). But if that is so, then it is after all more *unlikely* that either the λογοποιοί or their disciples will reap the fruits of wisdom. The social conviction to which this claim is εἰκός or congruent is that having less than the whole of two goods is in fact *less* beneficial than having their wholes. (As adapted to an argument concerning arts and their practitioners, this is premise (2) of the partaking argument.) But then the λογοποιοί do *not* place first in the contest for wisdom. That distinction will be reserved for those who are not mere partakers of philosophy and politics. The implication of this result seems to be that it is only the expert practitioners of either art---'the fully immersed'---who are likely to reap their 'full benefits', on the assumption that both philosophy and politics are good.

As we have noted above, the speechwriters' counter to this reversal is blocked by premises (1) and (3) of the partaking argument. These are εἰκός premises also. (I leave it as an exercise to the reader to work out the social convictions regarding the partaking of good and bad wholes which underwrite them.) The overall strategy of Socrates' reversal of his opponent may then be diagrammed as follows:



The argument Socrates reverses concerns the degree of value of modes of τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. The essence of Socrates' strategy is to press on the question which Callicles omitted to answer in his own version of the argument: how can the speechwriters be *benefitted* by standing between and partaking of philosophy and politics unless these latter arts are *good*? Yet if these are good arts, the speechwriters, insofar as they merely partake of these good arts, cannot outstrip those fully immersed in them in regard to attaining the end for which these arts are useful ('reaping the fruits of wisdom'). Rather, the speechwriters and their mode of argument will be worse in this regard than the practitioners of philosophy and politics and the modes of argument proper to these good arts. Ironically, the speechwriters could come out 'winners' if they concede that the arts of which they partake are thoroughly bad. But it is implied that they will not concede this; neither will they concede that they occupy a complex intermediate position, partaking of both good arts (philosophy and politics) and bad ones.

What is Socrates' estimation of the persuasive force of this argument? I suggest his answer will depend on the perspective from which the argument is evaluated. On the one hand, the partaking argument would seem to have a virtue which the strong man lacks: it actually *is* more persuasive than the εἰκός argument it reverses. This is the first joke that the partaking argument contains at the expense of Isocrates (or his tribe): Socrates has impersonated his protreptic rival's mode of argument and beat him at his own game. On the other hand, there are distinct signs in T3 and its aftermath that Socrates grasps that his argument will have a limited effect on its intended audience. The first of these is Socrates' anticipatory remark in T3 that it will be 'no easy matter to persuade his opponent (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον αὐτοὺς πεῖσαι)' to accept his argument (306a1). The second is that Crito---for whose benefit Socrates improvised the partaking argument in the first place---seems strangely unaffected by it. For upon hearing the conclusion of Socrates' speech Crito responds as follows:

> T20: All the same, Socrates, as I keep telling you, I am in doubt about what I ought to do with my sons. The younger one is still quite small, but Critobulus is at an age when he needs someone who will do him good. Now whenever I am in your company your presence has the effect of leading me to think it madness to have taken such pains about my children in various other ways, such as marrying to make sure that they would be of noble birth on the mother's side, and making money so that they would be as well off as possible, and then to give no thought to their education. But on the other hand, whenever I take a look at any of those persons who set up to educate men, I am amazed; and every last one of them strikes me as utterly grotesque, to speak frankly between ourselves. So the result is that I cannot see how I am to persuade the boy to take up philosophy (ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν). (306d2-307a2)

Coming at the end of the dialogue as it does, Crito's confession underscores a rather spectacular failure on his part: this self-de-

scribed φιλήκοος (304c6) of arguments, who at his own insistence has just heard a lengthy narrative involving the Socratic art of protreptic, does not know how to exhort (προτρέπω) his own son to take up philosophy. However when in T3 Socrates 'adjusts' his mode of argument from that which he employed with Cleinias to one that is better suited for Crito's consumption, Socrates still fails to illuminate his friend regarding the value of philosophy. The partaking argument has at best stirred up a non-cognitive affect which Crito feels in Socrates' presence. But Crito cannot sustain this emotion in Socrates' absence;[63] and he is no better off, despite Socrates' efforts in T3, at reflecting upon the theory of education that is implied by his behaviour: Crito seeks to purchase education as one would a commodity from the salesmen who, in Prodicus' metaphor, stalk the muddy ground between philosophy and politics.

These two signs of trouble are surely related. For as I have argued above, Crito and Isocrates share the same social outlook and values which Socrates' reverse εἰκός argument is designed to exploit.[64] I suggest however that Socrates does not regard the inefficacy of his performance as a failure on *his* part. On the contrary: its outcome rather demonstrates that 'rhetorical argumentation falls short of its own objective', viz. persuasion.[65] This is the second joke at the speechwriter's expense that our passage contains. As Socrates explains, if Crito is to grasp the value of philosophy, he must study 'the thing itself':

> T21: […] pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself (αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα): if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says. (307b6-c4)

Socrates' reply entails that if Crito is to arrive at a true and *stable* estimation of the value of philosophy---one that he may sustain in the physical absence of Socrates' powerful personality---he must study the properties of philosophical activity itself, not the men who practice it. Having clarified for himself what this activity is and why it is valuable, he must then practice it himself with others and with his sons; in particular, he must give up the passive role of φιλήκοος; and he must abandon the search for teachers who promise to decant wisdom into his sons' heads as into empty vessels.[66]

Now if I am right that Socrates is conscious of the limitations of the partaking argument, there can be little doubt that this injunction to Crito reveals what the source of its inadequacy is. Crito's remit is to work out (with suitable dialectical co-inquirers) the goodness of philosophy by working out what philosophy---the love of wisdom---is. But the partaking argument is silent on the precise relation of wisdom to goodness. The speechwriters claim they are wisest because they partake of philosophy and politics. As we have seen however what they seem to mean by this is that they partake of *modes of argument*. Socrates points out that if his opponents are *benefitted* by this partaking, they must admit that the arts of which they partake are good. But this move seems to invite the assumption that what makes philosophy and the political art good are simply modes of argument. But this does not explain what makes these modes of argument good. The strategy of reversal that Socrates employs seems to acquiesce in the same assumption. For the speechwriters' defense is reversed on the basis of the folksy conviction that it is better to have the whole of two good things rather to partake of both. But

this conviction again does not explain what it is about the modes of argument proper to philosophy or politics that makes them good; nor does it explain what it *is* for modes of argument to *be* proper to either philosophy or the political art, as opposed to inferior arts. It follows that if Crito relies on the partaking argument alone to sort out the goodness of philosophy, he may arrive at the conclusion that the source or cause of its goodness may be explained in terms of modes of argumentation alone.

But this cannot be something that Socrates believes. Indeed, it is impossible to read the epilogue of the dialogue without being reminded of the fact that Socrates took a most definite and controversial stand on the nature and scope of a good-making property in his first protreptic interview with Cleinias (278e-282e). The cornerstone of Socrates' strategy for motivating Cleinias to become wise and virtuous is his argument that *wisdom* is *good*, and *ignorance* is *bad* (ἡ μὲν σοφία ἀγαθὸν, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν, 281e4-5); while all the other sorts of things which we might have supposed to be good things---wealth, beauty, health, etc.---are in themselves neither good nor bad. For

> T22: […] if ignorance controls them they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they are more capable of complying with a bad master; but if good sense and wisdom are in control, they are greater goods; in themselves, however, neither sort is of any value (ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγῆται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι, ἐὰν δὲ φρόνησίς τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθά, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι, 281d6-e1).

Controversy has raged over the precise sense Plato attaches to Socrates' statement regarding the evaluative status of the conventionally recognized goods.[67] However what is of immediate importance for our purposes is the manner in which Socrates pairs up the polar opposites of wisdom and ignorance with the polar opposites of *good* and *bad*. The bearing that this pairing has on Socrates' εἰκός argument is this: the relevant sense---and the only relevant sense---in which an art may be said to be 'good' is that it is controlled and led by wisdom; and the relevant sense---and the only relevant sense---in which an art may be said to be 'bad' is that it is controlled and led by ignorance.

Now if that is so, the internal economies of arts in T3 are more complex than Socrates' εἰκός argument lets on. For both the good and the bad arts that feature in that argument must be constituted by modes of argumentation, *together with* the cognitive component by which they are led: the good arts of διαλέγεσθαι will be composed of modes of argument, together with the wisdom by which they are led; their bad counterparts will be composed of modes of argument, together with the ignorance that leads them. It follows that Crito cannot grasp the nature and value of philosophy by reposing upon Socrates' εἰκός argument. For that argument ignores the causal thesis which Socrates labored to establish in his earlier efforts with Cleinias: it is wisdom and wisdom alone which makes the use of any so-called good---health, wealth, good reputation, power in the city, even dialectic itself---genuinely good. The same goes for the speechwriters: a merely persuasive argument---one which fails to inquire into the *cause* of goodness---cannot help the rhetoricians to understand who they really are.

In the next section I will sharpen this claim by demonstrating what Crito and the speechwriters *would* learn if the internal economies of good and bad arts were reconceptualized as containing a cognitive component. The les-

son for the speechwriters will not be an attractive one. For the reconceptualization will entail that the speechwriters do not in fact partake of philosophy and the political art at all; they only falsely believe that they do this. In fact their art is thoroughly bad and ignorant. This is the final joke that the partaking argument contains at the speechwriters' expense: even their demotion to third place in the contest for wisdom is a species of polite flattery, the product of an argument that is confined to the 'εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανός'.

The lesson for Crito is that it is Socrates' own peculiar art that stands between and partakes of the twin good arts of philosophy and politics; neither rhetoric nor eristic occupy this intermediate position in the hierarchy of arts. Crito can work this out for himself only if he brings the lesson of the first protreptic episode---the causal thesis---to bear upon his conception of what makes an art either good or bad. But if he does do this, he will be in a position to discriminate Socrates from his protreptic rivals, and so grasp philosophy 'the thing itself'.

§4 SOCRATIC DIALECTIC BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

The results of the last section return us with a vengeance to the pressing questions regarding partaking we set aside in section §1. We began our analysis of that relation by noting that any art that lies between and partakes of philosophy and politics must share some common constitutive features with the latter arts. Two questions we set aside regarding this requirement were (1): What is it for one art to partake of the constitutive components of another? (2): What are the components of philosophy and the political art that make up the internal economy of each? The foregoing analysis of Socrates' argument suggests that the internal economies of both philosophy and politics will include *modes of argument* proper to these arts; this suggested to us in turn that an art partakes of philosophy and politics only if its practitioner employs modes of argument proper to either of these good arts.

We also noted that the partaking argument conceives of good arts teleologically in the following sense: a *good* art has no need to lie between or partake of the resources of another art; its own internal constitution is sufficient to achieve the end at which it aims. A *partaker* of a good art by contrast is therefore deficient in some sense in regard to at least one of the constitutive components that makes a good art good. As Socrates implies, this deficiency renders the partaker *worse* than either good art it lies between with respect to the end for which either of the latter arts is useful. This claim prompted our third question (3): What *is* the 'good-making' component (or set of components) that makes philosophy or politics good?

In section §3 we recalled that in his first protreptic interview with Cleinias, Socrates defended a causal thesis regarding the relation between goodness and wisdom. As applied to the use of arts, the thesis entails that an art is *good* just in case it is controlled and led by *wisdom*; an art is *bad* by contrast just in case it is controlled and led by *ignorance*. On the basis of this finding we decided that the partaking argument does not do justice to the internal economies of the arts concerned with argumentation: the good arts of διαλέγεσθαι must be composed of modes of argument, *together* with the wisdom by which they are led; their bad counterparts will be composed of modes of argument *together* with the ignorance that leads them.

To this finding we may now add the following observation. The complexity in the composition of both good and bad arts generally suggests that the internal economies of arts must

also have a certain *structure*: for example, in the case of a good art, there must exist a relation---call it *wise use*---between the wisdom by which the art is led or guided on the one hand, and the characteristic practices, activities, routines, behaviours, etc., that are formally internal to the art itself. We might fill this notion out with an example from medicine. In the case of the art of medicine of the 4th B.C.E., we might suppose that the characteristic practices internal to the art would include the diagnosis and prognosis of disease, therapeutic treatments (e.g. surgery, dietetics, pharmacology), and hygiene. If we further suppose that the end of medicine is health, (or the good of the body), then Socrates' causal thesis entails that if led by wisdom, the activities and practices internal to medicine will achieve health for the patient; while if they are guided by ignorance, they will not---indeed they may lead to more harm than if the patient had been left alone.[68]

The medical analogy suggests that a relation of *wise use* exists between the modes of argument internal to philosophy and politics and the wisdom by which either art is led. However the analogy also raises an immediate difficulty. As I have explored the analogy above, both the medical expert and the quack will employ the *same* characteristic activities or practices *internal* to the art of medicine. As applied to the partaking relation however this would entail that a mere partaker of the medical art partakes entirely in virtue of engaging in these activities or practices. In other words, the analogy (at least as I have explored it) entails that engaging in these activities and practices is not only necessary but also sufficient for partaking of the art of medicine. Yet this model does not seem to square with a key implication of the partaking argument: viz., that an art or its practitioner that stands between and partakes of two good arts is deficient *in the good-making component* of the outlier arts. (A deficiency which in turn explains why the partaker is worse at attaining the end for which either outlier art is useful.) For on our current understanding of the good-making component of a good art, the overwhelming implication of this claim is that the practitioner of the intermediate art must be *less wise* than the practitioners of the two good outliers.

If that is so, we seem driven to the following conclusion: a mere partaker of an art A must partake of both the cognitive component by which the art is led, as well as the other internal components of A upon which this cognitive component operates. As applied to our medical analogy, this would imply that a quack partakes of medicine by engaging in certain characteristic practices internal to the art; but since he has only an inadequate share of the wisdom by which medicine is led, he does not reliably attain the end for which medicine is useful.

However, this result returns us immediately to the fourth and final question we were forced to put aside in section §1: (4) If an art lies between and partakes of two good arts, does that mean the intermediate art is *partially* good? For that matter: if an art partakes of *one* good art, does it turn up 'partially good' as a result? This does seem to be an immediate consequence of the partaking argument. Yet on the assumption that wisdom is the good-making component of good arts, it will follow that any art (or any practitioner) that lies between and partakes of both philosophy and politics is *partially wise*. Moreover, *on the assumption that the quack partakes of the art of medicine*, it will follow that quackery is partially good, and its practitioners *partially wise*.

Now this result will surely spell trouble if we are supposed to take seriously the conclusion of the partaking argument. Socrates assures Crito with a straight face that the speechwriters come in third place in the contest for wisdom

(306c2-4).[69] On our current understanding of the partaking relation, this will entail that the speechwriters have a share of the wisdom by which philosophy and the political art are led. It will also entail that the *modes of argument* employed by the philosopher and statesman are employed by the speechwriters (though not vice versa; recall that the partaking relation is not symmetric).[70] Of course a similar embarrassment will befall Socrates if he extends the partaking argument to his other set of protreptic rivals, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. As we noted above, the eristic pair are described in terms that make it clear that Socrates would endorse such an extension.[71] But this extension will entail that Euthydemus and his somewhat dimmer brother are endowed with a share of the wisdom by which the genuine philosopher and statesman are led. It will also entail that modes of argument employed by the completely dialectically and politically wise are employed by the sophistic duo.

Thus we seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either Socrates does not take himself to be genuinely committed to the claim that an art that lies between and partakes of two good arts is partially wise; or he does not genuinely believe that either eristic or rhetoric stands between and partakes of philosophy and politics.[72] But this dilemma is only apparent. Socrates *is* genuinely committed to the partial wisdom of partakers of good arts. But he is not committed at all to the claim that either eristics or rhetoricians partake of philosophy or politics. If it seems that he is, it is because we have lapsed into thinking that it is not only necessary but sufficient for an art X to partake of another art Y that X shares in both the internal practices of Y as well as the cognitive component of Y by which these are led. However as we noted in section §1, partaking seems to require in *addition* that the end at which X aims be identical to the end at which Y aims.[73] It follows that Socrates will deny that eristic and rhetoric are partakers of the good arts of philosophy and politics if he denies that the former aim at the same ends as the latter. So is this something that Socrates does deny?

Of course the difficulty is that Socrates does not tell us what eristic or rhetoric aims at in the partaking argument itself. I suggest this is yet another sign of the rhetorical nature of that argument. Socrates' εἰκός argument is designed to persuade Crito but also to reach common ground with the speechwriters. Thus it will not do to inform them that the art they practice is thoroughly bad and aims at ends antithetical to those of philosophy and politics. But Socrates exercises no such restraint when describing speechwriting to Cleinias in his second protreptic conversation with the boy:

> T23: […] as far as I am concerned, whenever I have any contact with these same men who write speeches, they strike me as being persons of surpassing wisdom, Cleinias; and this art of theirs seems to me something marvelous and lofty. Though after all there is nothing remarkable in this, since it is part of the enchanters' art and but slightly inferior to it. (ἔστι γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπῳδῶν τέχνης μόριον μικρῷ τε ἐκείνης ὑποδεεστέρα). For the enchanters' art consists in charming (κήλησίς) vipers and spiders and scorpions and other wild things, and in curing diseases, while the other art consists in charming and exhorting (κήλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία) the member of juries and assemblies and other sorts of crowds. Or do you have some other notion of it? (289e1-290a5)

For all its irony, this is surely a savage portrait: the λογοποιοί are enchanters and charmers, differing from the charmers of vermin only

in their inferiority to the latter. (Evidently the art of enchantment has some redeeming medicinal applications which speechwriting lacks.[74]) While Socrates does not tell us in this text what the arts of enchantment aim at, we may supply this missing link from the *Gorgias*: rhetoric aims at pleasure.[75]

As for Socrates' conception of the end at which eristic aims, the *Euthydemus* abounds with important clues that it too aims at pleasure:

> T24: Then it is the wise who learn, and not the ignorant, and you gave Euthydemus a wrong answer just now. Whereupon the supporters of the pair laughed and cheered very loudly indeed, in admiration at their cleverness. (276c6-d2).

> T25: These things are the playful (παιδιά) part of study, which is why I also tell you that the men are playing (παιδιὰν); and I call these things 'play' because even if a man were to learn many or even all such things, he would be none the wiser as to the way things are but would only be able to make fun of people, tripping them up and overturning them by means of the distinctions in words, just like the people who pull the chair out from under a man who is going to sit down and then laugh gleefully when they see him sprawling on his back. So you must think of their performance as having been mere play. (278b2-c2)

> T26: Whereupon, my dear Crito, there was no one there who did not praise to the skies the argument and the two men, laughing and applauding and exulting until they were nearly exhausted. In the case of each and every one of the previous arguments, it was only the admirers of Euthydemus who made such an enthusiastic uproar; but now it almost seemed as if the pillars of the Lyceum applauded the pair and took pleasure in their success. (303b1-7)

> T27: Ctesippus gave one of his tremendous laughs and said, Euthydemus, your brother has made the argument sit on both sides of the fence and it is ruined and done for! Cleinias was very pleased and too, which made Ctesippus swell to ten times his normal size. It is my opinion that Ctesippus, who is a bit of a rogue, had picked up these very things by overhearing these very men, because there is no wisdom of a comparable sort among any other persons of the present day. (300d3-9)

It follows that Socrates cannot believe that speechwriting and eristic partake of philosophy and politics if he does not believe that the latter good arts also aim at pleasure. Of course we may feel fairly confident that Socrates does not believe this; he says no such thing in the *Euthydemus*. However, here we face another difficulty: the partaking argument does not reveal to us the ends at which either φιλοσοφία or the πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις (306b1-2) aim. Socrates only drops the completely mysterious hint that while both philosophy and politics are *good*, they each aim at something *different* (εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθόν ἐστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκατέρα, 306b2-3).

It is far beyond the scope of the present essay to elucidate this remark. What is of immediate importance for our purposes is that it provides a crucial clue to the solution of the ἀπορία Socrates reaches in his second protreptic conversation with Cleinias (288d-293a). That inquiry foundered when Socrates and Cleinias

could not discover the product of the superordinate art which, combining using and making, completes human happiness (289b4-6). An attractive solution to the puzzle is to observe that Socrates and Cleinias take a wrong turn when they assume that the political τέχνη must be identical with this superordinate art; for this assumption ignores the relationship of dialectic (290c5) to politics. What the co-inquirers might have explored is the notion that just as a 'using' art such as lyre-playing dictates to the lyre-maker the model of the instrument he requires (289d), so dialectic will dictate to the political art the nature of the virtues and social institutions needed to ensure human happiness. In other words, it will be the task of full blown dialectical wisdom to determine what Wisdom, Justice, Courage, Moderation, Unity, Freedom and Prosperity really are (281c, 292b). The task of the political art by contrast will be to produce citizens and institutions that instantiate these Forms.

Now one promising explanation of why Socrates does not say more about the ends of dialectic and politics in T3 is that he wants Crito to bestir himself to ask Socrates what he means by his obscure remark at 306b2-3. But Crito does not take the bait: Socrates' utterly mysterious but intriguing aside regarding the ends of these two good arts does not arouse his interest. Alternatively, Socrates could be making a deliberately obscure (but true) assertion to mock Crito's intellectual passivity.[76] In either case, the connection of Socrates' aside with the core problems of the second protreptic make it perfectly clear that Socrates will deny that either philosophy or politics aim at pleasure. But then Socrates cannot seriously believe that speechwriting and eristic genuinely partake of these two good arts.

But if speechwriting and eristic do not partake of philosophy and politics, what *is* the nature of the relation that they bear to these arts? I suggest the relation that Socrates believes actually to obtain between eristic and rhetoric on the one hand, and philosophy and politics on the other, is *imitation*. Of course as we argued in section §1,[77] *this is precisely what he asserts of the speechwriters' defense in T3*: from the perspective of philosophy, their λόγος is sustained εἰκότως; a mere likeness of the truth, it is plausible rather than true (Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν, 305e5-306a1). But we are only now in a position to offer a rigorous definition of the relation of imitation implicit in Socrates' remarks. Let us mark the distinction between *partaking* and *imitation* in terms of our analysis of the internal economies of arts. An art X *partakes* of an art Y just in case (i) X uses or employs practices or activities internal to Y, (ii) X is led by a share of the cognitive component by which Y is led, and (iii) X aims at the same end as Y. By contrast, an art A *imitates* another art B just in case (i) A appropriates some or all of the practices internal to B (ii) without being led by B's cognitive component and while (iii) aiming at a different end than that at which B aims. On this account of imitation the ignorant quack *imitates* the practices internal to medicine in a manner that is peculiarly *external* to medicine. To understand medicine from the inside, as it were, is to use or conduct its constitutive practices in a wise fashion to attain the end of health. To imitate medicine from the outside is to appropriate as many of the art's constitutive practices as one ignorantly supposes one needs to achieve one's end; but this end (e.g. money-making, fame) need have nothing to do with health. Moreover, because his practice of medicine is led by ignorance, the quack's performance transforms medical activity types into modes of action that are external to proper medical practice. In the same way the practice of eristic sophistry appropriates practices inter-

nal to genuine dialectic (e.g. obtaining premises by questioning, deduction, refutation); led by ignorance however eristic generates modes of argument that are *external* to the practice of genuine philosophy, and proper only to eristic.[78] The same may then be said of the speechwriters' art: since it is not guided by even a share of the cognitive component by which the true art of statesmanship is led, speechwriting generates modes of argument (e.g. the argument from 'likelihood') that are not proper to the practice of a genuine art of persuasion.[79]

The foregoing account of the imitative nature of eristic and speechwriting has been pieced together largely on the basis of the denial that these arts instantiate a relation---partaking---that is peculiar to the *Euthydemus*. Yet it is surely highly significant that precisely the same account of eristic imitation is voiced by Socrates in the *Republic*:

> T28: We must now look at the ways in which this nature [i.e. the philosophic one] is corrupted, how it's destroyed in many people, while a small number (the ones that are called useless rather than bad) escape. After that, we must look in turn at the natures of the souls that imitate (τάς μιμουμένας) the philosophic nature and establish themselves in its way of life, so as to see what the people are like who thereby arrive at a way of life they are unworthy of and that is beyond them and who, because they often strike false notes, bring upon philosophy the reputation that you said it has with everyone everywhere. (*Rep*. VI 490e2-491a5)[80]

> T29: What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily? What kinds of thoughts and opinions are we to say they beget? Won't they truly be what are properly called sophisms (σοφίσματα), things that have nothing genuine about them or worthy of being called true wisdom? (*Rep*. VI 496 a5-9)[81]

What our analysis of the partaking relation adds to these familiar texts is perhaps a deeper appreciation of the aptness of Plato's choice to describe eristic and speechwriting as *imitators*, rather than even *marginal* partakers, of wise arts. For according to our analysis of partaking, no ignorant art is *epistemically embedded* in a wise or good one even to a marginal degree. Like mirror images and their originals, the practitioners of eristic or rhetoric must stand apart from the dialectician and the statesman in order to imitate the wisdom of the latter; if they partake of the latter they no longer imitate them.[82]

The foregoing analysis of the relations of partaking and imitation nevertheless leaves unaddressed two imposing questions. The first concerns partaking: if neither eristic nor speechwriting actually partakes of philosophy and statesmanship, is the partaking relation of the *Euthydemus* empty? Or is there some art and its practitioner dramatized in the dialogue or elsewhere in the corpus which instantiate the relation? The second question concerns imitation: I have argued that the partaking argument is a Socratic impersonation of a rhetorical mode of persuasion. Does this entail that Socrates *imitates* the speechwriter's art in the strict sense defined above? I will conclude this section by indicating my answer to each of these questions in turn.

I suggest the answer to our first question is hidden in plain sight in the partaking argument. Socrates' demand that Crito contemplate philosophy---'the thing itself'---entails the requirement that Crito discriminate Socratic activity from that of his protreptic rivals; for 'it is

the mark of one who knows to detect similarities and differences' (T7). If Crito is successful in this task, he will discover that it is in fact Socrates' own art that lies between and partakes of philosophy and the political art; neither eristic nor rhetoric occupies this intermediate position. If we as readers make the same discovery, Socrates' peculiar art is revealed to us as *partially good* and its practitioner *partially wise*. Thus the cognitive or epistemic component by which Socratic activity is led is *partial wisdom*.[83]

This result of course accords nicely with Socrates' famous profession of ignorance: as Socrates declares in the *Apology*, his dialectical activity is guided by a wisdom that is merely human, not divine.[84] But in what sense is Socrates---a *philosopher*---a mere partaker of philosophy? And how could he possibly be construed as a partaker of the art of the statesman? I suggest the unique design of the *Euthydemus* provides a clue to both of these questions.

The *Euthydemus* is constructed in such a way as to leave us in no doubt that there are two distinct functions to Socratic conversation. The dialogue artfully unfolds in a series of alternating encounters between the sophists, Socrates and Ctesippus on the one hand, and Socrates and Cleinias on the other. In the Cleinias scenes, it is the protreptic aspect of Socratic activity that is on display. In his scenes with the sophists, it is rather the elenctic or refutational function of Socrates' skill that is in evidence. The protreptic function of Socratic dialectic is more positive in nature: in this aspect, Socrates exhorts Cleinias to care for his soul by pursuing wisdom (282d).[85] The elenctic aspect of Socratic dialectic is more negative: the elenchus proves the ignorance of pretenders to virtue and knowledge. Thus Socratic dialectic is a complex art that aims at two immediate ends: in its protreptic aspect, it aims at turning people to the pursuit of 'virtue and wisdom' (278d3); in its refutatory function, it aims at disabusing people of their false belief that they are already wise.

Now this might seem to spell trouble for the claim that Socrates' art partakes of philosophy and politics. For as I have argued above, it is a necessary condition of one art X partaking of another art Y that the end at which X aims is *identical* to the end at which Y aims.[86] Yet it seems clear that the ends of Socratic activity are not those of either the philosopher or statesman. As Socrates suggests himself at 306b2-3, while philosophy and politics are both good, they each aim at something different. I suggested above that a promising interpretation of this remark is that dialectic aims at discovering the accounts of the ordered structure of Forms (including Justice, Unity, Freedom, etc.); the political art by contrast aims at producing citizens and institutions that instantiate these. But if that is so, it does not seem true to say that Socratic dialectic partakes of either philosophy or politics. For the ends of the latter good arts are not identical to the dual ends of Socratic dialectic as I have described these above.

The solution to this challenge is to insist that Socratic activity aims at ends in addition to, or over and above, its own immediate ends. This is not problematic, since the successful attainment of the immediate ends of protreptic and elenctic activity does in fact *advance* the aims of philosophy (conceived of as full-blown dialectical wisdom) and politics. A famous passage from the *Gorgias* suggests that the hortatory aspect of Socrates' art bears precisely this relation to the art of politics:

> T30: I think I am one of a few Athenians---not to say the only one---who undertake the real political craft and practice politics---the only one among people now. I don't aim at gratification with each of the speeches I make, but aim at the best,

> not the pleasantest, and I'm not willing to do 'these subtle things' that you advise me. (521d6-e2)

As Socrates has argued prior to this assertion (515c-d), the goal of the politician is to make the citizens as good as possible. Socratic protreptic serves the propaedeutic function of turning the citizens to virtue and wisdom. Thus Socrates' protreptic skill advances the end of the statesman. Much the same can be said of the purgative function of the elenchus in relation to the end of dialectic. Refutation prepares the soul to know the Forms, since it extirpates from it the form of ignorance 'that causes all the mistakes we make when we think' (*Soph*. 229c5-6).

In that case we may state the solution to our first problem in this way: Socratic dialectic partakes of philosophy and politics because its dual functions---protreptic, elenchus---are propaedeutic arts which advance the ends of philosophy and politics. So conceived, protreptic and elenchus stand to philosophy and politics as parts to wholes. However, since the partaking relation is not symmetric, Socratic protreptic and elenchus are modes of argument which will not be employed by the completely wise dialectician or the philosopher king, at least when they are addressing interlocutors (advanced students of dialectic perhaps or intellectual peers) who stand in no need of elenchus or exhortation to philosophy.[87]

This result brings us to our final imposing problem. Does Socrates *imitate* the speechwriter in the epilogue of the *Euthydemus*? I submit we must clearly return an affirmative answer to this question. A good art---or a 'partially good' art such as Socratic dialectic---may imitate a bad art. The air of paradox is removed from this claim precisely because imitators are not epistemically embedded in the object of their imitation. In T3 Socrates appropriates a characteristic activity (persuasive speech) that is proper to rhetoric. But his exercise in this activity is not contaminated by the ignorance of philosophy or politics by which the speechwriters are led. It is rather governed by the cognitive component---*partial wisdom*---which is internal to the economy of Socratic dialectic. The purpose of Socrates' imitation of the speechwriter is similarly internal to his own protreptic art. This is the apotreptic end of persuading Crito to resist the speechwriters' defense and to devote himself to philosophy. Finally, in the same way eristic or speechwriting generate modes of argument that are external to the practice of genuine philosophy or politics, the εἰκός argument that is *generated* by this Socratic mimesis is peculiarly *external* to the art of the speechwriter. On the one hand, Socrates' εἰκός argument is an undistorted and clear-eyed reproduction of a mode of persuasion that belongs to the rhetorical tradition that Plato critiques. Yet in Socrates' hands it is shaped and transformed by deliberate omissions and lacunae which are the product of Socrates' peculiar protreptic craft. As I have argued above, these omissions include: the suppression of the causal thesis, first broached in the first protreptic episode, concerning the relation between wisdom and goodness; the occlusion of the truth that it is Socrates, and neither of his protreptic rivals, who partakes of philosophy and the political art; and the absence of an explanation of the mysterious remark that while philosophy and politics are both good, they each aim at a different thing. Once discovered these lacunae return Crito and the reader as well to the central problems of the second protreptic and the practice of aporetic philosophy. Seen in this light, Socrates' final speech in the dialogue, so far from being a joke or a piece of sophistry, emerges as an instantiation of the *process* of Socratic protreptic: it quite literally 're-turns' Crito and the reader to retrace the gyres of the λαβύρινθος (291b7)--

-the central image of the dialogue and an image of 'philosophy itself' (αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 307b8).

The discovery that Socrates imitates the speechwriter in the *Euthydemus* of course immediately gives rise to the question whether he *also* imitates the pancratists (271c7, 272a5) who are his combatants in the main event: does Socrates indulge in deliberate mimesis of eristic refutation anywhere in the dialogue? I cannot address this important question here beyond suggesting two lines of inquiry along which it might be fruitfully pursued.

On the one hand we may ask whether Socrates' *direct report* of eristic discourse in the eristic scenes constitutes imitation in the sense defined here. The answer must be 'yes' if we suppose that, like his impersonation of the speechwriter, Socrates' reportage of eristic discourse aims at an end internal to Socratic protreptic and does not aim at the end of eristic itself, viz., pleasure. That his report does have this serious purpose seems plausible given its clearly apotreptic function: Crito insists at the beginning of the dialogue (271a, 272d) that Socrates relate to him the entire conversation he had with the sophistic duo; at the dialogue's end Crito expresses disgust at the sophists' λόγοι and refuses to take up Socrates' offer to study with them (304c-305b).

Admittedly this interpretative proposal must accommodate the impression of many readers that Socrates' story of his wild encounter with the sophistic duo *does* aim at producing pleasure. But the concept of 'play' (παιδιὰν, 278b3) Socrates introduces in T25 suggests Plato is inclined to draw a distinction between the slapstick of his eristic clowns and the second order Socratic imitation of their antics. This distinction seems eventually (on the assumption that the *Euthydemus* predates the *Republic*) to be articulated in *Republic* 3. There Plato introduces an account of a more urbane form of play, viz., the imitation of an inferior person by his moral and intellectual superior:

> T31: Well, I think that when a moderate (μέτριος) man comes upon the words or actions of a good man in his narrative, he'll be willing to report them as if he were that man himself, and he won't be ashamed of that kind of imitation. He'll imitate this good man most when he's acting in a faultless and intelligent manner, but he'll do so less, and with more reluctance, when the good man is upset by disease, sexual passion, drunkenness, or some other misfortune. When he comes upon a character unworthy of himself, however, he'll be unwilling to make himself seriously resemble (σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν) that inferior character---except perhaps for a brief period in which he's doing something good. Rather he'll be ashamed to do something like that, both because he's unpracticed (ἀγύμναστος) in the imitation of such people and because he can't stand to shape and mold himself according to a worse pattern. He despises this in his mind, unless it's just done in play (παιδιᾶς χάριν). (*Rep.* 3 396c5-396e2)

Alternatively (on the assumption that the *Euthydemus* is at least coeval with the *Republic*), the distinction is already implicit in T25: when Socrates suggests the sophists have only been playing (προσπαίζειν, 278b3) and exhorts them now to demonstrate serious things (τὰ σπουδαῖα, 278c3), he is actually pretending to the crowd that these 'wise men' (271c5, 272b9, 273c3, 274a8, 274d3, 275c7, 276d2) must really be philosophers who have briefly indulged in an imitation of the type of false philosophers and inferior men that they *actually* are. In other

words, he is pretending that they are merely *imitating* eristics, not *being* eristics.[88]

The second line of inquiry regarding a potential Socratic mimesis of eristic is more contentious. Does Socrates deliberately employ sophistical arguments in his protreptic conversations with Cleinias? The charge that he does so has of course been leveled by several commentators on these passages.[89] Yet the account of imitation we have extracted from the partaking argument suggests the charge will stick only if it can be shown how Socrates' alleged adoption of sophistical argumentation furthers an end (protreptic/apotreptic, elenctic) which is internal to Socratic dialectic. (For example: what apotreptic function is served by a fallacious performance of Socratic protreptic, and who is its target? What apotreptic function is thereby served which is not already served by Socrates' direct mimesis of the sophists' discourse?) Our analysis of the partaking argument suggests moreover that the charge of fallacy may be leveled too hastily at a product of Socrates' wonder-producing (279d8) art: omission, lacuna and *aporia* must not be confused with the dumbfounding toys of the eristic duo (e.g. asyllogistic reasoning through homonymous terms, failing to contradict, fallacies of composition and *secundum quid*, etc.)

CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the partaking argument in the epilogue of the *Euthydemus* has been long and complex. What I hope to have shown is that a close examination of this badly neglected passage reveals its key importance to the plan of the dialogue. So far from being a parody of eristic argumentation or a hopelessly obscure joke, the partaking argument tasks the reader with the central problem of the *Euthydemus*: the discrimination of the sophist, rhetorician, and philosopher.

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NOTES

1 I have found no systematic analysis of this passage in the scholarly literature on the dialogue. The following remarks are representative: Sprague (1962): 'It is obviously to the advantage of [the speech-writer] to malign both philosophy and politics, but, according to Socrates at 306c, he is apparently unwilling to do this. Thus, we are intended to conclude, his attack is inconsistent', 32. Cp. Narcy (1984), 141: 'Pour montrer en effet que ce type d'hommes n'a de savoir qu'apparent, Socrate use d'un raisonnement curieusement abstrait (306a1-c5): toute chose intermédiaire entre deux éléments à quoi elle participe n'est supérieure aux deux que s'il s'agit de deux maux. Puisque ces gens ambitionnent d'être à la fois philosophes et politiques, ils ne peuvent considérer ces deux activités comme mauvaises: ils leur sont donc inférieurs.'

2 Burnyeat made the remark at a colloquium at Princeton University in the late 1990s where he presented an earlier draft of Burnyeat (2002). I have no idea if he still holds this view of the passage.

3 My finding that Socrates indulges in a deliberate mimesis of the speechwriter in the epilogue of the *Euthydemus* immediately raises the question whether he also deliberately employs eristic argumentation anywhere in the dialogue. This important and vexed question is far beyond the scope of this essay. However, since my analysis of imitation is in my view directly relevant to this problem, I suggest in a brief coda to section §4, 67-9 two lines of inquiry along which it might be fruitfully pursued in light of the account of imitation I offer here.

4 This passage teems with interest but I cannot discuss it in detail here. Scholars who have argued for identifying the critic with Isocrates include Schleiermacher (1836), 228; Thompson (1868), 179-182; Field (1930), 193; Ries (1959), 40-44; Guthrie (1975), 282-3; Hawtrey (1981), 189; Heitsch (2000); Kato (2000), 131; Michelini (2000), 530, and Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi (2014), 143-151. For opposing or skeptical viewpoints see Wilamowitz (1919), 235; Taylor (1926), 101-2; Bluck (1961) 115 n.4. Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi (2014), 142 claims that Crito's apparent acquiescence in the critic's application of the term 'philosophy' to eristic entails that Crito is inconsistent: on the one hand he rejects sophistic practice and seems willing to call it 'philosophy'; but on the other he defends 'philosophy' as a graceful thing. This seems to me to be an overreaction. It is more likely that Crito takes the term 'philosophy' to apply to dialectic in general, not to Socratic conversation exclusively. (For a somewhat similar suggestion see Peterson (2011), 200.) I suggest this reading is actually supported by the fact that Crito, due to his intellectual passivity, does not really understand precisely how Socratic dialectic differs from its other practitioners (an assessment of Crito with which Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi concurs, 141). For Crito, the φιλήκοος of arguments, 'philosophy' is dialectical conversation which can be practiced gracefully or rudely.

5 Some notes on my translation of T2: Sprague (1993) translates μεθόρια as 'no-man's land.' While the phrase is perhaps more evocative than 'marches' or 'borderlands', I think it evokes the wrong thing, viz., that a state of hostility exists between the philosopher and the statesman. Sprague also translates 'μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολτικῶν' as follows: 'for they think they are not only pretty well up in philosophy but also in politics'. (Cp. Lamb (1977), who translates along similar lines.) While this rendering is certainly possible, I

suggest it does not quite capture Isocrates' point: Socrates' rival is not conceding that he dabbles in philosophy and politics; he is rather insisting that unlike Euthydemus and his crew, he engages with philosophy and politics in due measure, i.e., he observes a line set against the excesses and deficiencies which (in his view) beset both the professional controversialists as well as those who are embroiled in political contests. (*C. Soph.* 14-15: some who have never taken a single lesson from the sophists have become able orators and statesmen; their success is grounded in natural ability and practical experience. As for the earlier sophists who composed technical manuals for pursuing lawsuits: they professed to exhort others to study political discourse but were in fact nothing but 'professors of meddlesomeness and greed', 19-20. Cp. *Ad Nic.* 39: Wise men do not dispute subtly about trifles (ἀκριβῶς περὶ μικρῶν ἐρίζοντας) but speak well on important issues; they are not those who while being in many perplexities themselves (πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις) promise happiness to others; they make modest (μέτρια) claims for themselves and bear moderately (μετρίως) the vicissitudes of fortune; cp. 51-2: the teachers of philosophy debate about the proper discipline of the soul, some maintaining that this is achieved through disputation (τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων), others that it is through political discourse (τῶν πολιτικῶν); but regardless of his training the well-educated man must as a result of his training display an ability to deliberate and decide. Cp. *Antid.* 261-268: the study of eristics and other disciplines far removed from the necessities of life (e.g. geometry, astronomy) are not part of philosophy but a gymnastic propaedeutic to philosophy proper. Consequently the young should not allow their minds to be dried up in these barren studies. Cp. *Panath.* 27-29: There exist experts of disputation who have studied the art so closely that they have become less cultured than even their servants; and there are those who have become so skilled in oratory that their private discourse is insufferable and offensive to their fellow citizens, and they neglect their private affairs besides.) Moreover, while it is clear from 305a that Isocrates does not confuse Socrates with the eristics, the speechwriters' defense here is nevertheless equally directed at Socrates, insofar as it is congruent with Isocrates' general position that the kind of exact philosophical knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which Socrates claims to seek is beyond our grasp: all we should really aim for is right opinion (δόξα). (Cp. *C. Soph.* 7-8; *Helen* 5; *Antid.* 270-271.) In that case the expression 'ὅσον ἔδει' should be understood as the extent to what is needed or 'right'. Finally, on 'εἰκότως' and 'ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου': A standard translation of 'εἰκότως' is 'reasonable' or 'plausible'. Hence 'ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου' would standardly be translated 'on a plausible/reasonable ground' or 'for a plausible reason'. However as I argue below (18-24) we will miss Socrates' point as well as the play in which he is engaged with these expressions if they are not translated in a way that brings out their connection to the participle ἐοικώς (seeming like, like, fitting, appropriate, likely) on which the adverb εἰκότως is based. It is nearly impossible to capture this in English. I have attempted to do so by relying on the existence of an archaic use of 'likely' (OED entry B.2): 'in a suitable or appropriate manner; suitably, appropriate, fitly; (also) reasonably'.

6 *Meno* 75e; *Protag.* 337a-c, 340e-341c, 358a-b; *Crat.* 384b; *Euthyd.* 277e; *Lach.* 197d; *Charm.* 163d; *Phaedr.* 267b.

7 *Meno* 75e1-5 may be read as suggesting that Prodicus was known to have made some distinction at least regarding the terms 'πέρας' (limit) and 'ἔσχατον' (boundary). Aristotle may be thinking of T2 in *SE* 34, 183a37-b8. Dio Chrysotom clearly refers to T2 in *Orat.* 24.8-9.

8 Cp. *Phaedr.* 269b-269c: it is their ignorance of dialectic that causes the rhetoricians to think they have discovered what true rhetoric is, when they have really only mastered what it is necessary to learn as 'preliminaries to the art' (τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα, 269b7-8). Knowing things preliminary to an art does not entail that one partakes of genuine constituents of the art.

9 Socrates' reference to Prodicus at *Euthyd.* 277e4 seems to serve this kind of function.

10 In speaking merely of 'things' or men standing between good and bad 'things' Socrates is being deliberately vague regarding the intended scope of the argument. I suggest this is because the outliers of which the speechwriters are said to partake are both philosophy and politics. Socrates refers to the latter as 'ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις'; and he has asserted in the second protreptic episode that ἡ πολιτικὴ is identical to a τέχνη, viz., ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη (291c4-5). In the second protreptic this identification seems to facilitate Socrates' obtaining a premise to the effect that the kingly art must have a product of some kind (291e-292a). However Socrates does not identify philosophy as a τέχνη in this sense. Rather he calls philosophy 'the acquisition of knowledge' (Ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης, 288d8); a characterization which seems deliberately to leave the object of this knowledge unspecified. If he is not more forthcoming, presumably this is because Plato wants to leave it up to the reader (as Socrates wants to leave it up to Crito) to work out the precise relationship between philosophy and politics. Things are somewhat clarified in *Plts.* 259c-260c: there τέχναι are divided into πρακτικαί, in which expertise is inseparable from πράξεις or 'doings', and γνωστικαὶ τέχναι, the theoretical arts which are further divided into κριτικαί and ἐπιτακτικαί; the statesman's art falls into the latter 'directive' or ruling category. As I take it we are meant to see

however, even this move does not settle the nature of the relationship between politics and philosophy in the second protreptic of *Euthyd*. For *both* arts are described as 'using' and therefore ruling arts (290b-c). Aristotle expresses the ensuing *aporia* this way: we think that the ἀρχιτέχτονες in each thing are wiser than the hand-workers because they know the causes and the that-for-the-sake-of-which the others make; so wisdom must be ἀρχική and the wise person must ἐπιτάττειν (*Metap*. 1.2 982a17-19). But if wisdom is 'purely theoretical', why is it valuable if it does not consider any of the things out of which happiness arises? (*EE* 5.12 = *NE* 6.12 1143b19-20)? (Cp. *Charm*. 172b-d.) And if φρόνησις is inferior to wisdom, why is it more authoritative (κυριωτέρα) than it, since it is epitactic and rules and commands about each thing (1143b34-5)? His answer to the first question is that 'wisdom does produce happiness, not as the art of medicine produces health, but as health produces health' (1144a3-5), i.e. the exercise of σοφία in contemplation *is* happiness. His answer to the second question is that while φρόνησις is the highest epitactic form of knowledge, it does not rule over σοφία; 'for φρόνησις does not use σοφία (sc. as ἀρχιτεκτονική uses the manual arts), rather it sees how to bring it about; so it issues commands (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of it, not to it' (1145a6-11; cp. *Plts*. 308d1-e10). For evidence that Aristotle's *aporiai* are inspired by the *Euthydemus*, see Menn (2018), Ia2. 10-13. My own view (Section §4, 58-9) is that considerable light is shed on Plato's own solution to these puzzles by noticing that unlike his pupil, Plato does not conceive of dialectical wisdom as purely theoretical in Aristotle's sense: for dialectical wisdom is infused with its knowledge of practical polis management (*Rep*. 539e2-540c2). (On this point cp. Reeve (1988), 83-4.) But this does not commit Plato to the view that the art of dialectic is strictly identical to the ruling art of practical polis management. The art of dialectic aims at grasping the Forms; the art of politics instills their order in the city and in the souls of the citizens. It is likely however that Socrates' protreptic rivals in the *Euthydemus* conceive of political activity and philosophy as utterly distinct. (E.g. Isocrates may conceive of the latter as simply bestowing 'mind-sharpening skills' upon the young; the sophists may conceive of philosophy as aiming at pleasure or money-making.) But it is not Socrates' purpose to disabuse them of these notions. On the role of education in both philosophy and politics see Narcy (1984) 143. On the relation of philosophy and politics in the *Euthyd*. cp. Hawtry (1981), 193-4; Morrison (1958), 209-10, 216; Sprague (1976), 55; Kahn (1988), 543-5; Kahn (1996), 209; Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi (2014), 60-64. On wisdom as a craft in the dialogue see Jones (2010), 96-131.

11 By this I mean only that the art needs no other art *qua* the art it is to achieve its own end. A superordinate art (such as that sought in the second protreptic episode, 288d-293a) will need to use the ends of subordinate arts in order to attain its end (290a-291d); it follows such an art may not attain its goal in the absence of other arts.

12 The verb 'μετέχειν' here means 'to have a share of'. The irreflexivity of the partaking relation has the interesting consequence that we may not characterize the self-sufficiency of philosophy or politics in terms of either being a complete partaker of itself.

13 The Isocratean figure Crito encounters explicitly makes this mistake at 304e7-305a1. But the same point is clear from Socrates' mention in T2 of the petulant reaction of the speechwriters whenever they are refuted in 'private conversation' (ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις, 305d5-6): they defensively blame their downfall on 'Euthydemus and his followers' (305d6-7). What Socrates has said prior to this observation is that the speechwriters' take their main rivals for the laurel of wisdom to be 'the men occupied with philosophy' (τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους, 305d1-2). Contrary to the supposition of some commentators, Socrates does not apply the term 'philosophy' to the activity of the sophists here (nor at 305b6); he refers to genuine philosophers (like himself) whose activity prompts the speechwriters' anxiety that they are not genuinely wise. What Socrates says next is that whenever the speechwriters are refuted in private conversation, they blame this on Euthydemus and his ilk. The remark suggests that the λογοποιοί resort to this accusation *whether or not* they have been refuted by eristics. Socrates' point is that the speechwriters attempt to bring true philosophy into disrepute by encouraging the public's (accurate) perception that the majority of professed philosophers are cranks. The speechwriters' strategy is usefully compared to Adeimantus' complaint at *Rep* 6 487a-d: the accuser (τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα, 489d3) of philosophy who is refuted by Socrates' argument for the supremacy of his own version of philosophy will, due to inexperience in argument, complain that the argument entraps him; but he will nevertheless deny the conclusion. Then in support of his denial he will wheel in the empirical claim that the greatest number of those who profess to practice philosophy are completely vicious, while a few (e.g. Socrates himself) are decent but useless.

14 Cp. n.5, 7-8 for references in Isocrates to his stance toward eristics. I discuss this stance in more detail below, Section §3, 35-40.

15 271d-272a, 273c-274a. Socrates asserts at 303e-304a that the sophists' technique can be rapidly acquired by anyone, and that the behaviour of Ctesippus in his encounters with the brothers showed him this.

16 The fact that the brothers are philosophical magpies in my view suggests that Plato does not use Euthydemus and his brother as masks for some particular school of philosophy (e.g. 'Megarianism'), but I cannot defend this position here.

17 Another point of overlap between our text and the *Gorgias* is of course Callicles' argument (485a3-e2) that while it is a fine thing for a young person to have a share in philosophy sufficient for the education of a free man, it is shameful if a man continues in philosophy beyond youth into adulthood: 'The most correct thing is to have a share in both'. I discuss this passage and its relevance to an interpretation of the partaking argument in section §3, 40-6.

18 Kraus (2007), 7.

19 Crito explains why in more detail in his final exchange with Socrates, 306d2-307a2: most men who set themselves up as educators of the young (like Euthydemus and his brother) are 'utterly grotesque'. I discuss this text (T20) in Section §3, 47-9.

20 Here it is important to note that at *Phaedo* 92d1-2, Simmias (with Socrates' evident approval) employs the term 'εὐπρεπείας' as a straightforward gloss of the phrase 'μετὰ εἰκότος'. Cp. *Theaet*. 162e where τὸ εἰκός and ἡ εὐπρέπεια are contrasted with the truth or knowledge.

21 *Soph*. 240a-b; *Theaet*. 162e4-163a1; *Tim*.29b1-d3.

22 All translations of *Phaedrus* are from Nehamas and Woodruff in Cooper (1997).

23 Hoffman (2008), 9-10; Kraus (2006), 143; Turrini (1977), 542-543. Turrini shows how Plato exploits the etymological connection between εἰκῶν (likeness or image) and εἰκός in the *Timaeus* (29b-c). The Eleatic Visitor similarly suggests that the term εἰκαστικὴ in his formula 'τεχνὴ εἰκαστικὴ' (the art of likeness-making) is derived from 'εἰκῶν' (*Soph*. 236a). As Hoffman points out, the Visitor's distinction between the crafts of likeness-making and image-making seems to reflect Plato's distinction between the verisimilitude and the doxastic sense of εἰκός.

24 This reveals another difference between the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*: in the latter dialogue Socrates certainly takes no prisoners against his dialectical opponents.

25 Here it is revealing to note that as the epilogue begins, Socrates has told Crito what 'is especially fitting for *him* to hear': if he joins Socrates' plan to take the sophists' course, it will not hinder Crito in the making of money 304c3-4.

26 Apart from Socrates' general knowledge of Crito, there is an indication of the latter's lack of discernment in this regard even prior to his final declaration (306e) that he can discover no suitable educator for his sons. In response to the Isocratean's attack on the eristics, Crito insists that 'philosophy' is nevertheless a 'charming' or 'delightful' thing (χαρίεν, 304e6). As I have argued above (n.4, 6), Crito applies the term 'philosophy' here to dialectic in general, not Socrates' conception of philosophy. His use of 'χαρίεν' moreover reveals Crito as the pleasure seeking φιλήκοος of speeches that he is. Callicles describes philosophy in precisely the same terms: 'Philosophy is a charming thing, if someone touches it in moderation (μετρίως) at the right time of life', (*Gorg*. 484c5-7). I discuss the resonance of this text with T2 below, Section §3, 40-6.

27 As many commentators have noted, Socrates' no holds barred approach in the *Gorgias* seems to have precisely this effect on his interlocutors.

28 Hinks (1940), 63-66; Kuebler (1944), 15; Kennedy (1963), 26-51; Goebel (1989), 41-42; Gagarin (2002), 29. However as Gargarin (1990), 30 and Hoffman (2008), 11 point out, the speeches of Hermes in *HH* 4, 265 and 377 are the earliest example of an εἰκός argument in Greek literature---at least on the assumption that this text antedates 5 B.C.E. On the grounds for the designation cp. n.41, 30.

29 On the 'strong man' argument see Hoffman (2003).

30 I borrow the expression 'reverse *eikos* argument' from Gagarin (1990), 30; cp. Gagarin (1994), 51; Gagarin (1997), 14; Gagarin (2002), 112-114.

31 Transl. Norlin (1929).

32 An example is found in Antiphon's *First Tetralogy*, 2.3 and 2.6. This work is an instructional handbook, not a set of speeches for use in a practical context. Cp. Gagarin 1997, 14. On sophistic antilogies cp. Hoffman 2002.

33 For reasons which I cannot pursue here in *Rhet*. 2.24.9 Aristotle appears to classify the strong man and similar arguments as fallacies of qualification. His account of this mode of apparent refutation is given in *SE* 5 166b37-20 and 25 180a23-180b39.

34 By this I simply mean that we may extract from T9-T10 Plato's awareness that the conclusions of reversing arguments cannot both be true, and that hence at least one of the opposing arguments must be unsound. In this respect εἰκός arguments share the feature of eristic arguments of which Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are most proud: they refute an answerer 'no matter how' he responds (*Euthyd*. 275e), i.e. regardless of which pair of a contradictory pair of propositions the answerer elects to defend at the beginning of an encounter. The procedures of both eristic and rhetoric are for Plato consequently antithetical to a search for the truth.

35 Cp. Goebel (1989), 43-45; Schmitz (2000), 47-48.

36 Translation E.S. Forster in Barnes (1984). There are two other serious problems with Forster's translation: no term corresponds to his 'likely' in the phrase εἰ τοὺς ἀκούοντας συνειδότας ληψόμεθα; also 'εἰκός' in the penultimate line does mean 'likely to be true' but this is not the sense we should attach to τὸ εἰκὸς in the passage.

37 Hacking (1975).

38 Synodinou (1981), 1-34; Turrini (1977), 544-557.

39 Todorov (1968), 1; Anastassiou (1981), 358; Schmitz (2000), 48-49.

40 Kraus (2007), 6-8.

41 Hoffman (2008) appendix, 25-29. Hoffman uses the argument of Hermes in *Hymn to Hermes* (*HH* 4) to demonstrate how ἔοικα, which signifies 'to be like' only with a dative object, could have been extended

in other constructions to yield the senses 'to be fitting' and 'to be likely'. Hermes twice argues that he did not steal his brother's cattle on the ground that he is not *like* a driver of cattle or a strong man. First to Apollo at 265: 'οὐδὲ βοῶν ἐλατῆρι, κραταιῷ φωτί, ἔοικα' ('I am not like to a driver of cattle or a strong man'). Here the perfect indicative is used with a dative object, a construction that is appropriately translated in the likeness sense. In his second address (to Zeus) at 377 the construction is still with a dative object but with the masculine perfect active participle ἐοικώς: 'αὐτὰρ ἐχὼ χθιζὸς γενόμην...οὔτι βοῶν ἐλατῆρι, κραταιῷ φωτί, ἐοικώς' ('But I was born yesterday…[and am] not one who is like to a driver of cattle or a strong man'). As Hoffman points out, it is one more short step to substituting the neuter perfect participle εἰκός in an infinitive with the accusative construction such as οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν τοὺς βοῦς, which may be translated as either 'It does not befit me to take the cattle' or 'It is not likely for me to take the cattle'. This suggests that the core 'similarity' sense of ἔοικα can give rise to the notion of the 'likely' or the 'befitting': Hermes is arguing that he is not *likely* to have stolen the cattle on the grounds that he is not *like* a cattle thief.

42 Hoffman (2008), 16.

43 Antiphon: 1.17, 1.18. Lysias: 13.41

44 Antiphon: 3.4.1 (2nd use), 5.4, 5.48, 5.49, 5.73. Lysias: 9.19, 12.28, 14.24, 19.3, 19.5, 19.38, 27.15, 30.13. Isocrates: 3.53, 4.2, 14.52, 16.14.

45 Antiphon: 1.2, 2.1.5, 2.2.7 (2nd use), 2.3.8, 3.4.1 (1st use), 5.63, 5.74. Lysias: 12.27 (2nd use), 12.27 (3rd use), 19.17, 19.58, 20.36, 24.16, 31.31. Isocrates: 1.45, 4.71, 5.19, 5.113, 11.35, 15.41, 15.86, 15.170, 21.14.

46 Antiphon: 1.7, 2.1.4, 2.2.7 (1st use), 2.4.5 (1st use), 2.4.5 (2nd use), 5.26, 5.28, 5.45, 5.60. Lysias: 1.6, 2.74, 2.75, 3.25, 7.13, 7.38, 12.27 (1st use), 14.4, 16.5, 19.36, 25.16. Isocrates: 4.163, 4.184, 5.41, 6.40, 6.75, 7.2, 11.11, 12.81, 12.105, 15.34, 15.82, 15.309, 17.46, 18.13, 18.14, 20.1, 20.12, 21.6, 21.7.

47 Hoffman (2008), 23.

48 Hoffman (2008), 21.

49 Trans. W.R.M. Lamb (1930).

50 Trans. Van Hook (1945).

51 For the use of such devices in Gorgias and Antiphon see Kuebler (1944), 29-30, 33-35, 43, 45-46, 48, 50.

52 Trans. Van Hook (1945), with modifications.

53 Cp. Irwin (1995), 8-9, 38-44. The unity of virtue thesis receives its most sustained treatment in the *Protagoras*.

54 It is important to note that Socrates mounts precisely the same objection against the eristic duo at *Euthyd*. 286c: their paradoxes of false speaking are just recycled from Protagoras or still earlier thinkers. The parallel demonstrates how in a three way shooting match of competing protreptics (Socratic, eristic, and Isocratean), two opponents may come to resemble each other when they level the same charge against the third. Socrates (or Plato) however differs from Isocrates in that he actually constructs an argument against the eristic denial of false speaking (287e-288a), whereas Isocrates simply complains that their thesis is false and unoriginal.

55 I take it that the first charge (concerning ἐπιστήμη) is leveled at Socrates, the second (concerning petty things) at the eristics; but it is just possible to read both as levelled indiscriminately at both. In any case, Isocrates' sentiments closely match those expressed by Crito at 304c-304d: there is a limit to the things Crito wants to learn; in particular, he would rather be refuted by the kinds of arguments the eristics employ than use them to refute others.

56 Of course Plato would probably disagree with the idea that opinion is a 'part' of knowledge; but Isocrates is not Plato. We might suppose that Isocrates is operating with an idea of knowledge that is more 'εἰκός' than Plato's, viz., that opining is part of knowing: one who knows that P also opines that P, in addition to other things. However it is not necessary to attribute this thesis to Isocrates in order to maintain the conceptual isomorphism of his argument with T2.

57 *Ad. Dem*. 44-52. Cp. *Ad. Nic*. 3: it is εἰκός that upon studying this wisdom literature a private citizen will become a better man. For a useful discussion of the process whereby in Isocrates' view absorption of such precepts converts a citizen to a life of φιλοσοφία see Collins (2015), 219-228.

58 Cp. n.5, 7-8 for expressions of this sentiment in several of Isocrates' later works.

59 Of course the practitioners of rhetoric and eristic in the *Euthydemus* are not discrete; Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have only recently begun to regard speechwriting as a sideline (*Euthyd*. 273d).

60 Trans. of the *Gorgias* are from Irwin (1979).

61 Alternatively, like Crito he could have no hard and fast distinction between sophistry and Socratic conversation: philosophy is just dialectic, which may be engaged in roughly or politely (n.4, 6). However I prefer to interpret Callicles' protestations at Socrates' hands as exemplifying the defensive posture Socrates tells us in T2 that rhetoricians take at being refuted in the dialectical arena by genuine philosophers. On this posture cp. n.13, 14-15.

62 Note that the goal of having the best reputation for wisdom is explicitly mentioned in T2.

63 In this regard Crito resembles Socrates' more wayward companion Alcibiades (*Symp*. 215d-216c).

64 Indeed Crito's speech in T20 tracks the sentiments of the critic of philosophy so closely that we are left to wonder whether Crito did not mention his name to Socrates at 305c because he wishes to disguise his familiarity with his work. If that is so Crito turns out to resemble Phaedrus, who hides under his cloak (*Phaedr*. 228a-e) the speech of Lysias he claims not to have committed to memory. This possibility raises another which cannot be pursued here: did

Crito also fib about not being able to hear the conversation between Socrates and the sophists (271a)?

65 Yunis (2005), 104.

66 It is no accident that the 'transmission' model of learning is implicitly criticized in the epilogue, since the problem of how virtue and wisdom is acquired is a core theme of the dialogue.

67 For various proposals see Vlastos (1991), 200-232, Annas (1993), Irwin (1995), 56-60, Parry (2003), Scott (2006), 148-9. I do not have space here to defend a particular interpretation of Socrates' claim that wisdom is good καθ' αὑτό. I am inclined to think he means that wisdom is the cause of the benefit of the other so-called goods in the sense that (a) wisdom must always be present when this benefit obtains, and (b) wisdom may never be the cause of the opposite of benefit (harm). Cp. Scott (2006), 148-9. (For the somewhat similar position that wisdom is the 'active principle of happiness', see Parry (2003), 10-12.) On this interpretation it will not follow that dialectical wisdom will be sufficient just by itself to produce its intended benefit; other background conditions may need to be in place.

68 Socrates implies precisely this point about the art of medicine at *Euthyd*. 280a2-3; he identifies health as the product of the art of medicine at 291e4-6.

69 Socrates' ranking does not entail that he thinks either philosophy or politics is superior to the other, but only that these two arts are superior to speechwriting.

70 Section §1, 13.

71 Section §1, 16-17.

72 The objection could be raised that Socrates (or Plato) would allow both Isocrates and the eristic pair a measure of wisdom, since Socrates says at 289e2-3 that speechwriters strike him as surpassingly wise (ὑπερέρσοφοι); and he frequently praises Euthydemus and Dionysodorus for their wisdom (in the prologue alone, seven times: 271c5, 272b9, 273c3, 274a8, 274d3, 275c7, 276d2; in the same episode he praises their knowledge (ἐπιστήμην, 273e6) and cleverness (272b4)). As for Isocrates, I argue on the next page that this remark is clearly ironic. It is also important to note that in the *Phaedrus* Socrates' praise of Isocrates extends only to the latter's natural ability and promise (279a); but an earlier passage (269d) seems to entail, when taken together with this remark, that Isocrates lacks knowledge of what rhetoric really is. As for the eristics: Socrates clearly implies at 278b5 that learning what the sophists teach does not generate knowledge (εἰδείη) of the way things really are. He also mounts two self-refutation arguments at the sophists in the dialogue (287e-288a and 303d-e). It is also highly significant that Plato never permits Socrates to refer to the sophists as 'philosophers' in the *Euthydemus*. Finally, Socrates says wisdom never makes a mistake (280a7-8), but Dionysodorus is portrayed as making a mistake in his own eristic argument at 297a. Thus it is more plausible to take Socrates' praise of the brothers as ironic also.

73 Section §1, 13-14.

74 Cp. Aeschylus *Eu*. 649; Sophocles' *Aj*., 582; Homer *Od*. 19.457; Gorgias *Helen* 10; Plato *Rep*. 426b; *Ch*. 155e.

75 *Gorg*. 462d11-462e1, 464d2, 501a-c, 502d-503a, 513d4. Unlike the *Gorgias*, the *Euthydemus* does not tell us directly that rhetoric aims at pleasure. However there is an indirect hint that it does so in Crito's rejection of Socrates' proposal to study with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (304c6-304d1): for he says that while he is a lover of listening (φιλήκοος) and that he takes pleasure (ἡδέως) in learning things, he finds he would prefer (ἥδιον) to be refuted by the brothers' arguments than use them to refute others. Taken together with his attraction to the speechwriters' defense, this suggests that the sophistic display did not produce a pleasure Crito expected from them, whereas rhetorical displays in his experience reliably do so. Gagarin (2000) argues that antilogies such as Gorgias' *Helen* did not aim at persuading the audience but rather at producing pleasure and appreciation of the author's intellectual skill.

76 Here it is important to note that the reader of the epilogue will already be aware that Crito declined to help extricate Socrates from the ἀπορία of the second protreptic, even when Socrates explicitly invited him to do (292a-292e). Socrates knows his Crito.

77 Section §1, 18-23.

78 I am here ignoring the complication that eristic may also imitate certain modes of argument that are proper to true statesmanship. I argued in n.4, 6 that Crito's use of the term 'φιλοσοφία' in the epilogue suggests that dialectic is the 'base' activity which is transformed into genuine or false philosophy, depending on who is practicing it. In the next line I also ignore the complication that speechwriting (and 'ignorant rhetoric' generally) may also imitate certain modes of argument proper to true philosophy.

79 Socrates' remarks in the *Gorgias* on the kind of oratory that is 'fine' (503a-b), when contrasted with his remarks on the true art of rhetoric in the (presumably later) *Phaedrus* (270b-272b), suggest that Plato may have gradually arrived at an assessment of Socratic dialectic as merely partaking of, as opposed to fully instantiating, a genuine art of persuasion. At *Gorg*. 521d6-e2 (T30 below) Socrates declares that his activity instantiates the true political craft (τῇ πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ), insofar as he aims at the best (which as 503a-b indicates is to aim at making the citizens as good as possible). But in the *Phaedrus* the requirements for instantiating the genuine art of persuasion are higher: the true rhetorician must have a theory of the soul, its different types and what affects it and how it is affected. If I have read

the partaking argument correctly, the Socrates of the *Euthydemus* displays a talent for knowing what kind of person is affected by what kind of speech, as well as for discerning upon meeting someone what kind of character he has (*Phaed*. 272a). (Of course his gentle approach to Cleinias indicates the same.) He also evinces an awareness of the importance of the nature of the soul and its affections to his protreptic project. For he states it is necessary to ask whether wisdom can be taught or comes to men of its own accord (282c); and he thinks we have knowledge in virtue of the soul (295b-295e). But Socrates does not articulate a theory of the soul in the *Euthydemus*.

80 Transl. Reeve-Grube (1992).

81 Ibid. That Plato would apply the account of imitation here to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus seems clear from the biographical detail of the sophistic duo he includes at *Euthyd*. 271c-272b (cp. 273c-d): like the bald little tinker of *Rep*. of 495e who marries above his station, the brothers have leapt from the mechanical craft of teaching fighting in armor to the art of fighting in λόγοις (their notion of philosophy).

82 This result sheds light on Socrates' denial in the *Gorgias* and elsewhere that eristic and rhetoric are arts at all (465a). However I have continued to describe them as arts in this essay only to avoid burdensome paraphrase and qualification each time I refer to speechwriting and eristic.

83 The result that Socrates is portrayed in the *Euthydemus* as partially wise raises an interesting question regarding a potential limitation of Socratic dialectic that is hinted at in the dialogue. In the first protreptic episode Socrates argues that wisdom never makes a mistake (280a-b). If Socrates is partially wise because he only partakes of complete *dialectical* wisdom, then Plato must suppose that Socrates is capable of making mistakes in his practice of dialectic. But what are Socrates' dialectical limitations that would lead him to error? An answer emerges if we assume with Plato that dialectical wisdom consists in the ability both to refute an answerer's thesis involving the predication of kinds, and to defend such a thesis while avoiding being refuted. (Cp. *Tim*. 29b7-c4, 44a1-44c4; *Rep. V* 454a4-9; *VI* 486a1-6; *VII* 532a5-532b2; 533b1-3; 534b3-534c5; 537c6-7; *Soph*. 253b-e; *Phaed*. 276e5.) If that is so it is I suggest highly significant that Socrates is portrayed in the dialogue as mounting self-refutation arguments against the sophists' theses that false speaking and thinking and contradiction are impossible (287e-288a); for the self-refutation response does not explain *why* these theses are false or why the arguments for the denial of false speaking or contradiction (283e-284c, 285d-286b) are invalid. This suggests that Socrates does not know enough about the nature of not-being to explain what is wrong with the arguments themselves. It follows that he *could* be refuted in the dialectical arena on the topic of the nature of not-being. This explanation of Socrates' dialectical limitation will apply whether Plato himself knew how to explain the sophists' fallacies or whether he did not at the time he wrote the *Euthydemus*.

84 *Apology* 20d6-20e3; cp.20c1-3. In the *Euthydemus* we are twice reminded of Socrates' profession of ignorance in the *Apology*: once in the Prologue (272e4), where his δαιμόνιον puts in an appearance; and again at 293b8, where Socrates declares that he knows many things, but only small ones (πολλά, σμικρά γε).

85 Here I am speaking only of the Socratic protreptic in the interior scenes of the dialogue. But Socrates' entire narrative of his encounter with the eristics, followed by his reaction to the speechwriter whom Crito encounters, is an exercise in the apotreptic branch or counterpart of Socratic protreptic. These scenes aim at turning Crito from the practitioners of Socrates' protreptic rivals, the eristics and the speechwriters.

86 Section §1, 13-14.

87 In support of this claim we may point to the separation of Socratic activity in *Sophist* (230a-d) from the activity of the Visitor and Theaetetus. The *Parmenides* would seem to constitute an even more extreme example of dialectic shorn of all the variegated aspects (including imitation of protreptic rivals) of Socratic dialectic.

88 This reading derives further support from two other allusions to imitation in the dialogue. At 288b7-8 Socrates pretends that the brothers are once again simply unwilling to give a serious demonstration of their wisdom, and are instead imitating the 'Egyptian sophist Proteus' (τὸν Πρωτέα μιμεῖσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν). While this is admittedly a joke, it shows that Socrates alludes to an urbane form of play which would involve the imitation by the wise of a sophist. In the second passage (303e7-8) Socrates remarks at the end of their encounter that the sophists' vaunted skill must be easily acquired since he has observed that Ctesippus was easily able to imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) it. His description and the put down that accompanies it invites the audience to conceive of Ctesippus' performance as an urbane imitation of a moral or intellectual inferior.

89 Most recently by Sermamoglou-Soulmaidi (2014), 9-48. Friedländer (1964) articulates the classic position that Socrates uses eristic arguments for his own ends thus: 'Eristic is indistinguishable from dialectic in form, distinguishable only by beneficial intention', 181.

BOOK REVIEWS

Luc Brisson, 2017. *Platon. L'écrivain qui inventa la philosophie*. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf. Pp. 298.

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Before being a philosopher, Plato was a writer. As a writer he makes his teacher Socrates the main character of many of his dialogues, thus building his memory and at the same time creating the prototype of who is a philosopher and what is his activity, namely philosophy. In this fascinating and lucid essay, Luc Brisson, one of the most prominent Plato's scholars in the world, who has translated many of his dialogues in French for PUF and then directed the *Oeuvres Complètes* for Flammarion (Paris: 2011), offers a picture of Plato as a man of his time. Brisson frames Plato's literary activity within the events of the 5th century Athens and, specifically, within his autobiographical experience.

In the first five chapters, the reader can appreciate the relevance of Plato's life for understanding his philosophical activity. The reader discovers the youth of Plato, his relationship with Socrates and his *entourage*, the effect of Socrates' death sentence in Plato's writing, and the motivations which underlie his choice to go to Sicily. As an investigator, Brisson looks for traces of philosophy in Plato's life and argues that Plato is the inventor of philosophy and that this invention should be understood as emerging from his life. The core experience of his life was undoubtedly meeting Socrates, but the genius of Plato was the one of inventing philosophy from this encounter, also establishing philosophical dialogue as its method. The chapters about Plato's relationships with the poets and the sophists (11-12) are crystalline about it: philosophy needs to provide the knowledge required for reforming Athens from its decadence, in contrast with the false tales of the poets and the utilitarian speeches of the sophists. In this sense, inventing philosophy as the knowledge of the truth, Plato binds philosophy to ethics and politics, as the fields for proving its relevance and efficacy.

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In chapters 13-16, the reader can learn about the main features of Plato's philosophy, and thus engaging with Plato's ontology, epistemology, ethics, the theory of the soul, and political philosophy. In these chapters, some of the thesis that has been argued by Brisson in more details in fourty years of scholarship are introduced. For example, it is presented the thesis for which the so-called world of the Ideas is not an abstract structure beyond the sensible world but a condition of possibility for the sensible world, as the foundation for thinking and living. Then, a superb analysis of the *Timeus* is provided, where Brisson can clarify the foundational relationship between Forms and sensible things. Finally, his account of Plato's theory of the soul puts this relationship at the heart of every human experience. The valorization of the soul for achieving the most critical epistemic objects through contemplation is not a denial of the body. Instead, the harmonic body is a sign of a beautiful soul, as the regular movements of the planets are expressions of the divine rules. Also, the sensible world is conceived as the place where to conduct the activity of self-mastering, both for personal and political life.

Focusing on real life is thus the *file-rouge* of the book. This is not only a method for discovering Plato's motivation for philosophical writing but also a clue for understanding his philosophy beyond a narrow dualism. For us, modern readers could seem weird trying to understand the philosophical thinking from the life of the thinker, but doing so Brisson is in reality following the ancient tradition, think about the *Life of Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius. The innovation here is the one of showing that life and thinking are deeply entangled: this means that the life of the philosopher is not described just as an introduction to his philosophical positions. Instead, some of the motivations which underline not only Plato's thought, but also his method and style, should be founded in his life. "Platon n'est pas un philosophe «professionnel» à la recherche d'une innovation conceptuelle qui le fera connaître, mais un citoyen qui se révolte contre la démocratie athénienne" (p. 134). Finally, what is relevant to highlight here is that Brisson's sensibility for the literary analysis – as his vast work on Plato's myths testimonies (see here in particular chapter 17) – is what makes also appreciate the embodied and embedded dimension of knowledge in the writing itself. Plato's dialogues are therefore the embodiment of Plato's philosophical exercise. The exercise of a man who, meeting Socrates, invented philosophy.

In conclusion, *Platon. L'écrivain qui inventa la philosophie* is not only an excellent introduction to the philosophy of Plato, but it is also a volume which explores a quite unexplored territory – Plato's life – as a method for better understanding his philosophy.

Plato and the Power of Images. By Pierre Destrée and Radcliffe G. Edmonds III (ed.). Leiden: Brill 2017. Pp. 243.

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In his *Republic*, Plato describes the power of images as something rather threatening. The cave analogy pictures images as more or less spellbinding us to ignorance. Furthermore, the imitating poets are banned from the ideal city because of the (potentially) disturbing effects of their poetical images. But, on the other hand, Plato presents his critique against images and imagination by using images. This is most obvious, of course, in the case of the cave analogy, but also the critique against poetry in books II-III and X is included in the project of imagining an ideal city in order to understand justice.

Pierre Destrée's and Radcliffe G. Edmond III's edited volume *Plato and the Power of Images* is dedicated to precisely this tension in Plato, namely the aiming at investigating what kind of power inhabits images according to Plato and what makes them simultaneously a potential harm for the soul and a useful (if not indispensable) element of philosophical investigations, the volume unites twelve contributions of international renowned scholars which examine different aspects of this general topic. The volume includes also an introduction by the editors, an *Index Locorum* and an *Index Thematicum* as well as detailed bibliographies accompanying each contribution.

The first two contributions examine the images of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*. Andrew Ford focuses on the presentation of Socrates as a statue (an εἰκών) of a Silenus containing beautiful ἀγάλματα (215a6-b3). With regard to this image, Ford develops an interpretation of the difference between εἰκόνες and ἀγάλματα according to which εἰκόνες aim at likeness and ἀγάλματα at amazement. And while creating εἰκόνες of intelligible entities must necessarily fail, creating ἀγάλματα is an appropriate way to 'present' intelligible entities since amazement can lead to soul towards the divine. In a second step, Ford reads the image of the statue contain-

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ing ἀγάλματα as an instruction for the reception of the *Symposium* itself: The readers are encouraged to search for the ἀγάλματα behind the εἰκόνες on the surface of the dialogue.

Elizabeth Belfiore's contribution centers on the claim in Alcibiades' speech according to which Socrates is special to such a degree that he cannot be compared to any other human being (221c3-6). The incomparableness of Socrates is shown by Plato's effort to picture what Socrates is not, that is, by the emphasis of Socrates as not being an image of a Homeric hero. Belfiore states that Socrates – instead of being pictured as having a likeness to some Homeric hero – is presented as a 'Reversed-Achilles' since he is described throughout the *Symposium* as contrary to the hero in his physical appearance, his inner qualities and his actions. This thesis is supported by a detailed and compelling analysis of the *Symposium* which reveals that even passages which don't include a direct reference to the *Ilias* contribute to the image of Socrates as the 'Reversed-Achilles', as, for instance, Socrates' staying awake at the end of the *Symposium* (223d8-12) stands in contrast to Achilles' falling asleep at the end of the *Ilias* (XXIV, 675-6).

The next two contributions offer different perspectives on the potential benefit and harm provided by beautiful images. Francisco Gonzales determines beautiful images as essentially ambivalent because they are simultaneously satisfying (and thereby bind the soul to the sensible) and unsatisfying (and thereby turn the soul towards the intelligible). The philosophers and the lovers of sights and sounds are both determined by a special relationship to beautiful images and therefore appear somewhat similar to each other, but the lovers of sights and sounds content themselves with the beautiful images, while the philosophers realize that the images point to a beauty which lies beyond them and long for this transcendent entity. These different effects of the beautiful images – which are grounded in their ambivalence –explain why Plato on the one hand criticizes images as (potentially) harmful and on the other hand uses images as a means for philosophy.

Radcliff G. Edmonds III interprets the palinode of the *Phaedrus* – especially its reference to *agalmatophilia* (251a1-7) – as emblematizing a right and a wrong way of dealing with images. The image of the beloved as a statue shows that recollection is successful if reason follows the trace of the original – that is, the trace of the Form of beauty – which is contained in the image but unsuccessful if the soul regards the image as something to be enjoyed in itself and is thereby driven to sexual pleasure. Edmonds argues that these two ways of dealing with images are transferred to (beautiful) speeches in the second part of the dialogue. Phaedrus' admiration for Lysias' speech is misdirected in the same way as the love of a person who strives for sexual pleasures when seeing a beautiful body since Phaedrus treats the speech as something to be simply enjoyed instead of treating it as stimulation for further examination.

Christopher Moore's contribution examines the constitutive power of images by analyzing the importance of self-images for self-knowledge and for the improvement of one's own character. Moore shows by means of examples from the *Protagoras*, the *Charmides*, the *Alcibiades* and the *Phaedrus*[1] that self-knowledge is impossible without a self-image which does not actually create the self but constitutes it as a (potential) object of knowledge. Such a self-image – which is not the result of self-knowledge but its precondition – is necessarily incomplete but this incompleteness is unproblematic as long as the self-image encourages moral improvement. According to Moore, Plato tries therefore to offer images which encourage the recipients to picture themselves as imperfect beings with the

potential to become perfect. With this analysis, Moore provides a differentiated picture regarding the question of image and reality with regard to the self. The image is not just a more or less perfect representation of the self but also a paradigm in accordance with which the self is formed.

Gerd van Riel examines the relationship of images to the divine. He establishes the thesis that theology – according to Plato – is dependent on images of the divine while these images simultaneously block a direct comprehension of the gods. This thesis is connected to Van Riel's interpretation of the relationship of gods and humans in Plato according to which 'becoming like god' is not assimilation to a divine intellect but assimilation to god as the measure which is accomplished by the virtue of moderation.[2] Moderation implies the recognition of one's own cognitive limitations. Gods can be understood adequately only from a divine perspective which humans are unable to take. The images used in theology are therefore necessarily incomplete or even inadequate. Philosophy has to warn us not to confuse these images with truth while it is itself – when speaking about the gods – dependent on images.

The last six contributions of the volume are focused on images in the *Republic*. Grace Ledbetter offers an original explanation for the special appeal of the image of the cave in book VII (514a1-518d7)[3]. According to her interpretation, the cave-image is extraordinarily effective because it provides us with the feeling of ascending from the cave. This interpretation is based on the specific presentation of the cave-image which prompts Glaucon (and the readers) at each stage of the ascent to imagine what the prisoner thinks and how he feels. They are encouraged to identify with the prisoner who is freed from his bounds and ascends. Parallel to this imagined ascent to the Forms, Glaucon (and the readers) accomplish a 'real ascent' during the unfolding of the cave-image: While they start with a wrong concept of education as the implantation of knowledge in the soul, they end with the more accurate concept of turning the attention of the soul towards the intelligible.

Olivier Renaut's contribution focuses on the political images of the soul in the *Republic* and their power to constitute the 'rule of law'. According to Renaut, these images are part of Plato's rhetoric strategy which aims at justifying the rule of law before the non-philosophers. Images which encourage people to think about their souls as small cities should establish the idea of law as interchangeable with one's own reason which justifies the power law hold over each individual. Renaut emphasizes that the power of these political images of the soul is independent of their 'truth' in the sense of an adequate presentation of 'preceding' relations between political and psychological elements of reality. Plato uses these images rather with regard to their formative than with regard to their descriptive powers which means that these images create the entanglement of city and soul instead of just presenting them.

Alexander G. Long aims at showing by means of Socrates' use of images in the *Republic* that he is not presented as an 'incomplete' philosopher-king but as a law-giver and founder whose role is fundamentally different from the role of the philosopher-kings.[4] Long first compellingly shows that Socrates uses images in most cases not to grasp Forms (as the geometers) but to grasp something in the sensible realm, as the ship-image of the state is used to explain why experts are often despised by people who could profit from their expertise (488a7-489a2). In a second step, the author argues that the art of ruling which depends on philosophical knowledge is fundamentally different from the art of founding a city and of giving laws which de-

pends on the art of persuasion. Socrates' use of images in the *Republic* must be regarded in most cases as part of his art of persuasion and thereby does not reveal him as an 'incomplete' philosopher-king still sticking on the level of διανοίᾳ but as a law-giver and founder whose activities are necessarily different from the activities of the philosopher-kings.

Kathryn Morgan examines the image of the philosopher-king as a goat-stage in *Republic* VI (488a4-6). This image shows that the philosopher-king is seen – by the majority of people – as a hybrid, paradox and somehow unreal creature because it unites the philosophical and the political which are apparently incompatible. The idea of the philosopher-king as a monstrous creature in the eyes of the majority sheds light on the other political images in book VI which explain the difficult situation of philosophers in most cities. Furthermore, the image of the goat-stage points to the process of creating images. By presenting Socrates as the painter of the goat-stage it reveals the creation of images in philosophy as the collection and unification of (apparently) separated elements.

Penelope Murray's contribution analyses the connection of tyranny and poetry and the function of images in establishing this connection. Murray argues that the interdependence of tyranny and tragedy is revealed in the *Republic* mostly through the associative power of images. This power is independent from the author's intention and for this reason Murray is primarily interested in images as poetical means which create meaning on their own. She shows that – on the level of images – tragedy is crucial for understanding tyranny since the tyrant is pictured by Plato as a tragic figure which is enslaved by its own desires. Furthermore, tragedy is imagined as causing this enslavement so that tragedy helps to imagine both the origin and the constitution of tyranny. And the other way round, tragedy is also made apprehensible by the picture of the tyrant since both – the tyrant and tragedy – are imagined to hide their confused inside by an (apparently) beautiful outside.

The volume closes with Douglas Cairns' examination of the image of the tripartite soul. He argues that the tripartite soul is not just explained by metaphors but that it is in itself a metaphor which Plato uses to explain the behavior of people. Cairns supports this thesis by a close analysis of Plato's description of the different degenerated characters in books VIII and IX. According to Cairns' interpretation, the whole talk about 'soul-parts' as personified agents interacting with each other, with the environment and with the person to which they belong, aims at making human behavior understandable to Socrates' interlocutors (and the readers) – who are regarded as the real agents – and to encouraging them to modify their behavior in the right way. With this approach, Cairns offers not only an interesting analysis of Plato's use of metaphors but also a challenge for interpretations which regard the 'soul-parts' as agent-like subjects.

All in all, Pierre Destrée and Radcliff G. Edmonds III provide with *Plato and the Power of Images* an excellent collection of papers which contain original insights and ideas and which will surely stimulate further discussions on the topic of images in Plato. What should be noted is that the volume – despite its quite general topic of images in Plato – is strongly focused on the middle dialogues, especially on the *Republic*, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. While six contributions are dedicated to images in the *Republic*, the volume contains just one contribution which put emphasizes on images in the early dialogues (Christopher Moore discusses self-images in the *Protagoras,* the *Charmides* and the *Alcibiades*) and one contribution which focuses on the late dialogues (Gerd van Riel examines the problem

of images in theology mainly with references to the *Theaetetus,* the *Timaios* and the *Laws*).

Of course – as the editors point out in the introduction –, the focus on the *Republic* can be justified because the dialogue is of special interest regarding the topic of images in Plato for it includes simultaneously the most famous images used in Plato's philosophy and Plato's most severe critique on images and the artists creating them. But given this focus it might nevertheless have been interesting to include one or two more contributions which center on the beginning of Plato's ambivalent approach to images in the early dialogues or its development in his later works. However, this is just a small point which shouldn't overshadow the high quality of the volume as a whole and of the particular contributions which make the volume recommendable for everyone interested in the topic of images in Plato.

NOTES

1 Christopher Moore offers a detailed analysis of self-knowledge in the *Charmides,* the *Alcibiades* and the *Phaedrus* also in *Socrates and Self-Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015.

2 This approach is connected to Gerd van Riel's thesis that Plato's god is not a transcendent intellect. Van Riel develops a detailed argumentation of this thesis also in *Plato's* Gods, Ashgate, Farnham 2013.

3 That the cave image continues until 518d is part of Ledbetter's argument. See 122-123.

4 Alexander G. Long discusses the difference between the art of ruling and the art of law-giving also in "The political art in Plato's Republic". In V. Harte and M. Lane (ed), Politeia *in Greek and Roman Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, 15-31.

Why we write in Japanese: A brief introduction to recent Plato studies in Japan[1]

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Plato is read and discussed all over the world. But most of the works on Plato known in the world are written in a few major European languages, in particular, English. We can see this in the activities of the IPS, given in five official languages, namely, English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. This language policy comes from a long history and tradition of Plato scholarship, but regrettably many works about Plato written in other languages remain unknown and mostly neglected.

Native speakers of the Japanese language are confined to the Japanese people, living in the Japanese islands. Although studying Japanese has become popular among East Asian countries, e.g. Korea and China, academic researchers of Western philosophy seldom study the Japanese language because of its notorious difficulty. Its unique writing system (with three types of letters, i.e. *hira-gana*, *kata-kana*, and *kanji*, that is, Chinese characters) is extremely challenging to learn, even for native speakers. Japanese cannot be easily read like Dutch or Portuguese, which can be guessed from their neighbouring languages. Therefore, when we Japanese scholars write in Japanese, we are aware that our scholarly literature is read only by ourselves.

One may suggest that Japanese scholars should write in English or one of the other major European languages, so as to be read in the international academic world. However, there are three reasons why we continue to use Japanese as the main language of Japanese scholarship.

First, education is given in Japanese in schools and universities in Japan. Whereas natural sciences attract more foreign students from Far-East and South-East Asian countries and use communication in English, the humanities are studied and taught mostly in Japanese, even at the major universities.

1 The introduction has been written by Noburu Notomi and the review of Yutaka Maruhashi's book by Satoshi Ogihara.

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Second, with 126 million people, Japan is proud of a high capacity of publication in Japanese. While academic books normally sell around one thousand copies per book, general-interest books on Greek philosophy often win popularity and sell over a few dozen thousand copies. Readers are not only specialists, but also ordinary citizens and students who hardly read books in English or French. So, the domestic market guarantees a reasonable sale for Japanese writers.

Third, many Japanese scholars have experiences of studying abroad, and they usually read academic works in European languages without difficulty. Nevertheless, it is not easy to express one's ideas properly in English, etc. Philosophy is by no means language-neutral, but deeply affected by each natural language: grammar, vocabulary, logic, and rhetoric, in one word, 'style'. The Japanese way of thinking is not automatically translatable to other languages, but we are proud of the rich styles of Japanese writing and thinking. Writing on Plato in Japanese must have some special aspects, which we wish to demonstrate to the world in the future in the major European languages.

Over the past one hundred years, Plato's dialogues have been translated several times from original Greek into Japanese. For example, the *Apology of Socrates* has more than ten translations, from Masaru KUBO's first edition in 1921 to my own in 2012, Il-Gong PARK's in 2017, and Ichiro KISHIMI's in 2018. Plato's *Apology* has been one of the most popular books of Western Philosophy in Japan.

Academic books and articles on Plato and other Greek philosophers are published every year. Both the Philosophical Association of Japan and the Classical Association of Japan issue two types of journals, one in Japanese and the other in European languages. Articles written in English, French, and German are published in *Tetsugaku* (PAJ website) and in *JASCA* (CAJ), so they are accessible for foreigners, but articles in Japanese are hardly read outside Japan. We see many articles on Plato in these and other academic journals (see Luc Brisson's *Plato Bibliography*, for further information).

While academic papers are read within academia, many books are written for general readers. Here I introduce some books on Plato published in recent years, categorized in four types.

The first category is academic books, which are based on doctoral dissertations and often modified for a wider audience. They are usually published by university presses with a small number of copies. In addition to Yutaka MARUHASHI's book on the *Laws* in 2017, which is reviewed by Satoshi OGIHARA below, we have Ikko TANAKA's *Plato and Mimesis* (Kyoto University Press, Kyoto 2015, based on his doctoral dissertation submitted to Kyoto University) and Akira MIKAMI's *Mousikē in Plato's Republic* (Lithon, Tokyo 2016, based on his doctoral dissertation submitted to Tsukuba University). The former examines Plato's concept of *mimesis* in the *Republic*, *Sophist*, and *Timaeus*, and the latter discusses the concept of *mousikē* in the historical and cultural contexts of classical Athens by focusing on *The Republic*.

The second category is collections of articles by a single author or a team of contributors. *Between Immanence and Transcendence: A Festschrift in Honour of Shinro KATO on His Eighty-Eighth Birthday* (edited by Shigeki TSUCHIHASHI, Noburu NOTOMI, Yuji KURIHARA and Osamu KANAZAWA, Chisen-shokan, Tokyo 2015) contains sixteen chapters, of which seven deal with Plato's dialogues and discuss Kato's interpretations of Plato. Yuji KURIHARA's second book, *Plato on Public and Private* (Chisen-shokan, Tokyo 2016, with an English summary; the first book is *Plato on Forms*

and Human Happiness, Chisen-shokan, Tokyo 2013), consists of thirteen chapters, many of which were revised from his earlier papers. This original and excellent book examines Plato's early and middle dialogues, i.e. *Protagoras*, *Apology*, *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, and *Republic* (the main focus), from the viewpoint of the ancient antithesis of public (*dēmosios*) and private (*idios*). Shigeki TSUCHIHASHI's *The Horizon of Living Well: Philosophical Papers on Plato and Aristotle* (Chisen-shokan, Tokyo 2016) includes his five earlier papers on Plato, namely *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Symposium* and *Menexenus*. Akihiro MATSUURA's *Plato's Later Dialectic: On the Unity and Plurality of Forms* (Shoyo-shobo, Kyoto 2018) focuses on the *Parmenides* and the Third Man Argument.

The third category is commentaries. Takashi YAMAMOTO's *The Symposium of Plato* (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo 2016) is a unique contribution, which includes a Japanese translation with extensive commentary and notes on the *Symposium*. Although it is common that a translation of Plato's dialogues is accompanied by an introductory essay and footnotes, this monograph provides a full commentary and exegesis. It is meant for more advanced readers who want to know Plato and his works in detail. On the other hand, it is a pity that this type of publication rarely appears, mainly because publishers face difficulties in sales.

Finally, the last category is culture books in pocket-size paperbacks featuring Plato. The most recent one is my own monograph, *Philosophy with Plato: Reading the Dialogues*, published in the series of Iwanami-shinsho (Iwanami, Tokyo 2015). This monograph is intended for students and ordinary people, and it introduces how we read Plato's dialogues philosophically. Each chapter focuses on one dialogue and starts with a citation of the key passage. Then, the comments and analysis of the passage invite readers to consider philosophical problems together with Plato. It analyses the *Gorgias*, *Apology*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Sophist* and the *Seventh Letter*. Iwanami-shinsho is the most popular paperback series in Japan on a variety of topics of culture and society (similar to the French Collection *Que sais-je?*). The series also includes Ninzui SAITO's beautiful monograph, *Plato* (1972), and Norio FUJISAWA's concise guidebook, *The Philosophy of Plato* (1997). My book is the third one in the series on the same philosopher, which shows how much Japanese people like Plato.

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Yutaka MARUHASHI, *The Rule of Law and the Philosophy of Dialogue: A Study in Plato's Dialogue* Laws (in Japanese), Kyoto University Press, Kyoto 2017. xiv + 443 + 25 (indices).

This is the first monograph ever written in Japanese on Plato's *Laws*. This dialogue has long been the focus of Professor Yutaka Maruhashi's study. His book is largely based on his doctoral thesis submitted to Kyoto University in 2004, which was mainly consisted of previously published papers. *The Rule of Law and the Philosophy of Dialogue* is unquestionably one of the

most important works written in the language on the *Laws*.

In Preface Maruhashi beautifully reports his pilgrimage to Crete, especially to Zeus' cave in Mt. Ide, that followed the paths of the characters in the dialogue.

Introductory Chapter (How to Read Plato's Dialogue *Laws*) has four sections: 1. The significance of the study in the *Laws*; 2. In search of the unity of Plato's political philosophy; 3. The structure of the *Laws* as a whole; and 4. The plan for this book. This chapter already and fully reveals the author's profound trust in Plato as a great philosopher. For Maruhashi, Plato penetrates into truths about humanity and the world, which we can learn by careful, unprejudiced reading of his texts. In particular, the *Laws* as well as the *Republic* presents his deep insights into political matters, grounded in his understanding of human nature, Maruhashi holds, and these insights constitute viable messages for the contemporary world in which liberalism is important (section 2). In section 3 the author shows how arguments in the *Laws* execute 'dialectical procedure', in which the question is raised, opinions and hypotheses put forward, and the conclusion reached. Here as well as below, limited space prevents me from covering all the important points that Maruhashi makes.

Chapter One (Plato's Political Philosophy and Socrates' Spirit) has four sections: 1. 'The rule of law' in ancient Athens; 2. Socrates' dialogue with 'the laws of the state' in the *Crito*; 3. 'The rule of law' and the idea of democracy; and 4. 'The rule of law' and the tasks for Plato's philosophy. In this chapter Maruhashi specifies three fundamental principles for political governance that are presented in the imaginary dialogue between Socrates and the Athenian laws in the *Crito.* First, the citizens ought to obey the laws. Second, the citizens have the right to ask for justification of the laws themselves, given interpretations of them, and new legislations. And third, certain conditions should be met for securing agreement from the citizens. These conditions include the availability of occasions for joint deliberation. Maruhashi maintains that these fundamental principles continue to work, and require justification, in Plato's political philosophy.

Chapter Two (On the *aitia* of Action) has five sections: 1. Socrates' critique of akrasia in the *Protagoras*; 2. 'Civic virtues' as *aitiai* of action; 3. The significance of the introduction of the tripartite-soul theory; 4. 'Genuine virtue' as the *aitia* of action; and 5. Prospect: *akrasia* and its overcoming in the *Laws*. In this chapter when considering the '*aitia* of action' in *Protagoras*, *Republic*, and *Laws*, Plato invariably discusses both civic virtues and wisdom, which is to ground them.

Chapter Three (Why Philosophy Can Influence Reality) has four sections: 1. What grounds the claim for philosophers' governance; 2. The background and the overview of the 'knowledge / *doxa*' theory in the *Republic*; 3. Knowledge and *doxa* as 'capacities (*dunameis*)'; and 4. The ground for the superiority of philosopher-kings in political practice. In this chapter Maruhashi concisely considers the *Republic*'s claim for philosophers' rule, to be contrasted with the case of the *Laws*.

Chapter Four (The Figure of 'a Puppet of the Gods') has four sections: 1. The myth of late Plato's pessimism; 2. An analysis of the figure of 'a puppet of the gods'; 3. Contrast with the tripartite-soul theory; and 4. Education to freedom in the *Laws*. In this chapter Maruhashi interestingly suggests that the Athenian's apparently pessimistic prospect of human moral development means to emphasize the indispensability of this development, and that the figure of the puppet suggests that we have to exercise

our intelligence on our own initiative if we do not want to be reduced to blind automata.

Chapter Five (The Logic of the Banishment of Poets) has four sections: 1. The starting point of Plato's critique of literature [in early dialogues]; 2. The composition of the *Republic* as a whole and the place of the critique of literature; 3. The critique of literature I [*Rep*. II-III]; and 4. The critique of literature II [*Rep*. V]. In this chapter Maruhashi overviews Plato's critical treatment of poetry in the *Republic*, to be compared with the case in the *Laws*.

Chapter Six ('The Most Beautiful Drama') has five sections: 1. Constitution and laws; 2. The third constitution [so mentioned in the *Laws*]; 3. The first constitution; 4. 'The second method of sailing' in the *Statesman*; and 5. The second constitution. In this chapter the author considers what he calls 'paradigmatism' in Plato's political philosophy in the *Laws* as well as in the *Republic* and *Statesman*. Generally speaking, paradigmatism is, as I understand Maruhashi, the view that for a given topic one has to present the ideal in its purest form, and that even when one takes into consideration a certain set of realistic conditions, one still has to seek for the best possible form under those conditions.

Chapter Seven (The Birth of the Dionysian Chorus) has five sections: 1. Fight against desires and pleasures; 2. The essence and the purpose of *mousikē*; 3. The organization of three *chōroi*; 4. The use of drinking parties; and 5. The guardians of education. In this chapter Maruhashi carefully considers the topics specified by the titles of the sections, and claims that for the author of the *Laws* education through *mousikē* can only function if citizens at large continuously engage in philosophical inquiry.

Chapter Eight (Dialectic as an Art of Persuasion) has four sections: The prefaces to the laws and persuasive rhetoric; 2. *Prooimion*: the figure of 'free doctors'; 3. *Epōdē*: *choreia* and *muthos*; and 4. *Dialogos*: dialogue with young atheists. In this chapter Maruhashi considers various, pervasive use of persuasion in the governance of Magnesia, and claims that its use should not be understood as paternalistic imposition of norms. The reason for this claim is that each citizen is supposed to engage in internal dialogue in the course of persuasion.

Chapter Nine (Therapeutic Education of the Soul) has four sections: 1. The principles of penal code; 2. Various kinds of ignorance, and *akrasia*; 3. <Ignorance> as the cause of crime; and 4. Punishment as therapeutic education of the soul. In this chapter Maruhashi identifies Plato's view, both intellectualist and 'philanthropic', that since injustice comes from ignorance, anyone can be cured of injustice if he/she comes to realize his/her ignorance through 'self-education'.

Chapter Ten ('The Nocturnal Council' and the Rule of Law) has four sections: 1. Where the issues are; 2. The circumstances of the introduction of 'the nocturnal council', and its members; 3. The proper tasks and the essential roles of 'the nocturnal council'; and 4. The guardians of the constitution. In this chapter Maruhashi curiously claims that Magnesia's treatment of religious dissidents does not violate the freedom of thought and belief. The reasons for this claim are that it aims to restore sound mind to the dissidents, and that in prison they can discuss with members of the Nocturnal Council, who provide them with most enlightened arguments for the orthodoxy. Maruhashi seems to have a unique conception of the freedom of thought. In what I take to be the usual conception, if a government grants citizens the freedom of thought and belief, this implies that atheists, for example, can remain atheists and be not imprisoned or executed for that. Magnesian atheists would enjoy no such freedom. Given this usual conception, Maruhashi would have been

consistent in his attempt to defend Magnesia's religious policies from liberal critiques if he had claimed instead that the freedom of thought was overvalued today. Anyway, Marihashi concludes Chapter Ten by pointing out that Socratic examination familiar from Plato's early dialogues is incorporated as a key element in the decent public life conceived in the *Laws*.

Final Chapters (The Tasks for Philosophy in the Dialogue *Laws*) summarizes the foregoing discussions.

There are two appendices. The first (Love, Intelligence, and Freedom) is an engaged response to Georg Picht's *Platons Dialoge >>Nomoi<< und >>Symposion<<* (Klett, Stuttgart, 1990). It has three sections: A. For the revival of genuine philosophical spirit in the present age; B. The natural-philosophical account of constitutions in the *Laws*; and C. The truth of *amor Platonicus*, and for its renaissance. The second appendix is a review of K. Schöpsdau's translation of and the commentary on the *Laws*. The book also contains a detailed analysis of the *Laws*.

To conclude, Yutaka Maruhashi's *The Rule of Law and the Philosophy of Dialogue* is an excellent example both of sincere high-quality scholarship and engaged thoughtful reflection on Plato's *Laws* ever produced in Japan.

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Plat., *Tim.* 35 a 4-6.
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