INTERNATIONAL PLATO SOCIETY

22

OCT 2021

ISSN 2079-7567
eISSN 2183-4105

Established 1989
http://platosociety.org/

Dossier
Richard D. Parry
Michael J. Augustín
Renato Matoso
Xin Liu
George Rudebusch
Tom Tuozzo
Roslyn Weiss

Papers
Marco Donato
Jeans Kristian Larsen
Ramus Sevelsted
Jan Szaif
Jonathan Lavilla de Lera &
Javier Aguirre Santos
Stephen Oppong Peprah

Book Reviews
Francisco L. Lisi

PLATO JOURNAL

Société Platonicienne Internationale

Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti

Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas

Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft

Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra

Coimbra Universiy Press

INTERNATIONAL PLATO SOCIETY

22 JUN 2021

ISSN 2079-7567
eISSN 2183-4105

Established 1989
http://platosociety.org/

Dossier
Richard D. Parry
Michael J. Augustín
Renato Matoso
Xin Liu
George Rudebusch
Tom Tuozzo
Roslyn Weiss

Papers
Marco Donato
Jeans Kristian Larsen
Ramus Sevelsted
Jan Szaif
Jonathan Lavilla de Lera &
Javier Aguirre Santos
Stephen Oppong Peprah

Book Reviews
Francisco L. Lisi

PLATO JOURNAL

Société Platonicienne Internationale

Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti

Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas

Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft

Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra

Coimbra Universiy Press

CREDITS

EDITION
Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra
Coimbra University Press
http://uc.pt/imprensa_uc

PROPERTY
International Plato Society

DESIGN
Carlos Costa

INFOGRAPHICS
Raquel Aido

ISSN
2079-7567

eISSN
2183-4105

DOI
https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105

SUMMARY

DOSSIER

“IPS at the American Philosophical Association”

Introduction

Richard D. Parry
Guest Editor
Fuller E. Callaway Professor of Philosophy Emeritus,
Agnes Scott College.
ORCID: 0000-0003-4540-1396

The 2022 triennial meeting of the International Plato Society will be held at the University of Georgia, in Athens, GA, and will be the first in the United States. In preparation for this event, incoming president, Edward C. Halper, proposed a series of joint sessions with the American Philosophical Association. These sessions are a way to acquaint the American philosophical community with the work of the Society. The papers in this volume were presented at sessions of the Eastern Division (January 2020) and the Pacific Division (originally scheduled for April 2020). That these articles started life as presentations constrained by time explains why some are as short as they are.

In "Socrates and Thrasymachus on Perfect and Imperfect Injustice," Roslyn Weiss forcefully argues for a thesis that challenges the orthodox interpretation of justice in the *Republic*. Orthodoxy holds that Socrates' account of justice in Book 1 is, at best, a preliminary effort, aimed at Thrasymachus; the fuller account, from Books 2-4, is what the reader should take as the authentic account. Weiss argues, to the contrary, that, in Book 1, Socrates correctly identifies justice and injustice as other-regarding. Thus, an individual is just or unjust because of the way she treats others; justice and injustice for a city are analogously other-regarding. What is called justice and injustice in Books 2-4 are an internal arrangement of parts of the soul whose function is not, in itself, other-regarding; at best, these are moderation and immoderation and are only necessary conditions for justice and injustice.

In "Self-Instantiation and Self-Participation," Michael Augustin returns to the issue of forms as self-instantiating. He argues that the so-called structuring forms of Being, Oneness, Identity, Difference, Likeness, and

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_0

Unlikeness must be self-instantiating. Each must have the property of which it is the essential nature; e.g., Being must have being. Although one might argue that it is the nature of such forms to be self-instantiating, the best way to explain self-instantiation in each case is by self-participation; each form instantiates itself because it participates in itself.

Thomas Tuozzo offers a novel reading of the notion of existence for forms in "Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato's *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6)." The fifth hypothesis states that the one is not. Taking the one to be a form, Tuozzo argues that the being denied of the one is spatial-temporal instantiation; the hypothesis considers a case where the form is not, as a contingent matter of fact, instantiated at some time and place. Later, in the deduction, when Parmenides says that the one participates in being in a way, this claim means that the one *is* in the condition of not being instantiated, although it could very well cease to be in this condition. The motion, generating and perishing that the deduction attributes to the one refer, Tuozzo argues, to the one form's passage from the condition of being instantiated to that of not being instantiated.

Renato Matoso begins with a problem in interpretating the Divided Line in the *Republic*. He attributes the problem to reading the passage through the lens of the widely accepted notion of Degrees of Reality. Vlastos famously argued that this idea is preferable to what he claimed to be the incoherent idea of Degrees of Existence. However, Matoso offers a way of understanding degrees of existence that is meant to overcome the objection. An original and, e.g., its image in a mirror differ in degrees of existence because the existence of the latter is so dependent on the former that it can be said to have a lesser degree of existence. This notion of dependent existence also has negative implications for the Two World view. Finally, he shows that this idea solves the original problem of interpreting the Divided Line.

In "*Philebus* 23c-26d: *Peras*, *Apeiron*, and *Meikton* as Measure," George Rudebusch reviews the problems with some current interpretations of the concepts Bound, Unbounded, and Mix. Then using the notion of scale, from abstract measurement theory, he offers a way of understanding these three concepts that resolves these problems. A scale is defined by a domain of items and the relations among them; it is an arrangement of related pairs of items in a graded array. Scales differ depending on the kinds of relations found among the items. In a partial scale, items are related anti-symmetrically and transitively; for instance, pairs of cities on rivers in the Mississippi Watershed, related by being downstream from one another, form a partial scale. The Unbounded, e.g., hotter and colder, can be represented as a partial scale without an upper or lower limit. The Bound is a set of equality relations and proportions that, when added to the Unbounded, produce a ratio scale; when pairs in the Unbounded are divided by intervals and are then related by equality or proportion, they form a ratio scale. The Mix of Unbounded and Bound can be represented as a ratio scale with appropriate bounds.

Liu Xin addresses methodology in "On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato's and Aristotle's Methods of Division." She starts with the Stranger's division of constitutions in the *Statesman* (291c-292b, 301a-303b). There constitutions are divided, first, according to the number of rulers—one, few, or many—yielding monarchy, rule of the few, rule of the many. Then the Stranger

adds legal-illegal, yielding six constitutions altogether: kingship-tyranny, aristocracy-oligarchy, democracy (legal)-democracy (illegal). If this division were a single *diairesis* (vertical division), 'legal-illegal' should be a sub-differentia of the differentia 'number of rulers.' However, 'legal-illegal' is not a sub-differentia of 'number of rulers.' According to Liu, this problem is due to the mistake of taking the division to be a single *diairesis*. Instead of a single *diairesis*, there are two independent but parallel divisions, associated with one another. The first divides constitutions according to the number of rulers and the second according to legality. Then the two parallel divisions are crossed, making a 3 x 2 chiasmus (cross-division), which yields the six constitutions. The distinctions among *diairesis* (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division) are more clearly found in Aristotle's method of division, which Liu then explicates, in a way that clarifies Plato's use of them.

Self-Instantiation and Self-Participation

Michael J. Augustín
Pennsylvania State University
m.augustin@me.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-9154-4051

ABSTRACT

Abstract: While each Form is *what it is to be* F, some Forms also instantiate F (or "self-instantiate"). Here I consider whether the explanation for a Form's instantiating F *should* be the Form's participating in itself. First, I motivate the need for an explanation of self-instantiation. Second, I consider the advantages and disadvantages of self-participation alongside an alternative explanation—that the Form's being *what it is to be* F is a sufficient explanation of its instantiation of F. The result is not a conclusive case for self-participation, but only some initial considerations in favor of it.

Keywords: Plato, Self-Predication, Self-Instantiation, Self-Participation, *Parmenides, Sophist*

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_1

1. INTRODUCTION

Starting in the *Parmenides* and continuing into the late dialogues, Plato's metaphysics develops in at least two ways. First, there is a shift from the Forms being predicationally simple to being predicationally many. By "predicationally simple," I mean that the Form has one and only one predicate–the predicate that refers to the nature that the Form is (*Prm*. 129b-130a; 137c-142a; cf. *Sph*. 251d-252d). By "predicationally many," I mean that the Form has many predicates–both in the sense that it *is* many things and in the sense that it *is not* many things (*Prm*. 161e-162b; *Sph*. 252d-257a).

Second, there is a shift from an Assimilation approach to predication, participation, and paradeigmatism to a Plural Predication approach. Christine Thomas describes the Assimilation approach as one where there is "a single predication relation for cases of self-predication and participation alike. The Form of Beauty and a beautiful sensible have Beauty predicated of them in the same way: both instantiate beauty. … Forms are paradigms by being perfect exemplars of properties (or kinds), and sensibles participate in Forms by deficiently resembling them, by being imperfect copies" (Thomas, 2014, p. 171). Thomas describes the Plural Predication approach as one where "the self-predication relation differs from the participation relation. … a Form *is* F or *is what it is to be* F, while the sensible *has* F. … Forms are paradigms as definable essences, and sensibles are dependent on Forms in at least the following sense: no sensible can *instantiate* F unless something–a Form–*is what it is to be* F" (Thomas, 2014, p. 171).

This paper explores whether there *should* be a third shift in Plato's late metaphysics–whether the explanation for some Form's instantiating F (what I shall sometimes call "self-instantiation") *should* be that the Form participates *in itself*. For there are some Forms that both are the *what it is to be* F and instantiate F. There are some scholars that argue that there *is* this third shift in Plato's late metaphysics. Yet framing the question in this way–whether the explanation for some Form's instantiating F is that the Form participates in itself–restricts discussion to just three passages: *Prm*. 162a-b, *Sph*. 255d-e, and *Sph*. 256a.[1] The former question, however, imposes no such restriction; it allows for consideration of the matter from a broader perspective.

I shall argue that there is some support for the claim that self-participation should be the explanation for self-instantiation. First, I shall motivate the need for an explanation for self-instantiation by reviewing a problem for the theory of Forms from the Parmenides, as well as the section on the Great Kinds from the *Sophist*. Second, I shall consider the advantages and disadvantages of self-participation as the explanation by setting it alongside an alternative explanation – that the Form's being what it is to be F is a sufficient explanation of its instantiation of F. The result shall not be a conclusive case for self-participation, but only some initial considerations in favor of it.

2. BOTH/AND

While all Forms are the *what it is to be* F for their respective properties (or kinds), some Forms must also instantiate F. Minimally, this group of Forms includes Being, Oneness, Identity, Difference, Likeness, and Unlikeness–a group that is often called the "structuring Forms."[2]

Consider the first section of argument in the second part of the *Parmenides* (137c-142a). This section starts from the hypothesis "if it is one" and ends with Parmenides arguing that there is no name, account, knowledge, perception, or opinion of the One because the One neither is one nor is (*Prm.* 141e-142a). Why? The One does not partake of Being (*Prm.* 141d-e). Yet Aristotle, when prompted by Parmenides, says that these conclusions cannot be true of the One (*Prm.* 142a). It is no surprise, then, that the second section of argument (*Prm.* 142b-155e) begins by confirming that if the One is one and is, then the One must partake of Being (142b-d). So, the One has the property of being–it *is*–because it partakes of Being. Yet the One is not just the *what it is to be one*; it also has the property of being one–it is one being (*Prm.* 142d). What is the explanation for this?

The same question is raised by the investigation of some of the Great Kinds (*Sph.* 254b-257b). Once the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus mark off Being, Change, Stability, Identity, and Difference, the Eleatic Visitor proposes that they draw some conclusions. Some of these conclusions are: Change has the property of being because it partakes of Being; Change has the property of being self-identical because it partakes of Identity; Change has the property of difference in relation to Identity, and so is not Identity, because of its association with Difference; Change also has the property of difference in relation to Stability, Difference, and Being for the same reason–it associates with Difference. Yet Being, Identity, and Difference–in addition to being the *what it is to be*, the *what it is to be self-identical*, and the *what it is to be different*, respectively–must themselves instantiate the properties of being, self-identity, and difference (in relation to something), respectively. If the explanation for Change instantiating these properties is that it partakes of the Kinds that are the *what it is to be* for these properties, what is the explanation for those Kinds *themselves* instantiating the properties of which they are the natures?

What about Forms that are not structuring Forms? The Beautiful is arguably described in the *Symposium* as not just the *what it is to be beautiful*, but also as instantiating beauty–and in a maximal or perfect way (211aff.). And perhaps the Good–what goodness *is*, the cause of knowledge and truth, an inconceivably beautiful thing–has the property of being good (*R.* 507a-509c). I suspend judgment about these Forms here, save only to note that if they too have the properties of which they are the natures, then the need for an explanation for self-instantiation is all the more pressing. There is a diverse and foundational group of Forms that both are the nature of some property and instantiate that property.

Do all Forms self-instantiate, though? Arguably, no. While Largeness, say, is the *what it is to be large*, it is difficult to make sense of the Form being a large thing, and why it would need to instantiate largeness. The same is the case for Smallness too. Yet even if it could be shown that Largeness and Smallness need to self-instantiate and explained what it means for them to be a large thing and a small thing, respectively, there is one Form that cannot self-instantiate–Change. The Forms are stable, unchanging entities; the Forms do not move from here to there, they do not turn around in the same place, and they are unalterable. Therefore, no Form is a changing thing–including Change. This observation is important, as it suggests that self-instantiation is limited. Only *some* Forms are both the *what it is to be* F and instantiate F. This too requires an explanation.

3. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

The case for some Forms both being the *what it is to be* F and instantiating F was made in the previous section. It is time to explore possible explanations for the latter. There are two candidates. First, it is the Form's being the *what it is to be* F that explains the Form's instantiating F. For example, Identity's being the *what it is to be self-identical* explains why it also has the property of being self-identical. I call this the "Nature Explanation" (**NE**). Second, it is the Form's participating *in itself* that explains the Form's instantiating F, just as things other than the Form must participate in the Form to instantiate F. For example, it is because Identity participates in itself that it has the property of being self-identical, just as things other than Identity are self-identical because they participate in it. I call this the "Self-Participation Explanation" (**SPE**). The initial difference between these two candidates is that by **NE**, the Form's being the *what it is to be* F is sufficient to explain its instantiating F; by **SPE**, the Form's being the *what it is to be* F is not sufficient to explain its instantiating F–the Form must also participate in itself.

NE as currently formulated is unacceptable. The case was made above that not all Forms instantiate the property of which they are the nature. So, **NE** must be revised–it cannot be the case that the Form's being the *what it is to be* F is sufficient to explain its instantiating F. There must be something more, something in addition to the Form's being the *what it is to be* F that explains its instantiating F. While it might seem that this is a point in favor of **SPE**, **SPE** is subject to a similar requirement. Since **SPE** too must limit which Forms self-instantiate, which it can accomplish by limiting which Forms participate in themselves, there must be some reason why, say, Difference participates in itself, while Change does not participate in itself. And though some may say that Change's instantiating the property of change conflicts with the immutability of the Forms, this reason cannot explain why Largeness and Smallness do not instantiate largeness and smallness, respectively. Perhaps there are different reasons for different Forms. Yet a single reason seems preferable, if there is such a reason.

What might such a reason be? Above I wrote that there is a special group of Forms, the structuring Forms. The name highlights the structuring role that these Forms fulfill in the intelligible and sensible realms. By "structuring role," I mean that these Forms provide the (minimally) necessary properties that anything that *is*–whether completely or deficiently–must have if it is *to be*. It is necessary for anything that is that it possess the following properties: it must *be*, be *one*, be *self-identical*, be *different* (from everything other than itself), and be *like* and *unlike* other things in various ways. It is not possible for something to be, yet lack one or more of these properties. By contrast, it is not necessary for something that is that it be a changing thing–the Forms are, but are not changing things. Similarly, it is not necessary for something that is that it be beautiful–Socrates is, yet he is not beautiful. If this is correct, then recognition of the structuring role that some Forms fulfill, while others do not, can serve as the reason that both **NE** and **SPE** need to meet the previous difficulty. On **NE**, if some Form is a structuring Form, then this, in addition to its being the *what it is to be* F, explains its instantiating F. Similarly, on **SPE** if some Form is a structuring Form, then this explains why that Form participates in itself and therefore instantiates F. Finally, on both explanations,

Forms that are not structuring Forms do not instantiate the properties of which they are the natures. Why? These Forms do not fulfill the requisite role for self-instantiation.

It seems that attending to the structuring role that some Forms fulfill in the intelligible and sensible realms puts **NE** and **SPE** on equal footing. If this is the case, then why prefer **SPE** to **NE**? **SPE** is preferable because it provides what I call a "uniform explanation for instantiation." Consider **NE**. It is a consequence of **NE** that there are two explanations for something's instantiating F: either something is the *what it is to be* F–and it is a structuring Form–or something participates in the *what it is to be* F. On **SPE**, however, there is only one explanation for something's instantiating F: something instantiates F just in case it participates in the *what it is to be* F. For example, everything other than Difference is different (from everything else) because of their participation in Difference; for Difference itself, the explanation for its being different (from everything else) is its participation in itself. The explanation is the same for both groups of objects, save that for the former they participate in something *other* than themselves, while for the latter it participates *in itself*. This is what I mean by a "uniform explanation for instantiation."

Why prefer a single explanation to two explanations? There is nothing inherently objectionable about the latter. Yet it would be an unnecessary revision to the theory of Forms. Consider the two ways in which Plato's metaphysics develops that I outlined in the **Introduction**. The first, that the Forms shift from being predicationally simple to being predicationally many, is a necessary revision to the theory of Forms. As I explained at the outset of **Both/And**, the first and second sections of the second part of the *Parmenides* show that if the One has only one predicate–the one that refers to the nature that it is–then it is not one (*Prm.* 141e-142a). If the One to be one, it must partake of Being (*Prm.* 142b-d). Moreover, if my above claim about the importance of the structuring Forms for all things in the intelligible and sensible realms is correct, then the One must (minimally) also partake of Identity, Difference, Likeness, and Unlikeness. The previous, predicationally simple understanding of the Forms led to unacceptable conclusions (*Prm.* 142a). If these unacceptable conclusions are to be avoided, then the Forms must be predicationally many.

The second development, from the Assimilation approach to the Plural Predication approach, is also a necessary revision to the theory of Forms. There are several reasons for this, though I shall mention just two of them. First, as I argued at the end of **Both/And**, it is not the case, as the Assimilation approach would have it, that all Forms self-instantiate. There must be some distinction between *being* and *having*, where the former is not sufficient for the latter. Second, while understanding the sense in which the Forms are paradigms as the perfect exemplars of properties is plausible for aesthetic and moral Forms, it leads to absurd results if we consider the structuring Forms. For example, there are no degrees of self-identity. And while it might be the case for Plato that there are "degrees of being," all Forms completely are, even if Being itself is the *what it is to be*. Therefore, the Forms cannot be paradigms in the perfect exemplar sense. Rather, the Forms must be paradigms in the sense of being the natures of properties or, as Thomas would put it, "definable essences" (2014, p. 171).

It is not, however, necessary to introduce a second explanation for instantiation, as **NE** does. The participation relation is sufficient

to explain both how things other than the structuring Form instantiate some property and how the structuring Form itself instantiates that property. And this is because by the late dialogues the Forms are paradigms in the sense of being the natures of properties. Consider this: suppose "participation" refers to the paradigm-copy account of participation proposed by Socrates in the *Parmenides* (132d). On this account, something participates in something else–the paradigm–by resembling it, by being modeled on it. So, "self-participation" on this account means that the structuring Form is modeled on itself. Yet on the perfect exemplar sense of paradeigmatism, this requires that the structuring Form *already* instantiates F, so that it is the model of F. The resulting explanation is circular–if paradeigmatism understood as perfect exemplification of properties, then self-participation offers no explanation for self-instantiation. There is no such circularity, however, if the Forms are the natures of properties, where this is not sufficient for instantiating properties.

This is not to say that Plato *does not* introduce a second explanation for instantiation in the late dialogues. He may do so. I am arguing only that he *need not* introduce a second explanation for instantiation. Participation can be the single explanation for instantiation. This tips the scale, if only slightly, in favor of a uniform of explanation for instantiation and, therefore, of **SPE**.

4. CONCLUSION

There are some Forms that are both the *what it is to be* F and instantiate F. How it is that these Forms instantiate the properties of which they are the natures requires some explanation. This paper explored the possibilities available to Plato in the light of certain ways in which the theory of Forms develops in the *Parmenides* and the late dialogues. It does not argue that Plato *does* adopt either of the explanations considered here. Rather, the paper considers only the advantages and disadvantages of these explanations to assess their preferability. The conclusion reached is that there is a slight preference for **SPE**, for self-participation's being the explanation for self-instantiation, because this results in the theory of Forms' having a uniform explanation for instantiation. The explanation for instantiation is always participation, whether the object participated in is something else or the thing itself. What remains is consideration of what explanation, if any, Plato did offer for self-instantiation.

APPENDIX: TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

T1: This is how being would most of all be and not-being would not be: being partaking of being with respect to being a being, and not-being with respect to not being a not-being, and not-being partaking of not-being with respect to not being a being, and being with respect to being a not-being, if not-being is completely not to be. – Most true. (*Prm*. 162a5-b8)[3]

T2: We must then say that the nature of the Different is fifth among the Forms we chose. – Yes. – And shall we say that it goes through all of them; for each one is different from the rest not on account of its own nature, but on account of participating in the Form of the Different. (*Sph*. 255d9-e6)[4]

T3: First, let us say that Change is completely different from Stability. Shall we say

that? – Yes. – So, it is not Stability. – Not at all. – But it *is*, because it shares in *that which is*. – Yes. – Then again Change is different from Identity. – Pretty much. – So, it is not Identity. – No. – But still it was self-identical, we said, because everything has a share of that. – Definitely. (*Sph*. 255e11-256a9)

Bibliography

Curd, (1988). Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist. *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5, no. 4, p. 307-320.

Curd, (1989). Some Problems of Unity in the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 3, p. 347-359.

Curd, (1990). *Parmenides* 142b5-144e7: The 'Unity is Many' Arguments. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 1, p. 19-35.

Kostman, (1989). The Ambiguity of 'Partaking' in Plato's *Sophist*. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27, no. 3, p. 343-363.

Schofield, (1996). Likeness and Likenesses in the *Parmenides*. In: Gill, C.; McCabe M. M. (eds). *Form and Argument in Late Plato*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 49-77.

Shorey, (1891). On Parmenides 162 AB. *The American Journal of Philology* 12, no. 3, p. 349-353.

Stough, (1990). Two Kinds of Naming in the *Sophist*. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20, no. 3, p. 355-382.

Thomas, (2014). Plato on Metaphysical Explanation: Does 'Participating' Mean Nothing? *Studia Philosophica Estonica*, p. 168-194.

Nehamas (1982). Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought. *The Review of Metaphysics*, p. 343-374.

Vlastos, (1973). Self-Predication and Self-Participation in Plato's Later Period. In Vlastos G. (ed.). *Platonic studies*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 335-341

Notes

1 These passages are reproduced in the **Appendix**.

2 Some argue that Likeness and Unlikeness are jettisoned from the catalogue of Forms after the *Parmenides*. For instance, see I disagree. Whether Likeness and Unlikeness remain in or are jettisoned from the catalogue of Forms, though, does not affect my argument–still present are Being, Oneness, Identity, and Difference.

3 This translation 162a5-b8 requires Shorey's emendations to the text, specifically the insertion of *mē* at 162a8 and the deletion of *mē* at 162b2.

4 This translation understands *allōn* as dependent on *heteron* and not *hekaston* at 255e4.

Cognition, Objects, and Proportions in the Divided Line

Renato Matoso
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
ORCID:0000-0003-1067-0545
renatomatoso@puc-rio.br

ABSTRACT

In a recent publication, Nicholas Smith discussed some elements of the *Republic's* divided line (*Rep*. 509d6-511e4) to demonstrate that they create an unresolved problem. I tackle Smith's argumentation to show that elements of the divided line that are mentioned by him do not create problems in interpreting this passage. On the contrary, these features convey one of the most important doctrines behind this passage. This is the idea that the world of sensible things holds a dependence upon the world of Forms in the same way that shadows and reflections depend on the things that are shadowed and reflected. Following this line of reasoning, I propose an interpretation of the divided line in which both knowledge and opinion are set over the same kind of objects F. One has an opinion about F whenever apprehending F by means of its effects, and one has knowledge about F whenever apprehending F itself.

Keywords: Plato; Divided Line; Existence; Degrees of Reality; Two Worlds Theory

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_2

In a recent publication in *Plato Journal*, Nicholas Smith (2018) proposes a problem of interpreting the *Republic's* divided line. According to Smith, the relationship between line segments and the degrees of clarity and truth that these segments intend to indicate are stated in such a way that the platonic doctrine behind this passage becomes troublesome. Smith begins his argument by indicating that for both versions of the divided line (*Rep.* VI. 511d6-e4 and *Rep.* VI. 509d6-510b1), the proportions between line segments are intended to indicate different degrees of clarity and truth. However, as Smith duly notes, it is unclear how Plato relates truth and clarity with the objects and cognitive states that are mentioned in the passage. For example, consider how Plato first explains the line:

> "It is like a line divided into two unequal sections. Then divide each section–namely, that of the visible and that of the intelligible–in the same ratio. In terms now of relative clarity and opacity (σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ), one subsection of the visible consists of images (εἰκόνες). And by images (εἰκόνας) I mean, first, shadows (σκιάς), then reflections in water (τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα) and in all close-packed, smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort, if you understand.
> I do.
> In the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images, namely, the animals around us, all the plants, and the whole class of manufactured things. Consider them put.
> Would you be willing to say that, as regards truth and untruth (ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή), the division is in this proportion: As the opinable (τὸ δοξαστὸν) is to the knowable (τὸ γνωστόν), so the likeness is to the thing that it is like?
> Certainly." (*Rep.* VI. 509d6-510b1)[1]

In this first passage, the degrees of clarity apply to the objects with which the line segments are associated (shadows, reflections, animals, plants, and manufactured things). Truth, in contrast, is brought in at the end to be applied to "the opinable" (τὸ γνωστόν) and "the knowable" (τὸ γνωστόν). In the subsequent second version of the divided line, however, clarity applies to cognitive states (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; i.e., to νόησις, διάνοια, πίστις, and εἰκασία, respectively), whereas truth applies to the objects that these παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ are "set over" (ἐφ' οἷς):

> "There are four such conditions in the soul (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ), corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding (νόησις) for the highest, thought for the second (διάνοια), belief (πίστις) for the third, and imaging (εἰκασία) for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity (σαφήνεια) to the degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth (ἀλήθεια)." (*Rep.* VI.511d6e41)

These two passages, when considered together, indicate that Plato appears to be somewhat unsure about what precisely truth and clarity are supposed to measure. To resolve this lack of precision, Smith goes back to Socrates' discussion about the merits of knowledge, opinion, and ignorance in Book V, simply to find the same kind of inexactness. He then suggests that we take the quality of kinds of objects as fundamental and the quality of different cognitive states as explicable in terms of the quality of these objects. In

this case, Plato would remain consistent in the middle books of the *Republic* in applying degrees of truth to kinds of objects, whereas the measure of clarity of cognitive states would "co-vary with the truth of the objects" (Smith, 2018, p. 100).

So far, this line of reasoning is good, but Smith's "nightmare" begins when he considers proportions between different line segments. Whatever the exact construction of the line that one adopts, there is a feature of it that seems to be inescapable. For both versions of the line, there must be a proportion between the two upper segments (taken together) and the two lower segments (taken together) that also applies to the two lower segments relative to each another. In the two figures below, that means (I1 + I2) / (V1 + V2) = V2/V1.[2]

Book VI Version



I1 + I2/V1 + V2 = I2/I1 = V2/V1

However, this mathematical feature of the line is supposed to create a philosophical problem of considerable importance:

"As far as I know, there has been no notice in the literature about the problem that this seems to create, namely, that V1 + V2 (that is, the entire lower section of the original division) must be clearer (and, as we soon learn, given the association of clarity and truth, also truer) than either V1 or V2 by themselves. But this seems to me to create nonsense: How can V1 + V2 be clearer or truer than either V1 or V2? Why would adding the relative lack of clarity (and truth) in V1 to whatever we find in V2 make V1 + V2 clearer (and truer) than V2 just by itself? Plato tells us that V1 consists in shadows and reflections in water and other reflective surfaces. Why would adding these to the visible originals give us a collection of things that is clearer or truer than the collection of visible originals without shadows and reflections added to that collection?" (Smith, 2018, p. 104)

Again, some excerpts below:

"The problem is that it seems absurd to think that visible originals taken together with their visible images (V1 + V2) will be clearer or truer than the visible originals alone […] So, too, the epistemic deficiencies we are supposed to associate with the lower subsections of the line, relative to the subsections just above them in each of the original divisions, make it absurd to suppose that Plato intends whatever epistemic condition we should apply to the entire lower line (V1 +V2)–δόξα in Book's VII recapitulation–to be clearer and truer than either εἰκασία or πίστις by themselves. Why would adding the (less clear/less true) εἰκασία to πίστις yield a clearer (or truer) cognitive condition

> (taken as a whole) than that enjoyed by πίστις alone?" (Smith, 2018, p. 104)

So, Smith concludes:

> "We are left with the unhappy result that Plato makes proportions of clarity and truth the focus of the comparisons he makes in the divided line passage, but in doing so, he creates an image that has both mathematical and also philosophical entailments that do not seem to represent views he would accept." (Smith, 2018, p.105)

In the following sections, I challenge Smith's conclusion by providing the explanation he demands. However, given the cleverness of Smith's argumentation, to explain why grasping V1 + V2 represents a clear and truer apprehension of reality than grasping V2 alone, I will briefly discuss two of the most famous–or should I say infamous–dogmas of 20th century scholarly platonism: the "two worlds theory" and the doctrine of "degrees of reality."

DEGREES OF REALITY

In 1965, Gregory Vlastos established what appears to be one of the most important tenets of analytically inspired interpretations of Plato. The so-called doctrine of degrees of reality was first put forward in the essay *Degrees of Reality in Plato* (1965) and then developed somewhat further in Vlastos' presidential address before the American Philosophical Association, later published as *A Metaphysical Paradox* (1966). The central hypothesis is that degrees of being in Plato could never mean degrees of existence because the very notion of grades of existence is complete nonsense. According to this idea, whenever Plato says that a given Form F is "really real," he is not asserting something about its existence–he is just categorizing its way of *being F*. The platonic thesis that sensible things "are and are not" means that sensible things "are and are not" *p* for a given predicate *p*. However, it would be extremely difficult for Plato to make sense of these expressions for the existential sense of being since the very notion of existence "rules out as *monstrosity* a *tertium quid* between existence and non-existence" (Vlastos, 1966, p. 10). Even if Plato had wished to follow this difficult path, then he "would have had to fight his native language all the way, and some sign of the combat would have shown up in the text" (Vlastos, 1966, p. 10).

Vlastos advises contemporary platonists to stop talking about degrees of existence and instead give attention to different ways by which Forms and sensible particulars are related to their predicates. The importance of this lesson for platonism can hardly be understated. Inspired by these remarks, a whole generation of scholars further developed an interpretation of Plato that places predication in the center of his doctrine, making his philosophy more relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions and turning passages that really seemed at odds for older interpreters into clearly understandable texts.

Nevertheless, I dare to say that it is time for us to reconsider Vlastos' absolute interdiction of the idea of degrees of existence in Plato. I do not mean that we should take the notion of predication from the center of platonic metaphysics. Rather, my point is that to answer Smith's aforementioned questions and correctly understand the divided line, we must consider degrees of existence.

One feature of the first segment of the line (V1) that is almost never noticed by interpreters is that Plato takes a considerable amount of time explaining exactly what kinds of images he has in mind here. Although the word εἰκόνες could be used to characterize statues, pictures, or any other kind of representations, Plato makes it clear that he is populating this segment of the line with shadows and reflections (σκιάς; φαντάσματα). Later, he takes care to mention that these are shadows and reflections that are caused by animals, plants, and objects that populate the segment V2 (*Rep*. 510a 5-6). We then must ask why he is so careful in describing the nature of these images and also what features shadows and reflections have in common when considered relative to the original of which they are images.

What these kinds of images have in common is that they are all direct effects of their models in a way that a painting or a statue is not. Therefore, shadows and reflections depend on their models for their existence in a manner that statues and paintings do not depend. If someone draws a caricature of me and then takes it away, then it will continue to exist, the same way that a statue of Fidel Castro exists now in Cuba although the man is now gone. Conversely, a shadow or reflection does not hold this kind of independent existence and can only exist while its model is effectively causing it.

I submit that this kind of dependent being of shadows and reflections represents a lesser degree of existence. Its essential feature is that these kinds of images can only exist as a dependent effect of their models, in opposition to other kinds of representations that we usually find in Plato, such as paintings and statues, that can exist independently of their models. A picture of me depends on me to be recognized as an image of myself, but it does not depend on me to exist. Yet, my image that is reflected in a mirror ceases to exist as soon as I am gone. If I cease to exist, then there can no longer be a shadow or reflection of me.

Another feature of this lower degree of existence is that these entities (shadows and reflections) are usually not considered enumerable objects. If someone wants to enumerate how many things are involved in the situation of a man who sees himself in a mirror, then he would probably say that there are just two things: the man and the mirror. The man's image in this case is usually considered simply an effect of the relationship between these two things. Likewise, my shadow and I do not form a pair of objects in the same way that a statue of myself and I would form. Of course my shadow exists, but it is not usually enumerated, and it only exists as a dependent effect of myself. Conversely, a statue of me is as much enumerable as I am and can exist even if I cease to exist. In fact, the majority of paintings and statues exist for longer than their models.

As soon as we realize the specificities of the kinds of images that Plato uses to populate V1, it becomes clear why apprehending V1 + V2 represents a truer and clearer grasp of reality than apprehending V2 alone. The objects of V2 are direct causes of the objects of V1. Therefore, grasping both of them is equivalent to grasping something more than the mere collection of objects in V1 + objects in V2. It reflects grasping the causal relationship that these two classes of objects have between them. When the prisoner of the cave starts to climb his way out of the cave and sees the objects that cast their shadows on the wall, he perceives this higher class of things and also understands that the shadows that he had previously seen were caused by these

objects (καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα: *Rep*. 515d1).

In fact, causal bonds that govern the relationship between different line segments is arguably one of the most important lessons of the line. Because of the mathematical features of the line that are pointed out by Smith, the relationship between V1 and V2 is necessarily proportional to the relationship between the whole realm of intelligible things (I1 + I2) and the whole realm of visible things (V1 + V2). Therefore, sensible things are images that are caused by intelligible things in the same manner that my shadow is caused by me. Just as my shadow depends on me to exist, sensible objects depend on Forms.

That the proportions of the divided line make the causal relations between line segments one of the most important lessons to be taken from this passage is such clear fact that only years of prejudice against the idea of degrees of existence could generate the problem proposed by Nicholas Smith. Only attributing the same degree of existence to every entity in the line it could be considered puzzling the fact that two consecutive segments taken together represent a clearer and truer apprehension of reality than just the upper segment.

TWO WORLDS THEORY

According to the doctrine of degrees of reality, images exist to the same degree as their models. Therefore, grasping the model is tantamount to apprehending the original, whereas grasping an image is tantamount to apprehending a different, independent object that just happens to be an image or imitation. If so, then why would I need the imitative version after being in contact with the original?

Smith's problem is such a good piece of scholarly reflection that it points to a subtle relationship between the two dogmas mentioned above (i.e., the doctrine of degrees of reality and the two worlds theory). According to the doctrine of degrees of reality, originals and images are two different independent entities. Therefore, apprehending one of them is never a way of apprehending the other. Applying this understanding to objects of the line, we arrive at the result that apprehension of the images (shadows and reflections) that populate V1 is in no way related to apprehension of the objects (plants and animals) that populate V2. Moreover, if objects of knowledge and objects of opinion populate different segments of the line, as indeed is the case, then there could be no opinion about objects of knowledge or knowledge about objects of opinion.

Gail Fine (1977) introduced the terminology "two worlds theory" as an indication that Plato distinguishes knowledge and beliefs by reference to their objects, such that one can have knowledge but not beliefs about Forms and beliefs but not knowledge about sensible things. Fine tries to save Plato from this theory by presenting a reading that makes some of the *Republic's* arguments about knowledge content-oriented rather than object-oriented. In her interpretation, "knowledge and belief are distinguished not by their different sets of objects, but by their truth implications" (Fine, 1977, p. 139). This movement has been severely criticized, mostly because many think that there are abundant, uncontroversial assertions of an object-oriented theory of knowledge in both the *Republic* and many other dialogues (c.f. Gonzales, 1996). I will not discuss Fine's arguments in this paper, but it is important to point out that my solution to Smith's problems provides an interpretation of the divided line in which we avoid the two worlds theory

while maintaining an object-oriented theory of knowledge.

Smith's problem indicates that the two worlds theory follows naturally from the doctrine of degrees of reality. Once the idea of grades of existence is denied from the picture, it becomes necessary to assign a different, independent object for each segment of the line and for each cognitive state of the mind that these segments represent. If existence is never a matter of degrees, then the objects of different line segments exist independently, and grasping one of them is never a way of grasping the other. If I am acquainted with Achilles only by one of his pictures, then what I have seen is not Achilles himself but rather another object or an imitation of him. Therefore, I can only have an opinion. If I see Achilles himself, then what I see is not merely an image but rather another object: the original. Now I can only have knowledge of him.

However, if we break the interdiction of degrees of existence and start to recognize that objects in V1 do not exist by themselves but only as effects of objects in V2, then it becomes clear that πίστις and εἰκασία represent two different ways of apprehending the same set of objects. Again, it is important to think about the kinds of images that Plato has in mind here. Grasping my shadow or reflection is not the same as grasping a different object as it would be if we were talking about statues or paintings. My shadow and my reflection are caused by me in a similar way that a flower causes its smell. To notice a flower by means of its smell is not to notice a different independent object but rather to grasp the flower through one of its direct effects. If I see myself in the mirror, then what I see is not a different object as it would be if I was seeing a statue of me. To see my reflection in the mirror is just an indirect way of seeing myself. Similarly, when the prisoner starts to climb his way out of the cave and sees the objects that cast shadows on the wall, he realizes that his previous experiences were nothing but a defective apprehension of these same objects that he now clearly sees. At this moment, he will "know each image for what it is and also of what it is the image" (γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν: *Rep.* 520c5)

Due to the proportions of the line, the relationship between images and objects of which they are images is analogous to the relationship between sensible things and Forms. Consequently, whenever I see a display of beauty in the sensible world, what I am apprehending is the very Form of beauty through one of its effects. Of course, this would be a defective apprehension. Restricted to sensible things, one cannot achieve knowledge. To have knowledge, one must grasp the Form of beauty *itself*. Nevertheless, opinion and knowledge are different cognitive states about the same set of objects. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, Forms are the primary objects of knowledge but not necessarily the *only* objects of knowledge. Knowing the causal bounds that govern relationships between Forms and sensible things, one can also know the sensible things as they are, namely direct effects of Forms.

By providing a reading of the divided line in which the distinction between knowledge and opinion does not depend on different kinds of objects, my interpretation saves Plato from the unwelcome consequences of the two worlds theory. The fact that, according to the two worlds theory, one cannot pass from the cognitive state of opinion to the cognitive state of knowledge about the same object is just one of them. Moreover, my interpretation avoids such kinds of unwelcome results without throwing the baby out with

the bathwater (i.e., without giving up the idea of an object-oriented theory of knowledge in Plato). According to my interpretation of the divided line, one has an opinion about F whenever apprehending F by means of its effects, and one has knowledge about F whenever apprehending F itself. As explained in the previous section, direct effects of the kinds of shadows and reflections are not different, ontologically independent objects. These are non-enumerable, ontologically dependent manifestations of F itself.

CONCLUSION

In summary, I disagree with Nicholas Smith's conclusion that the divided line is misconstructed. Rather, I take the mathematical property of the line that he considers troublesome as entailing one of the most important pieces of doctrine behind this passage. This is the idea that the world of sensible things holds a dependence upon the world of Forms in the same way that shadows and reflections depend on the things that are shadowed and reflected. To understand how this doctrine is conveyed by the divided line, we must surpass Vlastos' interdiction of the notion of degrees of existence. As a benefit of this transgression, we save Plato from some negative outcomes of the two worlds theory, including the embarrassing idea that different cognitive states must have different objects.

Bibliography

Cooper, J. M. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Fine, G. "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 60: 121-139.

Franklin, L. 2012. "Inventing Intermediates: Mathematical Discourse and Its Objects in *Republic* VII." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 50: 483-506.

Gonzalez, F. J. 1996. "Propositions or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V." *Phronesis*, 41: 245-275.

Smith, N. D. 1996. "Plato's Divided Line." *Ancient Philosophy*, 16: 25-46.

Smith, N. D. 2018. "Unclarity and the Intermediates in Plato's Discussions of Clarity in the Republic." *Plato Journal*, 18: 97-110.

Vlastos, G. 1965. "Degrees of Reality in Plato." in *New Essays in Plato and Aristotle*, R. Bambrough (ed), New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 1-19.

Vlastos, G. 1966. "A Metaphysical Paradox." *American Philosophical Association Proceedings*, 39: 5-19.

Notes

[1] For the sake of consistence, I will use the translations of Smith (2018), which are based on Cooper (1997), with occasional slight modifications.

[2] Both images are provided by Smith (2018).

On Diairesis, Parallel Division, and Chiasmus: Plato's and Aristotle's Methods of Division[1]

Xin Liu
Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Nanjing University, Xianlin Road 163, Qixia District, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu Province, CN
ORCID: 0000-0002-7265-7568
Email: liuxin10.03@nju.edu.cn

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I articulate three kinds of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper, valid methods of division, namely, diairesis (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division). I attempt to explain the relationship among the three kinds of division, namely, how they transform from one to another. Starting with Plato's division of constitution in the *Statesman*, I illuminate that from ostensible diairesis emerges a parallel division, and the parallel division causes a cross-division to occur. Thus, the sixfold division of constitution is not a diairesis (as it appears to be) but rather is a 3 x 2 cross-division. Inheriting the three kinds of division from Plato, Aristotle advances the form by providing a theoretical explanation to the transformation of the three kinds of division.

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_3

In *Topics* Z6, Aristotle prescribes two conditions under which a parallel division can originate from or construct ostensible diairesis and how the parallel division further causes a cross-division to occur.

Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, diairesis/vertical division, parallel division, chiasmus/cross-division.

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to articulate the three kinds of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper, valid methods of division, namely, diairesis (vertical division), parallel division, and chiasmus (cross-division). Starting with Plato's division of constitution in the *Statesman*, I show that the sixfold division of constitution is not a diairesis (as it appears to be) but rather is a 3 x 2 cross-division. The cross-division emerges from a parallel division, and the parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis (section 1). Then, I turn to Aristotle's explication of how a parallel division can originate from or constitute ostensible diairesis by introducing the two conditions prescribed in *Topics* Z6 (section 2). Further, to prove the propriety and validity of the two conditions, I invoke the division of contrary in *Categories* 10 as an example. On this basis, I establish general schemes, thereby theoretically exploring how a parallel division emerges from ostensible diairesis, and how the parallel division causes a cross- division to occur (section 3). Moreover, I delve into the biological domain, explaining the phenomenon that in classifying animals, Plato and Aristotle seem to make diairesis but actually conduct chiasmus (section 4). Finally, I conclude that there are three kinds of division, namely, diairesis, parallel division, and chiasmus – propriety and validity of which are admitted by both Plato and Aristotle. With particular emphasis on the relationship between the three kinds of division, I summarize how they are associated with each other, transforming from one to another (section 5). In closing, I add an appendix to answer the question of why chiasmus is familiar to philosophers and used by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant while being unknown to scholars for such a long time (Appendix).

1. PLATO'S DIVISION OF CONSTITUTION IN THE *STATESMAN*

At the end of the *Statesman*, Plato intends to distinguish the statesman from other citizens in general and from his imitators in particular. While the imitators rule by law or against law, the statesman rules by wisdom. Ruling by wisdom, the statesman not only aims at establishing the common good but also considers the specific situation. Ruling by law, the good imitators care about the common advantages prescribed in written or unwritten laws while omitting the diversity and complexity of concrete cases. Ruling against law, the bad imitators are only concerned about the interests of the ruling class. In discussing different kinds of imitators, Plato spells out different types of constitutions because a certain type of constitution mirrors a certain kind of imitator by sharing the same characteristics with him.[2]

To distinguish among different types of constitutions, Plato seems to make a diairetical division by dividing the genus into the differentiae and dividing the differentiae into the sub-differentiae until the final differentia is arrived at. First, in terms of the number of rulers, Plato divides constitution into three types in which one, few, or many rulers rule (*Plt*. 302c4-6).[3] In terms of the quality of rule, then, Plato subdivides the three types – that is, constitutions with one, few, and many rulers – into legal and illegal (*Plt*. 302e5-8). In this way, the constitution with one ruler (namely, monarchy) is subdivided into kingdom and tyranny, the constitution with few rulers is subdivided into aristocracy and oligarchy, and the constitution with many rulers is subdivided into two types that share the same name democracy (*Plt*. 302d1-e2).[4] Based on what Plato

Diagram 1



literally states in words, a sixfold division is conducted, illustrated through Diagram 1.

Initially, the division of constitution appears to be a diairesis, that is, a single division tree. This tree has three levels. The top level contains one genus, namely, *politeia*. The second level is a trichotomous division of the top level into three species, and the third level contains three dichotomous divisions of the second level into six subspecies. Thus, the division of constitution resembles a single division tree with three levels. Since it proceeds from the top down, the division of constitution seemingly has a vertical structure.

Despite appearing to be a diairesis, the division of constitution cannot be a proper, valid diairesis, at least from Aristotle's point of view, because it does not comply with the fundamental principle of diairesis. Aristotle states the fundamental principle of diairesis clearly in words such that at each level of diairesis, the one conducting the division must select the sub-differentia that is the appropriate differentia derived from the superordinate type – that is, *the sub-differentia of the differentia*.[5] The division in Diagram 1 is not a diairesis because 'legal-illegal' are not the appropriate sub-differentiae of the superordinate type 'one-few-many'. From Aristotle's perspective, in dividing one, few, and many rulers into legal and illegal, Plato could have made a categorical mistake, dividing something quantitative (number of rulers) into something qualitative (quality of rule).

Although 'legal-illegal' cannot be used to divide the superordinate differentiae 'one-few-many', they can be applied to divide the genus 'constitution' because a constitution can be either legal (insomuch as one rules by law) or illegal (insomuch as one rules against law) independent of how many rulers govern. Because 'legal-illegal' are not applied to divide the superordinate differentiae 'one-few-many' but used to differentiate the genus 'constitution', 'legal-illegal' cannot be subordinate to but should remain alongside 'one-few-many'. In this case, a parallel double structure replaces the single vertical structure of the diairesis in Diagram 1. In fact, Plato is fully aware of the parallel structure of the division of constitution in noting that "Do we suppose that any of these constitutions is correct, when it is classified and defined by the following criteria – one-few-many on the one hand, and wealth-poverty, force-consent or accompanied with written laws or without laws on the other hand?" (*Plt.* 292a5-9). Therefore, in the division of constitution, the two pairs of differentiae – that is, 'one-

Diagram 2



few-many' and 'legal-illegal' – are not vertically arranged but remain in parallel alongside each other, illustrated through Diagram 2.

The division of constitution is not a single division tree but contains two division trees. The two division trees remain in parallel alongside each other. Each of the two division trees contains two levels such that the same genus, '*politeia*', is divided into 'one-few-many' and into 'legal-illegal'. The two 2-level division trees have the same genus at the top level, but they do not need to have the same number of species (as well as differentiae) at the second level.

In dividing constitution, Plato does not conduct diairesis but performs another type of division – that is, parallel division, in which two 2-level division trees remain in parallel alongside each other. Instead of dividing constitution diairetically, Plato makes a division in two parallel lines, dividing constitution into one-few-many with respect to the number of rulers in one line (*Plt*. 291d1-9; 302c4-6) and into legal-illegal with respect to the quality of rule in the other line (*Plt*. 302e5-8). One pair of differentiae produces a trichotomy, and another pair of differentiae establishes a dichotomy. The two pairs of differentiae cross each other, which causes a 3 x 2 cross-division to occur. From the 3 x 2 cross-division, a sixfold division arises, illustrated as follows:

	μοναρχία	ὀλίγων ἀρχὴ	πολλῶν ἀρχὴ
ἔννομον	βασιλική	ἀριστοκρατία	δημοκρατία
παράνομον	τυραννική	ὀλιγαρχία	δημοκρατία

By means of a 3 x 2 cross division, constitutions are classified into six types: (1) the constitution in which one rules by law is called kingdom; (2) the constitution in which one rules against law is called tyranny; (3) the constitution in which a few rulers rule by law is named aristocracy; (4) the constitution in which a few rulers rule against law is named oligarchy; and the last two constitutions, (5) and (6), in which many rulers rule, regardless of whether they rule by law or against law, are named democracy.[6]

In summary, first, it is worth mentioning that there is a fundamental pattern for conducting division, that is, a single division tree with two levels (a single 2-level division tree). In the single 2-level division tree, the top level contains a genus, and the second level is a division of the genus into differentia. A dichotomy emerges from dividing the genus into two differentiae, similar to how a dichotomy is made dividing animal into footed and footless; a trichotomy arises from dividing the genus into three differentiae; for example, a trichotomy is conducted by dividing the genus

animal into walking, flying, and swimming.[7] In general, an *m*-chotomy originates from dividing the genus into *m* numbers of differentiae; therefore, the expression '*m*-chotomy' refers to *m* numbers of differentiae in a single 2-level division tree. A single 2-level division tree is the fundamental pattern for conducting divisions, regardless of whether it is a dichotomy, trichotomy, or polytomy.

Based on the fundamental pattern (namely, a single 2-level division tree), then, *diairesis* can be regarded as a single division tree with more levels (namely, a single *x*-level division tree) by which a genus is divided into the differentiae and the differentiae are divided into the sub-differentiae up to an indivisible final differentia. For example, the genus animal is successively and continuously divided into footed, two-footed, and split-two-footed (*PA* A2, 642b7-9). Proceeding from the top down, diairesis is regarded as a *vertical division*. *Parallel division* is the type of division in which two or more 2-level division trees are arranged in parallel and stay alongside each other.[8] As diagram 2 shows, in the two division trees, the same genus, 'constitution', is divided in parallel into one-few-many and into legal-illegal. Remaining in parallel alongside each other, the two 2-level division trees constitute a parallel division. Despite having the same genus at the top level, the two 2-level divisions do not need to have the same number of differentiae at the second level, as clearly seen in the fact that constitution is divided into one-few-many trichotomously on the one side and divided into legal-illegal dichotomously on the other side. Furthermore, parallel division can cause a *cross-division* (which Porphyrius calls '*chiasmus*') to occur. In the parallel division, there are two 2-level division trees: one containing an *m*-chotomous (*m*-fold) differentiae and the other containing an *n*-chotomous (*n*-fold) differentiae. When the *m*-fold and the *n*-fold differentiae cross each other, an *m* x *n* cross-division is conducted. As illuminated, the 3 x 2 cross-division of constitution occurs, when the threefold differentiae 'one-few-many' and the twofold differentiae 'legal-illegal' cross each other.

Plato, in the *Statesman*, describes that a 3 x 2 cross-division emerges from a parallel division and the parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis. In *Topics* Z6, Aristotle advances the form further by explaining the conditions under which a parallel division can originate from or constitute ostensible diairesis.[9]

2. ARISTOTLE'S EXPLICATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIAIRESIS AND PARALLEL DIVISION

To explain the relationship between diairesis and parallel division, Aristotle begins by analyzing parallel division, distinguishing valid parallel division from invalid division. The valid parallel division can constitute ostensible diairesis, while the invalid division cannot construct diairesis.

Aristotle first invokes an invalid parallel division as an example: it appears to be a parallel division composed of two 2-level division trees that remain in parallel alongside each other.[10] In one division tree, the genus animal is divided into walking, flying, and swimming with respect to the way of activity,[11] and in another division tree, the genus knowledge is divided into theoretical and practical with respect to their different aim (see Diagram 3).[12]

To clarify the issue clearly and precisely, Aristotle characterizes the two genera – animal and knowledge – with the technical term 'two

Diagram 3



non-subaltern genera'.[13] By 'two non-subaltern genera', Aristotle means two genera such that one does not contain the other (Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἑτέρου γένους ἡ ῥηθεῖσα διαφορὰ μὴ περιεχομένου μηδὲ περιέχοντος, *Top*. Z6, 144b12-13); that is, the two genera are neither superordinate nor subordinate to but remain in parallel alongside each other. As illuminated, the two non-subaltern genera are divided into their appropriate differentiae. A genus has its appropriate differentiae, so the differentiae of the two non-subaltern genera differ in kind.[14]

Furthermore, the division is not a valid parallel division but rather two independent 2-level division trees that stay alongside, unrelated to each other. A parallel division must consist of at least two 2-level division trees, but not all of the divisions composed of two 2-level division trees can be regarded as a parallel division. Two 2-level division trees remain in parallel alongside each other – this is merely the necessary condition for being a parallel division. The necessary and sufficient conditions are that the two 2-level division trees that remain in parallel alongside each other must be associated with each other. The two division trees are associated with each other such that the two pairs of differentiae that arise from the two division trees cross each other. Nevertheless, the two pairs of differentiae, namely, walking-flying-swimming and theoretical-practical, cannot cross each other; therefore, the division is not a valid parallel division but rather two independent 2-level division trees. Moreover, the invalid parallel division cannot constitute a diairesis because the two non-subaltern genera cannot be contained by or subordinate to a higher genus. Animal and knowledge belong to two of the ten highest genera, namely, substance and relation, so there is no higher genus to embrace them.[15]

As noted, the differentiae of animal (walking-flying-swimming) and those of knowledge (theoretical-practical) differ in kind, not only because the two non-subaltern genera – animal and knowledge – are differentiated into their appropriate differentiae but also because they cannot be subordinate to a higher genus. In general, the differentiae of the two non-subaltern genera differ in kind when the two non-subaltern genera are not subordinate to the same superordinate genus.[16] When the two non-subaltern genera are subordinate to the same superordinate genus, the differentiae of the two non-subaltern genera can be the same (*Top*. Z6, 144b20-2). For example, the two non-subaltern genera, namely, 'walking-animal' and 'flying-animal', can be divided by the same differentia, 'two-footed', because the

Diagram 4



Diagram 5



two non-subaltern genera are embraced by and subordinate to the same superordinate genus, 'animal' (*Top*. Z6, 144b22-5). Initially, the division appears in the form shown in Diagram 4.

Since the two non-subaltern genera, namely, walking-animal and flying-animal, are subordinate to the same genus, animal, the initial division can constitute a diairesis, illustrated through Diagram 5.

There are two possibilities to interpret this division depending on how to understand and translate πεζὸν and πτηνὸν. In one interpretation, someone regards πεζὸν and πτηνὸν as organs of locomotion, translating them as footed and winged. In this interpretation, the division is a diairesis in which animals are divided into footed animals and winged animals, and footed and winged animals are subdivided into two-footed and four-footed. Although it is theoretically possible to interpret the division in this way, I reject this interpretation. Despite properly dividing animals into footed animals and subdividing footed animals into two-footed, one cannot subdivide winged animals into two-footed. Because all of the winged animals – that is, all of the birds – are two-footed, the two-footed that coexists within birds cannot be used as a sub-differentia to

divide birds into subgenera. Moreover, if the division were merely a diairesis, there is no reason why Aristotle in *Top*. Z6 spells out a normal diairesis in such an abnormal way.

I offer another interpretation. Instead of treating πεζὸν and πτηνὸν as organs of locomotion, I view them as ways of activity for the following reasons. First, in many contexts, Aristotle divides animals into πεζὸν, πτηνὸν, and ἔνυδρον trichotomously.[17] In the trichotomy, one cannot regard the triple differentiae as organs of locomotion because, although πεζὸν qua footed and πτηνὸν qua winged can refer to the organ of locomotion, ἔνυδρον cannot reference the organ of locomotion. Also, one cannot treat the triple differentiae as places of habitation/activity because, although πεζὸν qua terrestrial and ἔνυδρον qua aquatic can designate the place of habitation, πτηνὸν cannot signify the place of habitation/activity. Thus, there is only one way to explain the trichotomy consistently: πεζὸν, πτηνὸν, and ἔνυδρον must be regarded as ways of activity (πράξεις) and translated as walking, flying, and swimming (*HA* A1, 487b33-488a2). Πεζὸν, πτηνὸν, and ἔνυδρον, as ways of activity, in turn, indicate both the organ of locomotion and the place of activity because every kind of activity requires a necessary, corresponding organ and must occur in a certain place. Second, Aristotle particularly emphasizes that one cannot divide substance by accidents; therefore, one cannot divide animals by their accidental habitation or activity places (*Top*. Z6, 144b31-6). If one could divide animals using πεζὸν-ἔνυδρον, then properly, πεζὸν-ἔνυδρον cannot refer to the place of habitation but must signify the way of an animal's activity. Third, Aristotle's usage of terminology provides further evidence supporting my interpretation. Aristotle applies ὑπόπουν in the dichotomy of ὑπόπουν-ἄπουν (*PA* A2, 642b7-8) or ὑπόπουν-πτηνὸν (*Metaph*. Z12, 1038a9-15) to designate the organ of locomotion, 'footed', while he uses πεζὸν in the trichotomy of πεζὸν-πτηνὸν-ἔνυδρον (*Cat*. 3, 1b18-19; 13, 14b34-15a3; *Top*. Z6, 143a36-b2) and in the dichotomy of πεζὸν-ἔνυδρον (*Top*. Z6, 144b31-6) to reference the way of activity, 'walking'. In the context of *Topics* (*Top*. Z6, 144b12-30), therefore, I am inclined to interpret πεζὸν-πτηνὸν as ways of activity and translate them as walking-flying.

According to my interpretation, then, Aristotle seems to conduct a diairesis by dividing animals into walking and flying and subdividing both kinds of animals into two-footed and four-footed. Nevertheless, this division cannot be a proper, valid diairesis because the division does not comply with the fundamental principle of diairesis, namely, 'the sub-differentia of the differentia'. 'Two-footed – four-footed' that designate the organ of locomotion in terms of the number of feet cannot be used as sub-differentiae to divide the differentiae 'walking-flying' that reference the way of activity. Fully aware of this problem, Aristotle supplements with a further explanation as follows:

> δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν διαφορὰν πᾶν οἰκεῖον ἐπιφέρειν γένος, ἐπειδὴ ἐνδέχεται τὴν αὐτὴν δύο γενῶν εἶναι μὴ περιεχόντων ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕτερον μόνον ἀνάγκη συνεπιφέρειν καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω τούτου πάντα, καθάπερ τὸ δίπουν τὸ πτηνὸν **καὶ** τὸ πεζὸν συνεπιφέρει **τὸ ζῷον**. (*Top*. Z6, 144b26-30)[18]
>
> Obviously, it is not of necessity for the differentia to accompany its own genus because it is possible for the same differentia to be the differentia of two non-subaltern genera, but this differentia must accompany all that are superordinate to

Diagram 6



it, just as the two-footed accompanies the flying and the walking together with accompanying the animal.

To explain the text, I should clarify some technical terms. First, the non-subaltern genera correspond to the coordinate differentiae, that is, a pair of differentiae applied to divide a genus, simultaneously. For example, corresponding to the non-subaltern genera 'flying-animal – walking-animal', 'flying-walking' are coordinate differentiae that designate the way of activity and are applied to divide the genus animal in this aspect, simultaneously. Second, a differentia *accompanies* (ἐπιφέρειν) its appropriate genus – that is, a differentia must be applied to *divide* its appropriate genus, or an appropriate differentia must be selected and used to divide the genus. The differentia and the genus must match each other.

As the text notes, the same differentiae, 'two-footed – four-footed', can be used to divide the coordinate differentiae 'walking-flying', when these coordinate differentiae are subordinate to the same superordinate genus 'animal'. Aristotle demonstrates that in this case, 'two-footed – four-footed' should be used to divide all that are superordinate to them; that is, they should be used to divide not only the differentiae 'walking-flying' but also the genus 'animal'. Nevertheless, 'two-footed – four-footed' qua number of feet cannot be used to subdivide the differentiae 'walking-flying' qua way of activity (inconsistent with the fundamental principle of diairesis); therefore, they can be applied only to divide the genus 'animal'. In fact, 'two-footed – four-footed' jump from being used to subdivide the differentiae 'walking-flying' to being used to divide the superordinate genus 'animal'. Thus, 'two-footed – four-footed' are not the appropriate sub-differentiae (ὑποδιαίρεσις) that should be subordinate to the differentiae 'walking-flying' but turn out to be the parallel-differentiae (ἐπιδιαίρεσις) that remain in parallel alongside the differentiae 'walking-flying' (διαίρεσις).[19] As a result, the genus 'animal' is divided in parallel into the differentiae 'walking-flying' (with respect to the way of activity) and into the parallel-differentiae 'two-footed – four-footed' (with respect to the number of feet), seen in Diagram 6.

This is a valid parallel division in which two 2-level division trees remain in parallel alongside each other, and the two pairs of differentiae that emerge from the two 2-level division trees can cross each other. As analyzed, Aristotle in *Top.* Z6 reveals the

conditions under which a valid parallel division can constitute ostensible diairesis. There are two conditions: (a) the same differentiae, 'two-footed – four-footed', are applied to divide the coordinate differentiae 'walking-flying' on both sides; and (b) the coordinate differentiae 'walking-flying' are used to divide the same superordinate genus 'animal'.

Apparently, Aristotle in *Top*. Z6 conducts a 'diairetical' division of animal from the bottom up, while Plato in the *Statesman* establishes a 'diairetical' division of constitution from the top down. Actually, the two divisions are not diaireses but rather parallel divisions. From the top down, Plato shows how a parallel division (constitution → one-few-many; constitution → legal-illegal) emerges from ostensible diairesis (constitution → one-few-many → legal-illegal); from the bottom up, Aristotle illuminates how a parallel division (two-footed – four-footed → animal; walking-flying → animal) constructs ostensible diairesis (two-footed – four-footed → walking-flying → animal). Although the one constitutes ostensible diairesis and the other originates from ostensible diairesis, essentially, the two parallel divisions are of the same kind. Insofar as a parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis, it can constitute diairesis; conversely, insofar as a parallel division constitutes ostensible diairesis, it can originate from diairesis.

3. DIAIRESIS, PARALLEL DIVISION, AND CHIASMUS

One might argue that the interpretation of *Top*. Z6 that I offer is based on the specific understanding of πεζὸν-πτηνὸν: I reconstruct a valid parallel division by treating πεζὸν-πτηνὸν as ways of activity and translating them as walking-flying. Were πεζὸν-πτηνὸν regarded as organs of locomotion and interpreted as footed-winged, the division cited from *Top*. Z6 would be a normal diairesis. To prove the universal validity of my interpretation, I cite another example from *Cat.* 10, where Aristotle unambiguously notes that under the two conditions prescribed in *Top*. Z6, a parallel division emerges from ostensible diairesis, and the parallel division further causes a cross-division to occur.

Diagram 7



Diagram 8



In dividing contraries into four kinds (*Cat*. 10, 11b32-12a17), initially, Aristotle seems to conduct a 'diairesis' by dividing contraries into exclusive and inclusive contraries[20] and subdividing exclusive and inclusive contraries into the same differentiae, 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject', respectively, illustrated through Diagram 7.

According to what Aristotle demonstrates in *Top*. Z6, the same differentiae, 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject', can be applied to divide the coordinate differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive' because these coordinate differentiae are subordinate to the same superordinate genus, 'contrary'. In this case, the differentiae 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject' shift from being applied to subdivide the differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive' to being applied to divide the genus 'contrary'. Thus, they are not the sub-differentiae of the differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive' (ὑποδιαίρεσις) but turn out to be the parallel-differentiae of the genus 'contrary' (ἐπιδιαίρεσις). In structure, correspondingly, 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject' qua parallel-differentiae are not subordinate to but remain in parallel alongside the differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive', shown in Diagram 8.

From ostensible diairesis emerges a parallel division in which the same genus 'contrary' is divided in parallel into the differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive' and into the parallel-differentiae 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject'. The differentiae and parallel-differentiae cross each other – this operation causes a cross-division to occur.

	οὐδέν ἀνὰ μέσον	ἀνὰ μέσον
ἐν οἷς γίγνεσθαι	νόσον-ὑγίειαν	μέλαν-λευκὸν
ὧν κατηγορεῖται	περιττὸν-ἄρτιον	φαῦλον-σπουδαῖον

By means of a 2 x 2 cross-division, contraries are classified into four kinds: (1) the contrary is exclusive and occurs in an animal body, such as healthy-ill; (2) the contrary is exclusive and predicated of a natural number, such as odd-even; (3) the contrary is inclusive and occurs on an object surface, such as white-black; and (4) the contrary is inclusive and predicated of a human behavior, such as good-bad.

In Aristotle's division of contrary, a parallel division emerges from ostensible diairesis because the same differentiae, 'occurrence in a substrate – predication of a subject', are used to divide the coordinate differentiae 'exclusive-inclusive', and these twofold coordinate differentiae are subordinate to the same superordinate genus, 'contrary'. This is exactly

the same case as Plato's division of constitution. From ostensible diairesis originates the parallel division because the same differentiae, 'legal-illegal', are applied to divide the coordinate differentiae 'one-few-many', and these threefold coordinate differentiae are subordinate to the same superordinate genus, 'constitution'. In this case, 'legal-illegal' shifts from being used to subdivide the differentiae 'one-few-many' to being applied to divide the genus 'constitution', so 'legal-illegal' are not sub-differentiae of the differentiae 'one-few-many' but rather parallel-differentiae of the genus 'constitution'. Therefore, the same genus, 'constitution', is divided in parallel into the differentiae 'one-few-many' and into the parallel-differentiae 'legal-illegal'. The two pairs of differentiae cross each other; therefore, a 3 x 2 cross-division is conduced, and constitutions are classified into six types.

Plato's division of constitution as well as Aristotle's division of contrary obviously illuminate how a cross-division arises from a parallel division and the parallel division emerges from ostensible diairesis. The emergence process of the parallel division from ostensible diairesis, which Plato in the *Statesman* and Aristotle in *Categories* portray, provides sufficient evidence confirming the propriety and validity of the two conditions prescribed in *Top*. Z6. The parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis under the conditions that (a) the same differentiae are used to divide the coordinate differentiae, regardless of whether the coordinate differentiae are twofold or threefold, and (b) the coordinate differentiae are used to divide the same superordinate genus. The general scheme of constructing ostensible diairesis can be illustrated through Diagram 9.

Diagram 9



Diagram 10



Under both conditions mentioned above, ostensible sub-differentiae E - E* shift from being used to subdivide the differentiae D - D* to being used to divide the genus G, so E - E* are not the sub-differentiae of the differentiae D - D* but rather the parallel-differentiae of the genus G. In structure, correspondingly, the parallel-differentiae E - E* are not subordinate to but remain in parallel alongside the differentiae D - D*. Thus, a parallel division replaces ostensible diairesis, seen in Diagram 10.

From dividing the same genus G, the differentiae D - D* and the parallel-differentiae E - E* emerge. The two pairs of differentiae cross each other – this operation causes a cross-division to occur, illustrated through Diagram 11 as follows:

Diagram 11



Based on the general schemes, the conditions under which a cross-division emerges from a parallel division and parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis can be summarized as follows. A parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis when ostensible sub-differentiae become the parallel-differentiae (ὑποδιαίρεσις → ἐπιδιαίρεσις) that are applied not to subdivide the differentiae but to divide the genus. Two (or more) pairs of differentiae, namely, the differentiae (διαίρεσις) and the parallel-differentiae (ἐπιδιαίρεσις), are applied to divide the same genus in parallel – this constitutes a parallel division. The differentiae and parallel-differentiae cross each other – this operation causes a cross-division to occur.

4. FROM DIAIRESIS TO CHIASMUS

As noted, through the transition of parallel division, a *chiasmus* originates from ostensible *diairesis*. It is no coincidence that in classifying animals, Plato and Aristotle perform those divisions that appear to be diaireses but actually are chiasmata. The reason is that in the biological context, there is only one target for division, namely, the genus animal. It appears that Plato and Aristotle could have conducted a diairesis by dividing the genus animal into the differentiae and further dividing the differentiae into the sub-differentiae. Actually, after dividing the genus animal into the differentiae, Plato and Aristotle do not divide the differentiae into the sub-differentiae but rather divide the same genus into the parallel-differentiae. Thus, they divide the same genus animal into two pairs of differentiae that remain in parallel alongside each other (G → D - D*; G → E - E*). The differentiae (D - D*) and the parallel-differentiae (E - E*) cross each other; therefore, a chiasmus occurs, as clearly seen in the following examples cited from Plato's and Aristotle's texts.

In the opening division of the *Statesman* (258b7-268d4), after dividing animate being into gregarious-solitary, Plato introduces another pair of differentiae, 'tame-wild', that is not used to subdivide the differentia 'gregarious' but rather is used to divide the genus 'animate being' (263e9-264a7). Thus, Plato divides the same genus, 'animate being', in parallel into the differentiae 'gregarious-solitary' (with respect to the manner of life) and into the parallel-differentiae 'tame-wild' (with respect to the disposition). The twofold differentiae and the twofold parallel-differentiae cross each other; therefore, a 2 x 2 cross-division is conducted.[21]

There is a similar 2 x 2 cross-division conducted by Aristotle in *History of Animals*:

> Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπιδημητικὰ καὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν τὰ δ' ἐκτοπιστικά. – *HA* A1, 488a13-14

Initially, Aristotle seems to make a diairesis by dividing the genus animal into the differentiae gregarious-solitary and subdividing these differentiae into migratory-nonmigratory. As analyzed, instead, Aristotle divides the same genus animal in parallel into the differentiae gregarious-solitary (with respect to the manner of life) and into the parallel-differentiae migratory-nonmigratory (depending on whether this kind of animal migrates). A 2 x 2 cross-division takes place in such a way that the twofold differentiae and the twofold parallel-differentiae cross each other. Using a 2 x 2 chiasmus, animals are classified into four types: the first type is gregarious and migratory; the second type is gregarious and not migratory; the third type is solitary and migratory; and the fourth type is solitary and not migratory.

Not only is the genus animal divided in parallel into gregarious-solitary and migratory-nonmigratory, but it is also divisible in parallel into gregarious-solitary and social-dispersed, illuminated as follows:

> Καὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων **καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν** τὰ μὲν πολιτικὰ τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν. – *HA* A1, 488a2-3

Again, it appears to be a diairesis, in which the genus animal is divided into the differentiae 'gregarious-solitary' and both of these differentiae seem to be subdivided into 'social-dispersed'. In fact, Aristotle does not subdivide the differentiae 'gregarious-solitary' into 'social-dispersed' but rather divides the same genus animal in parallel into the differentiae 'gregarious-solitary' (with respect to the way of life) and into the parallel-differentiae 'social-dispersed' (with respect to the manner of activity). The twofold differentiae and the twofold parallel-differentiae cross each other; therefore, a 2 x 2 cross-division occurs. From the 2 x 2 cross-division, four pairs of combinations are generated, namely, gregarious-social, gregarious-dispersed, solitary-dispersed, and solitary-social. Each pair composed of two diverse and compatible attributes can characterize and define a certain kind of animal. The animal that lives in herds and behaves socially is a pigeon; the animal that lives in herds and behaves dispersedly is a queen bee; the animal that lives singly and behaves dispersedly is a whale; and the animal that lives singly and behaves socially is a single, unmarried man or woman.

In the chiasmus mentioned above, it is possible to find some animals characterized by the two diverse and compatible attributes, namely, solitary and social, such as some single, unmarried men or women who live alone and are active in a community. In some chiasmata, however, it is completely impossible to find a type of thing characterized by two diverse and compatible attributes. Taking Porphyrius's paradigm, for example, living beings are divided in parallel into the differentiae 'rational-irrational' (λογικόν-ἄλογον) and into the parallel-differentiae 'mortal-immortal' (θνητόν-ἀθάνατον). The two pairs of differentiae cross each other; therefore, a cross-division occurs. From the 2 x 2 cross-division, four pairs of combinations are generated, and each pair is composed of two diverse, compatible attributes, namely, rational-mortal, rational-immortal, irrational-mortal, and irrational-immortal. Nevertheless, the four pairs of combinations can only characterize

and determine three kinds of living beings, that is, mankind is rational and mortal, God is rational and immortal, and animal is irrational and mortal. The fourth kind cannot come into being because there is no such kind of living being that is irrational and immortal.[22]

A 2 x 2 chiasmus qua fourfold division always produces four pairs of combinations, each of which is composed of two diverse and compatible attributes, regardless of whether the thing characterized by the two diverse and compatible attributes exists. In one case, there is no such kind of living being characterized as irrational and immortal, while in another case, it is possible to find some kind of animal characterized as solitary and social. Even though we could not find a certain kind of animal that is both solitary and social, this does not prevent the two attributes from combining with each other. Some editors have supposed that it is completely impossible to combine solitary with social, thereby deleting τῶν μοναδικῶν.[23] Because previous scholars have not borne the chiasmus in mind, they have not realized that due to its structure, the 2 x 2 chiasmus inevitably establishes four pairs of combinations. Thus, it is improper to delete τῶν μοναδικῶν based on the assumption that two diverse and compatible attributes cannot combine with each other. Aristotle classifies animals into four groups using a 2 x 2 chiasmus. To conduct a chiasmus, therefore, we must keep τῶν μοναδικῶν here.

In addition to a 2 x 2 chiasmus, Aristotle also conducts a 3 x 2 chiasmus, similar to the 3 x 2 chiasmus that Plato performs in the *Statesman*.

> **Τὰ μὲν** γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ μοναδικά, καὶ πεζὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ πλωτά, τὰ δ' ἐπαμφοτερίζει. – *HA* A1, 487b34-488a2

Aristotle discusses two cases. In one case (τὰ μὲν), it seems that Aristotle divides animals into the differentiae 'walking-flying-swimming' and subdivides these threefold differentiae into 'gregarious-solitary'. In another case (τὰ δ'), Aristotle claims that some animals are equipped with two characteristics by nature (ἐπαμφοτερίζει), being gregarious and solitary. The latter case refers to a natural phenomenon in which some animals have dual characteristics regardless of how they perform their activities, namely, walking, flying, or swimming. Since the latter case is irrelevant for the division, I set it aside and focus only on the former case.

In the former case, Aristotle seemingly makes a diairesis by dividing animals into the differentiae 'walking-flying-swimming' and subdividing these threefold differentiae into 'gregarious-solitary', just as Plato apparently divides constitutions into the differentiae 'one-few-many' and subdivides these threefold differentiae into 'legal-illegal'. In fact, what Plato conducts is not a vertical but a parallel division in which the same genus, constitution, is divided in parallel into the differentiae 'one-few-many' (with respect to the number of rulers) and into the parallel-differentiae 'legal-illegal' (with respect to the quality of rule). Similarly, Aristotle performs a parallel division by dividing the same genus, animal, into the differentiae 'walking-flying-swimming' (with respect to the animal's way of activity) and into the parallel-differentiae 'gregarious-solitary' (with respect to the animal's manner of life). Similar the sixfold division of constitution, conducted by a cross-division such that the threefold differentiae 'one-few-many' and the twofold parallel-differentiae 'legal-illegal' cross each other, a 3 x 2 cross-division of animal occurs in such a way that the threefold differentiae 'walking-flying-swimming' and the twofold parallel-differentiae 'gregarious-

solitary' cross each other. By means of a 3 x 2 cross-division, animals are classified into six types, and each type is characterized and determined by two diverse and compatible attributes. The first type walks on land and is gregarious; the second type flies in the sky and is gregarious; the third type swims in the water and is gregarious; the fourth type walks on land and is solitary; the fifth type flies in the air and is solitary; and the sixth type swims in the water and is solitary.

In the biological context, Plato and Aristotle conduct chiasmata that appear to be diaireses. Because there is only one target for division, it seems that the only target, namely, the genus animal, is divided into the differentiae, and the differentiae are further divided into the sub-differentiae. In fact, the same genus, animal, is divided in parallel into the *m*-fold differentiae and the *n*-fold parallel-differentiae. The *m*-fold differentiae and the *n*-fold parallel-differentiae cross each other, so an *m* x *n* chiasmus occurs.

5. CONCLUSION

There are three types of division that Plato and Aristotle acknowledge to be proper and valid: vertical division, parallel division, and cross-division. *Vertical division* refers to a single *x*-level division tree in which a genus is divided into the differentiae, and the differentiae are divided into the sub-differentiae, until an indivisible final differentia is arrived at. *Parallel division* refers to two (or more) 2-level division trees that remain in parallel alongside each other. Among the two 2-level division trees, it is possible that either the same genus is divided in parallel into differentiae and parallel-differentiae or two non-subaltern genera are divided into their appropriate differentiae. Correspondingly, there are two kinds of parallel division. The first kind of parallel division refers to the two 2-level division trees in which *the same genus* is divided in parallel into differentiae and parallel-differentiae ($G \rightarrow D - D^*$; $G \rightarrow E - E^*$) – all of the parallel divisions mentioned above belong to this type. The second kind of parallel division refers to the two 2-level division trees in which two non-subaltern genera are divided into their appropriate differentiae ($G^1 \rightarrow D^1 - D^{1*}$; $G^2 \rightarrow D^2 - D^{2*}$). Either dividing the same genus into differentiae and parallel-differentiae or dividing two non-subaltern genera into their appropriate differentiae can result in the emergence of two pairs of differentiae. When the two pairs of differentiae, whether they are two pairs of differentiae of the same genus ($D - D^*$; $E - E^*$) or those of two non-subaltern genera ($D^1 - D^{1*}$; $D^2 - D^{2*}$), cross each other, a cross-division occurs. A 2 x 2 cross-division establishes four pairs of combinations, and each pair composed of two diverse and compatible attributes (DE, DE*, D*E, D*E* or D^1D^2, D^1D^{2*}, $D^{1*}D^2$, $D^{1*}D^{2*}$) can characterize and define an *infima* species.

The distinction between two kinds of parallel division sheds light on explaining the relationship between diairesis, parallel division, and chiasmus. As analyzed, the first kind of parallel division can constitute or originate from ostensible diairesis and cause a chiasmus to occur. The first kind of parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis, when the same genus is divided in parallel into differentiae and parallel-differentiae instead of being divided into differentiae and sub-differentiae up to the final differentia, diairetically. As illuminated, instead of dividing the genus into the differentiae and dividing the differentiae into sub-differentiae, Plato in the *Statesman* conducts a parallel division by dividing constitutions in parallel into the differentiae 'one-few-many' and into the parallel-differentiae

'legal-illegal'. Similarly, instead of dividing animals into 'walking-flying-swimming' and subdividing these threefold differentiae into 'gregarious-solitary', Aristotle in *History of Animals* conducts a parallel division by dividing animals in parallel into the differentiae 'walking-flying-swimming' and into the parallel-differentiae 'gregarious-solitary'. Furthermore, the first kind of parallel division causes a cross-division to occur. Both in Aristotle's division of animal and Plato's division of constitution, the threefold differentiae and the twofold parallel-differentiae cross each other; therefore, a 3 x 2 chiasmus takes place. Using a 3 x 2 chiasmus, constitutions and animals are classified into six groups.

Whereas the first kind of parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis, the second kind of parallel division cannot originate from or constitute ostensible diairesis because the two non-subaltern genera cannot be subordinate to a higher genus. Whereas cross-division can be regarded as a result of parallel division of the first kind (insomuch as the first kind of parallel division causes cross-division to occur), cross-division is not the result of parallel division of the second kind but rather the criterion for judging whether a division (which is composed of two parallel 2-level division trees) is a valid parallel division of the second kind. As presented in the section 2, despite remaining in parallel alongside each other, the division of animal and that of knowledge cannot constitute a parallel division because they are not associated with each other. The two division trees are not associated with each other because the differentiae of animal 'walking-flying-swimming' and those of knowledge 'theoretical-practical' cannot cross each other. In contrast, when the differentiae of the two non-subaltern genera can cross each other, the two division trees constitute a valid parallel division of the second kind. For example, Aristotle in *Cat*. 2 conducts a valid parallel division of the second kind by dividing one genus, 'being', into its appropriate differentiae, 'substance-accident' and dividing another genus, 'mode of being', into its appropriate differentiae, 'general-individual'. This division is a valid parallel division of the second kind because the two pairs of differentiae that emerge from dividing two non-subaltern genera can cross each other. As a result, things are classified into four types: (1) the general substance that is not inherent in a substrate but said of a subject, such as man or dog; (2) the general accident that is inherent in a substrate and said of a subject, such as white or grammar-knowledge; (3) the individual substance that is neither in a substrate nor said of a subject, such as an individual man or an individual dog; and (4) the individual accident that is inherent in a substrate but not said of a subject, such as an individual white or an individual grammar-knowledge.[24] Comparing the valid parallel division (being → substance-accident; mode of being → general-individual) with the invalid (animal → walking-flying-swimming; knowledge → theoretical-practical), a conclusion can be drawn: if and only if two parallel 2-level division trees (whereby two non-subaltern genera are divided into their appropriate differentiae) cause a cross-division to occur can they constitute a valid parallel division of the second kind. In this case, cross-division is used as a criterion for judging whether a division is a valid parallel division of the second kind or not.

The first kind of parallel division originates from ostensible diairesis and causes a cross-division to occur (ostensible diairesis → parallel division of the first kind → chiasmus). Although the second kind of parallel division cannot originate from or constitute ostensible

diairesis, it must cause a cross-division to occur (parallel division of the second kind → chiasmus). In both cases, parallel division has transitional characteristics, so it can be seen as a transition (from diairesis) to a chiasmus. Due to its transitional characteristics, there is no specific terminology for referencing and naming parallel division. In comparison with the nonnamed parallel division, vertical division is called 'diairesis' (διαίρεσις) by Plato and Aristotle, and cross-division is terminologically named 'chiasmus' (χιαστή) by Porphyrius.[25] The terms that are closest to the meaning of 'chiasmus' are 'overlapping' (ἐπάλλαξις, *GA* B2, 732b15) and 'combining' (σύζευξις, *De Gen. et Corr*. B3, 330a30-330b1; *Pol*. Δ4, 1290b23-39), which are applied by Aristotle.[26] The term 'weaving' (ὑφαντική, *Plt*. 310e5-311c10) applied by Plato refers to the meaning of 'chiasmus' in the sense of interweaving such that the statesman combines diverse and compatible virtues with each other, interweaving bravery with temperance within and between citizens.

With particular emphasis on definition, Aristotle first draws attention to diairesis. To properly define a natural kind, for example, bird, one must divide animals in one single line throughout up to the final differentia (animal → footed → two-footed). In this way, bird can be characterized by the one defining feature 'two-footedness' and defined as the two-footed animal. Faced with the reality of the natural world, however, Aristotle is fully aware that it is impossible to properly characterize bird with only one feature (footedness) because it is equipped with other necessary, defining features. Considering this reality, Aristotle admits that to characterize a natural kind fully by virtue of all the diverse features it has by nature, one can not only divide animals in one single line but must differentiate them along many parallel lines.[27] To characterize bird as completely as possible, thus, one cannot be content with dividing animals in one single line into footed and two-footed merely with respect to the organ of locomotion. Rather, one should divide animals in parallel into flying-walking-swimming (with respect to the way of activity), into polypod-biped (with respect to the organ of locomotion in terms of the number of feet), into blooded-bloodless (with respect to the organ of producing and keeping heat), and into with beak and without beak (with respect to the organ of nutrition and defense). Moreover, in the natural world, nothing prevents diverse and compatible attributes from overlapping each other, just as bird is an animal that can fly and is blooded, biped, and equipped with a beak (ὄρνις ἐστὶ ζῷον πτερωτὸν ἔναιμον δίπουν ῥυγχωτόν, Michael of Ephesus *In Libros De partibus animalium Commentaria*, 15.20-21).[28] It is likewise with fish and other natural kinds. What a chiasmus demonstrates is nothing but the natural phenomenon that diverse and compatible properties can overlap in a certain kind of animal. To portray such natural kinds as bird, fish, or mankind as closely as possible to their own natures, therefore, one cannot use diairesis that divides animals in one single line but must apply parallel division as well as a chiasmus differentiating animals along many parallel lines. In this way, each natural kind can be defined, as well as characterized, with its multiple necessary, crucial features.

Diairesis characterizes one feature of the species as precisely as possible, while parallel division and chiasmus characterize a species as completely as possible. Diairesis is prior *to us* since we first recognize and use it to define *infima* species while being posterior *by nature* because diairesis can merely portray *infima* species to a limited extent by characterizing it with only one feature. Parallel division and chiasmus are prior *by nature*: they character-

ize a species as completely as possible, so the result of parallel division and chiasmus seems not only more natural but also closer to reality than the result of diairesis. Parallel division and chiasmus are posterior *to us*: despite admitting the propriety and validity of parallel division,[29] previous scholars have not realized the inherent relationship of parallel division to diairesis as well as to chiasmus while dismissing chiasmus as improper[30] or completely ignoring it. In the appendix, then, I propose an explanation of why chiasmus has not been known to scholars for such a long time.

6. APPENDIX

Chiasmus is unknown to scholars while being familiar to philosophers. As shown, Plato classifies constitutions using a 3 x 2 chiasmus while dividing animate beings using a 2 x 2 chiasmus, and Aristotle divides animals applying a 2 x 2 or 3 x 2 chiasmus. After Plato and Aristotle established the chiastic method of division, chiasmus played a continuous, crucial role in the history of philosophy. In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, for example, Kant makes the famous fourfold division – this is a 2 x 2 chiasmus:[31]

	a priori	*a posteriori*
analytic	analytic *a priori* judgments	analytic *a posteriori* judgments
synthetic	synthetic *a priori* judgments	synthetic *a posteriori* judgments

The 2 x 2 chiasmus occurs in such a way that the two pairs of differentiae, namely, 'analytic-synthetic' and '*a priori-a posteriori*', cross each other. The two pairs of differentiae emerge from dividing two non-subaltern genera, so the chiasmus that Kant conducts arises from parallel division of the second kind. Using a 2 x 2 chiasmus, Kant classifies judgments into four types: analytic *a priori*, analytic *a posteriori*, synthetic *a priori*, and synthetic *a posteriori*. Such expressions as 'analytic *a priori*' and 'synthetic *a posteriori*' seem to be tautologies, while 'analytic *a posteriori*' and 'synthetic *a priori*' appear to be contradictions. These tautological and contradictory expressions can come to light due to the chiastic method of division. Without any methodological reflection, Kant directly applies the chiastic method of division to lay the foundation for his critical philosophy, inquiring how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible. This provides clear evidence proving the power and profound influence of the chiastic method of division. Nothing stops philosophers from applying chiasmus, but what prevents scholars from recognizing it? Why have previous scholars been unwilling to acknowledge chiasmus to be a proper, valid method of division?

Balme has penetratingly observed the cross-divisions applied by Plato in the *Statesman* and Aristotle in *Parts of Animals*.[32] Despite noticing the application of cross-division, Balme has rejected cross-division as a proper, valid division because it 'splits natural kinds'.[33] In Balme's view, if we divide animals into [biped and] polypod, we cannot subdivide both into walking and swimming animals because polypod would appear under both walking and swimming, and we could not show whether a polypod animal walks or swims. According to Balme, then, we should recognize from the outset that polypod animals either walk or swim while avoiding cross-division, theoretically.[34]

Although Balme has properly pointed out that the cross-division that Aristotle conducts in *PA* A2 is associated with the discussion in

Top. Z6, he has drawn an improper conclusion that 'the cases are not parallel' (1992, 107). Just the opposite; the two cases are parallel: the cross-division cited from *PA* A2 occurs by complying with the two conditions prescribed in *Top*. Z6.[35] It appears that Aristotle could have conducted a diairesis by dividing animals into [biped and] polypod animals and subdividing polypod animals into walking and swimming (τῶν πολυπόδων γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις – *PA* A2, 642b19-20). According to what Aristotle demonstrates in *Top*. Z6, when the same differentiae, 'walking-swimming', are used to divide the differentiae 'biped-polypod' on both sides and these differentiae are subordinate to the same superordinate genus, 'animal', 'walking-swimming' shift from being used to subdivide the differentiae 'biped-polypod' to being applied to divide the genus 'animal'. In this case, the same genus, animal, is divided in parallel into the differentiae biped-polypod (with respect to the number of feet) and into the parallel-differentiae walking-swimming (with respect to the way of activity). The two pairs of differentiae cross each other, so a 2 x 2 cross-division occurs. From the 2 x 2 chiasmus, four pairs of combinations are generated, and each pair is composed of two diverse and compatible attributes, namely, biped-walking, biped-swimming, polypod-walking, and polypod-swimming. Chiasmus mirrors the natural phenomenon that both a biped and a polypod animal can either walk on land or swim in the water, and conversely, an animal can either walk on land or swim in the water regardless of how many feet it has by nature. Thus, what chiasmus reveals is not the split of natural kinds (as Balme has asserted) but rather the overlapping of diverse and compatible attributes (Συμβαίνει δὲ πολλὴ ἐπάλλαξις τοῖς γένεσιν, *GA* B1, 732b15). Since the chiasmus corresponds to and reflects on the natural phenomenon that diverse and compatible attributes overlap in a certain kind of animal, the theoretical investigation of the natural world must acknowledge its propriety and validity.

Invoking an example of Aristotle, Balme has intended to explain what a proper cross-division looks like. In Balme's view, Aristotle divides virtues in parallel into 'moral-intellectual' and into 'of-the-mean – not-of-the-mean'. A cross-division is conducted such that the two pairs of differentiae cross each other. Balme has acknowledged the division of virtue to be a proper chiasmus while insisting on the view that the chiastic division of animal in *PA* A2 is improper (1992, 104). In my estimation, however, both are proper, valid cross-divisions, and they differ in emerging from different kinds of parallel division. In *PA* A2, Aristotle performs the first kind of parallel division by dividing *the same genus*, 'animal', into the differentiae 'biped-polypod' and into the parallel-differentiae 'walking-swimming'. In classifying virtues, Aristotle conducts the second kind of parallel division by dividing *two non-subaltern genera* into their appropriate differentiae; it is likewise with the cross-division that Kant conducts. Contrary to Balme, therefore, I believe that the division of animal and the division of virtue are proper, valid cross-divisions.

Furthermore, despite realizing Plato's and Aristotle's application of chiasmus, Balme has been unwilling to admit its propriety and validity – the reason is deeply rooted in Aristotle. Aristotle criticizes the cross-division presented in *PA* A2 because in this context, he regards the division made by two differentiations (namely, the division made along two parallel lines) as pointless (ἡ εἰς δύο διαίρεσις μάταιος ἂν εἴη, *PA* A2, 642b17-18).[36] Not only does Aristotle criticize cross-division explicitly, but he also critiques parallel division implicitly. Aristo-

tle's criticism of parallel division is implicit because it mixes with his criticism of division by accidents.

In two parallel discussions of diairesis (*PA* A3, 643b9-23; *Metaph*. Z12, 1038a9-15), Aristotle aims to show how to conduct diairesis properly, thereby addressing the fundamental principle of diairesis, namely, the sub-differentia of the differentia. If someone fails to adhere to the sub-differentia of the differentia (even if he properly divides animal into wingless-winged), it is improper to subdivide winged into white-black in one case and into tame-wild in another case (*PA* A3, 643b17-23). These are examples signifying two types of division: they differ in such a way that white-black are accidental sub-differentiae of winged, while tame-wild are not sub-differentiae of winged but parallel-differentiae of animal. Because tame-wild are neither accidents or characteristics of wingedness nor associated in any way with the organ of locomotion but designate the disposition of animal, they cannot be used to subdivide winged but can only be applied to divide animal. In this case, one conducts a parallel division by dividing animals in parallel into wingless-winged with respect to the organ of locomotion and into tame-wild with respect to the disposition of animal (ζῴον → ἄπτερον καὶ πτερωτὸν; ζῴον → ἥμερον καὶ ἄγριον). In another case, one conducts a diairesis by dividing animals into wingless-winged and subdividing winged into white-black (ζῴον → πτερωτὸν → λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν). Thus, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of division: after dividing genus into differentiae, someone improperly subdivides differentiae into accidents in one single line or divides a genus in two parallel lines – the former refers to diairesis and the latter refers to parallel division. Based on this distinction, Aristotle criticizes the two types of division for different reasons. Aristotle critiques the first type of division for *not being a proper diairesis* because it is improper to divide differentiae into accidents, while he criticizes the second type of division – that is a type of parallel division – because it is *not a diairesis*. Using diairesis as a criterion, Aristotle in *PA* A2-3 and *Metaph*. Z12 criticizes parallel division and counts it as improper. The question is why does Aristotle select and use diairesis as a criterion to criticize parallel division as well as chiasmus? To answer this question, I should explain the relationship between division and definition by turning to the metaphysical background of Aristotle's criticism.

In *Metaph.* Z12 and H6, Aristotle endeavors to solve the problem of the unity of definition: how a definition composed of at least two elements (final differentia and genus) can be one and not many. To ensure the unity of definition, one should conduct the unity of multiple differentiae when the division is made using multiple differentiae. Against this metaphysical background, Aristotle in *PA* A3 first addresses *the unity of multiple differentiae* by emphasizing the fundamental principle of diairesis. Consistent with this principle, multiple differentiae can be unified by dividing a genus into the differentiae and further dividing the differentiae into the sub-differentiae up to an indivisible final differentia that embraces all of the predecessors. The diairetical division in one single line leads to one final differentia that ensures the unity of the multiple differentiae by embracing all of its predecessors. After the multiple differentiae are unified in one final differentia by means of diairesis, then Aristotle, in *Metaph*. Z12 and H6, articulates the solution of *the unity of definition* by establishing an analogy between the definition of a species and the production of a specimen: final differentia and genus (as intelligible matter) build up an

intelligible unity by defining a species, just as form and matter (as sensible matter) build up a sensible unity by producing a specimen.[37]

To ensure the unity of the definition, one should first establish the unity of multiple differentiae. Diairesis produces *a single final differentia* by dividing a genus in one single line, and the single final differentia unifies the multiple differentiae by embracing all of its predecessors. Parallel division and chiasmus, in contrast, produce *multiple final differentiae* by differentiating a genus along many parallel lines, and the multiple final differentiae cannot be unified. In *PA* A2-3 and *Metaph*. Z12, therefore, Aristotle criticizes parallel division and chiasmus due to his metaphysical concerns – that is, they cannot fulfil the function of diairesis to guarantee the unity of multiple differentiae and further ensure the unity of definition. Without considering the unity of multiple differentiae or the unity of definition, Aristotle not only justifies the propriety and validity of parallel division and chiasmus but also makes widespread use of them. Inheriting diairesis, parallel division, and chiasmus from Plato, Aristotle advances them by explaining the relationship between them. On the other hand, Aristotle's criticism prevents scholars from acknowledging parallel division and chiasmus to be proper, valid methods of division.

Bibliography

Alexander Aphrodisiensis. 1891. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*. Ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin: Reimer.

_____. 1898. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria*. Ed. M. Wallies. Berlin: Reimer.

Ammonius. 1891. *In Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

_____. 1895. *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

Aristotle. 1894. *Ethica Nicomachea*. Ed. I. Bywater. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1949. *Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione*. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1956. *De partibus animalium*. Ed. and Trans. P. Louis. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

_____. 1957. *Metaphysica*. Ed. W. Jäger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1957. *Politica*. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1958. *Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1961. *Parts of Animals*. Ed. and Trans. A. L. Peck. Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

_____. 1963. *Generation of Animals*. Ed. and Trans. A. L. Peck. Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

_____. 1964. *Analytica Prioria et Posterioria*. Eds. W. D. Ross and L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1965. *History of Animals, Books I-III*. Ed. and Trans. A. L. Peck. Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

_____. 1991. *History of Animals*. Trans. d' A. W. Thompson. In *The Complete Works of Aristotle I. The Revised Oxford Translation*. Ed. J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_____. 2011. *De generatione et corruptione* (*Über Werden und Vergehen*). Ed. T. Buchheim. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.

Asclepius. 1888. *Asclepii In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria*. Ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin: Reimer.

Balme, D. M. 1987. 'Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentiae.' In *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*. Eds. A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 69-89.

_____. 1992. *Aristotle: De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I (with passages from II. 1-3)*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bayer, Greg. 1998. 'Classification and Explanation in Aristotle's Theory of Definition.' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 36: 487-505.

Cherniss, Harold. 1944. *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Chiara-Quenzer, Deborah De. 1998. 'The Purpose of the Philosophical Method in Plato's Statesman.' *Apeiron* 31: 91-126.

Elias. 1900. *In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

Falcon, Andrea. 1996. 'Aristotle's Rule of Division in the Topics: The Relationship between Genus and Differentia in a Division.' *Ancient Philosophy* 16: 377-387.

_____. 1997. 'Aristotle's Theory of Division.' *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*. Supplement 68: 127-146.

_____. 2000. 'Aristotle, Speusippus, and the Method of Division.' *The Classical Quarterly* 50: 402-414.

Furth, Montgomery. 1988. *Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, Christopher. 1995. 'Rethinking Constitutionalism in Statesman 291-303.' In *Reading the Statesman*. Ed. Christopher J. Rowe. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag: 292-305.

Gill, Mary Louise. 2010. 'Unity of definition in Metaphysics H.6 and Z.12.' In *Nature, and Life in Aristotle*. Eds. J. G. Lennox and R. Bolton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 97-121.

Henry, Devin. 2011. 'A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division.' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 41: 229-255.

Kant. 2001. *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*. Ed. K. Pollok. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.

Klein, Jacob. 1977. *Plato's Trilogy Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Kullmann, Wolfgang. 2007. *Aristotle: Über die Teile der Lebewesen*. Berlin: Academia Verlag.

Lane, M. S. 1988. *Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lennox, J. G. 1987. 'Kinds, Forms of Kinds, and the More and Less in Aristotle's Biology.' In *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*. Eds. A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 339-359.

_____. 2001. *Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Liu, Xin. 2019. *Sein, Logos und Veränderung – Eine systematische Untersuchung zu Aristoteles' Metaphysik*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.

Lloyd, A. C. 1952. 'Plato's Description of Division.' *The Classical Quarterly* 2: 105-112.

Lloyd, G. E. R. 1961. 'The Development of Aristotle's Theory of the Classification of Animals.' *Phronesis* 6: 59-81.

Merrill, Jacqueline Pfeffer. 2003. 'The Organization of Plato's Statesman and the Statesman's Rule as a Herdsman.' *Phoenix* 57: 35-56.

Meyer, Jürgen Bona. 1855. *Aristoteles Thierkunde: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Zoologie, Physiologie und alten Philosophie*. Berlin: Reimer.

Michael of Ephesus. 1904. *Michaelis Ephesii In libros De partibus animalium, De animalium motione, De animalium incessu Commentaria*. Ed. M. Hayduck. Berlin: Reimer.

Miller, Mitchell. 1992. 'The God-Given Way.' In *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*. Eds. Cleary and Shartin. Lanham MD: University Press: 323-359.

_____. 2004. *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman: together with Dialectical education and unwritten teaching in Plato's Statesman*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Olympiodorus. 1902. *Prolegomena et In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

Pacius, Julius. 1966. *In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum, Commentarius Analyticus*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Pellegrin, Pierre. 1986. *Aristotle's Classification of Animals: Biology and the Conceptual Unity of the Aristotelian Corpus*. Trans. Anthony Preus. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____. 1987. 'Logical Difference and Biological Difference: The Unity of Aristotle's Thought.' In *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*. Eds. A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 313-338.

Philoponus. 1898. *Ioannis Philoponi (olim Ammonii) In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

Plato. 1901. *Philebus*. Ed. I. Burnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1901. *Phaedrus*. Ed. I. Burnet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1995. *Politicus*. Eds. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson and J. C. G. Strachan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1995. *Sophista*. Eds. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson and J. C. G. Strachan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1997. *Statesman*. Trans. C. J. Rowe. Ed. John. M. Cooper. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

_____. 2011. *Politicus*. Trans. F. Schleiermacher. Ed. G. Eigler. Darmstadt: WBG.

Porphyrius. 1887. *Porphyrii Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*. Ed. A. Busse. Berlin: Reimer.

Ricken, Friedo. 2008. *Platon Politicus. Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck/Ruprecht.

Rowe, Christopher J. 1995. 'Introduction.' In *Reading the Statesman*. Ed. Christopher J. Rowe. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag: 11-28.

Sayre, Kenneth M. 2006. *Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

Simplicius. 1907. *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*. Ed. K. Kalbfleich. Berlin: Reimer.

Stenzel, Julius. 1924. *Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles*. Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner.

Stern, Paul. 1997. 'The Rule of Wisdom and the Rule of Law in Plato's Statesman.' *American Political Science Review* 91: 264-276.

Zeller, Eduard. 2013. *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 2.2: Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker*. Darmstadt: WBG.

Notes

[1] This paper, originally titled with '*On Diairesis and Chiasmus: Plato's Methods of Division in the Statesman*', was presented in the section on Plato's Late Dialogues: Methodologies (30 June 2020, on Zoom), organized by Edward Halper on behalf of the *International Plato Society* (IPS) in the *American Philosophical Association* (APA) Pacific Division Meeting 2020. Thanks to Edward Halper for excellent organization and successful efforts to let the meeting be held on Zoom. Many thanks to William Altman for helpful comments and meaningful questions. To respond to his question, namely, why chiasmus has been forgotten by previous scholars, I add an appendix. Particular thanks is given to George Rudebusch for reading and commenting on earlier and final drafts. Accepting his suggestion, I eventually decided to use the term 'parallel division' to reference a division composed of two parallel 2-level division trees, instead of 'horizontal division' (which I have previously used). I would like to thank the chair, Jan Szaif, the other participants, Gabriele Cornelli and George Rudebusch, and the audiences for attending the meeting. Many thanks to the editor of the *Plato Journal*, Gabriele Cornelli, for an invitation to submit to the journal, and thanks also to the guest editor Richard Parry for his editing work. The present article is published in the framework of the research project: 'Research on Division and Method of Division in Ancient Greek Philosophy', supported by National Social Science Foundation of China, General Program [Grant Number: 21BZX088].

[2] *Plt*. 291c9-292b5, 301a6-303b7.

[3] See also *Plt*. 291d1-9.

[4] See also *Plt*. 291e1-292a3; Klein 1977, 193; Lane 1988, 159; Ricken 2008, 181-2, 251.

[5] *Top*. Z6, 145a5-7; *PA* A3, 643b9-10, 17-19; *Metaph*. Z12, 1038a9-15, 1038a25-6. See Alexander *In Metaphysica Commentaria*, 521.15-29; Asclepius *In Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria*, 426.20-9; Michael of Ephesus *In Libros De partibus animalium Commentaria*, 17.11-17; Cherniss 1944, 50-1, 52-3n42; G. E. R. Lloyd 1961, 67, 71; Balme 1987, 73; 1992, 102, 117; Pellegrin 1986, 30-1; Lennox 2001, 165-6; Falcon 1997, 134-5; 2000, 408n18, 413-4; Kullmann 2007, 324, 338; Henry 2011, 249.

[6] *Plt*. 291e1-292a3; 302d1-e2.

[7] *Phlb*. 23c4-5: Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ; *Plt*. 261b4-c5, 262e3-6, 265e10-11; *Soph*. 226c10-11, 264d12-e1; *Phdr*. 245e4-6, 265a9-c3; *PA* A2, 642b5-6. See also Meyer 1855, 76-7; Cherniss 1944, 54-5n43; Pellegrin 1986, 22, 172n11; Balme 1987, 69-71.

[8] Admitting the propriety and validity of the two kinds of division, Falcon called diairesis 'division by single tree' while naming parallel division 'division by several, simultaneous trees'; see Falcon 1997, 138. Responding to Balme's influence (Balme 1987, 69, 73, 76-7), Falcon and other scholars (Lennox 1987, 351; Furth 1988, 99) have suggested that division made in many trees occurs *simultaneously*. *Simultaneously*, however, does not sufficiently express the precise relationship among multiple division trees because we cannot divide 'animal' in many trees at the same time – division must be carried out step by step. Thus, what *simultaneously* designates is not something that happens at the same time but rather a case in which multiple division trees remain in parallel alongside each other. To articulate multiple division trees accurately, therefore, I prefer 'parallel'/'in parallel' to 'simultaneous'/'simultaneously'. Despite using the imprecise expression 'simultaneously' most of the time, Balme also expressed the truth of the matter in two other places; see 1987, 70-1, 86.

[9] By 'ostensible diairesis', I mean merely apparent diairesis as opposed to a genuine diairesis, which complies with the fundamental principle of diairesis.

[10] *Cat*. 3, 1b16-20; *Top*. A15, 107b19-21.

[11] In this context, Aristotle not only divides animals into walking, flying, and swimming but also divides animals into biped (ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, *Cat*. 3, 1b18-19). I temporarily set τὸ δίπουν aside, thereby regarding this division as the division of animal into. In due course, I explain the relationship of biped to walking-flying-swimming.

[12] Following Plato's dichotomous division of knowledge (*Plt*. 258e4-5), Aristotle divides knowledge into theoretical and practical, dichotomously. Theoretical knowledge aims at grasping the truth, while practical knowledge strives for doing something gut (*Metaph*. α1, 993b20-1). More commonly, Aristotle divides knowledge into theoretical, practical, and poietical, trichotomously, according to their different objects; see *Top*. Z6, 145a15-18; Θ1, 157a8-13; *Metaph*. E1, 1025b18-28; K7, 1064a10-19; *EN* Z2, 1139a27-9; Zeller 2013, 177-8n5; Liu 2019, 15n15, 18-22. Regardless of whether knowledge is divided dichotomously or trichotomously, the differentiae of knowledge differ from those of animal.

[13] *Cat*. 3, 1b16: τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων […]; *Top*. A15, 107b19: […] τῶν ἑτέρων γενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα […]; *Top*. Z6, 144b19-20: […] δύο γένεσιν οὐ περιέχουσιν ἄλληλα.

[14] In addition, Aristotle in *Top*. A15, 107b21-6 mentions an exceptional case in which the differentiae of the two non-subaltern genera can be the same. For example, the same differentia, 'sharp', is used to divide the two non-subaltern genera 'sound' and 'body'. The two non-subaltern genera 'sound' and 'body' can have the same differentia, 'sharp', because the term 'sharp' is applied equivocally. Therefore, when the term that signifies the differentia is used equivocally, the two non-subaltern genera can have the same differentia. See also Falcon 1996, 386-7.

[15] According to Aristotle's doctrine of category, animal is allocated to the category of substance (see *Cat*. 5, 2a14-19), and knowledge is allocated to the category of relation (see *Top*. Z6, 145a14-18).

[16] Alexander *In Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria* 453.23-5: ἢ ἐν Κατηγορίαις ἕτερα γένη τὰ πρῶτα λέγει, ἐπεὶ 'τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων' μηδ' ἄμφω ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν ὄντων γένος 'ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει αἱ διαφοραί'.

[17] *Cat*. 3, 1b18-19; 13, 14b34-15a3; *Top*. Z6, 143a36-b2; *HA* A1, 487b33-488a2.

[18] All of the translations are my own. I do not accept Ross's reading of καθάπερ τὸ δίπουν τὸ πτηνὸν **ἢ** τὸ πεζὸν συνεπιφέρει **ζῷον** at 144b29-30, but I am inclined to read the text as καθάπερ τὸ δίπουν τὸ πτηνὸν **καὶ** τὸ πεζὸν συνεπιφέρει **τὸ ζῷον**, following Alexander *In Topicorum Libros Octo Commentaria* 454.7-10. Falcon also intends to accept the reading of τὸ ζῷον at 144b30; see Falcon 1996, 383.

[19] Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of differentiae and the Neoplatonic commentators characterize them with technical terms. In classifying philosophy, Ammonius introduces three terms, namely, διαίρεσις, ἐπιδιαίρεσις, and ὑποδιαίρεσις to signify three kinds of differentiae. Διαίρεσις refers to the differentia of the genus, ἐπιδιαίρεσις refers to the parallel-differentia of the genus (which remains alongside the differentia of the genus), and ὑποδιαίρεσις refers to the sub-differentia of the differentia; see Ammonius *In Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces*, 9.25-10.10. In commenting on Aristotle's division of quantity in the *Categories* 6, Olympiodorus uses the same terms, making a similar distinction between διαίρεσις, ἐπιδιαίρεσις and ὑποδιαίρεσις; see Olympiodorus *In Categorias Commentarium*, 84.33-85.7. It is worth noting that Ammonius and Olympiodorus do not use the term διαίρεσις in the ordinary way as Plato and Aristotle have done, pointing to the division or the method of division. In distinguishing between three kinds of differentiae, the Neoplatonic commentators apply διαίρεσις in the sense of διαφορά, referring to the differentia of the genus. I explain Aristotle's distinction of the three kinds of differentiae and Ammonius's as well as Olympiodorus's explanation fully on another occasion.

[20] *Cat*. 10, 11b38-12a17; 12b26-35; Pellegrin 1987, 320, 332.

[21] It is definitely a cross-division because after this cut, what Plato further divides is not animate being in herds alone but animate being that lives in herds and is tame. See also Balme 1987, 70.

[22] Porphyrius *Isagoge*, 9.24-10.21; Liu 2019, 15-17.

[23] Peck edited the text at 488a2-3 as follows: καὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων [καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν] τὰ μὲν πολιτικὰ τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν. Having deleted καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν, Peck translated the sentence such that 'some of the gregarious animals are social, whereas others are more dispersed' (Peck 1965, 14-15). It is likewise with Thompson's translation as 'and of the gregarious, some are social, others independent' (Thompson 1991, 5) – this translation is based on the Greek text edited by Dittmeyer (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907); see Thompson 1991, 2n2. Instead of Peck's and Dittmeyer's editions, I adhere to the Bekker edition in which the text was properly edited as καὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν τὰ μὲν πολιτικὰ τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν.

[24] *Cat*. 2, 1a20-b6; Porphyrius *In Categorias Commentarium*, 78.34-79.11; Ammonius *In Categorias Commentarius*, 25.5-12; Simplicius *In Categorias Commentarium*, 44.11-25; Philoponus *In Categorias Commentarium*, 28.9-23; Olympiodorus *In Categorias Commentarium*, 43.3-11; Elias *In Categorias Commentaria*, 147.7-11; Pacius 1966, 28; Liu 2019, 81n92.

[25] Porphyrius *In Categorias Commentarium*, 78.34-79.11; Liu 2019, 15-18, 16n16, 16-17n17, 17n18.

[26] Liu 2019, 253-6.

[27] *PA* A3, 643b12-13: Τούτων δ' ἕκαστον πολλαῖς ὥρισται διαφοραῖς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν διχοτομίαν; 643b23-4: Διὸ πολλαῖς τὸ ἓν εὐθέως διαιρετέον, ὥσπερ λέγομεν.

[28] *PA* A3, 643b10-13; Michael of Ephesus *In Libros De partibus animalium Commentaria*, 15.13-25; Falcon 1997, 136-9. Aristotle portrays more natural features of bird in greater detail in *HA* B12, 503b29-504b12; see also Bayer 1998, 495-6, 501-2.

[29] Balme 1992, 101-5; Falcon 1997, 138-9; Bayer 1998, 494-6; Lennox 2001, 166; Kullmann 2007, 338-9.

[30] Balme 1987, 74-5; 1992, 107-8; Bayer 1998, 493-4.

[31] Kant 2001, 16-36; Liu 2019, 16n16.

[32] Balme 1987, 70-1; 1992, 104, 107-8. See also Bayer 1998, 493.

[33] Balme 1987, 74-5; 1992, 107-8.

[34] Balme 1987, 74-5; 1992, 107.

[35] Balme has argued that the cross-division presented in *PA* A2 and the discussion in *Top*. Z6 are not parallel because in two cases, the targets of division are different. According to Balme, Aristotle in *Top*. Z6 divides living beings while in *PA* A2, he divides animals (1992, 107-8). Indeed, Aristotle uses the same word, ζῷον, to signify both animal and living being. All animals are living beings, but not all living beings are animals. Living beings embraces animals and plants in the narrow sense while containing animals, plants, and God in the broader sense. Using the differentiae, 'mortality-immortality', Aristotle divides ζῷον into mortal animal and immortal God – in this case, ζῷον refers to living being (*APr*. A31, 46b3-19; *APo*. B5, 91b38-92a1; *Top*. Δ2, 122b12-14). In using such differentiae as 'biped-polypod' and 'walking-swimming', Aristotle can only divide animals (ζῷον) into subgenera. What Aristotle in *PA* A2 and *Top*. Z6 divides, therefore, is not living being but animal. Having the same target of division, the two discussions are parallel.

[36] *PA* A2, 642b16-20: Εἴπερ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν διασπαστέον, ἡ εἰς δύο διαίρεσις μάταιος ἂν εἴη· οὕτως γὰρ διαιροῦντας ἀναγκαῖον χωρίζειν καὶ διασπᾶν· τῶν πολυπόδων γάρ ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις.

[37] Stenzel 1924, 133-144; Cherniss 1944, 38-43; Gill 2010, 104-113; Liu 2019, 233-7, 234-6n319.

Philebus 23c-26d: *Peras*, *Apeiron*, and *Meikton* as Measure Theory[1]

George Rudebusch
Northern Arizona University
george.rudebusch@nau.edu
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8468-0792

ABSTRACT

At Philebus 23c4-26d10 Socrates makes a division into three kinds: Unbounded (apeiron), Bound (peras), and Mix (meikton). I review problems for the main interpretations of Unbounded and Mix and review kinds of scales defined in abstract measurement theory. Then I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing partial scales, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate ratio scales, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate for the good things that come to be in the world.

Keywords: Plato, *Philebus*, *apeiron*, *peras*, *meikton*, measure theory, division

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_4

INTRODUCTION

The *Philebus* investigates the good in human life. Socrates first frames the investigation as a debate familiar from other dialogues: that the good is either pleasure or cognition. Considerations of completeness, sufficiency, and desirability rule both these candidates out and lead to the conclusion that the best human life must instead be a mix of both pleasure and cognition. The dialogue here turns to a new debate for "second prize" (22c8), which goes to "whatever this thing is, such that after taking it the mixed life becomes at once choiceworthy and good" (22d6-7).

Socrates predicts that this new turn in the dialogue will require using "missiles of a device different from those of the earlier discussion–but perhaps some are the same" (23b7-9). I will suggest an interpretation of this obscure metaphor in the conclusion. The "starting point" (23c1) of the new turn occurs at *Philebus* 23c4-26d10, where Socrates makes a division of "all the things that are now in the universe "into two, or rather, if you are willing, into three" (23c4-5). The two are the kinds Unbounded (*apeiron)* and Bound (*peras*), while the kind Mix (*meikton,* 25b5) is the third. Eventually there will be need even of a fourth kind, the Cause of the mixes in the third kind (23d5-8), but my focus here is the first three kinds. Socrates identifies the members of the kind Unbounded as the hotter and colder, drier and wetter, large and small, high and low, fast and slow, and anything else that accepts the more and less, the intensely, the mildly and the excessively (24b4-5, 24e7-25a2, 25c5-6, 25c8-11, 26a2-3). The members of the kind Bound are "the equal, the double, and anything that is a number to a number or a measure to a measure" (25a7-b2). And he identifies the third kind, Mix, as the "progeny of these two kinds," "a birth into being out of the measures that were produced from the kind Bound" inseminating, as it were, the kind Unbounded (26d7-9).

There are longstanding problems in interpreting the method of division as it is used here and the three kinds that are its products. In part 1 I review problems for the main interpretations of the Unbounded and of Mix. In part 2, as background for my interpretation, I review kinds of *scales* defined in abstract measurement theory. In part 3 I take 23c4-26d10 speech by speech, interpreting the Unbounded as a kind containing *partial scales*, Bound as the kind containing the relations and quantities needed to turn partial scales into appropriate *ratio scales*, and Mix as the kind containing ratio scales appropriate for the good things that come to be in the world.

PART 1. PROBLEMS

One interpretation of the Unbounded is that each member of this kind–for example, the hotter and colder–is a continuum.[2] Let a *continuum* be a series of items that vary by imperceptibly small differences so that items that are near each other do not seem to differ, while items that are far apart do seem different. One problem for continuum interpretations of the unbounded is that Socrates never speaks of the unbounded in this way as a continuum. A second problem is that continuum interpretations do not fit the passages where Socrates says the unbounded–things like the hotter and colder–"could no longer exist" (ἔτι .. εἴτην ἄν) "after taking quantity" (λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν, like 24d2-3, likewise 24c6-d1). But there does not seem to be any necessary feature of being a continuum that prevents it from having or taking quantity. For example,

consider a body capable of growing hotter or colder in a continuous way. Such a continuum is unaffected if we become able to assign numbers as we measure the body's temperature. Such a continuum is able to exist after taking quantity, unlike Socrates' unbounded.[3]

A related interpretation would make the real number line unbounded, while the rational number line is bound. This interpretation would attribute to Socrates in the *Philebus* a sense for what today are called Dedekind cuts, a way to make the "unbounded" real numbers commensurate with the "bounded" rational numbers.[4] Such an interpretation of the unbounded as a real number line would be inaccurate. The real numbers possess equality, quantity, and proportion; Socrates' Unbounded does not; and the rational numbers are not bounded in any clear sense.

Another interpretation of the unbounded is as the indefinite or indeterminate.[5] This account, too, faces problems. For example, such an interpretation does not fit the unbounded at 27e7-9, where Philebus says, "Pleasure would not be all good if it were not its nature to be *unbounded* in both extent and in being more." (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον). Here Philebus is not praising pleasure for being *indeterminate* or *indefinite*. For him, at least in this passage, then, the unbounded is not the indeterminate. Again, Socrates at 52c3-d1 secures Protarchus' agreement to apply the word 'unbounded' (*apeiron*) not to pleasures that are indeterminate, but to pleasures that are "big" and "intense" (52c4-5).[6]

There is also a problem with understanding the kind Mix. Socrates appears to say that a moderate temperature is in the kind Mix but an extreme temperature is not. In giving an example of how Bound and Unbounded mix together to create that third kind, Socrates says, "The right association of [bounds] in [unbounded] heat and cold engenders the nature of health" (ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν, 25e7-8). Socrates seems to have a case of feverish temperature in mind here as an example of the unbounded, which, after receiving bound, becomes a case of healthy temperature. Delcomminette (2006: 247) states the problem well: "It is hard to see why, for example, a 'bad' fever of 41°C would be less perfectly determined [or bound in any sense] than a 'good' temperature of 37°C." This problem has been unsolved since at least Jackson 1882.

PART 2. SCALES

In preparation for a solution to problems like these, in this part I review kinds of scales. Scales are defined in abstract measurement theory using set theory (e.g. Narens 1985). But the distinctions between relevant scales are intuitively clear without set theory. For example a **scale** is defined as a set S and a relation R defined upon its members. While Socrates does not refer to "sets" with relations defined "upon" them, much less to "scales," he does speak of "the abode of the more and less and intensely and mildly" τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ, 24c7-d1), also calling it the "space in which they are present" (χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν, 24d2). Any such space, abode, or, as I shall call it, *domain,* with any such relation present in it, is intuitively a scale. For the sake of review of the scales of abstract measurement theory (not for an interpretation of Socrates' kinds), let the cities located on the rivers in the Mississippi Watershed be a domain. The domain itself is not a scale. It needs a relation–any two-place relation–present in it, for example, the relation

close to. For example, Minneapolis is close to St. Paul but not close to New Orleans.

A two-place relation R is *symmetric*–or, as Socrates alternatively speaks, "has the power" (τὴν … δύναμιν ἔχετον, 24c2) of symmetry in a given domain D–just in case, for any x and y in D, Rxy iff Ryx. For example, the relation *close to* is symmetric: Minneapolis is close to St. Paul iff St. Paul is close to Minneapolis. In contrast, a two-place relation R is *antisymmetric* on D iff, for any x and y in D, Rxy iff *not* Ryx. For example, the relation *preferable* is antisymmetric: Memphis is preferable to Minneapolis iff Minneapolis is not preferable to Memphis. A **pairwise scale** is a scale whose relation is *antisymmetric*. If I survey your preferences about cities of the Mississippi Watershed, so that for any two cities I record that you do or do not prefer one to the other, then I have defined a preference relation. That relation and its domain are a pairwise scale. Since the relation *close to* is not antisymmetric, that relation on the domain of those cities will *merely* be a scale: it does not have enough order to be a pairwise scale.

A two-place relation on a domain D–call it $<_d$–is *transitive* just in case, for any x and y in D, if a $<_d$ b and b $<_d$ c, then a $<_d$ c. For example, the relation *downstream* is transitive. For example, if New Orleans is downstream from Memphis, and Memphis is downstream from St. Louis, then New Orleans must be downstream from St. Louis. In contrast, the relation *preferable* need not be transitive. In listing pairwise preferences, for example, someone might deem Memphis preferable to Minneapolis and Minneapolis preferable to New Orleans but not deem Memphis preferable to New Orleans. A **partial scale** is a pairwise scale whose relation is transitive. For example, the downstream relation on the Mississippi Watershed cities is a partial scale. But the preference relation on that watershed is merely a pairwise scale. It does not have enough order to be a partial scale.

Let us have some domain D and relation $<_d$ that is a partial scale S. There is an *equality relation* ($=_d$) on D just in case:

1. The relation $=_d$ is *reflexive* (in D, for all x, x $=_d$ x).
2. The relation $=_d$ is *symmetric*.
3. The relation $=_d$ is *transitive*.
4. And in D, for all x and y, x $=_d$ y iff neither x $<_d$ y nor y $<_d$ x.

Then S (with its antisymmetric, transitive relation $<_d$) is an **ordinal scale** just in case there is an equality relation $=_d$ on D. For example, the Mohs scale of mineral softness and hardness is an ordinal scale. The domain of that scale consists of ten minerals: talc, gypsum, calcite, fluorite, apatite, feldspar, quartz, topaz, corundum, diamond. There is an antisymmetric, transitive relation *softer* on that domain (mineral a is softer than b just in case b can scratch a but a cannot scratch b). Given two minerals, if a is not softer than b and b is not softer than a, then a and b are equal in hardness. In contrast, there is no such equality relation for the downstream relation on the Mississippi watershed, because condition 4 does not hold true on that domain. This is because there are tributaries to the Mississippi within the watershed. For example, Cincinnati on the Ohio is not downstream from Kansas City on the Missouri, and Kansas City is not downstream from Cincinnati. Yet these two cities are in no sense 'equally downstream'. Thus the downstream relation on the whole watershed is merely a partial scale. It does not have enough order to be an ordinal scale. On the other hand, if the domain of the downstream relation were

only the Mississippi and none of its tributaries, then condition 4 would hold true: on that domain, for all x and y, x and y are equally downstream iff neither x is downstream from y nor y is downstream from x.

Given some domain D and relation $<_d$ that is ordinal, let us have next a *binary operation* $+_d$ (like addition on a domain of numbers) and an *identity element e* (such that, for all x, $x +_d e = x$, like 0 for addition). An ordinal scale with such an operation and element will be an **interval scale**. For example, Centigrade and Fahrenheit are interval scales of temperature. Each has an equality relation =, a binary operation +, and an identity element 0. The Mohs scale of hardness, lacking the order provided by these, is merely ordinal.

If an interval scale also possesses proportion, it is a ratio scale. In such a scale, for each x and y in D, if $e <_d x$, then for some positive integer n, $y <_d nx$.[7] It is easily proven in a ratio scale that, for each $x >_d e$ in D, $x =_d 1x$, $x +_d x =_k 2x$, etc. Call 1x **the equal**, 2x **the double**, etc. The natural, the rational, and the real numbers are all ratio scales on different domains of numbers. Given as domain an organism persisting through time, its age is another example of a ratio scale: notice that 62 years old is twice as old as 31. An age scale will have the same structure as the natural numbers with their relations < and =, the operation +, and the identity element 0. But neither Celsius nor Fahrenheit are ratio scales of temperature, since, 62 degrees is not twice as hot as 31 degrees in either scale. On the other hand, the Kelvin scale of temperature, differing from Celsius only in its identity element, is a ratio scale.

To summarize, in abstract measure theory there are a range of scales from less to more ordered: pairwise, partial, ordinal, interval, and ratio scales. For purposes of interpreting the *Philebus*, it is helpful to define a few more terms. For a ratio scale S with domain D and relation $<_d$ we can define an **inverse relation** $>_d$ such that for all x and y in D, $x >_d y$ iff $y <_d x$. For example, on the domain of some body, the relations *hotter* and *colder* are inverse.

A ratio scale S with domain D and relation $<_d$ is **bounded below** just in case there is an x such that, for all y, either $x =_d y$ or $x <_d y$. For example, the relation < on the natural numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. is bounded below. The same scale S is **bounded above** just in case there is an x such that, for all y, either $y =_d x$ or $y <_d x$. If S is not bounded below or above, it is **unbounded**.

PART 3. INTERPRETATION

Although I do not here defend an interpretation of Socrates' method of division, my hypothesis is that the method, kinds, and forms used by Socrates at 23c4-26d10 are the same sorts of things used by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman,* as if the Socrates of the *Philebus*–unlike the Socrates of the *Phaedrus*–has by this dramatic date observed the Stranger's method of division.[8] On this hypothesis, Socrates' non-technical vocabulary distinguishes between kinds and forms. Ordinary language users have no trouble distinguishing between on the one hand a *herd* of livestock and on the other the *brand* marking each member of the herd. Just as a herd contains many head of livestock, all sharing the same brand, so also for Socrates in the *Philebus* a *kind* contains many members, all sharing the same *form.* Unlike sets, a herd persists even as its membership changes as livestock die or are born. The five occurrences of the Greek word *genos* in *Philebus* 23c4-26d10 are well translated as 'kind', denoting an

object like a herd. For example, the fourth kind Cause at 23d5 contains as members all causes among things (likewise 24a9, 25a1, 26d1, and 26d2). Again, both occurrences of the Greek word *eidos* at 23c4-26d10 (namely, 23c12 and 23d2) are well translated as 'form.' Perhaps these two occurrences literally denote the forms *unbounded* and *bound*.[9] But it is more likely–in view of the coordinate reference to a "third" (τρίτον, 23c12) that "is being mixed together" (συμμισγόμενον, 23d1) out of the first two and the reference to a "fourth kind" (τετάρτου γένους, 23d5)–that the word *eidos* in both these occurrences figuratively denotes kinds, not forms, by metonymy.[10]

Philebus 23c4-26d10 consists of 35 speeches each by Socrates and Protarchus. In his first six speeches, Socrates proposes to divide "all the things there are now in the universe" (πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ, 23c4) by collecting four kinds of those things. Speeches 5, 6, and 7 are about kinds of cause, while speeches 8 and 9 are about the order of his division. Socrates, like the Stranger, collects each kind in four steps: first stating an open-ended list of items; second identifying the power shared by those items; third bringing those items together under a heading according to that power; and fourth naming the kind.[11] Socrates names the first two kinds before he begins: "The Unbounded" (τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, 23c9), "The Bound" (τὸ δὲ πέρας, 23c10), and gives definite descriptions (not names) to the third and fourth: "some one thing being mixed together out of the Unbounded and Bound" (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον, 23d1), and "the cause of the mixing together of the Unbounded and Bound with each other" (τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν, 23d7).

Socrates collects the kind Unbounded in a roundabout way. Speech 10 begins by getting Protarchus to agree that we cannot conceive any bound "of a hotter/more hotly and colder/more coldly" (θερμοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι … πέρας … τι, 24a7-8). Used without a definite article, the Greek neuter singular comparatives θερμοτέρου and ψυχροτέρου might be adjectives 'hotter' and 'colder' or adverbs 'more hotly' and 'more coldly'. It is consistent with this text to take these comparatives to refer to relations of more and less on a domain (if the comparatives are adjectives) of hot and cold things or (if adverbs) heating and cooling actions. For example, regions of the Earth make up a domain of hot and cold *things*, where for instance Australia is hotter than Antarctica, and Antarctica is colder than Australia. The regions of the Earth also make up a domain of hot and cold *actions*. For instance, the sun *shines more hotly* in Australia than in Antartica and *more coldly* in Antartica than in Australia.

Although Socrates does not say so, it is consistent with the text to take such a relation *hotter/more hotly* on a given domain as antisymmetric and transitive and to take *hotter/more hotly* and *colder/more coldly* as inverse relations on that domain (as antisymmetry, transitivity, and inversity have been defined above). Socrates' statement that there is no conceivable bound to these relations indicates that those relations are unbounded (as defined at the end of part 2) on that domain. There is the same adjective/adverb ambiguity in the case of the words Socrates uses to list other members of the kind Unbounded. In the rest of this paper I have for the sake of brevity used only the English adjective 'hotter' instead of 'hotter/more hotly' and likewise with the other such relations, trusting that the reader will bear in mind the ambiguity in the Greek.

In the same speech Socrates elicits that there being no conceivable bound to the relations *hotter* and *colder* is equivalent to "the

more and less dwelling in them, the kinds" Hotter and Colder (τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε τοῖς γένεσιν, 24a9). The reference to these two kinds tells us how to interpret the previous paragraph in a more accurate way. The previous paragraph states that the singular comparatives θερμοτέρου and ψυχροτέρου refer to many relations of *hotter* and *colder*. It is more accurate to take each singular comparative to refer to one object, not many. That one object is the kind Hotter, which contains many relations on many domains (or the kind Colder, which contains the inverse relations on the same domains). The adverbs μᾶλλόν "more" and ἧττον "less" modify adjectives or verbs, not nouns. We might take these adverbs to refer to two features of relations on domains of either things or actions. Thus "the more and less dwell in the kinds Hotter and Colder" by virtue of being a feature of the members of these kinds. I take these features *more* and *less* to be the powers of *being ever more* and *ever less*, that is, being *unbounded*. This interpretation gains support from Socrates' next speech: "So long as [the more and less] are dwelling in [a relation of hotter or colder], the [the more and less] could not permit an end to come to be [in that relation]" ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι, 24b1). I take this as follows: if the *more* and *less* are features of *merely antisymmetric and transitive inverse* relations–I shall call these MATI relations–then those relations are unbounded.

In speech 11 Socrates adds that "the more and less are always in the hotter and colder" (Ἀεὶ … ἔν τε τῷ θερμοτέρῳ καὶ ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ἔνι, 24b4-5). I take this to mean that there are forms or powers *more* and *less,* which are always present in the kinds Hotter and Colder, forms that cause those kinds of relations to be as expressed in speech 12 (where the causality is indicated by the inferential τοίνυν "therefore"): "Therefore these two do not have an end" (τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν, 24b7-8), that is, these two kinds of relations are always unbounded. I take the word 'always' to indicate that the *more* and *less* are *necessarily* features of these two kinds of relations.

In speech 13 Socrates states that "the intensely and mildly (τὸ σφόδρα … καὶ τό γε ἠρέμα) have the same power (τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχετον) as the more and less" (24c1-3). I take this statement to show that there are forms *intensely* and *mildly,* like the forms *more* and *less,* sharing the power to cause relations to be unbounded. Socrates' reason for positing the same power for these forms is "because wherever [the forms *intensely* and *mildly*] are present, they do not allow each item [there] to be a quantity" (ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, c3). He explains what it means to *forbid quantity*: "by always creating in every matter [something] more excessive than [something] more mild and the opposite [i.e. by always creating something more mild than something more excessive], the intensely and mildly produce the greater [thing] and the lesser [thing], and [in this sense] destroy quantity" (ἀεὶ σφοδρότερον ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τοὐναντίον ἑκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον, 24c4-6). On my reading, this destruction of "quantity" is an effect of removing upper and lower bounds on a given scale. For a scale to possess quantity, then, might be for it to have *some finite number of intervals* between its lower and upper bound. As shown in part 2, such a scale must at least be ordinal.

The same speech tells us more about the "quantity" suppressed by the power of the more and less and intensely and mildly. "By

not suppressing quantity, but instead by allowing it and measure to come to be in the abode of the more and less and intensely and mildly, these things themselves flow out of their space, [the space] in which they were present" (μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα ἕδρᾳ ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν χώρας ἐν ᾗ ἐνῆν, 24c6-d2). In this speech, quantity and measure seem to come and go together. In part 2 I reviewed three different scales of increasing order above the partial scale: ordinal and interval, which do not possess measure, and ratio, which does. It is not clear how to distinguish these scales in Greek mathematics, since their binary operation of arithmetic did not possess the identity element 0. In any case, Socrates does not distinguish these three. His contrast seems only to be an informal distinction between merely partial scales on the one hand and ratio scales as the more ordered scale on the other hand. For Socrates' purposes in this passage, if a scale possesses quantity it also possesses measure and is a bounded ratio scale, while if it lacks quantity and measure it is a merely partial unbounded scale.

Speech 13 continues: "For a hotter or colder could no longer exist after getting quantity" (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν, 24d2-3). The inferential γάρ ("for") indicates that this speech is presented in support of the general claim of the incompatibility of quantity with more and less and intensely and mildly. The support seems to take the form of an illustrative example of that general incompatibility in the case of hotter and colder. This speech is clearly true, if we take "a hotter and colder" to be a merely partial scale of the relations *hotter and colder* on a given domain, and if we take "quantity" to be the features that change a merely partial scale into a ratio scale, with the greater order that a ratio scale gives to the relations *hotter* and *colder*. Every ratio scale is a partial scale, but no ratio scale can be a *merely* partial scale.

The same speech develops this illustration by supporting the claim (with another inferential γάρ) of the incompatibility of hotter and colder with quantity: "For the hotter is always going on and not staying put, and the colder likewise, but quantity comes to a stop and ceases to go on" (προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προϊὸν ἐπαύσατο, 24d4-5). I take this speech, an elaboration of 24b7-8, to be an intuitive way of saying that it is the nature of the hotter and colder to be a scale containing the MATI relations *hotter* and *colder* on a domain D such that, for any x in D, there is a y such that y is hotter than x and there is a z such that z is colder than x.

Speech 13 concludes that, "according to this statement" [that the hotter and colder always go on] (κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον), "the hotter and the colder [in a given domain] would prove to be unbounded at the same time" (ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοὐναντίον ἅμα, 24d6-7). I translate γίγνοιτο 'prove to be' rather than 'come to be'. The hotter and colder cannot *come to be* unbounded, since you cannot come to be something you always are (24d2-3). But they can *prove to be*–that is, come to be understood as–unbounded. I interpret the phrase 'according to this statement' to be inferential, indicating an inference from *jointly always going on* to *being unbounded at the same time*. When Socrates speaks of the hotter and colder as always going on and therefore always unbounded, I take him to speak only of what I have called the

unbounded MATI relations *hotter* and *colder*. Certainly the relations *hotter* and *colder* can exist either in an unbounded partial scale or in a bounded ratio scale.

To this point, Socrates has only listed one pair of members of the kind he is going to collect: the unbounded MATI relations *hotter* and *colder* on a given domain. But speech 14 states his wish to abbreviate the project of collecting the kind Unbounded: "in order that we do not speak too long going through all [the list], see if we will accept this sign of the nature of the unbounded" (ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν, 24e4-5). It will suit Socrates, however, to list other items in the kind Unbounded later, as part of his collection of the third kind, Mix: "drier and wetter and superior and inferior and faster and slower and larger and smaller" (ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον … καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, 25c8-10). I take each of these pairs, like "hotter and colder," to be MATI relations on a given domain. Stating the "sign of the nature" shared by all these items–that is, their shared power–will be the second step.

Speech 15 presents the second, third, and fourth steps of collecting the kind.

> All these things–as many things as show themselves becoming more and less and accepting the intensely and mildly and the excessively and all such things–it is necessary to place into the kind of the unbounded as into a one. (Ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, 24e7-25a2.)

The second step, identifying the power shared by every member of the kind, is at the words "becoming more and less and accepting the intensely and mildly and the excessively and all such things." The third step is bringing the items in the kind together "into a one" according to the power identified in the second step: "it is necessary to place all these things [that share the same power] into the kind … as into a one." The fourth and last step is naming the kind: "the kind of the unbounded."

Speech 16 turns to the task of collecting the kind Bound.

> With respect to the things that do not accept [the intensely and the mildly and the excessively, cf. 24e8], but do accept all the things opposite to these–in the first place the equal and equality, and after the equal the double and anything that is a number to a number or a measure to a measure– if we were to render an account of all these together in regard to the [kind] Bound, we would seem to accomplish this [task of first collecting as many things as are scattered and dispersed and then putting on them the sign of some one nature, cf. 25a2-4] in a manner worthy of praise (τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα σύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο, 25a6-b2).

It is perhaps ambiguous when Socrates makes this statement whether the list *the equal … the double etc.* in this passage is appositive to *the things that do not accept the intensely, mildly, and excessively* or whether, as sug-

gested by closer proximity, it is appositive to *the things opposite to the intensely, etc.*

My hypothesis is that the list is appositive to *the things that do not accept the intensely, mildly, and excessively.* On this hypothesis, while the kind Unbounded contains scales as members (namely, unbounded MATI relations like *hotter* and *colder* on various domains), the kind Bound contains as members not scales but forms (namely, the forms that turn unbounded partial scales into bounded ratio scales, including for example *the equal, the double,* and *the triple*). Speech 16 lists some of these relations as a first step in collecting this second kind. As an indication of the second step, speech 16 also outlines how one might identify the power shared by every member of the kind: *accepting all the things opposite to* intensely *and* mildly *and* excessively. But speech 16 does not render an account of what these opposites are. Instead, Socrates speaks conditionally, using the participle of a verb of rendering an account to mark the condition of a future less vivid conditional (ἀπολογιζόμενοι = εἰ ἀπολογιζοίμεθα, Smyth §2344): *if we were to render an account … we would seem to accomplish this*.[12] And he indicates what the fourth step would be in naming the kind "Bound." It is only a potential and not yet an actual collection, as speech 24 will indicate later: "we did not do the collection [in speech 16]" (οὐ συνηγάγομεν, 25d7).

Speeches 23-25 confirm my hypothesis about the appositive in speech 16. The "family" (γένναν, 25d3) Bound is the kind that possesses as members "the equal and double and whatever puts a stop to things being at odds with each other and, putting in proportionate and harmonious things, produces a number" (τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται, 25d11-e2). Now an equality relation and proportion on a domain constitute a ratio scale. The kind Bound, then, as I take it, contains equality relations and proportions that are not themselves on any domain, but that, when added to a given domain, produce ratio scales. [13]

There is an interlude between speeches 16 and 23. Speeches 17-20 mark a transition to the third kind, Mix. Speech 21 recalls that they have spoken of "something hotter and [something] colder" (Θερμότερον … τι καὶ ψυχρότερον, 25c5-6). Speech 22 lists more members of Unbounded–"a drier and a wetter, a more and a less (*pleon* and *elatton*), a faster and a slower, and a larger and a smaller" (ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, 25c8-10)–and restates their shared nature or power: "the nature that accepts the more and less (*to mallon* and *hētton*)" (τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης … φύσεως, 25c10-11). In this speech, the English words 'more and less' translate two different Greek word pairs, the adjectives without a definite article, *pleon* and *elatton,* and the adjectives with definite article *to mallon* and *hētton*: As I take it, the adjectives *pleon* and *elatton* refer to features of the domain, namely, more and less of the domain, while the adjectives *to mallon* and *hētton* refer here as in speech 11 to features of the MATI relations, namely the unboundedness of the *hotter* and *colder*, *drier* and *wetter*, *faster* and *slower,* etc.

Socrates' speech 23 and Protarchus' speech 25 each use an active voice for a verb of mixing X in with Y or breeding X with Y (*meignumi* or *summeignumi*). Speech 23 gives a command to "breed the family of Bound in with it (the nature of Unbounded) συμμείγνυ … εἰς αὐτὴν … τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν 25d2-3), while speech 25 speaks of "breed-

ing these (i.e. the members of Bound [with something unbounded])" (μειγνὺς ταῦτα [sc. εἰς αὐτὴν], 25e3). Speeches 28, 29, and 30 use the passive voice for the same act of breeding the members or family of Bound–the equal, the double, etc.–into something unbounded. Speech 28 speaks of "these same things, being bred into [something unbounded]" (ταὐτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα, 26a3); speech 29 speaks of the family of bound, "after it has been bred into" (ἔν … ἐγγενομένη, 26a6) something unbounded; and speech 30 states that mixed things "have been born" of two parents, namely, "of unbounded things and things that have limit, after they have been bred together" (γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμειχθέντων, 26b2-3).

Socrates' speech 26 confirms Protarchus' impression that the kind Mix contains "some births" (γενέσεις τινὰς) that occur "in the case of each of them" (ἐφ' ἑκάστων αὐτῶν, 25e4). As I take it, in each case of interbreeding it is a given member of the kind Unbounded and an appropriate member of the kind Bound that are bred together, giving rise to a "birth."

Speech 27 gives an illustrative example of the interbreeding. "In illnesses, the right association of these things engenders the nature of health" (ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν, 25e7-8). Socrates appears here to make the assumption that health is a matter of proper proportion of underlying MATI relations, relations that in a frightening sense are unbounded: only death limits them. On his account the nature of health is therefore a ratio scale with appropriate bounds, where the domain is an organism. That nature is produced by creating proper ratios in the organism, such as by restoring a proper ratio of weight to height or of blood sugar in the blood stream in a human being.

Speech 28 gives a second example. "These same things (i.e. the equal, double, etc.), being bred into high and low [pitch] and fast and slow [tempo], which are unbounded, produce a bound and compose most perfectly music as a whole" (Ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπηργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν σύμπασαν τελεώτατα συνεστήσατο, 26a2-4).[14] It supports my interpretation that Socrates' example of a piece of music is in fact a ratio scale with appropriate bounds, where the domain is an episode of sound. Music is produced by creating proper ratios in the sound, such as playing each note at a pitch and for a time in the proper ratio to the pitch and time of the other notes.

Speech 29 gives a third example. The family of bound, "after it is bred into winter storms and summer heat, takes away the greatly excessive and the unbounded and produces at the same time the measured and the proportionate" (ἔν γε χειμῶσιν καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενομένη [sc. (from 25d2-3) ἡ τοῦ πέρατος γέννα] τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπηργάσατο, 26a6-8). Speech 30 continues the example: "We have come to possess (ἡμῖν γέγονε) seasons and all praiseworthy things (ὧραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα) from these things–unbounded things and things having bound–(ἐκ τούτων τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων) after they are mixed together (συμμειχθέντων, 26b1-3)." It again supports my interpretation that Socrates' example, a temperate climate, is a ratio scale with appropriate bounds, where the domain is seasonal weather. That nature is produced by proper ratios of such things as dry to wet and hot to cold weather.

Speech 31 alludes to a range of additional examples of members of Mix born from

unbounded things and things having bound being bred together. We have come to possess "beauty and strength [in the body] and, in the soul, very many other things that are fine in every way" (κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα, 26b5-7). It further supports my interpretation that Socrates' examples, a beautiful or strong body or a virtuous soul, are ratio scales with appropriate bounds for the relevant MATI relations on the domain of a body or soul. Speech 31 goes on to propose a divine cause (indicated by the inferential γάρ, 26b7) for such excellences: "For–with respect to wantonness and baseness as a whole of everyone (ὕβριν γάρ … καὶ σύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν)–this goddess (αὕτη … ἡ θεός), I suppose (που), after seeing no bound present in them, either of pleasures or filling-ups (οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν), established law and order (νόμον καὶ τάξιν … ἔθετο), things that have a bound (πέρας ἔχοντ', 26b7-10)." Socrates in this same speech contrasts his view with that of Philebus. "And you (Philebus) say that she causes [pleasures and filling-ups] to wear out (καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς αὐτήν), but I say in opposition that [she] preserves [them] (ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω, 26b10-c1)." In other words, according to Socrates, the lack of appropriate bounds wears out pleasures of restoration; appropriate bounds preserves those pleasures–a plausible remark.

When Protarchus (speech 32) asks for further clarification of the kind Mix, Socrates recalls (speech 33) that many items were evidently marked out as one kind, Unbounded, by "the more and less" as their shared feature (26d1-2). Speech 34 recalls that they "neither fussed that the kind Bound possessed many [members] nor fussed that it was not one in nature" (τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἓν φύσει, 26d4-5). Then Socrates says (speech 35): "Deem me to be saying that the entire progeny of these (two kinds)–in establishing this (to be) one–is a third (kind) (τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἓν τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν), a birth into being out of the measures that were produced with the (kind) Bound (γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων, 26d7-9)." I take this speech to give us the shared power of every member of the kind Mix: each member of the kind Mix comes to be from two parents, as it were: one parent is a member of the kind Unbounded, that is, this parent is an unbounded mere partial scale. The other parent is part of the kind Bound, that is, this parent is a subkind of appropriate relations of equality and proportion and numerical bounds. There is some cause breeding together the two parents, a cause that "adds measures" from the kind Bound (the particular cause might be a doctor producing health, a musician making music, a weather god preserving a climate, or a demiurge creating the cosmos). This cause by adding relations of equality and proportion and numerical bounds to the domain, changes a partial scale into a ratio scale with appropriate bounds. The ratio scale is a new offspring or "being" that comes to be ("is born") as a result of the "breeding" of equality and proportion and numerical bounds with the MATI relations on the domain.

CONCLUSION

By cutting up paper triangles and putting the three angles together like three slices of pie in a pie pan, students can sense a feature of triangles, namely that the interior angles sum to 180°. The student gets a sense of geometry before learning a rigorous proof of the feature.

A student with a good sense of geometry will be able to see features before proving them. Without a proof in hand, what the student sees is "hard to be sure of and subject to dispute" (*Philebus* 24a6). But the conjectures might guide research.

One theme of the *Philebus* is measurement. This theme is most obvious in the ranking of kinds of knowledge from more to less "accurate" (see Rudebusch 2020 on Moss 2019). Euclid was familiar with the mathematical work of Plato's Academy, and measure is a theme in his geometry.

> One of the most fundamental concepts in Euclidean geometry is that of the *measure m(E)* of a solid body *E* in one or more dimensions. In one, two, and three dimensions, we refer to this measure as the *length*, *area*, or *volume* of *E* respectively. In the classical approach to geometry, the measure of a body was often computed by partitioning that body into finitely many components, moving around each component by a rigid motion (e.g. a translation or rotation), and then reassembling those components to form a simpler body which presumably has the same area. One could also obtain lower and upper bounds on the measure of a body by computing the measure of some inscribed or circumscribed body; this ancient idea goes all the way back to the work of Archimedes at least. Such arguments can be justified by an appeal to geometric intuition (Tao 2011: 2).

As Tao observes, contemporary geometry reinterprets Euclidean geometry as "the study of Cartesian products $\mathbf{R}^d$ of the real line $\mathbf{R}$," with the unfortunate consequence that it is "no longer intuitively obvious how to define the measure m(E) of a general subset of $\mathbf{R}^d$" (Tao 2011: 2). Just as Plato had no inkling of set-theoretic presentations of measure theory, he did not conceive geometry as the study of Cartesian products.

My thesis about Plato is that he had an intuitive sense of some basic features of measure theory. In particular, he made use of scales and distinguished partial from ratio scales, in his terms, the kind Unbounded and the kind Mix. He intuitively sensed that a partial scale can be turned into a ratio scale by the addition of appropriate relations of equality and proportion, which relations in his terms are members of the kind Bound. Such an interpretation of the kind Unbounded as containing partial scales avoids the problems facing interpretations of that kind as a continuum or as the indefinite. And an interpretation of the kind Mix as containing appropriate ratio scales solves the problem how, for example, an unhealthy fever of 41°C is less bounded than a healthy temperature of 37°C. On my interpretation, it is incorrect to describe individual temperatures like 41°C or 37°C as members of the kind Mix. Scales, that is relations on domains, might be bounded or unbounded. Individual temperatures like 41° or 37° do not by themselves stand in proportions nor do they possess or lack bounds. Last and perhaps least, my interpretation permits the following interpretation of the obscure preface to 23c4-26d10, when Socrates says he needs "missiles of a device different from those of the earlier discussion–but perhaps some are also the same" (ἄλλης μηχανῆς … βέλη, … ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά, 23b7-9). I take the "missiles" (βέλη) to be the kinds Unbounded, Bound, and Mix. I take the "other device" (ἄλλης μηχανῆς) to be the measure theory intuited by the character Socrates and the author Plato, and I take the

missiles that are "perhaps the same" (ἴσως … ταὐτά) to be the method Socrates uses in the fourfold division, which is perhaps an instance of the "gift of the gods" (Θεῶν … δόσις, 16c5) already used at 16c-19b, just as Socrates says.

Bibliography

Barker, A. 1996. "Plato's *Philebus*: The Numbering of a Unity," *Apeiron* 29: 143-164.

Benitez, E. E. 1989. *Forms in Plato's* Philebus. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Burnet, John. 1901. *Platonis Opera.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Delcomminette, Sylvain. 2006. *Le* Philèbe *de Platon.* Leiden: Brill.

Dimas, Panos, Russell E. Jones, and Gabriel R. Lear. 2019. *Plato's Philebus: A Philosophical Discussion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Drozdek, Adam. 2000. "The Four Kinds of Reality in the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*," *Diálogos* 76: 125-141.

Frede, Dorothea. 1993. *Philebus.* Indianapolis: Hackett.

_____ 1997. *Platon: Werke, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, vol. III 2, Philebos. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Gill, Mary Louise. 2019. "The Fourfold Division of Beings: *Philebus* 23b–27c," in Dimas 2019: 71-89.

Gosling, J. C. B. 1975. *Philebus.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Hackforth, Reginald. 1972. *Plato's Examination of Pleasure.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. I follow the pagination in *Plato's Philebus,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Hampton, Cynthia. 1990. *Pleasure, Knowledge, and Being: an Analysis of Plato's Philebus.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hauser, Kai. 2010. "Cantor's Concept of Set in the Light of Plato's *Philebus,*" *Review of Metaphysics* 63: 783-805.

Jackson, Henry. 1882. "The *Philebus* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* I 6," *Journal of Philology* 10: 253-298.

Moss, Jessica. 2019. "Knowledge and Measurement: *Philebus* 55c–59d," in Dimas 2019.

Muniz, Fernando, and George Rudebusch. 2018. "Dividing Plato's Kinds," *Phronesis* 63: 392-407.

----------n.d. "*Eidos* and *Genos* in Plato."

Narens, Louis. 1985. *Abstract Measurement Theory.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Ross, William David. 1951. *Plato's Theory of Ideas.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Rudebusch, George. 2020. Review of Dimas 2019, *Ancient Philosophy* 40 (2020) 495-511.

_____ n.d.a. *Plato's Philebus: A Commentary for Greek Readers.* Forthcoming in University of Oklahoma Press.

_____ n.d.b. "Introduction: Dramatic Setting and Date" Forthcoming in Rudebusch 2021.

_____ n.d.c. Appendix A, "*Genos*, *Phusis*, and *Eidos.*" Forthcoming in Rudebusch 2021.

Sayre, Kenneth M. 1983. *Plato's Late Ontology*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, reprinted Las Vegas: Parmenides 2005.

Smyth, H. W. 1956. *Greek Grammar.* Revised by G. M. Messing. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Tao, Terence. 2011. *An Introduction to Measure Theory.* Providence: American Mathematical Society.

Taylor, A. E. 1948. *Plato: The Man and his Work*. London: Routledge.

Thomas, C. 2006. "Plato's Prometheanism," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31: 203-231.

Vogt, Katja Maria. 2019. "Rethinking the Contest Between Pleasure and Wisdom: *Philebus* 11a–14b," in Dimas 2019: 17-33.

Notes

[1] I am grateful to the International Plato Society and its president, Edward Halper, for organizing and inviting me to present research at a 2020 session on "Plato's Late Dialogues," as part of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division group meetings. I revised the title and content as a result of the discussion after my presentation, and I thank all participants in that session, in particular William Altman. Also I thank Xin Liu and Georgia Mouroutsou for reading drafts of this paper, saving me from errors, and suggesting paths for further research. Finally I thank Gabrielli Cornelli for inviting and Richard Parry for editing this submission to the *Plato Journal*.

[2] Not every interpretation of the Unbounded observes that it is a kind containing members. But if we set aside that issue, interpretations of Unbounded as a

continuum are given by e.g. Taylor 1948: 414, Ross 1951: 136, Hackforth 1972: 42, Gosling 1975: 165-181 and 196-206, Sayre 1983: 144-155, Benitez 1989: 69-76, Hampton 1990: 43, Barker 1996: 157, and Gill 2019: 79 and 85.

In correspondence, Xin Liu proposes to call these *quantitative* interpretations of *apeiron,* because according to Aristotle quantity is divisible into continuous and discrete (*Metaphysics* 5.13, 1020a8-11). Accordingly, arithmetic (which measures *number,* a discrete quantity) is categorically different from geometry (which measures *line*, *surface*, and *body*, continuous quantities).

3 Frede (1997: 187-188) raises a different problem. Frede argues that it is impossible for any continum to be in motion or to cease to exist, which does not fit the passages in which "Socrates repeatedly affirms that the unbounded things themselves are "in continuous flux" (*ständigen Fluß)* and "disappear" (*verschwinden).*

4 See Sayre 1983 for an account of Dedekind cuts and ancient mathematics. Sayre himself does not endorse this interpretation.

5 This appears to have been one of Cantor's interpretations (see Hauser 2010: 293) and has been defended recently by, for example, Delcomminette 2006: 218. Xin Liu has suggested in correspondence that modern interpreters of Plato may have inherited from Aristotle the intepretation of *apeiron* as indefinite in quantity or quality (*Physics* 1.4 187b7-9). Xin Liu points out that in Aristotelian terms, we might call these *qualitative* interpretations. Aristotle distinguishes qualitative from quantitative ἄπειρον at *Phys*ics 1.4, 187b7-9.

6 Drozdek makes the suggestive statement that "temperature ... is ... a set of particular temperatures organized by the relation 'being lesser than'" (2000: 13): that is, as defined below, a *scale*. But he calls temperature, as unbounded, a "continuum." And he describes the nature of the unbounded as being "indiscriminate about how, where, and to what extent it should be utilized," without explaining why Philebus would find such indiscrimination praiseworthy.

7 For the theorem, see Narens 1985: 30. Archimedes articulates a principle that if two quantities are given, some multiple of the first will exceed the second. This principle excludes, for example, *lexical* order, that is, the ordering found in a dictionary. Notice that no matter how many letters 'a' are added after 'a', it can never occur later in the dictionary than 'b'. Euclid stated the principle as the fifth definition of his fifth book: "Magnitudes that are *able, when multiplied, to exceed each other* are said to have a *ratio* (*logon echein)* to each other."

8 See Rudebusch n.d.b for a defense of the dramatic date of the *Philebus* after the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. See Muniz and Rudebusch 2018 for the interpretation of the Stranger's method that I follow here.

9 Notice the convention observed in this paper, using capitalization for kinds, e.g. the kind Unbounded, and italics for forms, e.g. the form *unbounded.*

10 On such metonymy see Muniz and Rudebusch n.d. For further discussion of this terminology in the *Philebus* see Rudebusch n.d.c.

11 Like the Stranger, Socrates sometimes abbreviates an episode of collection. If his interlocutor apprehends the third step alone, Socrates can produce an understanding of the given division without explicitly going through either or both of the first two steps.

12 LSJ I.2 gives a different, *ad hoc* meaning for ἀπολογίζομαι in this passage: "ἀ. εἴς τι *refer to* a head or class, Pl.*Phlb.* 25b," but they provide no support why ἀπολογίζομαι, a verb of rendering an account or calculating, when modified by εἰς + accusative becomes a verb of referring to. The verb ἀπολογίζομαι does not change meaning in this way in its single other collocation (according to *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*) with the preposition εἰς (Xenophon, *Economics* 9.8: δίχα δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπολελογισμένα κατέθεμεν "we set apart the things calculated [to last] for a year." In Xenophan's passage the prepositional phrase εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν is an idiom with the meaning *for a year* (LSJ II.2). Unlike verbs of collecting or referring, the verb ἀπολογίζομαι does not move its direct object, not even as an object of thought, and so the preposition εἰς following it naturally expresses relation, *in regard to,* rather than motion *into.*

13 Thomas (2006: 223), although not offering it as an interpretation of the kind Bound, makes the suggestive remark that "right ratios … are determined relative to the domain in which they operate."

14 Burnet 1901 unnecessarily (as Frede 1993 and 1997 observes) brackets ἐγγιγνόμενα and adds a raised dot after ταῦτα.

Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato's *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6)[1]

Thomas Tuozzo
University of Kansas
ttuozzo@ku.edu
ORCID: 0000-0002-5310-0916

ABSTRACT

The fifth "deduction" in Plato's Parmenides (160b5-163b6) concerns the consequences that follow for a (or the) one from the hypothesis that it is not. I argue that the subject of this hypothesis is, effectively, any Form, considered just insofar as it is one Form. The hypothesis, I further argue, does not concern any essential aspect of a Form, but rather posits its contingent non-instantation ("a one is not" = "a Form is not instantiated"). The motion this deduction attributes to its one is a special type of motion: motion into and out of instantiation.

Keywords: Plato, Parmenides, one, instantiation, not-being, alteration.

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_5

In the first part of the *Parmenides*, Socrates posits the existence of intelligible Forms in order to block Zeno's attempts to reduce to absurdity the view that there are many things. After raising problems for this proposal that leave Socrates at a loss, Parmenides remarks that Socrates' difficulties arise not so much from the proposal itself, but from Socrates' failure to submit it to the proper dialectical examination. In considering any novel ontological posit, one should investigate the consequences that follow, both for the thing potentially posited and for things "other" than it, first, from the hypothesis that it is, and then, from the hypothesis that it is not. Parmenides then agrees to illustrate this four-fold procedure by applying it to (as he says) his own hypothesis: the one (137b1-4). He proceeds to give two treatments of each of the four tasks he has distinguished, and these eight deductions (as they are usually denominated) generate many contradictory results, not only among themselves but also within individual deductions.

The arguments of these deductions have puzzled commentators since antiquity, and have in the past half-century received a great deal of critical scrutiny. This paper aims to advance the understanding of these arguments by sketching what I think is a novel interpretation of the Fifth Deduction, Parmenides' first go at deducing the consequences that follow for the one (or for "a" one) from the hypothesis that it is not. There are three important questions that an interpretation of this (or any other) deduction must address: (1) what is the referent of "one" in the hypothesis; (2) what sort of being is at issue in the hypothesis from which the deduction starts, and (3) whether "one" figures as the subject or the predicate in the hypothesis. As to this last question, I shall assume, like most scholars, that in our hypothesis "one" figures as subject.[2] The options for understanding what exactly "one" refers to are (a) the Form of Unity;[3] (b) any Form considered as a unit;[4] (c) any sensible object considered as a unit;[5] (d) any object at all, considered as a unit.[6] Lastly, as concerns the being at issue in the hypothesis, there are two major options. On one of these, the Fifth Deduction is concerned with the kind of non-being at play in negative predication, and which is explicated in the *Sophist* in terms of otherness (cf. 255c-260b). The Fifth Deduction would then be concerned, on this account, with the non-being involved when we say that the (or "a") one is not *F*.[7] The other major option takes the being denied to the one here as existence, more specifically, spatio-temporal existence.[8] In what follows I shall argue that the one should be understood as any Form, considered as a unit, and that the being denied it is spatio-temporal existence, construed in a special way: as (contingent) non-instantiation.

The Fifth Deduction can be divided into five sections:

1. 160b-5-d2: Introductory passage specifying the one in question in the deduction.
2. 160d3-161c2: Logico-ontological features of the one that is not.
3. 161c3-e2: Quantitative features of the one that is not.
4. 161e3-162b8: The being of the one that is not.
5. 162b9-163b5: Motion and rest of the one that is not.

The introductory section begins from the intelligibility of the hypothesis itself. Parmenides points out that the sentence "one is not" asserts something different from analogous sentences with a different subject term.

He offers as examples first the sentence "not-one is not," which he calls the "complete opposite" of our hypothesis, and continues with the sentences "largeness is not" and "smallness is not."[9] I do not think much should be made of Parmenides' use of "not-one" in his initial example; his point is simply to show, as starkly as possible, that difference in subject-term produces a different meaning. The choices of "largeness" and "smallness," on the other hand, are, I think, very significant. They seem to be something like Forms;[10] since they are substituted for the one in our hypothesis, it is reasonable to suppose that it, too, is a Form. Our only question is whether Parmenides means the Form of Unity in particular, or any Form, considered as a unit. In favor of the former is that it has Parmenides invoke the contrast between Unity and (e.g.) Largeness, which seems a more straightforward contrast than that between any-Form-you-like and Largeness. In favor of the latter are translation considerations (εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν at 160b7 is perhaps most naturally translated, "if a one is not") and the fact that no use is made of the specific nature of unity in the rest of the deduction. We may safely conclude that either Parmenides is discussing any Form as a unit, or (which amounts to much the same thing) he is using the Form of Unity as an example, the conclusions about which, since they do not depend on the specific nature of unity, can be generalized to any Form as such.

Parmenides argues that, since we know that the above sentences assert that in each case something different is "the thing that is not" (τὸ μὴ ὄν), we must have knowledge of the one of our hypothesis, a knowledge that is independent of whether we attribute being or not being to it (160c7-d2). In section two he expands the point about the one's difference from the others by saying that it possesses "difference in kind" (ἑτεροιότης) from them. This relatively rare term (used in our dialogue only here and in the Sixth Deduction[11]) is most naturally taken as emphasizing that the one differs not only numerically from the others, but also qualitatively from them.[12] That is, it has some qualitative nature that differentiates it from the others and allows us to think and talk of it in distinction from them. Given the prior occurrence of Largeness and Smallness as the things the one is different from, we should take Parmenides to be talking about the different essential natures of different Forms.

In the remainder of section two Parmenides attributes other logico-ontological features to the one, all on the basis of the intelligibility of the hypothesis. The one is a definite object of reference (a "that"), and possesses likeness to itself and unlikeness to the others (i.e., other Forms). In the middle of this section he emphasizes that possessing these features is not at all incompatible with our hypothesis that the one is not:

> It is not possible for the one to be (εἶναι), if in fact it is not, but nothing prevents it from partaking of many things. Indeed, it's even necessary, if in fact it's that one and not another that is not. (160e7-161a2)

The remarkable passage is important for the interpretation of our deduction, since it in effect gives us a gloss on what is meant by being in the hypothesis under consideration.[13] I suggest that the passage can best be understood if we take the being that is denied to the one (both here and in the hypothesis) to be existence, and in particular, spatio-temporal existence. From the beginning of the deduction Parmenides has insisted that to make any meaningful assertion about the one, including that it is not, requires that it have certain

features: it must be knowable, be an object of reference, differ qualitatively from other things, bear unlikeness to them and likeness to itself. In the current passage Parmenides points out that the ascription of these features to the one we are talking about does not entail that it has spatio-temporal existence.

The theme of the relation between the one's (non-)being and its possession of attributes is taken up again, in perhaps even more paradoxical form, at the beginning of section three. There, at the beginning of his treatment of the quantitative attributes of the one, we read:

> Furthermore, it is not equal to the others either (οὐδ'αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις); for if it were equal, it would both by that very fact (ἤδη) *be*, and be like them in respect of equality. But those are both impossible, if in fact one is not. (161c3-5)

Parmenides emphasizes that to say that the one that is not is equal to the others involves *two* absurdities, the first of which is, quite simply, that it would *be*. In light of the earlier passage discussed above (160e7-161a2), Parmenides must here be making a distinction between the locutions "the one *participates in F-ness*" and "the one *is F*." The former locution lets us describe the features the one possesses without asserting that it exists; the latter does not. And indeed, looking back over the dialogue so far, we find that Parmenides has made a point of avoiding the latter locution.[14] Instead, he says either that the one participates in such-and-such a feature, or that such-and-such a feature *belongs* to it (εἶναι + dative).[15] In fact, later in this section Parmenides argues that equality does indeed count as one of the features of the one: "To the one that does not exist, then, as it seems, there would belong a share of equality, too" (161e1-2).[16] The problem with the statement at the beginning of the section was the implication of existence that Parmenides attaches to the locution "*x* is *F*."

This repeated insistence that the one's possessing various features does not entail its being (or its existence, as I have construed it) makes all the more surprising the assertion at the beginning of section four that the one of our deduction also "participates in being (οὐσίας), in a way." All but the last line of section four is dedicated to arguing for this claim; the argument ends with the assertion: "Being (οὐσία) too, then, seems [to belong] to the one, if it is not" (162b6-7). The argument is thus encased by both locutions Parmenides has used to ascribe attributes to the one. One might suppose that Parmenides is simply adding one more feature to those he has already argued the one possesses, a feature more or less on the same level with likeness-to-self and the rest. But the initial qualification that the one participates in being "in a way" alerts us to the possibility that this case is different.

What sort of being does this argument ascribe to the one? If this is not to constitute a bare contradiction of the hypothesis of the deduction, it must be a different sort of being from that at issue in the hypothesis. One possibility is that, while the hypothesis denies that the one has spatio-temporal being, the one is said here to participate in the kind of being appropriate to Forms: eidetic being, if you will. On this view, this eidetic being is a kind of being that is constituted by, or presupposed by, the one's participation in other Forms (such as likeness-to-itself).[17] While attractive, there are reasons to resist such an interpretation. One such reason consists in the fact that, in tying the being here assigned to the one to its participation in other Forms, this interpretation seems directly to contradict Parmenides'

earlier claim (160e7-161a2) that participation in Forms does *not* entail that the one is.[18] One might insist that Parmenides there meant that *spatio-temporal* existence is not required for participation, and that now he is revealing that a different sort of being is. But if the point of our passage is that the participation we have been talking about actually requires that the one have a kind of being, it seems quite odd for Parmenides to have already drawn attention to the (non-obvious) issue of whether participation requires being, and to have answered that question in the negative. Though this consideration is not decisive, it does motivate looking for another interpretation; and as we shall see, there is one available that avoids this problem, and also accords better (as I shall argue) with the remainder of the deduction.

Parmenides begins his argument for the claim that the one of our deduction participates in being as follows:

> [The one] must have the condition we say it to have (ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν); for if did not have that condition, we would not be saying true things when we say that the one is not; but if we are saying true things, it is clear that we are saying things that are (ὄντα). (161e4-6)

In saying that the one is not, this passage asserts, we are saying that it is in a certain condition; and its being in that condition is precisely a kind of being. This seems to be a general point about predication; so it is natural to think that the being here referred to is the being that is sometimes thought to be expressed by the copula.[19] In fact, I think that Parmenides has a somewhat narrower notion in mind: that of the copula in a specifically accidental predication, that is, a predication that is only contingently true. The language of being in or having a certain condition (ἔχειν πως) is, I suggest, particularly well-suited to accidental predication.[20] Our deduction is not considering a one that by its nature is not; it is considering a contingency, the case where a one which we know and can talk about happens not to be.

Such a supposition fits well with a straightforward reading of how the argument proceeds:

> Therefore, as it seems, the one *is* a not-being (οὐκ ὄν); for if it is *not* to be a not-being, but is somehow to give up its being towards not-being, it will straightway be a being (ὄν). – Absolutely – So if it is not to be, it must have *being a not-being* (τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν) as a bond (δεσμόν) of its not being. (162a1-5)

If the not-being to which the bond binds the one were (in effect) the eternal being that characterizes a Form, then the supposition that the one (as a Form) might lose this being without the necessary bond would be not only contrary to fact, but also metaphysically impossible. Though this is not a decisive consideration against such an interpretation, it is nonetheless true that if the bond here is, rather, the copula of an accidental predication, a much less extravagant scenario is envisioned. There is no impossibility in the one's ceasing to be in the condition in which it only contingently finds itself. Furthermore, it is at least *prima facie* plausible to maintain that there must be something keeping it in that condition, so long as it remains in it; and its ceasing to be in that condition may well be described as a breaking or destruction of that bond.

If the one of our deduction is a Form, how are we understand the hypothesis that it, contingently, is not? If we understand the not-

being of our deduction as non-existence, and in particular spatio-temporal non-existence, then our hypothesis is that the Form is contingently not in space and time. Forms are, to be sure, essentially non-spatio-temporal; but it is, I suggest, only a slight stretch of language to say that when a Form is instantiated, it possesses spatio-temporal existence. Our deduction considers instantiation, as it were, from the side of the Form rather than the sensible. For the Form to be instantiated is for it, for some period of time and in some place, to *be* spatio-temporally. The hypothesis of our deduction posits a case where a Form is not instantiated; and our current passage points out that when we say such a thing, we are in fact ascribing a certain kind of being to the Form: its being not-instantiated-here.

The being in which the one is here said to participate is copulative: it connects the one to its condition of being un-instantiated. Whether or not this is ultimately a philosophically viable position is a question beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly Parmenides goes on to develop the notion in a paradoxical fashion – insisting that there is not only a positive copula, but also a negative one, so that what is instantiated is connected by copulative being to spatio-temporal existence and by *negative* copulative being to spatio-temporal *non*-existence (see 162a6-b3). But however we are to understand these developments, and whether Plato means them seriously or not, nonetheless understanding the being that the one shares in as that which contingently connects it to being (un)instantiated makes good sense of the deduction up to this point. And it will further prove itself in helping make sense of the assertions about the motion of the one that Parmenides makes in the fifth section of the deduction.

At the end of the fourth section, after proving that that the one that is not participates in being, Parmenides remarks that, since it is not, it also participates in non-being. At the beginning of section five he advances the claim that something can only be and not be in the same condition if it transitions from one to the other. Here, as at the start of the so-called appendix to the first two deductions (155e8-10), Parmenides makes a blatantly fallacious inference: since on any account the one has been shown to participate in being and non-being in different senses, there is no incompatibility in its participating in both at the same time. But although the inference is faulty, nonetheless, if the one's participation in being is, as I have proposed, its relation to (non)instantiation, then a consideration of motion from being to not-being is certainly in order: for a Form does (typically) 'move' back and forth between *being* instantiated and *not being* instantiated. And supposing that this is Parmenides' topic helps make sense of the many surface contradictions which mark this section.

If the one of our hypothesis is a Form, then the ascription to it of any sort of motion may seem particularly problematic. Before going on to show how this motion can be understood as the change from being un-instantiated to being instantiated, it will be useful to note an alternate interpretation that has been proposed in the literature. This view takes its cue from another Platonic passage where the possibility of ascribing motion to a Form is considered: *Sophist* 248b-249b, where a Form's coming to be known is construed as a kind of change or motion. On this view, the motion between being and not-being that the Form undergoes mirrors the change in the mind of the inquirer when, for example, she first subsumes a Form under a higher one (so contemplating an aspect

of its being) and then distinguishes it from its congeners (so contemplating what it is not).[21] But the motions that would thus be ascribed to the Form depend crucially on the context of philosophical inquiry; and of that there is no explicit mention in our passage. This is, I think, a serious drawback to the interpretation under discussion.

After stating that the one must change from one condition to another, Parmenides investigates what sort of change this could be. He first considers locomotion, and rules that out, since the one that is not "is nowhere among beings" (162c7); he then rules out rotating in place, for much the same reason. These are obviously changes that *instantiations* of Forms undergo, and if the one of our deduction is a Form, it cannot undergo these. Parmenides then considers alteration, and rules it out on quite other grounds:

> And surely, the one isn't altered from itself either, whether as a being or as a not-being. For the statement would no longer be about the one, but about something else, if in fact the one were altered from itself. (162d5-8)

Here Parmenides reverts to the logico-semantic considerations he appealed to at the start of the deduction. The qualitative likeness-to-self and difference-from-others that the one must have in order for us coherently to talk about it must not change, if it is indeed to be a stable referent of our discourse.

Having ruled out all the possible kinds of change,[22] Parmenides concludes that the one stands fixed and at rest (162e1-2). But far from abandoning his earlier claim that the fact that the one is in two conditions requires it to change, Parmenides calmly concludes that the one is both moving and at rest (162e2-3). Parmenides does not, however, just leave us with this bare contradiction. Rather, he reopens the question of the sort of motion the one undergoes, this time at a meta-level, as it were. Assuming that the one undergoes some motion, he argues that it must, thereby, necessarily undergo alteration:

> Furthermore, if in fact it moves, there is a great necessity for it to be altered; for in whatever way something is moved, to that extent it is no longer in the same condition as it was, but in a different one (οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως). (162e4-163a2)

The sort of alteration Parmenides has in mind here is clearly not the same as the change in qualitative character that he has just previously rejected. In particular, it is noteworthy that in this passage Parmenides reverts to the language of having (or being in) a condition, language with which he introduced the question of motion (162b9-10), and which made its first appearance in the deduction when he approached the question of the kind of being that the one that is not shares in "in a way" (161e4). If the "conditions" in those earlier passages were the conditions of being instantiated and being un-instantiated, the alteration of the one at issue here is its change from one such state to the other. Parmenides' subsequent inference, then, that the one both does and does not undergo alteration is thus only an apparent contradiction (163a6-7).

Parmenides goes on to explicate the sense in which the one does alter in terms of coming to be and perishing:

> Must not that which is altered come to be different from what it was before, and perish from its previous condition (ἐκ τῆς

> προτέρας ἔχεως)? … Therefore also the one, if it is not, comes to be and perishes, if it is altered, and does not come to be or perish, if it is not altered. (163a7-b4)

The interpretation we have developed allows us to understand the coherent sense that lies behind this swirl of apparent contradictions. The one's progressing from the state of not-being to being is indeed a coming-to-be – not of the Form insofar as it is the qualitative nature it is and remains, but rather of its instances in the spatio-temporal world.[23]

Bibliography

Allen, R. E. (1984). *Plato's Parmenides*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Brisson, L. (2002). 'Is the World One?' A New Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 22*, 1-20.

Brunschwig, J. (2003). Stoic Metaphysics. In B. Inwood (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (pp. 206-232). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cornford, F. M. (1950). *Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmemides Translated, with an Introduction and a Running Commentary*: Routledge & Kegan. Paul.

Damascius. (2003). *Commentaire du Parménide de Platon* (J. Combès & A.-P. Segonds, Trans. L. G. Westerink Ed. Vol. 4). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Ferrari, F. (2004). *Platone: Parmenide*. Milan: Biblioteca Universale Rizzole.

Gill, M. L. (2002). Plato on Being a Not-Being: The Text of Parmenides 162A–B. In *Noctes Atticae: Articles on Greco-Roman Antiquity and its Nachleben* (pp. 121-129). Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.

Gill, M. L., & Ryan, P. (1996). *Plato's Parmenides*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Kahn, C. H. (2013). *Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy of Nature*: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, M. (1986). *Plato's Parmenides. The Conversion of the Soul*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Palmer, J. (1999). *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Peacock, H. (2017). The Third Man and the Coherence of the Parmenides. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 52*, 113-176.

Sanday, E. (2015). *A Study of Dialectic in Plato's Parmenides*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Scolnicov, S. (2003). *Plato's Parmenides*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Turnbull, R. G. (1998). *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy*. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

Notes

1 References are to Burnet's OCT. English translations are based on Gill and Ryan (1996), modified where necessary.

2 For views that treat "one" as predicate in all the deductions, with the subject understood as "the world" or "everything," see Brisson (2002) and Peacock (2017).

3 So Allen (1984) 276.

4 So Miller (1986) 141, Sanday (2015) 154-155.

5 See Kahn (2013) 34. This view has a distant parallel in the interpretation of Damascius (2003) 82-83.

6 So Cornford (1950) 217-221, Scolnicov (2003) 27.

7 Proponents of this view include Turnbull (1998) 124-133, Scolnicov (2003) 37, 147-8, Ferrari (2004) 116-117. So also, with some qualifications, Palmer (1999) 159-166.

8 Cornford (1950) 217-221, Miller (1986) 144, Sanday (2015) 155.

9 These sentences seem to me to settle beyond reasonable doubt that the one of our hypothesis is subject, not predicate. Parmenides is hardly asking us to consider the sentence "the world is not largeness."

10 Indeed, they are called forms (εἴδη) in the Second Deduction (149e9).

11 164a3. The adjective ἑτεροῖον is also found in deduction VII (165d2) in connection with the variegated appearances of the many when it is hypothesized that one is not.

12 See on this point the discussion in Cornford (1950) 222-223.

13 The importance of the passage is noted by Kahn (2013) 33-34, who suggests that the only way to make sense of it is to take "participation" here to refer to accidental (his "*per aliud*") predication, and to take the being denied of the one to be that involved in essential (*per se*) predication. On his view, this passage asserts that the one of our hypothesis has

no essential attributes (a condition that, he argues, characterizes sensibles).

14 This has been noticed by several commentators, including Cornford (1950) 223-224, Miller (1986) 145, and Kahn (2013) 35.

15 Compare, for example, 161b3: "Then unlikeness would also belong to the one" (εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης).

16 The idiom here combines both the language of participating-in and that of belonging-to.

17 For views of this sort, see Miller (1986) 147149 and Sanday (2015) 159-161.

18 Miller does not seem to comment on 160e7-161a2. Sanday (2015) 157 quotes only the latter part of the passage (161a1-2), omitting the crucial point that participation does not entail being.

19 The question of whether treating the copula as expressing a kind of being leads to an infinite regress is one that cannot be addressed here. Gill and Ryan (1996) 94-99 argues that the purpose of this section is precisely to show that treating the copula as Parmenides does here leads to a vicious regress. (For a fuller statement of the position, see Gill (2002).)

20 Compare the Stoic category of πὼς ἔχοντα, of which a standard example was apparently a fist (a hand disposed a certain way); see Brunschwig (2003) 212.

21 See Miller (1986) 149-153 with n. 41, Sanday (2015) 161-165.

22 Parmenides had divided exhaustively divided change into these kinds in the Second Deduction (138b8-c6).

23 I wish to thank the participants in the Virtual IPS Panel on Plato's Later Dialogues in June 2020 for valuable comments on the version of this paper presented there. I am particularly grateful to Mitchell Miller for his helpful comments on the written version of this paper; naturally, he should not be presumed to agree with any of its claims. I also wish to thank the students of my University of Kansas Plato seminar of fall 2018, who valiantly picked their way with me through the deductions of the *Parmenides*.

Socrates and Thrasymachus on Perfect and Imperfect Injustice

Roslyn Weiss
rw03@lehigh.edu
Lehigh University
ORCID: 0000-0003-2636-688X

ABSTRACT

It is argued that the true definition of justice in Plato's *Republic* appears not in Book IV but in Book I, where it is clear that justice is other-oriented or external rather than internal as per Book IV. Indeed, on Book IV's definition, there is virtually no difference between justice and moderation. Considered here is a single argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus (351b-352d), in which Socrates contends that imperfect injustice is "stronger" than perfect. Rather than producing a just group, the justice between members of a group strengthens the injustice of a group whose external project is already unjust.

Keywords: Thrasymachus, imperfect injustice, perfect injustice, group, individual

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_6

In my view, the true Socratic definition of justice in the *Republic* is to be found not in Book IV, but in Book I. The definition Socrates proposes in Book IV, which would have justice be a wholly internal matter, a function of what goes on within a city and within a man as opposed to a matter of the relationship between cities and between men, is, I believe, not at all one that Socrates genuinely endorses. Although all virtues–including justice–are internal in one sense, namely, insofar as they are dispositions of the soul, there is something distinctive about the virtue of justice, something that keeps it from collapsing into its close cousin moderation; and that is that justice is, essentially, an outward-directed virtue. As in several other dialogues, notably the *Crito* and the *Meno*, where Socrates' own view, I believe, surfaces early and prepares the reader to resist views that appear later on in these dialogues, so too in the *Republic*. Here Socrates suggests right at the start what justice is really all about, thereby precluding in advance the false definition to be offered in Book IV. My claim in this paper is that the argument Socrates offers in Book I, in which he seeks to dispel Thrasymachus's cynical and ugly notion that perfect injustice, injustice that is massive in scale and maximally destructive, is the greatest thing going, consistently sees injustice as something that obtains between parties, and so prepares us to reject the Socratic proposal in Book IV that justice is an internal affair. There is much more to be learned about the Socratic conception of justice in Book I generally. I would go so far as to say that Book I as a whole serves as a prophylactic against the later definition of justice; forewarned is forearmed.

Unmistakable irony pervades Socrates' dealings with Thrasymachus in *Rep.* I. In this paper I shall focus on just one of the arguments (351a6-352d2) with which Socrates in Book I seeks to bring Thrasymachus to his knees. It is the argument for the claim that imperfect injustice, that is, the dilution of perfect injustice with some measure of justice, makes a city (as well as other entities, as will be seen) stronger (*kreittōn*) than perfect injustice does. This odd claim on which Socrates expends so much intellectual energy accomplishes, I will argue, two things: (1) it makes a mockery of Thrasymachus's view though without actually refuting it; and (2) it prepares the reader to resist the presumably "Socratic" definition of justice in Book IV.

Let us begin with a quick look at Book IV, where the untenability of the newly proposed Socratic definition of justice sits right there on its face. At 441d-e we have the following (Bloom's translation):

> And further, Glaucon, I suppose we'll say that a man is just in the same manner that a city too was just . . . Moreover, we surely haven't forgotten that this city was just because each of the three classes in it minds its own business . . . Then we must remember that, for each of us too, the one within whom each of the parts minds its own business will be just and mind his own business.

If justice is minding one's own business, then the *parts* of a city and the parts of a soul are just if *they* mind their own business, and, by the same token, the city and the individual are just if *they* mind their own business. But this passage draws the blatantly fallacious conclusion–the fallacy committed is the fallacy of composition[1]–that if the *parts* mind their own business so too does the whole, and, worse, that *because* the parts mind their own business so too does the whole. (Several

other passages raise similar concerns: 4.423d,[2] 433a-b,[3] 434c,[4] 443c[5]; 9.576a-b[6]) Why would anyone think that if, or, worse, because, the parts mind their own business, the whole does so as well?

There is, however, an even bigger problem in Book IV with regard to its definition of justice–bigger than its confusion of wholes with parts. And this is its most persistent and insistent claim that the justness of the whole consists in the internal order generated by the parts' minding their own business, the contention that the justness of city and soul *is a matter of* how their parts interact, and not at all about what they–city and soul–do or do not do. (See re the city: 434c.) The striking–indeed shocking–statement at 443c with respect to individual justice makes this point loud and clear: "And in truth justice was, as it seems, something of this sort; however, *not* with respect to a man's minding his external business,[7] but with respect to what is within."[8] Not only is this a bizarre understanding of justice, but it reverses what we just saw at 441, where the justice of the whole was precisely *its* minding its own business–even if, improbably, it is said to do so as a result of the parts' minding theirs.[9] As an aside, we should note that the definition at 443 far better suits moderation than it does justice,[10] whereas the straightforward definition at 441 far better suits justice. One might say that moderation is a necessary condition for, but not the cause of, justice; imagine not being able to distinguish the cause from that without which the cause would not be a cause! (*Phaedo* 99b)[11]

Let us turn now to Book I–specifically to Socrates' argument with Thrasymachus, beginning at 351b and concluding at 352d, regarding perfect and imperfect injustice. Socrates here advances, against Thrasymachus, the peculiar claim that imperfect injustice makes an entity "stronger" (*kreittōn)* than perfect injustice does. Socrates' argument is surely spurred by Thrasymachus's lauding at 344a of the man who is able to get the better of others "in a big way" (*ton megala dunamenon pleonektein*) whose injustice is whole (*holēn* -344c), copious (*hikanōs* – 344c), and "most perfect" (*teleōtatēn*), rather than "partial" (*merei*; *kata merē* -344b),[12] this praise being reinforced at 348d, where Thrasymachus affirms that those who can do injustice perfectly are good and prudent (*phronimoi*). Moreover, the term "stronger" (*kreittōn*) recalls Thrasymachus's contention that justice is the advantage of the stronger, a pronouncement proudly repeated by him as he concludes his encomium for perfect injustice at 344c: "and, as I have said from the beginning, the just is the advantage of the stronger (*tou kreittonos sumpheron*)."

When one considers Book I in light of Book IV, it is important to note, first, that Thrasymachus, when asked, agrees that "a city is unjust that tries to enslave *other cities* unjustly, and has reduced them to slavery, and keeps many enslaved to itself," and that he adds: "And it's this the best (*hē aristē*) city will most do, the one that is most perfectly (*teleōtata*) unjust" (351b). What makes a city unjust, then, is that it does unjust things–to other cities. Injustice, as both Thrasymachus and Socrates recognize here, is external. The question Socrates next poses is whether this *unjust* city exerts its power over other cities with justice or without justice. It would appear that this justice, the justice that will enhance the unjust city's power to do injustice, is internal: it is the cooperation among the city's members. Readers of the *Republic* seize immediately upon the similarity between what Socrates says here and what he will say in Book IV, namely, that justice is internal, and they will conclude that we have here a precursor

to the later view. And indeed admittedly we also have here in Book I another idea that will get considerable play later on (especially at IV.442-44), namely, that injustice produces factions, hatreds, and quarrels, and justice produces unanimity and friendship. But, as we have aleady seen, in Book IV the *city* was just because its parts were just, whereas here the city is *un*just–indeed more successfully so–because its parts are just. This is not a small difference.

Let us look then more closely at the argument. First, it is worth attending to the character of the other groups to which Socrates makes reference here: not just a city, but an army, or pirates, or robbers, or any other tribe "*which has some common unjust enterprise*." So, it is groups bent on injustice–external injustice–that are the subject of this exchange.

Second, the point Socrates makes is that if the members of these groups were to act unjustly toward one another, the group enterprise would not succeed. The injustice here, then, the injustice of each of the group's members, is also *ex*ternal. In other words, when the members of the groups treat each other unjustly, that creates disharmony in the group. What it does not create is the group's injustice. The group is unjust–that is a given. And it is unjust, regardless of the harmony or disharmony within. The group's internal harmony, produced by the individual members' external justice, enables the group's external injustice, empowers the group to do wrong. And so it is most emphatically not the case that when the members of a group treat each other justly, thereby creating harmony in the group, the group becomes just. The justice of each member toward others–and so, *ex*ternal–is what produces the group's internal harmony which in turn makes the group's injustice more effective. What the justness of each member toward others does not produce is the group's justness.

To be clear: the injustice that produces disharmony and renders the group less effective in its dastardly project is the members' "acting unjustly *to one another* (*allēlous* - 351c10)." By extension, it would be the members' acting *justly* to one another that would render the group *more* effective in the very same unjust projects. The justice among members would not make the group just; it would make the group more effectively unjust–in Thrasymachus's word, reprised here by Socrates, "stronger."

Socrates next asks about a group of two men. Is it not the case, he asks, that when injustice comes into being between two they will become enemies to one another? Note that the injustice here is again external; it arises between the two men and is not a feature of the two as a unit.[13] The injustice that these two men exhibit in their dealings with one another causes faction and enmity to arise within the group of two. Faction and enmity are now internal to the group. Once again, the injustice itself is external; the disharmony it causes, internal–not internal to the individuals but internal to the group they form. Disharmony makes it impossible for the two men *together* to accomplish anything, to bring to fruition any common goal. Yet the internal harmony or disharmony within a group has no effect at all on the justness or unjustness of the group. The assessment of the group as just or unjust depends entirely on whether the group's external project is just or unjust. Internal harmony or disharmony enables or hampers, respectively, the ability of the members of any group to work together effectively.

Socrates' final move is to consider injustice within one man. Here, too, readers have been quick to detect a similarity between

Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus and his later city-soul analogy. After all, here in Book I Socrates has begun with a city and talked about its injustice and its internal dissension, and has then shifted to considering an analogous single individual and his injustice and internal disharmony. But, here, too, the real differences outweigh the superficial similarities. For here in Book I, unlike in Book IV, the disharmony, the factiousness, produced within one man by parts that are unjust toward one another is not what makes the individual unjust; instead, what it does is make him unable to function effectively to accomplish any project–in our case, presumably an unjust one. As in a larger group in which dissension brings about the group's dysfunction, compounding the enmity that already exists between it and other groups and between it and those who are just, so, too, injustice in an individual ruins everything: one is one's own enemy because of internal conflict, and one is an enemy to those who are just because one's projects are unjust. Finally, since the gods are just, anyone who manifests injustice will be an enemy of the gods, to whom the just man but not the unjust man is a friend. Thrasymachus agrees, but only, he says, so as not to irritate the audience. Perhaps Thrasymachus believes that the gods prefer the unjust man, since, as he had said earlier, those who are thoroughly unjust are the ones called happy and blessed (344b-c).

The point of the argument is this: in a group bent on injustice the group's members are unjust to the extent that they share the unjust end of the group. If, however, they are completely unjust–that is, if they have in themselves not even enough justice to keep them from harming one another–they cannot accomplish the goal they pursue in common with the other members of their group. So, those who lack justice completely, those who are not even partially just, are unable to accomplish, together with others, the unjust goal they share. The group of many or of two is its own enemy, an enemy to all its opponents, and an enemy to those who are just. The single individual whose internal dissension prevents him from accomplishing his evil mission is an enemy to himself besides being an enemy to those who are just.

In the passage that concludes this exchange Socrates completes the feast: perfect injustice in those who work together is impotent; it can accomplish nothing. It is in fact the partially unjust–that is, those members of a group who are sufficiently unjust to want to harm entities outside the group but not so unjust as to want to harm each other–who achieve their evil ends. The modicum of justness that resides within the members of the group does not make the group just. On the contrary, it helps the unjust group accomplish its unjust goal.[14]

We notice that as Socrates concludes the discussion, the matter of injustice within one man drops out. We may wonder why Socrates introduces the matter of injustice within the single individual at all. There are, perhaps, two reasons. The first of these is that it prefigures Socrates' later analogy between city and soul but draws the analogy significantly differently: externally rather than internally. In Book I, just as the city is stronger–in accomplishing its injustice–when its members are just vis-à-vis one another, so is the individual stronger–in accomplishing his injustice–when the elements in his soul are just vis-à-vis one another. The second reason is integral to the case against perfect injustice that Socrates makes here in Book I. For unless Socrates can say about a single man what he says about two or more, he cannot rule out the greater potency of perfect injustice for

the man who commits injustice alone–that is, for the tyrant of whom Thrasymachus is so enamored (344a). Socrates has to be able to say that a man who is internally at odds with himself–that is, one who has internal faction and so is not only unjust with respect to others but experiences injustice among the parts within his own soul–is less successful, weaker, in his injustice than one who is internally at peace, that is, than one whose internal parts are only partially unjust.[15] There is absolutely no suggestion in Book I–indeed, quite the contrary–that an individual is just because of any sort of internal friendship.[16]

None of the above is intended to minimize the importance of optimal internal order, whether at the group or the individual level, as it is described not only in Book IV, but in Book IX at 588c-590c as well (by way of the colorful image of the human being who contains within a human being, a lion, and a many-headed beast). In a properly ordered city or soul, where reason is king, appetites are held in check, and spirit is reason's devoted ally, the likelihood that injustices will be committed is indeed greatly diminished. Yet two important points need to be made. First, this condition of the soul is not justice but, as I would argue–and have argued elsewhere–is moderation; it is called justice only to strengthen Socrates' case for the profitability in itself of justice.[17] But, second, as was argued in this paper, justice is external; even the best internal harmony is not what justice is. The very best internal harmony will certainly dispose one to justice and make the committing of injustice unlikely, but, as Book I shows, the justice of the whole is not a matter of the relations of its parts but of the character of its (external) projects. It is the members or parts that are in those relations that may be said to be just or unjust–because their relations are external.

To conclude: the differences between Book I and Book IV are critical. If Book I is right about what justice is then Book IV is wrong. According to Book I, what determines whether a person is just or not is how he treats, or is disposed to treat, others. What decides whether or not a city is just is how it treats, or is disposed to treat, other cities. What makes a member of a city or of any group just or unjust is how he treats others–both members of the group and those outside the group. And what makes a part of an individual unjust is (1) how it interacts with the individual's other internal parts, and (2) the extent to which it shares the unjust ends of the individual of whom it is a part. A city is just not because its citizens are just to one another; an individual is just not because his internal parts are just to one another. A city whose citizens are just to one another is more successfully unjust than one in which the citizens are unjust to one another; individuals whose internal parts are just to one another are more successfully unjust than those whose internal parts are unjust to one another. If Book I is right, then justice is always other-regarding and never internal.

The joke, of course, is on Thrasymachus, who meant by *perfect* injustice injustice that casts its net wide and deep, in contrast to petty crime, which is what he would no doubt mean by imperfect (or partial) injustice. The way in which Socrates has gotten the better of Thrasymachus is by changing the sense of his terms. And so, although Socrates has actually done nothing to derail Thrasymachus's claim that thoroughgoing unflinching perfect injustice, in Thrasymachus's sense at any rate, is best–indeed, the matter of whether justice or injustice makes a man happy is not taken up until the next argument–Thrasymachus stands, once again, defeated. This man, who

never denied or had any need to deny the value of cooperation in joint ventures, finds himself affirming, however reluctantly, that, after all, imperfect injustice is stronger than perfect.

Notes

1 One passage commits the reverse fallacy, namely, division: 9.586e: when the whole soul follows the true pleasures, each part of the soul does so as well.

2 Each man is one and not many so the city will grow to be one and not many.

3 The *city's* justice is a matter of each participant minding his own business and not being a busybody (*polupragmatos*), so minding *one's* own business is probably justice.

4 Each of the classes minding its own business in a city would be justice and would make the city just. Here it seems appropriate to ask: are the classes just because they mind their own business or is the city just because the classes mind their own business?

5 Socrates calls the arrangement in the rudimentary city in which each man does his own job and nothing else a "phantom of justice." Is Socrates saying that in his first city each worker's doing his own job was what made the workers just or, insofar as he regards this phantom of justice as a crude precursor to what will be the new city's justice, that each worker's doing his own job was what made the city just?

6 Tyrannic man is no one's friend, so he is unjust according to our earlier definition–that is, because his parts are not friends. (It is worth noting that parts being friends with one another and in accord with one another is the mark of moderation–not of justice–at 442c.)

7 I use "external" (*exō*) to indicate relations between entitites, and "internal" (*entos*) for a state within an entity.

8 It seems that this is meant to be a gloss on (or a correction to) 441d-e, where the natural reading is that the individual "within whom each of the parts minds its own business" and who therefore "will be just and mind his own business" is precisely one who minds his own *external* business, as the parts do theirs. If what was intended at 441d-e were that the just whole minds its own business internally, the connective would not have been the simple conjunction of *te kai*. That Socrates is aware that justice is indeed external may be seen from his slippery slide from the judge's justice, which seeks to ensure that no one has what belongs to others or is deprived of what belongs to him, to the justice of "having and *doing* one's own and what belongs to one." This internal justice, which ends up being a matter of the whole being just because its *parts* do only their own job, is not the justice a judge enforces; the judge enforces the doing one's own that is external–that is, the doing one's own that respects boundaries: what the parts presumably do–not what the whole does.

9 One advantage of the definition of justice as minding one's own *external* business is that it can be applied to all things without equivocation: to the parts of an individual soul, to the individual person, to the parts of the city, and to the city. And to acts as well.

10 Careful attention to 443c-444a reveals that when a person orders his soul he makes it "*moderate* and harmonized." When he acts with his moderate soul, and with wisdom supervising, the acts produced are just and fine; and these just and fine actions preserve and help produce the condition that gave rise to them, namely, the condition of moderation and harmony.

11 At 443a, having tested the new concept of justice against "vulgar" (*phortika*) standards, Socrates says that "the cause of all this is that…each of the parts in him minds its own business." But surely the parts' minding their own business is but a prerequisite for a person's not doing the unjust acts named. Such a person is said to be only least likely to do such things. Justice makes one just; moderation makes one less likely to commit injustice.

12 This point is mocked at 352c, where Socrates says that injustice can be successfully pursued only by those who are "half bad" (*hēmimochthēroi*) from injustice, the perfectly unjust being unable to accomplish anything.

13 Socrates adds: "and to those who are just," without offering any explanation for the addition. Those who are unjust externally–and the assumption throughout this argument is that we are talking about those who are unjust externally–are enemies of those who are just, whether men or gods. When injustice is also internal, there are also enemies within.

14 If we extend Socrates' conclusion to the case of a single individual, it will turn out that the parts of the individual must want to harm other individuals. Unless *this* form of injustice–the signing on to a project that would harm outsiders–exists in the members of the group (or in the parts of an individual), the group (or individual) as a whole would not be unjust.

15 The interesting implication of Socrates' position in Book I is that the more successful tyrants are those who have gotten all their internal ducks in a row–those whose reason, spirit, and appetite are both in accord with one another and supportive of the tyrant's ends. The tyrannic personality, as we learn in Book IX, is an internal and external mess, and the actual tyrant the most wretched of all men

16 Socrates never says of groups, or of single individuals regarded as groups with internal members, that

they are perfectly or imperfectly unjust. It is always said of the participants in the unjust joint venture that they are the one or the other.

17 See my *Philosophers in the 'Republic': Plato's Two Paradigms* (Cornell: Cornell University Press [Ithaca 2012]), Chapter 5.

PAPERS

Platon sur le *Parménide*

Marco Donato
CEREN, EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business
– Université de Bourgogne-Franche Comté
marcodona@hotmail.com
ORCID ID : https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7126-3543

ABSTRACT

In the Parmenides, Plato breaks the rules of Socratic dialogue by introducing, in the second part, a new guide for philosophical research: the elderly and venerable protagonist. This literary choice, which corresponds to a modification of the code of the dialogue going in the direction of a systematic exposition, is signalled to the reader in the first part of the work, where Plato disseminates allusions to his formal experimentation. It is moreover remembered in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* for its experimental value and as the main alternative model for a new form of non-Socratic dialogue.

Keywords : Plato, Parmenides, poetics, Socratic dialogue, Plato's Academy, Greek literature

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_7

1. La difficulté d'interpréter le *Parménide*, en particulier sa seconde partie, est presque devenue un lieu commun dans les introductions au dialogue[1]. L'étonnement des lecteurs, qui s'est traduit par une multitude d'hypothèses exégétiques dès l'Antiquité[2], se reflète – et trouve en partie son origine – dans la structure du dialogue, qui s'articule en deux parties distinctes[3]. En effet, après une première section où la discussion du jeune Socrate avec le vieux Parménide et son disciple Zénon débouche sur une critique de la théorie des Formes dans sa formulation « classique », vient une seconde partie où l'εὐτονία caractéristique du dialogue socratique[4] est totalement abandonnée en faveur d'un entretien sèchement conduit par Parménide, avec la longue série d'hypothèses et de déductions. Le rôle du répondant, tenu par le jeune Aristote qui sera membre des Trente, y est presque réduit à une assertion systématique, ce qui éloigne nettement l'entretien de la vivacité typique de la forme dialoguée.

Je me propose, dans cette contribution, d'analyser le choix littéraire opéré par Platon dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*, en m'appuyant en particulier sur les traces de poétique implicite que l'auteur lui-même a laissées dans le dialogue et ailleurs dans le *corpus*. Cela nous permettra de replacer l'entreprise littéraire du *Parménide* dans le contexte de la poétique platonicienne, tout en définissant une approche qui nous peut aider à mieux affronter les problèmes liés à son contenu.

2. La forme littéraire du *Parménide* constitue une représentation dynamique de l'abandon des canons du λόγος Σωκρατικός par Platon : la marginalisation du jeune Socrate, qui assiste simplement aux échanges entre Parménide et le jeune Aristote, est une mise en scène qui témoigne d'un choix formel que Platon opère apparemment pour la première fois. En effet, bien que l'on ne dispose pas de suffisamment de données fiables sur la chronologie des dialogues pour l'affirmer de manière incontestable, il est communément admis que le *Parménide* précède la série des autres dialogues où la voix de Socrate ne guide pas la discussion. Notre dialogue est donc probablement antérieur au *Sophiste* et au *Politique*, et sûrement plus ancien que les dialogues de la dernière phase, à savoir le *Timée*, le *Critias* et les *Lois*[5]. Le *Parménide* devient, à la lumière de ces considérations, une étape fondamentale dans l'évolution de Platon en tant qu'écrivain, et il est d'autant plus remarquable que la première occurrence d'un « dialogue sans Socrate » dans sa production soit le fruit de ce que l'on pourrait appeler un expérimentalisme littéraire extrême, qui bouleverse la plupart des lois et des pratiques du genre du λόγος Σωκρατικός[6]. Comme nous le verrons par la suite, Platon avait conscience de l'importance de son opération et du caractère fortement novateur de cette dernière, et il s'appliqua ainsi à en informer à plusieurs reprises son lecteur. Mais, avant d'examiner les indications de Platon sur la spécificité de son entreprise, il convient de rappeler très brièvement le développement du dialogue en ce qui concerne sa forme littéraire.

3. Dans le *Parménide*, Platon met en scène la réaction de Socrate à la lecture publique du traité de Zénon, qui a accompagné le vieux Parménide dans son voyage à Athènes. L'épisode est raconté par le beau-frère de Platon, Antiphon, qui avait entre-temps abandonné la philosophie pour se consacrer à l'élevage des chevaux[7]. Ce dernier avait à son tour entendu le récit de la bouche de Pythodore – qui avait hébergé les deux philosophes

pendant leur séjour à Athènes – et s'était efforcé d'apprendre le contenu de la conversation entre Socrate, Parménide et Zénon par cœur (εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν : 126c6-7)[8]. Les deux philosophes éléates étaient arrivés dans la ville à l'occasion des Grandes Panathénées de 450-449 av. J.-C. (127a7-b1)[9]: c'est dans la maison de Pythodore que Zénon fait une lecture de ses écrits, devant un grand rassemblement de personnes, parmi lesquelles se trouve le très jeune Socrate (σφόδρα νέον : 127c5)[10]. Après avoir écouté la lecture du traité de Zénon, le jeune homme – que les deux philosophes avaient apparemment déjà remarqué pour sa présence d'esprit[11] – donne une interprétation des arguments exposés et se demande s'il est possible de déplacer l'analyse des paradoxes du monde sensible vers la dimension idéale (128e5-130a2).

Le point de départ du *Parménide* est donc un commentaire « socratique » – c'est-à-dire mené par Socrate et sous la forme du dialogue socratique – du traité de Zénon[12]. Toutefois, le dialogue se transforme bientôt en une remise en question conduite par Parménide de la théorie des Formes développée par Socrate[13]. L'éléate, cependant, ne veut pas nier l'existence des Formes et admet qu'y renoncer signifierait « détruire toute possibilité de pratiquer la dialectique » (135c1 : καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ)[14]: le problème est que Socrate n'est pas encore prêt à affronter seul les difficultés soulevées par Parménide. C'est par le moyen de cette stratégie littéraire que Platon opère la révolution dont nous avons parlé, en substituant Parménide à Socrate pour conduire le dialogue. Le choix de Platon fait donc suite à la perception d'une insuffisance intrinsèque du personnage du jeune Socrate pour l'élaboration de la chaîne d'arguments sur l'Un et le multiple qu'il veut développer : quelle que soit pour Platon la valeur philosophique de la γυμνασία, il est évident que, pour lui, Socrate ne pourra pas en être le guide[15].

4. Concentrons-nous à présent sur les signes qui montrent que Platon est conscient de l'importance de ce qu'il propose au lecteur dans le *Parménide*, et plus particulièrement dans la seconde partie du dialogue. Le dialogue est, en effet, parcouru par une série de renvois à la grandeur de la tâche accomplie et à sa complexité : il n'est pas difficile ni, semble-t-il, arbitraire de relever dans ces passages des déclarations de poétique. S'il est vrai que les dialogues contiennent, en général, une série d'expressions plus ou moins fixes servant à souligner l'importance de l'argument abordé et très souvent attribuées au personnage de Socrate[16], ces indications ne sont ainsi thématisées et répétées nulle part ailleurs que dans le *Parménide*.

La première indication de l'importance du dialogue est donnée, de façon implicite, par la démarche de Céphale et de ses compagnons qui ont fait le voyage d'Ionie, notamment de Clazomènes, jusqu'à Athènes pour écouter le récit de la conversation de Socrate avec Parménide et Zénon. Si cette scène remonte à un τόπος de la littérature socratique, qu'on trouve ailleurs chez Platon[17] – notamment dans le proème du *Phédon* et du *Banquet* –, le cas du *Parménide* est tout à fait singulier. En effet, l'épisode en question s'était déroulé au moins cinquante ans auparavant[18], mais il était apparemment devenu si célèbre qu'il était parvenu aux oreilles des μάλα φιλόσοφοι de Clazomènes[19]. Pour exprimer le désir que les compagnons de Céphale ont d'écouter le récit de cette conversation entre grands hommes et philosophes, Platon utilise le verbe δέομαι, qui indique à la fois une demande et une prière et porte en soi la force de la nécessité. Céphale

dit à Adimante, qu'il a rencontré sur l'agora : « Eh bien […] je suis là précisément pour cette raison, parce que j'ai besoin de vous demander quelque chose » (126a5-6)[20]; la δέησις (126a6) de Céphale est précisément d'écouter les arguments échangés par Socrate, Parménide et Zénon : « ce sont ces discours que nous demandons d'écouter (δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι) » (126c5). Le choix du verbe διακοῦσαι est lui aussi significatif, car il indique que les étrangers de Clazomènes désirent écouter le récit *dans sa totalité*, puisque le préverbe διά donne au mot le sens littéral d'« écouter du début à la fin ».

Adimante, en accueillant la demande de son ami, répond chaleureusement (126c6) : ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, « mais cela ne présente aucune difficulté », phrase qui se révèlera bientôt une bravacherie. En effet, lorsqu'il est interrogé, Antiphon, lui, hésite car il s'agit d'« une tâche énorme » (127a6 : πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι). On est au tout début du récit et, déjà, Platon – sous le masque d'Antiphon – donne à son lecteur une première indication pour le mettre en garde : ce qui va arriver, bien loin des paroles confiantes d'Adimante, sera particulièrement difficile à interpréter[21]. Qu'y a-t-il de si « énorme » dans le récit du *Parménide* ? Si l'on suit les autres indications laissées par l'auteur, il semble évident que la difficulté mentionnée par Antiphon réside surtout dans la seconde partie du dialogue[22].

En fait, on retrouve le thème de la complexité et de la difficulté de l'entreprise dans le grand intermède qui relie la première partie à la série d'hypothèses et de déductions sur l'Un. Dans cette section, c'est Parménide – devenant ainsi un autre masque de l'auteur – qui souligne l'ampleur de la tâche qui lui a été confiée. À la description que Parménide fait de l'entraînement – γυμνασία – suggéré à Socrate, ce dernier répond en soulignant que l'examen des hypothèses positives et négatives sur l'être est presque impraticable (ἀμήχανος πραγματεία) : afin de montrer que cette entreprise est possible, Parménide devra en donner un exemple (136c6-8). Le vieux philosophe se plaint alors (136d1-2) :

> πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῷδε
>
> C'est, Socrate, un labeur important que tu exiges là d'un homme de mon âge.

Nous pouvons remarquer que l'expression utilisée par Parménide, πολὺ ἔργον, fait écho aux propos que tient Antiphon au moment de son hésitation initiale (127a6 : πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι). Socrate se tourne alors vers Zénon et lui propose d'accomplir cette tâche à la place de son maître. Zénon lui répond en souriant (136d4-e4) :

> αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου· μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ᾖ ὃ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.
>
> C'est à Parménide lui-même qu'il faut adresser notre prière, Socrate. *En effet, ce que tu demandes n'est pas une mince affaire. Ne vois-tu pas quelle somme de travail tu exiges ?* Bien sûr, si nous étions plus nombreux, il ne conviendrait pas de faire à Parménide cette demande. En effet, il ne convient pas d'aborder des

> sujets pareils devant un auditoire nombreux, surtout quand on a son âge. Le grand nombre ignore en effet que, faute d'explorer toutes les voies, sans cette divagation, il est impossible de tomber sur le vrai pour en avoir l'intelligence. J'unis donc, Parménide, ma prière à celle de Socrate, pour redevenir moi aussi ton auditeur depuis le temps.

Les termes utilisés par Platon reprennent ceux qu'il a attribués aux personnages du proème : la demande adressée à Parménide prend la forme d'une prière, encore une fois par l'emploi du verbe δέομαι (qui devient, à la fin, συνδέομαι) ; en outre, la question a pour but d'entraîner une exposition orale qui est décrite comme particulièrement difficile, et qu'on désire διακούειν[23].

À travers ces reprises ponctuelles, Platon *zoome* pour ainsi dire sur la section suivante, faisant ainsi de la série d'hypothèses sur l'Un le noyau du récit que désire entendre Céphale : cela semble indiquer que, pour Platon, l'essence du *Parménide* réside dans sa seconde partie[24].

5. Il est intéressant de voir que cette insistance de Platon sur l'importance du *Parménide*, et – si notre hypothèse est correcte – essentiellement de sa seconde partie, trouve un écho hors du dialogue, dans d'autres passages du *corpus*. C'est un fait qui ne doit pas être sous-estimé. Si la critique a relevé toute une série de renvois plus ou moins implicites entre les différents dialogues, les mentions explicites et précises sont bien plus rares : le cas du *Parménide* est donc en soi unique car le dialogue est cité deux fois par Platon, dans le *Théétète* (183e5-184a2) et dans le *Sophiste* (217c5-7), où Socrate se souvient de son entretien avec Parménide. Comment interpréter cette situation singulière ? En examinant ces deux renvois nous parviendrons, peut-être, à comprendre ce que Platon veut dire sur le statut du *Parménide* dans le cadre de son activité d'écrivain et de philosophe[25].

Commençons par le passage du *Théétète*, qui est sans doute le premier chronologiquement : ici, la mention de l'entretien avec Parménide[26] se fonde sur un problème de direction du discours. Socrate, après avoir conduit avec Théétète et Théodore la critique du modèle épistémologique fondé sur la doctrine du « flux universel », est provoqué par le jeune Théétète qui insiste pour mettre à l'épreuve la doctrine de ces penseurs qui soutiennent que « le tout est en repos » (τὸ πᾶν ἑστάναι, 183d1). Mais Socrate n'est pas prêt à affronter la question et il explique son refus ainsi (183e3-184b1) :

> Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, "αἰδοῖός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἅμα "δεινός τε." συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ ὂν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα.
>
> Mélissos et le reste de ceux qui déclarent le tout un et immobile, même si j'ai honte à l'idée de les examiner sans finesse, j'en ai moins honte que d'examiner ainsi

> l'unique qu'est Parménide. Parménide me paraît, le mot est d'Homère, être « pour moi à respecter » et en même temps « à redouter ». Car le fait est que je me suis trouvé en compagnie de l'homme, moi tout jeune et lui très vieux, et il m'a paru avoir une sorte de profondeur qui, en tout point, dénote une grande race. Je crains donc tout à la fois que ses paroles nous ne les comprenions pas et que ce qu'il pensait en les prononçant nous dépasse beaucoup plus ; et la plus grande de mes craintes c'est que, sous l'effet, si on leur obéit, de ces discours qui nous tombent dessus comme des fêtards, vienne à ne pas être examiné le motif initial de cette discussion : s'agissant de la science, ce qu'elle peut bien être. Enfin et surtout, celui que nous éveillons maintenant, et dont la taille nous réduit à l'impuissance, on va l'examiner soit de façon purement accessoire, et ce serait lui faire subir une indignité, soit avec toute l'attention requise, et il grandira jusqu'à éclipser la question de la science. Or, ni l'un ni l'autre n'est à faire[27].

Discuter la pensée de Parménide présenterait une série d'inconvénients : la profondeur de la pensée du philosophe porte Socrate à s'abstenir d'en faire l'examen de crainte de ne pas être à la hauteur et de ne pas comprendre les subtilités du raisonnement de l'éléate. D'autre part, une simple tentative dans cette direction signifierait s'éloigner considérablement de la question de la science, thème de la discussion, car la position de Parménide est extrêmement complexe : les discours dans lesquels on risque de se lancer sont impraticables de par leur grandeur (πλήθει ἀμήχανον).

Mais que dit-elle du *Parménide*, cette référence ? Comme on sait, la discussion évitée dans le *Théétète* sera menée par l'étranger d'Élée dans le *Sophiste*[28] : le renvoi au *Parménide* n'entend donc pas mettre en lumière un lien direct du point de vue du contenu ; il s'agit plutôt d'une indication de Platon qui suggère que le personnage de Socrate n'est pas adapté à la *forme de discours* qu'un examen de la doctrine éléatique demanderait. La tâche de Socrate est de tirer du jeune Théétète le savoir qu'il recèle en lui[29]. En termes de poétique implicite, renvoyer au *Parménide* signifie faire allusion à un dialogue dans lequel Socrate n'avait plus son rôle de guide du διαλέγεσθαι : Platon revendique fièrement dans l'expérimentalisme de la seconde partie du *Parménide* un modèle littéraire différent, plus adapté à la discussion de certains contenus mais qui remet toutefois en cause la position de Socrate.

Cette lecture poétique du renvoi présent dans le *Théétète* est confirmée par une autre mention du dialogue dans le proème du *Sophiste* : le rôle de l'allusion de Socrate y est manifeste. Ce dernier demande à l'étranger d'Élée s'il a l'intention de se lancer dans un long discours (μακρὸς λόγος) ou bien s'il s'apprête à exposer son point de vue en posant des questions, comme l'avait fait un jour Parménide (217c1-7) :

> μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ, τοσόνδε δ' ἡμῖν φράζε. πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαί τῳ βουληθῇς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὤν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;
>
> Ne décline donc pas, Étranger, la première faveur que nous te demandons, et veuille

répondre à cette question : à quelle méthode, pour mener à bien ta démonstration, va ta préférence, un discours long, ou bien des interrogations, comme celles utilisées jadis par Parménide, qui développa des arguments merveilleux en ma présence, lorsque j'étais jeune et qu'il était déjà très vieux ?[30]

En mentionnant son entretien avec Parménide, Socrate évoque une forme de dialogue qu'il propose comme modèle à l'étranger d'Élée : cette forme, qui ne veut pas être un μακρὸς λόγος, est toutefois différente de celle du dialogue « socratique », car elle se fonde sur la possession d'un savoir[31] et sur l'intention de l'exposer de façon systématique (ἐνδείξασθαι). Platon informe implicitement le lecteur qu'il va lui proposer quelque chose – au moins du point de vue littéraire[32] – de similaire au *Parménide*, qu'il désigne, non sans une pointe d'orgueil, par l'expression λόγοι πάγκαλοι[33]. La réaction de l'étranger est particulièrement significative. Il craint de ne pas savoir transposer son exposition sous forme dialoguée (217d8-e5) :

> ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδώς τίς μ' ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἄν αὐτὸ εἶναί τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου παμμήκους ὄν.
>
> J'ai un peu honte, Socrate, car aujourd'hui c'est la première fois que je me trouve parmi vous et, au lieu d'entraîner une conversation constituée de phrases concises, un mot répondant à un autre, je suis certain de m'engager dans un discours pesant, soit en m'adressant à moi-même, soit en m'adressant à un autre, comme si je faisais une conférence. Car, en réalité, le sujet que nous traitons n'est pas aussi simple qu'on pourrait le croire à être abordé par questions, et il exige, au contraire, un très long propos.

À la base de l'αἰδώς de l'étranger, on pourrait reconnaître une déclaration de poétique formulée par Platon : la question abordée, en raison de sa difficulté, requiert une longue exposition dont la forme diffèrera de l'aspect typique du genre du λόγος Σωκρατικός. On n'est pas au niveau du μακρὸς λόγος, mais la distinction se fait plus subtile : le discours, qui ne sera pas forcément un monologue (κατ' ἐμαυτόν εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον), sera toutefois nécessairement συχνός et παμμήκης[34]. Le lecteur est prévenu.

6. Avant d'en arriver à notre conclusion, il nous faut retourner à l'intérieur de la maison de Pythodore : comme nous l'avions vu, c'était finalement l'accord entre Socrate et Zénon qui avait conduit Parménide à accepter de tenter le discours ; à leur invitation se joignent Pythodore, le jeune Aristote, et les autres individus présents. Le vieux philosophe se dit contraint d'obéir et se compare au cheval chanté par Ibycos (fr. 287 P.) puis à un nageur qui doit traverser un « tel et si vaste océan d'arguments » (τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων, 137a5-6). Comme interlocuteur dans cette entreprise, qu'il décrit comme une πραγματειώδης παιδιά (137b2), il choisit non pas Socrate mais le jeune Aristote, précisément parce qu'il est le plus jeune, son âge garantissant une certaine docilité (137b6-8) :

> τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.
>
> Et qui donc, me donnera la réplique ? aurait demandé Parménide. Ne sera-ce pas le plus jeune ? En effet, c'est lui qui fera le moins d'embarras et répondra le plus ce qu'il pense. Par la même occasion, ses réponses me fourniront des pauses.

Le dialogue se transforme ainsi en une longue série d'affirmations de Parménide, déguisées en questions auxquelles la plupart du temps le répondant ne fait qu'assentir[35]. Or, il est intéressant de remarquer que, même si le rôle de Théétète dans le *Sophiste* est légèrement différent, il est choisi pour la même raison, parce que l'étranger recherche un interlocuteur bien disposé et docile (217d1-7) :

> τῷ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾷον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ καθ' αὑτόν.
>
> Quand l'interlocuteur est agréable et docile, Socrate, la méthode du dialogue est plus facile. Sinon, il est mieux de parler seul.

Bien que Socrate réplique en affirmant que tous les individus présents répondront tranquillement (πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονταί σοι πρᾴως), l'étranger décide tout de même de choisir Théétète en raison de son jeune âge. On n'est pas étonné, à ce stade, de voir qu'une situation similaire est décrite – de façon plus allusive – au début du *Politique* : là encore, l'étranger choisit pour lui répondre un jeune, cette fois Socrate le jeune, compagnon d'exercice (συγγυμναστής) de Théétète (*Plt.* 257c9-10).

7. Pour conclure, dans la seconde partie du *Parménide*, Platon transforme – et de manière très novatrice – le genre littéraire du λόγος Σωκρατικός en introduisant une série de modalités nouvelles pour l'entretien. Ces changements sont le fruit d'une réflexion de Platon sur le genre-dialogue en tant qu'instrument d'exposition et de transmission de la pensée et de la recherche philosophique : si la structure « ouverte » garantie par la forme dialoguée, véritable représentation littéraire de la recherche et de la dialectique, reste un modèle indispensable pour son écriture, les exigences connectées à la mise en scène dialogique d'une étude systématique des problèmes – l'étude menée au sein de l'Académie – conduisent Platon à réfléchir à la réalisation d'une nouvelle forme de dialogue. Cette forme, qui consiste en un déroulement continu de l'exposition, émaillé des réactions d'un interlocuteur qui en suit le développement argumentatif par des interventions discrètes, se rapproche davantage des exigences liées à la transmission d'un savoir positif[36] : son élaboration constitue une tentative de donner au genre les caractéristiques fonctionnelles du traité, tout en gardant la forme du dialogue.[37]

Bibliographie

Andrieu, J. (1954) *Le dialogue antique. Structure et présentation*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres.

Blondell, R. (2002) *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.

Brandwood, L. (1990) *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Brisson, L. (1984) Les réponses du jeune Aristote dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* de Platon. Essai

de classification, *Revue Informatique et statistique dans les sciences humaines* 20, p. 59-79.

Brisson, L. (2001) Vers un dialogue apaisé : les transformations affectant la pratique du dialogue dans le corpus platonicien. In: Cossutta, F.; Narcy, M. (eds.), *La forme dialogue chez Platon. Évolution et réceptions*, Grenoble, Millon, p. 209-226.

Brisson, L. (2018[4]) Platon. *Parménide*, Paris, Flammarion.

Brumbaugh, R. S. (1961) *Plato and the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Cambiano, G.; Fronterotta, F. (1998) Platone. *Parmenide*, Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Centrone, B. (2008) Platone. *Sofista*, Torino, Einaudi.

Clay, D. (2000) *Platonic Questions. Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher*, University Park (Pa), University of Pennsylvania Press.

Cordero, N.-L. (1993) Platon. *Le sophiste*, Paris, Flammarion.

Cornford, F. (1939) *Plato and Parmenides*, London, Routledge.

Fauquier, F. (2018) *Le Parménide au miroir des platonismes : logique – ontologie – théologie*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres.

Ferrari, F. (2004) Platone. *Parmenide*, Milano, Rizzoli.

Ferrari, F. (2010) Equiparazionismo ontologico e deduttivismo nel *Parmenide* di Platone. In: Giombini, S.; Marcacci, F. (eds.), *Il quinto secolo. Studi di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti*, Passignano sul Trasimeno, Aguaplano, p. 357-368.

Ferrari, F. (2011) Platone. *Teeteto*, Milano, Rizzoli.

Finkelberg, M. (2018) *The Gatekeeper. Narrative Voice in Plato's Dialogues*, Leiden-Boston: Brill.

Fronterotta, F. (1998) *Guida alla lettura del Parmenide di Platone*, Roma-Bari, Laterza.

Fronterotta, F. (2001) *Méθεξις. La teoria platonica delle Idee e la partecipazione delle cose empiriche. Dai dialoghi giovanili al Parmenide*, Pisa, Edizioni della Scuola Normale Superiore.

Fronterotta, F. (2007) Platone. *Sofista*, Milano, Rizzoli.

Fronterotta, F. (2019) L'ipotesi di Parmenide in *Parm.* 137b1-4: cosmologia, enologia o ontologia ?, *Études Platoniciennes* 15, en ligne, DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.1648

Giannantoni, G. (2005) *Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella Filosofia di Platone*, Napoli, Bibliopolis.

Graeser, A. (2010) *The Fog Dispelled. Two Studies in Plato's Later Thought*, Stuttgart, Steiner.

Hägler, R.-P. (1983) *Platons, Parmenides'. Probleme der Interpretation*, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter.

Horan, D. (2020) The Introduction of Plato's *Parmenides*. What Does It Introduce and to Whom?. In: Kaklamanou, E.; Pavlou, M.; Tsakmakis, A. (eds.), *Framing the Dialogues. How to Read Openings and Closures in Plato*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, p. 243-262.

Isnardi Parente, M. (2005) *Il dibattito sugli εἴδη nell'Accademia antica*. In: Fronterotta, F.; Leszl, W. (eds), *Εἶδος - Ἰδέα. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione Platonica*, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, p. 161-170.

Kahn, C. H. (1996) *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.

Kahn, C. H. (2007) Why is the *Sophist* a Sequel to the *Theaetetus*, *Phronesis* 52, p. 33-57.

Mansfeld, J. (2019) Il faut que vous soyez instruits de toutes choses…, *Études Platoniciennes* 15, 2019, en ligne, DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/etudes-platoniciennes.1458

McCabe, M. M. (1996) Unity in the *Parmenides* : the Unity of the *Parmenides*. In: Gill, C. et McCabe, M. M. (eds.), *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 5-47.

McDowell, J. (1973) Plato. *Theaetetus*, Oxford, Clarendon.

Meinwald, C. C. (1991) *Plato's Parmenides*, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Miller, M. H., Jr. (1986) *Plato's Parmenides. The Conversion of the Soul*, University Park (Pa), University of Pennsylvania Press.

Nails, D. (2002) *The People of Plato. A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*, Indianapolis-Cambridge, Hackett.

Narcy, M. (1995[2]) Platon. *Théétète*, Paris, Flammarion.

Rangos, S. (2020) Chance Encounters and Abrupt Endings. On the Preludes and Closures of Plato's Third Thrasyllan Tetralogy. In: Kaklamanou, E.; Pavlou, M.; Tsakmakis, A. (eds.), *Framing the Dialogues. How to Read Openings and Closures in Plato*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, p. 220-242.

Regali, M. (2012) *Il poeta e il demiurgo. Teoria e prassi della produzione letteraria nel Timeo e nel Crizia di Platone*, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag.

Rowe, C. (2007) *Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.

Rowe, C. (2015) Plato. *Theaetetus and Sophist*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.

Ryle, G. (1939) Plato's *Parmenides*, *Mind* 48, p. 129-151.

Scolnicov, S. (2003) *Plato's Parmenides*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, University of California Press.

Steel, C. (2002) Une histoire de l'interprétation du *Parménide* dans l'Antiquité. In: Barbanti, M.; Romano, F. (eds), *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione*, Catania, CUECM, p. 11-33.

Thesleff, H. (1967) *Studies in the Styles of Plato*, Helsinki, Societas Philosophica Fennica = Thesleff (2009) p. 1-142.

Thesleff, H. (1982) *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, Helsinki, Societas Philosophica Fennica = Thesleff (2009), p, 143-382.

Thesleff H. (2009) *Platonic Patterns. A Collection of Studies*, Las Vegas-Zürich-Athens, Parmenides,

Tulli, M. (2011) Platone, il proemio del *Teeteto* e la poetica del dialogo. In Tulli M. (ed.), *L'autore pensoso. Un seminario per Graziano Arrighetti sulla coscienza letteraria dei Greci*, Pisa-Roma, Fabrizio Serra, p. 121-133.

Turner, J. D. et Corrigan, K. (eds.) (2011) *Plato's Parmenides and its Heritage. Vol. I. History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, Atlanta, Society of Biblical Literature.

Walker, M. D. (2016) The Functions of Apollodorus, in Tulli, M.; Erler, M. (eds), *Plato in Symposium. Selected Papers from the Tenth Symposium Platonicum*, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, p. 110-116.

Notes

* Les traductions des passages du *Parménide* sont tirées de Brisson, 2018[4], avec parfois de légères modifications.

1 *e.g.* Brumbaugh, 1961, p. 1 ; Hägler, 1983, p. 1 ; Miller 1986, p. 3 ; Meinwald, 1991, p. 3 ; Fronterotta, 1998, pp. 3-4 ; Scolnicov, 2003, p. 1 ; Ferrari 2004, p. 9 ; Brisson, 2018[4], p. 9.

2 Pour un aperçu des différentes interprétations du *Parménide* dans l'Antiquité, voir entre autres Steel 2002 ; Turner & Corrigan, 2011 ; Fauquier, 2018.

3 La bipartition du *Parménide* doit probablement être rapprochée de la bipartition du poème de Parménide, qui constitue un modèle souterrain pour l'ensemble du dialogue : cf. Miller, 1986, p. 15-16.

4 Sur l'εὐτονία comme caractéristique des dialogues socratiques, voir D.L. II 60, l. 11-12 ; le contraste apparent entre la partie « socratique » du *Parménide* et la section « gymnastique » est souligné par McCabe, 1996, p. 5-8.

5 Voir par exemple Thesleff, 1982, p. 157-161 [=2009, pp. 304-308] et Brandwood, 1990, p. 251.

6 Le *Parménide*, même s'il ne constitue pas le dernier dialogue socratique, est toutefois le premier dialogue que l'on peut qualifier de « post-socratique » composé au sein de l'Académie. Les dialogues d'Aristote ne présentaient apparemment pas la figure de Socrate comme un guide ; il est possible que cela ait aussi été le cas des dialogues écrits par Speusippe, même si nous ne savons rien de ces œuvres, à l'exception de rares informations sur le *Mandroboulos* (F 5a-b Tarán).

7 Sur ce personnage, voir Nails, 2003, p. 31.

8 La mention de la μελέτη dans la mémorisation des discours rapproche le proème du *Parménide* de celui du *Banquet*, qui s'ouvre avec l'affirmation d'Apollodore : δοκῶ μοι περὶ ὧν πυνθάνεσθε οὐκ ἀμελέτητος εἶναι (172a1-2). Sur l'interprétation de cet élément pour la caractérisation d'Apollodore, voir Walker, 2016, p. 111-114 ; pour une comparaison entre le proème du *Banquet* et celui du *Parménide*, voir Rangos, 2020, p. 225-231.

9 Sur la chronologie fictive du dialogue, voir Nails, 2002, p. 308-309, et Brisson, 2018[4], p. 14.

10 On estime que Socrate avait une vingtaine d'années : cf. Nails, 2002, p. 308-309, et Brisson, 2018[4], p. 14.

11 Comme le montre notamment la description que Zénon lui-même fait de Socrate (128b8-c2) : « et pourtant, c'est avec le flair des chiennes de Laconie que tu harcèles et suis à la trace ce qui est dit » (καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα). Parménide avait déjà assisté à un dialogue entre Socrate et Aristote le jeune, deux jours auparavant (135d1-2).

12 En particulier, Socrate se concentre sur la première hypothèse du premier argument (127d6-7), une hypothèse derrière laquelle se cache, selon Zénon lui-même, le sens de l'écrit dans son ensemble (128a2-3 : ὅλον τὸ γράμμα). Cette représentation n'est pas une nouveauté pour Platon : dans les dialogues, Socrate joue assez souvent le rôle de commentateur de textes attribués à d'autres écrivains, qu'ils soient philosophes, poètes ou rhéteurs : songeons notamment au discours de Lysias dans le *Phèdre* ou à l'exégèse du poème de Simonide dans le *Protagoras* (338e6-347c2). Cependant, le développement de notre dialogue est totalement différent, car l'autorité herméneutique de Socrate y est mise en doute, en raison de son âge.

13 Les objections remontent probablement à une discussion interne à l'Académie sur la doctrine des Formes.

Pour le débat académique sur les εἴδη, voir la présentation d'Isnardi Parente, 2005 ; sur le *Parménide* en tant que « bassin collecteur », du travail conduit dans l'École, cf. Graeser, 2010, p. 36-38.

14 Sur le lien entre εἴδη, dialectique et forme dialoguée, voir par exemple Giannantoni, 2005, p. 313-343.

15 Platon ne veut cependant pas déprécier la contribution du personnage et la centralité de sa lecture du traité de Zénon. Au contraire, il se borne, apparemment, à défendre l'existence d'une dimension idéale de la réalité, à travers le personnage de Parménide qui avait à son tour dévoilé les apories menaçant l'hypothèse eidétique. La γυμνασία est explicitement désignée par le personnage comme un exercice qui doit être appliqué aux Formes de la dialectique zénonienne (135d5-e4). Toutefois, le lien précis entre les apories de la première partie et la séquence des hypothèses fait l'objet de nombreux débats : pour un *status quaestionis*, ainsi que pour une hypothèse d'interprétation qui explique la seconde partie comme une tentative de mieux décrire la consistance et les raisons des difficultés soulevées par la théorie des Formes, voir Fronterotta, 2001, p. 289-314 ; une tentative très fine de lire la seconde partie essentiellement comme une justification de la participation des Formes par les choses sensibles est proposée par Mansfeld 2019. Bien que l'une des règles herméneutiques fondamentales pour la lecture du dialogue socratique soit l'impossibilité d'identifier précisément l'auteur à un personnage spécifique – voir *e.g.* Clay, 2000, pp. 103-106 – on est tenté de reconnaître dans cette nécessité de βοήθεια apportée à la théorie des Formes une première forme de transparence de la présence de Platon dans son œuvre, c'est-à-dire la première étape du chemin qui portera à la création, dans les *Lois*, du personnage de l'étranger d'Athènes. Il faut cependant éviter toute lecture trop simpliste de la relation entre Platon et les « remplaçants » de Socrate : cf. Rowe, 2007, pp. 55 (et n. 56), 255-265. Pour une position différente, qui voit en Parménide un mauvais interprète de la doctrine des Formes, voir *e.g.* Ferrari, 2010. Une interprétation en sens cosmologique de la deuxième partie du dialogue est avancée par Brisson (cf. *e.g.* Brisson, 2018[4], pp. 46-78) ; voir aussi la mise à point de Fronterotta, 2019.

16 Cf. *e.g. Cra.* 384a8-b2, *La.* 185a3-5, *Euthd.* 273c3-4, *Grg.* 487b5, *R.* I 344d7-e3, II 368c8-d1, IX 578c5-7.

17 Le thème du désir pour les discours et la mémoire de Socrate est un « fil rouge » du genre des λόγοι Σωκρατικοί dans son ensemble et Platon l'emploie souvent : voir Regali, 2012, p. 45-48.

18 Cf. *e.g.* Brisson, 2018[4], p. 14, qui situe la conversation du proème autour de 400 av. J.-C. ; Nails, 2002, p. 309, pense plutôt à l'année 382.

19 Apparemment, Céphale – qui n'est pas dit φιλόσοφος – n'avait pas connaissance de l'épisode, ni du fait qu'Antiphon, qu'il avait connu enfant au temps de sa première visite à Athènes (126b1-4 ; cf. aussi 127a4-5), en gardait un souvenir : ses amis, les μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ont probablement fait appel à lui en raison de sa connaissance du personnage et, en général, de la famille de Platon (Adimante le reconnaît immédiatement et le salue en lui prenant la main : 126a2-4).

20 Je garde ici une double valeur pour l'expression πάρειμι ἐξ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν (127a6), tandis que Brisson, 2018[4], préfère traduire le verbe avec le simple sens de « demander » ; en revanche, voir la traduction de Ferrari, 2004, « appunto per questo mi trovo qui, perché *ho bisogno* di voi » (italique ajouté).

21 Il n'est pas sans intérêt de noter que ni dans le préambule du *Phédon* ni dans le *Banquet* n'est mentionnée la *difficulté* du récit : tant Phédon qu'Apollodore accueillent dès le début l'invitation à rappeler les discours de Socrate avec un plaisir qui ne comporte pas d'hésitation (*Phd.* 58d4-6 ; *Smp.* 173b9-c5). Il en va autrement dans le proème « mégarique » du *Théétète*, dans lequel Euclide n'a pas appris par cœur la conversation entre Socrate et Théétète et doit, par conséquent, recourir à l'écriture et chercher le livre qu'il avait composé, aidé par Socrate lui-même (142d5-143a5) : sur ce dernier passage en tant que manifeste de la poétique du dialogue de Platon, voir Tulli, 2011.

22 Cf. aussi Horan, 2020, en particulier p. 243-244 et p. 261-262.

23 Le premier à remarquer certaines de ces reprises verbales a été Miller, 1986, p. 16-17, qui ne s'étend cependant pas sur le sujet.

24 Dans la retardation de cette discussion, ou plutôt dans le fait que Platon a voulu l'annoncer dès le début, on pourrait reconnaitre un procédé littéraire dont le dialogue hérite à partir de la poésie narrative de la tradition grecque : sur la « Retardation » épique chez Platon, et plus particulièrement sur le cas du *Timée-Critias*, voir Regali, 2012, pp. 79-98.

25 Je me limiterai à mettre en évidence la portée littéraire des renvois : pour une analyse qui tâche de chercher derrière les références une valeur philosophique, voir Kahn, 2007.

26 Qu'il s'agisse d'une véritable mention du dialogue est évident : cf. déjà Diès, 1923, pp. xii-xiii, et Cornford, 1939, p. 63 ; puis *e.g.* Hägler, 1983, p. 104, n. 6 ; Fronterotta, 1998, p. 6, n. 5 ; Kahn, 2007, pp. 35-36 ; Rowe, 2015, p. 57, n. 65.

27 Traduction tirée de Narcy, 1995[2].

28 Cf. *e.g.* McDowell, 1973, p. 185 ; Kahn, 2007, p. 41-42 ; Ferrari, 2011, p. 402-403, n. 245.

29 Il n'est ainsi pas surprenant que la *recusatio* de Socrate se conclue par une référence explicite à la maïeutique : « ce que nous avons à faire, c'est d'essayer de délivrer Théétète, grâce à l'art d'accoucher, de ce qu'il est près d'enfanter au sujet de la science » (ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι).

30 Pour le *Sophiste*, les traductions sont tirées de Cordero, 1993, avec de légères modifications.

31 L'étranger est présenté par Théodore comme un philosophe et un savant, « qui avoue avoir ouï autant de leçons qu'il faut et ne les point avoir oubliées » (217b8-9) ; cf. les observations de Fronterotta, 2007, p. 202, n. 11.

32 Comme on sait, la méthode dialectique employée par l'étranger, qui se fonde sur la διαίρεσις, est différente de celle de Parménide : sur le rapport entre les deux « dialectiques » et leur théorisation dans la *République*, voir Kahn, 1996, p. 296-300.

33 Les différences que la critique a remarquées entre les deux formes dialoguées – voir *e.g.* Centrone, 2008, p. 9, n. 9 – témoignent probablement d'une volonté d'adoucir le mouvement trop rigide de la γυμνασία et, peut-être, aussi d'un effort de caractérisation stylistique dont nous ne pouvons pas nous occuper à présent. Pour un aperçu général de la caractérisation stylistique chez Platon, voir Thesleff, 1967, p. 160-164 [=2009, p. 132-135].

34 Voir aussi les considérations sur la longueur du discours proposées par l'étranger d'Élée dans le *Politique* (286e6-287a6).

35 Une analyse statistique des réponses nous est fournie par Brisson, 1984 ; Cambiano & Fronterotta, 1998, p. 118, n. 40, parlent même d'un « lungo monologo ».

36 Brisson, 2001, p. 221-226, parle d'une tendance à un « dialogue apaisé », dans la recherche d'une exposition dialectique formellement impeccable, suivant les règles que Platon lui-même avait établies dans les autres dialogues. En ce sens, la seconde partie du *Parménide* serait donc « le meilleur exemple d'un dialogue bien mené avec un questionneur » (p. 221-222). Ces conclusions sont en partie paradoxales au sens où elles sous-entendent que le meilleur dialogue serait la transposition en questions et réponses d'un exposé continu : en vérité, Platon semble adapter la forme du dialogue aux nécessités de la recherche, et les exemples du *Théétète* et du *Philèbe* montrent que la vivacité du Σωκρατικὸς λόγος préservait sa valeur. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est vrai que la forme choisie par Platon pour la γυμνασία du *Parménide* est évidemment un type d'entretien dans lequel Socrate trouverait difficilement sa place. Toutefois, le silence de Socrate ne doit pas être compris comme une absence : cf. Blondell 2002, p. 386-396.

37 Cf. McCabe, 1996, p. 21 : « in the second part, the persons have effectively disappeared, leaving behind just the arguments ». Une tentative de « traduction » de la seconde partie du *Parménide* sous forme de traité est proposée par Cornford, 1939, qui remarque que (p. 109) : « nothing is gained by casting the arguments into the form of question and answer » et que « this change of form (*i.e.* l'élimination des réponses du jeune Aristote) in no way falsifies the sense ». Cette impression est d'autant plus forte que les insertions narratives disparaissent à partir du début de la section des hypothèses et que, par ailleurs, il n'y a pas de retour à la dimension diégématique : la voix de Céphale se tait. Cf. Andrieu, 1954, p. 318-319 ; Thesleff, 1967, p. 138-139 [=2009, p. 115-116] ; Finkelberg, 2018 p. 38-44.

Seeing Double: Divisions of *eidê* and division of labor in Plato's *Republic*

Jens Kristian Larsen
Kristian.Larsen@ntnu.no
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
ORCID number: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4395-3664

ABSTRACT

This article argues that Plato's *Republic* identifies division, as it is described in supposedly later dialogues, as a procedure that sets dialectic apart from quarreling and strife. It further argues that the procedure is crucial for establishing the ideal city of the *Republic*, since the correct assignment of various tasks to different types of human beings depend on it. Finally, it urges, division aids the philosopher in contemplating the forms and setting his or her soul in order: the forms are interwoven and division helps the philosopher recognize the order permeating the fabric of forms.

Keywords: *diairesis*, dialectic, ontology, *Republic*, eristic, sophistry.

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_8

In[1] a crucial passage in the *Republic* (454a1-8) found within a discussion of women's role in the ideal *polis*, division in accordance with *eidē* is identified as necessary for dialectic. In this article I argue that a careful consideration of the way division is described here reveals that it closely resembles the procedure of division described in the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist*[2] and that this procedure, when carried out correctly, is central to dialectic according to the *Republic*. Consideration of additional passages from *Republic* II and V further indicate, I argue, that division should be understood as a twofold procedure. It aims at 1) inspecting a particular entity by 2) dividing in accordance with *eidê*[3]; importantly, the act of dividing is not simply directed at the entity under consideration, but rather at eidetic aspects or forms that the entity inspected may be judged in accordance with[4]. Such forms include virtues and various types of human nature. Indeed, according to the argument of the *Republic*, the correct use of division for the purpose of distinguishing types of human natures or various virtues that to the untrained eye may look alike is necessary for the good political rule that gives to each human being in the *polis* its due. In general, correctly performed divisions help the dialectician bring into focus an entity under consideration in a kind of double-vision that reveals that entity as a concrete phenomenon that may exhibit participation in different *eidê* when considered from different points of view. What the *Republic* passage makes clear, in particular, is that human beings may be perceived both as biological beings with specific roles in human reproduction and as souls with natural aptitudes for specific tasks, and that the correct use of our ability to divide in accordance with forms is what is called for if we are to avoid conflating these two perspectives on one and the same entity.

I begin, in section 1, by analyzing the passage 454a1-8 in detail and argue that the fact that Socrates identifies the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê* as that which sets dialectic apart from quarreling or strife indicates that dialectic as it is discussed in the *Republic* strongly resembles dialectic as discussed in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. In section 2, I analyze the wider context of the passage and, in particular, the division of labor discussed in *Republic* II that it comments on. I argue that this wider context supports the suggestion that division in the passage 454a1-8 is used in a deliberately technical sense and further demonstrates that the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê* is important not just in order that one may avoid engaging in strife unintentionally, but also for establishing the ideal *polis* discussed in the *Republic*. In section 3, finally, I argue that division of *eidê* plays a crucial role in the argument at the end of *Republic* V that seeks to define the philosopher, since it underlines the difference between the dialectician and the lover of sights; the dialectician is characterized by the fact that he or she is awake and the ability to consider something while dividing in accordance with *eidê* is part of what it means to be awake.

1. DIVISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH *EIDÊ* AND DIVISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH NAMES

In the passage 454a1-8 in book V of Plato's *Republic*, located within what Socrates calls the "female drama" (see 451c1-3), Socrates highlights the way conversation contrasts with quarreling in consequence of a dilemma Glaucon and Socrates apparently face. The dilemma results once they assume that women should be allowed to take part in the tasks

that the male guardians perform and be given the same kind of rearing and education that the male guardians receive (451d4-e2). For this assumption, Socrates now suggests on behalf of certain unnamed opponents (see 452e3-453a5), seems to conflict with their earlier agreement (at 369e3-370b4) that different natures should perform different tasks; on the basis of this agreement one might argue that women, whose *physis* or nature differ from that of men (453b6-8), must perform other tasks than those performed by men (453b9-10).

In the passage 454a1-8 Socrates suggests that this apparently sound argument exemplifies the activity of quarreling (*erizein*) rather than of conversing (*dialegesthai*) and that it exhibits the power inherent in "the art of contradiction" (*hê antilogikê technê*). In fact, he claims, many people unwillingly, and while believing they are not doing so, end up quarreling, "owing to their inability to inspect what is said by dividing in accordance with *eidê*" (*dia to mê dynasthai kat' eidê diairoumenoi to legomenon episkopein*);[5] they then pursue opposition merely in accordance with the name (*kat' auto to onoma diôkein … tên enantiôsin*), employing strife (*eris*) rather than discourse (*dialektos*).

As J. Adam remarks, the contrast between strife and discourse is "a common opposition" in Plato found also in e.g. "*Men*. 75c ff. and *Phil.* 17a" (Adam, 1902, note to 454a6),[6] a fact that suggests that *dialektos* is used in our passage more or less as a technical term designating the expertise of dialectic. Socrates' claim in the passage is, then, that the difference between discoursing, understood as an activity that employs dialectic, and quarreling, understood as an activity that employs strife and exemplifies the power of the art of contradiction, is to be found in the fact that discourse depends on the ability to inspect what is discussed through divisions in accordance with *eidê*. We may leave aside, for the moment, the question what Socrates means by *eidê* and concentrate on the fact that the activity of dividing in accordance with *eidê* is contrasted with another way of considering a matter under discussion where one looks merely to the word or name (*onoma*), a manner of proceeding that employs strife and exemplifies the power of the art of contradiction.

Plato often highlights the difference between genuine conversation and eristic and between dialectic and the art of contradiction for the purpose of distinguishing philosophy from sophistry and rhetoric (see e.g. Kerferd, 1981, p. 59- 67; Nehamas, 1990; McCoy, 2008; Rodriguez, 2019).[7] From dialogues such as the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, and the *Sophist* it may even appear that Plato's definition of philosophy depends to some extent on establishing this basic difference. It is therefore significant that Socrates in the passage under consideration indicates that the activity of quarreling (*erizein*) is something one may inadvertently end up being engaged in while aiming at conducting a conversation (*dialegesthai*), and that this activity somehow exemplifies the power inherent in the art of contradiction even if it is not itself a deliberate attempt at using that art. This suggests that strife or eristic is a deficient mode of speaking that is best understood when contrasted with the positive phenomenon it is not, namely, discourse that is aimed at inspecting the nature of a subject matter. It also suggests that the *power* of the art of contradiction (if it is an art) is something inherent in language itself, and not something that only accomplished rhetoricians or sophists have access to, since Socrates claims that one

need not engage in this activity deliberately in order to exhibit its power. The suggestion seems to be, then, that, even if words may be helpful in a dialectical inquiry where one attempts to inspect something while dividing in accordance with *eidê*, they may just as easily lead one to a merely verbal dispute if one divides only in accordance with them; in fact, unless one already aims at doing the former, one may not realize that one is, in reality, engaged in the latter.

If these considerations are to the point, it could even seem that Socrates is suggesting that rhetoricians and sophists, in so far as they are considered experts in contradiction and quarrelling, should be regarded as deficient dialecticians rather than as active opponents of dialectic or philosophy, that is, as people making their living from the fact that most of us, most of the time, fail to inspect the subject matter we discuss in accordance with correctly performed divisions of *eidê* and rather focus on mere names. Rhetoricians and sophists, when following such divisions through subtle distinctions between various meanings of words, could easily seem to be conducting dialectical investigations to one who does not know what they are doing.[8]

Socrates' claims about the importance of division in the passage we are considering gain further significance once we note that the expression "dividing in accordance with *eidê*" (*kat' eidê diairoumenoi*) is paralleled by expressions found in a number of passages from the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* where the expertise of the dialectician and the confusion characteristic of people untrained in dialectic are described (the parallel is noted in Adam, 1902, note to *R.* 454a5). In the *Sophist* it is said that it belongs to the science of dialectic to divide "according to *kinds* [*to kata genê diaireisthai*], (…) not thinking either that the same form [*eidos*] is different or, when it is different, that it is the same" (253d1-3; translation by Christopher Rowe, slightly modified). In the *Statesman*, people in general are said to throw things that are very different into the same category and to distinguish things that are really the same "because they are not accustomed to inspect things while dividing according to forms [*dia de to mê kat' eidê syneithisthai skopein diairoumenous*]" (285a4-8; translation by E. Brann, P. Kalkavage, and E. Salem, modified). These parallels and the fact that Socrates in the *Republic* explicitly states that the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê* is a prerequisite for engaging in conversation as an activity that employs dialectic suggest that "dividing" in the passage under consideration is used in a deliberately technical sense. Moreover, the distinction between only picking on names when considering a subject matter and being able to inspect it on the basis of divisions of *eidê* should be familiar to all readers of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. The inquiry of these two dialogues sets out from a distinction between merely "having a name in common concerning a given subject" (*toutou peri tounoma monon echein*) and deciding what that subject is (*ti pot' esti*) through an account (*logos*), and the method of division is introduced in order to help the interlocutors proceed from the former to the latter (see *Sph.* 218b6-219a2). In order to settle the question what the sophist is the interlocutors need to find out what kind of expertise, if any, he may be said to possess, and this, in turn, calls for divisions of the various types of expertise there are. The divisions, then, do not aim at dividing the sophist but the various *eidê* of expertise that are relevant for achieving a satisfactory perspective on the sophist.

2. DIVISION OF *EIDÊ*, DIVISION OF LABOR, AND THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR ESTABLISHING THE IDEAL *POLIS*

When read in isolation, the passage from the *Republic* does not tell us much about the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê*, and this may in part explain why few commentators regard it as referring to division in a technical sense, that is, to a procedure central to Plato's more general account of dialectic.[9] A careful consideration of the way Socrates explains why the interlocutors now run the risk of engaging, unwillingly, in quarreling will help us flesh out what division is meant to accomplish according to Socrates and see more clearly the way division is important to the overall argument of the *Republic*. Socrates' explanation runs as follows. If the interlocutors now find it plausible, as the hypothetical objector Socrates has introduced does, that women cannot share in the activities of the male guardians, it is because they pursue opposition merely in the letter of their earlier agreement that different natures ought to perform different tasks (454b4-6); for they now fail to consider "what *eidos* of diversity and identity of nature" they had in mind and "with reference to what" (*pros ti*) they defined (*horizesthai*) it when they initially assigned different practices to different natures (454b6-9).

The argumentative character of this passage resembles that of two other passages in the *Republic* where Socrates brings up certain hypothetical objectors, namely 436c10-e5 and 438a1-6. As Weiss (2007) argues, Socrates in these passages endorses the premises introduced by these hypothetical objectors, namely that something may in some sense stand still while moving and that all human beings in some sense desire the good, while denying that the conclusion the hypothetical objector claims follows from this in fact follows, namely that the same thing can move and stand still at the same time without qualification, and that thirst is a desire for good drink without qualification. In the first case, the qualification is that the moving and standing still are done with different parts; in the second, the qualification is that the desired good need not also be good in the sense of beneficial. We may suppose that Socrates in the passage we are considering likewise accepts the two premises on which the hypothetical objector here relies, namely that different natures should perform different tasks and that women differ from men by nature, but that he denies that the conclusion follows because the nature in accordance with which they inspect the subject discussed is not the same in the two premises.[10] For what he argues is that the conclusion only seems to follow because they now fail to ask in accordance with what *form* of different and same nature they advanced their earlier claim. This clearly indicates that something may be said to have the same nature in accordance with one form of nature, but a different one in accordance with another. Failing to realize that, one investigates the subject under consideration–what role women may be accorded in society–while pursuing mere verbal contradiction and not dividing in accordance with *eidê*. Let us now consider more carefully which divisions Socrates may be said to have performed in the course of their earlier assignment of different tasks to different human beings.

What Socrates had in mind when he introduced the suggestion that different natures should perform different tasks was that human beings differ in nature in so far as

some people are naturally suited for certain tasks while others are suited for other tasks (369e3-370b4, see also 374a5-e9), a point the importance of which he emphasizes by now reiterating it (at 454c7-d1).[11] In other words, when Socrates claimed (at 370b1-2) that none of us are born exactly alike, but that we differ by nature, he was thinking of "nature" in the sense of our suitability for various tasks. Due to their nature some people are more suited to performing the tasks of a farmer, others to performing the tasks of a shoemaker. Such natural differences, Socrates also argued (see 374b6-d6), become even more apparent once tasks such as guarding the city are introduced into the inquiry. The problem with the present claim is that it seems to assume without argument that the difference in nature between men and women that follows from the fact that women bear and men beget is relevant when it comes to the question which natures are suited to which tasks (see 454d9-e1), an assumption that seems to parallel the assumption that, since bald men differ by nature from longhaired men, the two are not suited to the same tasks. In other words, for the argument of the hypothetical objector to carry weight, it would have to be established that men and women also differ by nature when it comes to the question what tasks they are suited to perform (454d7-9), in particular the tasks concerned with organizing the city. But, Socrates argues, they do not, for there are no tasks that men or women are more suited to perform just because they are men and women; rather, women are as different as men when it comes to the question what tasks they will be suited to perform (455d6-e1), even if they will on the whole be inferior to men in performing them (455c5-d5). Thus, for every type of man suited to a particular task we will find a corresponding woman.[12]

On the basis of these considerations we may suggest that the quarrelsome argument displays a twofold inability to inspect a subject matter while dividing in accordance with *eidê*. On the one hand, it fails to consider the fact that there are different ways in which we may say that something has the same or a different nature–for instance with respect to the tasks they are suited to perform and with respect to their role in procreation. Difference itself differs in kinds when applied to nature and the answer to the question whether two things differ by nature depends on what nature we are talking about (see 454b6-8). On the other hand, it also fails to divide human nature into kinds in accordance with the different tasks that different men and women are suited to perform–the division that Socrates indicated at 369e3-370b4 is called for if we are to arrive at a well-ordered society. It is only when seen from the perspective of such divisions, one may argue, that it becomes apparent that men and women can be said to "have the same nature" if they are naturally suited to the same job (454d1-3)–even granted that they differ in their nature relative to some other activity incidental to this job (see 454d9-e1). In other words, in order to see that the difference between men and women relative to human reproduction is just one way we may speak of human beings having different natures, one needs to acknowledge that human beings, or human nature, may be divided in accordance with other differences as well.

The claim that women cannot perform the same tasks as men thus arises from too narrow an understanding of human nature–one that results from an insufficient grasp of the ways divisions may be applied to nature for the purpose of defining different types of human beings (on this point, see Friedländer, 1960, p. 95). We might also say that it results from

a one-dimensional understanding of human beings that fails to distinguish between the natural requirements of various activities, and that the cure for that mistake is a kind of double-vision that allows one to see that particular human beings that differ from each other naturally in one regard may nevertheless share a fundamental likeness in so far as they are naturally suited to similar tasks in another regard.

These considerations indicate, furthermore, that the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê* is important not just at this particular point of the argument for the purpose of avoiding engaging in mere word-fighting or eristic. It is also of great importance for establishing the ideal *polis* in *logos*. For the "construction" of this *polis* in words is based precisely on the claims that human beings differ by nature relative to various tasks and that the welfare of a community depends on correctly assigning to people the pursuits they are naturally suited to perform–especially when it comes to important pursuits such as guarding and ruling the *polis*. Dividing human beings correctly into kinds in accordance with their natural aptitudes is not only a theoretical task that helps us avoid quarreling rather than conversing, it is also a practical task of the highest importance. Much of the educational system discussed in the *Republic* is explicitly intended to make the rulers able to perform this task in a satisfactory manner.

But if division as discussed in the passages we have considered so far is directed primarily at kinds of human beings and the tasks that they are naturally suited to carry out, a critical reader might object to the suggestion advanced in the previous part of the article, that division as described in these passages resembles division as described in supposedly later dialogues. For, such a reader might object, division in the later dialogues is performed on forms (whatever ontological status they are to be ascribed in these dialogues), not on kinds of human beings for which, it could be assumed, there are no forms. In other words, it might be objected that the expression *kat' eidê diairoumenoi* at *Republic* 454a6 only superficially resembles the expressions *kata genê diaireisthai* at *Sophist* 253d1 and *kat' eidê syneithisthai skopein diairoumenous* at *Statesman* 285a4-5, since the entities that are divided are radically different in the *Republic* and the supposedly later dialogues.

I believe a simple answer to this objection may be provided. For we may note that the *eidê* referred to in the famous passage 265e1-266b1 from the *Phaedrus* discussing division are first and foremost kinds of love, parts of the soul, and different kinds of human beings (see Larsen 2010 and 2020a), and that the *eidê* or *genê* in accordance with which divisions are carried out in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are first and foremost kinds of expertise.[13] In other words, the procedure of division as exemplified in the supposedly later dialogues is primarily concerned with entities that many scholars would also be reluctant to think of as "Forms" or "Platonic ideas" for the very same reasons that they might be reluctant to identify the *eidê* mentioned in the *Republic* passage with forms.

We may sum up this consideration in a more general conclusion. Division, as described in the *Republic* passage, as well as in central passages from the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman*, is characterized first and foremost by the fact that it is concerned with kinds of things and with dividing them correctly; when seen from that perspective, the question what ontological status these kinds have is less important. For the purpose of understanding the significance of division

for Plato's conception of dialectic as contrasted with eristic and sophistry, it would therefore perhaps be better to avoid the claim altogether that division is preoccupied with "Platonic forms" or with "Forms", designated with a capital "F", as if such forms were clearly set apart in Plato from other types of *eidê*, and instead accept that division, when discussed in Plato in a technical manner, is described as a procedure that is concerned with kinds in accordance with which particular things may, or may not, be inspected, kinds that, in some dialogues, are analyzed in greater detail as regards their ontological status and in others not.

3. DIVISION AND THE COMMUNION OF FORMS

There is another way in which the ability to divide in accordance with *eidê* is discussed in the *Republic* as a prerequisite for the philosopher's knowledge that is undoubtedly concerned with what many scholars are used to thinking of as "Platonic Forms", however, as a consideration of a passage found at the end of book V (especially 476a5-476d2) will make clear. Here Socrates sets out from the claim that the true philosophers (*hoi alêthinoi philosophoi*) are those who "love to contemplate the truth [*hoi philothamones tês alêtheias*]" (475e3-4) and proceeds to clarify what contemplation of the truth means in two consecutive steps important for understanding the significance of the procedure of division for the overall argument of the *Republic*. In the first step Socrates suggests that the beautiful and the ugly are opposites and therefore two (476a1) and, since they are two, that each is one (476a3). In the second step he states that the same account or argument (*logos*) concerns the just and unjust, the good and the bad and "all of the *eidê* [*peri pantôn tôn eidôn*];" each is one but, due to their communion (*koinônia*) with actions, bodies and "with one another" (*allêlôn*), they appear as many (476a5-8).

The first step contains a simple enumeration of *eidê* that we may regard as a rudimentary version of dialectical division or distinction. The reason the *eidê* can be counted is that they differ from each other but can be viewed together: if the beautiful was not something in itself and the opposite of the ugly, we would not be able to see each as unities that together constitute a duality. The second step, in turn, establishes that each *eidos* appears as many because it has communion with a) actions, b) bodies, and c) other *eidê*.

The fact that Socrates describes the *eidê* as unities suggests that the term *eidê* here explicitly refers to the kind of entities that most scholars are used to thinking of as "Platonic Forms," an impression that is confirmed by the discussion of the beautiful itself that follows; Adam thus claims that the passage contains "the first appearance of the Theory of 'Ideas' properly so called in the *Republic*" (1902, note to *R*. 476a2). The description also suggests that, in order to see clearly each form as the unity it is, one needs to be able to distinguish it both from the actions and bodily entities and from the other forms that it has communion with and may appear as conflated with.

That Socrates, in a passage where he stresses the unity of each form, explicitly states that a form may appear as a plurality because it has communion with other forms, importantly calls into question a widespread view of Plato's development, according to which he changed his understanding of forms from being self-identical, pure ontological

unities to being essentially interrelated ontological entities (see e.g. Stenzel, 1917, Prauss, 1966; Moravcsik, 1973). The passage suggests that forms, while being self-identical, have communion with other forms in such a way that it may be difficult to see the unity and identity of each form; a form may, because it has communion with other forms, appear as many rather than as one. For readers of the *Protagoras* and the *Meno* and the complex analyses of virtues contained in these dialogues, this should be no surprise – justice, for instance, may appear as many things because it often comes to light together with moderation or courage (on this point, see Friedländer, 1960, p. 444, n. 35). We may also note that it is a related problem that faces the interlocutors in the middle part of the *Sophist*; regardless whether or not the communion characterizing the great kinds discussed in that section of the dialogue is of a peculiar sort when compared to the communion of other forms, the problem the interlocutors are faced with in the central part of the *Sophist* is first and foremost to decide what sameness, difference, being, and nonbeing are, precisely because they are easy to confuse with each other in consequence of their communion with each other.

Building on his claim about forms, Socrates next explains that he divides (*diairein*; 476a10) philosophers from lovers of sights on the basis of his distinction between *eidê*, actions, and bodily entities (476a10-b2). The distinction between philosophers and lovers of sight may therefore be regarded as a division that itself depends on a division in accordance with kinds, namely the two kinds a) forms and b) actions and bodily things (see Friedländer, 1960, p. 97; for the point that a) and b) are kinds of things that are, see *Phd*. 79a6). Only philosophers are able to approach and see forms such as the beautiful itself, Socrates suggests, in contrast to the lovers of sights who appreciate only the many beautiful things (*R*. 476b4-10). The latter, because they do not recognize (*nomizein*) the beautiful itself and are unable to follow, should someone lead them toward the cognition (*gnôsis*) of it, live as if in a dream, since dreaming consists in believing that a likeness of something is the thing itself that it is like, not a likeness of it (476c1-5). The philosopher, in contrast, lives fully awake because he or she believes that there is something beautiful itself and is able to catch sight of it as well as of what participates in it (*ta ekeinou metechonta*), and "neither supposes the participants to be it nor it the participants" (476c7-d3).

The "waking life" of philosophy, we see, thus depends on the ability to distinguish a form from what participates in it and to see both clearly. It depends on a kind of double-vision that, while distinguishing form and participating entities, keeps both in clear sight and does not confuse one with the other. Moreover, since Socrates has just suggested that a form may have communion not only with actions and bodies but also with other forms, we may infer that the expression "what participates in it" (*ta ekeinou metechonata*) might refer both to actions or bodies, and to other forms. Relating this to our earlier discussion, we may then say that it is because the philosopher (or dialectician) is able to inspect human beings in accordance with *eidê*, and is able to divide these *eidê* correctly without confusing one with the other, that they are able to see human beings for what they are and avoid judging, like sleepwalkers, that men and women, since they have different natures in accordance with one understanding of nature, are naturally suited to perform different tasks in accordance with another.

If this inference is correct, the division that separates philosopher from sight-lover itself depends on a twofold ontological division, first a division that separates forms from what is only in so far as it participates in forms, then a division of forms the aim of which is to gain a clear view of them, both in their unique individuality and in their interconnection. Again, we see, there is a clear connection between the description of the philosopher in the *Republic* and the description of the dialectician found in for instance the *Sophist*–for according to the latter, the dialectician is the one who is able to divide forms "without thinking either that the same form is different or, when it is different, that it is the same" (253d1-3).

A critical reader might object, however, that a single reference to "communion" as regards forms is a far cry from the detailed analysis we find of the communion of forms in supposedly later dialogues, and that it is far from clear that the ability to divide forms is of real significance to the argument of the *Republic*. Some brief considerations of a couple of passages from books VI and VII may provide a basis for a preliminary answer to such an objection, an answer that may also serve as a conclusion to the present article.

In regard to the communion of forms, we may note, first, that Socrates at 500c3-5 describes the objects contemplated by the philosopher as "things that are set in a regular arrangement [*tetagmena atta*] and are always in the same condition–things that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it at one another's hands, but are all in proportion [*kosmôi de panta kai kata logon echonta*]" (translation by Bloom, slightly modified). That the forms are here described as being set in arrangement and to be ordered proportionally seems to reflect the earlier claim that forms commune with each other, as does the claim that they do not act unjustly toward each other–a claim that may sound strange to a modern reader who thinks of forms as concepts. We find the same picture emerging in the passage 531c9-d1 where Socrates describes the inquiry (*methodos*) into all things, which is what the philosopher or the philosopher-as-ruler should be engaged in, as arriving at the community and relationship of these things and as drawing "conclusions as to how they are akin to one another" (translation by Bloom). The knowledge of the philosopher or the philosopher-as-ruler is not simply aimed at forms, but at the forms in their interconnection.

In asking what relevance the ability to see the way forms are connected has for the philosopher rulers, we may note that, when Socrates is confronted with the accusation that they would be doing injustice to the philosophers if they were to force them back into society, Socrates claims that they will be able to see "ten thousand times better" than the people dwelling in the cave (520c3-4); perhaps this ability depends on the ability to see things in due proportion. Put differently, we may suppose that the ability to see each form clearly for what it is, and to see how particular things, actions, and other forms may have communion with that form, is important not just for understanding the forms but also for understanding the sensible world we inhabit in all its complexity. To live life fully awake, we must be able to see universal types or kinds as well as particulars, and to understand how the two kinds of entities are related to, and differ from, each other. If we are not, we live the lives of sleepwalkers. And for those human beings who happen to be rulers of political communities, living such a life is not just a personal disaster – it is a disaster for the community as a whole.

Bibliography

Adam, J. (1902). *The Republic of Plato, vol. 1: Books I-V*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Burnyeat, M. F. (1992). Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability of Plato's Ideally Just City. In: Hopkins, J. and Savile, A (eds.). *Psychoanalysis, Mind, and Art*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 175-87

EL Murr, D. (2020). Eristic, Antilogy, and the Equal Disposition of Men and Women (Plato, *Reps*. 5.453b-454c). *The Classical Quarterly* 70, issue 1, p. 85–100.

Ferrari, G. R. F. (2013). Plato's Writerly Utopianism. In: Brisson, L., Notomi, N., (eds.). *Dialogues on Plato's* Politeia (Republic), Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, p. 131-140.

Friedländer, P. (1960). *Platon* 3, 2nd ed. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.

Hamlyn, W. D. (1955). The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato's Logic. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 5, 21, p. 289-302.

Ionescu, C. (2012). Recollection and the Method of Collection and Division in the *Phaedrus*. *Journal of Philosophical Research* 37, p. 1-24

Ionescu, C. (2013). Dialectic in Plato's *Sophist*: Division and the Communion of Kinds. *Arethusa* 46, p. 41–64.

Ionescu, C. (2019). *On the Good Life: Thinking through the Intermediaries in Plato's Philebus*. Albany, State University of New York Press.

Kerferd, G. B. (1981). *The Sophist Movement*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kosman, A. (2007). Justice and Virtue: Inquiry into Proper Difference. In: Ferrari, G. R. F (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 116-137.

Larsen, J. K. (2010). Dialectic of eros and myth of the soul in Plato's *Phaedrus*. *Symbolae Oslosenses* 84, p. 73-89.

Larsen, J. K. (2020a). What are collections and divisions good for? A reconsideration of Plato's *Phaedrus*. *Ancient Philosophy* 41, issue 1, p. 107-133.

Larsen, J. K. (2020b). Differentiating philosopher from statesman according to work and worth. *Polis* 37, issue 3, p. 550-566.

Lukas, F. (1888). *Die Methode der Eintheilung bei Platon*. Halle-Saale, C. M. F. Pfeffer.

Muniz, F. & Rudebusch, G (2018). Dividing Plato's Kinds. *Phronesis* 63, issue 4, p. 392-407.

McCabe, M. M. (2015). Is Dialectic as Dialectic Does. In: *Platonic Conversations*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 100-124.

McCoy, M. (2008). *Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Moravcsik, J. (1973). Plato's Method of Division. In Moravcsik, J. (ed.). *Patterns in Plato's Thought*. Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, p. 158-80.

Nehamas, A. (1990). Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato's Demarcation of Philosophy from Sophistry. *History of Philosophy* Quarterly, vol. 7.1, p. 3-16.

Notomi, N. (1999). *The Unity of Plato's Sophist*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Prauss, G. (1966). *Platon und der logische Eleatismus*. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.

Robinson, R. (1941). Review of Julius Stenzel's Plato's Method of Dialectic. *The Philosophical Review*, 50, issue 5, p. 542-544

Robinson, R. (1953). *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*. 2nd ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Rodriguez, E. (2019). More than a Reductio: Plato's Method in the *Parmenides* and the *Lysis*. *Études Platoniciennes* 15.

Shorey, P. (1933). *What Plato Said*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Sprague, R. K. (1962). *Plato's Use of Fallacy*, New York, Barnes & Noble.

Stenzel, J. (1917). *Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles – Arete und Diairesis*. Breslau, Trewendt & Granier.

Weiss, R. (2000). When Winning Is Everything: Socratic Elenchus and Euthydemian Eristic. In: Brisson, L. and Robinson T. M. (eds.). *Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides*. Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, p. 68-75.

Weiss, R. (2007). Thirst As Desire for Good. In: Bobonich, Chr. and Destrée, P (eds.). *Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus*. Leiden, Brill, Philosophia Antiqua Series, p. 87-100.

Notes

[1] I would like to thank Hayden Ausland, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Vasilis Politis, and Roslyn Weiss who all read and commented on earlier versions of the article. The article benefited from fruitful discussions at the *Amercian Philosophical Assiosiaten* meeting in Philadelphia in January 2020 and at the *Bergen Ancient Philosophy Society* meeting in May 2020.

[2] The fact that the passages discussed in this article contain examples of division has not gone entirely unnoticed, see e.g. Friedländer, 1960, p. 95-96, Hamlyn, 1955, p. 289, and McCabe, 2015, p. 101. To my knowledge, however, Socrates' claim in 454a1-8 that correctly performed divisions help set dialectic apart from eristic has not been discussed in any detail by critics to date. G. B. Kerferd correctly states that antilogic, as discussed in the passage 454a1-8, is set apart from dialectic by the fact that it "lacks … the power to discuss on the basis of Division of things by Kinds" (Kerferd, 1981, p. 63-64), but he does not pursue the question what Socrates means by division, while A. Nehamas briefly touches on the passage and points out that dialectic, in contrast to mere verbal distinctions, "aims at the discovery of the real nature of things" (Nehamas, 1990, p. 11), but he does not discuss why the "discovery" of such natures should depend on division. Both Lukas (1888, p. 10) and Adam (1902, note to 454a5) connect the passage with the so-called method of division but they do not offer any detailed interpretation of it. El Murr (2020, p. 89-90) remarks briefly on the technical terminology of the passage but does not discuss division in any detail.

[3] What entities the procedure of division is meant to be employed on – forms, particulars, general concepts – is a matter of controversy. For discussion, see Moravcsik 1973; Cohen 1973; and Muniz and Rudebusch 2018. For the view that division can be employed on various entities, and, in particular, on Forms as well as on participating phenomena, see Ionescu 2012; 2013; 2019, p. 1-30. While I do not seek to settle the question what ontological status we should accord the *eidê* discussed in 454a1-8, the reading I defend rules out that we are dividing "particulars"; what division aims at is to inspect particular entities by dividing *eidê* relevant for that inspection.

[4] I thank Roslyn Weiss and Vasilis Politis for impressing this point on me, the full significance of which I had not realized in Larsen 2020a.

[5] Many translators seem to presuppose that *to legomenon* is the object of *diairoumenoi*, supplying an "it" after "dividing"; I thank Roslyn Weiss for stressing to me the importance of the fact that it is not the target of the inquiry that is divided but rather the broader context in which it is located.

[6] See also *Theaetetus* 146b3-4 where Theodorus states that he is unaccustomed to Socrates' *dialektos*, implying that it is Socrates' way of conducting investigations through questions and answers that he finds difficult to follow, that is, that he is unaccustomed to following dialectical investigations

[7] Kerferd (1980) famously argued that Plato distinguished between *etistikê* and *antilogikê* and regarded the former in purely negative terms and the latter as a possible precursor to dialectic; as El Murr (2020) correctly points out, however, the present passage suggests that *etistikê* and *antilogikê* are on a par.

[8] This suggestion seems partly corroborated by Socrates' later claim that the young are not corrupted by the sophists, since the sophists merely follow the opinions of the many about things praiseworthy and not (see 492a5-493c8); such opinions, one may argue, articulate the understanding of right and wrong encapsulated in everyday speech and the names we employ for things but do not thereby necessarily articulate correct divisions of reality that would allow us to see each thing for what it is.

[9] Concerning this passage, J. Stenzel claims that "ein Blick auf den Zusammenhang zeigt, daß von dem Sinne der späteren Dialektik auch nicht im entferntesten die Rede ist" (Stenzel, 1917, p. 49); for, Stenzel claims, "einer so bewußten Theorie" as the one we find in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* must be motivated by considerations quite different from those that Plato is concerned with in the *Republic* (1917, p. 50). This view also explains Stenzel's cavalier denial that the passage 476a5-476d2 from the *Republic* discussed below contains any reference to *koinônia* in the sense discussed in the central part of the *Sophist* (1917, p. 50). Notwithstanding the influence of this view on much later scholarship–one may compare Stenzel's claim with a related claim advanced by J. Moravcsik (1973, p. 158-159)–, this appears to be special pleading. Stenzel presupposes that the terms *diairesis* and *koinônia* mean something significantly different in the *Sophist* from what they mean in the *Republic* because they, on Stenzel's view, are introduced in this supposedly later dialogue as part of a solution to problems identified in the *Parmenides* that, again on Stenzel's view, marred the theory of ideas as expressed in for instance the *Republic*. In other words, if Plato already knew that Forms could take part in one another and that dividing them correctly was important, the whole point of the critique found in the *Parmenides* and the solution presented to that critique in the *Sophist,* as read by Stenzel, would be pointless (see Stenzel, 1917, p. 50). But this argument already seems to presuppose the view of Plato's development that Stenzel is arguing for. Worth noting is also that Stenzel presupposes a specific view of division in the later dialogues, according to which it constitutes a new method for providing essential definitions (the *logos ousias*,

see Stenzel 1917, p. 47), a method that points in the direction of Aristotle's later work on definitions. There is a clear parallel to present-day work on the *Sophist*. For critical discussion of Stenzel's view of the passages from the *Republic*, see Friedländer 1960, p. 444, n. 35. See also Hamlyn 1955, p. 289. For a critical discussion of the view that division in the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman* is meant to provide essential definitions, see Larsen 2020a and 2020b.

10 I thank Roslyn Weiss for pointing out these parallels to me.

11 For further discussion of the way *physis* is used in Socrates' argument, see Burnyeat, 1992, p. 183-185 and Ferrari, 2013, p. 188-190; Ferrari points out, to my mind correctly, that Socrates by *physis* appeals to "the particular talents… of particular women" (Ferrari, 2013, p. 189, n. 1), not to something like the nature of women or to human nature in itself.

12 A. Kosman claims that Socrates here "mounts a notorious argument for the equal access of women to the role of the guardian by means of the distressing premise that since women are inferior to men in *every* respect, there can be no significant difference between the two of them." (Kosman, 2007, p. 133; emphasis in the original). While essentially correct, it is important to note that Socrates uses this point not so much to emphasize that women are *inferior* to men in all respects, but rather to prepare for a conclusion to be drawn on the basis that they are inferior to men in *all* respects. In other words, the main point of Socrates' argument is that there are no specific tasks in which men excel as men or women as women, not that women are inferior to men; note also Glaucon's modification of the claim at 455d4-5.

13 See Adam who states that *εἴδη* in the expression *κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι* "is not of course 'the ideas': but 'species', 'kinds'" (Adam, 1902, note to *Resp.* 454a4); he appears to justify this claim by referring, precisely, to the *Statesman* 285a and the *Sophist* 253d. Presumably he assumes that in these supposedly later dialogues, the expressions *εἴδη* and *γένη* no longer refer to "the ideas" and that the similarity between Socrates' expression here and the expressions made by the Eleatic visitor justifies the claim that *εἴδη* in the current passage cannot refer to "ideas". My point is not that what is divided in the supposedly later dialogues are not "the ideas", simply that there are no good reasons to claim that what is divided in the *Republic* has a radically different ontological status from what is divided in supposedly later dialogues commonly seen as employing the so-called method of division. Adam helpfully points out that the passage we are considering has a parallel in Xenophon's description of Socrates' art of conversation, see *Memorabilia* IV 5.12.

Myth and Truth in *Republic* 2-3

Rasmus Sevelsted
University of Cambridge
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0716-0096

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that myth in Kallipolis is used to communicate philosophical truths, rather than distribute politically motivated falsehoods. It first considers the function of myth in the ideal artistic culture of Kallipolis (I), and the philosophical theology that informs it (II). On this basis, it is argued that the discussion of medicinal falsehoods at 382a-d is more focused on the truth-content of myth than usually assumed (III). The final section (IV) explores the connection between myth in books 2-3 and Plato's philosophical use of myth.
Keywords: Republic*, poetry, myth, truth, falsehood, fiction.*

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_9

INTRODUCTION

It is usually assumed that the myths told by the rulers to the citizens in Kallipolis serve a political purpose which differs strongly from the purpose of Plato's philosophical myths.[1] While the first are usually taken to be educational myths that are intended to exercise social control, the philosophical myths are closely tied to argumentative analysis (thus, e.g. Morgan, 2000, p. 162). The central discussion of the function of mythology in Kallipolis is found in book 2 where Socrates describes the city's myths as useful 'medicinal' falsehoods told by the rulers to their citizens (cf. 382c10), a passage which is almost universally taken as evidence of the repressive and authoritarian nature of Plato's community.[2]

However, the discussion in books 2 and 3 is from the outset focused on the connection between myth and truth (377a); and the aim of the poetic culture, of which myth is constitutive, is to provide correct and truthful representations of the good and the beautiful. This article interprets the discussion of myth and truth, firstly, in the context of this ideal artistic culture in Kallipolis and, secondly, in light of the philosophical theology that informs it. On this basis, I suggest a new interpretation of the discussion of medicinal falsehoods at 382, according to which the aim of the passage is to show how true ethical belief, not falsehood, can be conveyed through fiction. On this picture, the opposition between political and philosophical myths disappears.

1. TRUTH IN *MYTHOS*

On the traditional view, Socrates' emphasis on the effect of myth as a vehicle to inculcate merely useful and not necessarily true beliefs in the young guards contrasts with his focus on truth elsewhere.[3] However, when myth is first introduced, Socrates is mainly concerned with its ability to convey the truth. In the following, I attempt to clarify the connection between truth and myth in this part of the discussion, leaving the discussion of medicinal falsehoods to section 3 below.

Myth is introduced at the very beginning of the discussion of education as the key constituent of *mousike* (376e8), where *mythos* is contrasted with *logos* as inherently false form of discourse. However, this dichotomy is immediately softened, as Socrates claims that there is also truth in myth:

> 'Do you count *logoi* as part of *mousike*, or not?' – 'Yes, I do.'– 'And are *logoi* of two kinds –one true, the other false?' (Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον) – 'Yes.' – 'Should we educate them in both, starting with the false?' – 'I don't understand what you mean,' he said. – 'You mean you don't understand that we start off by telling children stories? These, I take it, are broadly speaking false, though there is some truth in them (πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ).[4]

As argued by Robert Fowler, the immediate definition of *mythos* as false *logos* suggests that the *logos-mythos* distinction invoked here was taken to correspond to true and false discourse prior to Plato (Fowler 2011, p. 49-50). This strong dichotomy is carefully modified in this passage; myths, despite being false, also contain truth. Stories, or fictions,[5] do not communicate truth in the way *logos* does, but do nonetheless contain truth. It is the commitment to truth in fiction which thus seems

to be the particular Platonic contribution to the discussion (Fowler 2011, p. 63-65).

The idea of truth in myth is then immediately connected to the creation of beliefs, *doxai*, which form the soul (377a11-b9). Socrates speaks of forming the souls with stories that are beautiful or fine (καλόν, 377c2; cf. καλῶς d8; e7), suggesting that the myths must be composed beautifully in order to induce virtue (ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν, 378e3-4). It is often assumed that this move marks a shift in the discussion from focusing on truth to focusing on usefulness (e.g. Woolf, 2009, p. 26; Heath, 2013, p. 19; Wardy, 2013, p. 125). But the assumption that truth and usefulness are mutually exclusive, which this view implies, is not necessarily warranted by the text.

Thus, when Socrates goes on to rebuke Hesiod and Homer for not telling their stories beautifully, his claim is based on the view that their depictions are in fact false. This is stated in a brief theological argument: God is good (379b1), only the cause of good (379b3-c7; 380c9-10), beneficial (379b11), perfect and therefore unchangeable (380d1-381c8) and must be represented as such by the poets. The argument effectively establishes gods as standards of perfection, goodness and beauty (cf. ἀρετή; κάλλος, 381c2; κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος, 381c6-7).[6] On this view, the poets' attributions of flaws and imperfections to the divine, in stories or images, amount to falsehoods. To represent gods and heroes "as they are" (οἷοί εἰσιν, 377c; οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, 379a7-9), is to represent them as entirely virtuous and beautiful. The critique of the poets for failing to obtain verisimilitude (cf. ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια, 377e2; ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι, 388c3) is a critique for misrepresenting gods and heroes, that is, to represent them as imperfect and flawed.[7] Traditional stories with evil and disorderly gods are therefore ugly, "not beautifully told falsehoods" (cf. μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται, 377d8; ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, 377e7). These stories are both ugly and untrue.

By the same token, what is scandalous about the depiction of Achilles in the *Iliad* is the implicit claim that Achilles is godlike and thus good, and that his actions are therefore admirable (387d11-e2; 388e4-6). Poets should either abstain from telling such stories, or they should not attribute the actions to divine heroes who are (by definition) good (391c8-e2). The critique of Homer's representation of Achilles is thus not grounded in a notion of factual history but in notions of divine goodness and virtue.[8] This view is famously confirmed in book 10 where tragedy is targeted for staging flawed heroes, which according to Socrates will lead to a flawed conception of the good (6064e1-4; 605c9-606b8).[9]

On this view, the demand for beautifully told stories corresponds to the initial demand for myths to contain truth, because heroes and gods are taken to be good and beautiful by definition. There is thus no opposition between the true and the morally beneficial. Poets are allowed to invent stories, and thus to 'lie', as long as they represent gods and heroes truthfully. This hierarchy of truths, where ethical truths are valued over contingent ones, corresponds to effects on the psyche of the recipient. The beliefs that shape the souls are not beliefs about specific facts or information, but moral values which gods and heroes exemplify. The inner truths of the stories in the city correspond to these beliefs.

The metaphor repeatedly used of the ethical beliefs that the stories inculcate, is that of a mould, *tupos*, which forms the soul. These *tupoi* are the general ethical and theological beliefs defined by the law-makers and contained in the stories and thus impressed on

the soul through poetry (377b2; c9; 379a2,5; 380c7; 383a2; 383c1; 387c9; 396b6; e1-9; 379c9; 398b3; d5; 412b2). The metaphor shows that the educational process is thought to internalise a set of concretely defined ethical and theological beliefs,[10] a view confirmed in a number of passages where Socrates considers the effect of the education (377b6; 378e1; 380c-d; 398b; 405b; 424d-425b). Finally, the effect of this poetic training is that the citizens themselves will become virtuous and godlike (θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε, 383c3-5).

There is thus no contradiction between the initial focus on ethical truth in fiction and the subsequent focus on the effect on the young. Although Socrates changes his focus to the *effect* of storytelling in the course of the discussion, the argument assumes a continuity between the 'inner' truth of the stories, their 'beauty', and their effect on the young souls. And the crucial truth in myths is the implicit statements about the nature of the divine, and, consequently, beauty, goodness and the rest of virtue. From this perspective, at least, the initial distinction between inner, ethical, truth and falsehood (i.e. fiction) can be observed throughout the discussion. Thus, if the main goal of the early education is to instil *correct* belief, and correct belief is taken to be useful, then truth remains central to the argument.

2. POETIC IDEALISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The suggestion that the early education aims to instil true ethical belief is not new; it has been argued thoroughly by e.g. Terence Irwin (1995, p. 230-236) and Christopher Gill (1996, p. 266-275) who focus on the relationship between the two stages in the philosopher's training. On this view, correct belief instilled during childhood corresponds to the philosopher's stable theoretical knowledge of the Forms.

This connection between philosophical insight and the ethical beliefs transmitted through poetry is recognised retrospectively in the dialogue. The philosophers will create and uphold the poetic culture; this, in fact, is their main task as lawgivers, precisely because ethical beliefs are transmitted to the citizens through poetry (423d8-424e4, cf. also 405a6-b3; 410a7-9). Book 6 makes it clear that these laws are created as an imitation of the Forms (500d7-9).[11] The Forms that are in nature "just, beautiful, self-disciplined, and everything of that sort" (φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον, 501b1-3), are thus the direct model for what they put into the citizens. This is how the philosophers create "human characters as pleasing to god as human characters can be" (501c1-3, cf. 540a9-b1). That the philosophers use the Forms as models for the poetic culture suggests that the poetic education is isomorphic with the philosophical one, conveying the same values on a lower onto-epistemic level, as argued by Jonathan Lear (Lear 1992, p. 191-2).[12] The beliefs transmitted through poetry and myth are true because it made in imitation of the Forms.

Although the metaphysical roots of the education are only made clear in the middle books, the discussion of poetry is in fact informed by philosophical theology from the very beginning. As discussed in section 1 above, the paradigms of poetry are grounded in the theological argument about the nature of god at 379b1-381c8. It has long been recognised by scholars of Plato's religion that this discussion of the divine anticipates the description of the Forms in the middle books. Like the Forms in book 6, the Kallipolean

gods are perfect, ordered, unchanging and unable to wrong or be wronged (381b-382c, cf. 500c3-7). The citizens will look to and imitate these mythological paradigms (396c; 398b) in order for themselves to become as godlike as possible (383c), which is a well-known Platonic philosophical ideal.[13] Scholars have therefore taken the gods in book 3 to be a mythologized version of metaphysical reality of book 6 and 7, not least because of the recurrent use of words signifying 'form' in his description of the unchangeable, good, god (ἰδέαις, 380d2; εἶδος, d3; ἰδέας, d6, e1).[14]

God's attributes are above all the moral qualities of beauty and goodness which in turn is linked to reductive ontological properties, changelessness and sameness, which, on this argument, is a consequence of perfection (ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει, 381b4). More strikingly, even, is the change from speaking about gods, to god in the singular, and then 'the good' (τὸ ἀγαθόν, 379b11; 15). This argument thus introduces philosophical theology, and one which is closely connected to Platonic metaphysics, as the basis of poetry. Divinity is taken to be good and beautiful by definition, which is how philosophically informed ideas of perfect goodness and beauty come to inform the entire discussion of poetry.[15]

The theological argument thus effectively makes a philosophical notion of perfection the non-negotiable framework on which the poetic culture is based. This framework, in turn, is evidence of a philosophically informed notion of the virtues embodied in poetry – one which links artistic idealism with metaphysical perfection. This does not mean that artists imitate the Forms, as has sometimes been suggested.[16] By nature, art is confined to representing or imitating instantiations and can therefore never reach beyond the realm of belief (cf. 522a) (cf. Irwin 1995, p. 229; Gill 1996, p. 268). But the connection between the poetic theology and the later metaphysical theory shows the commitment to philosophical beauty and virtue is present already in the earlier books.

This view is confirmed by the general focus on ideal and rather abstract examples of virtue, rather than specific information, especially in the last part of the discussion: Representations of courage and moderation (esp. 386a-387c and 389d9-e3; cf. 413d6-e5; 429c-430b, esp. 429e7-430a1), thoughtful men (396d1), a "good man who acts and speaks responsibly and wisely" (396c, cf. 398a-b), brave, self-controlled, god-fearing and free men (ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, 395c5). And by seeing and imitating beauty and goodness, the young guardian will in turn become beautiful and good, *kalos kagathos*, as well as balanced and thoughtful (396c6).

This demand for rather generic representations of virtue culminates in a demand for artistic idealism at the end of the discussion where Socrates reflects on the nature of the artistic culture as a whole:

> Is it only the poets we have to keep an eye on, then, compelling them to put the likeness of the good nature into their poems (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν), or else go and write poems somewhere else? Don't we have to keep an eye on the other craftsmen as well, and stop them putting what has the wrong nature, what is undisciplined, slavish or wanting in grace, into their representations of living things, or into buildings, or into any manufactured object? Anyone who finds this impossible is not to be allowed to be a craftsman in our city (401b).

Good character or, as Socrates goes on to phrase it, "the nature of what is beautiful and graceful" (τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, 401c4-5) are the abstract ideals with which the young will become familiar through the artistic culture. The emphasis is now expressly on representation and subsequent assimilation of the abstract qualities of beauty, truth and goodness. This ideal environment is said to lead the young into "affinity, friendship and harmony with beauty and *logos*" (401c-d). Socrates explains this effect at length in terms that make it clear that he has in mind a normative standard of beauty:

> Anyone with the right kind of education in this area will have the clearest perception of things which are unsatisfactory – things which are not beautifully made or which are not beautifully grown (ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο). Being quite rightly disgusted by them, he will praise what is beautiful and fine. Delighting in and receiving it into his soul, he will feed on them and so become beautiful and good (καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός). What is ugly, he will rightly condemn and hate, even before he is able to arrive at a definition (λόγον λαβεῖν). And when the definition does come (ἔλθοντος τοῦ λόγου), won't the person who has been brought up in this way recognize it because of its familiarity, and be particularly delighted with it? (401e-402a).

The emphasis here is on the display of ideal beauty and goodness as a standard of perfection. This standard is achieved through habituation, not theoretical understanding of beauty (*logos*). Socrates even suggests that being fully *mousikos* is to be able to recognize all the different virtues and reading them like letters, wherever they occur (402a7-c9). This immediate recognition of virtue and beauty in all instantiations is thus the goal of the poetic training, as opposed to an education which is concerned with certain facts.

This focus on perfection in the early discussion reveals Plato's underlying concern with normative truth, which was also evident in the discussion of gods and heroes. Precisely because myths are not concerned with mere fact, the truth relevant to myth is ethical. Indeed, the idealism that underlies the entire discussion, connects beauty and truth with a set of highly rational properties, highlighted by Socrates in the discussion. These are order (*kosmos*, 400a1; 400e3, cf. 486b6; 500d1-3), unity (380d; 381c; 381c; 382e; 404b), straightness or correctness, *orthotes* (cf. 403a7; 397b8; 401e1), concord (*symphonia,* 380c; 398c; 401d; 402d), rhythm and harmony or attunement (*harmonia,* 397b-400d; cf. 401d and 430e; 431e), and balance (*metriotes,* cf. 396c6; 399b9; 412a5). These properties are rational and normative and suggest that beauty and goodness are linked to truth because they display the conditions of functioning optimally.[17]

It is the consistent prioritising of ethical and theoretical truths over contingent ones which makes it necessary to create falsehoods in the form of fictions. In order to create ideal images, one has to look away from the actual, which, as Socrates later explains, is always inferior to what can be outlined in words (473a1-b3). That is, only through fiction can the ideal poetic culture achieve its aim. From the normative perspective of true beauty, many facts are ugly.[18]

3. 382A-D: TRUE FALSEHOODS AND MEDICINAL LIES

In light of this general concern with ethical and philosophical truth in the early education, we can, I believe, reach a new interpretation of the 'useful falsehoods' at 382a-c. Against the traditional interpretation of the passage, according to which it aims to give a justification of the use of lies or propaganda,[19] I propose an interpretation which shows that the passage is more concerned with the communication of truth than with the distribution of falsehoods. The passage follows the discussion of the nature of god at 379b-381c. Having stated that god is perfect, omniscient and consequently entirely truthful, Socrates goes on to discuss why and how falsehoods can be useful to humans, even if they are useless to gods. He contrasts two types of falsehood: a falsehood in the soul, also called pure falsehood, and a falsehood in speech which is not purely false. While the pure falsehood is hated by everyone, both gods and humans, the second, mixed falsehood, can be useful to humans.

The former is described as a falsehood "in the most important part of oneself" and "on the most important things" (τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν […] καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα, 382a). Socrates explains:

> 'What I mean is that the thing everyone wants above all to avoid is being deceived in his soul about the things that are (περὶ τὰ ὄντα), or finding that he has been deceived, and is now in ignorance (ἀμαθῆ εἶναι), that he holds and possesses the falsehood right there in his soul. That is the place where people most hate the falsehood.' – 'I quite agree,' he said. – 'As I was saying just now, this ignorance in the soul (ἄγνοια), the ignorance of the person who is deceived, can with absolute accuracy be called true falsehood. But the falsehood in speech (τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις) is a kind of imitation of the condition of the soul, an image that comes into being later, not a wholly unmixed falsehood (μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶν παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος). Don't you agree?' – 'I do.' – 'The real falsehood is hated not only by gods but also by men' (382ab1-c5).

Socrates goes on to explain that the mixed falsehood can be used as a medicine against false belief. Just like falsehoods can be useful when people are about to do something evil out of madness or ignorance (ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν), so myths can be useful because of our ignorance when we "make falsehood as much like the truth as possible" (382d4).

To sum up: the pure falsehood is entirely false belief residing in the soul and is hated and useless. The mixed falsehood is by contrast not entirely false, it is a falsehood in speech and can be useful for humans. And while the pure falsehood leads to false belief, the mixed falsehood can be used to avoid false belief, which is emphatically stated to be not just what Socrates wants but what *everyone* wants.

There are several difficulties in this passage, relating both to the medium or location of the two types of falsehood (speech and soul) and to their truth-status. Many scholars have understood the falsehood in speech to be a falsehood told by someone who knows the truth in order to deceive.[20] In this case, the spoken falsehood would be a form of misinformation or propagandistic falsehood often associated with Plato. But the interpretation

has the disadvantage that the falsehood in speech, spoken by someone who knows it to be false, would give rise to false belief in the receiver, thereby causing 'pure' falsehood in their soul, which is exactly what Socrates wants to avoid.

A different solution has been offered by a number of scholars who instead focus on the type of truth, Socrates is interested in here, namely ethical truth. True falsehood, as a state of deceit in the soul, is not simply about any given fact, but false belief (ἄγνοια) about reality (περὶ τὰ ὄντα) or the most important things (τὰ κυριώτατα).[21] This 'pure' or unmixed falsehood does not contain truth but is false through and through. Many traditional myths or 'ugly falsehoods' such as Hesiod's succession myth are, according to our passage, true falsehoods and give rise to true falsehood because they present as beautiful what is in fact ugly (this is in fact the definition of pure falsehood given at *Tht.* 189c).[22]

The mixed falsehood in speech differs from the pure or 'true' falsehood precisely in relation to these 'deeper' truths, as some scholars have argued.[23] The falsehood in speech is clearly thought to help the listener out of their false belief, which it can only do by conveying true ethical belief. It does not, then, give rise to falsehood in the soul, because it does not deceive at this deeper, ethical level. This kind of 'deep' deception pertains to ethical truths (*ta onta*), not just mere fact. The constitutional difference between the two types of falsehood in our passage, then, is the same as in the earlier part of the discussion, namely their ethical content. The designations 'pure' and 'mixed' falsehoods refer to their truth-content. While the pure falsehood is false through and through, the mixed falsehood is mixed by virtue of the truth it contains (thus not purely false).

The falsehood in speech does not, then, cause deception in the soul of the listener; on the contrary, by virtue of its ethical content, it helps the listener out of false belief, as Socrates explicitly claims it will (382c9-d1). When he goes on to connect this type of falsehood with the 'myths we were discussing just now' (μυθολογίαι, 382d1-2), he is thus in agreement with his earlier definition of myth as falsehood with truth in it (377a). If we follow this interpretation, there is no contradiction between this passage and the earlier discussion of myth. On the contrary, the passage maps perfectly onto that discussion: Most stories about gods and heroes told in Athens are on this picture true, or pure, falsehoods, because they are both fictional and ethically false. Myths in Kallipolis will by contrast consist only of mixed falsehoods, i.e. ideal and ethically truthful fictions.

However, even the scholars who accept (some version of) this interpretation, focus on the repression of contingent truth here and connect it to Plato's authoritarianism. This view is based on the rather obscure characterisation of the mixed falsehood in speech as "a kind of imitation of the condition of the soul, an image that comes into being later, not a wholly unmixed falsehood" (382b9-c1). Scholars have taken the 'condition of the soul' here to mean a preconceived false idea in the storyteller's mind.[24] In this case, what the falsehood imitates is a false condition of the soul, which again places the emphasis on the deceit, despite the focus on ethical truth.

A more straightforward rendering of *pathema* here, I suggest, is to take it to mean *epistemic condition* or *state* (rather than a false idea or concocted fiction), which is a normal usage of the word. By calling the falsehood in words an imitation of the state of the speaker's soul, Socrates thus simply refers

to the speaker's epistemic state: true, ethical belief or knowledge, which is what the fiction imitates and therefore conveys. Not only does this interpretation make better sense of the Greek (*pathema* is frequently used to express 'epistemic state' in Plato);[25] it also fits with Socrates' own view of the effect of the spoken falsehood: It is an image of the true belief in the storyteller's mind and therefore causes true belief in the soul of the recipient. The paradox is thus again the characteristic mixture of truth and falsehood: Despite being literally false, the ethical falsehood is an imitation of the truth in the storyteller's mind. It is by virtue of being an imitation of truth that this type of falsehood in speech is mixed (οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος), that is, mixed with truth.

The spoken falsehood is, in other words, a carefully created fiction which reflects ethical truth, and as such an image of the true belief in the speaker's soul, and it conveys this truth to the soul of the hearer. This interpretation fits the general focus on ethical truth and true belief in the discussion as a whole. Furthermore, it explains why falsehoods or fictions can be useful for humans (cf. 382c10). Finally, it explains why Socrates calls it a falsehood in words, as opposed to the 'pure' or 'true' falsehood in the soul. The difference is not about the medium – both types of falsehoods are by definition spoken.[26] But while the pure falsehood reflects false belief, a falsehood in speech is a falsehood in words *only*. Socrates points to the paradoxical nature storytelling to convey truth through fiction – without necessarily deceiving anyone.[27] We may recognize the fictional nature of a story and still believe it to be ethically truthful.

On this interpretation, the passage grounds the entire discussion of myth in a more overtly philosophical understanding of truth and falsehood, tying myth to questions of ontology and epistemology which are only explained later in the dialogue. The reference to reality, *ta onta*, as the truth to which myth refers, anticipates the discussion in book 5 where the nature of the Forms is described in these terms.[28]

These epistemological undertones are heard more distinctly when Socrates concludes by saying that myths are useful to humans despite being false insofar as we, when telling myths, assimilate them to the truth (cf. 382d3-4: ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν). To god, who is omniscient, such approximation is useless (382d6-e6). This distinction between human ignorance and divine omniscience anticipates the later division between knowledge and belief (cf. section 2 above). The true belief which the early education creates through its myth, is thus placed between ignorance (or false belief) and divine knowledge. It is precisely an approximation to the truth (382d3).

This interpretation links the discussion of myth much more closely to the metaphysical stance of the later books and thus grounds it in the context of the ideal artistic culture of Kallipolis. It also explains the otherwise incongruent references to a more familiar Socratic intellectualism in the earlier books, especially Socrates' strong aversion to deception in this passage (382a4-9; b1-4). The use of myth here, rather than excuse or justify the use of falsehood deception, is meant to emphasise a radical commitment to truth (so strong that even the stories we tell must be committed to truth), which brings our passage in line with a familiar Socratic aversion to falsehood (couched in similar language e.g. in the *Protagoras*).[29]

This commitment to truth is confirmed a couple of pages later when Socrates states that the guards could only change the true

beliefs inculcated through myth and poetry unwillingly, since no one would willingly give up true belief. He explains:

> Isn't being deceived about the truth something bad, and knowing the truth something good? And don't you think that having a belief which agrees with the way things are is knowing the truth (τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι)?' – 'You're right. When people lose a true belief, it is without their consent' (413a6-10).

Socrates thus takes the poetic education to have conveyed true belief to the young guardians, and true belief is here conceived in language similar to that used about true falsehood at 382b2. Socrates clearly thinks that his own poetic culture will have conveyed truth, not falsehood to his citizens.

It remains an open question if any actual deceit is involved in the mythology under discussion here.[30] Support for the traditional view that the passage advocates an ideologically and ethically motivated suppression of contingent truths can perhaps be found in the connection Socrates draws between myth and deliberate lies to mad people and enemies, where Socrates is clearly talking about lying and deceit. However, while Socrates claims that we can use falsehoods *against* (πρός, 382c8) our enemies and mad friends who are trying to do something bad out of 'madness or ignorance', his tone changes when he goes on to talk about myth:

> And in the myths we were discussing just now, as a result of our not knowing what the truth is concerning events long ago, do we make falsehood as much like the truth as possible, and in this way make it useful?' (382d1-4).

The use of myth, according to this passage, relates to *our own* ignorance. Our ignorance is the reason *we* assimilate the falsehood to the truth and thereby make it useful (ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν, 382d2-3). Myth is useful not for disguising or repressing the truth, but for conveying an image of the truth which is otherwise inaccessible. This suggests that deceit is not in fact a necessary condition for myth to be effective (as it presumably is in the case of a mad friend).

4. MYTH AND PERSUASION

In conclusion I briefly turn to Plato's philosophical myths. I suggest that the use of myth for philosophical purposes might give an indication of how storytelling can be used in Kallipolis to propagate and explain philosophical truths rather than simply indoctrinate the citizens. The philosophical myths are usually taken to be different from the 'political' myths told in Kallipolis. However, if my arguments above are along the right lines, the distinction between the politically useful and the philosophically true falls away. Indeed, the definition of myth as a form of falsehood with truth in it (377a) or an assimilation to the truth (382c-d) fits Plato's philosophical myths neatly (cf. Fowler 2011, p. 6). These myths describe higher aspects of reality, such as the soul in the afterlife (*Grg.* 523a-527e; *Phd.* 107c-115a; *R.* 613e-621d, cf. *Phdr.* 246a-249d) or the divine creation of the Cosmos (*Ti.*). They are usually clearly identified as myths (*Ti.* 29c7-d3; 68d2, *Phd.* 110b1; b4; 114d7; *Phdr.* 253c7; *R.* 621b8), in

contrast to an account, *logos*, but always purport to communicate some form of truth, even if they are considered less accurate than a full account.[31]

These stories are told in mythical language, presenting abstract reality through concrete, often anthropomorphic imagery. Famously, the cosmogonic account in the *Timaeus* is described as a 'likely myth' (εἰκὼς μῦθος, 29d2), in which the Demiurge, 'the father and creator' of the Cosmos, personifies an abstract principle of creation.[32] This anthropomorphically envisaged creator allows Timaeus to speak of abstract realities in intelligible, human terms (28c3-5), much like Socrates in the *Phaedrus* can speak mythically about the winged soul in the procession of the gods by giving an image of what soul resembles (ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν), when a full account of its nature is considered a superhuman task (246a). The myths thus provide a mediated picture of the higher levels of reality.[33]

This use of myth to describe higher levels of reality when a theoretical account of the matter is considered impossible or too difficult, parallels use of myth to reflect theoretical reality in Kallipolis. Indeed, Plato's myths often seem to provide exactly the form of revised mythology that Socrates demands in *Republic* 2-3. The eschatological myths with their emphasis on cosmic order and justice (e.g. *Grg.* 523a-527e; *Phd.* 109d-110d; *R.* 616b-617d) contradict and correct the Homeric and Hesiodic picture of divine disorder and injustice in Homer and Hesiod, in line with the theology outlined in *Republic* 2. In Timaeus' theogony, harmony and co-operation have replaced the Hesiodic narrative of strife, criticised at *Republic* 377e-378e. As Thomas Johansen has shown, the mythical narrative in the *Timaeus* can thus be seen as an attempt to rewrite myth in accordance with the guidelines in *Republic* 2-3 (Johansen 2004, p. 64-68).[34]

Socrates' own stance as a recipient of these myths makes his position parallel to that of the Kallipolean citizens rather than the fully enlightened state of the philosopher-kings. He frequently emphasises that these myths of divine order and justice must simply be *believed*, because the realities they describe cannot be fully accounted for (e.g. *R.* 621c3; *Phd.* 114d1-9). This is not, of course, contrary to argument, but the stance adopted here is presented as one of pious belief in cosmic justice and closely connected to Socrates' professed ignorance.

This structure is conspicuous in the *Republic* as well, where Socrates repeatedly frames his description of Kallipolis and its philosopher-king as a *mythos* of which he is both the creator and the recipient.[35] The mythical nature of Kallipolis is pointed out at the beginning of the *Timaeus*, where the city is referred to as described "in a myth, as it were" (ὡς ἐν μύθῳ, 26c9). This remark continues Socrates' language in the *Republic*, where the vision of Kallipolis and its philosopher-king is frequently described in mythical terms or explicitly compared to a *mythos* (e.g. 376d9; 501e), just as Socrates compares his own images of city and man to ideal artworks (e.g. 361d; 420c–d; 472d; 504d; 540c). The mythical character of the city is conspicuous: It is a city that exists in speech, but not on earth (592a), a model in words of an ideal city (παράδειγμα … λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως, 472d9). Socrates even models his city on Hesiod's Myth of the Races (e.g. 415a1-c8; 547a1),[36] and ventriloquizes the Muses, whom he invokes in Homeric fashion (545e), to describe the inevitable downfall of the city. [37]

Like the description of the city, the picture of the philosopher-king is presented as an ideal

vision, a portrait more beautiful than any existing person (472d). Several scholars have pointed out how the philosopher in the central books of the *Republic* represents a new type of hero or mythical character.[38] The philosopher is a highly idealised figure, a divine hero, whose ascent to the divine Forms is envisaged as a heroic quest, as Andrea Nightingale has shown (2004, p. 98; cf. p. 107-118). Socrates carefully points out his own inferiority in comparison with this idealised philosopher. He never claims to have the philosopher's insight, but merely describes – through images and allegories – how the philosopher ascents to the highest levels of reality.[39]

By framing his narrative as a form of myth and by calling attention to the ideal nature of the philosopher, Socrates creates a story whose function in the dialogue is very similar to that of the mythical heroes in the ideal city. Socrates' images of the just man and the just city, are created in order to have *models* or paradigms of justice (472b7-d10, cf. 368c8-369a4), which is essentially the function of the poetic heroes in Kallipolis, who personify abstract virtues (as discussed in section 2 above). His primary aim in the dialogue is protreptic rather than philosophical in the strict sense: to convince the two brothers that the just man – the philosopher – is also the happiest, and thus, that they should pursue a just life (cf. 365a4-c6).[40]

If Plato's own myths exemplify the type of myth that will be told in Kallipolis, we could see Socrates' philosophical use of myth in the dialogue as an example of how he imagines that such myths will be told in Kallipolis. Rather than instruments for indoctrination, the philosophically founded myths could be used by the philosopher-rulers to *explain* a philosophically informed world-view to their citizens. Instead of seeing the philosophical argumentation to constitute a major difference between the philosophical dialogue and the political community in Kallipolis, we could see the philosophical use of myth in combination with argument as an example of the way myth can be used to explain philosophical truths in the city. Iokovos Vasiliou has pointed out that the metaphysical arguments presented in *Republic* 5-7 are expressly aimed at *ordinary people* who are currently averse to philosophy (esp. 449c-451b; 476d-e; 499b-501a). Socrates' discussion of the philosophers, their training and grasp of the truth, is designed to convince people in general to adopt philosophy's view on the world and, consequently, to respect the true philosophers as uniquely qualified to rule (501d1-3). This optimism about the possibility to win people over by careful argumentation even outside Kallipolis, could suggest that Socrates does not think that the citizens of Kallipolis would be coaxed or indoctrinated into loving their rulers but will, like the imagined ordinary citizens in book 6 and 7, be persuaded with myths and arguments (Vasiliou 2008, p. 240-244, cf. also Kamtekar 2004, p. 160).[41]

Indeed, if the primary function of myth in Kallipolis is to convey *philosophical* truth and provide truly virtuous models for the citizen, it is difficult to see the need to indoctrinate them at all, or to assume that they need to have literal belief in their myths. All that is needed for myth to be useful is that the recipients adopt a pious stance of belief in their myths as important and philosophically true fictions, similar to Socrates' pious belief in his own myths. And given the division of labour in the city, and the loving bonds between rulers and ruled (e.g. 431d9-e2; 463b-464a; 590d6-7; cf. 442c-d), it seems likely that the citizens will be willing to trust that the myths are accurate

representations of such philosophical truths. Given the lack of detail about distribution of myth in Kallipolis, this can hardly be more than a suggestion; however, the parallels between the function of myth in the argument and myth in Kallipolis suggests, in contrast to the traditional view, that the myths may be envisioned as fictional stories whose purpose is to *explain* and disseminate philosophical truth to the citizens, rather than simply indoctrinate them.[42]

Bibliography

Annas, J. (1981). *An introduction to Plato's* Republic. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Annas, J. (1999). *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*. Ithaka, Conell University Press.

Baima, N. R. (2017). *Republic* 382A-D. On the dangers and benefits of Falsehood. *Classical Philology* 112, 1-19.

Benitez, R. (2016). Plato and the Secularisation of Greek Theology. In Eidinow, E.; Kindt, J.; Osborne, R. (eds.). *Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 301-316.

Blondell, R. (2002). *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Bordt, M. (2006). *Platons Theologie*. Munich, Karl Alber Verlag.

Brisson, L. (1998). *Plato the Myth-Maker*. Translated, edited, and with a preface by Gerard Naddaff. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Broadie, S. (2014). *Nature and Divinity in Plato's* Timaeus. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Burnyeat, M. F. (2009). Eikōs muthos. In: Partenie, C. (ed.). *Plato's Myths*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 167-186.

Collobert, C.; Destrée, P.; Gonzalez, F. J. (eds.) (2012). *Plato and Myth. Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths*. Leiden, Brill.

Dodds, E. R. (1951). *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley, The University of California University Press.

Ferrari, G. R. F. (1989). Plato and Poetry. In; Kennedy, G. A. (ed.). *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Vol. 1: Classical Criticism*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 92–148.

Ferrari, G. R. F.; Griffith, T. (2000). *Plato. The Republic*. Edited G. R. F. Ferrari, translated by Tom Griffith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ferrari, G. R. F. (2003). *City and Soul in Plato's* Republic. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Ferrari, G. R. F. (2012). The Freedom of Platonic Myth. In: Collobert, C.; Destrée, P.; Gonzalez, F. J. (eds.). *Plato and Myth. Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths*. Leiden, Brill, p. 67-86.

Ford, A. (2002). *The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Fowler, R.L. (2011). *Mythos* and *logos*. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 131, p. 45-66.

Frutiger, P. (1930). *Les Mythes des Platon*. Paris, Alcan.

Gill, C. (1993). Plato on Falsehood – Not Fiction. In: Gill, C.; Wiseman T. P. (eds.). *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter, University of Exeter Press, p. 38–87.

Gill, C. 1996. *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Gosling, J. C. B. (1973). *Plato*. London, Routledge.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1975). *A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume IV Plato, the Man and His Dialogues: Earlier Period*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Halliwell, S. (1993). *Plato. Republic V*. Oxford, Aris & Phillips.

Halliwell, S. (2002). *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Halliwell, S. (2015). Fiction. In: Destrée, P.; Murray, p. *A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics*. Malden / Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, p. 341-353.

Harte, V. (2013). Plato's Politics of Ignorance. In: Harte , V.; Lane, M. (eds.). *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 139-154.

Heath, M. (2013). *Ancient Philosophical Poetics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Hobbs, A. (2000). *Plato and the Hero. Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Irwin, T. (1995). *Plato's Ethics*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Janaway, C. (1995). *Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Janka,M.; Schäfer, Ch. (eds.) (2002). *Platon als Mythologe. Neue Interpretationen zu den Mythen in Platons Dialogen*. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Johansen, T. (2004). Plato's Natural Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Kamtekar, R. (1998). Imperfect Virtue. *Ancient Philosophy* 18, p. 315-339.

Kamtekar, R. (2004). What's the Good of Agreeing? HOMONOIA in Platonic Politics. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26, p. 131-170.

Kamtekar, R. (2017). *Plato's Moral Psychology: Intellectualism, the Divided Soul, and the Desire for Good*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Keyt, D. (2006). Plato and the Ship of State. In: Santas, G. (ed.). *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's* Republic. Malden / Oxford, Wiley Blackwell. p. 189-213.

Lear, J. (1992). Inside and Outside the *Republic*. *Phronesis* 37, p. 184-215.

Lear, J. (2006). Allegory and Myth in Plato's *Republic*. In: Santas, G. (ed.). *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's* Republic. Malden / Oxford, Wiley Blackwell. p. 25-43.

Lear, G. R. (2006). Plato on Learning to Love Beauty. In: Santas, G. (ed.). *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's* Republic. Malden / Oxford, Wiley Blackwell. p. 104-124.

Lincoln, B. (1999). *Theorizing Myth. Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship*. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Long, A. A. (2009). Heraclitus on measure and the explicit emergence of rationality. In Frede, D.; Reis, B. (eds.). *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*. Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 87-110.

Long. A. (2017). The Ship of State and the Subordination of Socrates. In: Destrée, P.; Edmonds III, R. G. (eds.). *Plato and the Power of Images*. Leiden / Boston, Brill, p. 158-178.

McCabe, M. M. (1992). Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato. In: Barker, A.; Warner, M. (eds.). *The Language of the Cave*, Alberta, Edmonton, p. 47–67.

McPherran, M. (2006). The Gods and Piety of Plato's *Republic*. In: Santas, G. (ed.). *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's* Republic. Malden / Oxford, Wiley Blackwell. p. 84-103.

Mikalson, J. D. (2010). *Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy*. Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press.

Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1986). On Correcting the Poets. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4, p. 35-47.

Morgan, M. L. (1990). *Platonic Piety*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Morgan, K. A. (2000). *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Moss, J. (2005). Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29, p. 137-70-

Moss, J. (2007). What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad? In: Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 415–44.

Murray, P. (1996). *Plato on Poetry*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Murray (1999). What Is a Muthos for Plato? In: Buxton, R. (ed.). *From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought*. Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, p. 251-262.

Naddaff, R. (2002). *Exiling the Poets: The Production of Censorship in Plato's Republic*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Nettleship, R. L. (1901). *Lectures on the Republic of Plato,* 2nd edn. London, MacMillan.

Nightingale, A. (2004). *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2001). *The Fragility of Goodness*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

O'Connor, D. K. (2007). Rewriting the Poets in Plato's Characters. In: Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 55–89.

Partenie, C. (ed.) (2009). *Plato's Myths*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Patterson, R. (1985*). Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics*. Indianapolis, Hackett.

Pender, E. E. (2000*). Images of Persons Unseen. Plato's metaphors for the Gods and the Soul*. International Plato Studies Vol.11. Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag.

Petraki, Z. (2011). *The Poetics of Philosophical Language. Plato, Poets and Presocratics in the Republic*. Berlin / Boston, Walter de Gruyter.

Reeve, C. (1988). *Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's* Republic. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Rowe, C. (1999). Myth, History, and Dialectic in Plato's Republic and Timaeus-Critias. In: Buxton, R. (ed.). *From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought*. Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, p. 263-278.

Rowett, C. (2016). Why the Philosopher Kings Will Believe the Noble Lie. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 50, p. 67-100.

Rowett, C. (2018). *Knowledge and Truth in Plato*. Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press.

Rutherford, R. B. (1995). *The Art of Plato. Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation*. London, Duckworth.

Rutherford, R. B. (2002). Comments on Nightingale. In: Annas, J.; Rowe, C. (eds.*). New Perspectives on Plato, Ancient and Modern*. Washington, Centre for Hellenic Studies, p. 249-62.

Schofield, M. (2006). *Plato: Political Philosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Schofield, M. (2007). The Noble Lie. In: Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 165-201.

Schofield, M. (2009). Fraternité, inégalité, la parole de Dieu: Plato's authoritarian myth of political legitimation. In: Partenie, C. (ed.). *Plato's Myths*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 101-115.

Sedley, D. (1999). The Ideal of Godlikeness. In: Fine, G. (ed.). *Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*. Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, p. 309-328.

Sedley, D. (2007). *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Segal, Charles. (1978). "The myth was saved." Reflections on Homer and the Mythology of Plato's *Republic*. *Hermes* 106, p. 315–36.

Solmsen, F. (1942). *Plato's Theology*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Stewart, J. A. (1905). *The Myths of Plato*. London, Macmillan.

Tate, J. (1928). 'Imitation' in Plato's Republic. *The Classical Quarterly* 22, 1, p. 16-23.

Thaler, N. (2015). Plato on the Philosophical Benefits of Musical Education. *Phronesis* 60, 410-435.

van Noorden, H. (2015). (2015) *Playing Hesiod: The 'Myth of the Races' in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Vasiliou, I. (2008). *Aiming at Virtue in Plato*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Vasiliou, I. (2012). From the *Phaedo* to the *Republic*. Plato's tripartite soul and the possibility of non-philosophical virtue. In Barney, R;, Brennan, T; & Brittain, C. (eds.). Plato and the Divided Self. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 9-32.

Wardy, R. (2013). The Platonic Manufacture of Ideology, or How to Assemble Awkward Truth and Wholesome Falsehood. In: Harte, V.; Lane, M. (eds.). *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*. Cambridge, p. 119-138.

Woolf, R. (2009). Truth as a Value in Plato's *Republic*. *Phronesis* 54, p. 9-39.

Yunis, H. (2007). The Protreptic Rhetoric of the *Republic*. In: Ferrari, G. R. F. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 1-26.

Notes

[1] For the connection between philosophical images and myths, see e.g. McCabe, 1992; Murray, 1999. For the Allegory of the Cave as a myth, see especially Nightingale, 2004, p. 94-138. For the connection between allegory and myth, see Pender, 2000, p. 7.

[2] This view emphasises myth as a form of political propaganda; e.g. Annas, 1981, p. 90-6; Reeve, 1988, p. 208-13; Gill, 1993, p. 45-5; Janaway, 1995, p. 85-86; Murray, 1996, p. 150; Lincoln, 1999, p. 38-41; Ford, 2002, p. 220-224; Morgan, 2000, p. 162-3; Schofield, 2006, p. 287-288; 2007, p. 145-8; Woolf, 2009, p. 11-15; Harte, 2013, p. 146-149; Heath, 2013, p. 19; Wardy, 2013, p. 124-131. These political myths are usually treated in isolation from the philosophical myths. Thus, classical studies, such as Stewart, 1905; Frutiger, 1930, and Dodds, 1951, p. 207-224 focus solely on the philosophical use of myth, as do recent edited volumes; out of the contributions in Janka & Schäfer, 2002; Partenie, 2009; Collobert, Destrée & Gonzales, 2012, only one paper focuses on the political use of myth (Schofield, 2009). More comprehensive accounts can be found in Brisson, 1998; Morgan, 2000.

[3] E. g. Woolf, 2009. p. 26; Heath, 2013, p. 19; Wardy, 2013, p. 125. This view is connected to the widespread view of the early education as a training that aims to instil a notion of the honourable (*to kalon*) in the young guardians which is essentially different from the rational values of the philosophers and thus only superficially aligned with philosophical beauty, cf. Gosling, 1973, ch. 2; see also Annas, 1981,

p. 126-128; Reeve, 1988, p 36-37; 178-184; Kamtekar, 1998, p. 334-338; Hobbs, 2000, 8-31; G. R. Lear, 2006, p. 116-119; Moss, 2005, 155-6. Psychology lies outside the scope of this paper; see, however, Thaler, 2015 for a view of psychology which is fully compatible with the discussion of myth offered here.

4 All Translations are from Ferrari & Griffith, 2001, with moderations.

5 For the use of the term 'fiction' here, cf. Halliwell, 2015, p. 345-346; on the meaning of 'mythos' as fiction, cf. Fowler, 2011, p. 63; in an influential article Christopher Gill has argued that Plato does not have a concept of fiction in the *Republic* (Gill, 1993). Gill's central point is that Plato's emphasis on ethics in myth precludes him from valuing myth as fiction; my point below works to the contrary conclusion: It is Plato's ethical concerns that make fiction necessary in the city.

6 See e. g. Benitez, 2016, p. 308 for the meta-ethical reduction here.

7 This makes sense of the claim at 378a that even if the gods had done something wrong (which we later find out would be impossible), it should not be told to the wider public.

8 This goes against Gill, 1993, p. 46 who takes Socrates to be concerned with historical facts here. For the prominence of Achilles in these examples, see especially Hobbs, 2000, p. 199-209.

9 See Moss, 2007 an analysis of the moral inversion described in this passage.

10 Cf. Lear, 1992, p. 186-190 for the early education as a process of internalisation.

11 On the education of the guards as derived from the Forms cf. also Ferrari, 2003, p. 101-102.

12 Cf. also Thaler, 2015, p. 221-228.

13 For the ideal of godlikeness as a central philosophical ideal in Plato, see Sedley, 1999, and Annas, 1999, p. 52-71. In this way, divine rule is created in the auxiliaries as well as in the philosopher.

14 For the theological argument, see especially Solmsen, 1942, p. 72-73; for the similarity between the gods here and the Forms in book 6, cf. Annas, 1981, p. 217-241; Morgan, 1990, p. 115; Murray, 1996, p. 147; Bordt, 2006, p. 135-161; McPherran, 2006, p. 248-249 (cf. Mikalson, 2010, p. 213-214). The ideal and paradigmatic nature of the poetic representations is well discussed by Janaway, 1995, p. 90-91, cf. also Moravcsik, 1986, p. 40-41 and Nussbaum, 2001, p. 157-158 who criticizes this ideal of perfection. The philosophical implications of the passage, especially the close relation between truth and beauty here, has not to my knowledge been discussed.

15 This also implies, I believe, that the education is not about theological facts, as suggested by Gill, 1993, p. 46.

16 The idea of artists imitating the Forms directly is argued most vehemently by Tate, 1928, p. 20; but see Ferrari, 1989, p. 121-123 for a response. The image of the Form is its instantiation, as is clear from book 10 (595c8-598c4).

17 Cf. Long, 2009. p. 95, commenting on similar language in the *Gorgias*. For the truth of images, cf. also *Leg.* 667e-671a. For a theoretical discussion of this understanding of truth, see Patterson, 1985, p. 110-113, and now especially Rowett, 2018, p. 40-52.

18 It is in accordance with this principle that Socrates considers potential facts (i.e. quarrels between citizens) inadequate for poetic representation (378a; 380c).

19 For the view of this passage as a justification of propaganda, see e.g. Ferrari, 1989, p. 113-114; Gill, 1993, p. 45-55; Murray, 1996, p. 150; Schofield, 2007, p. 143-149.

20 This interpretation is preferred by, e.g. Naddaff, 2002, p. 35 & 143 nn. 84 & 85; Lear, 2006, p. 31; Schofield, 2007, p. 145; Woolf, 2009, p. 15; Wardy, 2013, p. 126. A more radical version of this interpretation has recently been suggested (Baima, 2017, p. 5); according to this version, the story told by someone who feigns false belief.

21 This is a fairly standard way of referring to metaphysical reality, and ethical truth.

22 In the *Theaetetus*, the expression 'true falsehood' is used of false judgment, explained as substitution of one of "the things that are" with another, as e.g. judging beautiful what is in fact ugly as an instance of "truly judging falsely" (τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ), thus designating the same confusion about ethical and metaphysical truths as I believe it does in the *Republic*.

23 Thus, e.g. Guthrie, 1975, p. 475-479; Reeve, 1988, p. 209-10; Gill, 1993, p. 52-54; Murray, 1996, p. 149; Murray, 1999, p. 253.

24 "An imitation of a previously conceived false idea", Nettleship, 1901, p. 91; cited in Reeve, 1988, p. 208-13; Gill, 1993, p. 45-55; Murray, 1996, p. 150.

25 The epistemic states on the divided line are referred to as four *pathemata* in the soul (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) at 511d7, where the word denotes the soul's being *affected* in a certain way. The widespread interpretation which takes *pathema* in our passage to refer to an idea or story made up in one's soul seems to stretch the Greek.

26 *Contra* Baima, 2017, 4.

27 I return to the theme of deceit below.

28 Before Plato, this was already used as a term for metaphysical reality, and it is the term used to denote it when the forms are introduced in Book 5 (without any further explanation of it). On the technical meaning of the term there, see Halliwell 1993, p. 215-216 *ad* 477a3; p. 217-218 *ad* 477c1.

29 Cf. *Prt*. 358c4-5: ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων;

30 E.g. Gill, 1993, p. 52-55; Murray, 1996, p. 150.

31 Thus, in the *Phdr.* the myth of the soul is called an exposition of what the soul resembles (ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν).

In the *Phd*. the myth is not "entirely true" (108d-e) but one should believe "this or something similar" (ἢ ταῦτ' […] ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα 114d). At *Grg.* 523a, Socrates insists on calling his *mythos* a *logos*, yet thereby seems to be insisting on the inherent truth of it rather than seriously questioning its status as myth, cf. Fowler 2011, p. 64 and Ferrari 2012, p. 67.

[32] See Sedley, 2007, p. 98-107 on the vexed question of the Demiurge and various interpretations of the principles or causes he may personify. On the use of the metaphors father, ruler and craftsman, see Pender, 2000, p. 100-110.

[33] For a full discussion of the myth, see Johansen, 2004, p. 60-64; Broadie, 2014, p. 29.

[34] For the myth as a correction of Hesiod's *Theogony*, see also Burnyeat, 2009, p. 168-169; Broadie, 2014, p. 41.

[35] For the city as a myth, see further Segal, 1978; McCabe, 1992; Rutherford, 1995, p. 208-227; Murray, 1999; Morgan, 2000, p. 201-210; Petraki, 2011, p. 109-243, cf. also Rutherford 2002. For the ways in which Plato appropriates mythical language, particularly in the discussion of the utopian nature of the city, see Halliwell, 1993, p. 199, and Petraki, 2011, p. 136-141.

[36] For the Hesiodic theme here, see esp. van Noorden, 2015, p. 106-142; cf. also O'Connor, 2007, p. 78-79; Schofield, 2009, p. 105-113.

[37] The combination of *mythos* and *logos* in the argument has suggested to some scholars that Socrates deliberately blurs the distinction between the two in order to question the hegemony of *logos* (e.g. Murray, 1999, p. 261; Rowe, 1999, p. 264-265; Partenie, 2009, p. 19-21; Collobert, Destrée & Gonzales, 2012, p. 1). However, Socrates insists on a clear theoretical distinction, claiming that myths and images are connected to an inferior epistemic position (and therefore useless for gods, cf. 382c and divine philosophers: 510b7-8, cf. 533), cf. Gill, 1996, p. 282-283; Morgan, 2000, p. 181.

[38] For further discussion of the philosopher as an idealized figure, see Nightingale, 2004, 98; Blondell, 2002, 225-6; other scholars have pointed out that the philosopher represents a new type of hero or mythical character: Hobbs, 2000, p. 235-240; Blondell, 2002, p. 229-245; O'Connor, 2007.

[39] For Socrates' epistemic inferiority and his use of myth and images, see Morgan, 2000, p. 181; Keyt, 2006, p. 198; 209; Vasiliou, 2012, p. 12; cf. also Long 2017, p. 158 for a discussion.

[40] For a discussion of the *Republic* as a protreptic dialogue, see Yunis, 2007. On the difference between the speakers in the dialogue and the ideal philosophers, see also Yunis, 2007, p. 15-24; Vasiliou, 2008, p. 234-246. Blondell, 2002, 98-122, points to the similarities between the two brothers in the dialogue and the musically trained guardians.

[41] I have not dealt with the Noble Falsehood (414b-415d) in this paper, as a full discussion would require a separate article. See, however, Lear, 2006, and Rowett, 2016, for interpretations of the Noble Falsehood which are fully compatible with the general view on myth discussed above. Rowett, especially, offers detailed arguments for her view that the Noble Falsehood is best understood as a preliminary version of the Allegory of the Cave, and that its tropes of childhood life as an underearthly, dream-like existence closely anticipate the philosophical worldview explained in the central books. On her view, the philosophers will believe the myth simply because it is (philosophically) true. Rowett's interpretation thus shows that the Noble Falsehood is, at its core, a philosophical myth. This shows, I believe, how the myth could be used in the city to disseminate philosophical ideas, in a way similar to the Allegory of the Cave in the dialogue itself.

[42] I am grateful to Gábor Betegh, David Bloch, G. R. F. Ferrari and David Sedley for discussion of the ideas in this article, and to the two anonymous reviewers for Plato Journal, for helpful suggestions.

The Place of Flawed Pleasures in a Good Life. A Discussion of Plato's *Philebus*

Jan Szaif
ORCID number: 0000-0002-7648-3577
University of California, Davis

ABSTRACT

The *Philebus* describes the "good" that enables human eudaimonia as a "mixture" in which cognitive states have to be combined with certain types of pleasure. This essay investigates how the various senses of falsehood that Plato distinguishes are applied to the question of the hedonic "ingredients" of the good. It argues that his theory allows for the inclusion of certain virtuous pleasures that are deficient with respect to truth: either qua "mixed pleasures" lacking in truth (genuineness) on account of the compresence of their opposite, pain, or because they are based on mistaken anticipations arising in the pursuit of virtuous and reasonable goals.

Keywords: Plato – *Philebus* – pleasure – good – falsehood – truth

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_10

The overall goal of Plato's *Philebus*, as a work on ethics, is to establish some common ground between the competing claims of hedonism and Socratic intellectualism, while upholding the primacy of intellectual virtues. To this end, the dialogue discusses which, if any, types of pleasure and of cognitive states can serve as "ingredients of the good," using this metaphor as a label for whatever can help to raise human life to its most favorable condition: *eudaimonia*. The dialogue's main thesis is that we can count not only all forms of cognition and skill among the contributing factors of the human good, but also certain pleasures, yet that they have to be ranked lower than the cognitive states. In the course of discussing the nature and value of pleasure, the dialogue develops a set of distinctions between various forms of falsehood, illusion, or lack of truth that can affect pleasure.

Why this focus on the alethic qualities of pleasure? When Socrates at 36c inserts the topic of truth and falsehood, illusion and real being, into his discussion of pleasure, it happens in a sudden and unprepared way. Yet book IX of the *Republic* already discussed the value of different kinds of pleasure, and one of the central ideas there was that certain very common pleasures are not true pleasures but a product of mere appearance (584a7-10, 584d1-585a5, 586b7-c5), while certain other pleasures are pure and real (584b). This idea was combined with the claim that the objects of pleasure can vary in degree of being or "truth", and that the pleasures that have the most real objects (i.e., the *forms*) are the truest pleasures (585b-e). The typical ancient audience of a dialogue as late and demanding as the *Philebus* was likely to be familiar with the *Republic* and its theory of the higher forms of pleasure. For the readers, this would be their primary point of reference when approaching the dialogue's long discussion of truth and falsity, reality and illusion in the domain of pleasure. The debates about pleasure in Plato's Academy also brought up the claim that pleasures, or at least the commonly pursued "vulgar" pleasures, are a deceptive and illusory phenomenon.[1] The *Philebus* is Plato's final statement on this question.

This dialogue does not simply repeat or expand the theory of pleasure in *Republic IX*. Rather, it seems to change or precisify its perspective in various important regards. My essay will focus on the *Philebus* exclusively, but with the aim of showing that its discussion of hedonic truth and falsehood provides a surprisingly differentiated picture that allows for the inclusion of certain false or untrue pleasures linked to virtuous activity among the ingredients of the good. Socrates, as the lead speaker, repeatedly emphasizes the difference between the *human* good and the kind of perfection attainable for divine beings. This enables him to acknowledge that the human good cannot be realized without certain less perfect components susceptible to falsehood or diminished truth. With respect to cognition or skill, the dialogue takes a very clear stance. The good life, as lived by humans, needs to rely also on imprecise and merely conjectural forms of skill or expertise that give room to diminished truth and falsehood. Its position is less easy to pin down with respect to certain imperfect forms of pleasure, such as pleasures that are mixed with pain. It has been a widely held view among commentators that the *Philebus* includes only the so-called "pure pleasures" among the ingredients of the human good; yet some scholars have argued that certain kinds of mixed pleasure too have a place among these ingredients, on account of their connection with virtuous activities.[2] This essay will offer a new argument in support of

this thesis. Additionally, I will also discuss whether the dialogue really, as generally assumed, advocates the claim that pleasures based on mistaken hopes are categorically excluded from the human good, irrespective of what may have warranted these hopes. This issue has relevance within the framework of virtue-ethical eudaimonism: If we grant, as we should, that uncertain but pleasant expectations about likely good outcomes of virtuous activity are an integral part of virtuous life, the question arises how to evaluate cases in which a reasonable and virtuously motivated anticipation later turns out to have been mistaken. Are these merely excusable accidents in an otherwise fine life, or valid ingredients of the hedonic component of the human good?

To provide a basis for my discussion, I need to begin with an outline of how the long central part of the dialogue maps the different senses or modes of hedonic falsehood and truth onto the various kinds of pleasure. This is the topic of section (1) of this essay, which has to be condensed and cannot provide full justification for all its assumptions. Section (2) will identify and discuss the "mixing rule" that guides the selection of the ingredients of the good in the segment on mixing (59d-64c). In (3), I will analyze the main argument of this segment and show why and how it endorses not only pure pleasures, but also mixed pleasures associated with health or virtue, although they are not fully genuine qua pleasures due to the compresence of pain. In section (4), I am going to discuss the general criteria for differentiating between good and bad pleasures as they can be extracted from the argument of this segment. I will argue that, based on the virtue criterion and certain other Platonic assumptions, the occasional mistaken hedonic anticipations that are bound to occur in the pursuit of virtuous and reasonable goals should also qualify for inclusion among the hedonic components of the good. The final section (5) will address certain text-based objections to this conclusion. The main task here is to show that the segment on mistaken anticipatory pleasures (36c-41a) does not, as commonly assumed, commit to the idea that groundedness in a false belief is, just by itself, a sufficient condition for the badness of a pleasure.

1

The theory of pleasure in the *Philebus* builds on an account of somatic pleasure as *felt restoration* or *felt replenishment* in the body reversing a process of "deterioration" or "emptying" (φθορά, κένωσις). In order to be felt, the somatic process has to cause a joint motion in the immaterial soul.[3] Since somatic pleasure typically sets out from a process of disintegration or emptying in the body felt as pain, it is pain-involving "mixed" pleasure.

While somatic pleasures are joint motions in the body and the soul, the pleasures that Plato calls "of the soul" are motions that take place only in the soul. Socrates discusses two types of psychic pleasure: first, anticipatory pleasures (which he describes primarily as anticipations in the soul of future somatic pleasures) and, second, pleasures of perception and intellectual grasping. Anticipatory pleasures are also typically mixed pleasures. According to 34c-36c, it is the painful feeling of some need that triggers the memory of a pleasant replenishment and thus gives rise to desire and, under putatively favorable circumstances, to a pleasant anticipation. The pleasures of the second class, by contrast, are naturally *pure*, i.e., naturally unmixed with pain. Plato analyzes them as forms of

felt replenishment taking place in the soul and correlating to a naturally *unfelt* lack in the soul (51b5, 51e7-52b3). The objects with which the soul becomes painlessly replenished are perceptual or intellectual contents; for instance, the representation of a pure color or, in the case of pleasant intellectual grasping, some "learnable" content (51b-d, 51e-52b). The natural purity of these pleasant "fillings" is due to the fact that the preceding reverse processes or states of deprivation–such as forgetting and ignorance–are *naturally* painless, unlike, for instance, the lack of nutrition in the body, which makes itself felt as pain.

The *Philebus* combines the description of various kinds of hedonic experience with a distinction of the several ways in which this experience can be linked to the terminology of truth and falsehood, broadly speaking. It is important to bear in mind that the Greek terms translated as "true" and "false" cover a rather wide range of related meanings and don't just function as *truth value* labels for propositions. The Greek word for "true" (ἀληθής) can also mean "genuine," "real," "non-deceptive," and the word for "false" (ψευδής) also "deceptive," "illusory," "delusive," "spurious," "fake," "specious," and the like. The charge that the *Philebus* confuses different senses of truth and falsehood[4] cannot be upheld for his discussion of pleasure, given the care with which the different ways for pleasure to be false are distinguished. The following are the four distinct kinds of hedonic falsity in the order in which they are discussed in the dialogue:

> 1 Representationally false/mistaken pleasure (**RepF**): an experience of pleasure that involves the imaginative representation of a non-obtaining state of affairs, based on a false belief (36c-41a).
>
> 2 Partially false/illusory appearance of pleasure (**FA-*part***): an experience of pleasure that is partly an illusion since the size of the hedonic motion appears larger or smaller than it is (41a-42c).
>
> 3 Wholly false/illusory appearance of pleasure (**FA-*whole***): a merely apparent experience of pleasure occurring when the person is, in fact, in a neutral state between pleasure and pain (42c-44a).
>
> 4 Untrue pleasure involving a mixing of opposites (**UTMix**): an experience of pleasure that lacks truth or genuineness due to the compresence of its opposite, pain (44d-50e).[5]

The first type of falsehood is introduced in connection with the analysis of anticipatory pleasure (προχαίρειν, 39D4, literally "pre-enjoying," "*Vorfreude*"), which is a hedonic experience grounded in a belief about a future enjoyable outcome.[6] The psychological mechanism that leads from such a belief to an experience of pleasure is described as involving imagination: Not yet the fact that one has a certain positive expectation, but the act of imagining the expected future pleasant situation is what creates an experience of anticipatory pleasure. Since this anticipation is not a case of mere day-dreaming but of someone's looking forward to an *expected*[7] outcome, the connection with a belief about a future state of affairs is essential. While the *Philebus* analyzes only the joys of hopeful anticipation, it mentions that beliefs about present or past states of affairs can also be a source of pleasures that involve mistaken representation (40d7-10, cf. 39c7-8). Beliefs are true or false, veridical or illusory, depending on whether or not they agree with what is the case (or was the case, or will be the case). The *Philebus* expands this notion of truth and falsehood by applying it

also to the acts of imagination that illustrate the beliefs (39b9-c6). I am speaking of *representational falsehood* (RepF) in order to have a term that is broad enough to cover both beliefs and imaginative representations. While this expanded notion of falsehood still seems quite intuitive, Socrates' argument in 38a-40e steers toward the much more controversial contention that this notion is applicable also to the pleasures experienced thanks to a belief-*cum*-imagination. The key move in this argument is difficult to reconstruct, but according to what I take to be the most plausible reconstruction, it is the act of joyful imagination of expected future pleasures that constitutes a pleasure of anticipation occurring in the present.[8] Since this mental act is an experience of pleasure and has a representational content representing some putative future state of affairs, a pleasure of this kind can legitimately be called true or false.[9]

The other three types of falsity or lack of truth relate to modes of what is loosely known as "ontological truth." Whereas true or false beliefs have a *propositional* content with a truth value ("semantic" truth or falsehood), the broad category of "ontological truth" applies, roughly, whenever the words "true" and "false" (or their partial synonyms) are used in reference not to propositions or propositional attitudes, but to objects so as to characterize either their *mode of being* or their *mode of appearance*.[10]

The ascription of ontological falsehood in the sense of an object's *false or misleading appearance* (FA-falsity) is usually limited to objects that exist, or appear to exist, extra-mentally. Yet owing to a peculiar twist in Plato's discussion hedonic illusion, it turns out that the hedonic motions in the soul can function as internal objects with potentially distorted modes of appearance. In 41d1-3, Socrates explicitly distinguishes between a pleasure or pain and the distorted perception thereof, as part of an argument that introduces a new type of hedonic illusion: Whenever a pain and a pleasure are contrasted and compared with each other in the soul, this can result in an inflated or deflated mode of appearance and a wrong belief about the respective sizes of these hedonic motions.[11] More specifically, the passage argues that the juxtaposition in the soul of a somatic pain and a simultaneously occurring psychic pleasure of anticipation makes the one look bigger, the other smaller than they actually are.[12] Plato also suggests that if we divide an inflated pleasure into its *real* part (its actual quantity) and the inflated surplus amount, then *this surplus amount*, if considered by itself, is wholly unreal–a merely illusory appearance.[13]

Plato links this kind of deflated or inflated appearance to false judgments or beliefs, but doesn't identify the object's appearance with the belief about it. He emphasizes that the order of dependence is reversed compared to RepF falsity. In the RepF case, the hedonic experience is real (37a1-b4, 40c8-e1) but representationally false because its imaginative content is based on an erroneous belief. In the FA case, the experience of pleasure itself is to some extent illusory (42a5-b6). As such, it can induce a false belief, but this false belief is the consequence, not the cause, of the falsehood of the appearance.

Plato also introduces a second kind of hedonic FA-falsity. This is the case in which a person is in a neutral state with no real experience of somatic pleasure or pain, but it appears to him as a pleasant condition. This harks back to an idea that was introduced in the *Republic* (583c-584a). An example there was the case of a sick person remembering how it was to be healthy. Health is a stable

balanced condition and as such neither pleasant nor painful. But the act of recalling one's previous health, and juxtaposing it in one's mind to the present state of somatic pain, produces a contrasting effect that makes the previous condition appear pleasant and then also leads to a corresponding false belief.[14] This type represents the simple or absolute case of false appearance in which the object (here: an apparent somatic pleasure) is wholly unreal: FA-*whole*.[15] In the other case, discussed before, only a part of the pleasure is absolutely unreal (42b8-c3), which is why we may label it FA-*part*.[16]

A different kind of ontological truth, or lack thereof, relates to an object's *being* (i.e., its being a thing of a certain kind). One of the ways in which an object's being can be compromised is through the compresence of a contrary attribute. The *Philebus* connects this case with the notion of purity *versus* impurity and illustrates it with the help of the example of impure white (e.g., white paint), which is white mixed with other colors that dilute its whiteness and render it less true or genuine (53ab). We can refer to this as *untruth due to mixture*: UTMix. The dialogue applies this notion to hedonic motions that include the compresence of pain. When speaking broadly, Socrates includes mixed pleasures among the *false* pleasures,[17] but UTMix is more fittingly characterized as *lack* of truth or genuineness. This is why the segment specifically on mixed pleasures avoids the term "ψευδής," while denying that they are true pleasures.

Both RepF and FA-falsity involve *illusion*, if in different ways. In FA-*whole* and FA-*part* cases, the hedonic experience itself is either partly or fully illusionary. In RepF cases, the pleasure felt now, as a hedonic motion in the soul, is real (37a1-b4, 40c8-e1), although it is grounded in, or caused by, a *doxastic* illusion (i.e., an illusory belief). Intense mixed pleasures too can involve a form of illusion: Their ostensibly intense presence and frequent occurrence conceals the fact that they are not the most genuine and most real manifestations of pleasure, but merely a mix of pleasure with pain.[18]

Lastly, we should note that one token of hedonic experience can instantiate more than one form of falsity or untruth. For instance, false hedonic anticipations (RepF) typically are, as noted above, mixed pleasures and hence UTMix cases (cf. 47c-d). His example of an FA-*part* illusion relates to a case of anticipatory pleasure, which could at the same time also be grounded in a mistaken expectation. This tells us that Plato does not distinguish between four separate (non-overlapping) classes of untrue pleasure-tokens. His distinction is not extensional, but intensional, based on different applications of the true/false terminology. Let's now investigate how these distinctions are applied in the quest for the "right ingredients" of the mixture.

2

The *Philebus* sets out as a debate between hedonism and intellectualism about *the (human) good*, which Socrates characterizes as a "possession and disposition of the soul" (ἕξις ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσις) that conveys *eudaimonia* (11d4-6). In 20b-22c, the interlocutors agree that the human good can be identified neither with pleasure alone nor with cognitive states alone. It must be a type of *mixture* whose *ingredients* will have to include some kinds (at least) of cognition and pleasure, since no one in their right mind would think that a life of cognitive virtue but devoid of pleasure, or a life with the sensation of pleasure but without

reason, understanding, memory, and true belief could be complete and fully satisfactory.

This talk of *ingredients* or *parts* of the human good is, to be sure, in need of further clarification. Unfortunately, the dialogue does not say enough about how exactly it is to be understood. First, it is important to retain that the leading question, as introduced by Socrates, is about the parts or ingredients not of the good *life*, but of the *good* that renders a life good. Even a very good human life will include episodes and aspects that don't contribute to its goodness. Some of its episodes might be indifferent (such as certain daily chores that are not too burdensome); others might detract from the quality of a human life (such as episodes of illness) without altering the basic eudaimonic quality of this life as a whole. Such occurrences are, in a trivial sense, still parts of a good life, but not parts of the good that makes it a good life.[19]

What are the criteria for singling out the appropriate ingredients of the human good? It is self-evident that a type of pleasure or cognitive state does not qualify unless it can make some positive contribution to the quality of human life. But what counts as making a positive contribution? Socrates' argument as to why technical skills are to be included in the mixture clearly indicates that *utility* for human life is a sufficient condition. As long as a skill is useful and does not otherwise cause harm, it is a legitimate ingredient of the human good.[20] The dialogue also points toward a conception of intrinsic value or desirability constituted by the presence of limit and measure. By conveying measuredness, proportion, etc, these principles elevate the receiving object to an intrinsically desirable condition of virtue and beauty.[21] Limit and measure undergird the goodness of the human good as a whole, qua mixture, and analogously also the goodness of the cosmos (64a), yet are applicable also to components of the mixture.[22] Further clarification of this issue lies beyond the scope of this essay; it will suffice to register that the dialogue's understanding of a "component" of the good is broad enough to draw on criteria of intrinsic desirability, but also mere utility value.

In segment 59d-64c, the investigation explicitly formulates and solves the task of determining which kinds of pleasure and cognition qualify as ingredients of the good. Since the argument is centered around the metaphor of mixing, I am referring to it as the Mixing segment. It begins with a brief recapitulation that includes a reminder of the criteria introduced at 20d for identifying the human good: Whatever the human good is, it must be such that it does not leave us wanting in any respect, but is something sufficient and perfectly complete (60b7-c5). In 61c-e, Socrates proposes a rule for how to approach the task of mixing. It is introduced in connection with a thought experiment purporting to construct an optimal mixture from scratch (59d10-e6, 61b11-c9). According to this rule (61e6-9, cf. 62d8-9), the safe approach is to start with ingredients that are most true or most genuine and to add less genuine ones only as a second step and only if it should turn out that the strictly true/genuine ingredients (τἀληθέστατα τμήματα, 61e6, cf. 62d8-9, e3-7) don't yet produce a fully satisfactory life (ἀγαπητότατος βίος).[23]

In order to understand the import of this rule, we have to clarify how the term "truth" is used in this context. The Mixing Segment is preceded by two segments that put the emphasis on purity. The first of these segments, Socrates' investigation of true pleasures in 50e-53c, is focused on truth qua purity (i.e, absence of contrary admixture).[24] When

transitioning to this topic, Socrates sets the true pleasures to be discussed in opposition both to mixed pleasures and to pleasures that are merely apparent (types UTMix and FA-*whole*) (51a3-9). Belief-based representational falsehood was not mentioned, and it would also not be applicable to the case of simple but pure perceptual pleasures since these precede belief formation.[25] Accordingly, the notion of truth is here to be taken in an ontological sense: The "truth" that characterizes this class of hedonic motions lies in the fact that they are real (not merely apparent) and unmixed.

The language of truth is used in a more complex and more confusing way in the subsequent segment on cognitive states and skills (55c-59d). Yet while the discussion of this genus does not carefully distinguish the various possible meanings or connotations of "truth," it again emphasizes the idea of purity and relates the degree of veridicality of the various kinds of knowledge or skill to the notion of a "pure" science. The inferior types of practical expertise or skill, because of their experience-based conjectural and stochastic nature, have what is unclear and imprecise "mixed" into them, thus failing to achieve a firm and stable grasp of the truth (55e-56b); and this is so because the subject-matters that they relate to don't allow for precision and clarity (57b, 58e-59b). Practical expertise that makes use of measurement and mathematical concepts already has a greater share in genuine knowledge (56b-c). Yet only the exact philosophical sciences are *pure* manifestations of knowledge, since they alone reach out to an ideal, never-changing reality that allows for an enlightened cognitive hold revealing an exact and unchanging truth (56c-58a, 58cd, 59a-d). Accordingly, only these sciences will be included among the "pure specimens" of knowledge to be used in the first phase of mixing.

In light of these observations, the underlying general idea of the Mixing Rule in 61e can be formulated as follows:

> The **Mixing Rule**: The production of an optimal mixture should begin by adding only strictly genuine and pure specimens of each relevant kind of ingredient. Only if this fails to achieve a fully satisfactory result, specimens that are less pure and genuine may be added to the extent that this helps to optimize the mixture.

Generally speaking, the application of this rule presupposes that the pure and fully genuine instances of the kinds in question have at least some (as yet unspecified) degree of positive value for human life. If they were harmful or irrelevant, adding them to the mixture would be either detrimental or pointless. Once it has been established that the pure specimens make a positive contribution,[26] it is reasonable to give them priority over defective and impure specimens of the same kind, as these might be harmful because of their defects and impurities. However, the Mixing Rule also opens a path for the inclusion of certain "untrue" pleasures and inexact forms of cognition. Such less perfect ingredients will be added on condition, and to the extent, that this is necessary for an optimal outcome, and only after their compatibility with the primary ingredients has been ascertained.[27] For the genus of cognitive states, this second phase is explicitly carried out in 62a-d, and its result is reconfirmed in the final ranking of good ingredients (66bc). It is more difficult to establish what view the Mixing segment (59d-64c) and the final ranking (66a-d) advocate regarding impure or untrue pleasures. Are any

of these admissible among the ingredients that make up the human good? To obtain a clear answer, we need to take a closer look at how the argument of the Mixing segment unfolds.

3

When the interlocutors set out to create the optimal mixture, they quickly agree that, in addition to the pure forms of knowledge, good human life also requires certain practical skills and applied forms of knowledge, notwithstanding their shortcomings with respect to precision and truth. In fact, they agree that nothing speaks against including *all* these lesser cognitive forms among the ingredients of the human good. They all are innocuous as well as beneficial, at least as long as the "first" sciences are also present in the mixture (62c5-d3, 63a1-2). Of course, this agreement cannot mean that each individual needs to have every useful skill in order to attain the good life. It must relate to what contributes to human *eudaimonia* collectively.

Socrates then turns to the question which pleasures belong into the good mixture. The interlocutors agree that the safe first step is to add only true pleasures (62e3-8). In the preceding segment, I have shown that the talk of "true pleasures" is here to be understood as referring to the pure pleasures discussed in 50e-53c and again endorsed in 66c4-6. Moving on to the question whether any other pleasures beside those belong into the mixture, the interlocutors immediately agree that *if* some pleasures are "necessary," they would also have to be included (62e8-10). But what are these "necessary pleasures"?

For an adequate understanding, it is essential not to overlook that the qualifier "necessary" harks back to how certain additions from the domain of impure cognitive skills were qualified as necessary. Protarchus conceded that it was "necessary" (ἀναγκαῖον) to add certain applied skills and competences since without them we wouldn't even "find our way home" (62b8-9), and that it was "necessary" to add *mousikê* (music, poetry) since without it "it wouldn't even be a life" (i.e., a life worth living; 62c3-4). While the pure philosophical sciences, directed at eternal Forms, represent a divine form of knowing (62b4, cf. 62a7-b2), human life also requires such lower types of skill and understanding. When Socrates then turns to the topic of necessary hedonic additions, he observes that if certain pleasures should turn out to be "necessary," they will have to be added "just *as in the case of cognition*" (καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, 62e9). This formulation clearly indicates the intended parallelism of necessary cognitive and hedonic additions. It allows us to infer that the necessary hedonic additions correspond to necessities and conveniences of the specifically *human* life-form, just as the necessary cognitive additions do.

Up to this point (62e8-10), the existence of necessary hedonic additions has been granted only hypothetically. Socrates goes on to ask if *all* kinds of pleasure (whether pure or impure) can be included as something beneficial and innocuous (63a1-5), just as it was the case with cognitive states and abilities. The alternatives would be that only *some* impure pleasures are to be added, or none. In order to settle this question, Socrates resorts to the dramatic device of an imaginary interview with the (personified) pleasures and higher cognitive states. Its main task is to clarify whether there really are such necessary hedonic additions to the human good, and, if so, what they are. The following quote contains part of the response of the (personified) higher forms of knowledge.

They declare which forms of pleasure they are willing to cohabitate with:

> **T-1** Yet as for the pleasures you called true and pure, you may consider them akin to us; and, in addition to these (πρὸς ταύταις), include in the mixture also the pleasures conjoined with health and a sound/moderate attitude (τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν), indeed, with the entirety of virtue/excellence (συμπάσης ἀρετῆς)–all the pleasures that accompany (συνακολουθοῦσι) virtue everywhere, as if appointed to attend to a goddess (καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι). Yet [to take] pleasures that follow a foolish/immoderate attitude (ἀφροσύνη) or any other kind of badness (κακία) and to mix them with reason/understanding (νοῦς) would be an absurd thing to do for whoever wants to see a mixture and blend that is most beautiful and free of any discord […].[28] (63e3-64a1)

The first sentence of this quotation confirms that there is a second class of pleasures to be included in the mixture, namely all pleasures associated with health or with a virtuous condition of the soul. It should be noted that the pleasures of health and virtue must relate to healthy or virtuous *activities* that induce the somatic and psychic processes which make themselves felt as pleasures. The fact that this second group of pleasures is introduced as something *in addition* to the true and pure pleasures indicates that they are not themselves a subset of the true and pure pleasures. Hence, it stands to reason that they are the supplementary impure but "necessary" pleasures that still needed to be identified.[29]

However, most commentators resist this conclusion. An influential reading suggests that this clause introduces an additional class of *pure* pleasures not yet mentioned in the discussion of pure pleasures in 50e-53c.[30] This is then typically combined with the view that the "necessary pleasures" mentioned in 62e8-10 are not to be identified with this additional class of (allegedly) pure pleasures, but with certain unavoidable pleasures that pertain to the satisfaction of our *basic* human needs–needs that relate to mere survival rather than to what constitutes a eudaimonic life.[31] A shortcoming of this reading is that it leaves unclear why Socrates mentions them at all in an account of the ingredients that together render human life eudaimonic.

Let's first address the claim that the pleasures relating to health and virtue are introduced as an additional class of *pure* pleasures. This construal of the first sentence in T-1 is not impossible, but the following reasons speak against it: *First*, in his survey of true and pure pleasures in 50e-53c, Socrates emphasizes how important it is that they clearly distinguish which forms of pleasure and knowledge are pure and which aren't, since a comparative evaluation of two genera ought to be based on an appraisal of their pure specimens.[32] This makes it unlikely that this survey would leave out a substantial subclass of pure pleasures. The care with which he enumerates three subclasses of pure pleasures (51e5, 7)–two types of pure perceptual and one of pure noetic pleasure–also suggests a concern for completeness.[33] *Second*, when Socrates mentions pure pleasures again in the final ranking of ingredients, he still restricts this class to pleasures induced by noetic grasping or painless sense-perception (66c4-6). If Socrates' remark in T-1 really had the purpose of expanding the scope of pure pleasures, this ought to be reflected in the final ranking.[34]

Aside from these clear indications in the text, the following philosophical consid-

eration also matters: When talking about pleasures associated with the exercise of virtue/excellence (ἀρετή), the interlocutors cannot resort to an Aristotelian account of pleasure as a mode or concomitant of a state of activation (ἐνέργεια, cf. *EN* X.4-5, 1174a13-75a3, 1175b30-35) sharply distinguished from "processes" or "becomings" (κινήσεις, γενέσεις). They approve instead of the view, rejected by Aristotle (*EN* VII.12, 1153a7-17), that pleasures are process-like "becomings" (γενέσεις), or essentially linked to them, and that such γενέσεις set out from a condition of lack and run *toward* a natural endpoint or goal (τέλος).[35] While in the case of the pure pleasures discussed in 50e-53c such lack is naturally unfelt and thus painless, in many other cases it will involve pain. Our human condition requires constant replenishment and restoration, and there is hence ample room for achieving restoration in ways that are virtuous and healthy and also experienced as enjoyable, if not free of pain. This is obvious at least for many healthy somatic pleasures. While health as such, as a state, is a neutral condition between pleasure and pain (cf. *R.* 583cd), healthy activities often convey mixed pleasure. Take, for instance, the case of eating, one of Plato's favorite examples for a pleasant somatic activity: if done sensibly, it sets out from an (at least) mild feeling of hunger, but it is also pleasant since it restores and preserves a balanced condition of the body. Another example would be physical exercise conveying pain but also satisfaction.

Such examples from the domain of healthy activities already prove that the additional class of good pleasures mentioned in T-1 includes many mixed pleasures. We can make a similar observation regarding the exercise of virtue. Take the following example, which is in line with Plato's general attitude as a moralist and with his comments on mixed emotional pleasures in the *Philebus*: For a virtuous agent, the observation of injustice will trigger a painful sense of aversion. But if this agent succeeds in correcting this injustice and subjecting the unjust person to an adequate form of punishment, this will cause a simultaneous experience of pleasant satisfaction.[36] A related example is the case of experiencing pain and satisfaction when courageously fighting an unjust attacker.[37] A different dimension of the Platonic ethos is marked by the example of virtuous erotic pursuit, which, while giving joys, also involves the painful struggles graphically described in the *Phaedrus*.[38]

We have seen that the talk of "necessary" additions from the classes of impure cognition and impure pleasure pertains to the discussion of what, beyond the pure forms of knowledge and pleasure, is required in order to complete the human good. As a result of our analysis of the Mixing segment, and also in light of what we have just said about the role of healthy and virtuous restorations in general, it is very likely that the notion of "necessary pleasures" applies to all the mixed forms of pleasure endorsed in T-1 and, moreover, that these are called "necessary" because they correspond to specific constraints of human life which would not afflict divine beings.[39] Such human constraints include the need to eat (which ought to be done in a healthy and virtuous manner), the urge to follow one's *erôs* (while suppressing the bad tendencies that come with it), the social obligation to oppose and correct injustice and to defend the community against assailants, etc. Although these mixed pleasures reflect imperfections of the human condition, they are grounded in the exercise of virtue. As such, they aren't negatives or simply neutral, but belong to

the specifically human form of eudaimonic excellence.[40]

We still need to address another influential objection against the reading proposed here. It is based on the observation that mixed pleasures are not mentioned in the final ranking of ingredients at the end of the dialogue (66a-c). While the argument of the Mixing segment suggests that there are two distinct classes of pleasures to be included, the final ranking, in combination with a remark in the recapitulatory segment 66d-67b, seems to contradict this conclusion, at least according to how it is usually interpreted by modern scholars. The rather obscure wording of a key sentence in the text makes it difficult to decide whether Socrates means to end his list of ingredients with the fifth rank, occupied by the pure pleasures of sense-perception and scientific understanding, or signals the presence of a sixth rank that could contain other kinds of pleasure, which is how the Neoplatonist commentators read it.[41] In this sentence, Socrates quotes from an Orphic theogony: "When reaching (ἐν) the sixth generation, end the array of the song," and then adds that their own account likewise "seems to have come to an end when reaching (ἐν) the sixth verdict" (66c8-10).[42] The Greek wording, by itself, can be interpreted as endorsement or rejection of a sixth class. But there is good independent evidence suggesting that the Orphic poem cited by Socrates was, in fact, an account of six theogonic generations, which, if true, makes it very probable that the quoted phrase is used to signal Socrates' endorsement of a sixth class of ingredients.[43] This class would then certainly include the mixed pleasures of virtuous and healthy pursuits mentioned in T-1, as a counterpart to the fourth rank occupied by the impure cognitive states.

However, the overwhelming majority of modern commentators rejects this reading for two reasons which, at first blush, seem compelling. First, Socrates does not name any ingredients in his final list that would fill the sixth rank. Secondly, the brief recapitulation at the very end of the dialogue assigns the "power of pleasure" to the fifth rank (67a14-15). Since the fifth rank is occupied by pure pleasures (66c4-6), this is taken to imply that he does not endorse the inclusion of any other kinds of pleasure.[44] In response, one can point out that the final ranking still relates back to the competition between pleasure and cognitive states for the comparatively higher rank, which has been the overarching theme of this dialogue from 22c-e onwards. By ranking the purest forms of pleasure below even the impure and inferior forms of cognition (cf. 22de), Socrates seals the defeat of pleasure in this contest. To drive his point home, he does not have to spell out what belongs to the even lower sixth rank. This observation also helps to explain why the telegraphic recapitulation at the very end only mentions the assignment of the "power of pleasure" to the fifth rank. In addition, one could also argue that they are not representative *specifically* of the power (δύναμις) of pleasure since mixed pleasures contain an element of pain. In sum, the final ranking can plausibly be read as endorsing six ranks. Yet my case for the inclusion of certain mixed pleasures does not rest on an interpretation of this ambiguous passage, but on a close reading of the Mixing segment.

4

Our analysis of T-1 has shown that there are two different classes of pleasures that qualify as ingredients of the good. They cor-

respond to two independent sufficient criteria for inclusion: pleasures qualify either because they are pure and genuine or thanks to their association with virtue or health. This latter criterion has, as we have seen, the purpose of justifying certain mixed pleasures as components of the human good. Purity is, hence, not a necessary condition for inclusion. We may formulate the two criteria as follows:

> (C-*purity*) If a pleasure is genuine and pure, it is a valid ingredient of the human good.
> (C-*aretê*) If a pleasure is a concomitant of virtuous or healthy activity, it is a valid ingredient of the human good.

The last clause of T-1 also suggests a negative criterion based on whether or not a pleasure is connected to a bad condition of the body or soul (63e7-64a1). Socrates talks about how utterly absurd (πολλή που ἀλογία) it would be if someone whose aim is "a mixture and blend most beautiful and free of discord (ἀστασιαστοτάτη)" were to add such pleasures. On the face of it, this is merely the statement of a criterion for exclusion from the good, but we can safely assume that it is also intended as a criterion for badness. Pleasures of this kind aren't simply indifferent or half-way between good and bad; they are bad because they antagonize the primary elements of the mixture and destroy its unity and cohesion (cf. 63d2-e3). This sets them in direct opposition to the good. We may paraphrase this negative criterion as follows:

> (NC-*kakia*) If a pleasure is linked to some persistent flawed condition of the soul or to an unhealthy condition of the body, it is opposed to the good life (and hence bad).[45]

In my formulation of this criterion, I speak of "persistent" defects since one could argue that all mixed pleasures–including the ones associated with healthy eating, virtuous corrective action, etc–entail temporary deficits that make themselves felt as pain. NC-*kakia* has to be restricted to *persistent* defective states *resisting* restoration. Only these qualify as forms of badness.[46] While C-*aretê* has NC-*kakia* as its negative counterpart, there can be no analogous counterpart for C-*purity*. Impurity is not a criterion for exclusion from the good since certain mixed pleasures have turned out to be valid components of the good.

Could the joint application of C-*purity* and NC-*kakia* produce inconsistent results? Such a situation would arise if some unmixed pleasures expressed a bad attitude. As for the pure cognitive and perceptual pleasures discussed in 50e-53c, it is certain that Plato views them as fully compatible with a virtuous and healthy disposition: advancing one's scientific understanding, or enjoying inherently beautiful perceptual objects (52cd), is never, in itself, an expression of a bad disposition. But couldn't *schadenfreude*, for instance, be a case of unmixed but morally defective pleasure? Even worse, couldn't sadistic pleasures be experienced by some without admixture of pain? If so, our moral intuitions would require that this conflict be resolved by stipulating that NC-*kakia* overrides C-*purity*. It is, however, more likely that Plato thinks that morally bad pleasures are never pure of pain. A case in point is the long digression on pleasures of malice or *schadenfreude* in 47d-50d, which aims to demonstrate that such pleasures too contain an element of pain, caused by some form of ill-will (φθόνος, 48b, 50a) but not easy to detect (48ab). A remark in 52a5-b3 suggests, moreover, that Plato's notion of pure pleasures is meant to apply to pleasures that are pure

of pain *according to their nature*. C-*purity* should, hence, be understood as singling out *types* of pleasure that are naturally pure. While it might be impossible to establish that every individual instance of *schadenfreude* contains a (perhaps barely noticeable) element of pain, Plato could still hold that mixture with pain is natural for this type of pleasure.

We have established that the "additional" class of pleasures endorsed in T-1 includes certain mixed pleasures. Could it also include pleasures that are false in one of the three other senses distinguished by Plato? The philosophically most interesting and challenging case would be that of anticipatory pleasures based on mistaken expectations, which have received so much scrutiny in this dialogue. Let's turn to the question if they are categorically excluded from the mixture. Based on our results so far, there are two options for justifying exclusion: If it should be the case that all pleasures that result from a false belief or false belief-*cum*-imagination are grounded in a persistent flawed condition of the soul, then they are all condemned by NC-*kakia*. Alternatively, representational falsehood could function as an independent negative criterion (in light, especially, of Socrates' remark at 40e9-10). I am going to explore, first, whether NC-*kakia* is by itself sufficient to condemn all RepF pleasures.[47]

Plato might, indeed, hold that error is always the consequence of some blameworthy intellectual failure. If so, NC-*kakia* would apply to all RepF-pleasures since Plato's notion of badness (*kakia*) in the soul is certainly broad enough to cover any case of *blameworthy* ignorance. The view that all error reveals some form of badness was later held by the Stoics. It can be established quite easily that this is not Plato's position. It is, of course, impossible that a rational person (or, in fact, any person at all) would *knowingly* embrace illusory hopes, as this would entail the absurd proposition that some people could believe something they know to be false. Yet Plato is not, like an orthodox Stoic, committed to the idea that a virtuous person would never entertain *uncertain* beliefs. There are, to be sure, the many passages in the dialogues that urge us to test our beliefs so that we can recognize unwarranted or unclear beliefs, become aware of our ignorance, and start searching for better comprehension.[48] But it is also clear that the Platonic Socrates would not in all instances strictly withhold judgment until he has reached some ultimate clarification. Already in the early dialogues, Socrates' famous "disavowal of (expert) knowledge" does not prevent him from expressing certain strong ethical convictions. In the so-called middle-period dialogues, the Socrates character draws a crucial distinction between subject-matters that are in themselves perfectly knowable–the domain of unqualified truth–and subject-matters whose ontological imperfections render them unsuitable for rigorous science: the domain of the phenomenal or physical world.[49] This also affects the field of practical and political action. On account of the uncertainties and irregularities of the phenomenal world, our beliefs about the concrete situations that demand action and about the projected outcomes cannot be strictly scientific. Yet we need to form such beliefs if we want to act (as we must),[50] notwithstanding the fact that we risk error when judging under conditions of uncertainty.

The *Philebus* likewise endorses judgments about matters that don't allow for certainty. The way in which the segment on cognitive abilities (55c-59d) correlates the higher and lower cognitive skills with the different ontological qualities of their subject-matters

is in basic agreement with the metaphysical epistemology of the *Republic* or the *Timaeus*. We have seen that the *Philebus* argues for the inclusion of the lower "stochastic" forms of cognition among the ingredients of the human good. While the discussion in 55c-59d does not explicitly mention ethical and political deliberation about concrete situations and outcomes,[51] the metaphysical distinctions in this segment imply that such deliberations and projections can never attain full certainty.[52] It lies, moreover, in our human nature that projections of hoped-for outcomes elicit feelings of joyful anticipation. They too are, hence, an aspect of what it means to live a virtuous life, notwithstanding the fact that any one of them may turn out to be mistaken.

Take the following example which seems in line with Plato's general attitude as an ethicist and educator: Whenever someone is committed to doing any kind of good to another person or group of persons–be it a friend or loved-one, a talented student, or the political community–one will engage in this activity with the hope and expectation that the chosen course of action will actually be helpful.[53] This positive expectation ought to be accompanied by a pleasant feeling if there is any real caring for the other person or the community. But, because of the uncertainty of future outcomes, this may turn out to have been an illusory hedonic anticipation. Another important area of cheerful if uncertain anticipation concerns the philosopher's expectations about the afterlife, as exemplified by Socrates (*Ap*. 40c-41d, *Phd*. 114d-115a). Socrates cannot vouch for the truth of his mythical narratives, but whether or not they'll come true, they help philosophically minded people to stay the course of a virtuous life and not be compromised by fear of death.

At 39e-40c, in the course of his discussion of anticipatory pleasures, Socrates makes a remark that suggests a connection of true expectations with virtue and false expectations with lack of virtue. At first sight, this seems to contradict our interim result that mistaken hopeful anticipations are an occurrence also in virtuous human life. Yet Socrates qualifies his remark by adding that the hopes of good people will come true "for the most part" (ὡς τὸ πολύ, 40b). In other words, *not all of their hopeful expectations will come true*. Since *good* people, by definition, are not subject to "some persistent defective condition of the soul," i.e., to depravity or foolishness, yet nevertheless occasionally err, it follows that not *all* mistaken anticipatory pleasures satisfy the negative criterion NC-*kakia*.[54] Since, moreover, the erroneous projections of the kind just described are linked to virtuous attitudes and activities, the concomitant pleasures not only *don't succumb NC*-kakia, *but also satisfy C*-aretê. They should, hence, not only not be classified as bad, but also be included among the elements of the human good. This is, however, only an interim result since there might be other indications in the text would that allow us to infer that Plato views the representational falsehood of a pleasure as a negative criterion in its own right, warranting the exclusion of all such pleasures from the good.

5

Our discussion in the preceding segment came to the conclusion that, judging solely on the basis of the criteria contained in T-1, the occasional mistaken joyful anticipations that occur in the pursuit of virtuous goals are not only not bad, but a concomitant of the human good, just like any other joyful anticipation which is both sensible and virtuously moti-

vated. However, a remark by Socrates, placed in the form of a question at the end of the segment on false anticipatory pleasures (40e9-10), is usually taken as a commitment to the idea that this kind of falsehood, just by itself, qualifies a pleasure as bad. If this is the lesson we readers are supposed to learn, RepF would function as an independent negative criterion applicable to all belief-based pleasures (NC-RepF). We would, moreover, have to assume that this criterion overrides C-*aretê* in those cases in which a virtuous person, reasonably pursuing some virtuous goal, joyfully entertains a mistaken hope. Note that NC-RepF could come in a stronger and a weaker version: as the rule that no representationally false pleasure can contribute to the good, or as the rule that all such pleasures are bad and hence antagonize the good.

Before I comment on 40e9-10 and its context, let's first look at a remark in the Mixing segment which could also suggest that RepF pleasures are categorically excluded from the human good. At 64a7-b4 (repeated at 64e9-11), Socrates declares that a mixture cannot turn out good unless *truth* is also included in the mixture. One might try to infer from this statement that the good mixture excludes any components characterized by falsehood. However, this notion of "adding truth to the mixture" is still very vague. We can narrow down what Plato has in mind if we look at Socrates' supporting argument. He remarks that nothing could "truly (ἀληθῶς) *become* anything or, as a result of having become it, *be* anything," unless "truth" (ἀλήθεια) is added. This is a metaphorical way of saying that nothing can either become or be F unless it *truly* becomes or is F–at first sight, a trivial observation since the added "truly" seems redundant. Yet there is a substantive point that motivates Socrates' remark. It harks back to a normative notion of mixture[55] in connection with a normative notion of ontological truth.[56] For Plato, *random* mixing does not yet produce a "true" or genuine mixture. For a mixture to be "true" it needs to attain some form of measured harmonious unity thanks to which it will be stable. Otherwise it would quickly self-destroy (64de). A mixture is, hence, good qua mixture, if and only if it is true in this specific sense.

Since this argument talks about truth as an ontological quality of the mixture *as a whole*,[57] it would amount to a fallacy of division if we drew any direct inferences regarding the truth or veridicality of its components. Plato is far from committing this fallacy, as we can gather from the fact that he has Socrates include impure forms of cognition in the mixture. These, as we know from 55c-59d, don't reveal any stable and precise form of truth and often have to rely on conjecture (εἰκάζειν) and stochastic judgment, which are imprecise forms of judgment susceptible to error.[58] In the Mixing segment, he even explicitly states that some cognitive components of the human good will involve falsity, such as the craft that uses "the *false* ruler and circle" (62b5-6), viz., the craft of building, as a form of applied geometry.[59] Our analysis of the Mixing segment has, moreover, shown that some untrue pleasures (in the UTMix sense) also qualify as ingredients of the good mixture, provided they satisfy C-*aretê*. While truth undoubtedly functions as a pivotal aspect of the good in Plato's thought, the *Philebus* does not advocate a simplistic correlation between truth and goodness such that all components of the good would also have to manifest truth in every respect.[60]

However, the fact that Plato allows for some aspects of falsehood for some components of the good still leaves open the possibility that

he views representational falsehood as strictly disqualifying. This takes us to 40e9-10, which comes at the end of the segment on RepF falsity (36c-41a) and suggests the strong version of NC-RepF. To be sure, Socrates presents this claim only in the form of a question, and his interlocutor refuses to agree. But a careful reading of segment 36c-41a in its entirety reveals how Socrates has repeatedly tried to prod Protarchus toward accepting a firm link between representational falsehood and the *badness* of a pleasure, leading up to his proposal in 40e9-10. There is, accordingly, a general agreement among scholars that Plato's investigation of hedonic RepF-falsity aims to establish that all such pleasures are bad.[61] In order to ascertain if this is really the best way to read this passage, we need to review the argumentative drift of this segment.

The first mention of badness (πονηρία) in this segment occurs at 37d, in the course of Socrates' initial failed attempt to convince Protarchus of the possibility of false pleasures. Socrates then makes a fresh start (38a-40e), and the key part of his new argumentation (39e-40c) introduces a quasi-theological assumption that is presented as a support for the premise that humans often have false hopes. It also brings the notion of badness back into the argument. Socrates suggests, with the approval of Protarchus, that the hopes of people who are good, just, and pious will come true for the most part because such people are *dear to the gods* (θεοφιλεῖς), whereas bad people (ἄδικοι, κακοί, πονηροί) will see their hopes dashed for the most part (40b, cf. Lg. 715e-6d). This statement appeals to the popular belief in earthly success or failure as a result of divine reward and punishment, a belief that (at least superficially) is in harmony with the idea of divine governance emphatically embraced by Protarchus at 28e.[62] Yet Socrates could have obtained agreement to the truism that many human hopes fail without this excursion into popular theology. It is therefore likely that this detour serves some additional purpose–but which?

As soon as Socrates has completed his argument and secured Protarchus' concession that there are false pleasures of anticipation, mostly affecting bad people, he tries to make him admit that these pleasures are bad on account of their falsity:

> **T-2** Socr.: Now then, can we say of judgments (δόξας) that they are bad and useless[63] in any other way than because they turn out to be false (ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας)?
> Prot.: In no other way.
> Socr.: Nor, I presume, will we find a way in which pleasures could be bad other than by being false?
> Prot.: What you have just said, Socrates, is quite the opposite *[i.e., of the truth]*. One would hardly regard pains and pleasures as bad because of their falsity, but, rather, because they are affected by some other great and considerable badness (πονηρία).
> Socr.: Well, we shall talk a little later about pleasures that are bad and are such because of badness, if it will still suit us; […]. (40e6-41a4)

In this quote, Protarchus accepts falsehood as the criterion of badness for beliefs, but resists Socrates' suggestion that it is the relevant criterion of badness also for anticipatory pleasures. He suggests instead that pleasures are bad on account of "some other great and considerable badness." He does not specify what kind of badness he has in mind, but we can assume that his response is influenced by the example in 40a and how it is framed. This example evokes the case of

a man who expects to gain much wealth and who looks forward to spending it on some unspecified pleasures. Socrates then brings up the endoxic theological view that thanks to the gods the hopes of bad people will usually turn out to be mistaken. This contextualization entices Protarchus (and the readers) to connect the case of a mistaken anticipatory pleasure with the idea of someone who would spend his wealth on ethically worthless or depraved desires. It is with this kind of scenario in mind that Protarchus now strongly resists the suggestion that representational falsehood, rather than moral failure, is the pertinent criterion of badness for anticipatory pleasures. This might be the clue that tells us why Socrates incorporates the theological consideration into his reasoning. It is unnecessary for validating the premise that not all human hopes come true, as this is a generally accepted truism. But it can be useful as a conversational stratagem to direct the attention to moral badness and to thus goad Protarchus into giving this kind of response. In other words, the very purpose of Socrates' maneuver might be to elicit this reaction from Protarchus, who initially had claimed that no pleasure, as such, could be bad (13bc). And indeed, as soon as Protarchus has committed himself to the existence of false pleasures whose badness is grounded in "some other great and considerable badness," viz., moral deficiency, Socrates abruptly postpones further discussion of NC-*kakia*. While his discussion of intense mixed pleasures will again evoke the notion of a pleasure that is bad because of the presence of some bad condition in the body or the soul (45e6), he will no longer link badness of a pleasure to RepF falsity.[64]

Socrates' suggestion in T-2, 40e9-10, is usually read as an expression of his own belief. Interpreters are then disappointed that he does not provide further clarification.[65] One might think that this is just one of the loose ends in the *Philebus*. Yet there are good reasons for concluding that Socrates' tentative proposal, resisted by Protarchus, is indeed just a teaser and does not express his considered view.[66] *First*, his suggestion that there is not "*any other way* in which pleasures could be bad than by being false" claims an exclusivity for NC-RepF which is not only manifestly absurd (since the belief-based pleasures of bad people aren't always factually wrong),[67] but also incompatible with his endorsement of NC-*kakia* in the Mixing segment.[68] Socrates' first argument in the dialogue for the existence of bad pleasures (12cd) already pointed to the idea that the connection with vice (ἀκολασταίνων) and foolishness (ἀνοηταίνων) renders a pleasure bad; and this is then confirmed in the Mixing segment (cf. T-1). His proposal in T-2 is just an outlier and can be explained, as we have seen, as part of a conversational stratagem.

Second, the *Philebus* compares judging falsely to attempting to hit a target but missing it (38d). False judgments are *dysfunctional* in that they have a goal (viz., semantic truth) which they miss. This provides an obvious teleological reason for why falsehood is the relevant criterion for a judgment's badness, qua judgment: a false judgment is "bad" on account of this dysfunctionality, without specifically moral connotations. Psychic pleasures, on the other hand, in Plato's no less than in Aristotle's understanding, express moral-cum-intellectual attitudes. To be pleased at the thought of an expected outcome one has good epistemic reasons to anticipate and good moral reasons to approve of, is a virtuous hedonic reaction, even if (because of unforeseeable circumstances) the expected outcome should fail to materialize.

We should, hence, conclude that Socrates' suggestion in T-2 does not amount to an endorsement of NC-RepF. It does not represent his (or Plato's) considered view. This is why it is also not validated by an explicit agreement among the interlocutors. Our analysis of the argumentative drift of 36c-41a with respect to bad pleasures provides, to be sure, only a negative result, telling us what is not a conclusion in this segment. Yet the fact that Socrates also nowhere else in this dialogue endorses representational falsehood as an independent criterion for the badness of a pleasure, together with the fact that the practice of virtue under conditions of uncertainty includes mistaken anticipations and that the interlocutors later agree that all pleasures linked to the exercise of virtue are legitimate components of the human good, entitles the reader to conclude that even mistaken pleasures of anticipation, if grounded in virtue, count toward the good. Mistaken anticipations are, to be sure, often the result of foolishness or intellectual laziness. These are bad because they manifest a blameworthy disposition. But taking pleasure in a future state of affairs one has good reasons to expect and good ethical reasons to welcome reveals a good disposition of the soul and is, hence, an aspect of the human good realized under conditions of uncertainty.

In sum, this essay has shown that the theory of the *Philebus* includes certain flawed or "false" pleasures among the contributing factors of the "human good." Our analysis of the Mixing segment has shown that it is best read as endorsing mixed pleasures associated with a healthy or virtuous disposition. This is not the trivial claim that mixed pleasures occur even in a virtuous person's life. It responds, rather, to the guiding question of the *Philebus* concerning the components of the human good that together render a life eudaimonic. The more speculative part of our investigation concerned the status of mistaken hedonic anticipations. It has established that the interlocutors do not commit to condemning belief-based pleasures solely on the grounds that the belief is false. It has also shown that the dialogue acknowledges the cognitive uncertainties involved in human action, which are the reason why the exercise of virtue and practical deliberation creates at least some mistaken anticipatory pleasures that can relate to significant aspects of a virtuous life. Since the interlocutors endorse both pure and virtue-based pleasures, the arguments of the dialogue enable the reader to conclude that such instances of mistaken hopeful anticipation also count among the good pleasures of a humanly pleasant and eudaimonic life.[69]

Bibliography

Brandt, R. (1977). Wahre und falsche Affekte im platonischen *Philebus*. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 59, p. 1-18.

Carone, G. R. (2000). Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's *Philebus*. *Phronesis* 45, p. 257-283.

Cooper, J. M. (1977). Plato's Theory of Human Good in the *Philebus*. *Journal of Philosophy* 74, p. 714-730.

Damascius (1959). *Lectures on the Philebus wrongly attributed to Olympiodorus*. Text, translation, notes, etc. by Westerink, L. G. North-Holland Publ., Amsterdam.

Delcomminette, S. (2006). *Le* Philèbe *de Platon. Introduction à l'agathologie Platonicienne*. Brill, Leiden.

Dillon, J (2003). *The Heirs of Plato. A Study of the Old Academy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Evans, M. (2008). Plato on the Possibility of Hedonic Mistakes. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 35, p. 89-124.

Fletcher, E. (2014). Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life. *Phronesis* 59, p. 113-142.

Fletcher, E. (2018). Plato on Incorrect and Deceptive Pleasures. *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 100, p. 379-410.

Frede, D. (1985). Rumpelstiltskin's Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in Plato's Philebus, *Phronesis* 30, p. 151-180.

Frede, D. (1993). *Plato: Philebus*. Translated with introduction and notes. Hackett, Indianapolis.

Frede, D. (1997). *Platon: Philebos*. Übersetzung und Kommentar (= E. Heitsch, C. W. Müller [eds.]. *Platon: Werke*, vol. III.2). Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1931). *Platos dialektische Ethik: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zum Philebos*. Meiner, Leipzig.

Gosling, J. C. B. (1975). *Plato: Philebus*. Translated with notes and commentary. Clarendon, Oxford.

Gosling, J. C. B. and C. C. W. Taylor (1982). *The Greeks on Pleasure*. Clarendon, Oxford.

Guhtrie, W. K. C. (1978). *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 5. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hackforth, R. (1945). *Plato's Examination of Pleasure (The* Philebus*)*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Harte, V. (2004). The *Philebus* on Pleasure: The Good, The Bad and The False. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 104, p. 113-130.

Ionescu, CH. (2019). *On the Good Life*. SUNY Press, Albany.

Irwin, T. (1995). *Plato's Ethics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kenny, A. (1960). False Pleasures in the *Philebus*. A Reply to Mr Gosling. *Phronesis* 4, p. 45-52.

Lovibond, S. (1989/90). True and False Pleasures. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 90, p. 213-230.

Migliori, M. (1993). *L'uomo fra piacere, intelligenza e Bene. Commentario storico-filosofico al "Filebo" di Platone*. Vita e Pensiero, Milano.

Mooradian, N. (1996). "Converting Protarchus: Relativism and False Pleasures of Anticipation in Plato's *Philebus*. *Ancient Philosophy* 16, p. 93-112.

Mouroutsou, G. (2016). "Placing Pure Pleasures beyond the Chain of Hunger." In Jirsa, J.; Karfík, F.; Špinka, Š. (eds.). *Plato's* Philebus. *Proc. of the 9th Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, 130-151. Οικουμενη, Prague.

Muniz, F. (2014), Propositional Pleasures in Plato's *Philebus*. *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* (Saõ Paulo) 8.1, p. 49-75.

Penner, T. M. I. (1970). False Anticipatory Pleasures: *Philebus* 36a3–41a6. *Phronesis* 15, p. 166-78.

Philippson, R. (1925): Verhandlungen über die akademische Lustlehre. *Hermes* 60, p. 444-481.

Shorey, P. (1933). *What Plato Said*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Stallbaum, G. (1842). *Platonis Philebus, recensuit, prolegomenis et commentariis illustravit*. Mennings, Gotha.

Szaif, J. (1996/98). *Platons Begriff der Wahrheit* (2nd edition 1998). Alber, Freiburg/München.

Szaif, J. (2017). Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement. In: Karamanolis, G.; Politis, V. (eds.). *The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 29-47.

Szaif, J. (2018). Plato and Aristotle on Truth and Falsehood. In: Glanzberg, M. (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Truth*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 9-49.

Taylor, A. E. (1956). *Plato: Philebus and Epinomis*. Translation and Introduction. Nelson & Sons, London.

Teisserenc, F. (1999). "L'empire du faux ou le plaisir de l'image. *Philèbe* 37A–41A." In: Dixsaut, M. (ed.). *La fêlure du plaisir*, vol. 1: *Commentaires*. Vrin, Paris, p. 267-297.

Tuozzo, Th. M. (1996). The General Account of Pleasure in the *Philebus*. *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34, p. 495-513.

Vogt, K. M. (2017). *Desiring the Good. Ancient Proposals and Contemporary Theory*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Warren, J. (2014). *The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Waterfield, R. A. H. (1982). *Plato: Philebus*, translated with an introduction. Penguin, Harmondsworth.

West, M. L. (1983). *The Orphic Poems*. Clarendon, Oxford.

Whiting, J. (2014). Fools Pleasures in Plato's *Philebus*. In: Lee, M.-K. (ed.). *Strategies of Argument. Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 31-59.

Wolfsdorf, D. (2013). *Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Notes

1 Cf. Philippson 1925; Dillon 203, p. 64-77.

2 Cf. Cooper 1977, p. 726-30; also Irwin 1995, p. 331 (referencing Cooper); Carone 2000, p. 282*f*; Mouroutsou 2016, p. 135; Ionescu 2019, p. 63-68.

[3] Cf. 31a-32b, 34c-36c. Initially, Socrates talks as if somatic pleasures are to be *identified* with restorative processes *in the body* (32ab, cf. 31d, 42cd), yet his considered view, according to 43b1-c7 (cf. 33c-34a), is that somatic pleasures occur only if the change in the body is powerful enough to cause a joint motion in the soul; cf. Tuozzo 1996, p. 498–502. Strictly speaking, the account of somatic pleasures as felt *restorations* applies only to the normative case of *healthy* somatic pleasures. Bad somatic pleasures compensate for a felt lack or imbalance without restoring the natural harmony of the body (cf. 44e-47b; also *Ti*. 86b-e). All very intense somatic pleasures are like this (45e).

[4] Cf. Gosling 1975: 212 ("rank equivocation").

[5] Gadamer 1931, Frede 1993 and 1997, Irwin 1995, p. 328*f*, and Wolfsdorf 2013 adopt a similar fourfold breakdown of false pleasures. Other commentators acknowledge only a threefold division (e.g., Hackforth 1945; Gosling 1975; Delcomminette 2006).

[6] A so-called "new school"-approach developed by Harte 2004 and others (following up on Lovibond 1989/90) claims that the pleasures in question are false because, roughly, they incorporate a wrong belief or attitude regarding what is truly enjoyable (similarly Brandt 1977, p. 11-18; Teisserenc 1999), yet the example in 40a9-12 and the remarks in 40c8-d10 show that Socrates is talking here about factual expectations regarding the future; see also Evans 2008, p. 93–103 and Whiting 2014 for criticism of this approach and section 5 below for an analysis of 39e-40c.

[7] ἐλπίς and its cognates in 36a7-c1 and 39e4-40a6 (cf. 47c7) are usually translated as "hope," but Socrates' example is more accurately described as a case of (positive) "expectation." One can knowingly hope against the odds, while expectation entails that one views the outcome as probable. Cf. *Lg.* 644c-d for ἐλπίς in the sense of "expectation."

[8] This comes very close to Gosling's reconstruction of the argument in 40a3-e5 (1975, p. 215-19), except that Gosling thinks that this position involves a fallacious identification of picture and picturing and that only the picture could be said to be true or false. I would grant Socrates that he is not talking about the "image" as an abstract repeatable content but as an individual and dynamic mental act and that such acts, just as the act of judging, can be conceived as legitimate truth-bearers. The main crux among the various problems with this argument (cf. Gosling/Taylor 1982. p. 437-440) is the apparently illegitimate leap from the falsehood of an image that represents a falsely assumed future pleasure to the notion of a false feeling of pleasure. To bridge this gap, we have to assume that Socrates equates the currently experienced pleasure of anticipation with the act of gladly imagining an expected future pleasure. This is how he can conceive of anticipatory pleasure as having a representational content.

[9] The question of how the meaning of ψευδής, as an attribute of RepF pleasures, compares to falsehood as a quality of beliefs, remains a controversial topic. Are pleasures of anticipation *propositional attitudes* whose propositional content can be true or false (cf. 37a and Penner 1970; Frede 1985)? Or does the *Philebus* contain merely a vague idea of false belief-*cum*-imagination somehow "filling" or "infecting" anticipatory pleasure with its falsehood (cf. 42a7-9 and Mooradian 1996, p. 103; cf. Muniz 2014 for a review of this debate)? My analysis of 40a3-e5, which I cannot lay out here, has some kinship with the propositional attitude approach since it views anticipatory pleasure as constituted by an act of imagination that has a representational content and is true or false as a function of the truth-value of the belief it illustrates. It is, however, not unproblematic to equate the content of an imagination with a proposition. Images don't seem to have the kind of logical structure that characterizes propositions (such as a subject-predicate structure, quantifiers, etc), and they also offer more detail than the proposition they illustrate.

[10] While the use of the truth terminology to denote aspects of "ontological truth" is conceptually dependent on the basic semantic sense of "truth," those usages are still different in important ways; cf. Szaif 1996/8, p. 25-71; 2018, p. 9-14.

[11] This is, admittedly, a controversial interpretative approach to 41b11-42b7. What it does presuppose is a capacity for internal observation of one's psychological states susceptible to misleading appearances. Appearances, generally speaking, are attributed to the object of a perception or judgment. They are dispositions to cause misperception and misjudgment. In the case of a transitory private internal object like a motion in the soul, it is, to be sure, harder to see how its appearance could be anything other than how it is perceived here and now by the subject. But linguistically, there is still a clear difference between predicating of an internal object that it appears in a certain way and predicating of the subject that it perceives the object in a certain way. The partly illusory character is attributed to the internal object on account of its inflated or deflated appearance, and this is the criterion for classifying the sense of "falsehood" involved as falling under the ontological notion of truth. The truth or falsehood of an internal perception or perceptual judgment (cf. 21c4*f*, 60d7-e1), by contrast, is a case of representational or semantic truth-value.

[12] Commentators often relate FA-*part* to situations in which the size of a *current* somatic pleasure is overestimated in comparison to *future* pain (e.g., Frede 1997, p. 261*f*; Warren 2014, p. 124*f*; also Damascius, §187). Yet this does not agree with the first part of Socrates' argument (41b11-d4, cf. Delcomminette 2006, p. 401), which refers back to the case of somatic *pain* triggering a desire and pleasant antici-

pation. The key sentence in the second part of the argument (42b2-6) is grammatically difficult, but amenable to a construal in line with the example of pleasant anticipation: anticipating a desired future pleasure, one brings it closer to the mind's eye and, by the same token, creates a mental distance from the current somatic pain (taking διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἑκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι as indicating the switching of the distances whenever the mental focus turns). This reversal alters the appearance and thus affects the mind's comparative assessment (ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας). This is plausible phenomenologically: feeling thirsty and longing for a glass of water, the apparent intensity of the anticipated pleasant act is liable to become inflated (cf. Wolfsdorf 2013, p. 86, Gadamer 1931, p. 140).

13 Cf. 42b8-c3. The idea of subtracting (ἀποτεμόμενος) the unreal part from an *inflated* hedonic impression (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν) is still quite intuitive, but the sentence in question speaks of subtraction with respect to both inflated and deflated pleasures and pains. In the case of deflation, this would have to be subtraction of the *negative* numerical value relative to the real size. The sentence also assumes two levels of distinguishable inflated or deflated things, the φαινόμενον (the pleasant or painful act or situation as it appears?) and the correlating feeling of pleasure or pain (τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον).

14 Cf. *R*. 583cd. The *Philebus* does not give an example.

15 D. Frede 1993, p. 39 (n. 2) and 1997, p. 273 (n. 83) claims that the *Philebus* is committed to the "facticity" or "incorrigibility" of pleasure (an idea suggested by Socrates in the form of a question at 36e5-8) and that the segment on merely apparent pleasure formulates not an actual phenomenon, but a theoretical idea held by some philosophers. However, while it is true that 42c-44a introduces this notion as a lead-up to Socrates' critique of the extreme anti-hedonist, his introductory remark at 42c5-7 (cf. 51a3-6) extends the experience of this kind of illusion not just to ordinary people, but to sentient living beings in general. In the *Republic* (583d-585a), merely apparent pleasure is also clearly presented as a real-life phenomenon. Cf. Whiting 2014: p. 29-32; Fletcher 2018.

16 Wolfsdorf 2013 also uses the terminology of semantic and representational *versus* ontological truth or falsehood, but classifies the second type differently, viz., as a form of representational falsehood (p. 89*f*, 99*f*), arguing that in this case the pleasure is still real qua pleasure, only its size is misjudged. Yet see n. 11 above. The fact that Plato tries to reduce this second type, FA-*part*, to FA-*whole* also indicates that he sees them as closely related.

17 In 42c5-7 (cf. 51a3-9), Socrates transitions to the discussion of FA-*whole* and UTMix (ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας … φαινομένας [=FA-*whole*] τε καὶ οὔσας [=UTMix]) by saying that these are "even more false (ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον)" than FA-*part*; cf. D. Frede 1997, p. 265, 274*f*; also Wolfsdorf 2013, p. 88.

18 In 51a, Socrates states that intense mixed pleasures are "ostensibly (φανταθείσας) both intense and numerous," while they are actually "kneaded together with pains as well as release from most intense pains." The φανταθείσας should not be interpreted as a denial of the reality of the hedonic components in mixed pleasure since the same sentence clearly distinguishes them from the case of merely apparent pleasures (τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς). In this regard, the argument of the *Philebus* differs from that of the *Republic*, where he does seem to reduce mixed pleasure to a mere appearance of pleasure (584d-585a, 586a-c). The context of 51a is important: Socrates is driving at the idea that the intensity of these pleasures makes them appear more real than the pure pleasures he is going to discuss next, which is why hedonists of a certain kind–the type represented by the fictional character of Philebus, or the real personality of Aristippus the elder–no less than their anti-hedonist opponents like to focus on them. In truth, those pure pleasures are the more real ones (cf. 44d-45c together with 52d-53c). The intensity of such hedonic motions has nevertheless a basis in reality since the underlying strong imbalance in the body or the soul causes intense desires, the satisfaction of which results in violent hedonic motions (cf. Stallbaum 1842, p. 53).

19 Gosling 1975, p. 224 mentions the distinction between "elements in the good life" and "elements that make some contribution to its goodness." Cf. Vogt 2017, p. 19-27 on the meaning of the question "What is the good?" in the *Philebus*.

20 63a1-2 (cf. 62a-c, d1-3) mentions two criteria, positive utility value (ὠφέλιμον) and the absence of negative utility value (not causing harm, ἀβλαβές), connecting them with a τε...καὶ-construction. I take this to mean that a good skill has to be *both* useful *and* such as not to be, in its specific nature, a source of harm.

21 This theory is only adumbrated; cf. 20d, 60bc on goodness and desirability; 64c-e on the connection of goodness and beauty with the presence of fitting measures and proportions (μετριότης, ἐμμετρία, συμμετρία) (cf. Frede 1997, p. 359*f*); 30a-c, together with 25b-26c, on how intellect, operating as a cause, provides mixture with fitting measures and proportions and thus generates stable well-ordered being both in individual people and in the entire cosmos; 66ab on the primacy of measure and proportion among the constitutive factors of the human good.

22 This notion of the good is referred to in 22d5-7 (cf. 64c7-9) ("whatever this thing is thanks to which, when acquired, [the mixed] life becomes both desirable and good"). Socrates argues that scientific understanding and knowledge has a particularly high degree of kinship to this principle (65d), yet

he attributes measuredness also to the class of pure pleasures (52cd).

23 In 62d8-e1, Socrates remarks that they can no longer apply the Mixing Rule as planned since they have already allowed impure forms of knowledge into the mixture before starting to add pure specimens of pleasure. However, this should not be understood as a dismissal of this rule, but as an acknowledgement of the flaws in the actual course of their investigation. They have followed the rule at least partially, at any rate, since they added the pure forms of cognition before the impure forms. They'll do the same with regard to pleasures, as we will see.

24 Socrates justified his focus on purity by referring to the following methodological principle for comparative evaluation: The comparative assessment of cognition and pleasure ought to be based on an evaluation of their pure specimens, since only those can reveal the intrinsic nature and value of the phenomenon in question (52d6-e4, 55c4-9, 57a9-b2, cf. 32c6-d6). In the segment that actually carries out the comparative evaluation (64c-66a), Socrates lets Protarchus take the lead, and he fails to restrict the comparison to pure specimens. But the Mixing segment and the Final Ranking (66a-d) make use of the distinction between pure and impure specimens.

25 Plato distinguishes between a pleasure's *being grounded in a belief* and its *grounding a belief* (e.g., a belief about the occurrence of a pleasure or its size and quality); cf. 41d1-42b7; 21c4-5, 60d7-8.

26 The dialogue does not present a proof of the life-enhancing capacity specifically of pure pleasures. The initial argument for the inclusion of pleasure (21d9-e4) simply appeals to the intuition that a life totally devoid of pleasure would not be worth living. Yet in 52c1-d1, Socrates emphasizes that pure pleasures are characterized by measuredness (ἐμμετρία), which gives them some degree of kinship with the good (cf. n. 21 above) and thus renders them desirable also from the view-point of reason (cf. 63e3-4). Their measuredness is presumably due to the absence of the pleasure-pain dynamic, which causes the limit-transgressing intensity of impure pleasures (cf. 45a-e). It is also supported by the nature of their objects.

27 Cf. 63d2-e3. Compatibility with the primary cognitive and hedonic ingredients is necessary for preserving the overall unity and cohesion of the mixture.

28 The sentence goes on to evoke an analogy between human and cosmic good, hinting at an underlying "form" (ἰδέα). I am leaving this out since this reference to a universal good is not immediately relevant for the argument at hand.

29 Cf. Waterfield 1982, p. 143 (n. 4) and Migliori 1993, p. 304, who don't offer much of an argument, unlike Cooper 1977, p. 724–30, who argues the case compellingly, yet limits the "necessary pleasures" to pleasures of the virtuous satisfaction of *appetitive* needs, which is too narrow according to my reading. Ionescu too argues for the inclusion of mixed pleasures, but qua "true pleasures" (2019, p. 63-68); this is, however, based on her claim that Plato separates between the criteria of truth *vs.* falsehood and *purity* vs. *impurity*, whereas 53a-c clearly indicates that Plato views purity as a form of (ontological) truth. Note also that a pleasure that is not genuine, qua pleasure, because of the compresence of pain could still be true in other regards, e.g., because its pleasure component is based on a true expectation.

30 Cf. Gosling/Taylor 1982, p. 139; Frede 1997, p. 353*f*; Warren 2014, p. 151.

31 E.g., Gosling 1975: p. 133; Frede 1997, p. 351; Delcomminette 2006, p. 552*f*.

32 Cf. n. 24 above.

33 Fletcher 2014 argues that pleasures of anticipation can also be free of pain, citing 32c6-d6 as evidence, yet this sentence can be translated in different ways depending on the reference of ἐν γὰρ τούτοις … ἑκατέροις and the meaning of ἀμείκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς. The text might even be corrupt (Diès and others). Since anticipations are linked to desires, painlessness is certainly not something grounded in their nature, even if they might sometimes be experienced without pain.

34 Delcomminette 2006, p. 555 wants to subsume the pleasures of virtue under the pure pleasures of reasoning, but there is no supporting evidence for this reading in Plato's text.

35 Cf. 53c-55c. Some commentators argue that the fact that the Socrates character does not claim authorship for the process theory indicates that Plato is not committed to it. But Socrates twice expresses his gratitude to the alleged authors of this theory (53c6-7, 54d4-6), and his own account of somatic pleasures already suggested that pleasure is a path toward οὐσία (32b3), thereby implying that it is a process (γένεσις). Gosling/Taylor 1982, p. 153*f* and Fletcher 2014, p. 133–35 claim that this theory clashes with Socrates' views on anticipatory pleasure and pure pleasure. Yet hedonic anticipations anticipate future process-like fillings, and pure pleasures are the perceived filling of an unfelt lack (51b5, 51e7-52b5). A shortcoming of the theory in 53c-55c is that it fails to mention that somatic processes have to have an impact on the soul to be felt as pleasure.

36 Cf. 49bc: ignorant people, if powerful, inspire not ridicule but fear and hatred; and 49d3-4: it is just to cheer if these people suffer some misfortune. Accordingly, just people will, for instance, fear and hate a tyrant (who, for Plato, is always someone ignorant of what is truly good), but cheer his downfall. We can infer that the same mix of emotions would also arise if the person were not only a passive observer, but directly involved in the toppling of the tyrant, performing an act of justice. This can be transferred to all virtuously motivated punitive

acts. On the virtuous rationale behind punitive action, e.g., *Grg.* 525bc.

37 Cf. *R.* 440b-d, *Ti.* 70ab on the painful thymoeidetic reaction to the experience of injustice and impulse for courageous fight, and *Phlb.* 12d on the sense of satisfaction associated with virtuous acts.

38 Cf. *Phdr.* 253d-256e; the *Philebus* too mentions *erôs* as a source of mixed pleasure (47e1, 50c1).

39 On the difference between human and divine modes of life see 32d9-33b11 (cf. 22c3-6, 30a, 55a).

40 *Republic* 581d10-e4 provides an interesting parallel, referring to all pleasures that are pleasures not of learning, but of the appetitive or thymoeidetic parts of the soul (cf. 580de), as merely *necessary* components of a philosopher's life. 586d4-587a6 asserts that the appetitive and thymoeidetic parts can enjoy their (relatively) truest pleasures whenever they are guided by reason. These better forms of appetitive and thymoeidetic pleasure correspond, at least roughly, to the virtuous and healthy, but mixed, pleasures endorsed in T-1. The example of toppling a tyrant would be an instance of a mixed thymoeidetic pleasure under the guidance of reason.

41 Cf. Damascius' commentary (1959), §§ 251–257, who reports that Syrianus and Proclus took the sixth rank to be occupied by pleasures that are necessary and/or impure. The middle Platonist Plutarchus, on the other hand, cites this passage as an example of Plato's estimation of the number 5 (cf. *De E apud Delphos*, 391de). The few supporters of the sixfold among modern commentators include Shorey 1933, p. 327*f* (whose suggestion that the sixth rank is reserved for Phileban pleasures is unacceptable); Hackforth 1945, p. 140 (n. 3); Taylor 1956, p. 91; Guthrie 1978, p. 236; Waterfield 1982, p. 32–35. If the attribution of six ranks is correct, there is also merit in the Neoplatonic proposal (reported in Damascius) that the six classes are arranged in three pairs such that the first member of each pair represents the pure manifestation of the genus in question (measure by itself, pure science, pure pleasure).

42 Translation partly based on West 1983. The ambiguity of the *Philebus* passage is in part due to the vagueness of the preposition ἐν. I take it that it has to be understood here either as "in the presence of" or in a temporal sense ("in/at the time of"); cf. LSJ *s.v.* ἐν.

43 Cf. West 1983, p. 116–139. West argues that the sixth generation in this theogony (viz., the children of Zeus, and especially Dionysus) conveys "the poet's religious message" (p. 136). Hence any contemporary Greek reader at least vaguely familiar with this theogony could not fail to realize that there are six classes.

44 Cf. Frede 1997, p. 366*f*.

45 In T-1, Socrates specifies the pleasures to be excluded as "τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας (*suppl.* ἡδονάς)" (63e7-8) and sets them in opposition to "τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς (*suppl.* ἡδονάς)" (63e4-5). In these two contrasting descriptions, ἀφροσύνη functions as the antonym of τὸ σωφρονεῖν, while the phrase ἡ ἄλλη κακία encompasses not only intellectual and ethical defects in general, but also bodily defects (because of the opposition to μεθ' ὑγιείας). In my formulation of NC-*kakia*, I simply distinguish between bodily and ethical or intellectual defects.

46 Cf. *Ly.* 217a-218c on badness as a condition incompatible with pursuit of the good.

47 Criterion C-*purity* is irrelevant for this question despite the fact that Socrates used the language of truth in his phrasing of this criterion. For it presents only a sufficient, not a necessary condition for inclusion in the mixture. Moreover, the talk of truth in this passage, as we have seen, does not relate to semantic or representational truth, but to the genuineness of hedonic motions that are real and painless.

48 E.g., *Men.* 84a-c, *Cra.* 428d, *Sph.* 228e-230e; cf. Szaif 2017.

49 Witness the self-characterization of the *Timaeus* as εἰκὼς μῦθος (29d2, 68d2), which builds on the metaphysical epistemology of *Republic* V–VII; cf. *Phlb.* 58e-59c.

50 Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics tried to refute the objection that suspension of judgment would result in *apraxia*. Yet the success of their defensive arguments is doubtful, and Plato was not a radical sceptic.

51 He mentions two arts closely associated with political craft: strategy (56b) and rhetoric (58b-d). Both involve projections of outcomes with a significant degree of uncertainty.

52 In *R.* 477e, Socrates attributes infallibility to the philosopher-ruler's knowledge (ἐπιστήμη); but in the same argument, he also confines the subject range of infallible ἐπιστήμη to the Forms.

53 This is not to say that there can't be desperate circumstances in which one tries to help with little hope of succeeding, just so as not to forgo even the smallest chance. However, such a situation does not lend itself to joyful anticipation.

54 In 40c, Socrates calls false anticipatory pleasures "ridiculous" imitations of true pleasant anticipations (μεμιμημέναι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα). The discussion of "ridiculousness" (τὸ γελοῖον) in 48c-49c identifies ignorance about oneself, and especially the foolish conceit of wisdom, as the form of badness (πονηρία) that makes weak people look ridiculous. Given how careful a writer Plato is, it is tempting to connect the two passages and to suggest that the remark in 40c contains an implicit critique of foolishness and lack of self-knowledge as the root-cause of false anticipations (cf. Frede 1997, p. 257; Teisserenc 1999, p. 296). However, since the *Philebus* acknowledges the need for error-prone

conjectural and stochastic modes of thinking, this gibe can be directed only at the false anticipations of the (all too many) fools.

55 Cf. Frede 1997, p. 194-202, 355*f.*

56 Cf. Szaif 1996/98, p. 49-56; 2018, p. 13 on the attributive usage of "ἀληθής."

57 This is confirmed by the subsequent comments in 64d3-65a6, which list truth as one of the three main qualities (alongside measuredness and beauty) that explain the goodness of the mixture as a whole.

58 Cf. 55e-56b, cf. 56cd, 57b-58a, 58e-59c; εἰκάζειν and stochastic: 55e5, 7, 56a4, 6, 62c1.

59 The adjective "false" in this sentence should be understood as qualifying both "ruler" and "circle." This is also an instance of *ontological* falsity: the circle and ruler are not strictly circular or straight by the standards of pure geometry. They deviate from this ideal standard. Yet because of this deficit in the object, the corresponding type of applied knowledge cannot attain the same degree of *epistemic* truth as in pure geometry. Cf. Szaif 1996/98, p. 72-163, 300-324; 2018, p. 18-26 on Plato's use of the truth terminology in the context of his metaphysical epistemology.

60 See also 58b9-d8, which can be read as cautioning us against simplistic inferences from truth to goodness or *vice versa*. Socrates grants Gorgias that the art of rhetoric may be the most useful, and thus best, form of expertise, but insists that it is not the purest or truest exemplification of knowledge. Socrates' remark, notwithstanding the irony in his deference to Gorgias, signals to the reader that an undifferentiated equation of truth/genuineness and goodness/benefit is to be avoided.

61 E.g., Frede 1993, p. liii; Evans 2008, p. 90*f* (his "Grounding Thesis"); Warren 2014, p. 3; Whiting 2014, p. 43*f.*

62 *Pace Gadamer* 1931, p. 138*f*, Kenny 1960, p. 51*f*, and especially the "new school" interpretations (cf. n. 6 above), I find it unnecessary to assume that the claim in 40b is meant to convey Plato's (or Socrates') understanding of divine providence.

63 Accepting Apelt's conjecture κἀχρήστους.

64 The Greek wording of the last sentence in T-2 (41a5-6) could be understood as hinting at a distinction between pleasures that are inherently bad (because they are false?) and pleasures that are bad because of some bad condition like vice or illness associated with them. Yet it might also merely acknowledge that any bad pleasure requires the presence of some form of badness. At any rate, Socrates is here only mentioning a topic of further investigation, not endorsing a specific result.

65 E.g., Evans 2008, p. 91.

66 It is hardly adequate to describe the exchange in this passage as "Socrates hold[ing] his ground" (Whiting 2014, p. 43). Socrates neither sticks to his suggestion nor explicitly disowns it, but only hints that they might return to the topic later.

67 A strict equivalency of falsehood and badness would also suggest a correlation of the factual truth of an anticipation with goodness (as the opposite of badness). The vicious anticipatory pleasures of a succeeding despot would then (absurdly) qualify as good.

68 It is hard to see how NC-*kakia*, which hinges on the underlying bad condition of one's body or soul, could be reduced to NC-RepF as a special case of NC-RepF. The underlying belief of an anticipatory pleasure is about a future state of affairs, and bad actors don't always go wrong in their particular expectations. The "new school"-reading (n. 6 above) seems to come down to the idea that the belief underlying a false anticipatory pleasure is wrong about what is truly enjoyable, which would make it a case of disorientation about some general truth that also holds in the present. But the example in 40a9-12 together with 40c8-d10 entail that the truth or falsehood of an anticipatory pleasure is a function of whether or not the expected future state of affairs will come to pass.

69 An earlier version of this essay was written for the IX. West Coast Plato Workshop at NAU. Thanks to Emily Fletcher and Gail Justin for commenting on this draft and to George Rudebusch and Julie Piering for hosting the conference.

La broma de Sócrates inspirado: *Fedro* 238d y *Crátilo* 396d

The joke of Socrates inspired: *Phaedrus* 238d and *Cratylus* 396d

Jonathan Lavilla de Lera
University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU)
jonathan.lavilla@ehu.eus
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0558-8806

Javier Aguirre Santos
University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU)
javier.aguirre@ehu.eus
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6828-7085

RESUMEN

El presente artículo defiende que Platón bromea cuando su Sócrates afirma estar inspirado o bajo posesión divina en *Fedro* 238d y *Crátilo* 396d. Para ello, primero se sitúan en contexto ambos pasajes; a continuación, se muestra que a lo largo de todo el *corpus* Platón contrapone el conocimiento y el arte (τέχνη) al falso saber y a la inspiración (ἐνθουσιασμός); en tercer y cuarto lugar respectivamente, leemos los pasajes en cuestión en función de esta contraposición, para mostrar que hay que desconfiar de cuanto dice Sócrates cuando burlonamente afirma estar inspirado.

Palabras clave: Platón, humor, *techne*, *enthousiasmos*, dialéctica.

ABSTRACT

The current paper holds the thesis that Plato is joking when his Socrates claims to be inspired or under divine possession in *Phaedrus* 238d and *Cratylus* 396d. In order to prove this, first, both passages are read in their context; then, it is shown that throughout the whole *corpus* Plato contrasts knowledge and art (τέχνη) to false knowledge and inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμός); finally, the two abovementioned texts are interpreted according to this contrast, showing, thus, that the reader must be wary of Socrates' words when he teasingly claims to be inspired.

Keywords: Plato, humor, *techne*, *enthousiasmos*, dialectic.

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_11

1. SÓCRATES INSPIRADO. *FEDRO* Y *CRÁTILO*

Es[1] bien sabido que en la obra de Platón el humor es un recurso muy habitual. En ella encontramos bromas, juegos de palabras, imitaciones paródicas, chascarrillos burlones y comedia de situaciones. También es conocido que los recursos cómicos de Platón están al servicio de una eficaz transmisión de contenidos serios. Su recurso al humor nunca es inocente, nunca es gratuito y nunca atañe simplemente a los personajes del diálogo. En las siguientes páginas trataremos de ilustrar esta afirmación refiriéndonos a una broma que Sócrates utiliza en dos pasos claves del *Fedro* y el *Crátilo*. Se trata de una broma relacionada con una cuestión ampliamente desarrollada por el ateniense en numerosos diálogos: la inspiración o posesión divina.

En un célebre paso del *Fedro* asistimos a esta conversación entre Sócrates y Fedro, un personaje que no destaca por ser experto en nada, sino por potenciar que los demás ofrezcan discursos –en esta ocasión trae consigo un texto de Lisias que lo ha fascinado– y por seguir las tendencias a la moda de la época, como las doctrinas de los sofistas y de ciertos médicos:[2]

> Sóc. – Pero, oh, amigo Fedro, ¿no te parece, como a mí, que he pasado un trance de inspiración divina (θεῖον πάθος)?
> Fedr. – En efecto, Sócrates, contra lo acostumbrado se ha apoderado (εἴληφεν) de ti una vena de elocuencia.
> Sóc. – Escucha en silencio entonces. Pues en verdad parece divino el lugar, de suerte que si al avanzar mi discurso quedo poseído por las ninfas (νυμφόληπτος), no te extrañes; que por el momento ya no ando muy lejos de entonar un ditirambo. (238d. Trad. Gil, 2009)

En esta ocasión, Sócrates introduce una pausa en su primer discurso sobre el amor para hacer este comentario. Cabe recordar, según las palabras de Sócrates (*Fedro*, 234e-236a), que aparentemente este discurso pretende superar estilísticamente al discurso de Lisias leído por Fedro, al que achaca defectos de forma. No obstante, ambos discursos sostienen una sola tesis, a saber, que siendo el amor una enfermedad, lo mejor es relacionarse con quien no está enamorado.

En un paso del *Crátilo* asistimos a una conversación similar entre Sócrates y Hermógenes, un convencionalista del lenguaje:

> Herm. – Y por cierto, Sócrates, simplemente me parece que de golpe profetizas como los posesos (ἐνθουσιῶντες).
> Sóc. – Realmente, Hermógenes, hago responsable en primer lugar a Eutifrón Prospaltio de que esta sabiduría me sobreviniera, porque desde el amanecer he estado mucho con él y le presté oídos. Me temo, entonces, que estando él poseído (ἐνθουσιῶν) no sólo me haya llenado los oídos de sabiduría demónica (δαιμονίας σοφίας), sino que también haya cautivado (ἐπειλῆφθαι) mi alma (396d. Trad. Mársico, 2006).

Este breve paso ocurre inmediatamente después de que Sócrates haya expuesto un extenso análisis etimológico de los nombres de algunos personajes y divinidades de la mitología griega. Aparentemente, su intención era defender la postura naturalista de los nombres. Hermógenes atribuye la magnífica exposición de Sócrates a una posesión divina similar a la que sufren los que recitan oráculos y Sócrates responde recordando al piadoso Eutifrón.

Que Sócrates se sirva de la inspiración divina para justificar su discurso, tanto en

el *Fedro* como en el *Crátilo*, es un argumento para defender de modo razonable que nos encontramos ante a una broma en un contexto irónico en el que Platón pretende rechazar no sólo las tesis previamente defendidas, sino también el modo en que se justifica el discurso, desenmascarando lo que revestido bajo la apariencia de saber no es sino ignorancia. En concreto, Sócrates utiliza frecuentemente la inspiración divina para indicar que ciertos discursos carecen de fundamento, a pesar de que puedan contener hermosas expresiones y a pesar de que puedan estar formalmente bien construidos; o expresado de otro modo: para indicar que nos encontramos ante un discurso que no está vinculado al conocimiento de la verdad.

Frente a la inspiración divina o ἐνθουσιασμός y el presunto saber, Sócrates presenta la τέχνη como modelo y criterio de conocimiento,[3] que, vinculada al conocimiento de la verdad, aparece así como la legítima fuente del discurso. El mensaje de Sócrates en el *Fedro* y el *Crátilo* –también en otros diálogos– es que ciertas figuras de la tradición, tanto antiguas como modernas, están desprovistas de τέχνη, de modo que su actividad está desvinculada del conocimiento. En ese grupo Sócrates incluye a poetas, rapsodas, sofistas, intérpretes de oráculos, logógrafos y redactores de leyes. Y frente a todos ellos, Sócrates sitúa al dialéctico, al filósofo. Por medio de esta distinción Sócrates separa a aquellos que emplean la retórica, esto es, un discurso que al persuadir produce mera creencia, y a los filósofos, cuyo discurso, cuando persuade según sus propósitos, produce saber (cf. p. ej. *Gorgias* 454c-455a y 458e6-459a1).[4] Este es el contexto general en el que debemos entender la recurrente broma del Sócrates inspirado. Antes de volver a los dos diálogos, veamos más de cerca este contexto general.

2. ΤΕΧΝΗ Y ἘΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΜΟΣ EN LA OBRA DE PLATÓN

La reflexión platónica en torno al ἐνθουσιασμός y a la τέχνη está ligada a su preocupación por la formación de ciudadanos para el recto gobierno de la ciudad. En un contexto político de fuerte carácter polémico existe un gran interés por parte de Platón en negar que ciertas figuras intelectuales posean la capacidad de educar en la excelencia; la vía para conseguirlo es negarles la condición de expertos (τεχνῖται). La expresión más clara de todo ello se encuentra en un célebre pasaje de la *República* referido a los poetas pero aplicable a otros personajes de la tradición.[5] Sócrates dice así:

> De otras cosas no pediremos cuentas a Homero ni a ningún otro de los poetas, preguntándoles si alguno de ellos era médico o sólo imitador de los discursos de los médicos, ni preguntaremos a quiénes se dice que cualquiera de los poetas antiguos o recientes ha sanado, como Asclepio, o qué discípulos de medicina ha dejado tras de sí, como éste dejó a sus descendientes, ni los interrogaremos en lo tocante a las otras artes; dejémoslos pasar. Pero en cuanto a los asuntos más bellos e importantes de los que Homero se propone hablar, lo relativo a la guerra y el oficio de general, al gobierno de los Estados y a la educación del hombre, tal vez sea justo preguntarle inquisitivamente: "Querido Homero, (...) ¿cuál Estado fue mejor gobernado gracias a ti, como Lacedemonia gracias a Licurgo y, gracias a muchos otros, numerosos Estados grandes y pequeños? ¿Qué Estado te atribuye ser buen legislador en su beneficio, como lo atribuyen Italia y Sicilia a

> Carondas y nosotros a Solón? (...) ¿Puedes mencionar uno?" (X, 599b-e. Trad. Eggers Lan, 1982).

Con estas palabras Sócrates niega que Homero posea una τέχνη, no sólo en el ámbito de la medicina, sino tampoco en el del gobierno, legislación, defensa y educación de la ciudad. Sócrates niega que Homero posea un conocimiento real como guía y educador de los ciudadanos en la excelencia. La noción de τέχνη está operando, pues, como modelo y criterio de conocimiento. Desde esta perspectiva, se entiende la impaciencia de Calicles cuando en el *Gorgias* le reprocha a Sócrates "hablar continuamente de zapateros, cardadores, cocineros y médicos" (491a. Trad. Calonge, 1983). Pero lo realmente reseñable para el tema que nos ocupa es que Platón presenta la τέχνη y el ἐνθουσιασμός como alternativas excluyentes, algo, por otro lado, absolutamente extraño a toda la tradición hasta el momento.

El lugar donde Platón desvincula τέχνη y ἐνθουσιασμός de un modo más claro y explícito es en el *Ion*. Según lo expuesto en el diálogo, dada una τέχνη, puede afirmarse que alguien la posee sólo en el caso de que sea capaz de juzgar cualquier asunto que caiga dentro del dominio de esa τέχνη. Según un segundo criterio, a cada τέχνη le corresponde una y sólo una función propia en un dominio determinado.[6] A lo largo del breve diálogo, Sócrates muestra que estos dos criterios –el *criterio de totalidad* y el *criterio de especificidad* respectivamente– no son satisfechos ni por Ion ni por Homero. Ni el rapsoda ni el poeta poseen un ámbito propio y completo de conocimiento. Y de ahí que Sócrates atribuya la actividad de ambos a otra fuente; esa otra fuente es la inspiración divina.

La inspiración divina también es un tema frecuentemente tratado por Platón. Desde la *Apología* y el *Ion* hasta las *Leyes*, el inspirado suele aparecer como alguien sometido a una fuerza no sólo irracional sino también externa. Es nuevamente en el *Ion* donde el tema es más extensamente desarrollado. A lo largo de su célebre monólogo (533c9-536d4), Sócrates explica el origen de la actividad rapsódica y poética recurriendo a una fuerza divina (θεία ... δύναμις, 533d3) procedente de la Musa. Y la analogía socrática de la piedra magnética y los anillos imantados expresa la idea de que el buen poeta y el buen rapsoda son meros instrumentos pasivos de una fuerza divina exterior que, asimismo, son capaces de transmitir al auditorio (cf. 535e-536d), algo que, en nuestra opinión, tiene unas consecuencias políticas de enorme transcendencia. A lo largo del monólogo Sócrates hace hincapié una y otra vez en la naturaleza irracional y externa de la inspiración, afirmando que los poetas componen "sin estar en su juicio" (οὐκ ἔμφρονες ὄντες, 534a; ἔμφρονες δὲ οὖσαι οὔ, 534a), dominados y poseídos por el furor báquico (βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι, 534a) o cuando "la inteligencia ya no está en ellos" (ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ, 534b); Sócrates se sirve también de numerosas metáforas en esa dirección, como la referencia a las ninfas, las abejas o los ríos de leche y miel (534a-b).

Adviértase que cuando Platón critica el ἐνθουσιασμός, más que contra un proceso de posesión divina, en realidad, está cargando contra la incapacidad de los poetas para dar cuenta del discurso que difunden; es decir, critica que su presunto saber, en realidad, es mera creencia, ignorancia. El motivo es que el fundamento y valor del discurso del poeta no radica en la fuerza de sus argumentos, sino en su belleza formal y en el peso de la tradición. Es decir, el concepto de ἐνθουσιασμός, contrapuesto al de τέχνη, denuncia que determinados discursos muy en boga son incapaces de

justificarse por sí mismos o autónomamente. Por el contrario, según Platón, quien posee una τέχνη no sólo es capaz de justificar el valor de lo que dice a partir del propio discurso, sino que debe ser capaz de transmitir su saber. De este modo, el filósofo ateniense establece la distinción entre aquel discurso que, pese a persuadir, no constituye un saber fundado, y el discurso persuasivo que transmite un auténtico saber. Por ello, no ha de extrañar que en los diálogos también se empleen términos que indican posesión y arrebato para denunciar determinados discursos no poéticos que no constituyen un auténtico saber.

Un ejemplo significativo de lo anterior lo hallamos también en el *Menéxeno*, diálogo en el que Platón denuncia el arrebato que producen entre el público asistente los discursos fúnebres de los oradores, independientemente de que éstos respondan o no a verdad, es decir, no como consecuencia de que contengan un auténtico saber, sino debido a su placentera apariencia:

> Sóc. – Ciertamente, Menéxeno, en muchas ocasiones parece hermoso morir en la guerra. Pues, aunque uno muera en la pobreza, se obtiene una bella y magnífica sepultura, y además se reciben elogios, por mediocre que uno sea, de parte de hombres doctos que no reparten sus alabanzas a la ligera, sino que han preparado durante mucho tiempo sus discursos. Hacen sus alabanzas de una manera tan bella, diciendo de cada uno las cualidades que posee y las que no posee y matizando el lenguaje con las más hermosas palabras, que hechizan nuestras almas. Ensalzan a la ciudad de todas las maneras y a los que han muerto en la guerra y a todos nuestros antepasados que nos han precedido y a nosotros mismos que aún vivimos nos elogian de tal forma, que por mi parte, Menéxeno, ante sus alabanzas, me siento en una disposición muy noble y cada vez me quedo escuchándolos como encantado, imaginándome que en un instante me he hecho más fuerte, más noble y más bello. Como de costumbre, siempre me acompañan y escuchan conmigo el discurso algunos extranjeros, ante los cuales en seguida me vuelvo más respetable. Parece, en efecto, que ellos, persuadidos por el orador, también experimentan estas mismas sensaciones con respecto a mí y al resto de la ciudad, a la cual juzgan más admirable que antes. Y esta sensación de respetabilidad me dura más de tres días. El tono aflautado de la palabra y la voz del orador penetran en mis oídos con tal resonancia, que a duras penas al tercer o cuarto día vuelvo en mí y me doy cuenta del lugar de la tierra donde estoy; hasta entonces poco faltaba para creerme que habito las Islas de los Bienaventurados; hasta tal punto son diestros nuestros oradores (234c1-235c6. Trad. Acosta, 1983).[7]

Esta analogía trazada por Platón entre el mecanismo poético y el retórico aparece de forma si cabe más clara en el *Gorgias*, en un contexto de tono marcadamente político[8] (cf. Fussi, 2006, p. 65-66). En una discusión entre Sócrates y Calicles en la que de fondo se está cuestionando quién debe gobernar en la ciudad, Platón establece una analogía entre los poetas –en este caso trágicos– y los maestros de retórica, precisamente, por hablar ambos desprovistos de τέχνη, que, como se ha señalado, es el requisito fundamental exigido por Platón para poder desempeñar cierta función con garantías:

> Sóc. – (...) si se quita de toda clase de poesía la melodía, el ritmo y la medida, ¿no quedan solamente palabras?/ Cal. – Forzosamente./ Sóc. – ¿Y no se pronuncian estas palabras ante una gran multitud, ante el pueblo?/ Cal. – Sí./ Sóc. – Luego la actividad poética es, en cierto modo, una forma de oratoria popular./ Cal. – Así parece./ Sóc. – Por consiguiente, será oratoria popular de tipo retórico, ¿o no crees que se comportan como oradores los poetas en el teatro?/ Cal. – Sí lo creo./ Sóc. – Pues ahora hemos encontrado una forma de retórica que se dirige a una multitud compuesta de niños, de mujeres, de hombres libres y de esclavos, retórica que no nos agrada mucho porque decimos que es adulación (502c5-d3. Trad. Calonge, 1983).

En el fondo, Sócrates critica tanto la educación tradicional griega, la música, como la nueva, que viene de la mano de sofistas y rétores, y que se reviste de una apariencia mucho más racionalizante. En los ejemplos del *Menéxeno* y del *Gorgias* vemos que Platón asimila la retórica y la política –ya sea anterior o contemporánea– a la música,[9] en cuanto preocupada exclusivamente por procurar placer o deleite[10] –arrebato– en el auditorio, sin importarle el saber y la verdad (cf. Petrucci, 2014, p. 195, n. 110). Es decir, como en el *Ion*[11] y en la *República*, nuevamente aparece la idea de que la buena política y el buen discurso –ya sea en verso o en prosa– no son otros que los sometidos a la verdad, esto es, los que constituyen τέχνη.[12] La crítica a poetas, maestros de retórica o políticos que recurren al furor y al deleite para cautivar a su auditorio trata de desenmascarar que los supuestos portadores de un saber son en realidad ignorantes que ignoran serlo. Frente a ellos, Sócrates reclama responsabilizarse de los propios límites de nuestro conocimiento, es decir, de nuestra ignorancia, poniendo en todo momento a prueba nuestras creencias y tratando de advertir sus límites, con el propósito de alcanzar, en la medida de lo posible, un conocimiento bien fundado.[13] Resumiendo lo visto hasta ahora: Sócrates establece una oposición entre τέχνη y ἐνθουσιασμός como fundamentos del discurso. Y desde esa oposición hay que entender la broma del *Fedro* y el *Crátilo*.

3. ΤΕΧΝΗ Y ᾽ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΜΟΣ EN EL *FEDRO*

Efectivamente, también en el *Fedro* y el *Crátilo* hay una crítica a ciertos discursos y a ciertas figuras intelectuales que justifican la broma sobre la inspiración socrática. En el caso del *Fedro*, la reflexión no se dirige a la creación poética en particular sino a la elaboración de discursos orales y escritos en general. La tesis de Sócrates es que "no es vergonzoso el hecho en sí de escribir discursos. [...] Pero esto otro [...] sí lo es: el no hablar ni escribir bien, sino mal y de una manera vergonzosa" (258d. Trad. Gil, 2009); y que lo relevante es "escribir con τέχνη o sin τέχνη" (τέχνῃ καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο, 277b). Nuevamente aparece la τέχνη como legítima fuente del discurso, algo que queda muy claro al final del diálogo, donde Sócrates afirma lo siguiente:

> Antes de que alguien vea la verdad de aquello sobre lo que habla o escribe, y llegue a ser capaz de definir cada cosa en sí y, definiéndola, sepa también dividirla en sus especies hasta lo indivisible, y por este procedimiento se haya llegado a conocer a fondo la naturaleza del alma, descubriendo la clase de palabras adecuadas

> a la naturaleza de cada una, y establezca y adorne el discurso de manera que dé al alma compleja discursos complejos y multisonoros, y simples a la simple, no será posible que se llegue a manejar con arte (τέχνῃ) el género de los discursos (τὸ λόγων γένος) [...], ni para enseñarlos ni para persuadir. (277b-c. Trad. Lledó, 1986)

Sócrates vincula la τέχνη a la verdad y a la buena retórica, que, en este y otros pasos, identifica con la dialéctica.[14] A lo largo del diálogo, Sócrates vuelve frecuentemente sobre su idea de buena retórica, que en numerosos lugares relaciona con la τέχνη (271c, 272a-b, 273a, 277a-b, etc.), la verdad (259e, 260d, 262a, 262c, 266b, etc.), la dialéctica (263b, 265d ss., 270d-e, 273d-e, 276e, etc.) y la ἐπιστήμη (269d). No es esa la idea que Fedro tiene de la retórica: ante la pregunta de Sócrates de si no es "un requisito necesario para los discursos que han de pronunciarse bien y de una forma bella el que la mente del orador conozca la verdad de aquello sobre lo que se dispone a hablar" (259e. Trad. Gil, 2009), la respuesta de Fedro es que, según ha oído,

> a quien va a ser orador no le es necesario aprender lo que es justo en realidad, sino lo que podría parecerlo a la multitud, que es quien va a juzgar; ni tampoco las cosas que son en realidad buenas o malas, sino aquellas que lo han de parecer. Pues de estas verosimilitudes procede la persuasión y no de la verdad (259e-260a. Trad. Gil, 2009).

El modelo intelectual de Fedro no sólo es Lisias, sino también ciertos médicos –Acúmeno, Erixímaco, etc.– (cf. 227a y *Banquete* 176d) y sofistas –Gorgias, Protágoras, Hipias, Pródico, etc.–, personajes todos ellos que son nombrados a lo largo del diálogo (cf. 269d). Y es según ese modelo que Fedro elabora su discurso. En realidad, ni siquiera lo elabora, puesto que se limita a una pueril repetición de lo escrito por otro, que carece de fundamento.[15] Lo mismo que los poemas de Homero constituyen la acrítica fuente del rapsoda Ion, el texto de Lisias constituye la acrítica fuente de Fedro.[16] En ambos casos nos encontramos ante interlocutores con una actitud pasiva y vinculados a una fuente heterónoma del discurso. En ambos casos se da una ausencia de conversación del alma consigo misma. Y, de hecho, hacia el final del diálogo, Sócrates llega a comparar el tipo de oratoria practicada por los rétores y oradores con la rapsodia (cf. 277e, 278a).

Así pues, frente a la τέχνη, Sócrates sitúa nuevamente la inspiración como fuente ilegítima del discurso. En esta ocasión, el filósofo se sirve también de numerosas referencias, algunas de ellas ya presentes en el *Ion*, como los coribantes (228b), los ritos báquicos (234d) o las Musas (237a, 259b). Y tras el brusco final de su primer discurso, afirma estar en posesión de las Ninfas (ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, 241e). Incluso el excepcional marco físico en que se produce el diálogo –fuera de la ciudad, al mediodía, junto al río, bajo un platanero y con el sonido de las cigarras– transmite la imagen de un espacio propicio a la posesión irracional.[17] Sócrates recurre también a imágenes originales, como la de la vasija (235d), que se llena de fuentes ajenas y que ilustra el modo en que Fedro asume y repite acríticamente los discursos ajenos, como el de Lisias o los del propio Sócrates.[18] Se trata de una cuestión de gran importancia, pues frente a la recepción pasiva del discurso externo –oral o escrito–, Sócrates reivindica aquel discurso que "unido al conocimiento

se escribe en el alma del que aprende; aquel que por un lado sabe defenderse a sí mismo, y por otro lado hablar o callar ante quienes conviene" (276a. Trad. Gil, 2009). Según indica Vegetti (2003, p. 4), los diálogos de Platón no buscan lectores, sino interlocutores; Platón no concibe la filosofía como un sistema formado por un conjunto de dogmas, sino como un diálogo vivo del alma consigo misma –y con otros– en busca de la verdad. Así, el par de contrarios interior/exterior aparece nuevamente en el *Fedro* como una cuestión fundamental relativa a la naturaleza autónoma o heterónoma del discurso.[19] Y en ese contexto cabe entender la broma de Sócrates inspirado, que asume pasivamente –acríticamente– la tesis del discurso de Lisias, como si del propio Fedro se tratase.[20] No sólo eso, cabe defender que el elogio a la inspiración poética y a otras formas de locura divina defendidas en la palinodia responden, en parte,[21] a este motivo.[22]

Resulta interesante indicar en este punto que la crítica a la inspiración, en el fondo, casa con un elemento harto conocido en el *corpus* y muy presente en este diálogo: Sócrates afirma seguir el precepto délfico "conócete a ti mismo" (γνῶθι σαυτόν),[23] lo cual implica, entre otras cuestiones, advertir los límites del conocimiento propio. Frente a los poetas inspirados que presumen poseer un conocimiento omnisciente y los personajes como Fedro que creen se portadores de un saber por el hecho de haber memorizado un texto como el de Lisias, Sócrates reclama responsabilizarse de la propia ignorancia. La reivindicación de la ignorancia socrática constituye una crítica del presunto saber de los poetas, sofistas y políticos, que no sólo ignoran cuanto creen conocer, sino que desconocen también su propia ignorancia. Frente a ello, la ignorancia socrática reclama llevar una vida examinada, esto es, poner a prueba nuestras creencias y examinar todo discurso, independientemente de la fuente de la que provenga. De forma significativa, Sócrates alude al autoconocimiento en *Fedro* 229e-230a, afirmando no tener tiempo más que para intentar conocerse a sí mismo. Pues bien, en ese contexto, hay una serie de pasajes (cf. p. ej. 227c, 228a-c, 230c-e, 236b-e, 242a8-b2) en los que cada personaje afirma conocer a su interlocutor, aunque en realidad, sólo Sócrates se conoce a sí mismo y a quien tiene delante, frente a un Fedro que se desconoce a sí y a aquél, característica que Sócrates aprovecha para parodiarlo, ahora mediante la imitación (cf. Griswold 1986, p. 29 y Sala 2007, p. 51-52), ahora mediante el recurso a formas arcaizantes como la inspiración poética o los misterios de Eleusis.[24] En definitiva, la crítica al entusiasmo responde directamente al carácter de Fedro, que incapaz de decir nada por sí mismo se limita a repetir, como una vasija, cuanto le llega de fuera. Según ha indicado Griswold (1986 *passim*), uno de los grandes temas del diálogo es el autoconomiento. No en vano, para poder aprender en qué consiste el auténtico arte retórico, Fedro primero tiene que conocerse a sí mismo, es decir, tiene que advertir su propia ignorancia, hasta reconocer que lo que habitualmente ha entendido por "arte retórico", en realidad, nada tiene de arte o τέχνη.

4. ΤΕΧΝΗ Y ἘΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΜΟΣ EN EL *CRÁTILO*

En el *Crátilo*, el tema tratado es la corrección de los nombres (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων), y la cuestión planteada, si los nombres son correctos por naturaleza (φύσει) o más bien

por acuerdo o convención (νόμῳ). A lo largo del diálogo van apareciendo otros temas relacionados con el uso de los nombres y su relación con la realidad. Nuevamente encontramos la oposición entre τέχνη e inspiración, y la dialéctica como vía de conocimiento.

Las referencias a la τέχνη se dan en el contexto en que, contra el convencionalismo de Hermógenes (385e-390e), Sócrates señala la necesidad de un νομοθέτης,[25] un experto (τεχνίτης) capaz de imponer nombres correctos según la naturaleza de las cosas. En su exposición, Sócrates compara la labor del νομοθέτης a la de otros expertos, como el tejedor, el carpintero, el herrero, el citarista, el piloto o el dialéctico. ¿En qué consiste su labor? Sócrates plantea lo siguiente:

> ¿Acaso, entonces, querido amigo, también es necesario que el nominador (νομοθέτης) sepa colocar en sonidos y sílabas el nombre que naturalmente corresponde a cada cosa, y mirando hacia el nombre en sí haga y coloque todos los nombres? Pero si cada nominador no coloca las mismas sílabas, no hay que sorprenderse, porque tampoco todo herrero moldea en el mismo hierro cuando fabrica el mismo instrumento para el mismo fin. Al contrario, mientras apliquen la misma forma, ya sea en el mismo o en otro hierro, de todos modos el instrumento es adecuado, ya lo haga alguien aquí, ya entre los bárbaros. ¿No es así? (389d-390a. Trad. Mársico, 2006).

Es particularmente interesante la comparación de Sócrates entre el tejedor y el νομοθέτης, pues la actividad de uno es separar los tejidos (κερκίζειν) y la del otro separar las palabras (ὀνομάζειν). Y también es muy significativa la presencia del dialéctico como supervisor del νομοθέτης.[26] Lo cual deja en evidencia que, para Platón, los nombres pueden estar bien o mal puestos, y que la única manera de saberlo –y de corregirlos– consiste en conocer la realidad mediante la técnica dialéctica. Platón proclama la τέχνη como modelo de conocimiento sistemático y, en el ámbito del lenguaje, la supervisión de los términos le corresponde al dialéctico. Expresado diversamente, los nombres son un instrumento al servicio del conocimiento, pero no puede conocerse la realidad mediante el mero análisis de los nombres, ya que, al ser posible que los nombres estén mal puestos o que se empleen mal, siempre es necesario contrastar la idoneidad de los mismos con la realidad. Todo ello concuerda, por otro lado, con el presupuesto platónico de que, en contra de Protágoras (*El hombre es la medida de todas las cosas*) y de Eutidemo (*Todo es igual para todos al mismo tiempo y en todo momento*) y en contra de Heráclito (*el flujo universal*), hay un fundamento ontológico en las cosas y en las acciones, y que ese fundamento ontológico es independiente de nosotros, de nuestra opinión y del lenguaje. En efecto, Sócrates afirma:

> es evidente, por cierto, que las cosas existen con una esencia propia constante, no relativa a nosotros, ni tampoco arrastradas arriba y abajo por nuestra imaginación, sino que existen por sí mismas en relación con la esencia propia que tienen por naturaleza (386d-e. Trad. Mársico, 2006).

Sócrates señala además que los hombres buenos son los sensatos (φρόνιμοι) y los malos, los insensatos (ἄφρονες), diferenciando entre los primeros y los segundos en la medida en que los primeros reconocen el

fundamento ontológico de la realidad y los segundos, en cambio, no (cf. 386b-c). Y en cuanto a las acciones, afirma que "también las acciones actúan según su propia naturaleza, no según nuestra opinión" (387a. Trad. Mársico, 2006); cortar o quemar se llevan a cabo según su naturaleza y con el instrumento adecuado, no según nuestra opinión.[27] También *debería* ser así en lo que atañe a la acción de nombrar (ὀνομάζειν), por más que, de hecho, no siempre se cumpla este anhelo platónico. En resumen, vemos que la tarea de nombrar es lo suficientemente importante como para considerarla una labor del τεχνίτης y del dialéctico bajo el horizonte de la ontología de las Formas.

¿Qué papel juega la inspiración divina en este diálogo? En nuestra opinión, se trata de una broma que, en contra de lo que pueda parecer en un primer momento, cargaría principalmente contra el naturalismo de Crátilo.[28] Cabe añadir, en cualquier caso, que no tenemos unos claros referentes de ella. ¿Está defendiendo Crátilo una concepción arcaica del lenguaje, donde la palabra aparece, bajo el manto de la magia y la sacralidad, intrínsecamente unida a la realidad? No podemos afirmarlo con seguridad, pero quizá debamos pensar al respecto en el piadoso Eutifrón, que a lo largo del diálogo aparece nombrado en seis ocasiones. En ese sentido, Crátilo sería incapaz de captar que al elaborar su falsa defensa del naturalismo Sócrates está burlándose de su tesis, hasta el punto de decirle lo que sigue: "y me parece, Sócrates, que cantas oráculos con bastante inteligencia, ya sea por haberte inspirado (χρησμῳδεῖν) junto a Eutifrón, ya sea que alguna otra Musa te hubo tomado antes inadvertidamente" (428c. Trad. Mársico, 2006).

Crátilo no niega un origen humano del lenguaje (él acepta la figura del νομοθέτης); simplemente exige un vínculo necesario entre nombre y ser. Cómo se concreta ese vínculo es, precisamente, lo que Sócrates le pide a lo largo de la sección etimológica y nadie, ni él ni el propio Sócrates, consigue ofrecer una respuesta mínimamente sólida. Así, creemos con Baxter (1992, p. 86-163), Barney (2001) y Salgueiro Martín (2021) que buena parte de la etimología y de la fonoalegoría desplegada por Sócrates puede entenderse en clave crítica y paródica;[29] Sócrates expone el naturalismo para criticarlo desde dentro.[30] También creemos con Mársico que, en general, se está cargando contra aquellos que en la época clásica defendían la adecuación de los nombres, que sostenían una concepción del lenguaje muy diferente a la de Platón:

> la época clásica está atravesada por la práctica de la "adecuación de los nombres" (*orthótes onomáton*), que comprende al lenguaje de un modo muy diferente a Platón. Para los cultores de la *orthótes*, el lenguaje no es una entidad de doble naturaleza que cobija la verdad y el error, sino un correlato exacto de la realidad automáticamente verdadero. El lenguaje resulta entonces una vía legítima para el conocimiento de lo real: quien conoce los nombres, conoce también las cosas. El *Crátilo* está enteramente dedicado a rebatir esta idea, a los efectos de despejar el terreno para el desarrollo de la Teoría de las Formas, señalando que el lenguaje puede servir para mostrar lo real, pero también es habitualmente vehículo para el error. (Mársico, 2006, p. 10-11)

Si tenemos en cuenta que "la cuestión de la «adecuación de los nombres» es fundamentalmente una preocupación sofística" (Mársico,

2006, p. 20)[31], no ha de extrañar que Platón emplee irónicamente el recurso de la inspiración divina, pues, según se ha expuesto, en varios diálogos hace lo mismo con claro afán polémico contra sofistas y poetas. Esto es, el ropaje con el que se viste esa parodia crítica de la adecuación de los nombres (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων) es la inspiración divina.

Por su parte, Hermógenes muestra de entrada una concepción en la que la palabra aparece, bajo el manto del individualismo y el subjetivismo, como si estuviera totalmente desvinculada de la realidad. Su nombre aparece junto al de Protágoras, Pródico o Eutidemo, si bien Hermógenes se separa explícitamente del relativismo extremo de Protágoras y su convencionalismo se torna bastante más moderado y sensato en la medida que avanza la conversación;[32] y además, distingue muy claramente entre bautizar las cosas y usar los nombres. Lo arbitrario, para él, parece más bien lo primero, no su posterior uso. No parece ésa una postura insensata ni radical: los nombres por sí solos no tienen valor de verdad (cf. Platón, *Sofista*, 259d-268d). Por ello, pensamos que mediante el recurso de la inspiración Sócrates podría estar criticando no sólo el convencionalismo de Hermógenes, sino también su propio carácter, en la medida en que su opinión cambia muy fácilmente al principio del diálogo, en cuanto Sócrates lanza las primeras críticas contra el convencionalismo. En efecto, Sócrates critica que ciertos personajes se dejen condicionar excesivamente por las opiniones de los supuestos expertos de turno.[33] Teniendo en cuenta cuanto acabamos de decir sobre la postura convencionalista de Hermógenes, pensamos que a Platón no le interesa criticar el convencionalismo en sí mismo, sino señalar cierto peligro que no se liga tanto a la tesis concreta de Hermógenes como a un convencionalismo mucho más radical en el que el acto de nombrar no ha de ir supeditado a un conocimiento técnico de la realidad designada. Es decir, Platón quizás está viendo el peligro de la incorrecta designación de las cosas, en llamar "cobardía" a la sensatez, por ejemplo, como recuerda Tucídides que sucede durante la guerra. Platón ve que, en cuanto materia prima del lenguaje, los nombres alteran el *lógos* y entiende que hay que nombrar correctamente las cosas para que las cosas no se confundan. Y para ello hace falta la labor del dialéctico sobre una ontología de las Formas (cf. Salgueiro Martín y Lavilla de Lera, 2021), cuyo conocimiento resultaría indispensable para que pueda entenderse que para Platón se pueda hablar de nombres mejores y peores (cf. *Crátilo*, 392 a-b). Es por ello que, al final del diálogo, tras haber criticado el naturalismo desde dentro (cf. Salgueiro Martín 2021) y denunciado un convencionalismo radical, Platón abre la puerta al convencionalismo, pero reclamando, como siempre, la necesidad de pensar por uno mismo y sopesar adecuadamente el valor de las hipótesis planteadas independientemente de cuál sea su fuente.

5. CONCLUSIONES

Como conclusión de todo lo dicho hasta el momento, cabe afirmar que la alusión a la inspiración divina en *Fedro* 238d y *Crátilo* 396d ha de entenderse en clave irónica. Mediante esta broma socrática Platón denuncia polémicamente en estos y otros diálogos la falta de fundamento de ciertos discursos y saberes, como la poesía y la retórica. Frente a ellos, Platón propone un discurso y un conocimiento técnico, su filosofía, cuya piedra angular sería la dialéctica.

Referencias bibliográficas

Acosta, E. (trad.) (1983). *Menéxeno*. En: Platón. *Diálogos II*. Gredos, Madrid, p. 161-190.

Aguirre, J. (ed.) (2013). *Platón y la Poesía:* Ion (introducción, traducción y comentarios de J. Aguirre). Plaza y Valdés, Madrid.

Aguirre, J. (2016). *Téchne* and *Enthousiasmós* in Plato's Critique of Poetry. *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 72 (1), p. 181-197.

Ademollo, F. (2011). *The Cratylus of Plato: A commentary*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511779022

Barney, R. (1998). Socrates Agonistes: the Case of the *Cratylus* Etymologies. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 16, p. 63-98.

Barney, R. (2001). *Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus*. Routledge, New York.

Baxter, T. (1992). *The* Cratylus. *Plato's critique of naming*. Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln.

Bonazzi, M. (ed.) (2011). Platone, *Fedro* (traduzione e cura di M. Bonazzi). Einaudi, Firenze.

Calonge, J. (trad.) (1981). *Critón*. En: Platón. *Diálogos I*. Gredos, Madrid, p. 193-211.

Calonge, J. (trad.) (1983). *Gorgias*. En: Platón. *Diálogos II*. Gredos, Madrid, p. 23-145.

Cassin, B. (1995). *L'effet sophistique*. Gallimard, Paris.

Eggers Lan, C. (ed.) (1982). Platón, *Diálogos VI: República* (introducción, traducción y notas de C. Eggers Lan). Gredos, Madrid.

Fussi, A. (2006). *Retorica e potere: una lettura del* Gorgia *di Platone*. Ezizioni ETS, Pisa.

Gil, L. (ed.) (2009). Platón: *Fedro* (edición bilingüe, introducción y notas). Dykinson, Madrid. (1ª ed. Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957).

Gonzalez, F. J. (1998). *Dialectic and dialogue: Plato's practice of philosophical inquiry*. Northwestern University Press, Illinois.

Gonzalez, F. J. (2017). Plato's perspectivism. *Plato Journal* 16, p. 31-48. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_16_4

Griswold, C. L. (1986). *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*. Yale University Press, Yale.

Helmer, É. (ed.) (2019). Platon: *Ménexène* (introduction, nouvelle traduction [texte grec en regard] et commenatire). Vrin: Paris.

Kahn, C. (1996). *Plato and the Socratic dialogue*: *the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lavilla de Lera, J. (2016). Fedre: dramatis persona. *Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia* XXVII, p. 169-192. https://doi.org/10.2436/20.3001.01.61

Lavilla de Lera, J. (2018) The Prayer to Pan of Plato's Phaedrus (279b8–c3): An Exhortation to Exercise the Philosophical Virtue, *Symbolae Osloenses* 92, n. 1, p. 65-106. https://doi.org/10.1080/00397679.2019.1584443

Lavilla de Lera, J. (2021a). La dicotomía interior/exterior en el *Fedro* de Platón. Pensamiento, 77 (293), p. 41-63. https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i293.y2021.003.

Lavilla de Lera, J. (2021b) *Ironía platónica en el Fedro de Platón*. En: Lavilla de Lera, J. y Aguirre Santos, J. (eds.). *Humor y filosofía en los diálogos de Platón*. Anthropos-UAM Iztapalapa, Barcelona-México D.F., p. 291-300.

Lledó, L. (trad.) (1986). *Fedro*. En: Platón. *Diálogos III*. Gredos, Madrid, p. 309-413.

Mársico, C. (ed.) (2006). Platón: *Crátilo* (introducción, traducción y notas). Losada, Buenos Aires.

Monserrat, J. (2010). Sobre la escritura de la filosofía. *Alpha* 31, p. 39-54.

Mouze, L. (ed.) (2007). Platon: *Phèdre* (introduction, traduction, notes et bibliographie). Le Livre de Poche, Paris.

Narcy, M. (1992). La leçon d'écriture de Socrate dans le *Phèdre* de Platon. En A.A.V.V. *ΣΟΦΙΕΣ ΜΑΙΗΤΟΡΕΣ. "Chercheurs de sagesse": hommage à Jean Pépin*. Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris, p. 77-92.

Penner, T. (1992). Socrates and the early dialogues. En: Kraut, R. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 121-169.

Petrucci, F. M. (trad.) (2014). Platone: *Gorgia* (a cura di A. Taglia e traduzione di F. M. Petrucci). Einaudi, Firenze.

Poratti, A. (ed.) (2010). Platón: *Fedro* (introducción, traducción, notas y comentario). Ediciones Istmo, Madrid.

Roochnik, D. (1996). *Of art art and wisdom: Plato's understanding of techne*. The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

Rosen, S. (1968). *Plato's* Symposium. Yale University Press, New Haven.

Sala, E. (2007). *Il* Fedro *di Platone*. *Commento*. Tesis doctoral. Università Degli Studi di Padova, Padova. http://paduaresearch.cab.unipd.it/891/1/tesi_SALA_EVA.pdf

Salgueiro Martín, D. (2021). Sócrates infiltrado: ironía y juego etimológico como estrategias refutatorias en el Crátilo de Platón. En: Lavilla de Lera, J. y Aguirre Santos, J. (eds.). *Humor y filosofía en los diálogos de Platón*. Anthropos-UAM Iztapalapa, Barcelona-México D.F., p. 280-290.

Salgueiro Martín, D. y Lavilla de Lera, J. (2021) Conocer, hablar y nombrar según Platón: una lectura cruzada del *Fedro* y del *Crátilo*. *Artículo inédito*.

Sales, J. (1996). *A la flama del vi: estudis sobre l'ensenyament platònic*. Barcelonesa d'edicions, Barcelona.

Sedley, D. (2003). *Plato's* Cratylus. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Szlezàk, T. A. (1989). *Platone e la scrittura della filosofia* (introduzione e traduzione di G. Reale). Vita e pensiero, Milano.

Taglia, A. (ed.) (2014). Platone*: Gorgia* (a cura di A. Taglia e traduzione di F. M. Petrucci). Einaudi, Firenze.

Trabattoni, F. (2009). *Platone*. Carocci, Roma.

Ustinova, Y. (2017). *Divine* Mania*: Alteration of Consciousness in Ancient Greece*. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315098821

Vegetti, M. (2003). *Quindici lezioni su Platone*. Einaudi, Tornio.

Werner, D. (2011). Plato on Madness and Philosophy. *Ancient Philosophy*, 31, n. 1, p. 47-71. https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20113113

Werner, D. (2012). *Myth and Philosophy in Plato's* Phaedrus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139108737

Notes

[1] Este trabajo ha sido financiado por el proyecto de investigación "Los usos del humor en Platón. Ironía, humor y filosofía en los diálogos platónicos (UHP) – Programa Logos Fundación BBVA de ayudas a la investigación en el área de Estudios Clásicos 2019". Quisiéramos agradecer también los valiosos comentarios de las personas que han revisado de forma anónima este artículo, que han contribuido en gran medida a aumentar la calidad del texto.

[2] Para una caracterización del Fedro histórico y del personaje platónico, véase Lavilla de Lera (2016).

[3] Adviértase que esta misma contraposición entre ἐνθουσιασμός y τέχνη aparece a lo largo del *corpus* plasmada a través de otros términos análogos. Por ejemplo, en el texto del *Fedro* citado anteriormente vimos que se empleaba la expresión θεῖον πάθος –equivalente a ἐνθουσιασμός– para indicar la falta de fundamento que acompaña a un discurso; asimismo, en no pocos pasajes encontramos el término ἐπιστήμη –equivalente a τέχνη– para referirse a su opuesto, esto es, a un saber bien fundado. En ese sentido, pensamos que en buena parte de los diálogos platónicos los términos ἐπιστήμη y τέχνη son perfectamente sinónimos; Penner (1992, p. 149, n. 14) y Roochnik (1996, p. 90) han demostrado suficientemente esta cuestión en lo que atañe a los diálogos tempranos y pensamos que lo mismo podría decirse en el caso del *Fedro* y del *Crátilo*, pese a tratarse de diálogos de madurez.

[4] Para esta distinción del discurso persuasivo apuntada en el *Gorgias*, véase Calvo (1986, p. 144-145). De forma similar, al comentar el diálogo, Taglia (2014, p. xvii-xviii) distingue entre una persuasión que crea mera creencia –la πειθὼ πιστευτική– y otra, bien distinta, que procura enseñanza –la πειθὼ διδασκαλική. Así, según ha indicado Mouze (2007, p. 150, n. 1), no hay que olvidar que enseñar también es persuadir.

[5] El presente artículo parte del presupuesto de que el conjunto de la obra platónica posee carácter unitario. En ese sentido, bebemos de enfoques como el de Kahn (1996) y Gonzalez (1998 y 2017), considerando que, si bien el Sócrates platónico se expresa de forma diversa en los distintos diálogos, prestar atención al componente dramático de cada diálogo, al carácter de los interlocutores de Sócrates y al objetivo de este último en cada caso permite superar esta aparente incoherencia. Esto es, partimos de la tesis holística de que en la filosofía platónica, presentada en forma de diálogo, el contenido y la forma, así como lo que los personajes dicen y hacen, siempre está indisociablemente unido de forma harmónica (cf. Monserrat 2010). Captar correctamente el mensaje de Platón y el de su Sócrates exige considerar no sólo lo que los personajes dicen, sino también cómo lo dicen, quiénes son y de qué modo actúan. Del mismo modo que el Sócrates platónico adapta su discurso al carácter de sus interlocutores (cf. p. ej. Gonzalez 1998 y 2017) y al objetivo que persigue en cada caso, también el propio Platón varía el enfoque y los matices de cada diálogo en función de sus objetivos y temas. En el fondo, creemos con Narcy (1992: 79-81) que Sócrates siempre dice lo mismo a lo largo del *corpus*, representando en todo momento una defensa de la filosofía tal y como Platón la concibe, por más que ello en ocasiones se haga mediante tesis que *aparentemente* parezcan opuestas.

6 Para un análisis más amplio de los dos criterios que debe cumplir toda τέχνη, véase Aguirre (2013, p. 93-116 y 2016).

7 Para un comentario detallado acerca de este pasaje, cf. Helmer (2019, p. 78-94).

8 Taglia (2014, p. xxx), entre otros, subraya el carácter político del *Gorgias*, hasta el punto de considerarlo junto a la *República* y las *Leyes* uno de los grandes diálogos políticos del fundador de la Academia.

9 Como recientemente ha notado Petrucci (2014, p. 197, n. 112), la idea de que la poesía constituya un discurso acompañado de armonía y ritmo es ofrecida por el propio Gorgias (*Elogio de Helena*, 9) y también es referida por Isócrates (*Antídosis*, 46-47); por su parte, además de en el *Gorgias*, Platón la trae a colación en *República* 398d-e con claro objetivo polémico.

10 Así, en *Gorgias* 513b-c puede encontrarse una imagen análoga a la de la piedra magnética del *Ion*. De la misma forma que el deleite de la música es el elemento que engarza al auditorio, al poeta y a la Musa, el placer del discurso retórico es el elemento que traba al auditorio y al orador. Adviértase que esta imagen manifiesta que no sólo el auditorio es cautivo del poeta y del orador en la medida en que es deleitado o persuadido, pues, análogamente, el poeta y el orador están a merced del auditorio, ya que para ganarse su favor deben hablar en todo momento de forma que colmen sus anhelos y expectativas.

11 Pese a que no se emplee ningún término que denote posesión ni se haga referencia a la poesía, también es posible trazar un paralelismo entre la poesía y la retórica en el *Laques*. En 197d1-5, Sócrates critica a Nicias por ofrecer un discurso incapaz de defenderse a sí mismo y cuya única fuerza son su mayor o menor capacidad persuasiva –la cual, según Laques (197d6-8), parece provenir de una vana capacidad de parecer ingenioso (κομψεύεσθαι), cuyo valor político es nulo– y la autoridad de provenir del profesor de música Damón, que a su vez ha aprendido de Pródico. Según ha indicado Gonzalez (1998, p. 34), Nicias es el típico personaje platónico que se enorgullece de un presunto saber que ha adquirido de un tercero. Así, pues, igual que el rapsoda Ion justifica su saber en Homero y éste en la Musa, Nicias justifica su saber en Damón, cuya autoridad proviene en buena medida de haber aprendido de Pródico. Las palabras de Nicias en 200a4-c1 parecen reforzar esta tesis: ante las diversas dificultades y contradicciones que subrayan sus interlocutores en su discurso, él señala que serán corregidas y superadas en otro momento con la ayuda de Damón. Esto es, Nicias no es capaz de socorrer su propio discurso y, si tenemos en cuenta las enormes dificultades que muestran los supuestos expertos a la hora de justificar su presunto conocimiento ante Sócrates en los diálogos, no es probable que Damón lo sea. Nuevamente, vemos que la inspiración critica la incapacidad de ciertos discursos para justificar cuanto exponen.

12 En ese sentido, en la medida en que Platón concibe el conocimiento –al menos idealmente– de forma *técnica*, juzgamos que en los distintos pasajes en los que el Sócrates platónico habla en favor de la *manía* divina, en realidad, no está siendo serio (*pace*, Ustinova, 2017, p. 313-328). El presente artículo se limita a subrayar y defender esta cuestión en lo que atañe a dos diálogos concretos, siendo conscientes de que, a fin de justificar más sólidamente esta hipótesis aplicada a todo el *corpus*, cabría abordar la tarea de hacer lo mismo en los restantes pasajes en los que Sócrates se vincula con la posesión divina y la asocia a la filosofía.

13 El presente texto tiene por objetivo subrayar el contraste neto trazado por Platón entre ἐνθουσιασμός y τέχνη. Con ello no defendemos, sin embargo, que Platón crea que el conocimiento humano sea tal que pueda alcanzar un saber técnico, concluyente y válido de una vez por todas. Más bien, pensamos que la τέχνη sirve de marco ideal al que se aspira y desde el que se critica a todos aquellos que presumen de ser expertos sin serlo. Dicho esto, si prestamos atención a pasajes como *Banquete* 203b-204c en los que –a través de la genealogía del *éros*–se describe la filosofía o si nos fijamos en el Sócrates de los diálogos, que no acostumbra a ofrecer definiciones precisas ni explicaciones concluyentes y técnicas, parece que lo más razonable es concluir que el saber filosófico, en realidad, se sitúa en un nivel intermedio, entre la ignorancia de los supuestos sabios y la certeza técnica. El filósofo afirma saber solamente que no sabe nada, pues es consciente de que no es sabio, en el sentido de que no posee un conocimiento de tipo técnico e infalible; no obstante, partiendo de dicha ignorancia consciente, el filósofo trata, en la medida de sus posibilidades, de ensanchar los límites de su conocimiento y de alcanzar un tipo de saber fundado. En este sentido, no es casual que Sócrates hable en favor de la *ignorancia consciente* en los diálogos o que reivindique la práctica de la mayéutica, pues, a diferencia de poetas y sofistas, no cree que el conocimiento pueda transmitirse de forma heterónoma, mediante el aprendizaje memorístico de una serie de proposiciones o definiciones, modelo que en buena medida critica bajo la fórmula del ἐνθουσιασμός. Del mismo modo, cabe recordar que los diálogos tienen una naturaleza abierta, que obliga al lector a reflexionar sobre todo lo expuesto para repensar sus propias creencias, y también las expuestas por el resto de interlocutores, incluido Sócrates. Según ha indicado Trabattoni (2009, p. 21), "ningún diálogo (...) es tan aporético que no haga dar un paso adelante en la investigación o que no sugiera, al menos de modo implícito, cierto tipo de solución; y ningún diálogo es tan concluyente que haga que las soluciones propuestas en él aparezcan como verdaderas, absolutas o definitivas" (trad. de

los autores). Así, tanto Sócrates como Platón evitan dar definiciones fijas que puedan transmitirse memorísticamente y, en cambio, ponen en marcha y muestran un nuevo modelo de saber, el filosófico, que situándose a medio camino entre la ignorancia plena y el conocimiento cierto, constituye un intento siempre renovado de revisar continuamente nuestras propias opiniones y de pensar y de vivir de la forma más coherente posible. Para una lectura más amplia y desarrollada de este enfoque, véase Gonzalez (1998 *passim*).

14 Según ha indicado Cassin (1995, p. 419) comentando el *Fedro*, en Platón la buena retórica equivale a la dialéctica, mientras que la retórica criticada es la retórica tradicional de los sofistas y oradores. Adviértase en cualquier caso que esta distinción entre dos tipos de retórica ya es anunciada en *Gorgias* 504a-b y 527c: Sócrates distingue entre la retórica tradicional, que meramente se preocupa de adular al auditorio y procurarle placer –de forma similar a como vimos en la cita del *Menéxeno*–, y una retórica noble, que consiste en hablar con τέχνη a fin de hacer mejores a los ciudadanos. Esta forma noble de retórica, que no es sino la dialéctica, es también la única y verdadera τέχνη retórica, según indica el propio Sócrates (cf. Fussi, 2006, p. 68). Frente a los políticos y oradores anteriores y contemporáneos, Platón reclama una nueva forma de hablar y de gobernar –¡es tan novedosa que Calicles es incapaz de pensar en algún ejemplo de político que la haya utilizado (504d ss.)!–, cuyo fundamento ha de ser un saber bien fundado y que apunte hacia el bien. Taglia (2014, p. xliii, n. 58) también ha advertido el paralelismo entre el tipo de retórica reivindicada en el *Fedro* y esta forma *técnica* de la retórica apuntada en el *Gorgias*, a la que se refiere mediante la expresión "*retorica positiva*" (Taglia, 2014, p. xliii).

15 Poratti ha captado magistralmente la necesidad que siente Platón en su época de dotar de un fundamento sólido al discurso: "El siglo v maduro, en que el *Lógos* queda obliterado y los *lógoi* humanos, las múltiples palabras y discursos, ocupan el espacio de su ausencia. Y tras el colapso, la percepción del vacío en el que los *lógoi* ya no son capaces de sostenernos y la posición de «dar razón», *didónai lógon*, la exigencia y la posición de un *fundamento*. No casualmente, el último episodio se desarrolla en Atenas: la posición del fundamento *como ausencia* (Gorgias). La consciencia de esa ausencia como abismo y la consiguiente re-posición del fundamento buscado (Sócrates-Platón). Y por último, la posición-positiva del fundamento (Platón)" (Poratti, 2010, p. 15). El propio Sócrates platónico lo expresa de forma nítida en distintos pasajes del *corpus*, como, por ejemplo, en *Critón* 46b4-6: "yo, no sólo ahora sino siempre, soy de condición de no prestar atención a ninguna otra cosa que al razonamiento (μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ) que, al reflexionar (λογιζομένῳ), me parece el mejor" (trad. Calonge, 1981).

16 Por lo demás, este texto guarda un claro paralelismo con el pasaje del *Laques* comentado previamente, en el que Nicias justificaba la fuerza de su argumento no ya de forma intrínseca, sino por provenir del maestro Damón, que, a su vez, había aprendido junto al ingenioso Pródico. A este respecto, a González (1998, p. 34-36) no le ha pasado desapercibido el hecho de que Nicias es el típico personaje que presume de poseer un presunto saber recibido acríticamente de un tercero, hasta el punto de que, además de las tesis de Damón, al final del diálogo también echa mano –aunque de forma antifilosófica– de tesis de marcado cuño socrático.

17 Bonazzi (2011, p. 55, n. 63) ha advertido que el contexto bucólico de la conversación del *Fedro*, fuera de los muros de la ciudad y muy inusual respecto al resto de los diálogos, contribuye en buena medida a justificar la inusual elocuencia retórica socrática, así como los múltiples pasajes en los que el de Alopece afirma estar bajo distintas formas de posesión (p. ej., la ninfolepsia, la posesión divina en general o la locura erótica). El entorno rural y la reiteración con la que Sócrates alude a las fuerzas paranormales sirven, en buena medida, como contrapunto de la postura urbanita, sutil (κομψός) y racionalista pero yerma de Lisias y Fedro. Precisamente, en distintos lugares hemos argumentado que, en este diálogo, la insistencia socrática en revestirse irónicamente de un aire arcaizante e irracional –hasta el punto de identificar la filosofía con la locura erótica (cf. *Fedro* 245b1-257a2) o con la iniciación mistérica (cf. *Fedro* 249c)– responde a la voluntad de incordiar a su interlocutor y denunciar la esterilidad de las posturas racionalizantes pero antifilosóficas de Fedro y de Lisias (cf. Lavilla de Lera 2018, 2021a y 2021b).

18 Resulta interesante advertir que en el *Banquete* la actitud de Fedro no difiere de la mostrada en el diálogo aquí comentado, ya que su discurso sobre el amor, más que de autoría propia, constituye un *collage* de ideas y tesis que Fedro ha escuchado de otros, como Hesíodo, Homero, Acusilao, Parménides, Esquilo y Eurípides. Con mucho acierto, Rosen (1968, p. 46) ha indicado que su discurso no argumenta propiamente a partir de un análisis de la naturaleza del amor, sino a partir de lo que *otros* han dicho al respecto. Una vez más, vemos que Fedro es el típico personaje que se limita a recoger y repetir lo que dicen las voces autorizadas de turno. Para un comentario del discurso de Fedro en el *Banquete*, además del texto de Rosen, véanse Sales (1996, p.14-18) y Lavilla de Lera (2016, p. 176-181).

19 Sobre la importancia que tiene la dicotomía interior/exterior en el *Fedro*, véase Lavilla de Lera (2021a).

20 Hay que tener en cuenta que Fedro es un personaje que vive siempre en función de opiniones y factores externos, como la opinión de Lisias o la meteorología y el paisaje. Análogamente, al final

del diálogo, Sócrates le asignará el rol de heraldo, limitándose a ser el portavoz de lo dicho por otros, que él asume de buen grado (cf. 278b7-d1; 278e4. Cf. también Lavilla de Lera 2018, p. 93 y 98, n. 16). Esto es, pese a que Sócrates use para sí mismo la imagen de la vasija en 235d, en realidad, el que actúa como un recipiente vacío que se limita a recibir y a verter las aguas de otros es Fedro. Sócrates está *imitando* a su interlocutor cuando dice comportarse bajo la influencia de potencias externas, por más que la naturaleza de la fuente externa que influye sobre el agente sea muy dispar en ambos casos. Véase Lavilla de Lera (2018, p. 78; 2021a; 2021b).

21 Otro motivo a tener en cuenta es que Sócrates está jugando a pinchar –como un tábano– a su interlocutor, tratando de mostrarle que sus creencias, por el mero hecho de ser modernas, no son mejores que las antiguas. Según ha indicado Griswold (1986, p. 24), Fedro da muestras durante el diálogo de no tener en gran estima la tradición ni las opiniones de los antiguos, pero no porque posea cierta capacidad crítica (cf. Werner, 2012, p. 20), sino a causa de que, según ha indicado Szlezàk (1989, p. 74), es un ferviente admirador de las vanguardias intelectuales de la época. Así, el tábano de Atenas, por momentos, juega a reverenciar todo lo antiguo frente a lo novedoso –véanse, por ejemplo, los pasajes en los que Sócrates defiende la inspiración divina, los lugares en los que se habla contra la interpretación racionalizante de los mitos, el paso en el que se recurre al mito de Theuth y Thamus, o la plegaria al dios Pan al final del diálogo–, no ya por convicción, sino para aguijonear a su interlocutor. Es decir, el hecho de que en el *Fedro* se aluda de forma tan marcada a fuentes de inspiración irracional y que se parangone la propia práctica filosófica con actividades no estrictamente racionales respondería en buena medida al carácter de Fedro.

22 En ese sentido, nuestra lectura coincide completamente con la de Werner (2011, p. 62), quien sostiene que, contrariamente a lo que la lectura literal del diálogo sugiere, no hay que pensar que Platón represente a Sócrates estando realmente inspirado (ni en la palinodia ni en el resto de pasajes del diálogo), sino fingiendo estarlo. Hemos argumentado en favor de esta tesis en varios lugares (cf. Lavilla de Lera 2018, p. 78; 2021a; 2021b), siempre bajo la hipótesis hermenéutica de que el comportamiento y las tesis de Sócrates en cada diálogo responden, en buena medida, al carácter y prácticas de sus interlocutores, por lo que más allá de lo que Sócrates y sus interlocutores dicen, hay que prestar atención al componente dramático de cada diálogo.

23 La alusión al oráculo délfico es recurrente en los diálogos. Véanse, p. ej. *Alcibíades* I 124a-b, *Protágoras* 242e-243b, *Cármides* 164d, *Filebo* 48b y *Leyes* XI 923a.

24 Según hemos indicado, en este diálogo Sócrates suscribe irónicamente creencias arcaicas o tradicionales en numerosos pasajes (cf. 243a4; 235b7; 237a7-b1; 244b6-244d5; 274c1-2; 275b7-c1), precisamente, con el ánimo de contradecir a Fedro, cuyas opiniones son vanguardistas pero carentes de fundamento. A este respecto, Szlezàk (1989, p. 74) es uno de los autores que ha subrayado el hecho de que Fedro representa al típico ciudadano excesivamente influenciado por las vanguardias intelectuales de la época, creyendo acríticamente cuanto luce nuevo y desconfiando de lo antiguo sólo por serlo.

25 Este término acostumbra a traducirse en castellano como "legislador", aunque, "*lato sensu*, más bien designa un personaje que instaura convenciones y normas, un artífice del lenguaje, en este caso, que debería ser capaz, en principio, de forjar nombres correctos a la manera de un artesano que domina una técnica" (Salgueiro Martín y Lavilla de Lera, 2021). Por ello, creemos que es más acertada la elección de Mársico (2006), que traduce "nominador".

26 El hecho de que un dialéctico deba revisar la labor del nominador muestra a las claras que la propuesta platónica está indisociablemente ligada a la incesante tarea de confutar el discurso y sus partes, sin fiarse de la autoridad del hablante. Así, es evidente que la distinción técnica de los nombres que Platón tiene en mente es muy diversa de la ingeniosa (κομψός) pero estéril división de los nombres (ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν) que Pródico practicaba y de la que Nicias se sirve en el *Laques*, siendo objeto de las críticas tanto de Laques como de Sócrates (cf. *Laques* 197d1-5 ss.). El motivo del rechazo de una forma tal de división de los nombres reside, precisamente, en no estar supeditada a la dialéctica, esto es, al conocimiento de lo real que permite justificar lo expuesto.

27 Véase Mársico (2006, p. 92, n. 20), que ofrece un útil comentario a este respecto.

28 Barney (2001, p. 69-73), que también lee en clave irónica la sección etimológica y el pasaje de la inspiración, sugiere que en este punto Platón hace que Sócrates imite y practique el género literario competitivo desarrollado por cierta tradición exegética –entre la que habría rétores y sofistas–, mostrando irónicamente que Sócrates es capaz de competir con ella, produciendo etimologías acerca de cualquier cosa. Asimismo, Barney sugiere que Platón también hace lo mismo en otros diálogos como el *Fedro* –en concreto, mediante el primer discurso socrático– y en el *Protágoras* –concretamente, al interpretar el poema de Simónides.

29 Mársico (2006, p. 16) ha señalado que el propio Hermógenes indicaría en numerosas ocasiones (p. ej. 396d, 409c, 414c, 420d, 421c) "las exageraciones y artilugios rebuscados que se interponen en la explicación" de las propuestas etimológicas socráticas.

30 En ese sentido, nuestra lectura difiere sustancialmente de la de Sedley (2003, p. 40-41), para quien el ejercicio etimológico de Sócrates es en buena medida serio y sincero. Según el británico, la alusión irónica a Eutifrón no sugeriría que las etimologías son falsas o irónicas, sino que Sócrates está aden-

trándose en un área –la elucidación de los nombres– que le resulta nueva y, extrañado de la elocuencia con la que ha hablado, de forma jocosa prefiere hacer responsable a Eutifrón y no a sí mismo de la brillantez de su ejercicio etimológico. Según Sedley, el recurso a la inspiración en este pasaje, pero también en *Fedro*, responde a que Platón está vinculando a Sócrates con la etimologización y con la retórica, haciendo de él un personaje elocuente en ambos ámbitos, lo cual resultaría novedoso para el personaje y no respondería a los hábitos del Sócrates histórico. Para una argumentación de los motivos que nos llevan a disentir de la lectura de Sedley, véanse los trabajos, entre otros, de Baxter (1992, p. 86-163), Barney (2001) y Salgueiro Martín (2021), con los que coincidimos en que la sección etimológica ha de ser interpretada en clave paródica y polémica.

31 Se trata, no obstante, de una hipótesis difícilmente contrastable. Por ello, no descartamos que la preocupación de la adecuación de los nombres referida en el *Crátilo* aluda, en realidad, a concepciones lingüísticas arcaicas, con las que Platón decide polemizar en este diálogo.

32 Generalmente y hasta los años noventa, la mayoría de interpretaciones han considerado que la postura de Hermógenes representaría un relativismo poco elaborado. No obstante, durante las últimas décadas autores como Barney (1998; 2001, p. 30-35) o Ademollo (2011, p. 73-75) han mostrado de forma convincente que, en realidad, la postura convencionalista de Hermógenes es mucho más sensata y compleja de lo que algunos pensaban, hasta el punto de que al final del diálogo el propio Sócrates parece invitarnos a repensar y considerar el valor de sus tesis. La interpretación de Márgico también apunta en esta dirección, cuando afirma que la distancia crítica que Hermógenes mantiene frente al naturalismo "permite que la obra se cierre con un llamamiento a Crátilo a seguir a Hermógenes, es decir, a avenirse a un convencionalismo, ya no extremo como el propuesto inicialmente por el hijo de Hipónico, pero sí apartado de las pretensiones naturalistas de correlato automático entre lenguaje y realidad" (Márgico, 2006, p. 16).

33 Recuérdese a este respecto cuanto dijimos acerca de Fedro y de Nicias en el *Laques*. En lo que atañe al *Crátilo*, podría pensarse que Sócrates está reclamando, nuevamente, la necesidad de ser conscientes de nuestra ignorancia. En este caso, Crátilo tendría que ver las inconsistencias de su planteamiento, pero el propio Hermógenes tendría que captar que sus tesis sobre el convencionalismo no estaban bien fundadas, como lo demuestra el hecho de que haya cambiado de opinión en cuanto Sócrates pone en cuestión su planteamiento. Frente a ambas posturas, Sócrates estaría reclamando la práctica filosófica, que partiendo de la consciencia de los límites del conocimiento de sí mismo trata una y otra vez de reflexionar sobre las opiniones propias y ajenas.

Re-examining the 'Compulsion Problem' in Plato's *Republic*

Stephen Oppong Peprah
University of Hradec Králové, Czech Republic
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1690-398X

ABSTRACT

Scholars have made several attempts to understand the 'compulsion problem' in the *Republic*, namely, why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to descend into the cave to rule. These attempts, however, fail to properly incorporate two other main instances of compulsion in the dialogue into the discussion: first, the compulsion in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics; second, the instances of compulsion in the future philosopher-rulers' education. My main aim in this paper is to re-examine the 'compulsion problem'. I argue that the just law that compels the philosopher-rulers to rule corroborates Plato's concept of education to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.

Keywords: compulsion, governance, guardians, rulership, education

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_12

1. INTRODUCTION

In the *Republic*, Plato nurtures philosopher-rulers who–he tells us–must be compelled to rule; he thinks that the best rulers are those who, paradoxically, despise (καταφρονοῦντα) ruling.[1] This famous ruling paradox is what I refer to in this paper as the 'compulsion problem'. Several scholarly attempts have been made to understand this problem, and the leading question has been why Plato compels the philosopher-rulers to return to the cave. Two main solutions have been offered as answers to this question.[2] First, some scholars, including Buckels and Brown, agree with Socrates that the philosophers are just people. Consequently, philosophers, *qua* just people, will accept being commanded to rule because they will not disobey the command to rule; disobedience to the just command will corrupt their souls. Buckels goes further to attempt to exonerate Plato's Socrates – the educator and lawgiver – of the criticism that he is committing an injustice against the philosophers. Other scholars, including Vasiliou and Sheffield, argue that the philosophers, through their education and habituation, will be morally motivated to rule.[3] [4]

However, despite the enviable erudition by which these scholars come to their conclusions, it seems to me that their proposed solutions do not properly accommodate other 'standard' senses of compulsion that can comprehensibly explain the instance of the compulsion requiring the philosophers to return to rule.[5] One such instance is found in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership in Book V, which requires that one can be a ruler in Kallipolis if and only if one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics. I understand this to mean that the only option the ruler in Kallipolis has is the following: philosophise and rule or forfeit the opportunity to philosophise in Kallipolis. The other instances of a standard sense of compulsion are found in the future philosopher-rulers' education, which points out how Plato intends to achieve the product of his concept of philosophical rulership. Accordingly, I argue that the law which compels the philosophers to rule corroborates Plato's concept of education to achieve the product of his ideal political leaders, i.e., rulers who despise ruling. Suffice to say that Plato uses the law and education as means to generate his ideal political leaders: rulers who despise ruling (*Rep.*, 521b1-2). I acknowledge that each of these instances of compulsion can be considered separately and examined in its context. Nonetheless, I think that what seems to unite them is Plato's aim of demonstrating the relevance of philosophy in tackling concrete political problems.

Thus, I show that the instance of the compulsion in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership appears to me to explain *why* Plato conceives of political leaders who despise ruling: the best ruler is the one whose psychic harmony is directly beneficial for the stability of the polis, given that the greatest evil in a polis is political instability (*Rep.*, 462a-465d). And the instances of the compulsion in the future guardians' education explain *how* Plato intends to generate such leaders: leaders whose souls have been nurtured under stringent conditions to be harmonious in such a way to guarantee the stability of the polis. That is, I shall show that the instances of the compulsion associated with the philosopher-rulers' education are conceptually linked with the instance of the compulsion in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership, and both instances explain, to a larger extent, why Plato compels the philosophers to return to rule. In essence, by tracing the reason why Plato compels his philosophers to return to rule from his concept

of philosophical rulership and education, I wish to offer a relatively comprehensive account of the role of compulsion in his political thought and education.

2. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE 'COMPULSION PROBLEM'

Buckels rightly suggests that Plato's frequent usage of the forms ἀναγκάζειν (i.e. to force or to compel) and ἀνάγκη (i.e. compulsion or necessity) should discourage any reading of the compulsion which tends to diminish its importance.[6] Buckels is equally right to have observed that "This repeated mention of compulsion is quite excessive and misleading if Plato merely intends to give philosophers a friendly reminder that it is time to rule."[7] If Plato is serious about his usage of compulsion, what could he possibly mean by the term? To answer this question, let us consider this passage. In Book VII, Socrates asks Glaucon:

> **T1**: Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be doing an injustice to those who've become philosophers in our city and that what we'll say to them, when we compel them to guard and care for the others, will be just. We'll say: "When people like you come to be in other cities, they'll be justified in not sharing in their city's labours, for they've grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution. But what grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing has justice on its side when it isn't keen to pay anyone for that upbringing. But we've made you kings in our city and leaders of the swarm, as it were, both for yourselves ad for the rest of the city. You're better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark…."[8]
> [Socrates then queries Glaucon] Then do you think that those we've nurtured will disobey us and refuse to share the labours of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their time with one another in the pure realm? It isn't possible, for we'll be giving just orders to just people. Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those who now rule in each city (*Rep*., 520a5-e3).

Two points are noteworthy in passage T1. First, Socrates seems to say that it is mainly for the sake of the benefit of the polis that the philosophers are educated at its expense. Can we say, then, that the wellbeing of the polis seems to have priority over that of the philosophers? Socrates' answer is straightforward: "Each of them will spend most of his time with philosophy, but, when his turn comes, he must labour in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as if he were doing something fine, but rather as something that has to be done" (*Rep*., 540b1-4). Hence, it is not that the philosophers are completely denied the opportunity to philosophise. Does Socrates' offer here suffice to exonerate him from the criticism that he commits injustice against the philosophers by compelling them to rule? I will return to this question in our subsequent discussion. At this point, I can only suggest that Plato is utilitarian in outlook in his political engineering, including his treatment of philosophy from the standpoint of its social benefits. By this statement, I mean that Plato

cares more about what the philosophers can do for society than what they prefer to do for themselves. Second, Socrates says that they will be giving just command to just people. It is crucial to note that it is one thing to say that the command is just because Socrates and his co-lawgivers say so and another to say that the rulers will accept such a command to be just. I shall return to these two points later. Meantime, let us suggest a working definition of compulsion that perhaps captures the sense in which Plato uses ἀνάγκη.

Now, in agreement with Buckels that Plato uses compulsion in the strong sense, I suggest that by compulsion (ἀνάγκη) Plato has in mind the following definition or something close to it:

> Compulsion involves coercing, forcing, or bending the will of someone to undertake something they will not do naturally or freely.

In this sense, the fact that Plato says his philosophers despise ruling makes it clear that the meaning of ἀνάγκη here cannot be understood in a non-standard sense. Instances of a standard sense of compulsion include where one, for instance, is held up at gun-point by armed robbers and told to either hand over one's purse or be killed; where a government compels us either to pay taxes and wear seatbelts or pay monetary penalties or serve jail terms or both. In this 'either…or' situation, one does not have freedom of choice over what one prefers. In the robbery case, the compelled object wants to have both his purse and life, but neither of the options offered by the robbers allows this. One can object, however, that the robbers provide a choice. But the victim is not willing to *both* obey the demand of the robbers and keep his life and property. In the light of these considerations, and if we are to believe Buckels that Plato's compulsion language is excessively strong, then I think that Plato's usage of ἀνάγκη plausibly captures the following essence of a standard sense of compulsion (which is the thesis I defend):

> If *X* does *A* under a standard sense of compulsion, *X* is compelled to do *A*, and *X* lacks the freedom of choice to reject doing *A*. This is grounded in the compelling agent's belief that *X* prefers to do something other than *A* or, in some situations, *X* does not want to act at all. This means that "no motive of personal gains" is an important part of what motivates *X* to do *A*.[9] In context, philosophers, according to Plato, want to only philosophise and *not* rule. But the only option they are given is that either they philosophise *and* rule or forfeit the opportunity to philosophise (we can call this the 'either…or condition'). Therefore, if the philosophers despise ruling and are coerced into doing so, then the lawgiver seeks to work against their will.

Several solutions offered to the 'compulsion problem' will challenge my position. For instance, Annas argues that the philosophers will obey the just order to rule because they transcend their personal good. Thus, philosophers "know what is really good, not relative to the interests or situation of anyone. And it demands their return; so they go. Their motivation is thus very abstract. They are not seeking their own happiness. Nor are they seeking that of others. They are simply doing what is impersonally best. They make an impersonal response to an impersonal demand".[10] An obvious problem with Annas' submission is that if the philosophers care neither about

their happiness nor that of others and simply do what is 'impersonally best', then it is hard to know whether the considerations that constitute the philosophers' reasons for decisions or actions are prudential or moral. Socrates is specific that the true philosophers are those who love the sight of truth (*Rep.*, 475e2-4), and this desire is a sustaining commitment they are unwilling to compromise. Prudentially, their motivation is not all that abstract: they want to dwell in the Isles of the Blessed and also aim to get the epistemic benefits that grasping the Good begets, including understanding (*Rep.*, 519c4-5; *Rep.*, 490a1-b7). The idea here is to suggest that we can say the philosophers are prudential in their epistemic journey to grasp the Good: they have the motivation to philosophise. Moreover, the desire to philosophise sustains even after their education. Recall that they will spend most of their time philosophising in Kallipolis whiles they rule only as something necessary. Therefore, since their only option is to philosophise *and* rule, as I shall argue, it is plausible that they will rule just so they can continue to philosophise. Hence, I deny Annas' claim that the philosophers lack any sense of obligation to advance their personal interest.[11]

On the other hand, I agree with Annas that the philosophers lack a commitment to rule such that by accepting to rule as something necessary, they will be doing something impersonally best. Why must it matter if they rule as something impersonally best? To answer this, I want to modify Annas' 'impersonally best' thesis to capture the sense of Plato's ideal political leadership, i.e. generating political leaders who despise ruling. In Book II, Socrates accepts the challenge to prove that justice is preferable to injustice. Socrates argues that justice is doing what one is naturally and intellectually fit to do. This definition of justice is social justice: the polis exists on the principle of mutual interdependence, with each member doing what he or she can physically and intellectually do best.[12] But the attitude of the philosophers towards ruling seems to indicate a counterexample to Socrates' social justice. However, if they develop this kind of attitude toward ruling, it can only mean that Plato has succeeded in achieving the products of his ideal political leadership, i.e. rulers who deride ruling. Thus, I am inclined to believe that the image of the philosopher Plato depicts in the *Republic* appears to be like the philosophers in the *Phaedo*, who are "essentially detached contemplators of reality" and are estranged from politics and social service.[13]

This image is starkly different from the *Apology*'s Socrates who never despised social and political life and was willing to sacrifice his wellbeing and that of his family to implore others to live the philosophic life. In particular, the *Apology's* Socrates never despised political leadership and it is not true that philosophers generally despise ruling (*Apol.* 28a10-29a; 32a9-b). Socrates, *qua* the quintessential philosopher, is a moralist who is committed to virtues that promote the wellbeing of others, because a central feature of morality is the awareness of the possible implications of one's decisions and choices, judgement or action, not only for one's wellbeing but that of others. But one thing is common among the philosophers in the *Apology*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedo*: they all despise material acquisitions or inducements.[15] Therefore, it seems to me that two reasons may explain what Plato means when he says his philosophers despise ruling: (1) ruling will conflict with their time with philosophy; (2) the material honours and pleasures that come along with ruling the perceptible world contribute nothing to their happiness.

But Plato, I think, is primarily concerned with reason (2); and this is explicitly demonstrated in his repeated comparison of his philosopher-rulers with those who love to rule. Plato wants to generate rulers who despise material acquisition and honours. His foremost reason is that individuals who naturally love ruling are those who fight over it. Such people usually happen to be those whose lives are impoverished and devoid of personal satisfaction but who hope to snatch some compensation for their material inadequacy from a political career; such needy people fight for power, which results in civil and domestic conflicts that ruin both themselves and the polis (*Rep*., 521a3-7). He says that his best rulers are "those who have the best understanding of what matters for good government (φρονιμώτατοι δι'ὧν ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται) and who have other honours than political ones, and a better life as well…" (*Rep*., 521b7-9). He concludes Book VII on a note that Kallipolis can come about only "when one or more philosophers come to power in a city, who despise (καταφρονήσωσιν) present honours, thinking them slavish and worthless, and who prize what is right and the honours that come with it above everything, and regard justice as the most important and most essential thing, serving it and increasing it as they set the city in order" (*Rep*., 540d1-e3). Hence, from the perspective of Socrates, the philosopher-rulers become worthy candidates to rule Kallipolis at least for two reasons.

First, in terms of Plato's psychology, the philosopher aims at the fulfilments of goods that have some eternality about them: truth, knowledge, and wisdom. These fulfilments are guaranteed by the greatest of all goods, i.e. the Good. Second, knowing the Good is worthwhile not merely as a means to action but because in coming to know it we develop our capacity to reason.[15] In other words, the philosopher's aim of developing his rational capacity to see the Good is a commitment that steers him away from pursuing other goods that can only guarantee ephemeral satisfaction (see *Rep*., 581c3-e4). Plato thinks that the philosopher is the best candidate to rule partly because the objects of his erotic desire differ starkly and significantly from those of individuals who love to rule and partly because they always act justly. In essence, Plato requires them to rule because of their commitment to grasp the Good and their being and acting justly. Hence, I propose that Plato compels the philosophers to rule not necessarily because they consider the polis and its citizens as objects of love (their only objects of love are the Good and the Forms) but because their actions are going to benefit these entities. I think this plausibly fits Annas' impersonally best thesis. And it is in this context that it may be said that Plato cares more about what the philosophers will do to cure the polis of its feverishness than what they seek to do for themselves.

Apart from Annas, some scholars, including Brickhouse, Smith, Buckels, and Brown, variously argue that the philosophers will accept to rule because ruling–supposing it is just–must in some way be conducive to sustaining the just condition of the ruler's soul. It is important to note here that my understanding of the just law is starkly different from these scholars' seemingly unanimous position. To reiterate, I am urging that the law compelling the philosophers can rightly be just if it is understood in the context of the polis' social justice and not in terms of morality. I shall show the difficulties with the moral understanding soon.

Now, Buckles argues that whatever Annas means by 'impersonal' "conflicts with Socrates' aim of showing how justice is in the

agent's own personal interest, not merely that it is impersonally beneficial."[16] Buckels then tries to account for why the philosophers will return in a way that will exonerate Socrates of the criticism that he is committing injustice against them. Buckels explores the 'ruling as a requirement of justice' thesis by analysing what Socrates means by 'just order' or 'just law'. In agreement with Eric Brown, Buckels argues that the lawgivers enact a just law commanding philosophers to rule and then specify that this law is just but not required by justice.[17] Buckels then distinguishes between a general requirement of justice itself and the specific demand of a just law to argue that: "if we accept that it is a general requirement of justice that philosophers rule the city, then 1) they would be reluctant to do what justice itself requires, and 2) justice itself would require them to accept an inferior life."[18] Buckels concludes that: "On the hypothesis that justice demands that one obey just laws, philosophers must rule Kallipolis because a just law demands it. Thus, it is not *justice* that compels the philosopher to accept an inferior life, but the law."[19] Buckels believes this proposal saves Socrates' project of defending justice as eudemonistic. But I think Buckels seems unconvincing for at least three reasons.

In the first place, it is Platonically unwelcoming to say, metaphysically, that it is the 'just law' which compels the philosophers rather than justice itself (the Form Justice) if the just law instantiates as a sortal kind, a particular, of justice itself. One can legitimately assert that justice itself will *indirectly* prescribe the inferior kind of life. By *indirectly*, I wish to suggests that justice itself is conceived at a high level of generality and abstraction and it manifests itself in the form of the law or order in this case, that philosophers who owe a debt to the polis for their nurturing ought to repay it by taking political command in Kallipolis. I owe this point to Sheffield. This means that it is both justice itself and its manifestation in the form of a specific law or order which are compelling the philosophers to rule. This allows for the fact that justice itself will not *always* compel philosophers to rule, because the specific manifestation of justice in this context will not always apply, for instance, to spontaneously generated philosophers who owe no debt for their education and upbringing.

Second, Buckels believes that "the philosophers will obey the requirements of justice, no matter what they may prescribe, since to act justly is to act so as to harmonise one's soul, and philosophers always act so as to do just that." Buckles op. cit., 77. Thus, although ruling may be inferior for the philosopher compared to philosophising, once it is a requirement of justice he will not disobey but accept it; otherwise, the philosopher causes disharmony in his soul. Buckels rightly believes that acting justly–practical justice–is beneficial to the agent, and it always comes along with psychic justice, i.e. being just.[22] This is a welcome thesis. True philosophers always act justly to promote the wellbeing of the soul. This point does not elude Socrates: he says his fully-fledged philosophers are just people, and it is one of the reasons why they become the ideal candidates to govern Kallipolis. However, what Buckels and Brown fail to question is whether the philosophers will consider the command as just (I promised to return to the understanding of the just command from a moral perspective). The philosophers never spoke in the dialogue, save the few objections Glaucon and Adeimantus raised on their behalf, especially about their happiness. But we should remember that they are told many lies during their education. Hence, it is entirely possible, for instance, that they may later re-

alise that their supposed superiority among the other citizens is not divinely inspired, contrary to what they were made to believe about the autochthony during their childhood education (*Rep*., 414d-415c6). Perhaps, they may also later realise that their whole education is a façade to get them to share their time spent philosophising with something else (*Rep*., 415d1-3). The potentiality of such an epiphanic moment explains Socrates' uneasiness and great caution in introducing dialectics into their education (*Rep*., 537d8-539d7). Hence, we cannot simply assume that they will consider the command as just. If one insists that the philosophers will accept the command because the lawgiver says it is just, it raises the question as to whether they accept anything without argument (cf. *Rep*., 582d). Therefore, even if they are willing to go down to the cave to rule on a presumption that it is something that will conduce to the wellbeing of their soul, it does not shelve the fact that where there is non-compliance on their part they will be coerced into doing so. Another important point that challenges the 'care for the soul' thesis is that even though Socrates says they are just people, he legislates that they must be compelled. Does Socrates trust the moral discretion of the philosophers to do what the law requires them to do? As stated above, Buckels acknowledges the seriousness of the instance of compulsion requiring the philosophers to rule. But his explanation, as I have shown, is not inductively forceful to capture the full force of what the compulsion demands.

For his part, Vasiliou also acknowledges that "the compulsion language… is very strong." He argues strongly that knowledge of the Good does not motivate the philosophers to return to rule. Vasiliou then argues that the philosophers will be morally motivated to accept to rule. If the compulsion language is very strong,[23] like how I have conceived it above, then it raises the question as to why Vasiliou thinks that the philosophers' moral motivation, borne out of their education and habituation, does anything to answer the compulsion question. More importantly, if philosophers naturally despise ruling, then their education must do less to motivate them to agree to rule. As Smith observes: "It makes no sense to speak so often of compulsion if those being compelled are already independently fully motivated to do what they are compelled to do" Smith 2010, 88. In essence, the moral motivation scholarship mitigates the full force of the law commanding the philosophers to return. In a similar line of reason, Sheffield agrees with Vasiliou, Brown and Buckels that the philosophers will be morally motivated to rule due to their education and habituation. Sheffield agrees with Vasiliou to argue that "Plato, like Aristotle, understands moral motivation as arising from proper education and habituation." Sheffield extends the domain of moral motivation to include *philia* motivation, which emphasises the principle of reciprocity: "talk of the philosopher being compelled is made intelligible and unobjectionable because they *owe* it to the ruled, within a *philia* of reciprocal benefits". Here, I agree with Sheffield that the philosophers owe their upbringing to the polis in the context of the principle of mutual interdependence – a principle which grounds the polis' social justice. But I am sceptical as to whether the compulsion to rule can be explained by *philia* motivation. If the philosophers accept being commanded to rule out of philial motivation, it implies that they, at least, have a reason to rule, and that seems to mean that the law and education fail to assist Plato in generating his ideal political leaders, i.e. leaders who despise ruling.[25]

However, if the compulsion language is very strong, as I agree with Buckels and Vasiliou that it is, then we must be willing to draw its implication more forcefully. To draw such an implication, suppose the philosophers decide not to care for their soul. Suppose further that their education fails to morally motivate them or imbue in them *philial* sentiments. What happens to them in Kallipolis? The answer I am going to defend is that they will be barred from practising philosophy in Kallipolis. Thus their only option is to choose between philosophising and ruling or completely losing the opportunity to philosophise in Kallipolis. As promised above, I defend this thesis in the sections that follow.

3. THE COMPULSION AND THE COINCIDENCE OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

To get to the root of my claim, that the philosophers are to choose between philosophising *and* ruling or forfeiting the opportunity to philosophise in Kallipolis, it is worth looking carefully at how Plato conceives of philosophical rulership in this very famous passage in Book V:

> **T2**: Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophise, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so (τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἑφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν), cities will have no rest from evils. And, until this happens, the [polis] we've been describing in [speech] will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun (*Rep.*, 473c10-e2).[26]

Socrates likens this passage to one of the greatest waves of laughter, which is that women should be made guardians. Truthfully, Glaucon takes Socrates' proposal with great scorn, and challenges Socrates to put up a defence to explain it, as otherwise he will pay the penalty of great derision. Glaucon and Adeimantus object that in practice philosophers are either useless (ιό ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι) or vicious. Socrates admits that there are charlatan philosophers and that the philosophic nature can be corrupted in a society that promotes the wrong values and attitudes (*Rep.*, 489c8-494a8). Socrates' defence spans from *Rep.*, 474c in Book V to the end of Book VII. It shows the relevance of **T2** in appreciating Plato's conception of philosophical rulership. To convince Glaucon, Socrates, however, wants to make a case that in a society where the appropriate values are promoted, the relevance of philosophy and its practitioners will be fully appreciated. He assures Glaucon that if they are to escape great derision, they need to define for the sceptics who the philosophers are that he dares say they must rule. And once that is clear, "we need to defend ourselves by showing that the people we mean are fitted by nature both to engage in philosophy and to rule a city…" (*Rep.*, 474b2-c2). Socrates defines the philosopher as one who loves learning in its completeness and all its various manifestations, and it is for this reason Socrates says at the beginning of Book VI that the philosopher must be the one to rule (*Rep.*, 484b).

A detailed examination of Socrates' defence is not relevant for our purpose. What we need to pay attention to are the two *provisos* in **T2**:

first, Socrates says "the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively must forcibly (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) be prevented from doing so." Socrates is unambiguous about what this condition means: political power and philosophy must be vested in the same person such that neither a philosopher nor a politician is to be made ruler in a polis. Second, Socrates says until the coincidence happens, Kallipolis will never be born to the fullest extent possible or even see the light of the sun. The question is why Plato proposes that two different natures with two different desires and motivation–philosophy and politics–must completely coincide. The answer is straightforwardly suggested in **T2**: Socrates aims to generate the best leaders to end the evils in polities. This, again, suggests to me that Plato wants to show the utility of philosophy for the active political life. Recall that the need for guardianship followed after the fevered polis was discovered in Book II. I suggest, therefore, that Plato conceives philosophical rulership as a conceptual response to tackling concrete political problems.

And so, by the expression ἐξ ἀνάγκης in **T2** Plato, I think, understands and uses compulsion in the sense of our working definition for the following three main reasons. (a_1) Whosoever becomes a ruler in Kallipolis cannot be exclusively a politician or a philosopher; he must be identified as both, i.e. a philosopher-ruler. That is, if one is a ruler in Kallipolis, then one is a product of the coincidence of philosophy and politics. This is precisely the reason why think that the demand of the just law or order has priority over the moral conviction of the philosophers as to whether or not they must return to the cave. That is, if the first proviso holds, then we can observe closely that the either…or condition of our working definition of compulsion is applicable here: either one agrees to rule and philosophise or one does not philosophise at all. This means that no simultaneously generated philosopher can emerge, or be allowed to practise philosophy in Kallipolis. We now get a plausible response to why Socrates thinks the spontaneously generated philosophers grow against the will of the constitution: once they owe nothing to the polis for their upbringing, the community may not derive any benefit from them.

Nor can the current crop of leaders without philosophic knowledge be permitted to rule Kallipolis. Before the discussion of the coincidence from Books V-VII, the future philosopher-rulers are first identified as guardians of the polis in Book II. The guardians are later divided into the auxiliaries and the best guardians based on who can protect the conviction never to harm the polis (*Rep.*, 412b-414b). But, as Molchanov argues, the distinction between the auxiliaries and the best guardians seems to have less to do with philosophy.[27] The auxiliary class represents the spirited part of the soul, and courage (ἀνδρείαν) is their characteristic nature, and the aim of educating them is to transform their savage courage into political courage (ἀνδρείαν πολιτικήν) (*Rep.*, 430a2-c2). This means that if the best guardians are better at protecting the polis than the auxiliaries are, it presupposes that the former are more courageous and patriotic than the latter. Moreover, the best guardians care for the polis but not because they love philosophical wisdom; even if they did, this wisdom is not philosophical wisdom but political.[28] If this holds, does it not contradict our initial claim that the philosopher-rulers lack the motivation to rule? My response is that there is no contradiction here if we strike a distinction between the best guardians *before* and *after*

Book V. The best guardians are not permitted to rule unless they have philosophical wisdom. In Book VI, Socrates is specific that "those who are to be made our guardians in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers" (*Rep.*, 503b3-5). I shall argue in the next section in educating the future rulers, Socrates, qua the educator, aims to blunt the ruling desires of the potential rulers: the appetitive part is tamed and the spirited part is suppressed. The second reason is that (b_1) since philosophy and politics consist of different types of knowledge, whoever becomes a ruler in Kallipolis must acquire both types of knowledge, namely, knowledge of the Good and practical knowledge and experience about politics. Hence, (c_1) the instance of compulsion in **T2** is not only about coercing or bending the will of the philosopher to accept a life he does not want, but also to pursue knowledge and studies knowledge and studies, including practical training, he will not freely choose to undertake. Given reasons (a_1)-(c_1), I share the view of Vasiliou that "[in] a situation where justice did not demand that the philosophers rule (e.g. in some situation where they did not owe their education and training to the city…it is plausible to think that this practical training would be unnecessary to them qua philosophers."[29]

Now, in connection with the second proviso, Socrates says at *Rep.*, 519c4-7 that without some sort of compulsion the founding of Kallipolis will be a hopeless aspiration because the philosophers "will not act, thinking that they had settled while still alive in the faraway Isles of the Blessed."[30] The next passage which follows is that when the philosophers are able to reach the intelligible realm and can grasp the Good, "we mustn't allow them to do what they're allowed to do today," i.e. philosophise (*Rep.*, 519c9-d1). The imperative language used in this last passage corroborates what Socrates says in **T2**. From the foregoing, we have reasons to believe that the only option the philosophers have is either they rule and philosophise or forfeit the opportunity to philosophise. We should remind ourselves that while this condition works against the philosophers, it is a way Plato desires to generate his ideal political leaders, i.e. rulers who despise ruling.

To summarise this section, recall that Plato wants to demonstrate the utility of philosophy for the active political life, and passage **T2** strongly supports this view: the best guardians in Book III do not qualify to rule until they gain philosophi wisdom; without philosophic wisdom, they may not be different from ordinary politicians who love to rule for the sake of the acquisition of material wealth and honours. At the end of Book III, Socrates legislates to prevent the best guardians from acquiring private property beyond what is wholly necessary (*Rep.*, 416d3-417b7). Certainly, Plato believes that political problems are essentially moral problems, and thus tackling them requires moral solutions. One such moral solution is to promote the philosophic life. Thus, in defending his proposal in **T2**, one of Plato's conclusions is that his rulers are "those who have other honours than political ones, and a better life as well" (*Rep.*, 521b7-9). Plato's repetition of this at *Rep.*, 540d3-e3 is his way of drawing our attention to the novelty of his proposal that the philosophic life can guarantee a fevered polis true happiness. In the last section, I try to show that the education of the potential philosopher-rulers is mainly to achieve the product of the coincidence; that the compulsion in the conception of philosophical rulership explains comprehensively the compulsion in the education required for it.

4. ACHIEVING THE PRODUCT OF THE COINCIDENCE

As we saw in Section 2, Vasiliou attempts to argue that the philosophers will be morally motivated to rule given their education and habituation. Vasiliou rightly denies that knowledge of the Good does anything to motivate the rulers to philosophise. While I agree with him on this point, I disagree that the guardians' educational system does anything to morally motivate them to rule. I have argued for this claim above. In this section, my goal is to show that Plato conceives the guardians' education to achieve the products of the coincidence of philosophy and politics. Against Vasiliou's position, I hope to demonstrate that instead of the future guardians' education generating rulers who are morally motivated to rule, it rather does the opposite.

Now, Plato looks out for two main natural qualities in children who are over the age of ten years: philosophical temperament and public-spiritedness. The traits of a philosophical temperament include a love for learning to the highest level, telling the truth, a good memory, and youthful passion (*Rep.*, 485a4-487a; 503c2-d4), and public-spiritedness requires that the potential philosopher-rulers must be those who appear to us on observation to be most likely to devote their lives to the service of the polis, and who are never prepared to act against the polis (*Rep.*, 413c2-d3). I observe that the two main natural qualities are consistent with the demand of the first proviso in **T2**: nurturing public-spiritedness and a philosophical nature to attain the product of the coincidence. To understand how Socrates seeks to nurture rulers who despise ruling, let us pay close attention to Plato's psychology. Consider this passage in Book XI:

> **T3**: …when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war (στασιαζούσης) in it, each part does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular, it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasure possible for it. But when one of the other parts gains control, it won't be able to secure its own pleasure and will compel the other (ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν) parts to pursue an alien and untrue pleasure. And aren't the parts that are most distant from philosophy and reason the ones most likely to do this sort of compelling? [Glaucon] They are more likely (*Rep.*, 586e3-587a8).

The essential idea here is that for Plato psychic happiness is psychic health. That is, there is an inherent conflict among the parts of the soul such that the entire soul's happiness supervenes on the competitive strength of the philosophic part to dominate the competitive strengths of the spirited and appetitive parts (see also *Rep.*, 444b-445b5). In Book IV, the appetitive part is said to be the rebellious part and "is by nature suited to be a slave" (*Rep.*, 444b1-7); it coerces the spirited part to engage in flattery and become a slave, accustoming it from youth on to being insulted for the sake of the money needed to satisfy its insatiable desires (*Rep.*, 590b4-10). So, in discussing the instance of compulsion in Plato's concept of education, we are particularly interested in how the educator hopes to secure the alliance between the philosophic part and the spirited part against the appetitive part in the potential philosopher-rulers in conditions of the standard sense of compulsion. I discuss this in the light of the anabatic and the katabatic phases of the future philosopher-rulers' education.

4.1 COMPELLED TO ASCEND: THE ANABASIS

I observe that the future philosopher-rulers' education is two-phased: the anabatic phase and the katabatic phase. I use the anabatic phase to mean the intellectual journey toward grasping the Good and all subjects that aid in this enterprise. This phase encompasses preliminary, scientific, and dialectic studies. The preliminary studies include literature, music, arts, and gymnastics. Socrates says education is "not a matter of tossing a coin, but turning a soul from a day that is a kind of night to the true day–the ascent to what is (τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον), which we say is true philosophy…just as some are said to have gone up (ἀνάξει) from Hades to the gods" (*Rep*., 521b10-c6). This phase is primarily meant to nurture the rational part, with the help of the spirited part, to rule the entire soul. In describing their alliance, Socrates and Glaucon agree on the following:

> **T4**: A mixture of music and poetry, on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, makes the two parts harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning, relaxing the spirited part through soothing stories, and making it gentle by means of harmony and rhythm. And these two parts, having been nurtured in this way, and having truly learned their own roles and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive part, which is the largest part in each person's soul and is by nature the most insatiable for money. They will watch over it to see that it isn't filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and that it doesn't become too big and strong that it no longer does its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn't fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone's whole life... And it is because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single person courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn't (*Rep*., 441e7-442b2; cf. *Rep*., 429b-c).

Harmony (ἁρμονίᾳ) between the two parts is fundamental for the unity of the soul and its strength of existence. It is important to bear in mind that this harmony is achieved in conditions of compulsion. Consider these other two passages:

> **T5**: It is our task as founders, then, to compel (ἀναγκάσαι) the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and looked sufficiently enough, we mustn't allow them to do as they're allowed to do today [i.e.] to stay there and refuse to go down again (πάλιν καταβαίνειν) to the prisoners in the cave and share their labours and honours, whether they are of less worth or of greater (*Rep*., 519c6-d5).

Socrates repeats the prescription, this time putting great emphasis on surviving tests in practical matters:

> **T6**: Then, at the age of fifty, those who've survived the tests and been successful both in practical matters and in the sciences must be led to the goal and compelled (ἀναγκαστέον) to lift up the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light for everything [the Good].

> And once they've seen the good itself, they must each, in turn, put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model (*Rep.*, 540a3-b4).

Now, the crucial question is this: if philosophers have the prior motivation to philosophise, why are they being compelled to grasp the Good? I suggest the following answer: I think that the instances of compulsion in **T5** and **T6** fall under the domain of non-standard compulsion, relative to the education of the philosophic part. As repeatedly mentioned, the educator aims to nurture the philosophic part to be in a position to take a leading role among the parts of the soul. In doing so, the educator nurtures a potential philosopher but thereby also a future political leader. If the philosopher has the prior motivation to philosophise, then the educator will not be working against this existing motivation to grasp the Good, but will rather be helping it to take full effect. In that case, the would-be philosophers will not disapprove of being compelled to grasp the Good. We can observe a non-standard sense of compulsion as applicable here: the would-be philosophers with prior motivation to philosophise will not object to their being compelled by their educators. Notice that grasping the Good as such involves painful intellectual modus and motivation may not be enough to propel the would-be philosopher (see below). However, the non-standard senses of compulsion in **T5** and **T6** do not pose any serious threat to the potential philosopher.

On the contrary, I think the real victims of a standard sense of compulsion during the anabatic phase are the appetitive and spirited parts. For instance, the gains of both psychic parts are compromised if any of them becomes the victor and directs the entire soul to rule either for the sake of honour and glory or the material benefits, which was traditionally measured in terms of the precious loot or spoils one could grab in a war in Greek culture. We saw earlier that the best guardians, in whom public-spiritedness is more forceful, are prevented from ruling. The spirited part is coerced to serve the philosophic part in terms of preserving through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what is not. Its role involves ensuring that the entire soul does not become a "victim of compulsion", namely, "those whom pain or suffering causes to change their mind". The victims of compulsion are compared to "victims of magic…who change their mind because they are under the spell of pleasure or fear" (*Rep.*, 413b1-d5). Socrates describes this at length:

> **T7**: We must subject them to labours, pains, and contests in which we can watch for these traits. Then we must also set up a competition for the third way in which people are deprived of their convictions, namely, magic. Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they're afraid, we must expose our young people to fears and pleasures, testing them more thoroughly than gold is tested by fire. If someone is hard to put under a spell, is apparently gracious in everything, is a good guardian of himself and the music and poetry he has learned, and if he always shows himself to be rhythmical and harmonious, then he is the best person both for himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a guardian…. But anyone who fails to prove himself in this way is to be rejected. (*Rep.*, 413c5-414a).[31]

This indicates clearly that those who are genuinely courageous are those who will survive the tests. In other words, the survivors of the tests are those who cannot be forced to change their conviction to pursue pleasures other than those which promote the wellbeing of their entire soul and the polis. That is, the strong alliance between the spirited and the philosophic parts makes the entire soul incoercible to the pursuit of pleasures that lead it into destruction. We now know that in the potential philosopher-rulers the erotic desire of the appetitive part is tamed: it must not be able to coerce and benumb both the spirited and philosophic parts to lead them to destruction (*Rep*., 589d4-590a2); the spirited part is equally suppressed and cannot align with the appetitive part to pursue reputational goods at the expense of the entire soul. Socrates says that one who is committed to satisfying the desires of the spirited part becomes envious so much so that his love of victory makes him violent so that he pursues the satisfaction of his anger and his desires for honours and victories without calculation and understanding (*Rep*., 586c5-d2). The philosophic part has been sharpened to take control of the entire soul.

So far, I have tried to show that it is the spirited part that must endure unwelcoming pains under this phase to support the convictions of the philosophic part. We also noted, that even if the philosophic part has the prior motivation to grasp the Good, and the intellectual pleasure of this pursuit is self-edifying, it equally endures pain during this phase, as I mentioned earlier. The cave allegory provides a semblance of the pain. Socrates describes it:

> **T8**: When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled (ἀναγκαστέον) to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he'd be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he'd seen before…. And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn't his eyes hurt, and wouldn't he turn round and flee towards the things he's able to see…? And if someone dragged him away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and didn't let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn't he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn't he be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be true? (*Rep*., 515c6-e)

As far as I know, there is no justification in the *Republic* for claiming that Plato identifies dialectics with the Socratic elenchus. Nonetheless, even if the pains associated with both ways of acquiring philosophical knowledge are not identical, they seem similar. For instance, in the *Theaetetus*, the followers of Socrates "suffer the pains of labour and are filled day and night with distress" (*Tht*. 151a). Unlike the midwife, Socrates claims that with his art he can assuage the pains. Similarly, Socrates secures the assent of Adeimantus that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is; the process involves bearing pain. And the lover is "relieved from the pains of giving birth" after the soul has had intercourse with that which is and begotten understanding and truth and is intellectually nourished (*Rep*., 490b). Thus, release from the pains of labour does come to the philosopher, but not until the end of the anabatic process, where he is in touch with the true being or the Good itself. But we have seen that both the spirited and philosophic parts endure pain and other inconveniences, but the chief difference is that the pain the latter goes

through is something peculiar to the nature of philosophy, and it is worth bearing; it is the spirited part which is coerced into enduring pain and assisting in studies which are downright irrelevant to its desire.

4.2 COMPELLED TO DESCEND: THE KATABASIS

The situation is completely different for the philosophic part during the katabatic phase. I use the katabatic phase to refer roughly to all the subjects pursued to acquire practical knowledge and experience in the cave.[32] As I mentioned earlier, the anabatic phase involves subjects that are of practical purposes, including music and gymnastics. But the key point is that the anabatic phase aims at theoretical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the Good. In the katabatic phase, they are compelled to return to continue with their practical education before they cannot become fully-fledged philosopher-rulers. They are to acquire practical knowledge and experience to be able to rule. Consider this passage:

> **T9**: [After] someone continuously, strenuously, and exclusively devotes himself to participation in arguments, exercising himself in them just as he did in the bodily physical training…you must make them go down (καταβιβαστέοι) into the cave again (πάλιν), and compel (ἀναγκαστέοι) them to take command in matters of war and occupy the other offices suitable to young people, so that they won't be inferior to the others in experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ). But in this, too, they must be tested to see whether they'll remain steadfast when they're pulled this way or that or shift their ground (*Rep*., 539d8-540a1).

Here, I agree with scholars, including Klosko, Smith, and Vasilious, who observe that the future philosopher-rulers do not return to the cave directly to rule.[33] Instead, they must, first, continue to acquire practical knowledge and experience in political matters for fifteen years before, second, they are allowed to rule in Kallipolis. Under this phase, it is the philosophical part that is compelled to pursue studies it will not willingly prefer to study. Not only is the philosophical part compelled to study courses it does not naturally prefer, but also it must endure other inconveniences in the cave. We are told that the liberated prisoner is received in the cave under conditions of insecurity and violence. From *Rep*., 5163e3-517a6, Socrates chronicles the fate of the liberated prisoner in the cave: upon his return, he must recover his eyesight while his vision remains dim, and the adjustment would not be quick. Consequently, he will be ridiculed by the shackled prisoners for ruining his eyes in his journey upward. Second, he may be put to death should he try to free them and lead them upward. Compelling the philosophers to study subjects they will not freely study and the inconveniences they will face in the cave, including the fact that they may be put to death, specify some of the reasons they will be unwilling to share in the labour of ruling.

5. CONCLUSION AND SOME REFLECTIONS

Suggested solutions to the 'compulsion problem' include the claim that the philosophers care for the wellbeing of their souls and they will not do anything to corrupt it; hence, they will accept being commanded to rule. Others have also suggested that the

philosophers will be morally motivated to rule, given their education and habituation. Any of these solutions, I have argued, seems to undermine the full force of the just law. In my interpretation, I have shown that Plato uses education and the law to generate rulers who despise ruling; that the law only corroborates the effort of the guardians' education to generate such leaders. To show this, I examined the instances of the compulsion in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership and the education required for it. I then argued that there is a strong conceptual link among the instances of the compulsion in Plato's concept of philosophical rulership, education for the guardians, and the demands of the just law. Plato's concept of political leadership presupposes his use of coercion to generate his ideal political leaders, i.e. leaders who despise ruling. Philosophers become the plausible candidates, given their prior commitment to pursuing metaphysical intelligibles. The coercion is evinced in how the philosophers are compelled to return to the cave to pursue studies they will not freely undertake and, more importantly, take up leadership role, something they despise. Accordingly, I think that the just law is an additional supervisory and regulatory mechanism to ensure that the philosophers undertake something they despise. In essence, the just law stands in relation with Plato's concept of philosophical rulership and the education required for it to generate his ideal political leaders.

This returns us to the question as to whether Socrates commits injustice against the philosophers by compelling them to return to the cave to continue studying politics and rule subsequently.

We may be cautious to accuse Socrates of committing injustice against the philosophers by compelling them to rule. Socrates does not deny them the opportunity to philosophise: they will spend most of their time with philosophy and rule only as something necessary. Getting the ample time to philosophise is precisely what Socrates means when he says that he has found a better life than ruling for the philosopher-rulers (*Rep.*, 5204-521a3). If so, can we absolve Socrates of the criticism that he commits an injustice against the philosophers? I doubt. If it were enough for Socrates that the philosophers are morally motivated to rule or that they care about the purity of their souls, and so they will obey the just command to rule, he would not have repeatedly mentioned that they must be compelled to rule. The offshoot is that he does not count on their obedience so much; otherwise, the philosophers could decline to rule and decide to dwell in the Isles of the Blessed while living in Kallipolis. But they lack the autonomy to make such a decision: they will simply be barred from practising philosophy in Kallipolis. Plato's strong stance on the compulsion is ostensibly consistent with the notion of compulsion, together with its essential condition, I imputed to him.

Bibliography

Annas, J. (1981). *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Audi, R. (1974). Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 11. p. 1-14.

Barney, R. (2008). Eros and Necessity in the Ascent from the Cave. *Ancient Philosophy* 28. p. 1-16.

Brickhouse, T. C. (1981). The Paradox of the Philosophers' Rule. *Apeiron* 15. p. 1-9.

Brown, E. (2000). Justice and Compulsion for Plato's Philosopher-Rulers. *Ancient Philosophy* 20. p. 1–17.

Buckels, C. (2012). Compulsion to Rule in Plato's *Republic*. *Apeiron* 46. p. 1-21.

Burnet, J. (1903). *Platonis Opera*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Cooper, J. (1977). The Psychology of Justice in Plato's Republic. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14. p. 151-157.

Grube, G. M. A (trans. Revised by Reeve C. D. C.) (1997). Plato. Republic. In Cooper. J. Plato. Complete Works. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

Irwin, T. (1977). *Plato's Moral Theory*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Klosko, G. (2006). *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Kraut, R. (1992). The Defence of Justice in Plato's Republic. In Kraut, R. (ed.). *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 311-337.

Kraut, R. (1973). Egoism, Love, and Political Office in Plato. *Philosophical Review* 82. P. 330-334.

Liddell, H. G.; Scott, R. A. (1996). *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Mackie, J. L. (1977, rpt. 1991). *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Penguin Books.

Mahoney, T. A. (1992). Do Plato's Philosopher-Rulers Sacrifice Self-Interest to Justice? *Phronesis* 37. p. 265-282.

Molchanov, S. (unpublished). On the Coincidence of Philosophy and Politics in Plato's *Republic*.

Piechowiak, M. (2019). *Plato's Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity*. Berlin, Peter Lang GmbH.

Reeve, C. D. C. (2007). Goat-Stags, Philosopher-Kings, and Eudaimonism. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 22. p. 185–209.

Sheffield, F. C. C. (forthcoming). Moral Motivation in the *Republic*: *Philia* and Return to the Cave.

Shields, C. (2007). Forcing Goodness in Plato's *Republic*. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 24. p. 21-39.

Slings, S. R. (ed.) (2003). *PLATO. Platonis Respublica*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Smith, N. D. (2010). Return to the Cave. In McPherran, M. L. (ed.). *Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 83-102.

Smith, N. D. (2000). Plato on Knowledge as Power, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38. p. 145-168.

Trabattoni, F. (2016). *Essays on Plato's Epistemology*, Leuven University Press, Leuven.

Vasiliou, I. (2015). Plato, Forms and Moral Motivation. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 49. p. 37-70.

Vernezze, P. (1992). The Philosopher's Interest. Ancient Philosophy 12. p. 331-349.

White N. P. (1979). *A Companion to Plato's Republic*, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., Indianapolis.

Notes

I am grateful to the reviewers for their critical and insightful comments on the paper. I am also grateful to F. C. C. Sheffield and Jaroslav Daneš who read initial version of the paper and made some critical comments; I am, however, responsible for all errors. I thank the University of Hradec Králové, which generously supported this paper.

1 Translations from the *Republic* are based on Grube in Cooper 1997, and the Greek text is the edition of Slings 2003 and Burnet 1902.

2 A sample of scholarship on the 'compulsion problem' includes Buckels 2012; Vernezze 1992; Smith 2010; Brown 2000; Vasiliou 2015. Other contributions include Reeve 2007; Barney 2008; Shields 2007; Annas 1981; and Brickhouse 1981. For the details of other contributions, see Buckels (in his work cited here).

3 Vasiliou 2015; Sheffield (forthcoming). My paper benefits greatly from Vasiliou's work, and I share some of his conclusions about this problem. However, I disagree with his definite solution to the problem.

4 I shall offer a detailed analysis of these proposed solutions to the 'compulsion problem' in Section 2.

5 What I mean by a standard sense of compulsion will be explained in the next section. Examples of a non-standard sense of compulsion are the following: I certainly would not go for dental treatment and would avoid all that it entails unless I regard receiving such treatment as necessary. But my going to the dentist does not entail that my free will has in any way been impaired. Also, and to use Audi's example, a particular worker might think that it would be good for his too lenient employer to threaten him with dismissal just so he will feel compelled to finish a given project; if the employer does so, the employee might not disapprove of it (Audi 1974, 7).

6 The four main senses of the substantive ἀνάγκη in Liddell and Scott's *A Greek-English Lexicon* are 'force', 'constraint', 'necessity', and 'compulsion exerted by a superior'.

7 Buckels op. cit., 66 (n. 12).

8 Few lines after passage **T1**, Socrates asks: "Can you name any life that despises political rule besides that of the true philosopher?" And Glaucon answers in the negative: "No, by god, I can't." Socrates further

elaborates that "But surely it is those who are not lovers of ruling who must rule, for if they don't, the lovers of it, who are rivals, will fight over it" (*Rep*., 521b1-6). The priority Socrates gives to the polis over the philosophers' interest seeks to undermine this further reason. That is, here Socrates creates the impression that it will benefit the philosophers to rule for their own sake. I find this reason unconvincing.

9 See Audi op. cit., 7-8.

10 Annas 1981, 267.

11 This is not to say that knowledge of the Good *necessarily* motivates them to accept to rule. On this, I share Vasiliou's view that "given that the one thing that knowledge of the Forms does motivate one to do is to *continue* to contemplate them, knowledge of the Forms motivates the philosophers *not* to rule." Vasiliou op. cit., 42. Cf. Cooper 1977, Irwin 1977, and Kraut 1992. For a discussion of whether or not the philosophers will sacrifice their self-interest for justice, see Mahoney 1992.

12 Sheffield defends this position more forcefully.

13 Vernezze 1992:331. For a discussion of the differences in the philosophers' orientation, see Trabattoni 2016:265-266 and also Vasiliou (in the work cited here).

14 For a discussion of the differences in the philosophers' orientation, see Trabattoni 2016, 265-266 and also Vasiliou (in the work cited here)

15 Despite Socrates' political and military career, as well as his philosophical evangelism, he became materially poor. In the *Apology*, Socrates admits that his divine mission "has kept me too busy to do much either in politics or in my own affairs", and he asks his fellow-Athenians whether it seems "human that I should have neglected my own affairs and endured the humiliation of allowing my family to be neglected for these years, while I busied myself all the time on your behalf…?" (*Apol*., 23a9-c2; 31b1-4).

16 Kraut 1992:318.

17 Buckels op. cit. 4

18 As cited in Buckels, Ibid. 5.

19 Ibid. 16.

20 Ibid: 17.

21 I owe this point to Sheffield.

22 Buckels op. cit., 77.

23 Ibid 68.

24 Vasiliou op. cit., 50.

25 Smith 2010, 88.

26 Vasiliou 2015, 66-67.

27 Sheffield ibid., 34.

28 I thank the reviewer for pointing out this passage to me.

29 Molchanov (unpublished)

30 Ibid 8.

31 Vasilious op. cit., 51.

32 On this point, I share the following view of Vasiliou op. cit., 48: "we should understand 'will not act' quite literally: they will not be interested in or care about doing anything in the ordinary world... Although Socrates is being playful, the point of the Isles of the Blessed" remark is quite serious; as far as the philosophers (knowers of the Forms) are concerned, they have arrived at their final destination: knowledge. And now the only thing left to 'do', in a sense, is to contemplate. Socrates is accusing these philosophers of having made a mistake, which is indeed caused by the fact that they have achieved knowledge of the Forms. They are confused about where they are; they think they are 'dead' and have gone to the afterlife, although they are in fact still embodied and alive."

33 Vasiliou derives the source of his moral motivation thesis from this passage. He writes: "The passage makes it clear that what determines how successful this training is–i.e. how strong their moral motivation remains–is their 'nature and upbringing'. The topic under consideration is justifiably considered *moral motivation*, for the beliefs that have been inculcated are true beliefs about right and wrong, virtuous and 'vicious' (i.e. contrary to virtue) actions" Vasiliou op. cit., p. 65. Vasiliou anticipates the objection that one worry is that this passage is about 'civic' courage, and "[once] the philosophers are in the picture, it is they who will have genuine courage (via their knowledge of the Forms), and so, one might think, the sort of habituation and testing for the 'preservation' of beliefs will no longer be necessary." Ibid. I have two worries here. First, I find it hard to believe that knowledge of the Good makes the philosophers courageous. There is no textual evidence to support it. I have argued in Section 3 that the distinction between the auxiliary and the best guardians is precisely based on who can protect the polis; that the best guardians are courageous before they become philosophers. Second, I do not deny that the education of the philosophers will contribute to their moral rectitude. But passage **T7** is more about how the spirited part is coerced into serving the rational part than how the future rulers will become morally motivated to rule. Since the desire to rule the material world is peculiar to the spirited and appetitive parts, especially given its material rewards and honours, the passage appears to me to show how Plato intends to blunt such spirited and appetitive impulses.

32 Vernezze is among the few scholars who pay attention to this phase of the future philosopher-rulers' education, arguing that the compulsion of the katabatic phase at least is "a planned stage of their development (1992:347 (n.25)). The details of my exposition of this phase, however, differ from that of Vernezze.

33 See Klosko 2006, 174-175; Smith 2000, 157; Vasiliou op. cit., 64-65.

BOOK REVIEWS

Harold Tarrant, Danielle A. Layne, Dirk Baltzly & François Renaud, *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity.* Brill's Companion to Classical Reception 13. Brill: Leiden/Boston 2018. ISSN 2213-1426; ISBN 978-90-04-27069-5 (hardback); ISBN 978-90-04-25538-5 (e-book): xxii 658pp.

Francisco L. Lisi
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Instituto de Estudios Clásicos Lucio Anneo Séneca
email: flisi@hum.uc3m,.es
ORCID Nr. /0000-0002-8644-6374

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_22_13

Platón y sus seguidores han tenido una enorme influencia en la historia de las ideas. Es imposible ofrecer en un único volumen todos los aspectos de la recepción de su pensamiento y, mucho menos, hacer justicia a todas las corrientes existentes de interpretación. Los autores del presente volumen han asumido un gran desafío. El libro no ofrece tanto trabajos sobre el impacto del pensamiento del filósofo ateniense cuanto una representación del desarrollo del platonismo en la Antigüedad. Con la excepción de algunos pensadores cristianos[1] y del estoicismo, sus capítulos ofrecen sobre todo una selección de filósofos platónicos.

El ejemplar comienza con una pequeña introducción general (1-7), que, tras unas páginas preliminares (1-4) con una relación de algunas cuestiones de principio relacionadas con esta presentación de la recepción Platón, resume el contenido y organización de la obra (4-7). Los trabajos están agrupados en tres secciones. La primera trata el período que va de los sucesores inmediatos del fundador de la Academia hasta Cicerón (10-89). La segunda (92-249) contiene capítulos dedicados al platonismo de la época imperial temprana, mientras que la última y más larga (252-579) incluye contribuciones sobre cristianismo y platonismo tardío. Una conclusión sucinta (580-2) cierra las tres secciones. Unos breves *curricula* sobre los colaboradores del volumen y una lista de abreviaturas preceden los capítulos. Cierra con una bibliografía muy útil y dos índices (Índice general e *Index locorum*). Cada sección está precedida por una breve presentación panorámica sobre el período incluido.

El primer período incluye capítulos sobre dos figuras pertenecientes al círculo íntimo de Platón, la recepción de Platón en el estoicismo, la Nueva Academia y el reflejo de la transición de la Nueva Academia al platonismo

medio en la obra de Cicerón. El capítulo de S. Horky sobre Espeusipo y Jenócrates (19-45), sucesores directos de Platón como cabezas de la Academia, subraya su compromiso con las líneas educativas de su maestro, sobre todo con el estudio de la realidad basado en la división (*diairesis*). Ch. E. Snyder expone el período que se extiende durante casi dos siglos entre Arquesilao y Filón de Larisa (ca. 265-84 BC). En él, la Academia abandonó aparentemente los aspectos metafísicos del pensamiento de Platón y se centró en la investigación lógica y epistemológica (58-71). S. ofrece un claro cuadro del desarrollo de la Nueva Academia, especialmente de su práctica de la enseñanza oral y del método del *in utramque partem disserere* promovido por Arquesilao y Carnéades. La defensa de la comunicación oral y el rechazo militante de la transmisión escrita ejercidos por ambos filósofos muestra claramente la gran importancia de la enseñanza oral en la tradición académica, un hecho indiscutible más allá de las doctrinas que acompañaren esa enseñanza. Es innegable que esa tradición arranca en Sócrates, pero tampoco cabe una duda razonable acerca de que fue continuada por Platón, aunque la motivación pudiere ser diferente. En el último trabajo de esta sección, F. Renaud (72-89) señala de manera convincente el escepticismo moderado de Cicerón y su visión de la filosofía del fundador de la Academia como una fusión creativa de pensamiento pitagórico y socrático. La sólida contribución de F. Alesse sobre el impacto de la ética platónica entre los estoicos (46-57) cae un poco fuera de la perspectiva general del volumen. Sin embargo, su análisis claro y profundo revela muchos aspectos de la influencia de los diálogos platónicos en los principales pensadores estoicos.

La parte intermedia (*Early Imperial Reception of Plato*) incluye nueve capítulos y comienza con uno de H. Tarrant sobre cómo el pensamiento platónico se difundió de manera material, e. d. los diferentes tipos de textos que se estudiaban en las escuelas de filosofía (101-114). Los profesores producían introducciones en la lectura de los diálogos y síntesis para principiantes. T. cree que los comentarios tenían como horizonte un público que se iniciaba en el estudio del filósofo. Sin embargo, estas obras eran de muy diferente tipo y muchos, si no todos, estaban dirigidos a estudiosos exponiendo la interpretación del autor sobre pasajes o aspectos problemáticos de la doctrina. También explicaban el estado del arte en cada ocasión. Esta sección concluye con una investigación de R. C. Fowler sobre el impacto de Platón en la segunda sofística (222-249). En este capítulo, la delimitación de la segunda sofística se comprende de manera lata, pues se incluyen no sólo oradores influidos por Platón y/o Aristóteles, sino también figuras cuya pertenencia a la segunda sofística es realmente dudosa tales como Plutarco o que difícilmente puedan ser considerados miembros del movimiento como Longo, Galeno o, incluso, Apuleyo. Un tratamiento de las coincidencias generales entre los autores tratados para dar una idea de la imagen vigente del pensamiento del filósofo en la época habría sido más útil e instructiva para el lector. El tratamiento que hace S. Yli-Karyanmaa del impacto de Platón en Filón (115-129) adopta más bien una perspectiva cuantitativa y no va más allá de la verificación de la pertenencia del filósofo judío a una cultura que sintetizaba dos tradiciones. Y.-K. pone con razón el acento en la importancia del *Fedón* en algunos asuntos de la exégesis filoniana de la *Biblia*, pero deja de lado, p. ej., la importancia del *Timeo*, en el comentario del relato eloísta de la creación en el *Génesis*.

M. Bonazzi investiga las coincidencias existentes entre la obra de Plutarco de Queronea y el comentario anónimo al *Teeteto* (130-142), ambos del período entre el primer y segundo siglo a. C. Para B., son el resultado de una tendencia a sistematizar la filosofía de Platón propia de la época. B. se centra en cuatro puntos del platonismo de Plutarco: su interpretación de la historia de la Academia para incluir el período escéptico, su recepción del *Timeo,* especialmente su interpretación literal del mito creacional, la posición de las Ideas y su 'escepticismo' en el sentido de que los seres humanos no pueden conocer completamente los primeros principios. El capítulo de B. adolece de algunos lugares comunes y afirmaciones discutibles. La idea de que la supuesta sistematización de Platón es tardía es el producto de un prejuicio y representa sólo una visión muy limitada de su filosofía deleatur. La cuestión principal yace en el significado del término 'sistema', pero las versiones de Aristóteles, Espeusipo o Jenócrates, aunque divergentes en algunos puntos, están muy lejos de una imagen de Platón como pensador no sistemático. Además, el capítulo ofrece escaso tratamiento de los textos concretos. La aportación F. Petrucci está dedicada al impacto de Platón en las matemáticas de Teón de Esmirna (143-155). La importancia de las matemáticas en el pensamiento de Platón no sólo se conoce a través de los diálogos, sino también a través de Aristóteles y toda la tradición indirecta. Esa significación ha sido ilustrada por varios estudios, algunos de ellos clásicos como los de León Robin,[2] Konrad Gaiser[3] o Elisabetta Cattanei[4] entre muchos otros, estudios que ni siquiera se mencionan. Lo mismo puede afirmarse de la doctrina no escrita, a menos que consideremos que la expresión 'philosophic historiography' es una alusión a ella. Sin embargo, el giro es demasiado impreciso y la falta de un tratamiento expreso de ese punto resta profundidad al capítulo. La simportancia de la tradición indirecta, o mejor de la doctrina no escrita, en ese tema se confirma con el acercamiento de Platón a los pitagóricos que hace Teón y puede observarse también en su uso de la *Epinómide*. Otro indicio es la diferenciación entre números ideales y números sensibles (*cf. e. g. De utilit. math.* 19,7-20,15; *et passim*). En definitiva, la especulación matemática de Teón es incomprensible sin acudir a la doctrina no escrita.

La incursión de G. Roskam en el platonismo medio romano (156-170) es una aportación innovadora que rompe una lanza contra la opinión habitual y en favor del valor filosófico de Apuleyo. R. ilustra el profundo platonismo presente en las *Metamorfosis* y la dimensión ética del segundo libro del *De Platone*. El platonismo de Apuleyo se demuestra también de manera convincente en su interpretación de la retórica. En el capítulo dedicado a Alcinoo (170-182), C. S. O'Brien sostiene que el *Didascálico* no es un manual para principiantes, sino que está dirigido a un público con un cierto conocimiento del pensamiento de Platón.[5] Para O'B., Alcinoo continúa una larga tradición de sistematización que comienza en la Academia Antigua. El sistema representado por Alcinoo adolece de algunas inconsistencias originadas en ciertas malinterpretaciones del texto platónico. A mi entender, la conclusión de O'B. de que, si el demiurgo copia el universo de un modelo, el modelo no puede estar en él (175), no tiene mucho fundamento textual, dado que ésa es precisamente toda la interpretación del platonismo medio, la mayoría de cuyos representantes tenían el griego como lengua madre. La supuesta evidencia del texto del *Timeo*, por tanto, no debe de ser tan concluyente y, de hecho, debe ser interpretada como una metáfora. Aparentemente, O'B. comparte

con muchos estudiosos una concepción muy materialista de un modelo. ¿Es que el demiurgo está creando en el espacio como para utilizar las categorías de dentro y fuera?

P. Athanassiadi hace un análisis muy detallado del pensamiento de Numenio y su recepción (183-205). El filósofo de Apamea ocupa un puesto de transición entre el platonismo medio y el neoplatonismo. H. J. Krämer ya demostró la relevancia de Numenio como puente entre la Academia Antigua, específicamente Jenócrates, y el neoplatonismo.[6] Asimismo, puso en evidencia la importancia de la doctrina no escrita en este asunto. A. subraya también el alcance de la herencia oral de Platón. Numenio es el primer testimonio sistemático de la interpretación de la historia de la filosofía que pone a Platón como un miembro de una tradición que se remonta a los orígenes del género humano y fue revelada por los dioses. Esa perspectiva será adoptada luego por el neoplatonismo. La simiente de una ideología semejante, empero, se encuentra en el mismo Platón. A. estudia también los tres dioses de Numenio como una anticipación del pensamiento neoplatónico. El capítulo de J. Rocca, dedicado a Galeno (206-22), pone el acento en el platonismo práctico del médico y en su adopción de la figura del demiurgo para explicar el orden existente en el universo.

La última sección cubre un período en el que, tal como sostiene el autor de la introducción de esta parte (252-269), el pensamiento de Platón impactó no sólo en los autores paganos, sino también en el cristianismo. Este hecho acentúa especialmente los rasgos religiosos de su filosofía, pero también las discordancias en la tradición platónica. En realidad, los cristianos sólo continuaron la tradición judía de adaptación del mensaje de Platón al *Antiguo Testamento*, en especial en lo relativo al creacionismo. Por otra parte, los filósofos paganos enfatizaron la estructura ontológica derivativa y su politeísmo. Coherentemente con toda la tradición que nos es conocida, ambas corrientes estaban convencidas de que Platón tenía una doctrina coherente o, si se prefiere, un sistema.[7] Tres de los diecisiete capítulos de esta parte están dedicados a platónicos cristianos. Uno se ocupa de los gnósticos setianos y otro, escrito por C. Addey (411-432), trata sobre las lectoras de Platón, un tema más relacionado con la primera sección por su generalidad. D. J. O'Meara analiza el reflejo de los diálogos políticos de Platón en la obra del emperador Flavio Claudio Juliano (400-410). El resto de la sección está dedicada a los filósofos neoplatónicos.

I. Ramelli describe alrededor de dos siglos de impacto del platonismo en el cristianismo, desde Clemente de Alejandría hasta Evagrio Póntico (271-291). R. expone con autoridad el deslizamiento que sufre la teología cristiana del platonismo medio al neoplatonismo, sobre todo en cuestiones como la noción de logos y la trascendencia de Dios. También defiende la identificación del neoplatónico Orígenes con el Orígenes cristiano. La posibilidad de que otros platónicos como Numenio hayan podido influir sobre el supuesto Orígenes neoplatónico no es ni siquiera considerada. Al mismo período pertenece Calcidio, de cuya identidad no se conoce prácticamente nada, ni siquiera si era romano o griego. C. Hoenig no está segura de que haya sido un cristiano. Su capítulo, dedicado al traductor y comentador del *Timeo* (433-447) relega la cuestión de sus fuentes y subraya la originalidad del comentario de Calcidio apuntando a la interrelación entre éste y la traducción. En su capítulo sobre Agustín, G. van Riel adopta una perspectiva diferente (448-469). Agustín es un eslabón importante en la integración del platonismo en el cristianismo. v. R. subraya

la forma en la que Agustín da una versión de manual del platonismo, que está dirigida a remarcar y adaptar los asuntos útiles para el cristianismo y su doctrina de la inspiración divina de los filósofos paganos.

Los gnósticos fueron otro de los variados movimientos religiosos influidos por Platón. El lamentado J. D. Turner ofrece un capítulo muy instructivo sobre el impacto de los gnósticos setianos (294-315). Demuestra que los tratados platonizantes de Nag Hammadi evidencian una lectura cuidadosa de los diálogos 'metafísicos' de Platón y un sistema derivativo innovador que precede al de Platón en algunos puntos fundamentales como la trascendencia absoluta de lo Uno, la posición del Intelecto como mediación entre lo Uno y la Multiplicidad, el ascenso y descenso del alma individual, etc. Sin embargo, el logro más destacable de T. es su demostración basada en un detallado análisis textual de la atenta lectura de los diálogos de Platón que llevaron a cabo los gnósticos setianos.

Plotino comenzó una línea de interpretación que en el siglo XIX se bautizó con el nombre de neoplatonismo y que continuó hasta el fin de la Antigüedad. Uno de los rasgos más importantes de estos precisos lectores de los escritos platónicos es su comprensión de la totalidad del mensaje del maestro, escrito y oral. El capítulo de Ll. Gerson (316-335) pone en evidencia esa característica a través de una explicación clara de la exégesis del *Parménides* que le permite a Plotino desarrollar su teoría del despliegue triádico de la unidad (Uno, Intelecto, Alma). El neoplatonismo siguió, más allá de las diferencias particulares la senda iniciada por Plotino. Su discípulo, Porfirio, tuvo una actitud más escolar. Tal como ilustra M. Chase (336-350), Porfirio institucionalizó un orden de lectura de los diálogos, escribió comentarios y profundizó la tendencia a armonizar Platón y Aristóteles. Su teoría adaptó y transformó en su sistema material del platonismo medio. Sin embargo, contrariamente a éste, defendió una interpretación monista del *Timeo*, según la cual la materia no es un principio independiente, sino creada y dependiente del intelecto del demiurgo.

Jámblico, cuyo pensamiento expone J. Finamore (366-380), impuso una nueva orientación en el neoplatonismo. Jámblico acentuó las prácticas religiosas que estimó por encima de la filosofía. Ese cambio impregnó a los pensadores más importantes representados en este volumen. La magia filosófica, teúrgia, ocupa ahora el centro del sistema. F. detalla diferentes aspectos del pensamiento de Jámblico que luego fueron determinantes para los continuadores. Entre estos puntos se encuentran el canon de lecturas que culmina en el *Timeo* y el *Parménides*, la centralidad del *skopos* o finalidad en la hermenéutica de cada diálogo, la complejidad de las mediaciones entre lo Uno y la naturaleza, así como la importancia del intelecto y el alma en su sistema. Al círculo de Plotino pertenecía también Amelio, quien, aparentemente, fue influido por Numenio hasta el punto de que abandonó Roma y se instaló en Apamea. D. Baltzly analiza el pensamiento de este miembro latino estrechamente vinculado a Plotino y Porfirio. El mismo capítulo ofrece una exposición del griego Teodoro de Ásine (380-399). Se conoce muy poco de ambos filósofos, tan sólo algunos aspectos generales de su sistema y de su actividad como autores. B. no cree que Amelio haya escrito algún comentario de los diálogos de Platón. Porfirio menciona tan sólo un tratado suyo sobre la noción de justicia. Según parece, ambos fueron influidos por Numenio y los neo-pitagóricos.

Al final de la Antigüedad quedaban dos centros en los que se practicaba filosofía

platónica, Atenas y Alejandría. Ambos tenían entre sí una estrecha relación. El volumen incluye seis capítulos dedicados a los miembros de ambas escuelas. Uno trata a un representante de la escuela alejandrina, Olimpiodoro, mientras que los cinco restantes analizan el pensamiento de los miembros del centro ateniense. S. Klitenic Wear considera que la característica más importante del pensamiento de Siriano es su cercanía hermenéutica al texto y su sistema metafísico que acentúa la relación entre lo Uno y lo Uno-Ser, así como la multiplicación de tríadas (470-485). Para Siriano el texto platónico está lleno de símbolos que alertan al lector de la estructura ontológica del universo. Hermias, un alumno de Siriano, tomó notas de las lecciones de su maestro sobre el *Fedro*. Éstas son estudiadas por H. Tarrant y D. Baltzly (486-497). Tal como señalan los autores de este capítulo las notas son un ejemplo de cómo la escuela de Atenas analizaba y comparaba los textos de los diálogos platónicos. Es muy probable que este método se remonte a Plutarco, el fundador de la Academia ateniense. Lo que es realmente incomprensible en este capítulo, es el interés de los autores por demostrar que Hermias no supone que los diálogos platónicos estén incluidos en la crítica de Sócrates a la escritura. En primer lugar, Hermias/Siriano afirma claramente que en la crítica está incluida toda clase de escritos. En segundo lugar, los autores se limitan a repetir argumentos en favor de su hipótesis que ya han sido refutados innumerables veces por la escuela de Tubinga/Milán. Por último, ¿están excluidos todos los diálogos -el diálogo es un género literario en Grecia ya en esa época- o sólo los escritos por Platón?[8] En caso de ser así, ¿cuál es la causa para que se excluyan sólo los platónicos y no el resto de diálogos existentes, especialmente los socráticos? Sin embargo, la afirmación de que Proclo hace sólo tres referencias a la doctrina no escrita es aún más sorprendente. ¿Conocen los autores todas las obras de Proclo, no sólo las conservadas? En segundo lugar, no basta con buscar el sintagma *agrapha dogmata* en el TLG. Tendrían que haber buscado también, p. ej., *arreta, arreton* o términos similares, así como las indicaciones de una antigua doctrina transmitida oralmente y que se refleja en el sistema de Proclo. Esas referencias o alusiones son muchas más de tres. De acuerdo con la interpretación de la historia de la filosofía que tenían los neoplatónicos, son todas referencias a un corpus doctrinario caracterizado por Aristóteles como *agrapha dogmata* (cf. Proclo, *Theol Plat.* I 1, 6:16-7:8). Además, tal fijación con la mención de un sintagma ignorando, p. ej., los *hyperbata,* carece de sentido. La ciencia no se construye sobre el fundamento del consenso, sino de la verdad y ésta no se decide por una mayoría de votos o 'poder de fuego' editorial.

El capítulo sobre Proclo de J. Opsomer ofrece una visión distinta (498-514). O. apunta a la adhesión de Proclo al método hermenéutico de Siriano y su interpretación de los diálogos en una doble vía, la tradición escrita y la oral. El Platón de Proclo es sobre todo un pensador teológico, pero eso no implica una visión reduccionista, puesto que Proclo incursionó en diferentes asuntos científicos y políticos. S. Ahbel-Rappe expone la contribución de Damascio al método de comentario de la escuela de Atenas (515-532). Según A.-R., Damascio reacciona al dogmatismo de la tradición introduciendo en sus escritos un momento socrático-aporético. G. Gabor subraya la perspectiva unitaria del último intérprete de la Escuela de Atenas, cuyos escritos han llegado hasta nosotros (569-582). Simplicio no fue un gran innovador y se consideraba parte de una

antigua tradición de la que Platón mismo era sólo un miembro.

M. Griffin muestra la independencia de Olimpiodoro, probablemente el último filósofo pagano de Alejandría, a pesar de la presión cristiana sobre los círculos intelectuales de la ciudad (555-568). Olimpiodoro mantuvo la visión tradicional del platonismo sin polemizar con los cristianos. Las lecciones que se han conservado indican que están dirigidas a un público no especialista. Esta última sección incluye dos obras que se han transmitido anónimas, un comentario al *Parménides* y una introducción en la filosofía de Platón. D. Clark (351-365) ofrece un panorama de las diferentes propuestas para identificar el autor del comentario. Sin embargo, la cuestión de la autoría no es tan importante como la visión que el escrito permite del período transicional entre al platonismo medio y el neoplatonismo. D. Layne trata el segundo texto, la *Introducción en la filosofía* (533-554). L. remarca que la *introducción* presenta un Platón inserto en una tradición revelada, pero su figura supera al resto de sus miembros. Platón es un auténtico conductor de almas y el *skopos* de los diálogos es transformar la vida de los lectores. L. apunta a la importancia que tiene la doctrina no escrita para el autor de la *Introducción*.

Si se acepta que este es un volumen más sobre el desarrollo del platonismo que acerca del impacto de la filosofía platónica en la Antigüedad, constituye una aportación útil para aquellos que quieran conocer el estado del arte en ese ámbito. No obstante, es extraño que no haya ni siquiera un capítulo dedicado al impacto que el platonismo tuvo en Aristóteles y el aristotelismo, para no hablar del epicureísmo, el neopitagorismo u otras corrientes filosóficas y religiosas de la Antigüedad. Sólo se abordan algunos aspectos muy parciales del estoicismo y el gnosticismo. Quizás hubiera sido más útil delimitar la obra a un período menor. Es obvio que es muy difícil incluir en un solo volumen todos los aspectos de la huella del pensador ateniense y que los editores debieron tomar decisiones que cercenan la selección. Aunque no siempre los capítulos parecen estar elegidos por la importancia de los autores o las corrientes a las que pertenecen. No se entiende, por ejemplo, la ausencia de personajes tan importantes como Plutarco de Atenas o Marino y la presencia de textos o autores que no tuvieron una proyección semejante. Tampoco hay una cierta unidad temática en el tratamiento de los diferentes autores, sino que los temas que abordan los capítulos en cada autor no parecen estar coordinados. Asimismo, tal como suele suceder en obras de este tipo, los capítulos tienen grandes diferencias en lo que concierne no sólo la perspectiva, sino también en el *skopos* concreto. Algunos son excelentes introducciones o estados del arte que sirven para comenzar una investigación, otros abordan temas colaterales dejando completamente de lado el sistema general del autor. No obstante, estas observaciones son prácticamente inevitables en toda obra de estas características y el futuro lector puede descontar que se trata de un libro de consulta útil para toda persona interesada en la historia del platonismo.

Notes

1 La escasa presencia de autores cristianos se debe a que se ha anunciado un volumen sobre la recepción de Platón en el cristianismo que comenzará con Agustín de Hipona (cf. p. 7).

2 La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres selon Aristote. Paris 1908.

3 Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaft in der Platonischen Schule. Stuttgart 1968^2.

4 Enti matematici e metafísica. Platone, l'Accademia e Aristotele a Confronto. Milano1996.

5 El autor o los autores de la introducción de la tercera parte defienden la interpretación contraria (252)

6 H. J. Krömer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin. Amsterdam 1964.

7 No es éste el lugar para discutir el significado del término 'sistema'. Sin embargo, creo que la identificación de 'sistemático' y 'dogmático' implicada por el autor o autores de la introducción a esta sección es, no sólo históricamente incorrecta – de hecho el así llamado neoplatonismo tuvo tantos sistemas como filósofos conocemos, sino también inaceptable desde el punto de vista científico, pues intenta descalificar una parte significativa de la tradición platónica y del trabajo histórico filológico contemporáneo.

8 Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ὁ λόγος διὰ **πάντων** φοιτῶν φοιτᾷ καὶ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ **πάντων γενῶν**. Λυσίου δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρου καὶ Σόλωνος ἐμνημόνευσεν, ὡς ἄν εἴποις, πολιτικοῦ καὶ ποιητικοῦ καὶ νομοθετικοῦ λόγου (277.25-8; el énfasis es mío). Un lector normal de Platón se percataría del amplio significada del término *logos* en todo el pasaje. Creo innecesario insistir sobre los significados de ποιητικός y νομοθετικός muy diferente, del de las lenguas modernas.

9 Cf. nota anterior.

10 Entiendo aquí *hyperbata* en sentido lato, e. d. considerando tal la separación por partículas, etc.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

International Plato Society

Guidelines for Authors

GENERAL GUIDELINES

1) The manuscript should not be submitted to any other journal while still under consideration.

2) If accepted, the author agrees to transfer copyright to Plato Journal so that the manuscript will not be published elsewhere in any form without prior written consent of the Publisher.

SUBMISSIONS

Books reviewed must have been published no more than three years prior.

We invite submissions in every field of research on Plato and Platonic tradition. All the IPS five languages (English, French, Italian, German, Spanish) are accepted. The articles or reviews should normally not exceed 8000 words, including notes and references, but longer papers will be considered where the length appears justified. All submissions must include an abstract in English. The abstract should be of no more than 100 words and include 2-6 keywords.

Please submit your article online, at http://iduc.uc.pt/index.php/platojournal/.

For any additional information, please contact the Editors at platojournal@platosociety.org.

DOUBLE-BLINDED PEER REVIEW

The Plato Journal follows a double-blinded peer review process. Submissions are forwarded by the Editorial Committee to the Scientific Committee or to ad hoc readers. Submissions are judged according to the quality of the writing, the originality and relevance of the theses, the strength of the arguments and evidence mustered in support of the theses, and their critical and/or informative impact on the advancement of research on Plato and Platonic tradition.

GREEK

Use a Greek Unicode font (free Unicode fonts are available on 'Greek Fonts Society').

QUOTATIONS

Set long quotations (longer than 2 lines) as block quotations (with indentation from the left), without using quotation marks.

ITALICS & ROMAN

1. Italicize single words or short phrases in a foreign language.

2. Words, letters or characters that are individually discussed as a point of analysis should not be italicized. Instead they should come between single quotation marks.

3. Use italics for titles of books and articles; do not italicize titles of dissertations or journal / book series.

4. Use italics for title of book cited within title of book: e. g.: R.D. Mohr- B.M. Sattler (ed.), *One Book, the Whole Universe: Plato's Timaeus Today*, Las Vegas-Zurich-Athens 2010.

PUNCTUATION

1. Punctuation generally goes outside quotation marks.

2. Use single quotation marks; use double quotation marks only within single quotation marks; in an English text, replace quotation marks from different systems or languages (e.g. « … » or „…“) by single or double quotation marks.

3. Place ellipses within square brackets when they indicate omitted text from a quotation (e.g. […]).

FOOTNOTES

1. Footnote reference numbers should be located in the main text at the end of a sentence, after the punctuation; they should be marked with a superscript number.

2. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively.

3. Do not use a footnote number in main titles; if a note is required there, use an asterisk.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

ANCIENT AUTHORS AND WORKS

When referring to Platonic dialogues by their full title, use the title that is customary in your language (italics), e.g. *Phaedo*, *Phédon*, *Phaidon*. When using abbreviations, please use this standard set:

Apol., *Charm.*, *Epist.* (e.g. VII), *Euthyphr.*, *Gorg.*, *Hipp. mai.*, *Hipp. min.*, *Crat.*, *Crit.*, *Lach.*, *Leg.*, *Lys.*, *Men.*, *Parm.*, *Phaid.*, *Phaidr.*, *Phil.*, *Polit.*, *Prot.*, *Rep.*, *Soph.*, *Symp.*, *Theait.*, *Tim.*

For other ancient authors and works, use abbreviations standard in your language, e.g. (in English) those in Liddell-Scott-Jones or the Oxford Classical Dictionary.

Authors are asked to conform to the following examples:

Plat., *Tim.* 35 a 4-6.
Arist., *Metaph.* A 1, 980 a 25-28.
Simpl., *In Cat.*, 1.1-3.17 Kalbfleisch (CAG VIII).

MODERN AUTHORS AND WORKS

In the footnotes:
Use the author/ date system:

Gill 2012, 5-6.

In the list of bibliographic references:

Gill 2012: Gill, M. L., *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2012.

CHAPTER IN BOOK:

A.H. Armstrong, *Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus's Account of Nous*, in P.-M. Schuhl – P. Hadot (ed.), *Le Néoplatonisme*, CNRS, Paris 1971, 67-74.

ARTICLE IN JOURNAL:

G.E.L. Owen, *The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues*, «Classical Quarterly» 3 (1953), 79-95.