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Logos, Inspiration, and Self-Motion in Plato's *Phaedrus*

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ABSTRACT

Plato is often seen as the quintessential champion of reason, but many of his dialogues dramatize the insufficiency of certain conceptions of reason for ethical and political life. In this article, I trace out the multiple forms and purposes of reason and inspiration in Plato's *Phaedrus*, and show that each can be discerning or misleading. No method of reason or experience of inspiration can automatically provide secure moral knowledge. Instead of certainty, the *Phaedrus* recommends a kind of self-motion that requires an ongoing choice of self via an ongoing practice of *logos* with others. In this practice, reason intertwines with other forces to ask and answer the questions generated by the multiple values of the soul.

Keywords: Plato, Phaedrus, reason, inspiration

Plato is often seen as the quintessential champion of rationality, and in two ways. The first account draws from Plato's vision of a city where philosopher-kings rule according to knowledge derived from the unchanging forms of true being. On this view, Plato is a believer in universalistic knowledge and philosophical certainty (e.g., Reeve, 2006). The second account focuses on Plato's Socrates and his role as gadfly, employing critical reason to puncture the beliefs of those who think they know. On this view, the primary purpose of Socrates' activities is to undermine certainty (e.g., Villa 2001). However, as other scholars have shown, neither of these views do justice to the way many of Plato's dialogues dramatize the insufficiency of either form of reason for ethical and political life. [1] In this article, I focus on the *Phaedrus*, where inspiration figures as a companion or counterpart of reason. I call inspiration a "companion" of reason in order to stress that inspiration is neither opposed to reason nor reducible to it, and I aim to show that Plato takes it seriously as a potential source of knowledge.

With "inspiration," I am not tracing a particular Greek term in Plato's work, but rather referring to Plato's repeated representation of the experience of being moved by an insight whose origins we cannot necessarily trace, and that we do not arrive at by explicit reasoning. I begin by sketching how Plato dramatizes different limitations of reason – limitations that call for a normative examination of ways of *being moved*. I then turn to the *Phaedrus*, which assists with this normative analysis in three ways: a) by drawing attention to multiple forms of reason and inspiration, some of which are discerning and some misleading; b) by showing that both the misleading and the discerning cases may be accompanied by the *feeling* of knowing; and c) by shifting our

attention away from the opposition between reason and inspiration, toward what it means to be self-moving. However, the "self" in self-moving cannot simply be identified with reason, but rather is discerned through one's ongoing choices in an ongoing practice of *logos* with others.

THE LIMITS OF REASON IN PLATO

We can see three ways in which *logos* as reasoned argument is not a self-sufficient or a final source of security with respect to knowing. First, reason can't justify itself unless one is already persuaded of the value of reason – of knowing more rather than less, of thinking better. As David Roochnik points out in his commentary on the *Cleitophon*, "there is no argument which can, without begging the question, establish the goodness of argumentation...rational argumentation depends on a value judgment: that it is good to pursue the argument, to strive to replace opinion with knowledge" (1984, p. 141-2). Thus Socrates' usual insistence on proceeding via dialogic argument rather than through competing speeches cannot be justified simply in its own terms. If I don't already think that by reasoning and argumentation I can achieve some good, then what argument can persuade me? Or rather, why would *argument* persuade me? As a result, the project of philosophy "is initiated, not by a demonstration of its value, but by exhortation" (Roochnik 1984, p. 142).

This is perhaps why, in so many of Plato's dialogues, we see not simply a formal elenchus or logical procedure but Socrates' own exhortations, enticements, and provocations. This leads to the second kind of limitation of reason that Plato dramatizes, as we see So-

crates exhorting other people to live a just life, rather than a life aimed at amassing political power and material wealth. Plato shows us that particular reasoned arguments, for what ways of life are worth choosing, may not be enough to persuade. Socrates does of course give reasons for choosing a particular ethical view – those reasons have to do with the kind of life we would lead, the kind of person we would be – but Socrates also has to get those reasons to *matter* to his interlocutors. To matter to us – to really take hold in our soul – we have to "feel their force," yet in a way that makes them our own.[2] But Plato often portrays Socrates' interlocutors as instead *feeling forced* by Socrates. Recall Callicles, who in the *Gorgias* resists the "discipline" of the discussion and who in the end is not really convinced, or Thrasymachus' blushing, sweating reluctance in Book 1 of the *Republic* (*Grg.* 505c, 513c; *R.* 350c-d).[3] It is perhaps not incidental that both Callicles and Thrasymachus identify freedom with having power over others, and see speech as central to that power. This view of *logos*, and this equation of freedom with rule over others, is one that Socrates persistently contests. He also enacts a kind of freedom himself (he denies in both the *Gorgias* and the *Crito* that others have the power to harm him), and he works to get his interlocutors to reconsider what *kinds* of compulsion, what kinds of force, they should in fact fear and resist. Doing so requires moving them to care most about what it means to lead a just life; those are the kinds of reasons that have to come to matter, and the kind of purposes that have to guide the practice of *logos*.

Once again, this understanding of the limits of reason shows why Socrates' practice of dialogic reasoning is necessarily intertwined with exhortations, provocations, and reproaches.[4] This calls for a normative defense of *being moved*. What kind of moving and being moved is compatible with something like freedom – with not being in someone else's power but being moved by our own power?[5]

A conventional Platonic answer would refer to the mastery of reason –i.e., that we are moved "by our own power" when we are moved by reason (Stalley 1998). But there is a third difficulty that further complicates conventional portrayals of Plato's rationalism: his work indicates that reason is not the only way we come to know things. This is dramatized by Plato's depictions of Socrates himself as inspired. As a particularly notable example, Socrates often speaks about his *daimonion* -- a divine sign, a "spiritual manifestation" (*Ap.* 40a) that opposes him when he is about to do something wrong. In many of the dialogues, Plato explicitly depicts Socrates as someone who comes to know the right thing to do via being moved by a divine sign.

Socrates' *daimonion* has been interpreted as simply the inner voice of conscience, or alternatively as an authoritative religious command. What is unsatisfying about both of these options is that they too easily tame the strangeness of Socrates the philosopher being guided away from certain actions by a divine sign. Indeed, Plato has Socrates say in the *Republic* that such a thing is rare (496c). But why then does Plato craft his dialogues to include these repeated mentions of Socrates' divine sign? In what way is this to engage readers/listeners who don't have these kinds of spiritual manifestations? I suggest that when Plato portrays Socrates as inspired by the divine, it is illuminating to read this as a portrayal of a compelling experience that is more widely shared -- the experience of ethical/intellectual intuition or insight. Portraying this type of inspiration captures the phenomenon of "knowing" things ("feeling

the force" of things) whose origins are not in a chain of conscious reasoning.[6]

A different version of the "feeling of knowing" appears in Plato's dialogues too, when we see interlocutors whose unexamined opinions have been formed by the stories they were told as children or the cultural common sense that they repeat and accept. *That* feeling of knowing is a crucial sort of mistake that Socratic dialogue is meant to unravel. Socrates' own inspiration is clearly a different sort of phenomenon. By the "feeling of knowing," then, I mean to refer to an *experience*, where we experience ourselves as knowing something. But the "feeling of knowing" is not an *epistemic* condition; we may or may not actually have knowledge that stands up to further investigation.

Socrates' own inspiration can surely be reconciled with reason, as many ingenious interpretive attempts have shown.[7] This isn't wrong, exactly; as Plato portrays him, Socrates reflects on, and offers reasons to explain, why his *daimonion* forbids certain actions (e.g., *Ap.* 40a-b, *Phdr.* 242c-d). But this way of making sense of Socratic inspiration simply reasserts reason as a higher authority or final arbiter, *without acknowledging that only certain kinds of reasons and certain chains of reasoning are going to make sense to Socrates*. From a contemporary point of view, that would make Socrates' response to his *daimonion* an example of motivated reasoning – he is interpreting evidence to suit already held beliefs, a practice far from exemplary. But perhaps Plato's work can help de-familiarize these contemporary assumptions. To be sure, moral reasoning requires that we be able to question our beliefs, even those deeply interwoven into the fabric of our identities. Indeed, Plato's Socrates regards this questioning as the ongoing task of human living. But Plato's dialogues also show

that reasons are always internal to lives; as Socrates often reminds his interlocutors, what is at stake in their discussions is what way of life is worth pursuing (e.g., *R.* 344d-e, *Grg.* 500c-d). Thus I argue that Plato's work *also* suggests a kind of moral thinking in which reason is neither wholly detached from our identities nor reduced to mere rationalization of those identities. What kind of moral thinking is neither radically autonomous nor passively enculturated?

To probe this further, I turn to a dialogue in which reason and inspiration play vivid dramatic roles: the *Phaedrus*. The dialogue shows that inspiration takes multiple forms, and can turn out to be either true or false, right or wrong, illuminating or misleading. But it also shows that reason has the same multiplicity, and the same ability to illuminate or mislead. This returns us to the need for a closer normative examination of what kind of moving and being moved is compatible with freedom, rather than involving manipulation, passivity, or self-deception. If different forms of reason cannot automatically trump inspiration/intuition as the standard that justifies the soul's self-motion, what are we to do with "the feeling of knowing"? I argue that the drama of the dialogue suggests the need to recursively ask, answer, and investigate the relation between two questions at the heart of moral thinking: not only "is it true?" but also "does it truly move me?"

PHAEDRUS I: FORMS OF REASON AND INSPIRATION

The dialogue takes place outside the city walls, as Socrates and Phaedrus meet while walking in the countryside.[8] Phaedrus is bubbling over with enthusiasm about a speech

written by Lysias, and Socrates teasingly likens this enthusiasm to the "frenzied dance" of the Corybantes.[9] Yet Socrates portrays himself as a partner in this enthusiasm, as someone "sick with passion for hearing speeches (*logoi*)" and willing to follow Phaedrus anywhere to listen to one (227d-228b). One obviously odd aspect of this entertaining beginning is that Plato's Socrates is generally not a lover of speeches but rather the opposite – a persistent critic of rhetoric and of conventional practices of speechmaking, often reorienting the form of the conversation away from competing speeches and toward the question-and-answer that he claims is more fruitful. But here in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates himself is the one offering competing speeches. First he enters into the mindset of competitive oratory, challenging the absent Lysias by offering a supposedly better speech on the same topic. And then he is moved to give a second speech recanting his first. The dialogue thus shows Socrates playing with and performing the various meanings of *logos* in multiple ways. But to what end?

Lysias's speech is from the point of view of a "non-lover," a speaker who claims not to be in love with the boy who is the addressee. The speech aims to persuade the boy that it is better to favor the speaker, who doesn't love him, rather than someone who is carried away by the madness of love. The non-lover depicts himself as rationally calculating and clear-eyed, and argues that such a state of mind enables him to act well, in a way that is honest, self-controlled, and reliable. By contrast, a lover swept up in passion is "well aware that he is not thinking straight" but simply can't control himself. He is likely to be jealous, angry, and inconstant (230e-234c).

Despite (or because of) Phaedrus's enthusiasm for the speech, Socrates claims to know an even better speech from the same

perspective, and is moved to give it, even as he clearly marks out this speech in favor of the non-lover as not his own:

> "My breast is full and I feel I can make a different speech, even better than Lysias'. Now I am well aware that none of these ideas cannot come from me – I know my own ignorance. The only other possibility, I think, is that I was filled, like an empty jar, by the words of other people streaming into my ears" (235c-235d).

We can compare this description of being filled with others' ideas with the later account of the dangers of writing -- readers will put their faith in something "which is external and depends on signs that belong to others" and "will imagine that they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing" (275a-b). The difference here is that Socrates is, as always, aware of his own ignorance. He further distances himself from the speech by embedding it in a story about a beautiful boy, calling on the Muses to assist him, and covering his head while he's speaking (235c-d, 237a-b). The head covering is allegedly out of embarrassment at competing with Lysias' "wisdom," but it is the content of the speech that the drama reveals as shameful in Socrates' eyes.[10]

Socrates's first speech proceeds by definition and distinction – not only defining what love is, but also identifying the difference between being in love and not being in love. That difference is whether reason – *logos* – is in command or not. The speech goes on to offer an account of the kinds of harm that would come to the boy from someone possessed by the "unreasoning desire" of *erōs* (238c). And in the middle of the speech, Socrates pauses to comment on how inspired he is: "don't you think, as I do, that I'm in the grip of something

divine?" Under the influence of the nymphs to whom their riverside resting place has been dedicated, Socrates waxes poetic (238c-d).

Note, then, what a strange mixture the speech is. Is the practice of definition and distinction supposed to portend the later reference to collection and division as a necessary practice for "dialecticians" and lovers of wisdom? If so, the speech employs a method of philosophy – but wrongly, given how Socrates remakes the divisions in his next speech. At the same time, this methodical approach is conveyed in eloquent poetic language that Socrates stresses does not come from him. Whose speech *is* this strange hybrid of orderly method and poetic inspiration (the Muses? The Nymphs? The named wise people or unnamed prose writers of 235c?)?[11]

The strangeness is deepened when, after explaining the various harms that come from the lover being more concerned with his own pleasure than with the boy's good, Socrates suddenly ends his speech, saying that he is unwilling to become more completely possessed (241e). Yet as he prepares to leave, another divine inspiration – his *daimonion* – prevents him, and he interprets this as a prompt to recant the speech he has just given, which he now characterizes as "horrible...foolish...close to being impious" (242d). If we regard the first speech as inspired, the subsequent need for recantation shows the moral dangers of yielding to the experience of inspiration. But this is complicated by the fact that the first speech also had the *appearance* of reason, and that the recantation was itself prompted by an experience of inspiration.

This dramatic portrayal of different experiences of inspiration and reason is then explicitly thematized in the next speech, which distinguishes bad kinds of "madness" from divine kinds. The non-lover had claimed to be a better partner for the boy precisely because he

was calm and reasonable, rather than mad with desire. But Socrates's second speech rethinks the simplistic opposition between reason and madness: whether reason is better than madness depends upon what *kind* of madness we are talking about (and, it turns out, what kind of reason). As noted, Socrates later names himself a lover of precisely these kinds of "divisions and collections" whereby one discerns the parts that make up a kind, and the connections and distinctions between them; this is central to being able "to think and to speak" (266b). Here he first considers the divine inspiration seen in the "madness" of prophecy. The priestesses are "out of their minds" in their "god-inspired prophetic trances" yet they "give sound guidance" (244b-c). And poets are possessed by the Muses, and "without the Muses' madness" their poetry would be inadequate -- technically correct about the subject, but without the power to move (244a-245a).[12] Socrates then argues that love too is a god-given madness, and to possess it – or be possessed by it – is "our greatest good fortune" (245c).[13]

To understand the beneficial madness of love, Socrates says, we need to know the nature of that which loves: the soul. Socrates' account of the soul works to further complicate the opposition between someone who is sane, controlled, and in their right mind, and someone who is out of their mind and possessed by another force. I argue that the crucial question turns out not to be whether we should be moved by cool reason or mad *eros*, but something quite different: what it means to be self-moving.

PHAEDRUS II: THE ANIMATE SOUL AND ITS VALUES

At the heart of Socrates' description of the soul is its *self-moving* character. "Whatever

moves itself is essentially soul;" being a source of motion is "the very essence and principle of a soul" (245e).[14] But to say that the soul is self-moving is not to say that it is radically autonomous, or unaffected by its surroundings; Socrates says that understanding the soul requires "examining what it does *and* what is done to it" (245c, my italics). The soul both acts (it moves itself) and is acted upon (affected by what it experiences). How is it that we can think of this as *self*-moving, as opposed to being moved by something outside us? In what way might our responses to something external be no less ours? This is crucial to parse, for to say otherwise – that we can't help ourselves in the face of external temptation, for example -- is to assert a fundamental unfreedom, whereby we are at the mercy of whatever comes to us, whatever we experience, however our culture has shaped us. This requires thinking about self-motion as not radically detached from other forces, and thinking about "being moved" as not always passive. Charles Griswold's (1986, p. 87) formulation is helpful: "If the soul desires what appears to it to be good and beautiful, the appearance may be said to move the soul, but only because the soul values the appearance. In this very broad sense, then, the soul may be said to move itself." To value something is to have a kind of active response to the external, an interaction. We might say that the soul moves itself in response to what is outside itself, what it experiences through perception. The soul's active engagement with the external is precisely "what allows the soul to be talked into desiring different things" (Griswold 1986, p. 87).[15]

Socrates depicts the complexity of the self-moving soul -- and the way it can be talked into desiring different things -- in the context of an elaborate myth in which human souls, before they come to earth, catch varying glimpses of true being (Justice, Beauty, and so on). In the image that Socrates uses, the soul is figured as a charioteer with two horses, one noble and one bad. The noble horse is "a lover of honor with modesty and self-control… and is guided by verbal commands alone." The bad horse is ugly and wild and "just barely" controlled by physical force (253d-e). If we have in mind the tripartite soul of the *Republic*, it is easy to assume that the third figure, the charioteer, represents a straightforward conception of reason, but this is undercut by the way the character of erotic madness is portrayed.[16]

The occasion for the portrayal is the struggle in the soul that happens upon seeing a beautiful boy (253e-254e). The "entire soul" feels the appeal, the desire for beauty. But it is the bad horse who leaps forward and who, when the other two resist, persistently badgers them to go forward and proposition the boy. The charioteer and the good horse are plunged into a stew of conflicting emotions and beliefs: they "tingle" with desire, they're angry at being pressured to do something they believe is shameful, they are exasperated and finally worn down by the wild horse's persistence, "reluctantly agreeing to do as they have been told." Then:

> They are close to him now, and they are struck by the boy's face as if by a bolt of lightning. When the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to Self-Control. At the sight he is frightened, falls over backwards awestruck, and at the same time has to pull the reins back so fiercely that both horses are set on their haunches" (253e-254c).

The noble horse cooperates with this sudden reversal, suffused with "shame and awe," but the other horse, indignant at being restrained, promptly resumes its importuning (254c). This scene replays itself, "time after time," as the bad horse continues to press its purposes on the other two, and the charioteer and the good horse delay, dissemble, and give in – only for the charioteer to be "struck with the same feelings as before, only worse" (254e). He is overwhelmed each time by the memories that rise up at the sight of the boy. These are memories of seeing true being, of perceiving the "real nature" of things -- of *knowing*. These memories move the charioteer to act to forcefully restrain the bad horse. This restraint becomes progressively more violent, painful, and bloody, until finally out of fear the bad horse becomes "humble enough to follow the charioteer's warnings" which allows the soul to "[follow] its boy in reverence and awe" (254e).

The charioteer clearly represents a complex power. He uses the tools of violence and pretense, and both he and the noble horse are capable of anger and of inconsistency, as they get worn down by the bad horse's persistence.[17] And the bad horse engages in persuasion, remembers earlier agreements, and calculates when to apply what kind of force. So we can't identify each "part" of the soul simply with one capacity (desire, self-restraint, reason). All three aspects of the soul feel desire; all three parts of the soul engage in reason. But each has a primary value, a characteristic focus, something that matters most. The bad horse's aim is to fulfill bodily appetite, and it is to this goal that it directs its attempts at compelling its companions, whether through physical force or verbal persuasion. The noble horse is committed to honor and self-restraint; this mostly involves following the charioteer's lead, but also involves some kind of applied judgment about whether the behavior is more and less honorable. The charioteer? The violence with which he chastises the bad horse, and the result that the horse eventually "dies of fright" when it sees the boy (254e), might seem to indicate that the charioteer's aim is to eradicate lustful desire. But this isn't right, and Plato's text supplies two kinds of reasons why not. First and perhaps less interestingly, the bad horse is simply irrepressible. It becomes animate again once the lover is used to spending time around the boy; in a particularly tempting situation, the bad horse "has a word to say to the charioteer – that after all its suffering it is entitled to a little fun" (256a). Although tamed, the bad horse has not been wholly silenced. Bodily appetites, lustful desires, instrumental reasoning toward narrowly defined goals – perhaps these are recalcitrant elements of selfhood that can never be fully eradicated. But, secondly, this is not necessarily something that should be regarded with regret. For the bad horse is indispensable; it is the source of the movement that brings the charioteer close enough to the boy for the charioteer to actually be struck by insight -- to be moved by memory – and to act upon it.[18]

Scholars are divided on what might this mean in non-mythical, non-metaphorical terms. Nussbaum (1986, p. 214-216 and ch. 7 *passim*) argues that the *Phaedrus* represents a change in Plato's own valuations, and that he is here giving non-intellectual passions and desires an important motivational and "guiding" role, as "intrinsically valuable components of the best human life." In contrast, Sheffield (2012, p. 230-232) contends that the black horse is simply an inevitable characteristic of the charioteer's "mortal nature" and represents "the backdrop against which philosophical *eros* must struggle." Rowe (1990, p. 238-241)

concurs with Sheffield that the desires of the black horse require struggle and control, rather than "enjoyment."

I agree with the latter two scholars that, if we take Plato's depictions seriously, the black horse's desires are not intrinsically valuable in and of themselves. Yet neither are they simply a matter of regret or disdain. Although the charioteer notices the boy's beauty before the black horse leaps forward, he is not close enough to be struck by insight until the black horse's movement, contra Sheffield (253e-254c). To translate this into non-mythical, non-metaphorical terms: it is precisely the multiple values of the soul that press upon us the question of what -- of who -- we want to be. The self-restraint of the noble horse might be that part of us responsive to the valuations of others and of society (this is why shame and honor are so important for it). Simply giving into it would be as unfree as giving into the selfish erotic desire of the other horse, unfree because compelled either by societal opinion or erotic necessity. This idea of compulsion is compatible with the self-moving character of the soul, because as noted before, the soul moves itself according to how it values what it perceives. But as the chariot metaphor depicts so vividly, the soul has multiple desires and sources of value.

The multiplicity of the soul opens up the question, in Ferrari's astute formulation, of "how best the life of the whole person should go" (1987, p. 201). This is a question about freedom not because it involves reason ruling non-reason, but because the answer is a choice of self – a choice involving what desires we want to be moved by, and what reasons we want to matter to us.[19] Thus, to characterize Platonic freedom as being governed by reason, as Stalley 1998 does, is too simple. Yet neither is the mere fact of choice sufficient to ensure

that we are governed by our own power. Nightingale (1995) captures the issue at hand with her distinction between "alien" and "authentic" discourses. Alien discourses are those that come from others, including stories that have been passed down to us or *logoi* accepted on the authority of another (136-38). But "alien" also includes the multiple conflicting discourses of the soul; as Nightingale notes, each part of the soul is associated not only with certain desires, but with the "discourse of these desires" (143). And this shows the need to "examine and evaluate not only external discourse but also the voices within" (145), for it is through this process that we reject some alien discourses and transform others into authentic ones, ones that are "our own" (165-169). Not only are some *logoi* better than others, then, but also a better soul-condition means being in a specific kind of relation to the *logoi* that move us.

This indicates a deeper, more normative understanding of what it means to be self-moving. Strictly speaking, the soul is self-moving in the myth when the bad horse lunges toward the beautiful boy. But it is clear that the charioteer's movements involve the right valuing of that which the soul perceives, and thus are the kind of self-motion we should desire. I will call this "true" self-motion, indicating both moral truth and an active orientation of the self to that truth. This active orientation reflects a recognizable kind of freedom, of being under our own power rather than subject to another.[20]

Nightingale's articulation of the need to "examine and evaluate" might seem to re-center reason as the measure of a soul's self-motion. True self-moving does require reason, to be sure, but not merely the instrumental reasoning of the bad horse, or the applied but unquestioning judgment of the noble horse.

(We can imagine a situation in which it is the noble horse the charioteer has to train, to persuade it to a different understanding of what is shameful and what is honorable.) The charioteer feels the desires of the other two, and understands their reasoning, but his role, his aim, is to evaluate and direct action from the perspective of the good of the whole. In Ferrari's words again (1987, p. 201):

> "The essential point of contrast between the charioteer and rebellious horse is not that between the faculty of reason (without desire) and a faculty of appetite or desire (without reason) but, as we have seen, between that in us which aims at how best the life of the whole person should go and that which looks only to as immediate a satisfaction as possible."

And this means "integrating" the multiple aspects of the soul -- choosing a self. The training of the bad horse is a necessary element of this integration; leaving its desire in its untamed wild state would mean the battle must be fought without end, never less violently, the soul charging first in one way, then another. In the integrated soul, the bad horse does not become passive or silent, but how it acts on its desires changes; it pipes up with "a word to say to the charioteer" (256a), but it no longer lunges forward or attempts to use physical force.[21]

The untamed horse, and the non-lover in Lysias' speech, and Socrates' own first speech, all show that instrumental reason can be short-sighted in the way that emotion and desires can. But even the more holistic judgment of the charioteer can go wrong, as he performs his difficult work; he gives in to the bad horse, pretends to forget their agreement, allows the values of undisciplined appetite to have too

much power (254b-254e). But he is able to rethink, to right himself, and this involves being moved by an experience of knowing that comes not through conscious reasoning, but through inspiration.

Recall that prophetic and poetic inspiration involve the person being inspired in the sense of being "occupied by" the divine, possessed by a god who is speaking or acting through them. In other words, the inspired person is a passive vehicle for an external force. Erotic/philosophic inspiration is something different. It is not passively being taken over by an external force, as in Socrates' first speech (recall the passage at 235c-235d cited above). Rather, it involves experiencing something that seems to come from without and yet at the same time is one's own, and sparks action within us. As Irani argues (2017, p. 139), this is "the sort of experience one suffers in seeing the beauty of a good argument… those who are compelled in philosophical argument are an important sense compelled *by themselves*."[22] This is one helpful *example* of the experience, but philosophical/erotic inspiration as depicted in Socrates's second speech can't simply be reduced to philosophical argument. In the myth, after all, it is the sight of beauty that strikes the charioteer so forcefully. As Kathryn Morgan argues (2010, p. 54-55), "rather than being invaded by an outside force [i.e., possessed by a god], the mind of the philosopher leaves the mortal world…Being inspired is a question of being next to the divine…by means of your memory."

What is the significance of memory or recollection, in the myth and in non-mythical life? In the *Meno*, Socrates calls recollection "finding knowledge within oneself" (*Men.* 85d).[23] This phrase is evocative precisely of the experience of having a sudden insight, an experience of knowing that comes not through

conscious reasoning. In such instances, I may not be able to trace the source of my insight, as Socrates can with his *daimonion*. But I still experience it as *my* knowing. The problem, of course, is that mere opinion, short-sighted desire, or non-philosophic enthusiasm can move us in the same way, as Phaedrus is captivated by Lysias's speech.[24] So there is a contrast between what Socrates the myth-maker shows us, which is that the charioteer's experience of inspiration reflects the truth, and what Socrates as an interlocutor shows us, which is that he can never be finally or completely sure. The *experience* of insight, no matter how powerful, is no guarantee of our epistemic condition, no guarantee that we have in fact glimpsed or grasped something true. It *feels* like knowing and it feels like mine. But that feeling of inspiration or insight can turn out to be right or wrong, true or false.[25]

It is this double possibility that Plato has Socrates perform in the *Phaedrus* via his two different speeches on love, speeches that are both explicitly linked to divine inspiration. I argue that the palinode is not only a rejection of what came before, but that each speech represents an ever-present possibility of the experience of inspiration, and that both possibilities must be held in mind. This doubleness is also reflected in Plato's use of the Muses. Recall that in Hesiod's *Theogony,* the Muses give Hesiod the talent for poetry along with a warning: "we know to tell many lies that sound like truth, but we know to sing reality, when we will" (lines 25-30). And recall that Socrates invokes the Muses in his first speech, the one he then recants; in his second speech he associates the Muses with poetic madness, and Eros with philosophic madness (242d ff., 245a-b). But as the dialogue continues, this erotic philosophical madness turns out to have as patrons two of the Muses, Urania

and Calliope, who Socrates appropriates for "the special kind of music" that is philosophy (259d). Noting that Muses preside here too should remind us that even the felt experience of inspiration -- finding the knowledge inside us -- has the doubleness that the Muses warn of: it can sing reality, but can also merely sound like truth.[26]

It is tempting to think we can resolve this difficulty by subjecting to the test of reason any "knowing" that comes to us through non-reason. But various forms of reason – whether reasoned argument, the procedure of collection and division, or surface-level *technē* – are shown to have the same kind of double quality, i.e., they can lead us rightly or wrongly. We have already seen this in the speeches from the non-lover, who voices an instrumentally rational argument that both misrepresents love and conceals his own lustfulness (at least in Socrates' version). But we also see this double quality of reason stressed in the part of the dialogue that comes *after* Socrates recants the non-lover's speeches.

In this section, Socrates returns to a critique of Lysias's speech, pointing out its disorderly and superficial character – it doesn't begin with a definition of love, the points appear to be in random order rather than building an argument (263d-264d). But this is itself a notably superficial criticism compared to Socrates's earlier characterization of it as "horrible" and "close to being impious" (242d) -- and indeed part of what Socrates goes on to do is to make a distinction between superficial and deeper knowing. He underscores the point with his mockery of treatises on the rhetorical art, with their subdivisions of the parts of a speech, and their ordered lists of the technical means of persuasion and refutation.[27] But this is more than a witty interlude, for it shows again that the *appearance* of "collection and

division" does not necessarily lead to meaningful knowledge. For Socrates, these accounts of rhetoric are meaningless, for rhetoric can't be a "systematic art" (*technē*) without a deeper and normative understanding of what it acts on: the soul (270b-e). The true rhetorical *technē* is "directing the soul by means of speech (*logos*)" (261a), and so requires a *logos*, in the sense of an account, of the soul. The conclusion is that rhetoricians should engage in something more like philosophy first, although the precision of the account that Socrates requires for rhetoric to be a serious art is so demanding that surely he can't expect any would-be philosophical rhetoricians to achieve it (270c-271a, 273e).[28] Socrates argues here that we must know the essential nature of the soul and the nature of the world *before* we engage with others: "first, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about" (277b). But the drama of the dialogue cuts directly against that claim, for the very thing that Socrates now says about thinking "systematically" -- that we need to know whether our object of investigation is simple or complex (270d) – is precisely what he says earlier he does not know about his own soul (230a). Yet this doesn't stop him from going on to offer a picture of the soul -- one that "perhaps it had a measure of truth in it, though it may also have led us astray" (265b).

And this is the difficulty that I argue Plato would have his readers wrestle with in the *Phaedru*s. We don't have a *technē*, a systematic art, and we can't simply rely on what looks like division and collection, or what feels like inspiration, to justify what we value and hence our true self-moving. Both reason and inspiration have multiple forms and multiple purposes (only some of which are oriented towards "how best the life of the whole person should go"). And they can be

discerning or distracting; they can lead us to a deeper understanding, toward the self we realize we want to be, or they can lead us away.

But of course Plato is no skeptic. There may be no secure or guaranteed method to establish our knowing beyond question, to justify our feeling of knowing once and for all, but there is an ongoing interactive practice that Socrates recommends and that is "the art of dialectic":

> The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse (*logos*) accompanied by knowledge – discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which more discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any human being can be (276e-277a).

The e*pisteme* that accompanies *logos* here cannot be some sort of sure final knowing, for this has just been the critique of written discourse, that it says one thing and then is silent; it can't "defend itself" when questioned. This *logos* is active, and indeed interactive, as it produces the seed – the generative capacity -- of *logos* in others, which ends up helping "the man who planted it." The value of this practice, then, is not in its ability to produce an irrefutable truth, but in its "ability to keep the pursuit of truth in motion."[29] It is this interactive and ongoing pursuit that constitutes the kind of self-motion that Socrates recommends.

The dialogue begins by playing with the meaning of *logos*, and it ends with this praise of a different kind of *logos*: "articulate speech" with others.[30] But why should true *self*-motion require others? In articulate speech with oth-

ers, we give voice to something we think we know in a way that others can hear and understand. Articulating our meaning for others is a practice through which we can understand ourselves, or realize that we don't.[31] We can come to see ourselves more clearly in another's reaction to our words.[32] This shared speech requires us to give an account of what we believe, and to test not only the moral truth of that account but whether we live our lives accordingly – to test what reasons *matter* to me, whether I am compelled by my own *logos*, whether the beliefs I act on are the ones I recognize as true. This ongoing engagement is necessary in part because of the incomplete character of human reason – in other words, to continually test whether the beliefs I hold actually are true. But it is also a test of the condition of my soul – as all Socrates' engagements are – a test of whether the beliefs I recognize as true are what animate me, what move me to act. Both aspects – is it true and does it move me – are crucial for reflectively becoming a self who feels the force of the reasons that should matter.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have argued that two less-noticed aspects of Plato's *Phaedrus* appear when read in light of Plato's own depictions of the limits of reason. The first aspect is that the portrayal of the self-moving soul is layered, and that "true" self-moving is not equated with reason in a narrow sense, but with choosing and forming a self to whom the right reasons *matter*. The second aspect that I've illuminated is the repeated figuring of different forms of inspiration and reason, none of which automatically provide reliable epistemic grounds for knowing, or for guid-

ing the self-moving of the soul. This is the characteristic paradox of Socrates on knowing: to consistently challenge any notion that we have full and certain knowledge, while at the same time affirming its necessity and value. We can't know anything without certain ways of thinking, but to have engaged in those ways of thinking is no guarantee that we have done so well, that we have achieved meaningful rather than superficial knowledge, or that we can justify our self-motion.

Thus "reason's companions" can be understood in a multilayered sense in this dialogue. In the first sense, self-motion involves reason *and* feeling, argument *and* inspiration, moving *and* being moved. And secondly, the self requires companions with whom to engage in *logos* about it all, to test the appearance of reason/inspiration and to reveal my ongoing choice of self. As Moore (2016, p. 72) shows, "Socrates' exhortation to philosophy" is an exhortation to precisely such conversations, for it is these conversations that "press a person to express what he finds most valuable and true." This engagement is ongoing because human knowledge is incomplete and reason has its limits; it is also ongoing because a choice of self is not a decision made once and never revisited, but rather a continued practice. The contexts in which we act change; we may encounter a beautiful person, as in the *Phaedrus*, or we may find ourselves experiencing something more grave, as does Socrates in the *Crito*. There (*Cri.* 46c-d), he expresses both a consistent sense of self ("I am the kind of man who listens to nothing within me but the argument that on reflection seems best to me") and also some curiosity about whether he will think differently now that he is facing death: "I'm eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will appear in any way different to me in my present cir-

cumstances, or whether it remains the same, whether we are to abandon it or believe it." This ongoing choice of self means that freedom -- to not be enslaved to another power, to be truly self-moving -- is an ongoing practice of interaction and judgment, not something securely and finally accomplished.

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ENDNOTES

1   Consider, for example, scholars investigating the interplay between reason and other ways of knowing or understanding, like myth or storytelling (e.g., Murray 1999, Werner, 2012, Sevelsted, 2021). Or the arguments about the role of shame in McKim 2002 and Tarnopolsky 2010.

2   "Feel their force" comes from Ferrari 1987, 58.

3   Even a more sympathetic interlocutor, Adeimantus, points out the difference between feeling trapped by Socrates' argument and actually being convinced (R. 487b-e).

4   Recall here the powerful effect of Socrates' words as portrayed by Alcibiades (Smp. 215d-e) and Cleitophon (Clit. 407-408).

5   It may seem anachronistic to stress "freedom" in an analysis of Plato. But, as Stalley (1998, 148) puts it, Plato clearly "helps himself to the language of freedom" as he depicts Socrates engaging with his interlocutors. And as Raaflaub (2004) shows, the dominant meaning of freedom after the Persian wars was to not be enslaved, i.e., not to be subject to a master. In thematizing force and freedom, then, Plato takes up and reworks aspects of Athenian democratic culture for his own ends. By using "freedom" in this analysis, I'm not claiming that Plato was concerned with freedom in anything like the modern sense, but rather that he was concerned with characterizing the condition that is the opposite of subjection or enslavement.

6   I am not alone in suggesting that we can think of Platonic inspiration as intellectual intuition or insight. See Morgan 2010, Griswold 1996, Carter 1967.

7   Carter (1967, p. 118) argues that Plato accepts inspiration as long as it is "purified and checked by a rational method." Other scholars have argued that the rational justification for Socrates obeying his daimonion is rooted in its empirical reliability; see Brickhouse and Smith 2005 and Partridge 2008.

8   The many facets of this dialogue have led interpreters to focus on a variety of themes: love (Nussbaum 1986), self-knowledge (Griswold 1986), rhetoric (Nehamas and Woodruff 1995), soul-leading (*psychagōgia*, Moss 2012). My analysis does not aim to capture the entirety of the dialogue's concerns, but to illuminate how the dialogue addresses the concerns articulated in the previous section.

9   This is the same image that Alcibiades invokes to convey the way in which Socrates' speeches "possess" listeners (Smp. 215d-e). Unless otherwise noted, I use Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff's translation of the Phaedrus.

10   Ferrari (1987, p. 103-105) points out that Socrates' head-covering works also to stress the wrongness of treating speech as competitive entertainment rather than genuine inquiry.

11   Schenker (2006, p. 72-73) also notes the many-authored character of the speech.

12   Much scholarly attention has been paid to the differences between this account of poetic inspiration and that of the Ion; see, for example, the discussion in Gonzalez 2011.

13   Socrates also mentions a kind of ritual madness that brings a kind of purification of guilt (244d-e; for further explanation, see Dodds 1951 and White 1993).

14   As the Hackforth (1952) translation puts it in the passage immediately following: "Any body that has an external source of motion is soulless, but a body deriving its motion from a source within itself is animate or besouled" (245e). Irani 2017 also stresses the importance of the self-moving character of the soul.

15   See also Ferrari 1987, p. 137-9. Davis 2011 offers an account of the soul as both a principle of motion/engagement, and a principle of awareness/perception.

16   Yunis 2011, Hackforth 1952, and to some extent Schenker 2006 read the charioteer image as emphasizing the mastery of reason.

17   Thus the charioteer cannot solely represent nous, despite nous being referred to as "the soul's steersman" at 247c-d.

18   As noted by Ferrari (1987, p. 192-194), Belfiore, (2012, p. 251), and Nichols (2009, p. 114-115).

19   My argument here is not inconsistent with Irani 2017. Although Irani identifies the charioteer with reason, it is a capacious conception of reason, not a narrow calculative one: "the job of the charioteer, the reason-seeking part of the soul, is to recognize and appreciate a system of values that the lover can come to endorse as his own, and to determine as a result of this activity which of the soul's desires are worth satisfying and which are not" (Irani 2017, p. 127; see also 142, 176). A similar treatment is in Burnyeat (2012), who refers to the charioteer as "pure reason," and describes philosophic inspiration as being inspired by one's "own power of reason" (p. 247, 242). Yet he also concludes that Plato is showing "a process of transformation involving complex interactions of thought, desire and even perception" (Burnyeat 2012, p. 258). I disagree with Burnyeat's first characterization, but share the second. To put it another way, in the present argument, I want to take seriously the intertwining of reason and inspiration in the choice of self, without reducing the distinctive experience of inspiration to reason.

20   We might, with Nightingale, call it "authentic" self-motion, but to my mind the language of authenticity runs the risk of stressing the origin rather than the active aim.

21   In addition to Ferrari 1987, my analysis chimes with Belfiore 2012, Griswold 1986, and Irani 2017. But none of us have answered to my satisfaction why the training is depicted as so violent, merciless and agonizing for the horse. Is this an indication of how difficult it is to shape certain kinds of desires to match our chosen sense of self? Or of how painful it can be to have these kinds of desires thwarted? Or how difficult it is to commit to a choice of self and to leave other possibilities behind?

22   Similarly, in her discussion of persuasion, Frank (2018, p. 127-131) argues that what distinguishes legitimate persuasion from deception or mere obedience is the listeners' active role in persuading themselves.

23   As Giasoumi (2022, p. 31) notes, the theory of recollection in the Meno "indicates that we can discover truths that our senses alone could not discern" and that such discovery may happen through "reminders" in discussion (thus not simply through reason).

24   As Griswold (1986, p. 110) puts it: "Nongodly souls… might ask themselves whether they are nourished because they know the truth or whether they think they know the truth because they feel nourished. The doubt here concerns an opposition not between reason and emotion but between one kind of complex of reason/emotion and another (true reason and genuine satisfaction versus opinion and false satisfaction)."

25   To be clear: I am not arguing that philosophic inspiration itself can be right or wrong for Plato, but that a person can be right or wrong about whether it is philosophic inspiration.

26   Thus I disagree with Murray (2002, p. 29-46), who sees Plato as appropriating exclusively the truthful aspect of Muses for philosophy and prose. I contend that it is the twofold potential of the Muses -- the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne (memory) -- that is significant.

27   Socrates cites various teachers of rhetoric and their accounts of their art: "first, I believe, there is the Preamble with which a speech must begin… second comes the Statement of Facts and the Evidence of Witnesses concerning it; third, Indirect Evidence; fourth, Claims to Possibility…" and so on through "Reduplication, Speaking in Maxims, Speaking in Images… Correct Diction… Recapitulation" (266d-267b).

28   Werner (2012) and Rowe (1986) argue in different ways that only dialectic can come close to fulfilling these terms, not rhetoric (Werner) or written philosophy (Rowe).

29   The quoted phrase is from Nightingale (1995, p. 168).

30   "Articulate speech" is used to characterize *logos* in Salkever (2009, p. 4-5). See also Kahn (1979, p. 107) on Heraclitus' conception of soul: "the new concept of psyche is expressed in terms of the power of articulate speech: rationality is understood as the capacity to participate in the life of language, 'knowing how to listen and how to speak.'" Frank 2015 (reading Aristotle) illuminates the significance of holding onto a conception of *logos* as speech.

31   See Irani 2017, Griswold 1986, and Asmis 1986 for thoughtful analyses of how the presence of others is necessary for self-knowledge. Irani stresses that the *logos* that is crucial to self-moving requires a caring, not competitive, attitude toward others. For

a similar perspective in a contemporary context, see Fricker's (2007, p. 52-53) argument that "trustful conversation with others is the basic mechanism by which the mind steadies itself," and that this is "how we come to be who we are."

32   In the palinode, Socrates describes the boy responding to his own beauty as reflected through the lover's desire; he is unknowingly "seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror" (255D). This experience of "backlove" doesn't necessarily parallel the interaction between partners in dialogue, but it does suggest the possibility of seeing ourselves in another's reaction to us. It also raises the possibility that such interaction can be confusing rather than clarifying; thus the necessity for ongoing dialogic engagement.

Categorizing concept predications and participations in Platonic dialogues: An exhaustive analysis of the various types of participation of things and ideas in ideas throughout the Platonic work

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ABSTRACT

The Platonic work, extended to a lot of dialogues, could be used among others as an analytical instruction of the nature of participation given through various types of predication relations. This article focuses on the identification of the implicit and explicit predications (seen as participations) dispersed in the Platonic work. Nine distinct categories have been found and each of them is comprised of certain structures, carrying distinguishable meanings. Ordinary predication, Pauline predication, identity, difference, otherness and definition are included, while the various senses of self-predication and self-participation are presented. Lastly, concept maps of mutual relations between selected ideas are exhibited in a software ontology environment.

INTRODUCTION

Predication is a proposition through which a feature is declared about something (a concrete thing or a number or an idea). The predication has usually the form 'A is B', where A is the subject and B is the predicate, that is, B is predicated of A. At times the copula 'is' and the predicate are united in one term in the form of a verb. Additionally, the predication is not denoted under the form 'A is B' but it is hidden under other expressions such as 'A possesses B', 'B exists in A'. The revelation of the hidden predications in the various Platonic dialogues is one of the main contributions of this article.

Another pole of the current research is the uncovering of the meaning given by Plato to the various prodicative propositions. *Predication* in Plato implies *participation* in the most of its occurences. The operation of participation constitutes the kernel of the Platonic philosophical system. The predication 'A is B' implies the participation of A in B; B is an idea in which A participates. Participation is the key process under the Platonic theory of Forms, according to which the sensible things are images or shadows of corresponding ideas, owing to them their existence. In this way the sensibles communicate with the noetic substances. Beyond that Plato provides us with a remarkable extension: not only sensible things but also ideas can participate in ideas.

The most prominent commentators of the nature of Platonic predications –considered as participations– are Allen (1971), Nehamas (1982) and Ryle (1971).

Allen and Nehamas speak about different levels of reality concerning the ideas and the participating sensibles. They follow the main Platonic view that the ideas are noetic entities that exist by themselves, while the sensibles reside in a lower level as mere reflections of the ideas.

Allen, in his attempt to solve the so called *Dilemma of Participation*, finds the more detailed description of the participation process in Plato himself, specifically in his dialogue *Parmenides* (131a-c, 142d-e, 144c-d). Platonic Permenides tells of the idea as part of the participant: "If anything partakes of an Idea, a part of the Idea is in it: additionally that part of the Idea is a part of the participant" (Allen, 1998, p. 218).

Ryle looks into the nature of the relation between subject and predicate in a predicative proposition. He supports that our linguistic familiarity of this type of proposition does not allow us to face it in accurate scientific terms. A relation between a particular and a universal (*instance-of* relation) is implied, a relation which, if we pay attention to, is not a valid relation, since it connects things of different types. Mathematical equation, for example, relates numbers, that is, members of the same class, while predication relation relates sensibles to ideas. Considering the *instance-of* relation as a pseudo-relation, Ryle concludes to a radical rejection of the whole Platonic theory of ideas (Ryle, 1971, 9-12).

If we identify predication with participation, we should also identify self-predication with self-participation. Nehamas discerns self-predication from self-participation, though. He describes the diference between them as follows: the self-predication 'F is F' must be replaced by the most accurate expression 'F is what it is to be F'; self-predication only tells us what feature it is that the Form constitutes (Nehamas, 1982, p. 355-6). On the other hand, according to Nehamas, the proposition 'F is F' implies 'F participates in F' or equivalently 'F is an F-thing' (Nehamas, 1982, p. 357). Vlastos (1994, p. 479-86) realizes self-predication in the manner Nehamas realizes self-participation: 'F is F' means for him

'F is an F-thing'. As we saw before, Nehamas gives a certain meaning for self-predication and therefore he admits that this could be applied to all ideas. On the contrary, Vlastos considers that self-predication is not valid for all of them. He supports that some –not all– of the ideas are self-predicated, such as the four of the five great genera mentioned in *Sophist* –the being, the rest, the same and the different– while the fifth one –the motion– is not: the *being* is being (namely it exists), the *rest* is rest (namely it rests), the *same* is same (namely it is same with itself) and the *different* is different (namely it is different from anything else), while the motion is not motion (it cannot move and change, since it is an Idea). Additionally, Vlastos wonders whether Plato identifies self-predication with self-participation and thus if self-predication implies necessarily self-participation. He recites two passages of Platonic *Parmenides* about the possibility of self-participation of an idea, leading to ambiguous results: In *Parm.* 158a4-6, Parmenides makes clear that "if something participates in the one then it is not the one itself for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one". Clearly this passage supports the self-predication, excluding at the same time the self-participation. The counter-example is extracted from *Parm.* 162a7-b1: the Being (the idea of being) is to be fully being only through participation in Being; thus in this case Being is required to participate in itself (the Idea of being) in order to be being. Thus, in this case the self-predication 'Being is being' is necessary and sufficient condition of the self-participation 'Being participates in Being'.

In *Parm.* 132a1-b2, Parmenides argues that the Idea of largeness cannot participate in itself since in that case the idea of largeness,

considered as large, should participate in a second idea of largeness, leading *ad infinitum*. This is the first reference to the 'third man argument' (TMA) paradox. Vlastos (1994, p. 489-98) claims that the paradox can be eliminated if one allows self-participation, without introducing the axiom that whatever participates in an idea cannot be the idea itself.

Mutual predication or communication between ideas is the subject of *Sophist*. Late Plato attempts to reveal how the five great genera-ideas of being, motion, rest, sameness and difference are predicated of each other, if any combination of them is valid and which is the meaning of the valid predications. He is not restricted to the ordinary predication, presenting also the identity-relation and the otherness-relation.

Studying the various predications in Plato in the frame of Fregean Logic and the contemporary Predicate Calculus, we can represent them in the form of two main categories of functions: one-argument functions, such as 'justice is pious' transformed into the function *pious* (*justice*) and two-argument functions, such as 'being is-same-as one' transformed into the function *same* (*being*, *one*).

The article is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, the various types of predications are analysed theoretically. In Chapter 3, a number of rich in predications Platonic dialogues is selected, organized in nine main categories, based on the theoretical analysis exhibited in the previous chapter. The chapter is integrated with two concept maps, one of the idea *One* and the other of the idea *Being*, by using the drawing environment of the ontology software *OWL Protégé*.

This article belongs to the interdisciplinary section among humanities, typical logic and informatics, complementing a series of relative articles of the author. In *Philosophical Views*

about Digital Information and Relational Schemata a review of old classification schemata is exhibited in the frame of modern relationship types. It is claimed there that the relations mentioned in Platonic *Sophist* imply the earliest distinction between the two ways of predication: BT/NT (broader term/ narrower term) and identity (equivalence) (Dendrinos, 2006). The process of the extraction of typical predicate relations from a philosophical text and the construction of an analytical concept map concerning the various types of relations of the Idea of One has been presented in detail in *Organization of the concepts of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides into a software ontology* (Dendrinos, 2015). Predicative propositions presented by Aristotle in *Prior Analytics* and *Topics* are examined thoroughy in *Concept predications and hierarchies in Aristotelian Organon: A philosophical ontology presented in terms of a software ontology*, where one can also see integrated concept maps concerning the three Aristotelian syllogistic schemes (Dendrinos, 2022).

2. VARIOUS FORMULATIONS OF PREDICATION IN PLATO

Plato interpreted the attribution of a feature to a thing (sensible or number) as *participation* of the thing to a corresponding Idea. The participation process includes, according to Plato, two interrelated situations: the first is that something has a certain feature (the feature is predicated of a specific thing), constituting the so called predication; the second is that there is a cause of this predication in the form of an independent entity –Idea- in which the thing participates. Let call the above type of predication *Plato.type.1.thing-participating-in-idea*.

While in most dialogues Plato presented in detail the predication of sensibles and the equivalent participation of them in Ideas – operating as the ontological analogs of the predicates– one can find in Plato an extended theory of combination of Ideas –Ideas predicated of Ideas– which can be viewed as participation of an Idea in another Idea and in some cases even to itself (self-participation). Such predications are met in great extent in *Protagoras, Sophist* and *Parmenides.* Let call this type of predication *Plato.type.2.idea-participating-in-idea.* Passing from the sensibles-participants to the ideas-participants is described in detail in Nehamas[1].

The participation of a thing (sensible or number) or an idea in an idea is usually denoted through the copula *is*: subject *is** predicate [idea in the form of adjective[2]] (* ἐστὶν)[3]. An equivalent form for the construct 'is-predicate' is a composite verb-predicate (without *is*)[4]: subject [idea] *verb-predicate.* Other forms used are the following: subject *participates-in** predicate [idea] (*μετέχει τινὸς); subject *partakes-of** predicate [idea] (* μεταλαμβάνει τινὸς); subject *is-near-to** predicate [idea] (*πάρεστι); predicate [idea] *is-present-with** subject (*πάρεστι); [subject] *is-said-as** predicate [idea] (* λέγεται); predicate [idea] *exists-innately-in** subject (*εγγίγνεται).

Predication 'A is B' is denoted sometimes by 'A has B' as follows: The predication 'one has parts' is equivalent to 'one is divided' and the predication 'it has soul' is equivalent to 'it is aminate'. The typical expression is: subject *has** predicate [idea] (* ἔχει). The expression *is affected* [πέπονθεν] is also used as an alternate way to denote the participation in an idea, such as the things participating in *unlimited* or in *limit* (*Parm.* 158e4-7), the idea of *three* participating in the idea of *odd* (*Phd.* 104a4). The typical expression is: subject *is-affected-by**

predicate [idea] (* πέπονθεν). Another interesting expression for the participation of a thing (sensible or number) in an Idea is that the Idea possesses the thing (*Phd.* 104d): predicate [idea] *possesses** subject [thing] (* κατέχει).

Following the view of Nehamas, I consider self-predication as a specific type of predication and I denote it as *Plato.type.3.self-predication*. The expression used to denote this predication is: subject [idea] *is-what-it-is-to-be* predicate [idea], e.g. justice is what it is to be just.

Self-participation belongs to the general category of participations: *Plato.type.2.idea-participating-in-idea*. Following the view of Nehamas, we consider self-participation as the relation 'F is an F-thing'. The expression used to denote this type of predication of an idea to itself is: subject [idea] *participates-in-itself*, e.g. 'the one is one', 'the motion moves', 'the rest rests', 'the being participates in being'.

Phd. 104e-105a presents a very interesting relation between a thing (material thing or number) and an idea, where a thing A *brings along* [ἐπιφέρει] an idea B, so representing an indirect participation: "as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always *brings* its opposite *along* against it, and as the number two *brings* the opposite of the odd *along* and fire that of cold, and so forth". The meaning of the passage is that number three participates directly in the idea of threeness and indirectly in the idea of oddness, since the set of triads is included within the set of odd numbers; similarly, material fire participates directly in the idea of fire and indirectly in the idea of hotness. Vlastos uses the term *implication* for the description of this relation: If a thing x *is* A and A *brings along* B then x *is* B. We could consider the above indirect participation as the inclusion relation, where a thing belongs to a class or

equivalently a class of things included in a broader set. The first is found in *Phil.* 30e, where Socrates presents the mind as belonging to the class of the causes [ἐστὶ γένους τῆς τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος]. A similar inclusion relation is found, for Vlastos, in *Timaeus*, where Timaeus describes the *intelligible living beings* as ideas existing within the *Living Being* [ἐνούσας ἰδέας τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον], which contains them [ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν] and of which all other living beings, severally and generically, are portions [καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια] (*Tim.* 30c, 39e).

Let call the above described type of predication *Plato.type.4.is-included-in*. The expressions used to denote this predication are: subject [thing] *brings-along** predicate [idea] (*ἐπιφέρει), subject [idea] *is-subclass-of** predicate [idea] (*κατὰ γένη μόρια), subject [thing] *belongs-to-class** predicate [idea] (*ἐστὶ γένους), subject [idea] *is-part-of** predicate [idea] (*μόρια), predicate [idea] *exists-within** subject [idea] (* ἔνεστι), predicate [idea] *contains** subject [idea] (* περιλαμβάνει/ περιέχει).

Besides, Vlastos introduced apart from the typical predication –called *ordinary predication (OP),* which is the above mentioned *Plato.type.2.idea-participating-in-idea*– another one predication –called *Pauline predication (PP)*. He presented PP in his text *The Unity of Virtues in the Protagoras* (Vlastos, 1994, p. 317-402) in order to give meaning to some predications which seem absolutely unreasonable, like 'the Justice is pious' or 'the Piety is just'. He also speaks about PP in his text *An Ambiguity in the Sophist* (Vlastos, 1994, p. 403-448), where the Stranger sets under consideration the premises 'the Motion rests' and 'the Rest moves'. Pauline predication 'X is y' is meant not with the ordinary meaning 'the entity X has the feature y' but with the meaning 'x has the feature y', where x are sensible

manifestations of X. Under this interpretation Vlastos can consider the proposition 'the Justice is pious', which is completely nonsense, as 'every just human is pious' which makes sense. In the same way, the proposition 'the Rest moves' should be examined in the frame of the sensible world under the formulation 'the resting things are moving', for Vlastos, since the Stranger does not deal in the specific context in *Sophist* with the ideas, but with the nature of the sensible things. Vlastos has spent a great effort to categorize the various predications found in *Sophist* in these two distinct classes. He considers the predications in 256a1, 256c-d as *OP,* while the predications in 250a11-12, 252d2-11, 255a6-12, 256b7-9 as *PP.* I do not agree with him, in the sense that all his mentioned predications in *Sophist*, characterized as *PP*, are, in my opinion, due to the reference of the idea as idea itself, obviously *OP.* Among them 255a6-12 is indeed dubious, since, in spite of its apparent *OP* typical formulation, the logic proof of Vlastos seems indeed to support *PP* (Vlastos, 1994, p. 438-9). All of them will be presented in detail in Chapter 3.

Let call this extraordinary type of Pauline predication between ideas: *Plato. type.5.Pauline-Predication,* and the corresponding expression: subject [idea-1] *is-PP* predicate [idea-2 in the form of adjective] ⇔ the class of the sensible manifestations of [idea-1] *is included in* the class of the sensible manifestations of [idea-2]. A similar predication concerns two ideas applied to each other in such a way that their sensible manifestations are in fact related, such as the mastership is mastership of slavery, which can be meant as a master is master of a slave (*Parm.* 133d-e). The expression used to denote this type of predication is: subject [idea-1] *is-applied-on-PP* predicate [idea-2] ⇔ a sensible manifestation

of [idea-1] expresses the relative property with regard to a sensible manifestation of [idea-2].

Ackrill contributed a lot to the clear discrimination between predication, identity and idea-to-idea communication, through a deep analysis of a critical passage of *Sophist.* At first he studies the Platonic phrase in *Sophist* about Motion: "it (the Motion) *is* because it shares in being" [ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος] [*Sophist*, 256a1]. The word because [διὰ] here does not introduce a proof that Motion partakes of being, since this has already been agreed without question before. Therefore, for Ackrill, the term *is* [ἔστι] in this passage must be taken existentially: "the Motion exists" (Ackrill, 1971 [1957], p. 211-2). The expression used to denote this predication is: subject [idea] *exists** (*ἔστιν). The predicate *exists* is equivalent to the predicate *participates-in* being. Therefore, it is a specific case of *Plato. type.2.idea-participating-in-idea.*

The remaining meanings of *is* [ἔστιν] are the ordinary copula and the identity-sign. Where the '*is*' is being used as copula it is equivalent philosophically to participating [μετέχειν], as we saw it in the beginning of the modes of participation in an idea. When the '*is*' is used as identity, it is equivalent to the expression 'shares in sameness' [μετέχειν τοῦ ταυτοῦ], whereas the '*is not*' [οὐκ ἔστιν] is equivalent to the expression 'shares in difference' [μετέχειν τοῦ θατέρου] (Ackrill, 1971, p. 213-4). Vlastos also marks the cases where the copula is meant as identity-sign (Vlastos 1994, p. 444): Motion partakes of the same (*Soph.* 256a10), Motion / Rest partake of the same (*Soph.* 255b3), all partake of the same (*Soph.* 256a7-8). Additionally, Ackrill mentions the Fregean *identity*-role of '*is*' versus its *copula*-role (in predications) via quoting some of Frege's examples: 'something is green' or 'something is mammal' versus 'the morn-

ing star is Venus'. The last example denotes identity, where the '*is*' is equivalent to 'is no other than' (Ackrill, 1971 [1957], p. 213).

Identity is a commutative relation, that is, 'A is same as B' and also 'B is same as A'. Let call the identity type of relation between ideas *Plato.type.6.identity*. The expression used to denote *identity* is: subject [idea] *is-same-as** predicate [idea] (* ταὐτόν ἐστι). The relation *is-same-as* is equivalent to the relation *partici-pates-in* sameness to. A specific case of identity is the declaration that an idea is identical to itself, such as 'motion is the same as motion' and 'rest is the same as rest' (mentioned in *Sophist*). The predication 'idea *is-same-as* itself' is equivalent to 'idea *participates-in* sameness to itself', which can be abbreviated to the formal expression: [idea] *participates-in* sameness [μετέχει τοῦ ταυτοῦ], following the Platonic text. This predication is included as a specific case of *Plato.type.2.idea-participating-in-idea*.

Similarly, let call the difference type of relation between ideas *Plato.type.7.difference*. The expression used to denote the relation of *difference* is: subject *is-different-from** predicate (*ἕτερόν/ θάτερον ἐστι). The relation *is-different-from* is equivalent to not *same-as* and also equivalent to the relation *participates-in* difference from. According to the above terminology, an idea A is *different from* an idea B, when A is not the same as B. This relation could be also named as *unlike* [ἀνόμοιον], as mentioned in Platonic *Parmenides*.

Another important relation between two ideas is the relation of *otherness*, with A and B completely different, not sharing any common characteristic (the term used in *Parmenides* is ἕτερον). Let call this type of relation between ideas *Plato.type.8.otherness*. The expression used to denote the relation of *otherness* is: subject [idea] *is other-than** predicate [idea] (*ἕτερόν ἐστι) [5].

Ackrill mentions a very informative extract of David Ross, where he presents two different textual constructions: the first one with genitive for an idea sharing of/ partaking of an idea [κοινωνεῖν τινὸς, προσκοινωνεῖν τινὸς] (*Parm.* 250b9, 252a2, b9, 254c5, 256b2, 260e2) versus the second one with dative for an idea in combination or communication with an idea [κοινωνεῖν τινὶ, προσκοινωνεῖν τινὶ] (251d9, e8, 252d3, 253a8, 254b8, c1, 257a9, 260e5). Though Ross believes that the two constructions are used by Plato indifferently, Ackrill supports that the usage of the genitive or the dative is used consciously by Plato to differentiate between the non-symmetrical relation of participation and the symmetrical relation of connectedness (Ackrill, 1971, p. 219-220).

These additional expressions belong to the general category 'participation of an Idea in an Idea' (*Plato.type.2.idea-participating-in-idea)* and they are given as follows: subject [idea] *shares-in** predicate (*κοινωνεῖ τινος) and subject [idea] *communes-with** predicate [idea] (*προσκοινωνεῖ τινος), where the verbs κοινωνεῖ and προσκοινωνεῖ are followed by genitive.

Another usual practice of arranging ideas, found in the Platonic dialogues, is the attempt for the definition of a term through its genus and the proper differentia. The term to be defined is a species, which is described through a higher term, the genus. Cases of this type have been extracted from *Laches, Euthyphro, Theaetetus, Protagoras, Alcibiades I* and *Hippias Major*, where Socrates tries to define certain ideas (usually virtues). Between them an '*is*' is intervened. Thus, in this case, an idea (the genus) is the predicate of another idea (the species). Let call this type of predication between ideas: *Plato.type.9.Definition-Predication*, and the expression used to denote this type of predication: subject [idea-1] *is-defined-by* predicate [idea-2]

3. CONSTRUCTING THE PLATONIC CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

After the theoretical analysis presented in the previous chapter, certain cases of the various types of predication follow along with the passages of Platonic dialogues they are mentioned in (the translation from ancient Greek to English is based on Perseus Digital Library of Tufts University)[6]. The dialogues used are: Sophist, Parmenides, Timaeus, Phaedo, Philebus, Protagoras, Meno, Alcibiades I, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Hippias Major.

General Predication Type *Plato. type.1.thing-participating-in-idea*

Textual expression 1.1: subject *participates-in** predicate [idea] (* μετέχει τινὸς)

|Pred.1| [two] *participates-in* [duality]

Relative passage: "You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which any thing can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality" (*Phd.* 101c).

Textual expression 1.2: predicate [idea] *possesses** subject [thing] (* κατέχει)

|Pred.2| [triad] *possesses* [thing]

Relative passage: "You know of course that those things which the idea of triad possesses must be not only three but also odd" (*Phd.* 104d).

Textual expression 1.3: predicate [idea] *exists-innately-in** subject [thing] (*εγγίγνεται)

|Pred.3| [unity] *exists-innately-in* [number]

Relative passage: "If you ask what exists innately in a number through which it becomes odd, I shall not say oddness, but unity, and so forth" (*Phd.* 105c).

General Predication Type *Plato. type.2.idea-participating-in-idea*

All the various expressions that follow are categorized under the general expression: *participates-in*.

Textual expression 2.1: subject [idea] *is** predicate [idea in its very form or in the form of adjective] (* ἐστὶν)

|Pred.4| [one] *is* [all] / |Pred.5| [one] *is* [whole]

Relative passages: "But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all [πᾶν] and whole [ὅλον]" (*Sophist*, 245a1-3). "– Must not the one which exists [ἕν ὄν] be a whole of which the one and being are parts? – Inevitably" (*Parm.* 142d4). "Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part" (*Parm.* 142d8-9).

|Pred.6| [one] *is* [infinite] / |Pred.7| [one] *is* [divided] / |Pred.8| [one] *is* [many] / |Pred.9| [one] is [limited]

Relative passages: "– The existent one would be infinite in number? – Apparently" (*Parm.* 143a1-2). "Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole? Consider that question – I am considering and I see that it is impossible. – Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided" (*Parm.* 144d1-5). "The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in number. – Clearly. – Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one divided by existence, must be many. – Certainly. – And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole" (*Parm.* 144e4-10).

|Pred.10| [good] *is* [perfect]

Relative passage: "Socrates: Is the class of the good necessarily perfect or imperfect? – Protarchus: The most perfect of all things, surely, Socrates" (*Phil.* 20d).

|Pred.11| [good] *is* [sufficient]

Relative passage: "Socrates: Well, and is the good sufficient? – Protarchus: Of course; so that it surpasses all other things in sufficiency" (*Phil.* 20d).

|Pred.12| [good] *is* [beautiful] / |Pred.13| [good] *is* [symmetric]

|Pred.14| [good] *is* [true]

Relative passage: "Then if we cannot catch the good with the aid of one idea, let us run it down with three: beauty, proportion, and truth" (*Phil.* 65a).

|Pred.15| [justice] *is* [virtue]

Relative passage: "Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue" (*Meno,* 73d).

|Pred.16| [bravery] *is* [virtue] / |Pred.17| [prudence] *is* [virtue] / |Pred.18| [wisdom] *is* [virtue] / |Pred.19| [grandiosity] *is* [virtue]

Relative passage: "Well then, bravery, I consider, is a virtue, and prudence, and wisdom, and grandiosity; and there are a great many others" (*Meno*, 74a).

|Pred.20| [virtue] *is* [good]

Relative passage: "Socrates: Well now, surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not, and our hypothesis stands, that it is good? Meno: Certainly we do" (*Meno,* 87d)

|Pred.21| [bravery] is [beautiful]

Relative passage: "But bravery was admitted to be something beautiful" (*Laches,* 193d).

|Pred.22| [good] is [friendly]

Relative passage: "– But now, is the good a friend? – I should say so" (*Lysis*, 220b)

Textual expression 2.2: subject [idea] *participates-in** predicate [idea] (* μετέχει τινὸς)

|Pred.23| [motion] *participates-in* [different]
|Pred.24| [rest] *participates-in* [different]

Relative passage: "Both (motion and rest) certainly participate in the same and the other" (*Sophist,* 255b3).

|Pred.25| [one] *participates-in* [being]

Relative passage: "One participates in being" (*Parm.* 142c6)

|Pred.26| [one] *participates-in* [straight-shape] / |Pred.27| [one] *participates-in* [round-shape] / |Pred.28| [one] *participates-in* [mixed-shape]

Relative passage: "And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will participate in some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two" (*Parm.* 145b4-6).

|Pred.29| [part] *participates-in* [one]

Relative passage: "The part must participate in the one" (*Parm.* 157e5-158a1)

|Pred.30| [prudence] *participates-in* [good] / |Pred.31| [pleasure] *participates-in* [good]

Relative passage: "Prudence's participation in good is greater than pleasure's" (*Phil.* 60b).

Textual expression 2.3: subject [idea] *partakes-of** predicate [idea] (* μεταλαμβάνει τινὸς)

|Pred.32| Not [motion] *partakes-of* [rest]

Relative passage: "Stranger: Then even if absolute motion partook in any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest? Theaetetus: It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not" (*Sophist*, 256b7-11).

Textual expression 2.4: subject [idea] *participates-in-itself*

|Pred.33| Not [motion] *moves* ⇔ Not [motion] *participates-in* [motion] ⇔ Not [motion] *participates-in-itself* (the self-participation here is evidently not valid)

Relative passage: "Stranger: And in granting that they (motion and rest) exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion? Theaetetus: By no means. Stranger: But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist? Theaetetus: Of course, not" (*Sophist,* 250b2-7).

|Pred.34| [being] *participates-in* [being] ⇔ [being] *participates-in-itself*

Relative passage: "The existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent" (*Parm.* 162a7-b1)

Textual expression 2.5: subject [idea] *participates-in* sameness* (*μετέχει τοῦ ταυτοῦ) – Self-sameness

|Pred.35| [being] is-same-as [being] ⇔ [being] *participates-in* [sameness] / |Pred.36| [motion] is-same-as [motion] ⇔ [motion] *participates-in* [sameness] / |Pred.37| [rest] is-same-as [rest] ⇔ [rest] *participates-in* [sameness]

Relative passages: "Each of them (being, motion, rest) is, then, different from the remaining two, but the same as itself" (*Sophist*, 254d15-16). "Both (motion and rest) certainly participate in the same and the other" (*Sophist,* 255b3). "But yet we found it (motion) was the same, because all things participate in the same" (*Sophist*, 256a7-8).

|Pred.38| [one] is-same-as [one] ⇔ [one] *participates-in* [sameness]

Relative passage: "It (the one) must be the same with itself" (*Parm.* 146a9).

|Pred.39| [one] is unlike [one] ⇔ Not [one] is-same-as [one] ⇔ Not [one] *participates-in* [sameness]

Relative passage: "It is, then, also (the one) unlike itself" (*Parm.* 147c1-2).

Textual expression 2.6: predicate [idea] *exists** (* ἔστιν)

|Pred.40| [motion] *exists* ⇔ [motion] *participates-in* [being] / |Pred.41| [rest] *exists* ⇔ [rest] *participates-in* [being]

Relative passages: "But it (motion) exists, by reason of its participation in being" (*Sophist,* 256a1). "And yet you say that both (motion and rest) and each of them equally are?" (*Sophist,* 250a).

Textual expression 2.7: subject [idea] *verb-predicate*

|Pred.42| Not [being] *moves* ⇔ Not [being] *participates-in* [motion] / |Pred.43| Not [being] *rests* ⇔ Not [being] *participates-in* [rest]

Relative passage: "According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion" (*Sophist*, 250c6-7).

|Pred.44| Not [rest] *moves* ⇔ Not [rest] *participates-in* [motion] / |Pred.45| Not [motion] *rests* ⇔ Not [motion] *participates-in* [rest]

Relative passage: "Theaetetus: Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another. Stranger: But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion? Theaetetus: Of course" (*Sophist*, 252d6-11).

|Pred.46| [one] *moves* ⇔ [one] *participates-in* [motion] / |Pred.47| [one] *rests* ⇔ [one] *participates-in* [rest]

Relative passage: "– This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest? – How is that?" (*Parm.* 145e7-8).

Textual expression 2.8: subject [idea] *is-said-as** predicate [idea] (* λέγεται)

|Pred.48| [one] *is-said-as* not [divided]

Relative passage: "Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be said to be completely without parts" (*Sophist,* 245a8-9).

Textual expression 2.9: subject *has** predicate [idea] (* ἔχει)

|Pred.49| [being] *has* [soul] ⇔ [being] *is* [aminate] / |Pred.50| [being] *has* [mind] ⇔ [being] *is* [thoughtful] / |Pred.51| [being] *has* [life] ⇔ [being] *is* [living]

Relative passage: "Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although

endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?" (*Sophist,* 249a11-12).

|Pred.52| [one] *has* [part] ⇔ [one] is [divided]

Relative passage: "Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part" (*Parm.* 142d8-9).

|Pred.53| [one] *has* [being] ⇔ [one] is [being] / |Pred.54| [being] *has* [one] ⇔ [being] is [one]

Relative passage: "Always one has being and being has one" (*Parm.* 142e7-8).

Textual expression 2.10: subject [idea] *is-affected-by** predicate [idea] (* πέπονθεν)

|Pred.55| [part] *is-affected-by* [one]

Relative passage: "But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all [πᾶν] and whole [ὅλον]"[7] (*Sophist,* 245a1-3)

|Pred.56| [the-others] *is-affected-by* [unlimited] / |Pred.57| [the-others] *is-affected-by* [limit]

Relative passage: "– Inasmuch as they (the others) are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way – Certainly – And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also" (Parm. 158e4-7).

Textual expression 2.11: [subject] *is-near-to** predicate [idea] (*πάρεστι)

|Pred.58| [living-being] *is-near-to* [good]

Relative passage: "Whatever living being is near to the good always, altogether, and in all ways, has no further need of anything, but is perfectly sufficient" (Phil. 60c).

Textual expression 2.12: predicate [idea] *is-present-with** subject (*πάρεστι)

|Pred.59| [whiteness] *is-present-with* [locks of hair]

Relative passage: " – Suppose some one tinged your golden locks with white lead, would they then be or appear to be white? – Yes, they would so appear, he replied. - And,

in fact, whiteness would be present with them? – Yes" (*Lysis*, 217d).

Textual expression 2.13: subject [idea] *shares-in** predicate [idea] (* κοινωνεῖ τινος)

|Pred.60| [motion] *shares-in* [being] / |Pred.61| [rest] *shares-in* [being]

Relative passage: "Since you comprehend and observe that they (motion and rest) share in being" (*Sophist*, 250b9).

Textual expression 2.14: subject [idea] *communes-with** predicate [idea] (* προσκοινωνεῖ τινος)

|Pred.62| [motion] *communes-with* [being] / |Pred.63| [rest] *communes-with* [being]

Relative passage: "Stranger: Well, then, will either of them (motion and rest) be, if it does not commune with being? Theaetetus: It will not" (*Sophist*, 252a2-4).

General Predication Type *Plato.type.3.self-predication*

Textual expression 3.1: subject [idea] *is-what-it-is-to-be* predicate [idea]

|Pred.64| [justice] *is-what-it-is-to-be* [just]

Relative passage: "The thing you named just now, justice, is that itself just or unjust? … then justice is of a kind that is just" (*Prot.* 330c).

|Pred.65| [piety] *is-what-it-is-to-be* [pious]

Relative passage: "Do you say this thing itself [piety] is of such nature as to be impious, or pious? For my part I should be annoyed at this question, I said, and should answer: Hush, my good sir. It is hard to see how anything could be pious, if piety itself is not to be pious" (*Prot.* 330d-e).

General Predication Type *Plato.type.4.is-included-in*

All the various expressions that follow are categorized under the general expression: *is-included-in.*

Textual expression 4.1: subject [idea] *brings-along** predicate [idea] (* ἐπιφέρει)

|Pred.66| [three] *brings-along* [oddness] / |Pred.67| [two] *brings-along* [evenness] / |Pred.68| [fire] *brings-along* [hotness]

Relative passage: "As the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always *brings* its opposite *along* against it, and as the number two *brings* the opposite of the odd *along* and fire that of cold, and so forth" (*Phd.* 104e-105a). "You know of course that those things which the idea of triad possesses must be not only three but also odd" (*Phd.* 104d).

Textual expression 4.2: subject [idea] *is-sub-class-of** predicate [idea] (* κατὰ γένη μόρια)

|Pred.69| [intelligent-living-being] *is-subclass-of* [Living-Being]

Relative passage: "But we shall affirm that the Cosmos, more than aught else, resembles most closely that Living Being of which all other living beings, severally and generically, are portions⁸" (*Tim.* 30c).

Textual expression 4.3: subject [thing] *belongs-to-class** predicate [idea] (* ἐστὶ γένους)

|Pred.70| [mind] *belongs-to-class* [cause]

Relative passage: "Mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all. Now, you see, you have at last my answer" (*Phil.* 30e).

|Pred.71| [pleasure] *belongs-to-class* [infinite]

Relative passage: "Mind was akin to cause and belonged more or less to that class, and that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end" (*Phil.* 31a).

Textual expression 4.4: subject [idea] *is-part-of** predicate [idea] (*μόρια)

|Pred.72| [knowledge] *is-part-of* [virtue] \ |Pred.73| [justice] *is-part-of* [virtue] \ |Pred.74|

[bravery] *is-part-of* [virtue] \ |Pred.75| [prudence] *is-part-of* [virtue] \ |Pred.76| [piety] *is-part-of* [virtue]

Relative passages: "Among the parts of virtue, no other part is like knowledge, or like justice, or like bravery, or like prudence, or like piety" (*Prot.* 330b). "Then it seems that justice or prudence or piety or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things" (*Meno*, 78d-e). "Socrates: that it is a part, there being also other parts, which taken all together have received the name of virtue. – Nicias: Why, of course. – Socrates: Besides bravery, I refer to prudence, justice, and other similar qualities" (*Laches,* 198a).

|Pred.77| [piety] *is-part-of* [justice]

Relative passage: "Piety is a part of the just" (*Euthyphro*, 12d)

Textual expression 4.5: predicate [idea] *exists-within** subject [idea] (* ἔνεστι)

|Pred.78| [intelligent-living-being] *exists-within* [Living-Being]

Relative passage: "Reason perceives Forms existing in the Living Being itself, such and so many as exist therein" (*Tim.* 39e).

Textual expression 4.6: predicate [idea] *contains** subject [predicate] (* περιλαμβάνει/περιέχει).

|Pred.79| [Living-Being] *contains* [intelligent-living-being]

Relative passage: "Living Being embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living beings" (*Tim.* 30c-d).

|Pred.80| [being] *contains* [motion] / |Pred.81| [being] *contains* [rest]

Relative passages: "All things immovable and in motion, and must say that being and the all consist of both" (*Sophist*, 249d). "Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it" (*Sophist*, 250b8-10)

General Predication Type *Plato. type.5.Pauline-Predication*

Textual expression 5.1: subject [idea] *is-PP* predicate [idea in the from of adjective]

|Pred.82| [justice] *is-PP* [pious/ idea:piety] ⇔ all just humans *are* pious

|Pred.83| [piety] *is-PP* [just/ idea:justice] ⇔ all pious humans *are* just

Relative passage: "Justice is pious and piety is just" (*Prot.* 331b).

|Pred.84| [virtue] *is-PP* [beneficial]

Relative passage: "Socrates: And if we are good, we are beneficial; for all good things are beneficial, are they not? Meno: Yes. Socrates: So virtue is beneficial? Meno: That must follow from what has been admitted" (*Meno,* 87e).

|Pred.85| All just things *are* beautiful ⇔ [justice] *is-PP* [beautiful]

Relative passage: "Socrates: Well, are all just things beautiful? Alcibiades: Yes" (*Alcib. I,* 115a).

|Pred.86| All just things are profitable ⇔ [justice] *is-PP* [profitable]

Relative passage: "Socrates: And that just things are profitable? Alcibiades: Yes" (*Alcib. I,* 116d).

Relative passage: "Socrates: And everyone is good in that wherein he is prudent? Alcibiades: Yes" (*Alcib. I,* 125a).

|Pred.87| All prudent men are good ⇔ [prudence] *is-PP* [good]

|Pred.88| [prudence] *is-PP* [beautiful] ⇔ all prudent humans are beautiful

|Pred.89| [prudence] is-PP [beneficial] ⇔ all prudent men benefit (from prudence)

Relative passages: "And prudent men are also good? – Yes. – Well, can that be good which does not produce good men? – No, indeed. – And we conclude that it is not only beautiful, but good also" (*Charm.* 160e). "To acknowledge this to be prudence until I have made out whether such a thing as this would benefit us or not. For, you see, I have a presen-timent that prudence is something beneficial and good" (*Charm.* 169b).

|Pred.90| All happy men are prudent ⇔ [happiness] *is-PP* [prudent/ idea:prudence]

|Pred.91| All happy men are good ⇔ [happiness] *is-PP* [good]

Relative passage: "Then it is impossible to be happy if one is not prudent and good" (*Alcib. I*, 134a).

|Pred.92| All good things are beautiful ⇔ [good] *is-PP* [beautiful]

|Pred.93| All beautiful things are befitting ⇔ [beautiful] *is-PP* [befitting]

Relative passage: "Socrates: And the better is also more beautiful? Alcibiades: Yes. Socrates: And the more beautiful more befitting? Alcibiades: Of course" (*Alcib. I,* 135b).

|Pred.94| [vice] *is-PP* [befitting-slavery] ⇔ vicious humans befit slavery

|Pred.95| [virtue] *is-PP* [befitting-freedom] ⇔ virtous humans befit freedom

Relative passage: "Socrates: So vice is a thing that befits slavery. Alcibiades: Apparently. Socrates: And virtue a thing that befits freedom. Alcibiades: Yes" (*Alcib. I*, 135c).

|Pred.96| All good humans are wise ⇔ [good] *is-PP* [wise/ idea:wisdom]

|Pred.97| All brave men are good ⇔ [bravery] *is-PP* [good]

|Pred.98| All brave men are wise ⇔ [bravery] *is-PP* [wise/ idea:wisdom]

Relative passage: "Nicias: I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned. Socrates: Well, that is true, Nicias, I must say. Nicias: And hence, if the brave man is good, clearly he must be wise" (*Laches,* 194d).

|Pred.99| All brave men are learned ⇔ [bravery] *is-PP* [knowledge]

Relative passages: "Who has knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is not—the man

whom I call brave?" (*Laches*, 195d). "Socrates: do you say that bravery is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared? Nicias: I do" (*Laches*, 196c-d).

Textual expression 5.2: subject [idea] *is-applied-on-PP* predicate [idea]

|Pred.100| [mastership] *is-applied-on-PP* [slavery], that is, mastership is mastership of slavery ⇔ a master is master of a slave

|Pred.101| [slavery] *is-applied-on-PP* [mastership], that is, slavery is slavery of mastership ⇔ a slave is slave of a master

Relative passage: "if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract" (*Parm.* 133d-e).

General Predication Type *Plato. type.6.identity*

Textual expression 6.1: subject [idea] *same-as** predicate [idea] (* ταὐτόν ἐστι)

|Pred.102| [being] *is-same-as* [one] / |Pred.103| [being] *is-same-as* [whole]

Relative passage: "Stranger: And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?" Theaetetus: "Of course they will and do say it is the same" (*Sophist*, 244d-e).

|Pred.104| [one] *is-same-as* [the other(s)]

Relative passage: "And likewise (the one is) the same with the others" (*Parm.* 146b1-2).

|Pred.105| [one] is unlike [the-others(s)] ⇔ Not [one] is-same-as [the-other(s)]

Relative passage: "It is, then, also (the one) unlike the others" (*Parm.* 147c1-2).

|Pred.106| [beautiful] *is-same-as* [good]

Relative passage: "Hence we have seen again that beauty and good are the same thing" (*Alcib. I*, 116c).

General Predication Type *Plato. type.7.difference*

|Pred.107| [being] *is-different-from* [motion] / |Pred.108| [being] *is-different-from* [rest]

Textual expression 7.1: subject *different-from** predicate (* ἕτερόν/ θάτερόν ἐστι)

|Pred.109| [motion] *is-different-from* [rest]

Relative passages: "Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them" (*Sophist*, 250c3-4). "Each of them (being, motion, rest) is, then, different from the remaining two, but the same as itself" (*Sophist*, 249d). "Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or different" (*Sophist*, 255b5-6). "Stranger: Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not? Theaetetus: We do. Stranger: Then it is not rest" (*Sophist*, 255e11-14). "Stranger: Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two. Theaetetus: Why not? Stranger: Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became 'different' would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite" (*Sophist,* 255a6-b1).

|Pred.110| [motion] *is-different-from* [same][9] / |Pred.111| [motion] *is-different-from* [difference] / |Pred.112| [rest] *is-different-from* [same] / |Pred.113| [rest] *is-different-from* [difference]

Relative passages: "But certainly motion and rest are neither different nor the same" (*Sophist*, 255a3-4). "Now motion again is different from the same… Therefore it is not the same" (*Sophist,* 256a3-5). "Stranger: Then let us recapitulate: Motion is different from the different, just as we found it to be different from the same and from the rest. Is that true? Theaetetus: Inevitably. Stranger: Then it is in

a sense not different and also different, according to our present reasoning" (*Sophist*, 256a3-5).

|Pred.114| [being] *is-different-from* [same]

Relative passage: "Stranger: But should we conceive of 'being' and 'the same' as one? Theaetetus: Perhaps. Stranger: But if 'being' and 'the same' have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are. Theaetetus: But surely that is impossible. Stranger: Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one" (*Sophist,* 255b8-c4).

|Pred.115| [being] *is-different-from* [difference]

Relative passage: "If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other… Then we must place the nature of 'the different' as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples… And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other" (*Sophist*, 255d4-e6).

General Predication Type *Plato. type.8.otherness*

Textual expression 8.1: subject *is-other-than** predicate (* ἕτερόν ἐστι)

|Pred.116| [one] *is-other-than* [one]

Relative passage: "It (the one) must be other than itself" (*Parm.* 146a9).

|Pred.117| [one] *is-other-than* [the other(s)]

Relative passage: "And likewise (the one is) other than the others" [10]

|Pred.118| [one] is like [one] ⇔ Not [one] is-other-than [one]

|Pred.119| [one] is like [the-others(s)] ⇔ Not [one] is-other-than [the-other(s)]

Relative passage: "It is, then, also (the one) like itself and others" (*Parm.* 147c1-2).

General Predication Type *Plato. type.9.Definition-Predication*

Textual expression 9.1: subject [idea] *is-defined-by* predicate [idea]

|Pred.120| [bravery] *is-defined-by* [wisdom]

Relative passage: "So the wisdom that knows what is and what is not dreadful is bravery" (*Prot.* 360d).

|Pred.121| [prudence] *is-defined-by* [knowledge-of-self]

Relative passage: "Socrates: And self-knowledge did we admit to be prudence? Alcibiades: To be sure" (*Alcib. I*, 133c).

|Pred.122| [bravery] *is-defined-by* [wisdom]

Relative passage: "Our friend appears to me to mean that bravery is a kind of wisdom" (*Laches*, 194d).

|Pred.123| [bravery] *is-defined-by* [knowledge]

Relative passage: "Socrates: do you say that bravery is knowledge of what is to be dreaded or dared? Nicias: I do" (*Laches*, 196c-d).

Pred.124| [prudence] *is-defined-by* [knowledge]

Relative passage: "For if prudence is above all a knowledge of the knowledges, and presides too over the other knowledges, surely she will govern this knowledge of the good, and so benefit us" (*Charm.* 174e).

|Pred.125| [knowledge] *is-defined-by* [right-opinion]

Relative passage: "Then, it seems, if asked, 'What is knowledge?' our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation" (*Theaet.* 210a)

|Pred.126| [piety] *is-defined-by* [knowledge]

Figure 1. Idea of *one*: its participations in various Ideas (one rests, one moves, one is being, being is one etc). The relation *participates in* is depicted by green line. [Drawing environment: Protégé, Ontograf].

Relative passage: "Then piety, according to this definition, would be a knowledge of giving and asking concerning the gods" (*Euthyphro*, 14d)

|Pred.127| [beautiful] *is-defined-by* [befitting]

Relative passage: "Whatever is befitting for any particular thing makes that thing beautiful" (*Hippias Major,* 290d)

|Pred.128| [beautiful] *is-defined-by* [useful]

Relative passage: "Whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful" (*Hippias Major*, 295c)

|Pred.129| [beautiful] *is-defined-by* [joyful]

Relative passage: "What is beautiful makes us feel joy" (*Hippias Major*, 297e)

Figure 1 presents the concept-map of the idea *one*.

Figure 2 presents the concept-map of the idea *being*.

CONCLUSION

This article could help the transformation of the natural language philosophical propositions to typical logical expressions, which is prerequisite for processes, such as automatic deduction and mechanical evaluation of argumentation. Besides, it could contribute to locating similarities among apparently distant

Figure 2. Idea of *being*: its participations and identity relations in various ideas (being is the same as one, motion and rest participate in being, but being does not participate in motion or rest, etc). The relations *participates in* and the *same as* are depicted by yellow line and grey line, correspondingly. [Drawing environment: Protégé, Ontograf].

philosophical texts and differences among apparently close ones.

Obtaining the accurate form of the philosophical declarations in the various philosophical corpora could help either in the search of identification of orphan or fragmented phrases or in checking the authorship of disputed fragments, based on its content itself rather than its textual expression.

After a detailed analysis of a number of selected Platonic dialogues, where various forms of predication are mentioned, the following cases of predication relations have been extracted:

The Platonic types of predication: subject *is** predicate [idea in the form of adjective] (*ἐστὶν), subject [idea] *verb-predicate,* subject *participates-in** predicate [idea] (* μετέχει τινὸς), subject *partakes-of** predicate [idea] (* μεταλαμβάνει τινὸς), subject *is-near-to** predicate [idea] (*πάρεστι), predicate [idea] *is-present-with** subject (*πάρεστι), subject *is-said-as** predicate [idea] (*λέγεται), predicate [idea] *exists-innately-in** subject (*εγγίγνεται), subject *has** predicate [idea] (*ἔχει), predicate [idea] *possesses** subject [thing] (*κατέχει), subject *is-affected-by** predicate [idea] (* πέπονθεν), subject [idea] *shares-in** predicate (*κοινωνεῖ τινος), subject [idea] *partakes-of** predicate [idea] (*προσκοινωνεῖ τινος), subject [idea] *exists** (*ἔστιν), subject [idea] *is-what-it-is-to-*

be predicate [idea], subject [idea] *participates-in-itself,* subject [idea] *brings-along** predicate [idea] (*ἐπιφέρει), subject [idea] *is-subclass-of** predicate [idea] (*κατὰ γένη μόρια), subject [thing] *belongs-to-class** predicate [idea] (*ἐστὶ γένους), subject [idea] *is-part-of** predicate [idea] (*μόρια), predicate [idea] *exists-within** subject [idea] (* ἔνεστι), [idea] *participates-in* sameness [μετέχει τοῦ ταυτοῦ], predicate [idea] *contains** subject [idea] (*περιλαμβάνει/ περιέχει), subject [idea]: *is-PP* predicate [idea], subject [idea] *is-same-as** predicate [idea] (* ταὐτόν ἐστι), subject *is-different-from** predicate (*ἕτερόν/ θάτερον ἐστι), subject [idea] *is other-than** predicate [idea] (*ἕτερόν ἐστι), subject [idea] *is-defined-by* predicate [idea].

Taking into account the various predication relations of significant philosophical terms we can represent them overall in graphical form in ontology software environments. This will increase researchers of philosophy to have a total concise view of the philosophical 'paths' of main concepts within the work of a certain philosopher or extensively in the general frame of philosophy.

Lastly, since predicative propositions constitute a great part of dialectics and rhetoric it is expected that this work could be considered as a guide for standardization of the various freely expressed conceptual schemata and technics, leading to a deeper understanding of the great art of discource.

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ENDNOTES

1   "In *Sophist* participation also obtains between one Form and another. Now that this categorical barrier has, for some reason, been crossed, we may want to ask whether participation can obtain between a Form and itself. Can a Form be among its own participants? The question is not without interest" (Nehamas, 1982, p. 351-2)

2   Such as just for justice, good for goodness, unitary for unity, moving for motion, resting for rest etc.

3   The predication 'A is B' is a non-commutative relation Pred(A,B) with the property: Pred(A,B) ≠ Pred(B,A) since 'A is B' does not in general imply 'B is A'. The specific case Pred(A,B)$\Leftrightarrow$ Pred(B,A), that is, if B is predicated of A and also A is predicated of B, it means that A is the same to B. This is the identity relation (Plato.type.6.identity) studied later.

4   Such as *moves* (instead of *is a moving thing*), *rests* (instead of *is a resting thing*) etc.

5   We must make here a distinction between the relation 'other than' mentioned above and the concept 'the others' used in Parmenides as a term for the not-one.

6   http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/

7   "ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὂν καὶ ὅλον ἓν εἶναι".

8   "οὗ δ᾽ ἔστιν τἆλλα ζῷα καθ᾽ ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια".

9   We must make here a distinction between the genera 'same', 'different' and the relations 'is-same-as', 'is-different-from'.

10   "καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ἕτερον εἶναι" (Parm. 146b1-2). We must distinguish between the relational term 'other than' and the 'others', which are the not-one.

An-Other Socratic Method: Socratic *mimēsis* in the *Hippias Major*

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ABSTRACT

There is another Socratic method, Socratic *mimēsis*, and an instance of this is when Plato has Socrates play 'the annoying questioner' in the *Hippias Major*. Other interpreters have suggested that the reasons for Socrates' dramatic play are depersonalization and distance. I argue for viewing Socrates' role-playing as a way to dramatize the inner dialogue that happens inside one's mind in what we may call conscience. Hippias the sophist lacks a conscience: his focus is acquisitive as opposed to inquisitive. Plato has staged a pedagogical theater of Hippias' failed lesson for the benefit of Plato's audience, the listeners/readers of the dialogue.

AN-OTHER SOCRATIC METHOD: SOCRATIC *MIMĒSIS* IN THE *HIPPIAS MAJOR*

The[1] term "Socratic method" is ubiquitous, but what exactly it is and if it is a single method or many methods has been much debated (Scott, 2002; Benson, 2009; 2010; Tarrant, 2006; Cain, 2007; McPherran, 2007; Futter, 2013; Young, 2009; Rodriguez, 2016). As a tentative definition of Socrates' method, we could say that it involves questioning his interlocutors, and it often leads them to contradictory conclusions. This method sometimes goes by the name of *elenchus* or "dialectic." In this paper, however, I want to highlight another method Socrates uses in philosophical conversations, what I call "Socratic *mimēsis*" (Duque, 2020). At crucial moments in several dialogues, Socrates takes on a role, a *persona*, and speaks as someone else. Socrates' dramatic imitation of others is a way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to and educate different kinds of audiences. Some examples of Socratic *mimēsis* are:

> [1] in the *Crito* Socrates plays the part of "the Laws" (50a–54c);
> [2] in the *Theaetetus* he acts the part of "Protagoras" (166a–168c); and
> [3] in the *Menexenus* he recites a funeral speech learned from "Aspasia" (236d–249c).
> I will consider another instance, and the focus of this paper:
> [4] in the *Hippias Major* Socrates takes on the persona that I will call 'the annoying questioner' (287d–304e).

In the *Hippias Major* Socrates encounters Hippias, a traveling sophist from Elis who is a kind of jack of all trades. There is a prologue to the main question in which Hippias and Socrates discuss Hippias' journey to Sparta, their laws, and law more generally. Right before Hippias can demonstrate his *epideixis*, or display speech, that he gave the Spartans, Socrates asks Hippias, "what is τὸ καλόν?" The ancient Greek word καλός has a broad semantic range, most often it means "beautiful," but it can also mean "noble," "fine," or "admirable" (Sider, 1977; Barney, 2010; Lear, 2006; 2020; Fine, 2018). For this paper I will most often refer to τὸ καλόν as "the beautiful," with the definite article, but please keep the other meanings in mind. In the course of their conversation, Hippias offers three definitions (really, examples) of the beautiful: a beautiful girl; gold; and a rich, healthy, and honored life. Then Socrates, via his questioning of Hippias, offers some other definitions: the appropriate; the useful; the beneficial; and the pleasures of sight and sound.[2] The dialogue ends in *aporia*, that is, they are not able to answer "what is τὸ καλόν?"

The character of 'the annoying questioner' that Socrates will role-play makes his first appearance at 286c5–d2, and Socrates uses the character to ask Hippias "what is the beautiful." Socrates says to Hippias:

> For recently, my excellent friend, someone really threw me into a confusion when I was censuring some words as ugly and praising some as beautiful. Thus, he questioned me very *insultingly*: "From where, Socrates, tell me, do you know what sorts of things are beautiful and ugly? And then, come now, would you be able to tell me what the beautiful [τὸ καλόν] is?"[3]

We can imagine that Socrates most likely changes his voice and maybe even his posture

when he speaks as 'the annoying questioner,' but we do not have to imagine that Plato makes it obvious that Socrates is playing the role of another person because, first, Socrates addresses comments made by the character in the third person to "Socrates."[4] Furthermore, Socrates makes it clear that this is a case of Socratic *mimēsis*—that is that he is imitating another—when he tells Hippias, "Nevertheless, without hindering you, I'm going to imitate [μιμούμενος ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον] that man" (287a3). And Socrates comments only a little later, "Come now, so that I may become that person as much as possible to try to ask you questions" (287b5). The person is the character that I call 'the annoying questioner.' Lastly, Plato has Socrates reiterate the point: "I'll speak to you the same way as before, imitating [μιμούμενος ἐκεῖνον] that man." (292c2–4).

Socrates characterizes 'the annoying questioner' at various moments by heaping scorn on him: "He is not clever but garbage [οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός]" (288d4); "He is very annoying [μέρμερος πάνυ ἐστίν]" (290e4); "imitating him in order that the words that I say are not directed against you; they're the sorts of things that he says toward me: harsh and grotesque [χαλεπά τε καὶ ἀλλόκοτα]" (292c4–5). And in a bit of an over-the-top, comic ribaldry, Socrates also insinuates that this person may even beat [τύπτειν] Socrates: "I think if I answered in this way he would be justified in beating me" (292b9–10).

The two most common reasons given by interpreters as to why Socrates takes on the persona of 'the annoying questioner' are distance and depersonalization.[5] By asking his questions in character, Socrates puts some distance between himself and the harsh and strange criticisms directed against Hippias' replies. By having Socrates speak as 'the annoying questioner,' Plato also makes the con-versation less about a personal confrontation between Socrates and Hippias, and, instead, Socrates is able to recruit Hippias in a joint venture against this common antagonist. There is an episode in the dialogue, however, where the mask of the character seems to slip, and Socrates may be breaking character and going against the distance and depersonalization implied so far.

This is the moment in the dialogue when this 'annoying questioner' might actually be named and revealed. Hippias at 298b5–6 implies that many of the things they have been saying might slip the notice of this 'annoying questioner,' and Socrates, at 298b7–9, responds, "By the dog, Hippias, not to the one I'd be most embarrassed to say foolish things and to pretend to say something while saying nothing." Hippias asks who it is that Socrates would be the most embarrassed to say these things in front of, and Socrates replies, "Sophroniscus' son" (298b11).[6] This is the big reveal. Since Hippias is a foreigner from Elis, he might not know that Socrates' father is Sophroniscus (*Alc*. 1 131e3; *La* 180d7, 181a1; *Euthd*. 297e7,8, 298b2). Thus, it is Socrates who is "Sophroniscus' son," and Socrates is actually talking about himself and, perhaps, admitting that everything said previously in the voice of 'the annoying questioner' was himself the entire time! The Sophroniscus reference has a special bite, given that one of Hippias' areas of expertise is genealogy. Hippias brags about his knowledge of the genealogies of heroes and men at 285d–e.[7]

This rejoinder would seem to complicate and eradicate the "distance and depersonalization" that Socrates has thus far carefully maintained. It is likely that Plato left it in as a signal to his audience, and it is not one that Socrates necessarily expects his interlocutor, Hippias, to understand as evidenced by the

fact that Hippias never seems to acknowledge that Socrates is 'the annoying questioner.'[8] Just a few lines later, Socrates continues, "I hear every insult from some others around here and from that very person who is always refuting me" (304d1–3). Adding another turn of the screw to see if Hippias will comprehend, Socrates discloses that, "he happens to be a close relative of mine and he lives in the same house" (304d3–4).

Instead of distance and personalization, I contend that Socrates in the *Hippias Major* creates a double in order to represent, or, better, to *dramatize for Hippias* both *what* an inquisitive moral conscience is and *how* it functions.[9] In fact, this is a recurring Platonic idea—the analogy of thought as if having a silent internal conversation with oneself—and it shows up in the *Theaetetus* 189–190a and in the *Sophist* 263a–264b. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates describes the soul engaged in thinking as "simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirming and denying" (189e8–190a2).[10] In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger gets Theaetetus to agree to the following two points: "Thought and speech [are] the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul, in conversation with itself" (263e3–5); and, a few lines later, "Affirmation or denial occurs as silent thought inside the soul" which is belief (264a1–2).[11] This Platonic way of conceiving of thinking as internal dialogue between a questioner and a respondent is very close to how Sorabji (2014) defines conscience as "sharing knowledge with *oneself*, not with another, as if knowledge of the guilty secret had split one into two people, one fully self-aware, the other reluctantly sharing."[12]

This inquisitive conscience is in contrast to Hippias' acquisitive stance as a sophist.

Hippias brags about how much money he makes: "Socrates, you know nothing of the beauties [τῶν καλῶν] of this [sc. sophistry]. If you knew how much money I've made, you'd be amazed." (282d6–7). Money is repeatedly brought up in the prologue. In fact, Socrates sarcastically quips, "It seems right to many that the wise man ought to be wise, most of all for himself. And the mark of this is whoever makes the most money." (283b2–3). This quote encapsulates Hippias' standard that money is the marker of wisdom. (There are people today who still think this way.) There are surface similarities between Socrates and a sophist like Hippias. They both teach, but, whereas the sophists' ultimate aim was money, Socrates does not accept payment; and his ultimate goal is wisdom and (moral) self-knowledge, both for his interlocutor and himself. This ethical self-knowledge is arrived at by the questioning inner voice of conscience that Socrates is modeling with the character of 'the annoying questioner.' As Sandra Peterson (2000) puts it "Hippias is depicted as having a conceit and self-satisfaction that make him impervious" to Socrates' pedagogical interventions (272).[13]

At 295a4–6, Hippias expresses the desire to go away by himself to investigate the beautiful in solitude, and he boasts that he thinks it will not be hard to find it and that he will be able to give Socrates "a more accurate account of it than absolute accuracy." But Hippias going off by himself would lack this inner voice that Socrates is performing. If Hippias were truly to learn from Socrates, he would have to imitate Socrates' method of doubling himself and of doubting and asking *himself* questions.[14]

Socratic *mimēsis* can also give us insight into Plato's own use of *mimēsis* in writing the dialogues and filling them with diverse characters. Socrates' doubling, which is internal to the action of the dialogues, mirrors what

Plato does as an author to present his ideas: he creates different characters with varying points of views and plays them off each other. In the *Hippias Major,* we get Hippias, Socrates, and then Socrates-as-the-annoying questioner. One difference between Socratic and Platonic *mimēsis* is the audience of each. Socrates' audience, Hippias, does not get Socrates' pedagogy. He misses the lesson that Socrates is trying to teach. He misses Socrates' reference to Socrates himself as the son of Sophroniscus. He does not get that Socrates' annoying and questioning role-playing is meant to be illustrative. He has not learned anything in the end. Hippias is, however, only the *internal* audience; the ultimate audience is *external*—it is us, the readers and listeners of Plato's dialogue.[15] Furthermore, *if* it can be shown that Socrates is not fully committed to everything he has his characters say and do (as in the case of the *Hippias Major* with Socrates' character of 'the annoying questioner') and that Socrates' imitation is more of a provocation aimed at his interlocutor, *then*, perhaps, in a like manner, Plato is not committed to everything his characters say and do (not even to Socrates!), and what is represented in the dialogues is more like a provocation to its listeners and readers.

Additionally, Plato's analogy of thinking as having a dialogue with oneself seems to imply a simple two-person conversation between an interrogator and a respondent. But an imagined conversation could also be more elaborate. Perhaps an internal dialogue could even be more like one of Plato's own multi-character dialogues with shifting voices, perspectives, and intentions.

On the point about the listeners/readers of the *Hippias Major* being the ultimate audience, I agree with Sonja Tanner (2022). She, however, emphasizes the comic aspects of the dialogue much more than I do. And, while I do think there is a tremendous amount of comedy in the dialogue, that has not been my focus. Although Socrates fails to teach Hippias, ultimately, Plato, the hand and the mind behind the whole drama, is staging this play-within-a-play for the benefit of his readers/listeners. Tanner and I both agree that what I call "Socratic *mimēsis*" and what she calls "an instance of "metatheatre" has as its philosophical aim to provoke the reader/listeners of the dialogue to further self-knowledge and self-reflection. Plato has set up a kind of pedagogical theater; Plato has staged a failed educational exchange between Hippias and Socrates, but Plato hopes that his external audience will learn the real lesson about the dramatization of conscience.

I was inspired to call Socrates' performance of 'the annoying questioner' a representation of 'conscience' by Hannah Arendt (1979).[16] I agree with her that, in the *Hippias Major*, Socrates dramatizes reason, or better, conscience. However, what I do not follow is that, for her, this Socratic doubling implies a return back to a unified, single consciousness. This is the 'one' in her formulation 'the two-in-one.' Instead, I emphasize that Plato, through Socrates' doubling, is highlighting the multiplicity and the diversity of voices and characters in our moral thinking. A conscience is at least One other voice (maybe more) within us, questioning and interrogating us, trying to make us better.

I want to address one final suggestion by Sandra Peterson (2000); she proposes that "Socrates is reporting *quite accurately* how he talks to himself" (p. 267, emphasis added). However, while I do think that Socrates is *dramatizing* the kind of internal questioning that he inflicts on himself, I do *not* think that Socrates' performance is a completely accurate depiction of *how* he talks to himself or *what*

he says. The act is stylized and overblown. It is meant to be funny, and it is directed more at Hippias than at Socrates. Peterson (2000) wants to treat Socrates' roleplaying in the dialogue as a kind of genuine confession.[17] Even if I were to grant this point, Socrates' words are aimed at Hippias, and there is still very much a public-performative element to his "confession." There's a moment in the dialogue where Socrates says of the annoying questioner that "he thinks of nothing other than the truth" (288d5). As Peterson (2000) points out there is a problem: Socrates "imitates" the annoying questioner, and this imitation involves deception or untruth (p. 271). Later, Socrates reveals himself to be the annoying questioner. So, does Socrates "think of nothing other than the truth?" I think he uses the fictionality of *mimēsis* and acting to try to help his interlocutors arrive at a higher philosophical, ethical truth. As Kierkegaard (2009 [1859], p. 53) writes, "Do not be deceived by the word *deception*. One can deceive a person out of what is true, and—to recall old Socrates—one can deceive a person into what is true."

THE PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION OF BEING A DUO BY ONESELF

By having Socrates perform the role of 'the annoying questioner,' Plato is also showing us something about performance and performative contradiction. By 'performative contradiction' I mean an inconsistency between one's words and one's deeds. Performative contradiction is similar to the kind of contradiction that Socrates elicits with his *elenchus*: what an interlocutor says at one moment—the content of an espoused view—conflicts with some

other thing that an interlocutor says at another moment. In a performative contradiction, the conflict comes not just from a difference in the content of my views, but it arises from the *form*: from *how* I say it. The very manner or method in which I am expressing myself undermines the view I am trying to espouse. Sometimes this distinction is explained as a conflict in the semantic as opposed to the pragmatic dimension of an utterance. So, for example, there is nothing contradictory in the content of the statement, "There is no yelling in the library." But, if someone were to shout this in a library, the pragmatics of the utterance—the way in which they express it—would be in contradiction with the content of what is being communicated. Another example: "I may in fact be modest. But I cannot say, 'I'm modest' without negating the statement. The performance belies the truth-content."[18] What I am calling a 'performative self-contradiction' would be classed as J.L Mackie's (1964) "pragmatic self-refutation" (p. 196).

Toward the end of their conversation, (at 301d–303c) Socrates finds a quality that can be attributed to *both* Hippias and Socrates collectively but that cannot be attributed to *each* individually (without the other)—namely that they are a duo. This example is ironic because Socrates has been doubling himself this entire time throughout their conversation. So, there is a sense in which Socrates *is* capable of being a double or a duo *by himself*. By performing the role of 'the annoying questioner,' Socrates has doubled himself, and thus undermines or contradicts what he asserts: that 'being double' or 'being a duo' cannot be attributed to an individual. Indeed, it can in cases of *mimēsis* where the imitator is split between the actor and the role being represented. In this case, Socrates has presented himself as a kind of rhapsode/actor, as a messenger, and the "real poet" (so to speak)

or author is this annoying questioner that is a relative of Socrates and who lives with him. However, when Socrates reveals that this man is "Sophroniscus' son" the listener or reader of the dialogue should understand and recognize that it is Socrates himself who is really the author of these views and that he has been acting as both poet and rhapsode this entire time.

Some very literal reader of the dialogue might vehemently disagree with my interpretation and say that Socrates is still just one person, that Socrates is not *really* a duo or two. Even if I were to grant this point and accept that Socrates does not performatively contradict himself, at the very least, my simple critic would have to admit that Socrates' *mimēsis* definitely *complicates* the claim that Socrates is merely one, a singleton. Socrates has maintained throughout the dialogue two different perspectives, two different registers, and two ways of communicating. Acting, imitating, and role-playing make us question our simplicity, integrity, and unity—but not necessarily for the worse. This questioning can force us to reflect on the various parts of ourselves and help us to better understand ourselves. This kind of internal dialogue can be a model of conscience: the kind of conscience that Hippias lacks, but Socrates attempts to enact for him.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have demonstrated that there is another Socratic method, Socratic *mimēsis*. An instance of this is when Plato has Socrates play 'the annoying questioner' in the *Hippias Major*. Other interpreters have suggested that the reasons for Socrates' dramatic play are depersonalization and distance. I argued for viewing Socrates' role-playing of

this other character as a way to dramatize the inner dialogue that happens inside one's mind, in what we may call conscience. Hippias, the sophist, lacks a conscience. His focus is acquisitive as opposed to inquisitive. So, even when he claims that he wants to go off alone by himself in silence to try to find the beautiful (295a3–6), he will not be able to do it because he does not have the capacity to question and interrogate *himself*. Plato has staged a pedagogical theater of a failed lesson for the benefit of his audience, the listeners/readers of the dialogue. I also showed that Socrates performatively contradicts himself (but I think it is something Plato wants the astute reader/listener to catch). Socrates contradicts himself by saying that 'duo' cannot be attributed to either himself or Hippias, each alone by themselves. However, Socrates, in playing the role of 'the annoying questioner,' has effectively doubled himself, and so it would not be inappropriate to call him a 'duo' by himself.

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ENDNOTES

and from our class discussion of that dialogue. I would also like to thank the organizers of "From *Logos* to Person," the 2021 5th Interdisciplinary Conference at Polis, the Jerusalem Institute of Languages and Humanities. I was not able to make it to the conference in person, but I learned a lot from it and from my fellow panelists. I want to acknowledge Hasse Hämäläinen and Joseángel Domínguez for their questions. My replies during the conference were overly brief, but I hope to have answered them here in print.

2   The prologue runs from 281a–286c. Socrates' main question, "what is the *kalon*," begins at 286c. Discussion of Hippias' examples/definitions of: young maiden 287e–289; gold 289d–291d; and a life well-lived 291d–293c. Discussion of Socrates' definitions of: 'the appropriate' 293c–294e; 'the useful' 295c–296e; 'the beneficial' 296e–297d; 'pleasant sights and sounds' 297e–301b.

3   Translations for the *Hippias Major* are my own in consultation with Fowler, 1926 and Woodruff, 1982.

4   While I do think the *Hippias Major* is genuinely by Plato, I cannot defend that view here. I take it for granted, and it is outside of the scope of this paper. For some discussion of the dialogue's authenticity, see Tarrant 1928; Kahn, 1985; Woodruff, 1982, p. 94–103; Trivigno, 2016, p. 56–62; Tanner, 2019, p. 3. For a wonderful essay that develops the question of authenticity within the drama between Socrates and Hippias of the *Hippias Major* itself, see Duvoisin, 1996.

5   For some examples of the claims of what I term "distance and depersonalization," see Woodruff 1982, p. 107–108; Trivigno, 2016, p. 53–56; Tanner, 2019, p. 8–9.

6   This is reminiscent of Odysseus' self-revealing and hubristic epic boast against the cyclops Polyphemus in *Odyssey* 9.366–506.

7   I owe this point to Nickolas Pappas (personal communication).

8   *Pace* Woodruff, 1982, p. 108, who writes: "It is impossible to read the dialogue and believe that Hippias did not recognize the Questioner. Either the dialogue is badly contrived, or Hippias does, from the very start, understand what Socrates is doing. He must have recognized the Questioner."

9   I recognize that the use of the word 'conscience' here can be contentious. As I will discuss later, the choice of 'conscience' was inspired by Hannah Arendt's analysis of the *Hippias Major*. For the history of the concept of 'conscience,' especially in the ancient Greek context, see Sorabji, 2014, particularly chapter one "Sharing Knowledge with Oneself of a Defect"; Langston, 2010, p. 7–20.

10   This is from the translation by M. J. Levett, revised by Myles Burnyeat in Cooper, 1997.

11   These lines are from the translation by Nicholas P. White, in the Cooper, 1997.

12   Sorabji, 2014, p. 1, emphasis in the original. On p. 18-20, Sorabji hunts down all the uses of the Greek words "*suneidôs*" and "*suneidenai*" from which the Latin word "*conscientia*" is derived (from where we get 'conscience') that occur in Plato. He also discusses on p. 21-2, Socrates' "*daimôn*" as a precursor to conscience, but he points out incongruities. For example, in Plato, Socrates' "*daimôn*" is infallible since it is divine, and it also only instructs Socrates negatively, that is, it only tells him what not to do. Sorabji misses this Platonic concept of thinking as internal dialogue of the soul that I am highlighting with the *Hippias Major* (and that is also in the *Theaetetus* 189–190a and the *Sophist* 263a–264b). A book that covers this idea of conversation in the soul in Plato is Long 2013; for discussion of *Hippias Major*, see p. 46–63, for a discussion of *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, see p. 109–38. I am sorry that I do not have the space here to properly engage with this engaging secondary work. Long, p. 111n5, also acknowledges that the soul of the cosmos speaks to itself in *Timaeus* 37a2–c3. I owe a reminder about this book and the reference to *Timaeus* to Sara De Leonardis.
This is a form of conscience that can instruct you on what you should do, and that occurs through discussion and reflection with and upon oneself. One does not need another outside interlocutor. According to Sorabji, this form of reflective conscience only comes later—as late as Roman times. I owe thinking on this point to a question by Hasse Hämäläinen.

13   Peterson [originally published as Olson], 2015. Although I disagree with it, her paper is probably one of the best and most insightful on the *Hippias Major*. She makes an interesting proposal as to *why* Socrates might question Hippias even though he is incorrigible: "In another person Socrates can observe more clearly the bad effects of total self-satisfaction. So we have learned that Socrates has reason to converse with Hippias" (p. 274). I will have more to say about this paper later.

14   This detail confirms my claim that Plato's seemingly merely aesthetic or literary choice of having Socrates double himself and create a character also has a *philosophical* and an ethical or moral foundation. It is not just mere style and play. The manner in which Socrates presents this idea of conscience by acting out the role of 'annoying questioner' is constitutive of the lesson he wants to teach. The form of this pedagogical theater is also part of its content. I owe this point to a question by Joseángel Domínguez.

15   A lesson I have learned from many, but I want to single out Miller, 2017; Altman, 2020; Schultz, 2013; and Trivigno, 2016, p. 32, 62.

16   From a chapter entitled "The Two-in-One" in *The Life of the Mind*, p. 179–193.

17   I find it incredibly telling that Sandra Peterson used the pseudonym 'Halsten Olson' in order to publish

her paper. She hand-wrote a note on the first page of the scanned, uploaded version of the paper on her academia.edu page: "I used a pen name for this because I submitted to a journal that did not do blind refereeing, and I submitted it to a conference whose program would appear online while the paper was still under review."
https://www.academia.edu/6593504/Socrates_talks_to_himself_in_Platos_Hippias_Major (last accessed February 15 2024).
I think that Peterson's experience of pseudonymity has perhaps inspired her own views of Socrates' use of the character of the 'annoying questioner' as accurate and genuine. Her and Halsten Olson's views are identical, and she would endorse everything she wrote under that name. I do not think that the same is true of Plato's Socrates and his 'annoying questioner.' It's too bad that more scholars do not know that this article was penned by Peterson.

18   I owe this example to Nickolas Pappas (personal communication), who got it from his late colleague, Jonathan Adler.

Injustice and instability in Plato's *Republic*: the case of the timocracy and its rulers

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the timocracy, the first of the four corrupt regimes described in Plato's *Republic*, is a fragmented regime ruled by individuals with fragmented and unstable characters. The deterioration of the elements forming the positive cycle that links the good nature of Callipolis' guardians and the good quality of their education causes three levels of instability in the timocracy: the compresence of elements belonging to three different regimes, the destruction of the guardians' unity due to the emergency of the *oikos*, and the split of the *oikos* in which the timocratic man grows up.

Keywords: *Republic*, timocracy, soul, instability, fragmentation

INTRODUCTION

In Books 8 and 9 of Plato's *Republic* Socrates describes the four deviant regimes and the four corrupt individuals that he believes to exemplify the corruption of justice. The timocracy, the oligarchy, the democracy and the tyranny mark the four successive stages of Callipolis' decline. Corresponding to them, the timocratic man, the oligarchic man, the democratic man, the tyrannical man illustrate the four types of corruption that the soul experiences after it loses the state of harmony justice gives to it. The state of harmony enjoyed by the just souls of Callipolis' rulers is an effect of the proper functioning of a cycle that also ensure the stability of the city. The good nature of its rulers and the good education they receive mutually reinforce and improve each other in a cycle that perpetuates itself until one of its components deteriorates for independent reasons and causes the decline of the other component too.

In this paper I will turn my attention to the timocracy, the first regime that becomes established after the elements that constitute this cycle deteriorate. The first section of the paper will provide important background information for my argument by outlining the link scholars have seen between individuals and their surrounding environment in the *Republic* and showing that Socrates clearly assumes the existence of this link when he insists on the importance for Callipolis' stability of the virtuous cycle between the good nature of the guardians and their good education.[1] The main focus of the paper will be on the effects that the collapse of this virtuous cycle causes on the timocratic regime and its rulers. I will argue that the timocracy turns out to be a fragmented regime and the timocratic rulers prove to be individuals with fragmented and instable characters.

INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT: A RELATION OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE

A relation of mutual influence can be detected in the way in which individuals and their surrounding environment are portrayed in the *Republic* to interact with each other. Lear highlights this relation by describing the two processes that in his view govern it: internalization and externalization.[2] Internalization is the ability of the human mind to be shaped by the external environment and to be moulded by the influence to which it is exposed.[3] One clear indication of the importance given to this principle in the *Republic* is the great care dedicated to education: between Books 2 and 3 (376e1-398b9) over twenty-two Stephanus-pages are occupied by the criteria that Socrates sets out for the stories suitable for the education of the future guardians.[4]

Externalization is the reverse process to internalization.[5] Individuals project their ideas onto the environment they inhabit and shape it with them. Culture and cultural products are instances of this process. The activity that the philosopher is described to do in Book 6 (500b8-d10) is one further example of externalization.[6] After gaining knowledge of the perfect order of the Forms and moulding his character according to it, he undertakes to transpose this order into the habits and characters of the citizens of the city he rules. Whether or not carried out by a philosopher, externalization is a pervasive phenomenon, as lines 435d8-436a3 clearly show:

> Well, then, we are surely compelled to agree that each of us has within himself the same parts and characteristics as the city? Where else would they come

from? It would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness didn't come to be in cities from such individuals as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us who are held to possess spirit, or that the same isn't true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world, or of the love of money, which one might say is conspicuously displayed by the Phoenicians and Egyptians.[7]

People exteriorize their customs and habits and shape with them the environment in which they live. A community receives its character from the character of the people who form it and a clear correspondence can be detected between the characters of the individuals and character of the communities formed by them. Although people externalize their character, a community does not receive its character from each of its members, as emerges from the following passage:

> And do you realize that of necessity there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think that constitutions are born "from oak or rock" and not from the characters of the people of those cities that tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the others along with them? (544d5-e2)[8]

While a community is constituted by people with different characters, the character displayed by a community itself is not some sort of average between the different characters of the many citizens who live in it, but it is the character of those citizens that are successful in shaping the character of the whole community.[9] Callipolis illustrates this point clearly: it is wise in virtue not of all of its citizens but only of the philosophers, who are most able to shape the character of the city due to the leading position they occupy in it.

While Lear believes that identifying the processes of internalization and externalization paves the way to the solution of most of the difficulties concerning the city-soul analogy,[10] I will now direct my interest to a passage in which Socrates outlines a link that implies awareness of the existence of a mutual influence between individuals and their surrounding environment. In lines 424a5-10 Socrates openly acknowledges the existence of the connection between the education imparted to Callipolis' guardians and the excellence of their character:

> And surely, once our city gets a good start, it will go on growing in a cycle. Good education and upbringing, when they are preserved, produce good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other respects, just like other animals.

As long as the education provided to the guardians and their good nature remain linked to each other, they form a virtuous cycle. The guardians improve their nature through the education they receive, their improved nature ensures that the education available to the next generation of guardians is further improved, and the cycle re-starts with the new generation of guardians better placed than the preceding one.[11] By creating ever improving citizens who will gradually but constantly improve the education imparted to the coming generations, this cycle ensures Callipolis' stability.

As soon as this positive cycle is broken, both of its two elements are set on a path of

decline and the stability of the city is threatened. Education is no longer preserved on a path of incremental improvement and the nature of the guardians no longer refined by that education. Socrates shows full awareness of the fragility of this cycle and denounces the risk of actions that may deteriorate its elements. He warns that introducing changes to music would result in the alteration of the fundamental laws of the city (424c5-6). As the great care he dedicates to regulating it in Books 2 and 3 signals, the triad rhythm, melody and lyrics or, more generally, text, in which music consists, is as pervasive in the life of Callipolis' citizens as it was in that of ordinary citizens of any Greek *polis*, and it plays a crucial role in shaping the character that the guardians acquire through their education.[12] Changes to music are therefore bound to result in different characters. If the character acquired by the guardians changes, the norms and values that are so closely related to its formation will change with it. Different norms and values will in turn produce different laws. Different laws will change the education and the new education will form guardians even further removed from the excellence that they previously achieved. Preventing this vicious cycle from being initiated requires that the elements forming it be preserved from deteriorating due to external causes. To ensure the preservation of the quality of the education provided in Callipolis, Socrates entrusts the guardians with the task of preventing any potential changes to what can guarantee the stability of the laws of the city. Using the metaphor of building a bulwark in music (φυλακτήριον, 424d8), he indicates that it is of cardinal importance for the stability of the city that the guardians ensure that the sets of Callipolis' cultural values remain unchanged.

THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE DETERIORATES: THE TIMOCRATIC REGIME

While Callipolis' stability requires the virtuous cycle formed by the good nature of the people who are educated and the good quality of the education that these people receive, the four corrupt regimes that Socrates describes in Books 8 and 9 are examples of cities formed after the two elements constituting this cycle have deteriorated.[13] The timocracy, the oligarchy, the democracy and the tyranny illustrate how a city and the members of its ruling class become fragmented and instable when they are captured by a "monopoly of values" deviant from the justice promoted by Callipolis.[14] I will now turn my attention to the timocracy and try to show that the timocracy is a fragmented regime, and that the timocratic ruler displays an unstable and fragmented character.[15] By arguing that the fragmentation of a timocratic regime is matched by the instability of character displayed by its rulers, I will analyse a case in which environment and individual influence each other under the conditions existing after the deterioration of the elements constituting the virtuous cycle that ensures Callipolis' stability.

The timocratic regime is fragmented on three different levels.[16] Its first level of fragmentation is a consequence of its genesis. Arisen from the disintegration of Callipolis, the timocracy displays characteristics inherited from the previous order, characteristics anticipating the order that will replace it, and a few characteristics peculiar to itself. The decline of the excellence of the guardians creates the conditions for a conflict that causes the transition of the city into a timocracy. Due to the inability to identify the appropriate moment for reproduction, the guardians begin

to generate an increasing number of children with a nature below the required standard (546d1-3).[17] Since the most capable of these children are despite their deficient nature allowed to access the group of the guardians and perform the corresponding duties once they have become adults (546d3-5), education is no longer controlled as competently as it previously was (546d5-7). The ensuing decline of its quality results in a further decrease of the level of the following generation of guardians, who continue to loosen control over the access to their own group (546e7-547a2). The positive cycle ensuring Callipolis' stability has been reversed. More individuals from the bronze and iron races are admitted into the group of the guardians and the newly admitted members lower the standards of education further. At this stage, the conflict breaks out that Socrates invokes the Muses to retell (545d7-8). The increasingly numerous guardians possessing a deficient nature and presented as individuals from the bronze and iron races in the mythical narration of the Muses clash against the shrinking group of guardians who have preserved an excellent character and are portrayed to belong to the golden and silver races.[18] The conflict ends in a settlement. The faction of the guardians who possess a deficient nature and are driven by appetite obtains that houses and land are privatized and that the people previously protected as free citizens are reduced to subjects and dependants (547b7-c3); the guardians who still originate from the golden or the silver races and follow the leadership of reason succeed in reaffirming the duty of the ruling class to defend the city and be in charge of the activities connected to war (547c3-4).

Resulting from the compromise that ended the mythical conflict that disintegrated Callipolis, the timocracy retains four character-istics inherited from the previous order: the respect given to the rulers (547d5), the rulers' habit of organizing common meals (547d7), their refusal to engage in commercial or economic activities (547d5-7), and the importance they attach to gymnastic and war and warlike activities (547d7-8). This last characteristic was already observable in Callipolis but it was displayed by a different class: while gymnastic and war were cultivated by the auxiliaries, they become favourite activities of the ruling class in the timocracy. In common with an oligarchy, a timocracy has the love for money (548a5-6), although its way of loving is peculiar. Since in a timocracy private wealth cannot be acquired openly, money is gathered in secret and spent by men stingy with their own money but liberal with that of others (548a6-b5). Distinctive of the timocracy is the type of men it chooses for government. After the genuinely wise philosophers of Callipolis have been replaced by rulers whose wisdom is mixed and impure, the timocracy is bound to rely on aggressive men interested more in war than in peace (547e1-548a3).

A second level of fragmentation is caused by the emergence of the *oikos* in the timocracy. The existence of private houses where families can retreat and amass private wealth fractures the unity that bound the guardians in Callipolis. Around halfway through Book 5 (462a1-464d5, esp. 464c5-d5) Socrates explains that the commonality of women and children gives a crucial contribution towards creating unity among Callipolis' guardians. A strong sense of common belonging is felt when the same feelings are experienced in the same circumstances, and certain events are greeted with joy be all the members of a community while others grieve all of them. This identity of feelings is shared when all the members of a community refer the pronoun

"my" to the same objects or people. Sharing women and children renders every member of a generation of guardians a possible referent for this pronoun and creates the feeling of unity that binds Callipolis' ruling class. By contrast, Socrates warns (462b8-c4), the unity of a community disintegrates when in the face of the same event some people are cheerful while others mourn. Although he does not go into further detail, it is natural to suppose that the feeling of common belonging is fragmented under circumstances opposite to those that help to create it. When different citizens direct their care and affection to different objects and people, the disintegration of this feeling is triggered. The introduction of private property and the formation of the nuclear family lead the rulers of a timocracy to identify different objects and people as the referents of their care. The emergence of the *oikoi*, "private nests" (**νεοττιὰς ἰδίας,** 548a9) thus contributes substantially to disintegrating the sense of unity that bound the members of the ruling class when women and children were held in common in Callipolis.

A FRAGMENTED CHARACTER

A timocratic ruler both lives in a society that has lost the sense of unity shared by Callipolis' guardians and retreats in a private dimension which is itself fragmented.[19] The *oikos* in which he grows up is divided between opposing factions that exercise different influences on him. This dividedness is the third level of fragmentation to which the timocratic ruler is exposed and the one that is more directly responsible for the instability of his character and the change of it into that of a fully-fledged timocratic ruler. Portrayed with traits reminiscent of those of comedy characters', the people surrounding the young timocratic man exert opposing influences on him:[20] his father nurtures his reason while his mother, the house servants and gossipers feed his appetite and render his spirit more aggressive.

Despite the lack of details provided on the father, it is possible to make some tentative inferences on his character and the influence he exerts on his son. The father of the timocratic man is said to be a good man (549c2) who fosters the development of reason in his son (550d1-2) but avoids active engagement in the political life of the not well-governed city (549c2) in which he lives. Given that he is said to foster the development of reason in his son, it is natural to assume that the father of the timocratic man possesses himself a soul led by reason. Although a reason-led soul renders him virtuous, his virtue fails to be as accomplished as the one displayed by Callipolis' philosophers. The type of city in which he lives and the life he lives in it suggests us why. Although his city is different from Callipolis, it is also unlikely to be a fully developed timocracy as it is the stage for the action of the father of the timocratic man, not of the timocratic man himself. Rather, this city seems to reflect the stage immediately following the conclusion of the conflict that split the group of the guardians. Due to the unorderly situation existing in the newly formed city, the father of the timocratic man decides to avoid active engagement in political life and to accept the diminished social status derived from retirement into the private sphere (549c1-5). This choice suggests the intention to avoid *philopragmosynē*, and it invites the reader to compare and contrast him with a philosopher operating in Callipolis. According to the indications given in Book 4 (434c7-11), justice consists in *oikeiopragia*, which on the political level prescribes that every citizen carries out his or her own duty and that alone.

The crucial duty of a philosopher in Callipolis is to participate in the government of the city after completing the long curriculum studiorum that the city organised for him or her. By contrast, the city where the father of the timocratic man lives neither takes any steps to educate the citizens who will be later occupy positions of leadership nor does it impose any obligation on the members of its ruling class to participate actively in the government of the city when they are adults. By refraining from entering the political life of an unorderly city, the father of the timocratic man avoids the risk of engaging in *philopragmosynē*, but he also remains incapable of reaching the level of virtue that the philosopher-rulers achieve in Callipolis by fulfilling the function the city designs for them.

If these inferences are correct, the virtue possessed by the father of the timocratic man is less than fully accomplished. He possesses a soul led by the rational part, but he does not carry out the function fulfilled by a member of the ruling class of a well-governed city. Although he refrains from *philopragmosynē*, he lives a life retired from the political scene. Given his imperfect virtue, it is plausible to assume that the support he is able to give to his son will be limited. He will act as a conservative force that helps the rational part to retain a role of leadership in the soul of his son, but the effectiveness of his action will be undercut by the lack of prestige of his diminished social position.

While the rational part of the soul of the young timocratic man is ineffectively fostered by his father, spirit and appetite receive support from his mother, the home servants and the gossipers heard on the street. His mother has a barrage of criticism against her husband. She feels that her status is diminished by her husband's hesitation in holding high offices

(549c7-8). Since he does not fight back against public and private offences, she blames him for his lack of resolve (549d2-3). She complains that he does not enrich himself like other members of the ruling class, albeit secretly, do (549d1-2). Disappointed for all these reasons, she denounces her husband to her son as "unmanly" (ἄνανδρος, 549d6) and "too easy-going" (λίαν ἀνειμένος, 549d7). These recriminations are highly likely to exert on the soul of the young timocratic man an effect contrary to the one produced by his father: instead of stabilizing the precarious state of his soul, they encourage a change towards a new relationship among its three parts. The leadership of the rational part is weakened by the denigration of the only person who fosters it. At the same time, his mother's complaints about a lost status and the appeal for brave behaviour strengthen spirit while the talk of money renders appetite stronger.

A similar effect is caused by the comments made by the house servants. Observing their master's passivity, they encourage the young timocratic man to be more of a man (ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον, 550a1) than his father and to proceed against those who have damaged the family financially or otherwise once he has become an adult (549e2-550a1). Like the mother's, these comments contribute to diminish the role that the rational part plays in the souls of the young timocratic man. While the belittlement of his father further weakens the rational part of his soul, the invitation to behave more bravely strengthens spirit and the prospect of financial reparation renders appetite stronger.

Further agents that contribute to the weakening of the rational part in the soul of the young timocratic man are the gossipers he hears on the street. They slander "the people who mind their own business" (τοὺς μὲν τὰ

αὐτῶν πράττοντας, 550a2) whereas they praise those who are ready to get involved in any kind of affairs. The phrase "the people who mind their own business" suggests why these slanders are detrimental to the rational part of the soul of the young timocratic man. In Book 4 this phrase occurs multiple times to describe the conduct Callipolis' just citizens engage in (433a8, b4, b9) and the behaviour adopted by each part of a just soul (441e1, 442b1, 443b2). By slandering "the people who mind their own business," the gossipers diminish those people who display a type of behaviour reflective of a soul led by the rational part. When heard by the young timocratic man, these slanders are then likely to exert a weaking effect on the rational part of his soul.

The young timocratic man grows up in a fragmented regime in which he is exposed to the contrasting influences of a divided *oikos*. Since these influences are unequal in strength and intensity, they modify the balance among the parts of his soul. Although in his youth his soul is controlled by the rational part, spirit and appetite continue to gain strength and size from the external environment while he grows up.[21] The support that the rational part receives from his father becomes insufficient to balance the increase in size of spirit and appetite fed by his mother, the house servants and the gossipers. As an effect of this incremental growth, spirit breaks the alliance it previously had with reason and begins to lean towards appetite.[22] At this stage, the young timocratic man "settles in the middle and surrenders the rule over himself to the middle part—the victory-loving and spirited part" (550b5-7).[23] The transition is complete. The now fully-fledged timocratic man clearly manifests the main character traits that spirit generates: he is high-minded and ambitious (ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος, 550b7).

Even after spirit has taken control of his soul, the timocratic man continues to display a fragmented and instable character. The main traits of his character clearly reflect the role of leadership that spirit has acquired, but they are complemented by other traits divergent from them and there are still other traits in his character that continue to change. The timocratic man oscillates between being "a lover of ruling and a lover of honor" (549a3-4) and "very obedient to rulers" (549a3), "harsh to his slaves" (549a1) and "gentle to free people" (549a3), "less well trained in music and poetry" (548e4-5) and "a lover of it" (548e5), ready to "love to listen to speeches and arguments" (548e5) and "by no means a rhetorician" (548e5-549a1).[24]

The fragmented character of the timocratic man does not cease to change even after he has reached adulthood and become part of the ruling class of the timocracy. His attitude towards money aptly illustrates it.[25] He is portrayed to "despise money when he's young but [to] love it more and more as he grows older" (549a9-b2). Some aspects of the already described genesis of his character helps us to understand the dynamics of this change. In his early childhood, the young timocratic man is open to the influence of a father who does not proceed against those who cause financial damage to the family. Observing his father's behaviour, the young timocratic man learns to attach little importance to money. While growing up, he keeps hearing his mother and the house servants level criticism at a father who prefers to accept financial losses over actively taking action against the debtors. Along with a sense of revenge, the timocratic man begins to develop a growing attachment to money. When he becomes an adult, his desire for money is likely to have become quite intense while his childhood memories have

not vanished completely. The environment of a regime in which spirit, not appetite, is dominant completes the process of shaping the attitude towards money of the timocratic man. Forbidden to acquire wealth openly, he grows an even stronger attachment to money and directs this conservative impulse towards the money he has himself amassed. The concomitant memory of a time when he saw his father treat money lightly remains alive in his mind and preserves in him a taste for wild expenses as long as the money used for them is not his own.

CONCLUSION

If I have defended my thesis convincingly, I hope to have shown that the timocratic ruler and the timocratic regime are instances of the instability caused by the deterioration of the elements forming the virtuous cycle that links the good nature and the good education of the rulers in Callipolis. The timocracy is a fragmented regime and its nature is mirrored by the fragmented and unstable character of its rulers. Formed after the disintegration of Callipolis, the timocracy displays three levels of fragmentation. First, it includes relics from a previous order, elements anticipating the subsequent regime and a few elements peculiar to itself. Second, the emergence of the *oikos* disintegrates the sense of unity that bound the members of the ruling class in Callipolis. Third, the *oikos* in which the timocratic man grows up is itself split into different factions that exert contrasting influences on him. Living under these conditions, the timocratic man comes to reflect the fragmentation of the environment surrounding him. The character he develops reveals contrasting traits and is subject to steady change.

The analysis of the timocracy I have presented in this paper contributes to the growing interest in the corrupt regimes described in the Books 8 and 9 of Plato's *Republic*. It focuses specifically on one regime and proposes a detailed discussion of how a phenomenon common to all the four corrupt regimes unfolds in it: the fragmentation of its society and the instability of its rulers. This phenomenon had already been noted by scholars but not yet made object of in-depth analysis. To complete a detailed description of its manifestation, the results I am presenting in this paper need to be supplemented by the analysis of the phenomenon in the oligarchy, the democracy and the tyranny.

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ENDNOTES

1 Lear 1992.

2 Lear 1992. According to Lear, the existence of a mutual influence between individuals and their surrounding environment plays a key role in providing the foundation for the city-soul analogy because it creates the isomorphism between the city and the soul that is the ultimate basis for the analogy between them. Ferrari 2003 rejects the view that there is an isomorphism between the city and the soul, and he denies that the process of externalization described by Lear plays a role in explaining what in his view is merely an analogical relationship between the city and the soul. As he maintains, "internalization is never invoked in order to ground the city-soul analogy" (52) and "the text does not permit us to break through the barrier of the parallelism to a direct causal-psychological connection with the corresponding societies" (52). However, Socrates explicitly says at 435d8-436a4 and at 544d5-e2 that the habits of a city derive from the behavioural patterns of the citizens inhabiting it. If, following Ferrari, we translate the clause "οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται" (544e1-2) "[the characters of the people who live in the city] which tip the scale, as it were, taking the rest with them," and we take the clause to "express the generalization that individual characters in a city outweigh every other factor when it comes to determining the overall character of the city" (49), we may be left wondering whether the characteristics of a city are transmitted to it by its ruling class or by other groups of people. However, it remains difficult to deny that the lines immediately preceding this clause ("Or do you think that constitutions are born 'from oak or rock' and not from the characters of the people who live in the cities governed by them?," 544d5-e1) as well as the passage 435d8-436a4, quoted below, state that the characteristics of a constitution are transmitted to it by the people who inhabit the city, however this transmission takes place and whatever group of people within a city does the transmitting.

3 Lear 1992, 186-190.

4 In the *Republic* the term "guardians" indicates the members of Callipolis' ruling class before the philosophers are separated from the auxiliaries (374e1, 374e9, 375a3, and passim). In this paper I will use this term to indicate the philosophers and the auxiliaries collectively even after they have been divided into two different classes.

5 Lear 1992, 190-193.

6 Ferrari 2003 denies that the philosopher's ordering of the city according to the model provided by the forms involves externalization. Instead, he argues, "they [the philosophers] look to the forms directly, and regulate the city after that pattern, just as they look to that pattern to regulate their own souls (484c, 500d, 501b) […] Philosophers do not serve up to the city the rational order of the forms that they have cooked in their souls. The twin procedures of regulating oneself and one's city are lifelong and go on at the same remove from the forms" (101-102). But the identity between the habits of the city and the habits of the philosophers exists irrespective of whether it reflects an external model. Even if they order the city by looking at the forms, the philosophers have first shaped their souls after the pattern of the forms. Moreover, whatever the original pattern is, the identity between the customs in the city and those in the philosophers' souls is a direct effect of their activity.

7 Unless otherwise stated, the translations of Plato's *Republic* are from Grube 1992.

8 Despite the alternative proposal of Ferrari 2003 (see footnote 4), I leave Grube and Reeve's translation unchanged because it is perfectly possible (as

Ferrari acknowledges) and it yields a sense coherent with the view I am endorsing.

9   Lear 1992, 195-197. The process of externalization described by Lear can be seen as providing a foundation to Williams' predominant section rule according to which "a city is F if and only if its leading, most influential, or predominant citizens are F" (Williams 2006, 112).

10   Lear 1992, 197-207.

11   See Reeve 1998, 260 for some considerations on how this cycle unfolds at its very early stages, when its two components are not yet in an optimal state. When a philosopher acquires a position of leadership in a not well governed city, his soul too has a level of harmony inferior to the ever increasing one it will reach after he has started to order the city and the virtuous cycle between nature and education has been established.

12   For an account of the concept of *mousike* and its significance in Greek culture see Koller 1963, 5–16.

13   Annas 1981, 295 questions the choice of the four corrupt regimes used in the *Republic* to illustrate the degeneration of justice. First, she laments that it is left unclear whether this choice is normative or intended to describe historic realities. Second, she argues that the choice of these four regimes is arbitrary and the parallel description of the corrupts regimes and the corrupt men requires the problematic assumption that corruption takes the same form in regimes and people. Irrespective of considerations about the arbitrariness of the instances chosen for description, Irwin 1995, 281-282 observes that the analysis of the corrupt souls complements the description of the behaviour of the just soul, previously left incomplete in important respects due to the absence of a fully articulated account of the Form of the Good.

14   Frede 2011, 202. Annas 1981, 295 maintains that the transition from Callipolis to the timocracy and from a corrupt regime to the next is presented as a historical process. On a very different line, Frede 2011 argues that the aim pursued by Plato in describing the stages of the decline of the just city is to illustrate the *Idealtypen* created on the political and on the individual levels by the set of corrupt values dominating in each of the four cases analysed.

15   The timocracy is also called by Socrates "timarchy" (545b8, 550d2) and "Cretan or Laconian" constitution (544c3, 545a3). For a discussion of the relation between the timocracy, Sparta, its idealisations in the Sparta-like city of Magnesia described in the Plato's *Laws*, see Calabi 2005, 282-293.

16   Calabi 2005, 278-279 maintains that the fragmented character of the timocracy is caused by the prevalence of spirit, which inherently oscillates between obedience to reason and indulgence to appetite. But fragmentation is not an exclusive characteristic of the timocracy. While spirit undeniably has the ability to follow either reason or appetite depending on

the education it has received, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny are also marked by conflicts between opposing values.

17   The inability to identify the appropriate moment for reproduction is presented as a consequence of the philosophers' failure to establish "the geometrical number" (546c7) that regulates the cycle of human fertility. This failure is in turn interpreted by Annas 1981 as a sign that "Plato is symbolically expressing the idea that no ideal can ever fully be realized" (296). Vegetti 2005 argues that the guardians' failure suggests the impossibility of subjecting an entity existing in the realm of becoming to a complete rational control (144-145). Campese 2005, 191-192 follows a similar line. For recent attempts to determine the numerical value of the "geometrical number," see Blössner 1999, 10-86 and Callataÿ 2005, 172-176.

18   The mention of the golden, the silver, the bronze and the iron races refers back to the Noble Lie, which Socrates introduces in Book 3 (415a-c) to instil in Callipolis' citizens a sense of fraternity through their belief in the common descendance from the earth while at the same time providing a justification for the existence of different classes. While the Noble Lie does not contain an explicit mention of Hesiod, the addition of the words "which are Hesiod's [sc. races] and your own" in Book 8 (547a) invites the reader to compare and contrast the Platonic and the Hesiod myths. Calabi 2005, 265-268 provides an analysis of similarities and divergences between the two mythological narratives. For a view of the Noble Lie as an ideological tool aimed to advance a sense of unity among the citizens without consideration for equality see Schofield 2009.

19   Following Williams' predominant section rule and Lear's view (see footnote 3), I maintain that the timocratic ruler and the timocratic man are one and the same person and that the timocracy is ruled by individuals with timocratic souls, i.e. a soul led by spirit. Accordingly, by "young timocratic man" I refer to the same person who will be part of the ruling class of the timocracy when he becomes an adult. On a very different line, Ferrari 2003 argues that the rulers of the timocracy cannot be correctly identified as individuals possessing souls led by spirit. Since he contends that "the description of the various societies and the corresponding individuals run on parallel but entirely separate tracks" (50-51), he denies that the city-soul analogy can dictate that the rulers of a regime have souls corresponding to that regime. However, I believe (see footnote 23) that a comparison between the character traits of the timocratic man and those of the timocratic ruler confirms that, at least in the case of the timocracy, it is correct to identify the rulers with individuals possessing souls corresponding to the regime they rule.

20   Campese 2005, 202-210 highlights similarities between the portrayals of the *oikos* in which the young

timocratic man grows up and the representations given of it in the Old Comedy and in the New Comedy. E.g., in Aristophanes' *Clouds* we see a contrast between an ambitious wife and her less competitive husband, and a conflict between a father and his son eager to climb the social ladder. Slaves are portrayed to disparage their master or allay with his son and his wife to plot against him in Menander's *Epitrepontes*, *Aspis* and *Perikeiromene*.

21   Since the control over his soul is said to be handed over to spirit only at 550b5-7, it is natural to assume that his soul was previously controlled, albeit feebly, by reason.

22   Socrates clarifies in Book 4 (441e3-442b3) that the alliance between spirit and reason is instrumental to keeping appetite in check, thus ensuring that reason retains the role of leadership it occupies in a virtuous soul.

23   Irwin 1995, 285 maintains that the phrase "[the timocratic young man] surrenders the rule over himself to the middle part—the victory-loving and spirited part" gives an indication that the takeover of the leadership over the soul by spirit involves an agent other than spirit. He argues (287-288) that the ability to choose which part of the soul or which set of desires assumes the leadership over the soul is retained by reason, even when it abdicates its role of leadership due to a malfunctioning caused by a previous imbalance.

24   A survey of the character traits of the timocratic man shows close similarities with those of the timocratic ruler. The timocratic ruler is part of a group of men who are "more naturally suited for war than peace" (547e4-548a1) just as the timocratic man "doesn't base his claim to rule on his ability as a speaker or anything like that, but […] on his abilities and exploits in warfare and warlike activities" (549a4-7). Both of them are far from reaching the intellectual heights of Callipolis' philosophers. As the timocratic rulers are "simpler people" (547e3) who have "neglected the true Muse—that of discussion and philosophy," (548b8-c2) so the timocratic man is "less well trained in music and poetry" (548e4-5) and fails to behave "as an adequately educated person does" (549a2). If this comparison is convincing, it seems plausible to me to identify the timocratic man with the timocratic ruler. After the objections of Ferrari 2003, a systematic identification of the ruler of a regime with the man possessing the soul corresponding to that regime requires an extensive argument that includes, among other things, evidence that their identification is supported by the similarity of their descriptions also in the case of the oligarchy, the democracy and the tyranny. But it seems safe at this stage to conclude that at least the timocracy is governed by timocratic men, i. e. rulers who have souls led by spirit.

25   Ferrari 2003 detects a difference in the attitude towards money between the timocratic rulers and the timocratic man and considers this difference a clear reason for rejecting their identification with one another. As he observes, the timocratic rulers are "secretive and stingy with their money, and passionate about it (548a-b); the timocratic man, by contrast, begins by being openly contemptuous of it in his youth and ends by openly enjoying it (547d)" (66). However, the text does not say that the way in which the aging timocratic man enjoys money is open. It says that the timocratic man will "love it more and more as he grows older" (549b1-2). On this basis the description of the timocratic rulers and that of the timocratic man can be seen as agreeing on a central point and supplying further details that do not seem mutually incompatible. Both the timocratic man and the timocratic rulers are said to love money. Details are added on the secretive manner in which timocratic rulers have to deal with money in a regime that, being centred on the pursuit of honour, can be easily expected to display an ambivalent attitude towards money. Non inconsistently with this information, the timocratic man is said to develop an interest in money that increases with age, but not ever to put a love for money at the top of the hierarchy of his values. If this consideration is plausible, the attitude towards money is not an objection against identifying the timocratic ruler with the timocratic man or maintaining that the timocracy is ruled by timocratic men.

The distinction between knowledge and opinion in *Rep*. 477c1-478a6

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ABSTRACT

Plato's argument in *Rep*. 5, 477c1-478a6, proves that knowledge (*epistēmē*) is a power different from opinion (*doxa*), and their objects are different in kind, too. This claim by itself would probably have been rejected by the so-called 'sight-lovers', i.e. people who deny the existence of Forms, so the argument uses premises that the sight-lovers would admit as true and self-evident, in order to convince them. My paper engages in the debate concerning the appropriate reading of these premises, and explains why the sight-lovers should accept something they previously would not.

One of the most puzzling things in Plato's *Rep.* 5 is his claim that *doxa*, which is usually translated as 'belief' or 'opinion', is a power different in kind from *epistēmē*, knowledge, and their objects are different in kind, too (477b, 478a).[1] These claims contradict with our common sense. In the *Meno*, for example, knowledge seems to be a subset of belief, since knowledge is true belief 'bounded with reason' (*Men.* 98a). Accordingly, someone might believe without knowing what someone else fully knows, e.g. the Pythagorean Theorem: in both cases the object of knowledge and opinion is the same. So, why does Plato assert such a counter-intuitive claim in *Rep.* 5?

Any answer to this question should take the context into account. Socrates distinguishes two different groups of people, the philosophers and the so-called 'sight-lovers', to show that only the first ones possess knowledge in general, while the others do not. Unlike philosophers, the sight-lovers seem to be ordinary people who reject the existence of Forms and trust only their senses as a means to learn what the beautiful, the pious, the good etc. are (476b4-7, 479a1-4). We have good reasons to assume that in 476e-480a Plato presents a deductive argument that is addressed particularly to these ordinary people (see, e.g., 476d7-e8; 478e7-479a5), so as to show them that they lack knowledge and have nothing but opinions, and therefore that they are unsuitable for ruling. This assumption has been called 'the Dialectical Requirement' by G. Fine (1999, p. 217), a term which I shall adopt from now on. But if Plato aims to convince *them* that they lack knowledge, it means, firstly, that the sight-lovers are able to follow a deductive argument, and secondly, that its premises must be understandable and acceptable by them.

In this paper I will take the Dialectical Requirement for granted and assume that

Glaucon, the interlocutor of Socrates, plays the role of a sight-lover's spokesman (476e7-9). I shall not focus on the whole argument, nor on an analysis of what sort of entities the objects of knowledge and opinion are. Instead, I will focus only on a part of the argument which proves the distinction between knowledge and opinion as well as between their objects (477c1-478a6). My aim is to engage in the debate over this controversial topic and to propose a reasonable interpretation. I shall show that the conclusions of this short argument are dialectical and necessary given the premises. To do this, I shall examine the premises themselves by considering that they are supposed to be adopted by any sight-lover. In accordance with scholars like J. Moss (2021), and contrary to scholars like G. Fine (1999), I will assume that when Plato talks about the objects of knowledge and opinion, he refers to things, instead of propositional contents.

From 476e7 and on Socrates elicits statements that a sight-lover supposedly asserts. A few lines later, however, Glaucon affirms willingly and without any question that:

A) Opinion is a power different from the power of knowledge. (477b6-7)
B) Whatever opinion is set over, it is different from whatever knowledge is set over, according to the power of each. (477b8-10)

Is it possible that the sight-lovers would eagerly take (A) and (B) as self-evident premises? Evidently not. Immediately after 477b10, Socrates asks Glaucon whether knowledge is set over being and knows it as it is (477b11-12), but he does not wait for his reply. Suddenly, he pauses and presents an argument which deductively proves (A) and (B). Only after proving (A) and (B) will Socrates repeat the question

whether knowledge is set over being and knows it as it is (478a7). This digression, an argument within an argument, shows that Plato takes (A) and (B) not as self-evident claims, but as something that cannot be accepted by the sight-lovers without proof. Apparently Glaucon has violated the Dialectical Requirement by affirming both (A) and (B). Socrates' argument in 477c1-478a6 restores the Dialectical Requirement by using premises that a sight-lover would accept as true, as we shall see.

I think that the argument addressed to the sight-lovers uses the well-known Socratic method. The usual pattern of this method reveals that Socrates' interlocutors are unaware of the logical consequences of some of their beliefs, which contradict with some other beliefs that they possess, but at least they are able to follow an argument, and they would never affirm an obvious contradiction. An interlocutor initially asserts that he believes that *p*. Then, after Socrates' questions, we learn that he also believes that *q* and *r*, but the combination of *q* and *r* logically leads to *not-p*. So, the interlocutor simultaneously believed *p*, *q* and *r*, without realizing that whoever accepts *q* and *r* must also accept *not-p*. Since he is able to grasp the logical necessity of the argument, and since he is not willing to abandon premises *q* and *r*, he is then forced to reject *p* and to adopt *not-p*. If the same method is applied here, and if the aim of the argument is to destroy some of the sight-lover's core beliefs while at the same time it respects the Dialectical Requirement, then we could reasonably assume that *the conclusions of the argument are the exact opposite of what a sight-lover used to believe* before his confrontation with the argument, while its premises are admitted by a sight-lover as true. If this suggestion is correct, it will help us reconstruct what a sight-lover used to believe on this subject.

So we may assume that the sight-lovers, before their confrontation with the Socratic argument, would not admit that knowledge and opinion are different powers. Their relation to each other is analogous to the relation between good vision and bad vision. Both good and bad vision are one and the same power and they are set over the same kind of things, namely colors, but only the good one accomplishes its *ergon*, i.e. it clearly sees and correctly discerns colors. So, a sight-lover would suggest that we should not take strong vision and weak vision as different powers that are set over the same objects (i.e. colors) but accomplish different things.

As Harte (2018, p. 149) correctly observes, the verb ἀπεργάζομαι "is often found in Plato with its cognate accusative: '*to ergon apergazomai*' (to effect its work or function)", and we should look back in *Rep.* 1 to better comprehend its meaning. In 353a10-11 Socrates says to Thrasymachus that "the function [ἔργον] of each thing is what it alone can do or what it does [ἀπεργάζηται] better than anything else" (transl. Grube-Reeve), while a few lines below he adds that "anything that has a function performs it well [τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται] by means of its own peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice" (353c6-7, transl. Grube-Reeve). The examples he gives in 353b-c are vision and hearing. Any lack or defect of their own particular virtue implies bad performance of their function (κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται, 353c9-10); evidently it does not imply another function. This means that weak vision or hearing does not accomplish anything at all. Accordingly, a sight-lover would think that opinion is bad, weak, or incomplete cognition, while knowledge is perfect, complete cognition. Nevertheless, both knowledge and opinion are set over the

same things: an F may be either the object of knowledge or the object of opinion.

We may assume that the negation of the last conclusion sounded so absurd and counter-intuitive in Plato's time, just as today many scholars find it difficult to accept. We shall see that the aim of Socrates' argument is to lead deductively to this shocking conclusion by using premises that almost anyone would eagerly affirm. Let us see how:

1) Powers belong to a genus of beings which enable us to do what we are able to do and any other thing to do whatever it is able to do. We discriminate what we call 'power' only when we look upon what it is set over and what it accomplishes. (477c1-d3) [P = premise]

2) We call a power 'the same' when it is set over the same thing and accomplishes the same thing. We call a power 'different' when it is set over a different thing and accomplishes something different. (477d2-7) [P]

3) Both knowledge and opinion belong to the genus of powers.[2] (477d8-e4) [P]

4) Knowledge does not accomplish the same with opinion, since knowledge is infallible, while opinion is fallible. (477e7-8) [P]

5) Knowledge and opinion are different powers. (478a1-3) [from 1-4]

6) Knowledge is set over something different from that which opinion is set over. (478a4-6) [from 2 & 5]

According to premise (1), a 'power' is anything by which either men or other things are able to do what they are able to do. Powers are a genus (γένος τι) of beings (τῶν ὄντων). So a sight-lover admits that powers are something real, they exist somehow. Something is called 'power' not based on its color or its figure etc. (477c7), but *solely* (μόνον) on two character traits: a) what it is set over (ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι) *and* b) what it accomplishes (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται) (477d2). Although the second criterion always implies an *ergon*, there is no need to conflate the *ergon* of a power with its objects, as Santas (1973) has shown by criticizing Hintikka's interpretation.[3] This conflation might be meaningful in crafts, since they *produce* their objects (e.g. the *ergon* and the subject of building-craft is the same, namely buildings), but crafts are only a subclass of powers, while other powers such as vision, knowledge and opinion *discover* their objects, which are something different than their *ergon* (cf. *Chrm.* 164a-168d; also Santas, 1973, 41). Socrates gives the examples of the powers of vision and of hearing (477c3). If we apply to them the two character traits of a power, we may legitimately infer that vision is set over visible things and produces cases of seeing, while hearing is set over audible things and produces cases of hearing.

Let us, for now, skip premise (2) and proceed to (3). According to (3) both knowledge and opinion belong to the genus of powers. They are powers because they fall under the general description of a power in (1), i.e. power is that by which we are able to do something: by knowledge we are able to know (478a7), and by opinion we are able to opine (478a9). Since they are powers, there must be something which they are set over and something that they accomplish.[4]

Premise (4) and conclusions (5) and (6) should be examined after seeing what exactly the relevant passage says, because this passage raises a lot of disputes among scholars:

[i] 'But not long ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion are not the same.' [ii] 'How could any rational

man affirm the identity of infallible [ἀναμάρτητον] with what is not infallible [μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ]?' [iii] 'Excellent [Καλῶς]', said I, 'and obvious [δῆλον] is our agreement that opinion is a different thing from knowledge'. 'Yes, different'. [iv] 'Each of them, then [ἄρα], since it is able to do something different, it is set over something different'. 'It is necessary so'. (477e5-478a6, transl. based on Shorey and Rowe, with changes; Latin letters and Greek words in brackets added)

Socrates reminds Glaucon that he took [i] as a premise in 477b6-7. One might suppose that it works also as a premise in the current argument. This, however, would make [iii] an unnecessary repetition, since it says exactly the same thing (cf. Gerson, 2003, p. 156). But the words καλῶς and δῆλον that refer to ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν indicate that [iii] is illuminated and justified in light of [ii], which is an explanation that was apparently a hidden assumption in 477b6-7. This makes [iii] not a premise, but a conclusion derived from [ii] and something else, which I do believe is premise (2), i.e. "we call a power 'the same' when it is set over the same thing and accomplishes the same; we call a power 'different' when it is set over a different thing and accomplishes something different" (477d2-7). Furthermore, [iii] in combination again with (2), leads to the conclusion of [iv] (note ἄρα in 478a4), i.e. that knowledge and opinion are set over different objects. The necessity of the conclusion given the premises is affirmed by Glaucon in 478a6.

Many scholars refuse to accept the soundness of this argument, or to read it this way. The source of the problem is located in premise (2), which can be read in two mutually exclusive ways:

a) If two powers are the same, then they are set over the same thing and they accomplish the same. But if two powers are different, then *either* they are set over different things, *or* they accomplish different things, *or* both.

b) If two powers are the same, then they are set over the same thing and they accomplish the same. But if two powers are different, then they are set over different things *and* they accomplish different things.

Consider that the argument is valid only if we adopt (b), and in the sense that each of the two criteria is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for making two powers same or different.[5] Some scholars, however, either prefer (a), implying that some different powers could be set over the same things, or they admit that (b) is the correct reading of (2), but it is either a false premise, or it is at least a weak one and barely convincing.

Among the scholars who prefer the (a) version are Gosling, Fine, and Harte. Gosling (1968, p. 123-5) rejects (b) by claiming that we should not stress the analogy with the powers of seeing and hearing too far, and he thinks that Plato "thought about [these two character traits] as two ways of getting at the same point". But this view would cancel Socrates' unitary assumption about powers: it would mean that some powers have different objects, while others do not. I will come back to this problem below. Nonetheless, Gosling's reading cannot explain why Plato tries to prove deductively why knowledge and opinion are set over different things. Fine (1999, p. 220) rejects (b) in favor of (a), if we assume that we talk about *things* instead of *propositional contents*, because she takes the second part of (b) (i.e. "But if […] different things") as an

invalid inference derived from its first part (i.e. "If two powers […] accomplish the same").[6] But this is not the case, and we should take (b) in its entirety as a premise for reasons that we will see below.

Among other scholars who think that (b) is the correct reading, although (b) is incorrect or a weak premise, are Cross and Woozley (1964, p. 150-1) and Gerson (2003, p. 155 n. 6). Also, Annas (1981, p. 202) thinks that the two criteria which separate knowledge from opinion "are logically distinct but not in fact separable". This, however, would beg the question: it cannot be self-evident for a sight-lover that these two cognitive powers must have objects different in kind. Moreover, Cooper (1986, p. 231-2) reads the argument that discerns knowledge from opinion and their objects in a way that I think is correct, but he does not clarify whether he takes infallibility and fallibility as two different accomplishments, or not.

The purpose of all the above references is to reveal the difficultness of interpreting the passage under discussion properly, and not to provide a detailed analysis for all of them. Nevertheless, I shall focus on Harte's (2018) reading, because I believe she offers the most plausible defense of (a), while at the same time respects the fact that the text seems to be closer to (b). Then I will explain why it seems evident to me that her reading is wrong.

Harte (2018) suggests that two different powers may have distinct and non-overlapping domains, and yet their respective domains are non-exclusive (p. 147). She relies on two examples taken from *Rep.* 1: the first is found in 346b2-6: "Suppose a navigator, while exercising the skill of navigation, came to be healthy as a result of being relevantly advanced by sailing" (p. 151). Medicine and navigation are skills, and any skill is a sub-class of pow-

ers (p. 151). Their domains are distinct and non-overlapping, and yet, as the example shows, they are not mutually exclusive, since navigation is set over a part of medicine's domain. Accordingly, as Socrates says in 346b11, medicine might be profitable, so in this case its domain is set over the domain of money-earning, although it is not medicine's own domain (and the same is true if we contrast money-earning with shepherding, ruling etc.).

The second example that Harte offers is taken from 353a, and its meaning is that "an *ergon* is unique only in the sense that it is uniquely specialized" (p. 152), but not in the absolute sense; "[t]he ergon of a pruning knife is pruning", but "[m]any kinds of knife can be used to prune" (p. 152). Harte calls these cases 'atypical results' of powers (pp. 153-61). Accordingly, the atypical result of belief is to be set over Forms, and the atypical result of knowledge is to be set over sensibles. On this point Harte follows Fine (1999, p. 227), and finds the first case in 506c6-7, where Socrates "implies that he has beliefs without knowledge regarding the Form of the Good" (p. 156), and the second case in 520c1-5, which describes the philosopher's return to the cave and his ability "to exercise knowledge (*gnōsesthe*, c4) of the 'images' (*eidōla*, c4)" (p. 156).[7]

I do believe, however, that none of the examples Harte appeals to proves that two different powers might under certain conditions be set over the same things (or domains). It is not navigation that (atypically) results in good health; rather, it is medicine that unintentionally has been applied. A doctor would suggest to the sick navigator to expose himself to open sea air, not to navigate a ship. Accordingly, navigation as such has nothing to do with a navigator's health condition or the quality of air that he is exposed to. The example shows only that *the same person exercises simultane-*

ously two different powers, one intentionally (navigation), the other unintentionally (medical treatment), and each of them has its own distinct and exclusive domain. The first has as its object the sailing of a ship, the second has as its object someone's health condition. Hence, the particular example does not show that one power is (atypically or not) applied to the domain of another. What is common in both domains is the person, not the power.[8] The fact that the domains of two different *erga* / powers are mutually exclusive is evident in Plato's text when we come to the examples of money-earning on the one side and medicine, ruling and the rest of the skills on the other side (346b-d). It is not medicine or ruling that (atypically) results in profit; rather it is the skill of money-earning that it is applied *in addition to* (προσχρῆσθαι, 346c10) the other skills. Again: one and the same person exercises two different powers.

The second example in 353a is unsuitable to prove Harte's claim, because knives are not powers, but tools by means of which we exercise powers. It is as if we confuse the power of vision with the eyes. Harte (2018, p. 152) tries to overcome this problem by emphasizing the *ergon* of the knife, instead of the knife itself, but this does not make things better. Pruning with a pruning knife and pruning with a knife of another sort are not two different *erga* / powers. In both cases the *ergon* is one and the same, namely pruning, and the tools you choose determine whether you perfectly accomplish this *ergon* or not, just like the health condition of an eye determines whether you perfectly exercise the power of vision or not. Moreover, the context of 506c reveals that Socrates' opinion is not set over the Good itself, but over an image / an appearance of it that takes the same name.[9] The fact that Socrates claims that there must be a Form of

the Good does not prove that he knows what it is. Finally, the verb γνώσεσθε in 520c4 has the non-technical meaning of 'to recognize' and it refers to the correlation between images and their corresponding Forms, hence it does not have the same meaning that it has in *Rep.* 475e-480a (Gerson, 2003, p. 165 n. 22; Moss, 2021, p. 21 n. 16).

If infallibility and fallibility do not refer to two different accomplishments, then either we should take only infallibility as an accomplishment and fallibility as a bad performance of one and the same cognitive power, or we should take neither of them as an accomplishment, but as a third trait that belongs to knowledge and opinion respectively, different in kind from the accomplishments and the objects of these powers. The first option must be rejected, because it does not prove that knowledge and opinion are different powers, but it proves quite the opposite (as we've seen in a similar case of good vs. bad vision). The second option has been chosen by Hestir, who takes infallibility and fallibility as a third trait of knowledge and opinion respectively, different in kind from their work or their objects, and he assumes that the distinction between knowledge and opinion derives from this difference, because "[p]resumably this follows from an appeal to something like Leibniz's Law" (Hestir, 2000, p. 315, p. 329 n. 12 and n. 13). As a result, he infers that the conclusion "belief [= opinion] and knowledge do something different" does not derive from the premises "and cannot if it is to avoid circularity" (Hestir, 2000, p. 316). The problem, however, lies not in Plato's argument, but in Hestir's reconstruction of it: his reconstruction overlooks the crucial passage 477d3-7 (i.e. the second premise in my reconstruction of Plato's argument), and this omission completely distorts Plato's syllogistic

steps. Nevertheless, the second option must be rejected because it contradicts with the first premise of the argument, which affirms that "we discriminate what we call 'power' *only* when we look upon what it is set over and what it accomplishes" (477c1-d3). This means that there is no other way to discern a power from anything else apart from its accomplishment or the things it is set over.

Since *Rep.* 477e5-478a6 affirms that the distinction between knowledge and opinion is drawn due to the distinction between infallibility and fallibility, and since they are not the objects of these two powers, then infallibility and fallibility can be nothing but two different accomplishments. But why should a sight-lover accept this claim? We assumed before that he takes for granted that only knowledge has an accomplishment while opinion is a bad performance of one and the same cognitive power. So it has to be implied that there is something in the meaning of 'infallible' and 'fallible' that forces a sight-lover to admit that they are two different accomplishments.[10]

As Vlastos (1985, p. 12-13) has correctly noticed, the adjective 'infallible' (ἀναμάρτητον, 477e7) can be read in two ways: a) that which never fails, or b) that which is impossible to fail, and the last reading seems to be the correct one in our case. Accordingly, the adjective 'fallible' (τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ, e7) might mean either c) that which sometimes fails, or d) that which is not impossible to fail. We should notice that (b) implies (a), but (d) does not imply only (c); it implies (a) as well. For example, I might throw arrows that always find their target, even if it is by mere luck, which means that there is nothing that guarantees that I will not fail in a subsequent shot. The (c) version of 'fallible' cannot be an accomplishment, but the (d) version of 'fallible' can be, if my good luck always guides my arrows to their target.

Yet, (d) is different from (b), since my luck is not impossible to fail.

Even a sight-lover, who might never have contemplated the nature of knowledge and opinion, would affirm that someone can find the correct answer of a problem without being an expert in the given subject. For example, a young student may guess the correct answer of a mathematical problem through sheer luck, or by a kind of inspiration. A sight-lover would also affirm, though, that the student's accomplishment is not infallible in the sense that nothing guarantees that her luck or her inspiration will be correct in the next challenge. On the contrary, an expert's accomplishment is not due to luck or any kind of inspiration. It must be something different, and whatever it might be, it must be infallible (cf. Vlastos, 1985, p. 13 n. 32).

In *Prt.* 319b-c, for example, Socrates mentions that the Athenians in public gatherings take into consideration only the advice of experts concerning a subject of their expertise, but they laugh at or get angry with non-experts who publicly express their own opinions. We might assume that the Athenians do so not because they think that non-experts always say false things, but because the non-expert's pronouncements are always based on something 'fallible'. Hence, there is no guarantee that their pronouncements are correct or wrong. Similarly, in *Euthphr.* 3c1-4, Euthyphro complains: "Whenever I speak of divine matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. Nevertheless, they envy all of us who do this." (transl. by Grube). Even if we accept that his assertion "I have foretold nothing that did not happen" is true, we know well that his following 'soothsaying' in 3e4-5 is false, since he 'predicts' that Socrates' trial will have a

happy ending. On the contrary, an expert's advice is always based on something that is supposed to be infallible. In *Rep.* 340d-341a, for example, Thrasymachus asserts that an expert *qua* expert never fails.

Hence, since even non-philosophers admit that achieving infallible results is a different accomplishment from achieving fallible ones (premise 4), then the sight-lover has to accept the valid inference that knowledge and opinion are two different powers (conclusion 5). But since knowledge and opinion are two different powers, a sight-lover must also admit that they are set over different objects (conclusion 6). This conclusion is deductively derived from premise (2) (i.e. "we call a power 'the same' when it is set over the same thing and accomplishes the same; we call a power 'different' when it is set over a different thing and accomplishes something different") and (5) (i.e. "knowledge and opinion are different powers"). Glaucon provides a recapitulation of the argument when Socrates asks him (numbers in brackets indicate the enumeration of the statements of the argument):

> 'Does it opine the same thing that knowledge knows, and will the knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?' 'Impossible by our admissions', he [i.e. Glaucon] said. 'Since different powers are naturally set over different objects (2), and since both knowledge and opinion are powers (3), but each different from the other (5), as we've said, these admissions do not leave place for the identity of the knowable and the opinable (6)'. (478a11--b2, transl. by Shorey with changes)

So, since the sight-lover has accepted (2) and (5), and provided that he recognizes the logical necessity of a deductive argument, he has to accept (6) as well. However, someone could raise another question against the most controversial premise, i.e. premise (2): Why would a sight-lover accept (2) as a universal rule without exceptions? Someone might accuse Glaucon that "he has allowed a misleadingly incomplete induction", as Stokes (1992, p. 120) points out.[11] In the case of premise (1), when Socrates talks about powers in general, he brings vision and hearing as characteristic examples: obviously they are both set over different objects, since vision cannot see sounds and hearing cannot hear colors. But why should we infer from these two examples that *every* single power is set over objects different from those of any other power?

I think that this is a characteristic case of Socratic *epagoge* (ἐπαγωγή), which is not to be identified with modern induction. The persuasive power of *epagoge* is not grounded in the sufficient number of cases that are used as premises, but in the kind of premises that Socrates uses. As Robinson (1941, p. 36-8) has pointed out, two or three examples used as premises is the commonest number that Socrates uses when he applies this method, and Plato has never made any distinction between enumerative and intuitive induction. Therefore Socrates and his interlocutors treat premises of the form 'X is A and B', 'Y is A and B' etc. as characteristic cases that set the ground for the conclusion 'all As are Bs'.

Let us take for instance *Prt.* 332c3-9. On the basis of only three examples, namely the pairs beautiful-ugly, good-bad, shrill tone-deep tone, Socrates derives the general conclusion that "for each thing that belongs to opposites, there is only one opposite". Similarly, vision and hearing are sufficient examples to convince someone that every different power is set over different objects and accomplishes different things, not because

they are numerically adequate, but because they represent sufficiently what a power is. But even if one demands more examples, all the cases of crafts-powers taken from *Rep.*1 lead to the same conclusion.[12]

There is only one dramatic persona in Plato's dialogues who has seriously attempted to question the Socratic *epagoge*, and this is Critias in the *Charmides*. In this dialogue we read that Critias constantly denies that temperance (σωφροσύνη) has any similarity with any other kind of knowledge, or power, or anything else, aiming to defuse any *epagoge* that would probably lead him to contradiction (see *Chrm.* 165e, 166b-c, 168a). But when Socrates finally asked him to classify temperance and to explain why such classification is true (169a-c), Critias was captured by *aporia* (169c6). Accordingly in the *Republic*, if knowledge and opinion were *powers of a different kind* than the rest of the powers, the onus of proof would be on the sight-lovers, and, as many similar cases from Plato's dialogues show, we have good reasons to assume that they would fail to do so (cf. Stokes, 1992, p. 121).

Hence, the sight-lovers are now forced by the implication of their own beliefs (i.e. premises 1-4) to reject their previous assumption that knowledge and opinion are one and the same power that is set over the same objects, like, e.g., strong and weak vision is set over colors. Socrates will use it to prove that the sight-lovers have only opinions and therefore their objects of contemplation differ in kind from the objects of knowledge. A presentation, though, of the whole argument would go beyond the purpose of this paper.[13]

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ENDNOTES

1   Here and below I follow Sling's edition.

2   There is no need to stretch the argument in a way that takes (3) as a conclusion derived from (1) and passage 477e3-4 for opinion plus a hidden assumption analogous with 477e3-4 for knowledge, as Santas (1973, p. 46-7) does. The words τιθεῖς in 477d9 (for knowledge) and οἴσομεν (future tense of φέρω) in e2 show that Socrates takes (3) as a premise. Glaucon's rhetorical question in 477e3-4 ("what else makes us capable of opining, if not opinion?", transl. by Rowe slightly modified) asserts the second part of premise (3), namely 'opinion belongs to the genus of powers'; it is not a further premise.

3   Prince (2014) also supports what he calls 'the Identity Reading', namely that the two criteria are in final analysis one, i.e. they refer to one and the same thing in two different ways. This reading, however, cannot follow Socrates' argument properly: why would Socrates bother to search for what opinion is set over, since he has already found the way in which opinion is different from knowledge (478a)? Moreover, the Identity Reading is totally incompatible with what Plato says about powers in *Rep.* 6: hearing and its object, voice, are two different kinds (507c10-d2), and accordingly vision and colors (507d10-e1; cf. also 508c5, where the presence of a color is stated as something totally independent from the power of seeing). See also *Rep.* 7, 524a1-3, where the crucial phrase 'to be set over something' which is expressed with ἐπί + dative refers clearly to something different from a power or its accomplishment.

4   Glaucon calls knowledge "the most powerful [ἐρρωμενεστάτην] among all powers" (477e1) without further explanation, but it is reasonable according to the context, to assume that a sight-lover would agree with it: knowledge is -among other things- the most important attribute for ruling; cf. *Rep.* 3, 402b9-c8, and *Rep.* 6, 484c4-d6.

5   Boylu (2011, p. 114) has correctly shown that "each condition is both necessary and sufficient for setting two powers apart since it entails the other condition", while any other reading of the (b) version makes the argument invalid.

6   Therefore, Fine favors the content-based reading of this statement which avoids invalidity. Cf. also Baltzly, 1997, p. 262.

7   Similarly, Kamtekar, 2008, p. 140-3; Smith, 2019, p. 64. For a much shorter but similar approach to Harte's thesis see Schwab, 2016, p. 47-50. For another view against Harte's thesis, see Moss, 2021, p. 80.

8   Someone might object that exercising an ergon / a power presupposes knowledge, as for example Aristotle states, but this cannot exclude the assumption that one and the same person can be both a navigator and a doctor. Even in this case their reaction would be exactly the same. In any case, the issue here is not what someone knows, but what someone does, since any power, as premise (1) affirms, is identified according to its object and result, not to its agent's state of mind.

9   Cf. the Sun Analogy, especially line 509a9; also Gerson, 2003, p. 164-5 and p. 172.

10   Although Boylu (2011, p. 119-20) has correctly noticed that infallibility and fallibility must refer to the one of the two criteria that discern knowledge from opinion, she wrongly assumes that infallibility is associated with perfect cognitive contact while fallibility with imperfect cognitive contact with their respective objects. But this assumption takes something imperfect as an accomplishment (which is contradictory in terms); otherwise it cannot explain why these two powers (knowledge and opinion) are not analogous with e.g. a perfect and an imperfect vision which are set over the same things, namely colors.

11   Nevertheless, Stokes rejects such a suggestion.

12   See, for example, *Rep.* 340d-e (an epagoge made by Thrasymachus), and *Rep.* 341c-342c.

13   I am grateful to Alexander Nehamas and Christos Panayides for the intriguing discussion and their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Demosthenes Patramanis for his useful remarks.

Pleasure and Subjectivity in the Republic IX 'Authority Argument' (580d3-583a10)

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ABSTRACT

I argue that the *Republic* IX 'Authority Argument' (580d3-583a10) embraces both subjectivity of hedonic experience and objectivity of hedonic character. This combination of views undermines the interpretations of both the argument's main critics and its main defenders. A more adequate interpretation, drawing on the idea of inapt hedonic experiences which fail to reflect the pleasantness of their objects, points towards a reassessment of the Argument's place in the sequence ending Bk. IX. On the view presented here, the 'Authority Argument' is not a stand-alone argument, but depends on the 'Olympian Argument' that follows it.

Keywords: Plato, Pleasure, Republic, Subjectivity

In Bk. IX of the *Republic*, Socrates gives two successive, seemingly independent arguments for the claim that the life of a Philosopher is the most pleasant. In the first—which I shall call the Authority Argument—Socrates presents a debate about the pleasure of different lives, and cites the Philosopher's authoritative judgment, based in greater experience, wisdom, and reason, to conclude that the Philosopher's life is most pleasant (*R.* IX 580d3-583a10). Though the argument has both critics and defenders, there is one point on which interpreters generally agree: the argument does not seriously consider the subjectivity of pleasure.[1] Against this consensus, I show that the subjectivity of pleasure, in at least one sense, is central to Plato's purposes in the Authority Argument. This will lead to a reappraisal of the argument, and its place in the sequence of arguments that end Bk. IX of the *Republic*.

Since the terms 'subjective' and 'subjectivity' are used in multiple ways, it will be useful to disambiguate two main alternatives at the start. In saying that pleasure is subjective, we might mean that different people experience pleasure differently, taking pleasure in different activities, or in the same activities in different ways or to different degrees. These differences may be idiosyncratic, as between individuals' favorite ice cream flavors, or they may hold between types of people. Alternately, in saying that pleasure is subjective we might make the stronger claim that there is no fact of the matter about how pleasant an object of enjoyment is. Notably, these two alternatives approach pleasure as a subject differently: the first is primarily about variations in the experience of pleasure, that is, in *enjoyment*. The second is primarily about pleasure as a putative characteristic of objects and activities, that is, as *pleasantness*.[2] In what follows,

I will refer to the first conception as *subjectivity of hedonic experience*, and the second as *subjectivity of hedonic character*.

In the first part of this paper, I'll show that in the Authority Argument Socrates embraces the *subjectivity of hedonic experience*, highlighting systematic variations in the patterns of enjoyment of different types of people, and rejects the *subjectivity of hedonic character*, insofar as the argument asserts that there is an objectively correct ranking of activities with respect to their pleasantness, and a single most pleasant human life. This combination of claims undermines the interpretations of the Authority Argument's critics and defenders alike. Though critics incorrectly allege that Plato neglects the subjectivity of pleasure, one of their main complaints about the argument is strengthened by his recognition of the *subjectivity of hedonic experience*. Specifically, critics have urged that the argument's reliance on the Philosopher's more extensive experience is spurious, since the Philosopher cannot experience other people's pleasures. Responding to this charge, the argument's defenders have asserted that Socrates is considering long-term patterns of activity or whole lives. What is most pleasant on this scale, they claim, is not a matter of subjective preference; wider experience and better rational calculation ground an authoritative judgment about which life is most pleasant. As I'll argue in the second section, though, this defense fails because the subjective variations in experience which Socrates recognizes range over all of a person's activities, and persist for their whole life. There is no straightforward sense in which the Philosopher can have more extensive experience of the *lives* being compared. Nor is it plausible to assert, as the argument's defenders do, that non-Philosophers simply miscalculate the overall quantity of pleasure

offered by their own lives in comparison to the Philosopher's.

To arrive at a coherent reading of the Authority Argument, we must directly investigate how Plato can coherently maintain *the objectivity of hedonic character* alongside his recognition of *the subjectivity of hedonic experience*. These views are compatible if one regards the experience of pleasure as a fallible gauge of the hedonic character of its object. An experience of pleasure can, on this view, more or less accurately reflect the pleasantness of its object. In the final section, I'll show that an account of this kind is suggested by the criteria on rational authority forwarded in the Authority Argument. It will turn out, however, that a full explication of these criteria requires a *theory* of both the experience of pleasure, where subjectivity resides, on one hand, and the objective hedonic character of any object or activity on the other. Such accounts are not on offer in the Authority Argument; they are provided only in the Olympian Argument that follows, as I will outline in my concluding remarks. Thus, although the Authority Argument presents Plato's position, it does not stand alone. Properly understood, it is dependent on the theoretical account worked out in the Olympian Argument.

I. OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE AUTHORITY ARGUMENT

Critics and defenders of the Authority Argument agree that Plato does not seriously consider the subjectivity of pleasure. Against this consensus, I'll first show that the argument embraces both hedonic objectivity and hedonic subjectivity of a kind. Plato does this by centering the Authority Argument on a debate between three basic human types, each ruled by a different part of the soul: the Money-Lover ruled by Appetite, the Honor-Lover ruled by Spirit, and the Philosopher ruled by Reason. The debate arises from the fact that each type praises its own life as the most pleasant (*R*. IX 580d2-582a2). Socrates resolves the debate by arguing that the Philosopher alone is a qualified judge (*R*. IX 582a3-583a7). Accordingly, his praise for his own life is authoritative (κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος, *R*. IX 583a4-5). Plato is interested not just in who wins this debate, but in the commitments that underlie it. When we debate another person on how pleasant something is, or which item among several is most pleasant, we implicitly endorse two ideas. The first is that it is appropriate to speak of an object or activity as possessing a single degree of pleasantness.[3] As we shall see, both the terms of the debate and Socrates' argument for the Philosopher's authority assume the *objectivity of hedonic character* of the objects or activities we enjoy. At the same time, if we take our opponents to argue sincerely on the basis of their experience, we will acknowledge that different people take enjoyment from the same objects and activities in different ways or to different degrees. This idea, *the subjectivity of hedonic experience*, is brought to the fore in Socrates' introduction of the parties to the debate, and specifically the *forms* of pleasure he assigns to distinct human types.

I begin with the objectivity of hedonic character, since it is a presupposition of both the initial debate and Socrates's subsequent argument. In brief, the debaters assume that it is appropriate to speak of how pleasant an activity is in its own right. To see this, we must get clear on precisely what their disagreement is about. Although Socrates introduces the

debate by asking whose life is most pleasant (*R.* IX 581c9-11), the speakers do not praise their lives directly, or compare one life as a whole to another.[4] Instead, each speaker assesses the same set of activities—earning profit, being honored, and learning—all three of which are present in all three lives, (*R.* IX 581c11-e3). Each type prefers its own life, presumably, because the activity it deems most pleasant predominates in that life. Nevertheless, the explicit disagreement concerns the comparative pleasantness of these shared activities. This makes sense. If different parties are to debate, there must be some object or objects they can speak about in common. Furthermore, it is only if each object is assumed to possess a single character that the debaters can take themselves to be speaking incompatibly about it, and endeavor to discover who speaks most truly (ἀληθέστατα, *R.* IX 582a1, 582e8-9). The debate at issue is meaningful, then, only if the speakers assume that each activity holds a single degree of pleasure, or pleasantness, in its own right.[5]

This assumption is also at work in Socrates' argument for the Philosopher's authority. At the start of the argument, Socrates introduces three criteria for being a qualified judge: experience, wisdom, and reason (*R.* IX 582a4-6). As the argument proceeds, the latter two criteria are discussed only briefly (*R.* IX 582d4-e2); we will examine them in more detail later. By far, the most developed part of Socrates' argument is the claim that the Philosopher has the most experience with all of the pleasures at issue (ἐμπειρότατος, *R.* IX 582a7, ἐμπειρότερος, *R.* IX 582a9 μᾶλλον, *R.* IX 582a5, c2). To make this point, Socrates repeatedly uses the formulation *the pleasure of* _____, (τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ____ἡδονῆς, *R.* IX 582a10-b1, c2-3, cf. 582b4, 582c7-8). Socrates refers to each activity in the singular, framing each one as the bearer of a degree of pleasantness proper to it.[6] Thus, all three human types can have *the* pleasure of being honored since "Honor comes to all of them, provided they accomplish their several aims," (*R.* IX 582c2-5).[7] Similarly, in describing the Philosopher's more extensive experience with the pleasure of learning, Socrates treats philosophical contemplation as the repository of pleasure (τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, *R.* IX 582c7-8). Since neither the Money-Lover nor Honor-Lover can engage in Philosophy, neither can experience "the sort of pleasure *which it holds*," (ὅιαν ἡδονὴν ἔχειν, *R.* IX 582c7-8, my translation and emphasis).[8] Like the debaters, Socrates regards each activity as the bearer of a quantity of pleasantness proper to it. Thus, both the terms of the debate and Socrates' main argument for the Philosopher's authority assume that objects and activities possess a degree of pleasantness in their own right. That is, both the terms of the debate and Socrates' argument assume *the objectivity of hedonic character* for the activities at issue (Cross and Woozley 1964, pp. 264-6; Irwin 1977, p.285; White 1979, p. 228; Annas 1981 p.308; Reeve 1988, p. 145).

There is some vagueness in what exactly it means to assign a single degree of pleasantness to any activity in its own right, that is, irrespective of who is partaking of that activity. On one hand, the notion of a degree of pleasantness present in the activity, and available in some sense to all who participate in it, is required for Socrates' argument. The Philosopher's more extensive experience lends authority to his judgment only if she has experienced the same pleasures as the Money-Lover and Honor-Lover. Conversely, if these activities somehow hold different pleasures for different people, then the Philosopher's more extensive experience is specious; it does not give her access to how pleasant a given activ-

ity is for another type of person (Reeve 1988, p. 146; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.328-9). At the same time, asserting the objectivity of pleasantness is implausible if it entails that everyone has an identical experience of pleasure in every instance of participating in the activity. Clarification is needed, then, for Plato's commitment to hedonic objectivity, and the Philosopher's more extensive experience, if they are not to come into conflict with the familiar fact that different people take pleasure in different ways from the same activities.

Plato poses this very problem by highlighting the subjectivity of hedonic experience within the Argument for Authority. To see this, we must return to Socrates' introduction of the debating parties at the beginning of the argument. After reminding Glaucon of the division of the soul into three parts, he posits that each part of the soul is characterized by its own distinctive pleasure (ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία, *R.* IX 580d7). Different individuals are ruled by one of these parts, such that there are three main types of people (*R.* IX 581c4-5), and a different *form* of pleasure belonging to each human type (καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἴδη, *R.* IX 581c7).[9] After introducing these types and their distinct *forms* of pleasure, Socrates introduces the statements that constitute the debate.

Socrates' introduction is bookended by references to two *pleasures*: the first are the pleasures assigned to each part of the soul; the second are the *forms* of pleasure assigned to human types. It is unclear how we should think of either pleasure, or how they are related. One might suppose they are identical, i.e., that the *forms* of pleasure belonging to the human types simply are the pleasures assigned to the distinct parts of the soul. On this reading, the *form* of pleasure belonging to the Money-Lover just is the pleasure of Appetite, that of the Honor-Lover is the pleasure

of Spirit, and the Philosopher's is the pleasure of Reason. Against this, however, Socrates stresses that there is one *form* of pleasure belonging to each human type. (καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἴδη ὑποκείμενον ἕν ἑκάστῳ τούτων, *R.* IX 581c7). The reference of τούτων in this remark is unambiguously the human types. Socrates is assigning the *forms* of pleasure—whatever they are—to the *people*, not their psychic parts. Consequently, if the *forms* of pleasure were identical to the pleasures of the psychic parts, Socrates would be saying that each human type has the pleasure of only its ruling part. But this is not Plato's view. At the end of the Olympian Argument, Socrates states that Spirit and Appetite will experience better and truer pleasures when ruled by Reason (586d4-587a2). The Philosopher has an Appetite and Spirit, and the ability to enjoy things appetitively and spiritedly. More broadly, he makes clear that each type of person has all three parts of the soul and can experience the pleasures of all three parts. Whatever the *forms* of pleasure are, they are not identical with the pleasures assigned to the psychic parts.

Instead, the relationship between the two pleasures can be seen in the developmental arc that links them. In this passage, Socrates is building the human types and their *forms* of pleasure from the parts of the soul and their proper pleasures. He introduces the pleasures belonging to the three psychic parts, along with the rule proper to each (ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία…ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί, *R.* IX 580d6-7). Socrates next explains that one part of the soul rules in each person. Only then does he introduce the *forms* of pleasure that belong to the human types ruled by different parts of the soul. The idea must be that the ruling part shapes how the pleasures of all three parts are experienced (cf. *R.* IX 586d4-587a2). The pleasures assigned to the psychic parts are

elemental capacities for pleasure common to all human beings. A *form* of pleasure, by contrast, is a complex hedonic disposition composed of these elemental capacities, disposed and interrelated as they are by the ruling part. This is confirmed by the types' rankings of the common activities, which immediately follows the introduction of the *forms* of pleasure. Each human type is capable of enjoying all three activities—making money, being honored, and learning—even if the activity does not satisfy the desires of the ruling part. The Money-Lover enjoys being honored even when it does not lead to profit.[10] The elemental capacities assigned to the three parts of the soul are all present and expressed irrespective of which part rules. Nevertheless, the specific way each part's elemental hedonic capacity is realized depends on which part of the soul rules.

Let us clarify the way the types' ranking statements evince the *forms* of pleasure that have just been introduced. As we have seen, in order for there to be a meaningful disagreement, the debaters must speak about a set of subjects commonly accessible to all. Those common subjects – what they are talking about – are shared activities. But the *forms* of pleasure are distinctive to the human types; a different *form* belongs to, or inheres in, each human type. Accordingly, the *forms* of pleasure cannot be the subject matter of these statements. I suggest instead that the *forms* represent the experiential basis for each type's ranking of the activities in question. Socrates stresses that the speakers are offering evaluations of the pleasure of these activities, and not their worth or nobility (*R*. IX 581e6-582a1). How has each speaker formed his or her judgment about the pleasantness of the activities at issue? Typically, when we forward claims about how pleasant, funny, or tasty something

is, we do so because that is how we have experienced it. Seeing the forms of pleasure as the experiential basis, but not the subject, of the types' ranking of the activities explains a curious detail in the text. Pivoting from the testimonials to the debate itself, Socrates says, "since the pleasures of each *form*, and the lives themselves, are debating this way…" (Ὥτε δὴ οὖν…ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, *R*. IX 581e5-6).[11] Strikingly, Socrates frames the *forms* of pleasure as parties to the debate, that is, as *speakers* of the conflicting statements, not as their subject-matter. This makes sense if the *forms* of pleasure represent dispositions for the experience of enjoyment; the conflicting statements are a kind of testimony, expressing the way each type has experienced the activities in question. The Honor-Lover derides the pleasure of profit as vulgar because *in her experience* that pleasure is tinged with feelings of degradation. The Money-Lover has enjoyed being honored, even when it does not lead to profit, as a frivolous delight. The Philosopher experiences the pleasures of food and drink as necessary because, presumably, she feels these pleasures as unavoidable responses, even though she assigns little value to the activities by which they are provoked. The debaters do not speak *about* the *forms* of pleasure, but *from* them.

In the *forms* of pleasure, then, Plato highlights the fact that one's hedonic experience is shaped by one's character. Each *form* of pleasure is grounded in the associated type's distinctive psychic structure, determined by the part of the soul that rules, and specifically the *love* proper to that psychic part, (διὰ ταῦτα, *R*. IX 581c4). One's psychic structure shapes not only what one tends to value, desire, and believe, but also one's subjective hedonic experience. A *form* of pleasure is an

integrated hedonic disposition—a distinctive, comprehensive way of experiencing enjoyment in all the activities of one's life—composed of elemental hedonic capacities based in the three parts of the soul. By assigning different *forms* of pleasure to the different human types, Plato recognizes the *subjectivity of hedonic experience.*

Three qualifications are important here. First, saying that a *form* of pleasure comprehensively shapes one's enjoyment does not mean that Plato thinks an experience of pleasure has one's life as a whole life as its proper object. The comprehensive scope of a *form* of pleasure is compatible with the object of enjoyment on any occasion being a specific episodic activity (Russell 2005, pp.123-6). The idea is simply that one's *form* of pleasure ranges over all of these episodic activities. Second, we should not overstate the difference between the hedonic experiences of the three types. Presumably, the shared elemental pleasures belonging to the psychic parts will ground experiential commonalities. The Philosopher's pleasure in eating ice cream may in some respects be phenomenologically akin to that of the Money-Lover. Nevertheless, this common aspect need not comprise, for either type of person, the whole of their hedonic experience in that moment. Rather, the individual's experience of pleasure on any occasion may involve the responses of all three parts of the soul. For instance, the Money-Lover's pleasure in being honored seemingly combines spirited joy with appetitive disdain. Third, in grounding the *forms* of pleasure in one's psychic orientation, Plato need not construe the experience of pleasure as a kind of reflective assessment. The fact that an hedonic experience is infused with one's ethical perspective need not mean that the experience expresses one's considered evaluative judgment.[12] Each human type's *form* of pleasure—a complex disposition for episodic enjoyment—is grounded in its distinctive psychic structure. Some pleasures in that disposition will express or align with one's values, but some will not.

By centering the Authority Argument on a debate, Plato asks the reader to examine the commitments implicit in arguing with others about the pleasure of shared activities. When we enter into such a debate, we simultaneously accept that there is a single, rationally correct position on how pleasant the activities are—*the objectivity of hedonic character*—and that others have experienced those activities in a different way, *the subjectivity of hedonic experience.* Plato wants both commitments to be in view as we consider which life is most pleasant.

II. A CRITIQUE REVIVED

Here we encounter a problem. Plato's recognition of hedonic subjectivity seems to invalidate the argument Socrates has given, centered on the Philosopher's more extensive experience. Specifically, the Philosopher's claim to more extensive experience seems to be negated by the recognition of subjectivity. If two people experience pleasure in the same objects in different ways, the notion that one might straightforwardly have all the pleasures of the other, *plus more besides*, is dubious at best. The Authority Argument may not be negligent for overlooking a familiar aspect of our experience—the subjectivity of hedonic experience— but it is apparently internally incoherent. In this section, I'll show that this problem, now augmented by the *forms* of pleasure, confronts the most common defense of the Authority Argument. If we are to make sense of the Authority Argument, we will need

a different way of understanding its account of the Philosopher's authority.

The defense I wish to consider is offered in response to the critique that Plato neglects to consider the subjectivity of pleasure in the Authority Argument. Against this, interpreters have stressed that the pleasures under evaluation are not momentary episodes, but long-term patterns of activity, or lives. They claim that it is reasonable to assert that pleasure, considered on this scale, is objectively evaluable, and that experience and reason promote better judgment about how pleasant a life is overall. As Reeve (1988, p. 145) puts it, to evaluate pleasures on this scale is to ask "… whether they are absorbing, whether they are completely satisfying, whether they become boring in the long run, whether they can be engaged in throughout life…whether they necessarily involve pains or frustrations of any sort." This defense depends on a distinction between the kinds or aspects of pleasure that are subjective and those that are not. Plato's defenders allow that there is subjectivity with respect to idiosyncratic preferences, variations in taste which are not subject to rational scrutiny (Annas 1981, p.308-9; Russell 2005, p.124; Reeve 1988, p. 145). But besides these small-scale variations, there remain regularities in human hedonic experience concerning broad patterns of activity over long periods of time. As Annas (1981, p. 309) puts it, "Particular tastes may very well be subjective. But judgments about the pleasantness of a life are not clearly subjective." So long as we are assessing the pleasures of whole lives we needn't worry about idiosyncratic subjective differences, since these are negligible compared to the objective patterns pertaining to a lifetime's worth of pleasure and pain. Plato says little about the subjectivity of pleasure because he is interested in these large-scale patterns.

The *forms* of pleasure block this defense. Beyond showing that Plato does not neglect the subjectivity of pleasure, they also show that he does not accept a distinction between small-scale pleasures that exhibit subjective variation and large-scale pleasures that do not. Plato is surely aware of idiosyncratic differences between, say, two individuals' favorite foods. As we have seen, though, the *forms* of pleasure represent comprehensive, patterned differences in the way different human *types* enjoy different *categories* of objects or activities. That Plato would focus on variation on this scale makes sense. There is not really an interesting difference between the lives of two gluttons who disagree about which cuisine is most delicious. More important is the difference between the glutton and the Philosopher. For even though the Philosopher may prefer the same cuisine as the glutton, the two will enjoy food overall in a significantly different way. The glutton will regard the enjoyment of eating as the most significant and desirable gratification life affords, whereas the philosopher will see it, however intense it may occasionally be (*R.* IX 584c5, 586c1-2), as meager compared to the pleasures of learning, a necessary and perhaps illusory result of the body's condition. Differences of this kind are far more salient to the shape of one's life and how pleasant it is overall. Moreover, because the *forms of* pleasure are grounded in fixed psychic structures, they are stable dispositions of enjoyment. Rather than varying from individual to individual, they are displayed regularly by members of the same type. In the *forms* of pleasure, then, Plato recognizes wide-ranging, durable patterns of subjective variation in human hedonic experience.

For much the same reason, the *forms* of enjoyment are also insular: a person of one type cannot experience another type's *form*

of pleasure except by becoming that type of person. Together, the durability and insularity of these forms undermine any claim the Philosopher might make to more extensive experience in a straightforward sense. The Philosopher will not experience the pleasures of making profit or being honored as the type of person who loves these pursuits or, consequently, as one who cultivates them to the utmost (Reeve 1988, pp.145-6; Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp.320-33; Cross and Woozley 1964, pp. 265-6). Just as the Philosopher alone experiences the utmost rational pleasures of philosophical contemplation, his opponents may insist that only avid pursuers of honor or material gratification will experience the most gratifying enjoyment these pursuits offer.[13] This point holds especially against an interpretation which emphasizes that the argument compares whole lives, rather than episodic activities. If the scope of comparison is an entire life, then the point that the Philosopher has experienced the pleasures of eating and honor "from youth" is irrelevant (*R.* IX 582b1-3). More broadly, Plato's argument is incoherent if it claims that the Philosopher has an authoritative vantage point, based in experience, from which to assess the pleasures of *multiple whole lives*. A straightforward appeal to more experience cannot ground the Philosopher's authority.

The defenders of Socrates' argument do not take it to rely exclusively on the Philosopher's wider experience. They also invoke the Philosopher's superior wisdom and facility with reason to explain why she is a better judge of how pleasant any life is (Annas 1981, pp.308-10; Reeve 1988, p.145). But a similar point can be made concerning these criteria. Since the debate centers on a ranking of activities, the claim that the Philosopher's life is most pleasant is the claim that the activities that

comprise the Philosopher's life represent the most pleasant human life. The defenders assert that the Money-Lover and Honor-Lover miscalculate or misjudge the pleasure of different lives, inflating the pleasantness of their preferred activities, underestimating those of dis-preferred ones, overlooking the way their preferred pleasures diminish over time, incur pains, and so forth. But if they were to consider activities or lives in a comprehensive and rational way, they would come round to the Philosopher's view. That is, if they were to consider the pleasures of the Philosopher's life carefully and with an open mind, they would recognize its superior pleasantness for all, *themselves included*.[14]

This might be right when we consider disorderly character types—e.g., drug addicts—whose lives contain short-lived and diminishing pleasures, and a high proportion of pain to pleasure.[15] Plausibly, the people who live such lives are incapable of rationally evaluating their own lives because of their psychic disorder. However, even though Socrates has just been discussing the tyrannic personality (*R.* IX 577b10-580c8), he does not consider lives of this sort here. Rather, he directs us to compare the claims of those who pursue their aims in a more coherent way, so as to be honored for excelling in their respective endeavors (*R.* IX 582c4-5). For the purposes of this argument, the individual ruled by Appetite is not an addict but, more likely, the successful executive who has secured a life of material comfort for herself and her family.[16] For such a person, the experience of making money and spending it on appetitive indulgences is deeply satisfying and achievable without a great deal of pain. Moreover, because of the stability of her character and the associated *form* of pleasure, it will remain so throughout a long life. Most importantly, for this sort of

person the activities that comprise the life of the Philosopher are charmless, frequently painful, and will remain so permanently. It is simply implausible to claim that a Money-Lover is miscalculating or reasoning poorly when she concludes that her own life is more pleasant than the Philosopher's. She's simply not wrong about which life *she* would enjoy most.

The leading defense of the Authority Argument holds that it is unproblematic for Plato to overlook the subjectivity of pleasure because he is considering the pleasure of whole lives. When we consider whole lives rationally, and from a basis of thorough experience, we can legitimately conclude that the Philosopher's life is most pleasant. The *forms* of pleasure block this reading because they describe subjective variations in enjoyment that range over all of one's activities, and endure through the course of one's whole life. As a result, first, the *forms* undermine the possibility of the Philosopher experiencing the lives of other human types. An argument for authority based in greater experience, in a straightforward sense, does not hold up. Furthermore, the *forms* of pleasure confirm and explain the following hard truth: those ruled by Spirit and Appetite experience more enjoyment in non-philosophical lives.[17] When the Money-Lover and Honor-Lover assert that their own lives are more pleasant, they are not guilty of miscalculation. We need a different way of understanding the Authority Argument.

III. A WAY FORWARD

There is something puzzling about engaging in a debate about what is most pleasant, while acknowledging that your opponent does not enjoy your preferred activity as much as you do. How do we explain our opponent's position while maintaining that ours is the correct assessment? Anyone who has argued with their teenager about music is familiar with this. One can insist that Beethoven holds greater pleasures than Taylor Swift, but there's no denying whose music the teen enjoys more. The Authority Argument presents a debate of this kind. The defense we have just considered locates non-Philosophers' error in their calculations or reflective judgments about the comparative pleasantness of their own lives versus the Philosopher's. This is akin to telling the teenager that they're just not giving Beethoven an open-minded chance: "Listen more closely, and do a better job of assessing your listening enjoyment, and you'll see that you enjoy Beethoven more." This reading of the argument, however, is blocked by the *forms* of pleasure which describe comprehensive, stable, insular differences in enjoyment. The Money-Lover and Honor-Lover, like the teenager, are correct about what they enjoy most.

Plato has a better way of resolving this puzzle. On the reading I propose, Plato locates the non-Philosopher's mistake not in their judgments about hedonic experience, but in the experience itself. Specifically, Plato can maintain *the objectivity of hedonic character* alongside *the subjectivity of hedonic experience* if he holds that *experiences* of pleasure can more or less correctly reflect the pleasantness of their objects. In this section, I'll explain this view and show that it best fits Socrates's argument for the Philosopher's authority. A full defense of Plato's position is admittedly not provided in the Authority Argument. I'll therefore close with some remarks about how the Olympian Argument answers the questions that remain, and what this means, tentatively, for the relationship between Socrates' two arguments about pleasure in Bk. IX.

The solution I have in mind emerges from the conceptual space between the two formula-

tions of subjectivity with which I began. The *subjectivity of hedonic experience* states that different people take enjoyment in different ways from the same objects and activities. This is the idea Plato recognizes in the *form*s of pleasure assigned to distinct human types. The *subjectivity of hedonic character* says that there is no fact of the matter about how pleasant any object or activity is. This is the idea Plato rejects by arguing in a way which assumes there is an objectively correct ranking of the pleasantness of human activities and lives. The question before us is how to make sense of this combination of claims. One might think that the second of these ideas follows directly from the first. On this view, the mere recognition of differences in enjoyment of some activity entails the denial of any fact of the matter regarding the hedonic character of that activity itself. Given that some enjoy mint chocolate chip ice cream while others do not, one concludes that there is no fact of the matter about whether it is pleasant or not. There is an inference here, though, which depends on the assumption that no experience of pleasure is privileged as a gauge of the hedonic character of its objects. Call this the *parity of hedonic experience*. If all hedonic experiences reflect the pleasantness of their objects equally well, then whenever a single object is enjoyed differently by different people, there can be no single fact of the matter concerning the pleasantness of that object. On the other hand, if one denies *parity*, and allows that an experience of enjoyment can surpass another as a gauge of the pleasantness of its object, then one can block the inference from the recognition of differences in enjoyment to the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter regarding the hedonic character of objects and activities. That is, one can consistently maintain both the *objectivity of hedonic character*

and the *subjectivity of hedonic experience* with respect to the same set of objects and activities, including whole lives.

Let us say that an experience of pleasure is more *apt* when it surpasses another as a gauge of the pleasantness of its object. In fact, the notion that hedonic experiences can vary in aptness is suggested within the Authority Argument, specifically in Socrates' brief explication of the Philosopher's superior wisdom: "[The Philosopher] alone will come to have experience along with wisdom," (μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται, *R.* IX 582d4-5, translation adapted from Reeve). Socrates is not saying that wisdom improves the Philosopher's judgment regarding pleasantness. That role is assigned to the third criterion of authority, reason or argument, in the next line (κρίνεσθαι, *R.* IX 582d7-13; Reeve 1988, p.146).[18] Rather, what Socrates says here is that the Philosopher's wisdom improves her experience of the pleasures in question *as they are occurring*: they come about in the presence of (μετὰ) wisdom. The idea seems to be that in virtue of her wisdom the Philosopher's enjoyment of an activity is a better gauge of the pleasantness of the activity itself. By way of illustration, consider that an expert in music might be said to hear and enjoy a sonata better than a novice. The sonata offers the same pleasure to all, but only the expert is capable of taking all the pleasure it holds because of their more acute musical discernment. More broadly, what is implied is that there can be a disparity between the pleasure an activity offers and what we take from it. Some experiences of pleasure are inapt because of a lack of receptivity in the subject. But it is also possible for enjoyment to be exaggerated by flawed orientation or condition; we may take more pleasure than an activity in fact holds. Socrates' claim is that the philosopher's wisdom

enables him or her to experience pleasure most aptly, taking from any activity just as much pleasure as it holds.

Equipped with such a view, Socrates can assert that the Money-Lover's experience of enjoyment misgauges the pleasantness of both his own characteristic activities and the Philosopher's, taking too much in the former and too little in the latter. To be clear, the Money-Lover may be correct about how much she enjoys her own life, and even correct about how much she would enjoy the Philosopher's life, but incorrect in moving from the fact of that experience to a judgment about the pleasantness of the objects and activities in their own right. There is, then, a twofold error. The first part is in the experience of inapt pleasure (or pain). But, again, inapt pleasure and pain are still real experiences of pleasure and pain.[19] The second involves the uncritical assumption that one's experience transparently reveals the hedonic character of its object, resulting in a *judgment* assigning a mistaken degree of pleasantness to the activity itself. As we have seen, Plato dramatizes this step in the Authority Argument, in the transition from the experiential *forms* of pleasure to competing judgments explicitly about the pleasantness of shared activities. The Philosopher's experience of any activity is most apt, rendering her enjoyment superior not only in quantity or extent but also in aptness. The philosophical life *offers* the greatest pleasures, even though only Philosophers are capable of experiencing that pleasure fully and aptly.

Thus, taking Plato to hold that experiences of pleasure can be more or less apt yields an interpretation of the Authority Argument which both fits the text and avoids the problems of the most common defense, revealing how Plato can coherently maintain the subjectivity of hedonic experience alongside the objectivity

of hedonic character. It must be admitted that while the Authority Argument presents this view, it does not defend or explain it fully. In concluding remarks, I'll outline how the subsequent Olympian Argument addresses the main questions raised by the Authority Argument. This will shed further light on the Authority Argument, and in particular Socrates' appeal to the Philosopher's greater experience, and the third and final criterion of reason.

To defend the view I have ascribed to him, Plato must explicate two main points. The first is an account of what it is about an object or activity that makes it pleasant in an objective sense. The second is an account of the experience of pleasure, i.e. enjoyment, which explains how that experience can be inapt. Though there are numerous interpretive questions concerning the Olympian Argument, we can readily locate answers to these questions within it. In the latter part of the argument, Socrates offers an account of pleasure as "being filled with what is appropriate to our nature," (*R.* IX 585d11). This definition meets the first demand, offering a description of what makes an activity or process objectively pleasant.[20] Insofar as our true nature resides in reason, and the pleasures of reason are more genuine fillings, this account licenses the claim that the pleasures of Reason are greater than those of Spirit or Appetite (*R.* IX 585511-c14).

In the first part of the argument, Socrates tackles the phenomenon of different people (or the same person at different times) experiencing the same conditions in different ways (*R.* IX 583c10-584a10).[21] The aim of this investigation is to explain the possibility of illusory hedonic experiences (*R.* IX 584a7-10, cf. 583b2-7). The central example is the experience of taking pleasure in health after sickness, or the cessation of pain (*R.* IX 583c6-e2). On

Socrates' account, the pleasures in question are hedonic illusions which result from the contrast with previous pain, an analysis which characterizes the experience of pleasure in representational terms, as forms of appearance (φαντασμάτων).[22] In short, the illusory experience of pleasure is a misrepresentation of the state of health *as fulfilling*. In latter stages of the argument, Socrates applies this account to explain the especially intense but, on his view, inflated pleasures of those ruled by Spirit and Appetite, (*R.* IX 586b7-d2). In this way, he explains how one can experience pleasure in activities that are not objectively pleasant, or fail to enjoy those that are (*R.* IX 584d1-585a7),[23] concluding that the Philosopher experiences pleasures that are not simply greater in degree or quantity than another, but also in *truth* (583b3, 586e4-587a1).[24]

If this is right, the Olympian Argument provides an answer to the two questions raised by the view presented in the Authority Argument. As a result, we can now provide a more detailed account of the way the Philosopher's experience grounds her authority. The Philosopher will have more extensive experience insofar as she alone among the human types will have engaged in the activity that provides the purest and greatest pleasure of reason: philosophical reflection and contemplation. To the objection that the Money Lover and Honor Lover can claim greater experience in their own respective pleasures through exorbitant wealth, haute cuisine, or international fame, the Philosopher is in position to make two points. The first is that none of these pleasures represents a true pleasure of Appetite or Spirit. Each is exaggerated by the distorted orientation of the subjects to whom they appeal (cf. *R.* IX 586b7-d2), etc.). The second is that even if the Philosopher has not engaged in the specific activities cited here, they will have had experi-

ence with appetitive and spirited pleasures that are distorted in essentially the same way. This is the import of the commonplace example Socrates employs in the Olympian Argument. Just as the Philosopher will have experienced the pleasure of health after sickness, she will also have experienced from youth the intense pleasures of drinking when very thirsty, or finding company when lonely. In this way, a case can be made for the claim that the Philosopher has more extensive experience, though it is not the straightforward claim that the Philosopher has experienced each and every one of the pleasures experienced by other types, and more besides. Rather, the Philosopher can explain in what way specifically she has experienced fundamentally the same sort of illusory pleasures as the Money Lover and Honor Lover, without partaking of every instance of these pleasures. And she can explain why the intensity of their experience does not count as a reflection of the activities' genuine pleasantness (cf. *R.* IX 5896c1-2).

The philosopher's superior experience can be explained, but the explanation depends on the *theory* of pleasure that is developed in the Olympian Argument. In this light, I propose a similar reframing for the third criterion on the Philosopher's authority, his or her superior facility with reason (*R.* IX 582b11-e5). Beyond calculative skill at weighing up the pleasures and pains that occur in a life, the Philosopher is distinctively capable of developing a theoretical account or *logos* of what pleasure is. This theory coherently integrates the objective and experiential aspects of pleasure, so as to explain the patterned variety of hedonic experience displayed by different types of people, and provide a rational standard for analyzing and evaluating those experiences as pleasures. The Philosopher is able to distinguish the intensity or magnitude of a pleasure (or pain)

from its truth or aptness, and factor each aspect into an overall rational assessment. In fact, there is reason to think that possession of this account is part of the wisdom that improves the Philosopher's moment-to-moment experience of pleasure insofar as it enables her to resist exaggerated, illusory pleasures through understanding their true origins.[25]

In short, on the reading presented here the first two criteria of the Philosopher's authority—more extensive and wiser experience—depend on the third, the Philosopher's possession of a *logos,* where this refers specifically to the possession of a theoretical account of pleasure. This *logos* legitimates the claim that the Philosopher genuinely has more extensive experience in the first place, answering the objection that the Money Lover and Honor lover can each claim their own greater experience. And this theoretical understanding guides and informs the Philosopher's hedonic experience, making it *apt,* as it occurs. Socrates' oblique remarks on the Philosopher's superior *logos* look forward to the argument he is about to provide in the Olympian Argument. The Olympian Argument is "the most authoritative" proof that the Philosopher's life is most pleasant (κυριώτατον, *R.* IX 583a6), because this argument provides the theoretical underpinnings of the authority that is asserted, but not fully explained, in the Authority Argument.

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ENDNOTES

1   The Authority Argument is not regarded as one of Plato's most important arguments. Notably, there is no consideration of it in either of two recent companions to the Republic. See Ferrari 2008 and Santas 2006. Likewise, there are few stand-alone scholarly articles about the argument. Instead, it has received consideration primarily in works providing systematic treatment of Plato's works or the Republic, such as Cross and Woozley 1964, Murphy 1967, White 1979 Annas 1981, and Reeve 1988 or in works addressing Plato's ethics or theory of pleasure, Irwin 1977, Gosling and Taylor 1982, and Russell 2005.

2   For an influential discussion of how these two framings figure in the Nicomachean Ethics discussion of pleasure, see Owen 1972, p. 138. Notably, a distinction of this kind is not found in Plato's works prior to the Republic, on a standard dating of the dialogues. In passages on pleasure in both the Gorgias and Protagoras, Socrates speaks exclusively of objects or activities, such as eating, drinking and sex, calling these activities pleasures themselves, (Gor. 496c6-e2, Prot., 353c6-8). At no point in these dialogues does Socrates locate pleasure in the soul, or characterize pleasure as a kind of experience. Discussion of pleasure occurring in the soul or as a form of appearance (phantasma) becomes explicit in the next Olympian Argument (R. IX 583c6-7, 583e9-10, and 584a9-10), on which, see Wolfsdorf 2013.

3   This is compatible with restricting one's claims to a specific kind of subjects, e.g. human beings. So, one might think that musical harmony is objectively pleasant for (all) human beings, even if it is not at all pleasant for dogs. Such claims are backed by an account of pleasantness in relation to the common nature of the type of subject for whom objects and activities are pleasant. See R. IX 585d11-12.

4   Pace Russell 2005, p. 123 and Annas 1981, p. 309.

5   By contrast, on some subjectivist accounts statements overtly about the pleasantness of activities are to be interpreted as statements about subject experience or preference. On such an account, "Chocolate ice cream is yummy," really means "I like chocolate ice cream." Apparent disagreements about pleasure dissolve into compatible claims about what different subjects enjoy. See Annas 1981, p. 307-8.

6   By locating the name of the activity between the article and the genitive ἡδονῆς, Socrates suggests a proprietary connection between the pleasure and the activity whence it comes. In two other uses, Socrates employs a simple genitive in place of the ἀπὸ τοῦ construction, but the meaning is clearly the same (582b4, c7-8).

7   Unless otherwise noted, translations are from Reeve 2004.

8   There is some tension between this claim and the earlier testimony of the Money-Lover and Honor-Lover, to the effect that both experience some pleasure in learning (581d2, d6). An outright contradiction is avoided by Socrates' specification that the Philosopher's pleasure is taken in contemplation, as opposed to other forms of learning. But this opens up a different charge, to the effect that the Philosopher lacks experience with the pleasures associated with the most dedicated appetitive and spirited pursuits. Just as the Honor-Lover cannot experience the pleasure of philosophy, the Philosopher cannot experience the pleasure of international fame.

9   There is little reason to suppose that Socrates' use of ἔιδη is intended to invoke the Forms that are central to Plato's metaphysics and epistemology.

10   See 554b-c on the oligarchic person's need to suppress 'dronish' appetites by force, or 549a-b on the timarchic individual's secret love of money and its effects over a lifetime.

11   I follow Reeve 2004, p.283 in reading ἀμφισβητοῦνται in the middle voice. But see Adam 1902, p.45. Adam admits that reading ἀμφισβητοῦνται in the passive is awkward, perhaps because there is no identification of the agent by whom the pleasures are debated. Additionally, reading it in the passive renders redundant the latter part of the sentence, where Socrates specifies that the debate is about pleasure. Finally, contra Adam, I see no problem for the singular αὐτὸς ὁ βίος. The pleasures and the life of each form, ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους, are debating.

12   But see Russell 2005, pp. 125-6. It is hard to square Russell's interpretation with the Philosopher's remarks on appetitive pleasures. According to Russell, pleasure is a reflection of "the value one's emotions" assign to an activity as part of one's whole existence. This reading blurs the line between pleasure and reflective endorsement, and it is undermined by the presence in each type's life of pleasures they do not endorse.

13   Plato may signal his awareness of this problem in restricting the Philosopher's greater experience with learning to that of contemplation, (τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, R. IX 582c7-8), while allowing that both Money-Lover and Honor-Lover take pleasure in learning of some less philosophical kind.

14   Annas 1981, p.308 is subtle on this point. On her reading, Plato does not deny that the Money and Honor-Lovers enjoy their lives "as much as they think they do." Their mistake is in not recognizing that they would enjoy the Philosopher's life even more.

15   Interpreters refer to addiction frequently in explicating Plato's point here. See Cross and Woozley 1964, p.266, Annas 1981 p.309-10, and Reeve 1988, p.146.

16   This explains why that Socrates' argument ignores the distinctions between appetitive types previously

delineated in Bks. VII and IX. To demonstrate the superior pleasantness of the philosophical life, it must be compared to the most coherent of appetitive and spirited lives. But see Annas 1981, p.306.

17   This has ramifications for the political project of the Republic. Philosopher-rulers must know that members of the craft and auxiliary classes experience different forms of pleasure if they are to give all citizens a life they can enjoy, something presumably vital for achieving civic moderation. See 430d-e, cf. 586e, 590c-e.

18   Note Reeve's strained translation of phronêsis as "dialectical thought," p. 284. Cf., Annas 1981, pp. 308-9, White 1979, pp.227-8, and Adam, 1902, p. 346 ad loc..

19   Cf. Phil. 40c8-d10 for a clear articulation of this idea. Just as one who judges falsely really judges, so one who experiences false pleasure really experiences pleasure. Similarly, at Republic 584c-6 Socrates allows that illusory pleasures are among the most intense we experience.

20   Note that Socrates' examples to illustrate this definition include activities or processes in the body: eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty, etc. (R. IX 585a8-b8).

21   On this passage, see Butler 1999 and Warren 2011.

22   For the view that appearances are representational states, see Storey 2014 and Franklin 2023.

23   See Butler 2005, pp. 614-618.

24   For very rich discussion of the notion of truth at work in the Olympian Argument, see also Wolfsdorf 2013

25   This may be akin to the way an account of mimêsis is said to provide an antidote to the harmful appearances of imitative poetry (R. IX 595b3-7.) On the interaction of reasoning, calculation, and appearance, see Prot. 356c-d and R. X 602c-e.

The False Appearance of the Sophist Himself in the First Six Definitions of Plato's *Sophist*

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ABSTRACT

The key to how the definitions in *Sophist* fit together is the seventh definition, the maker of false appearances. The first six definitions are a false appearance of the sophist himself, as a businessman who sells an art of disputation to rich young men. Because this is a deception, to unmask him we need to supplement the brief descriptions in *Sophist* from Plato's portraits of sophists in other dialogues. This lets us see his true nature, a predatory hunter for students' money, whose promise of political success is bait, but whose practice enslaves one to the ignorance and vice of the people.

Keywords: Sophist, Appearance, Collection, Division

1. INTRODUCTION

Interpretations of the seven definitions of the sophist, in Plato's *Sophist*, range from (A) unimportant or (B) inconclusive sketches, to (C) completely false appearances, to (D) a catalogue of historical sophists, (E) to genuine aspects of sophistry.[1] This lack of scholarly consensus seems to indicate that we don't yet have a successful account of how these definitions fit together into a coherent whole. In this study I will suggest that *Sophist* cannot be understood on its own. Taking as my starting point the seventh definition, the sophist as a maker of false appearances (*phantastikê*), I will argue that each of the first six definitions is deceptive in some manner and that in order to see through these deceptions we need to supplement them with Plato's portrayals of sophists in other dialogues.[2]

If Plato means for us to take seriously the dialogue's conclusion that the sophist is an 'insincere, unknowing word-juggler',[3] who makes false rather than true copies of things, then presumably he also thinks that the sophist would not want to advertise this character of his.[4] If this is the case, then it is worth investigating whether the much more reputable descriptions in the first six definitions, as hunter, merchant, disputer, and purifier of souls, serve in some way to hide or obscure the sophist's character as a fraud and a cheat. My thesis is that Plato has given us an enactment of the sophist's technique of verbal deception in the first six definitions, applied to the sophist himself, whose aim is to make himself seem better than he is.[5] If this is so, then we should expect a certain amount of difficulty in discerning what is going on in them, which could explain the kind of scholarly difference of opinion we in fact have.

In order to test the thesis that they are deceptions, I will employ two principal strategies that would let us see through them. First, I will argue that in other dialogues Plato portrays much more fully the aspects of sophistry given only a very brief description in each of the first six definitions. So by looking at those other dialogues, we can be better equipped to understand what it really means for a sophist to be a hunter, merchant, disputer, or purifier of souls. Second, I will argue that, in these other dialogues, Plato portrays sophists employing two related rhetorical techniques, which are a sort of inversion or violation of the philosophical techniques of Collection and Division outlined in the *Phaedrus*.

When we apply the results of these two strategies to *Sophist*, it will become clear that this pair of rhetorical techniques allows the first six definitions to present an appealing picture of the sophist as a businessman who sells virtue as an art of disputation to rich young men.[6] Because the fuller accounts in other dialogues have alerted us to the falsehood of this picture, and because we have discerned the rhetorical techniques that produced it, we will also be able to find the deeper coherence that Plato has embedded in these six definitions. It will turn out that the sophist's true nature is a predatory hunter for his students' money, who baits his trap with the promise of political success, but whose art of disputation enslaves them to the ignorance and vice of the people.[7]

2. FALSE APPEARANCE IN *SOPHIST*

At the beginning of his seventh and final definition, the Stranger asserts that the sophist claims he can dispute about every single subject. But because it is impossible to be wise about everything, the Stranger continues, the

sophist has only the appearance of wisdom (233a-c). He fools the young and the ignorant, making them believe he speaks the truth about everything, when all he has is a sort of a cheat and a copy (234c-e). The stranger characterises this cheat and copy as the worse half of the art of imitation (*mimêsis*). The better kind of imitation reproduces the proportions of its model faithfully, and is what the Stranger calls "likeness-making (*eikastikê*)" (235d). The sophist's imitation, on the other hand, is not faithful. The Stranger gives the analogy of a sculptor who makes very large works. Just as this sculptor falsifies the proportions of his original, so does the sophist, the Stranger implies, presenting an image in words that 'falsifies the proportions' of what he is discussing, be it "laws and all kinds of political issues" (232d), or anything else. Were the sculptor to reproduce the true proportions of the original, his product would not appear beautiful: "the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger, because we see the upper parts from farther away and the lower parts from closer" (236a). The Stranger proposes to call this part of imitation that falsifies its model *phantastikê* (236c). In this paper I will bring out the character of *phantastikê* as a kind of falsification, opposed to *eikastikê* as the art of making true or accurate likenesses, by calling it the art of 'making false appearances'.[8]

Before the Stranger is able to complete the analogy and explain how the *phantastikê* of the sophist falsifies the proportions of his original, the discussion is derailed by the objection that making false appearances is impossible. "This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and this saying things but not true things" (236e) involves us in speech which has been forbidden by Parmenides. The bulk of the dialogue addresses the question of Being and Not-Being, and in the end it concludes that false appearances are in fact possible, because there is a licit kind of Not-Being, the form of Difference shared in by all other things (259a-b). Not-Being mixes with speech, so because "there is deception then necessarily the world will be full of copies, likeness, and appearances (*eidôlôn te kai eikonôn êdê kai phantasias*)" (260c). The Stranger then picks up the division of the art of imitation where he left off, completes the final definition of the sophist, and the dialogue ends. We are left on our own to figure out how the sophist's falsifications work.

I propose to take seriously the analogy with those who make very large sculptures that the Stranger used to explain what he meant by 'false appearances'. If we complete the analogy ourselves, we should be able to figure out how Plato thinks the sophist 'distorts the proportions' of his 'original' and how he makes these false proportions appear 'beautiful' in words. A deceptive sculpture seems beautiful from a certain point of view and from far away. But because this beautiful appearance is the result of certain of its parts being larger than the original and others smaller (236a-b), one presumes these distortions would make it ugly from up close. The corresponding technique in speech is likely what Socrates describes in *Phaedrus*, misrepresenting things by small degrees (*Phdr.* 260b, 262a). The rhetorician, perhaps, exaggerates certain aspects of his original and downplays others through assertions of similarity and difference, producing speech that is ugly 'up close', but that appears beautiful to those 'far away' from the truth (234c). That is, his speech is 'ugly' if one hears it with an awareness of its falsehood, detecting how he distorts his topic, while it appears 'beautiful' if this distortion remains undetected and one accepts his speech as true.[9]

The antidote to this technique of deception, therefore, is twofold. On the one hand, one must know what the things in question are really like, just as to judge a statue of a man or a horse one must know what a man or horse actually looks like. And on the other, one must examine the speech of the sophist closely, in order to detect any misrepresentation of similarity or difference in it in comparison with the things themselves. This would correspond to looking at the large sculpture from close up, to gain the 'adequate viewpoint' that lets one see its skewed proportions (236b).

If we compare the result of the final definition to what came earlier, we can see that, although the Stranger himself doesn't explain how the sophist makes his 'ugly' speech appear beautiful, it seems that he has given us an example in the first six definitions. Both the 'insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier' and sophist as he appears in the first six definitions are men who deal with speech. I propose that the 'hunter, merchant, disputer, and purifier of souls' corresponds to the large statue that misrepresents the proportions of the original, while the original is the word-juggling maker of false appearances. Although the six definitions present a beautiful appearance from a certain point of view, a close-up inspection shows that their proportions are ugly. In plainer terms, close inspection shows that the six definitions misrepresent the maker of false appearances, emphasising some aspects of his art and downplaying others. This misrepresentation is 'ugly' when we see how it is a falsification of the original. But it is designed to appear beautiful, for its falsehoods to pass unnoticed, so that the man seems better than he is.

However, it is difficult to get 'up close' to the definitions in *Sophist* to see their skewed proportions. The first thing one is confronted with is that, with the exception of number six, the definitions are presented in an excessively brief manner.[10] Of the terms by which the divisions are made — such as 'by force' vs. 'by persuasion', 'privately' vs. 'in public', 'earning wages' vs. 'giving gifts' (222c-d) — almost none of them get any explanation at all. And the few times we get a supplemental explanation it is very short. So, for example, all we find out about 'giving gifts' is that it is the way lovers hunt (222d-e). More importantly, there is no real explanation of the upshot of each definition. At the end of the first we arrive at a hunter who earns wages from rich young men (223b), but what that actually means, concretely, is not even discussed.

If we compare the divisions made in *Sophist* to those made in *Statesman* and *Philebus*, it is hard not to conclude that this brevity is intentional. While one couldn't say that the description of each option in the divisions in *Statesman* is verbose, at least we get more than a simple name.[11] *Philebus* is on the opposite extreme, taking, for example, five Stephanus pages simply to divide pleasure into three kinds (*Phlb*. 31a-36b). And in both *Statesman* and *Philebus* the divisions are a preliminary to an extended discussion and analysis of what is divided. We get nothing like this with the results of the first five definitions in *Sophist*. Instead, we get about as much information as we do in Protagoras' first response to Socrates, that by studying with him Hippocrates will become "a better man" (*Prt*. 318a-b), or Gorgias' first response, that oratory is knowledge "about speeches" (*Grg*. 449d-e).[12]

I think that this brevity is designed to deprived us of an 'adequate viewpoint' from which to see how the sophist as hunter, merchant, etc. is like a statue with skewed proportions. So in order to get such a viewpoint, we need to look elsewhere. Once we do, we

find that there is a striking coincidence of the first six definitions in *Sophist* and Plato's portrayals of sophists in other dialogues. Principally in *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*, but also in Book I of *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, and *Apology*, we find sophists either exemplifying or being described in ways that correspond to one or another of the definitions in *Sophist*. So we have a multiplicity of portrayals spread out over a number of dialogues, and in *Sophist* we have this multiplicity gathered together into one place. In neither place are we told explicitly how they add up to a single thing. But if we compare the 'beautiful appearances' in *Sophist* with their corresponding pictures in other dialogues, we can see that they are really ugly distortions, and we can begin to see how they all fit together.

Consequently, in the next four sections I will do the following. First, I will show how the first six definitions of the sophist correspond to Plato's treatments of sophists in other dialogues. This will confirm for us that *Sophist's* hunting, selling, disputing, etc., are accurate descriptions of how Plato's sophists present themselves, and it will give us a fuller picture of what it means to engage in these activities. Second, I will show how the 'original' sophist from the end of *Sophist*, the 'insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier', corresponds to Plato's account of what sophists are really like, in the other dialogues. He shows them engaging in a kind of rhetoric that gives only the appearance of wisdom (233a-c), in *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*, through a violation of the rules of Collection and Division given in *Phaedrus*. Third, I will show how the sophist pretends that his rhetorical technique is wisdom and virtue. This is the principal way that he 'distorts' his own proportions. I will show that

in the six definitions in *Sophist* there is an employment of the violations of Collection and Division which characterises the sophist's rhetoric. Each definition enacts a verbal slight of hand designed to skew the sophist's proportions in a manner that corresponds to Plato's fuller treatments elsewhere. In the light of those other treatments, we will see how the proportions are ugly, i.e. how they are a falsification of what the sophist actually does. Finally, I will step back and see how the same distortions of his technique appear 'beautiful' to those ignorant of its true character. This will let us see how the various definitions in *Sophist* are meant to fit together into an appealing false appearance.[13]

3. THE DEFINITIONS IN *SOPHIST* IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER PLATONIC DIALOGUES

The Stranger sums up the first six definitions of the *Sophist* as follows:

> [Stranger] I think we first discovered him as a hired hunter of rich young men… Second, as a wholesaler of learning about the soul…Third, didn't he appear as a retailer of the same things? [Theaetetus] Yes, and fourth as a seller of his own learnings?… [Stranger] I'll try to recall the fifth way: he was an athlete in verbal combat, distinguished by expertise in debating…The sixth appearance was disputed, but still we made a concession to him and took it that he cleanses the soul of beliefs that interfere with learning. (231d-e)

With the exception of the sixth, none of the definitions give much more detail beyond

their division of terms. So to see whether Plato means us to take these definitions in earnest, and so get a fuller picture of what he means by hunter, etc., I propose to look at his portrayals in other dialogues.

(Def. 1) Do we find the 'hunters of young men' in other dialogues? If they are found among the "plentiful meadows of wealthy youths" (222a), then it seems that the sophists present at the 'trade-show' at the home of Callias (*Prt.* 314e-316b) are engaged in hunting. Moreover, as described in the first definition in *Sophist*, although these 'hunters' charge money for their association with students, they "claim that it is for the sake of virtue" (223a). So Protagoras claims he will make Hippocrates a better man (*Prt.* 318a-b). Gorgias, although he says he does not teach virtue (*Men.* 95c), does say that he will make you wise in speaking (*Grg.* 449e). Hippias says his wisdom will make you virtuous (*Hp. Ma.* 281b, 283c). Even Euthydemus claims his association will make you virtuous (*Euthd.* 273d), perhaps by revealing your pre-existent wisdom (*Euthd.* 293b). Hippocrates, for his part, is a youth eager to partake of the wisdom of Protagoras, even though he has no idea what this is (*Prt.* 312c). And according to Callias, Evenus of Paros is the man who can train your sons (*Ap.* 20). So a 'hunter' who associates with youths, ostensibly to train them in virtue, is a common picture in these other dialogues.

(Defs. 2-4) However, in *Sophist*, this association for the sake of virtue costs money.[14] Likewise, in the other dialogues we find the 'merchants of articles of knowledge about virtue' (224c) charging fees. Socrates claims that sophists offer their various wares indiscriminately (*Prt.* 313d-314b), which really seems to be the case with Hippias, who offers memorised recitations of everything from geometry and letters to genealogies and history

(*Hp. Ma.* 285b-e). Gorgias sells stock arguments to less able students (*Men.* 70a), and 'success' to more advanced ones like Callicles (Cf. Arist., *SE* 34.183b36-184a7). Protagoras claims to offer 'advanced instruction' in virtue and even offers a sliding scale of payment (*Prt.* 328a-c), while Prodicus offers more or less complete courses for different prices (*Cra.* 384b-c). Thrasymachus expects to be paid for his wisdom (*R.* 337d), as do Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (*Euthd.* 304c). Socrates' defence against the charge of sophistry, conversely, is that he charges no money for his company (*Ap.* 19d). So in addition to being a hunter, the other dialogues also portray the sophists as merchants.

(Def. 5) The 'champion of verbal combat' whose expertise is in "debating" (*tên eristikên technên*, 231e), from *Sophist*, is also found elsewhere.[15] It is present throughout the *Gorgias*. Gorgias calls rhetoric a "competitive skill (*agôn*)" like boxing (*Grg.* 456c-d), and his conversation with Socrates is one such competition, where Socrates forces Gorgias over and over to say more than he intended. In the end, he forces him to reveal that the victory sought by his rhetoric is the enslavement of fellow citizens by their own consent and the control even of their proper arts (*Grg.* 452d-e, 455a457c, Cf. *Phlb.* 58a-b). Polus thinks a rhetor's victory is so complete he can act like a tyrant (*Grg.* 466b-c). For Callicles rhetoric promises victory in the contest of life (*Grg.* 483d-484c), and Socrates' lack of rhetorical skill renders him defenceless against attack (*Grg.* 486a). Consequently, Callicles has no interest in continuing a losing contest (*Grg.* 505c-d). Similarly, Protagoras has no interest in losing his verbal combat with Socrates over who is the more powerful speaker (*Prt.* 335a, 339a, 348b-c). Protagoras' estimation of the value of powerful or clever speech is shared

with Gorgias (*Grg.* 449e, *Men.* 95b, Cf. *Euthd.* 305c).[16] Finally, such champions insist on the rules of the contest, as when Thrasymachus complains that Socrates always attacks but never defends (*R.* 337e), and Protagoras claims he must be refuted by his own admissions (*Tht.* 166a-b). The entire *Euthydemus*, finally, is verbal combat.

(Def. 6) Finally, the 'purifier of the soul' who removes 'beliefs that interfere with learning' is Socrates, I think, when engaged in the refutation (*elenchus*, 230d) necessary as a preliminary to any philosophical investigation (*Men.* 84a-d).[17] As such, the reader can easily fill out the general picture in *Sophist* from any number of dialogues. However, for my argument we do need to examine the specific point of why the Stranger says there is a similarity of this 'sophist of noble lineage' to (def. 5) the verbal athlete (231a), i.e. how the philosopher can sometimes "take on the appearance…of sophists" (216d). Socrates the philosopher can be mistaken for a sophist, first, because the hatred of sophists on the part of someone like Anytus is not based on knowledge, so he probably can't tell the difference between them (*Men.* 91b-95a). Indeed, behind Anytus' prosecution on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians, Socrates claims, is the popular belief that Socrates makes the weaker argument the stronger (*Ap.* 19b-20c), a skill openly claimed by Protagoras (Arist., *Rh.* II.1402a24-27). The unnamed speechwriter who heard the display by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus also thinks Socrates' elenchus is no different from sophistical refutation, which is why he considers all philosophy worthless chatter (*Euthd.* 304e-305a).[18] Meno can't tell the difference between genuine refutation and argumentative trickery (*Men.* 80a-b). And even Adeimantus claims most people whom Socrates refutes think it is due to their

inexperience in argument rather than genuine refutation (*R.* 487a-c).

Socrates can also be mistaken for a sophist because, conversely, sophists try to be mistaken for philosophers (233b-c; *Plt.* 291c, 303c).[19] Although they have no real knowledge of what is "fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust," they use these words in accordance with the opinions of the many and call "this knack wisdom" (*R.* 493b, *Phd.* 90c). They take on the label of philosophy, whose language is "full of fine names and adornments," but more often than not bring upon it ill-repute (*R.* 495b-d). Both Protagoras and Gorgias claim that their skill in speaking qualifies them to advise the city on all matters, even claiming that politics itself consists in their rhetorical wisdom (*Tht.* 167c, *Prt.* 319a, *Grg.* 455a-456a).[20] Although they are completely *alogos* (*Grg.* 499e-501a), the 'knacks' of sophistry and rhetoric imitate the reasoned skill of legislation and justice, as pastry-baking and cosmetics imitate medicine and gymnastics (*Grg.* 464d-465b). The knacks seek to supplant these arts and often succeed, as shown by Plato's characterisation of Socrates' condemnation for the practice of true, philosophical politics. In the prosecution of a doctor by a pastry-chef in front of a jury of children, it is the pastry-chef who claims to be wise (*Grg.* 521d-522b).

In the light of these other dialogues, then, how should we understand the definitions in *Sophist*? He is a hunter of young men in the sense that he seeks them out as customers and offers them training in virtue for a fee. The virtue that he offers is sometimes merely a collection of edifying speeches about various topics. The more advanced, more expensive virtue is a training in rhetoric, which is explicitly a form of verbal combat, whose aim is domination of one's fellow citizens. In the service of victory, the sophist teaches them even

to make the weaker argument the stronger. Finally, he makes this rhetoric seem like virtue by taking on the language of philosophy, partly by exploiting the apparent coincidence of his own practice of refutation with philosophical refutation, and partly through the simple claim to be wise in all matters, including the business of the city. This is what it means for the sophist to be a hunter, merchant, and disputer. As for purifying souls, it turns out that really isn't part of the sophistical package.

4. THE 'ORIGINAL' SOPHIST AND THE TECHNIQUES OF 'ANTI-COLLECTION' AND 'ANTI-DIVISION'

If the portrayal of sophists from Plato's other dialogues reflect the definitions in *Sophist*, how do these other portrayals also reflect the 'original', the 'insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier' from the end of the dialogue? This word-juggler practices 'making false appearances' (*phantastikê*). He makes the weaker argument the stronger. If the original 'proportions' of his topic will not lead him to victory, he must distort them. To those who know how things really are, these distortions are ugly (false), but his aim is to fool the ignorant into thinking they are beautiful (true).[21] But he must also present his rhetoric itself with skewed proportions. He will claim that it is virtue and wisdom, when in fact it is an empty knack that presents falsehoods as truths to the ignorant.

We can see the way in which Plato thinks the 'original' sophist has only an empty technique if we take Collection and Division as our touchstone. Although this pair of techniques actually constitutes dialectic in the *Phaedrus*, it is the argumentative technique that Plato

associates most closely with skill in rhetoric (*Phdr.* 265d-c). The rhetorician in question aims to deceive his audience by small degrees (*Phdr.* 261e-262a) about things where opinions vary greatly (*Phdr.* 263a-b), and to do this skilfully he must have knowledge of the thing in question (*Phdr.* 262a-c). He must make use of Collection to see how certain things that differ from each other are also one in some way because they belong to a single kind. And he must use Division to cut up a single kind into its parts because that single kind is itself also many. However, Plato implies that a man who mastered Collection and Division would not use it in the service of rhetoric, preferring instead "to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods" (*Phdr.* 273e). So although the philosopher's genuine Collection and Division would give him the highest rhetorical skill, he would prefer to investigate the truth rather than practice deception.

Consequently, a sophist who practices deceptive rhetoric cannot be practicing genuine Collection and Division, and Plato does not portray them doing so. What he gives us instead is a remarkably consistent picture of sophists practicing a systematic violation of the rules of Collection and Division, which for simplicity's sake I will call 'anti-Collection' and 'anti-Division'.[22] Protagoras and Gorgias don't actually have wisdom, according to Plato, but they grasp the formal character of arguments well enough to present things clearly or vaguely, accurately or inaccurately, as they please.

What I mean by anti-Collection is a gathering of things together that violates the rule that what is gathered must belong to a single kind by means of definition (*Phdr.* 265d). Anti-Collection uses a vague or inaccurate definition or explanation to pretend that what it has gathered belongs together, or simply offers no definition at all. The point of this method is

that, by multiplying various unclear connotations of the term in question, one can cast one's net as widely as possible, either to include illegitimate things within the anti-Collection or to make a false equivalence between one or more items within it. For example, if one wants to claim that skill in verbal combat is virtue, one might use the term virtue in a vague and loose way to refer to many and various things, so that one's audience accepts one's inclusion of verbal combat.

Anti-Division is the converse. It violates the rule that a kind must be Divided along its natural joints (*Phdr.* 265e). Instead, it pretends no Division is possible, presenting a given term or description as if it can be understood in only one manner, again either by giving a vague or false definition or no definition at all. The point of anti-Division is to zero-in on the single connotation that the rhetorician wants to plant in his audience's mind, while either adding to it or replacing certain of its characteristics with ones drawn from other, unmentioned, connotations, or simply excluding from consideration connotations that would weaken his argument. For example, if, as above, one wanted to claim that skill in verbal combat is virtue, one might instead refer to this skill alone as virtue, either ignoring other connotations of the word or, more likely, pretending that all other connotations are equivalent in meaning to skill in verbal combat. Courage, justice, and wisdom, one might claim, all find their acme in the defeat of one's political enemies for the sake of the good of the city. So while anti-Collection is a sort of unprincipled inclusion of many different things under a single kind, anti-Division is a false univocity that excludes most of the things that should fall under a single kind.[23]

Plato portrays the sophists practicing anti-Collection and anti-Division in four principal dialogues, *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. Anti-Collection is seen in a clumsy way in *Hippias Major* and in a more subtle way in *Protagoras*. Hippias so automatically thinks that a multiplicity can be called by a single name, but without a unifying principle, that he doesn't even understand Socrates' distinction between 'the fine' and 'a fine thing' (*Hp. Ma.* 287d). He thinks the fine is simply a list of fine customs (*Hp. Ma. 286*b), or a fine girl (*Hp. Ma.* 287e), a fine horse (*Hp. Ma*. 289a), gold (*Hp. Ma*. 289e), or riches, health, honour, long life, and a good funeral (*Hp. Ma*. 291d-e). Hippias himself perhaps engages in anti-Collection because he has a simplistic metaphysics in which there actually is no unifying principle of a multiplicity, so even natural kinds are pure aggregates (*Hp. Ma.* 300b-302a).[24]

Protagoras is more calculating. He pretends, for example that 'sophist' refers equally to the poets, prophets, athletes, and musicians, so that Homer and Orpheus are as much sophists as he, but he does so without defining what he means by sophist (*Prt.* 316d-317a).[25] His anti-Collection probably aims at the opposite of what he claims. Rather than these earlier figures hiding their sophistry under the mask of more reputable arts, it is Protagoras who wants to mitigate the bad reputation that 'sophist' has taken on by association with older uses of the name.[26]

Protagoras' main anti-Collection, however, is of virtue. Without ever giving a clear definition of what virtue is in itself, he claims he can 'make you better every day' (*Prt.* 318a), and that virtue is sound deliberation, how to be powerful in speaking and acting in the city, and the art of citizenship (*Prt.* 319a). He claims both that virtue is natural because it is given to men by the gods (*Prt.* 322c), and that it comes through education and custom

(*Prt.* 325c-326d). All men teach virtue, but Protagoras is a better teacher than all men (*Prt.* 328b). Virtue is justice, temperance, piety, wisdom, and courage, but these have no unifying principle (and are unrelated to his other accounts), being related as the parts of a face (*Prt.* 329d-e).[27] Finally, having 'established' himself as an expert in virtue, Protagoras gets to what I think is the point of this anti-Collection, which is his claim that "the greatest part of a man's education (*paideia*) is to be in command of poetry (*peri epôn deinos*)" (*Prt.* 339a). *Paideia* here is probably a continuation of the discussion of virtue. And being *peri epôn deinos*, whose surface connotation is being good at explaining poetry, really means being formidable in verbal contests, as the sparring match over the text of Simonides that follows demonstrates. In other words, Protagoras is insinuating that, because he is an expert in virtue, when he trains you to be a 'champion in verbal combat' he is training you in virtue.

As with Hippias, Protagoras' use of anti-Collection may depend on a particular metaphysical view. He seems to think that words like 'good' or 'advantageous' are just names for sums of disconnected things with no unifying principle, so that the same thing can be both good and bad, as olive oil is good for the hair and bodies of humans but bad for plants and for the fur of animals or when ingested in more than small amounts (*Prt.* 334a-c). Moreover, the reason he doesn't take seriously Socrates' argument that Justice resembles Piety is that he thinks words can make anything resemble anything else, even white resemble black, or hard resemble soft (*Prt.* 331d-e), possibly because the world itself is just a disconnected panoply of appearance. Rather than look for the principle of something like virtue that would explain its various ap-

pearances, Protagoras may really think that the 'principle' of Collection is the sophist's rhetoric, by which he can "change the appearances" to whatever he wishes (*Tht.* 166d).

Plato portrays anti-Division, in turn, being practiced in a clumsy way throughout the *Euthydemus*. As Socrates points out to the young Clinias, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus move back and forth between meanings of a single word while pretending that there is only one meaning (*Euthd.* 277d-278b). When Socrates attempts to counter with a proper Division, they get angry with him, forbid him from making distinctions in his answers, and change the subject (*Euthd.* 295c-297b).[28]

Anti-Division is also the main technique in *Gorgias*. Gorgias begins with a vague account of rhetoric that results from a refusal to make distinctions: rhetoric is simply wisdom (*Grg.* 449d-e) in making speeches (*Grg.* 450d). In their combat, Socrates forces Gorgias into a step by step Division of his account of rhetoric, depriving him of the ambiguity of his initial anti-Division. He forces Gorgias to say that rhetoric is about the greatest of human concerns (*Grg.* 451d), i.e. persuading fellow citizens and ruling over them (*Grg.* 452d), about the just and unjust (*Grg.* 454b), without actually teaching them (*Grg.* 454e), and even directs them in the just and unjust use of their own arts (*Grg.* 455d). Because he shows it to be only one particular kind of 'wisdom in making speeches', Socrates deprives Gorgias' rhetoric of the generally positive connotation that initially attached to that phrase. Gorgias' rhetoric is 'wise speech' in a much narrower sense, directed only to ambitious young politicians rather than to the mass of citizens, over whom it promises domination. Further, when Socrates refutes Gorgias' claim that the rhetorician could use rhetoric unjustly, Gorgias remains silent about Socrates' use of

anti-Division against him. Socrates assumes a single meaning of the word 'justice', but this is a meaning Gorgias himself does not share (*Grg.* 460b-461b), as pointed out later by Polus (*Grg.* 461b) and Callicles (*Grg.* 482c), who certainly do not think justice has the compulsive power Socrates attributes to it.[29]

When Polus takes over from Gorgias, he thinks he doesn't need to hear anything more about rhetoric than that it produces pleasure and gratification, and is completely unprepared for Socrates' Division, in which rhetoric takes its place as a knack beside sophistry, over against justice and legislation (*Grg.* 464d-465b). Further, on the basis of a presumed univocity, Polus considers power to be an unqualified good, to which Socrates responds by Dividing 'doing what you see fit' from 'doing what you want' (*Grg.* 467b).

After berating Socrates for defeating Polus by not Dividing what is shameful by nature from what is shameful by convention (*Grg.* 482d, see 474c),[30] Callicles himself attempts a series of anti-Divisions. He pretends that the superior (*kreitton*), better (*beltion*), and stronger (*ischuroteron*) are the same thing and have the same definition (*Grg.* 488b-d). But once Socrates Divides 'superior' in a way that undermines Callicles' claim that the 'stronger' are superior, he drops 'stronger' and claims that by 'superior' he just meant 'better' and 'worthier' (*ameinous*) all along (*Grg.* 489b-e). When Socrates throws in 'more intelligent' (*phronomôterous*), Callicles initially accepts this as univocally good, but then reacts to Socrates' Division by rejecting the knowledge of the craftsmen and shifting its meaning to being "intelligent about the affairs of the city," throwing in being 'brave' for good measure (*Grg.* 491a-b). Callicles is attempting an anti-Division rather than an anti-Collection, I think, because he is not try-

ing to Collect together a number of distinct things by means of a single name. Instead, he is trying to claim that these words are really just different names for one single thing, the 'superior' person whose reason and bravery serve his large appetites (*Grg.* 491e-492a). He downplays, trivialises, or tries to ignore meanings of these words that don't fit his univocal conception. He does the same with pleasure, claiming that it is always a good (*Grg.* 492d, 494b), i.e. that it is a single univocal kind, which is why he loses the argument once he accepts Socrates' Division of pleasure into better and worse (*Grg.* 499b).[31]

That the sophist's use of anti-Collection and anti-Division yields only a sham wisdom is shown by Socrates' successful use of Collection and Division against them. So the response that Socrates gives, both in *Hippias Major* and in *Protagoras*, is to look for the actual principle that would turn each of the multiplicities invoked by the sophists into an accurate Collection.[32] With Hippias, Socrates doesn't reach the principle, but his suggestions of the appropriate, the useful, the beneficial, and the 'pleasant through hearing and sight' are movements in the right direction (*Hp. Ma.* 293d to end). With Protagoras, Socrates spends the entire end of the dialogue arguing that the single principle behind an accurate Collection of the various virtues is that they are kinds of wisdom (*Prt.* 361b). Protagoras leaves the conversation before Socrates can point out that this principle would disqualify skill in verbal combat. In *Euthydemus*, Socrates' few proper Divisions give the lie to the whole affair, and in *Gorgias* his Divisions are so effective against Callicles that he simply withdraws from the discussion and Socrates must complete it himself (*Grg.* 505c).

At this point we can understand how the 'original' that lies behind the hunter,

merchant, and disputer is a 'contrary-speech-making, insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier' (268c). The sophist hunts for young men to whom he can sell a training in rhetoric, which he thinks is a form of combat, i.e. 'contrary-speech-making'. He is aware that this rhetoric is not true wisdom, i.e. that he is 'unknowing'. What he has, instead, is a technique for manipulating appearances with an eye to his audience's ungrounded opinions. Because he knows this, his claim to teach wisdom is 'insincere'.[33] And because his technique depends on illicit inclusions, in anti-Collection, or illicit exclusions, in anti-Division, he is a 'word-juggler'. In other words, the 'original' sophist is a dealer in speeches who knows his rhetoric is a manipulation of appearances, but who pretends otherwise. In the next two sections, we will investigate how this pretence, the claim that his rhetoric is wisdom and virtue and that it brings political success, is the 'distortion' he introduces into his proportions, to continue the statue analogy. We will see how, to the ignorant, this pretence makes him seem 'beautiful'. But first we will occupy a viewpoint where we can detect the ugliness/falsehood of this distortion.

5. THE UGLY DISTORTIONS IN THE DEFINITIONS IN *SOPHIST*

With the 'original' sophist in front of us, we can see how he distorts his proportions to make himself seem better than he is. The extreme brevity of the first five definitions, as I remarked above, make it difficult to do this on the basis of *Sophist* alone.[34] However, we do find in these six definitions examples of anti-Collection and anti-Division. When read together with the fuller pictures Plato gives us elsewhere, these let us detect the means

by which the sophist presents himself falsely. The essence of his distortion is to present his rhetoric as if it were the height of wisdom, a kind of philosophy and political science combined. We can see how this distorted image is 'ugly', because we are able to compare it with the original. It is not wisdom. It is only a manipulation of appearances.

The anti-Collection in the definitions turns mainly on the unprincipled inclusion of a multiplicity of items under the term 'virtue'. As we saw above, sophists in many dialogues claim that (def. 1) virtue is something you will acquire by associating with them. But it is also, as in *Protagoras* especially, (defs. 2-4) akin to a trade-good that can be acquired in one city and sold in another. As in *Gorgias*, it is implied that (def. 5) skill in debating (eristics), which is a subdivision of verbal combat, is also virtue. And, in keeping with Socrates' practice in many dialogues, (def. 6) virtue is also the cleansing of the soul's false opinions in order to make it better. As in *Protagoras*, this is an anti-Collection, because the connection of virtue to the various activities described in the definitions in *Sophist* is merely asserted. At no point in *Sophist* is virtue defined. Nor, for that matter, are Gorgias, Hippias, or the rest forthcoming in their dialogues about exactly how what they teach is a form of virtue. Moreover, it is possible that, as in *Protagoras*, the point of the anti-Collection here in *Sophist* is to make what is not virtue (i.e. def. 5) seem like it is virtue, by association with what really is virtuous, namely (def. 6) Socrates's purifying refutations.[35] Socrates really will (def. 1) associate with you for the sake of virtue, and really does (def. 6) refute you for your own betterment, so when the sophist seems to do the same, his (def. 5) art of disputation also seems to be beneficial and (defs. 2-4) worth the money he charges. The vagueness of a

Gorgias or Hippias on this point likely has the same aim, to distort the character of their rhetorical instruction so that they can include it under the umbrella term 'virtue'.

Further, we find within each definition an anti-Division, an ambiguity or unclarity that encourages a univocal understanding of some term. These ambiguities distort the character of the sophist's various activities, making them seem to be in the service of virtue. (Def. 1) The first definition piggybacks on the practice-definition of the angler, so it literally obscures a Division made by the Stranger: only within the angler is acquisition Divided into the opposition of 'taking possession' and 'mutually willing exchange', and only there is it made clear that hunting is a secret taking possession (219d). The first definition of the sophist picks up after that point (221d), so it simply omits the cardinal character of hunting, that the prey does not enter into the association willingly. This distorts the purpose of the sophist's association with his students. He "claims" (223a)[36] it is for the sake of his students' virtue, but, as a form of hunting, it is really a taking possession for his own enrichment. That his promise of virtue is parallel to the pleasure that the flatterer uses as 'bait' (222e) indicates another distortion by which he masks the aim of his association. He pretends it is exchange in order to hide its character as acquisition, and he pretends that he has a genuine article to exchange. But if his teachings are 'bait', then he has nothing of worth. Compare this with Protagoras' claim that Hippocrates will become a better man each day that he studies with him (*Prt*. 318a-b). Protagoras' debate with Socrates, most likely, is a piece of advertising intending to gain fee-paying customers from the rich young men assembled at the house of Callias. But it is clear by the end of the *Protagoras* that the sophist does not know what virtue is.[37] So his claim that he can make Hippocrates better is clearly false. No virtue would be acquired, so no exchange would be made.

(Defs. 2-4) The distortion of the sophist's association in the first definition made it look like exchange, hence we have the second to fourth definitions of the sophist, as a sort of merchant. Here, again, we find an anti-Division. We are given only a single way to think about the goods sold by merchants, namely as separable objects that can be made, procured, and disposed of. Even the goods for the soul are presented in this way, as pieces of music, paintings, or travelling shows (224a). This is in keeping with how, for Gorgias, virtue was something that he could basically throw in as an afterthought if a student happened to need it (*Grg*. 460a). Similarly, when forbidden from selling virtue in Sparta, Hippias simply substituted a different selection of his wares (*Hp. Ma*. 285d-e). But this univocal presentation ignores what Socrates claims about teachings (*Prt*. 313c), that they are not acquired in the same manner as separable goods. They are not the sort of thing that you can carry away in a container. They enter directly into your soul (*Prt*. 314b), such that a man who truly knew justice would never act unjustly (*Grg*. 460c). So the distortion in the first definition made the sophist's hunting seem to be one where the student exchanges money for virtue. The distortion in the second to fourth definitions make virtue seem like a trade-good, the sort of thing the merchant-sophist can plausibly claim to offer.

(Defs. 5-6) The final anti-Division is effected by the juxtaposition of the final two of the six definitions, and consists in conflating the different kinds of refutation in argument. The sophist's most valuable 'trade-good' is a technique of disputation that he distorts

into a semblance of education in virtue (*Prt.* 339a) or wisdom (*Grg.* 449e). He is able to present this technique of refutation as a kind of virtue, even though it aims only at victory, by assimilating it to Socrates' refutation of ignorance. And he can do this because most people don't see that the athlete in contests of words differs from the purifier of souls as a "wolf from a dog, the wildest thing there is and the gentlest" (231a). As we saw above, Socrates is often taken to be a sophist because sophists attempt to make their arguments resemble wisdom (233b-c).

This anti-Division, therefore, presents refutation as a single thing, namely as the sort of thing that Socrates and other philosophers engage in. Hence the distortion that it introduces into the sophist's rhetoric is complex, because depends on the listener's opinion of Socrates and other philosophers. This variety of opinion lets sophistical refutation appear to be three different things to three different audiences, each of whom ends up with a different univocal understanding. The juxtaposition of these last two definitions in *Sophist*, I think, indicates a complex subterfuge that we see played out when sophists in other dialogues present their rhetoric as a kind of 'virtue-for-sale'. Some of their listeners think their rhetoric is a waste of time, others think it is the height of wisdom, while still others think it is a technique for power.

To some, (A) sophistical refutation seems like the 'chatter' of the annoying but harmless man who simply enjoys argument, and who occupies the other half of the division of 'debating' (eristics) with the sophist as verbal athlete (225d). This is the opinion of the unnamed man who, a forensic speechwriter himself, considers the display of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to be an example of philosophical discussion, and so who considers phi-

losophy to have "no value whatsoever" (*Euthd.* 304e-305a). This is a distortion because, while sophistical rhetoric doesn't have the degree of power Gorgias claims for it, it can sway the opinions of citizens about important things and so is not as trivial as this appearance pretends (*Tht.* 167c; *Grg.* 452e, 455b-456c).

To others, (B) the sophist's claim to improve his students (*Prt.* 318a-b) makes him seem like the wise sophist of noble lineage, whose refutation purifies souls of their ignorance (230d). These students listen to the sophist's 'edifying' speeches and enjoy his public verbal contests and think they have been bettered.[38] This seems to be the opinion of young Hippocrates, who is so innocent that he asks Socrates to intercede for him with Protagoras. This is also a distortion, because the sophist has only an empty verbal technique. This is why Socrates, instead of enrolling Hippocrates as a pupil of Protagoras, unmasks the sophist in a complete and very public take-down.

(C) Others really hear the sense of strife and battle in debating (eristics) (225c). This audience is aware of the difference between a sophist and a philosopher, so the anti-Division doesn't fly with them. However, this works in the sophist's favour, because these men have no interest in philosophy. On the contrary, they think sophistical refutation will allow them to enslave their fellow citizens (*Grg.* 452e). Callicles is the prime example of this audience. He considers philosophy admirable in a youth but shameful in a grown man, because it renders such a man helpless in the vicious contest of Athenian politics (*Grg.* 485c-486c). But Plato thinks this appearance directed at the vicious and power-hungry is also a distortion. Although rhetoric is not toothless, Socrates argues that it does not deliver the power over one's fellow citizens

that Gorgias promises. It is merely an art-less knack, a flattery that is dependent on its audience, guessing at what will satisfy their prejudices (*Grg.* 463a-466a). Contrary to his expectation, a student of sophistical rhetoric like Callicles does not have the freedom to use words as he pleases, because what he says has to please the *demos*. And if you are going to persuade the people you have to speak like the people (*Grg.* 513a-c; *R.* 487e-488e, 578e-580a; *Tht.* 172e-173b).

Finally, we should notice an important connection between the fifth definition and the first. As in the first, the Stranger obscures the fifth definition by omitting a step in the jump from acquisition to combat. What lies between is that combat is openly taking pos-session rather than mutually willing exchange. So, as with the hunter, this omission makes the sophist's training in argument seem to be for the sake of his students' betterment. But as with hunting, debating (eristics) as combat is a form of acquisition. But it is an odd sort of acquisition. When one bests an opponent in debating, one doesn't strip them of their armour. Instead, one simply wins a victory. For the sophist, however, his victory in verbal combat gains him a higher reputation, which leads to more students, and hence to the real object of acquisition, his students' fees.[39]

6. THE BEAUTIFUL APPEARANCE OF THE SOPHIST

Let's remind ourselves of the terms in our analogy. There is the 'original' sophist, which, like the sculptor's model, is the sophist as he actually is. This is the 'contrary-speech-making, insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier'. And there is the image of the sophist, the false appearance produced by distorting the proportions of the original. For a large statue, the same distorted proportions seem ugly up close, but appear beautiful when seen from far away. For the sophist, when we compare the sophist's distortions of his rhetorical technique to the actual character of that technique (i.e. get 'up close'), we perceive their falsehood ('ugliness'). But when someone encounters the same distortions without the ability to compare them with his technique's genuine character (i.e. 'from far away), they are fooled. Like the viewer of the large statue, to whom the ugly proportions seem beautiful, to this naïve observer the sophist's false claims about his practice seem true ('beautiful').

The sophist's general 'beautiful' appear-ance lies in his claim to improve his students (def. 1), because he is a merchant of virtue and wisdom (defs. 2-4). He offers all sort of goods for sale, such as edifying speeches about his audience's existing opinions about virtue (*Hp. Ma.* 286a-b; *R.* 493a-c). He offers more basic (*Men.* 70a, *Cra.* 384b-c) and more advanced courses (def. 5) in wise speech (*Grg.* 449e). And, as with any businessman, he takes no personal responsibility for his students' use of his wares (*Grg.* 457b-c).

More specifically, this false appearance seems 'beautiful' in different ways, as we saw in the last section, depending on the listener's attitude towards what the sophist has for sale. (A) To someone with a low opinion of both philosophical and sophistical debate, (def. 5) the sophist's wares seem like mere chatter. This appearance is useful to the sophist, because he has to be careful of a man like Anytus, who is perhaps suspicious of the idea that virtue is something that can be bought and sold, and who perhaps dislikes being contradicted in public and urged to care more for virtue than profit (*Ap.* 31b), blaming Socrates rather than himself (230b, *Men.* 80a-b).[40] The sophist

knows he is disliked by Anytus, to whom his wares are empty and money spent on them is wasted. So he would like his distortion of his technique, his claim to wisdom, to give Anytus the impression that all philosophy and all sophistry are "worthless and ridiculous" (*Euthd.* 305a). He wants to appear 'beautiful' in the sense that men who might be alarmed by his technique accept its false appearance as harmless chatter, which it is not.

On the other hand, the sophist-merchant appears to be (B) a genuine purveyor of wisdom to someone like Hippocrates (*Prt.* 310d-e), who is young and impressionable, and who knows nothing about what Protagoras teaches, only that "he has a monopoly on wisdom… [and that] everyone says he's a terribly clever speaker" (*Prt.* 310d-311a). Many of the sophist's customers will be like Hippocrates, thinking only that sophists are wise and can argue about everything (232b-233c, 234c). These customers will never make it to the 'advanced course' in disputation, because they don't want to become sophists (*Prt.* 312-a-b). Because the sophist wants to extract money from them, he presents his wares as snippets of wisdom (def. 1) that they acquired somewhere or generated themselves (defs. 2-4). He gives them rhetorical displays (def. 5) that entertain and make these naïve customers consider themselves wise. After listening to Protagoras' "virtuoso performance" on Prometheus, Epimetheus, and the rest, most listeners won't immediately begin interrogating the speaker, as Socrates proceeds to do (*Prt.* 329b). They will simply applaud and think that they have gotten their money's worth from Protagoras, the merchant of virtue. Someone like Callias counts himself lucky to have found a man who can educate his sons for the 'reasonable' fee of only five minas (*Ap.* 20b).[41] Even the 'old late-learners' (251b) Euthydemus and Dionysodorus actually

seem to think that the stock technique they have paid for is genuine wisdom, as incredible as that seems (*Euthd.* 274b, 275a, 303b).

Finally, to an ambitious young aristocrat who perceives the agonistic character of sophistical rhetoric and thinks it a worthwhile investment, the sophist appears 'beautiful' as (C) a merchant of success. Although Gorgias claims that he makes his students 'wise' (*phronein*, *Grg.* 449e) in what they speak about, what he means is that he makes men 'formidable speakers' (*Men.* 95c, cf. *Prt.* 339a). Virtue in the sense that Socrates means it isn't part of his instruction (*Grg.* 460a). Instead, Gorgias wants his prime customers to hear 'virtue' in 'merchant of articles of knowledge about virtue' (224c) in a very different sense, namely as the 'excellence' that will make you a successful man by making your fellow citizens your slaves (*Grg.* 452e).

As we saw above, Gorgias is initially cagey about what he teaches, saying only that it is about "the greatest of human concerns" (*Grg.* 451d), and likely doesn't broadcast too widely that the 'wisdom' he offers is a technique for dominating others. It is likely that Gorgias has to be careful, even though his conception of virtue as a kind of domination is a lot closer to the mainstream than is the virtue of Socrates. Polemarchus' 'helping friends and harming enemies', for example, seems the obvious way to order one's life to one of the richest men in Athens, who, although a foreigner, feels at home among its aristocratic elite (Blondell, 1989, pp. 26-28). But even though he claims justice is a kind of factionalism among powerful men by which you amass as much for your side as possible (*R.* 332a-b), Polemarchus doesn't seem to realise that he is only a hair's breadth away from Thrasymachus' egoism. And although many men think success in life consists in dominating others, they don't often say so openly,

and instead praise justice for the "reputations, honours, and rewards that are its consequences" (*R.* 366b-367a).[42] Their praise of justice, in other words, doesn't indicate an acceptance of Socrates' virtue, which demands an admission of your own ignorance and a willingness to change your whole life, but neither does it indicate a tolerance of Thrasymachus. What Gorgias sells young aristocrats, on the other hand, is the promise that they can in fact take their culture's version of 'success' to its logical conclusion: a naked pursuit of power that doesn't require them to change their character one bit. Although he is a bumpkin, Meno is an aristocratic bumpkin and serves as an extreme example. When asked what virtue is, this less-than-gifted student of Gorgias essentially answers 'power' all three times (*Men.* 71e, 73c, 77b). For their part, Callicles and Thrasymachus are clear that 'virtue' is the pursuit of power (*R.* 348c-d; *Grg.* 483a-d). And Alcibiades is such a singular character because, while rejecting Socrates' company in favour of his unscrupulous political career, he is perfectly aware that he is rejecting real virtue (*Smp.* 216b-c).

This polyvalence of the sophist's 'beautiful' appearance affords him a measure of protection. He is able to appeal to a Meno or a Callicles, I think, while at the same time not alienating a Polemarchus or alarming an Anytus, because the 'beautiful' false appearances (A) and (B) serve as a sort of screen for appearance (C). Not everyone has the ambition or the lack of scruples of Meno, or the wealth and connections to devote themselves to politics. And to these men who are not his 'preferred audience', the sophist hides behind his merchant persona, letting himself seem either as (A) a quibbler or (B) fount of wisdom, depending on the prejudices of others. But the sophist wants the rich, ambitious young man to think that they are seeing the sophist as he

is, and that (C) for a fee the sophist can make him too into an athlete in contests of words.

Underneath these 'beautiful' false appearances is still the original, the 'insincere, unknowing, word-juggling falsifier'. He wants his customers to think they receive something of value through their association with him. But he is, at bottom, a hunter for his students' money, and hunting is a taking possession done in secret. So, as we saw, the sophist is only pretending to be a merchant with a valuable product for sale, when in actuality his 'virtue' is merely bait. His first prey, those who mistake his 'word-juggling' for wisdom and edification, lose only their money. His preferred prey, however, an advanced student like Callicles, loses more than that. Plato thinks that Gorgias cannot deliver the 'success' that Callicles wants, and when Callicles tries to put this rhetoric into practice it actively makes him ignorant and vicious.

As we saw in our examination of anti-Collection and anti-Division, and as the Stranger shows in the seventh definition, the sophist does not make men wise. Rather, he merely takes advantage of an opponent's ignorance to score points over them in argument. That his technique is unknowing, the Stranger takes to be demonstrated by the impossible breadth of subjects that they are "clever at contradicting" (232c) men about: the gods, things on the earth and in the sky, being and coming to be, laws and political issues, and "anything you need to say to contradict any expert himself, both in general and within each particular field" (232d). Because it is impossible for any human being to know everything, the sophists only "appear to their students to be wise about everything...without actually being wise" (233c).[43] Far from being true education (*paideia*), the Stranger concludes, claiming to know everything and

to be able to teach it cheaply and quickly is merely "a game for schoolchildren (*paidia*)" (234a). The pitiful effect of this can be seen in the clumsy show of argument of a Meno, Euthydemus, or Dionysodorus.

In addition to ignorance, if a student actually tries to use the sophist's technique to gain political power, it instils vice in his soul. Speaking to the *demos* is not the same as conducting a debate in a sophist's school. While the technique seems to give power to the speaker, letting him choose whichever ambiguous meaning works to his advantage, the actual scope of his speech is very limited. Because his rhetoric is a form of flattery (*Grg.* 463a-466a), he has to conform his speech to the opinions of his audience. The effect of this, according to Socrates, is that rather than enslaving your fellow citizens this technique makes you the slave of their ignorance and vice and ultimately makes you as vicious as they are (*Grg.* 513a-c). As the readers of *Protagoras* would have noticed, the prospective customers at the sophist trade-show became some of the worst men in Greece, whose ambition and vice led many of them to bad ends.[44]

7. CONCLUSION

These first six definitions in *Sophist*, I have argued, are an enactment of the sophist's application of his technique to himself. They present a calculated false appearance, a distortion of the sophist's actual rhetorical practice. Seen 'from afar', without an awareness of his rhetoric's true character, this distorted image seems 'beautiful'. It appeals to potential students without alarming other citizens. The sophist seems merely to be a businessman who 'hunts' for rich young men, selling them a collection of fine opinions or

a training in disputation. This appears to a Callicles as the means to political power, but to most it seems like the harmless quibbling of a Euthydemus, even if to some it seems like the beneficial refutation of a Socrates. When compared to the actual character of his rhetoric, which is an unknowing manipulation of words, the ugliness of this image becomes apparent. He is neither a businessman nor a trainer in success. He is essentially a hunter in the core sense of the word. His promise of edification or of political power is the bait he uses to acquire his students' money, and all he gives them is an empty and childish technique. At best they part with their money for a sham sort of wisdom and entertainment. But if they put his rhetoric into practice they look foolish. At worst, this rhetoric enslaves them to the vice of the *demos*.

The strength of this interpretation of *Sophist* is that it gives a plausible explanation of how the six definitions fit together, something that I don't think has yet been offered in the literature. It also gives a plausible explanation of how they relate to the seventh definition, which occupies the rest of the dialogue, insofar as it implies that the first six definitions are an example or enactment of what is later investigated philosophically. That false speech is possible is what allows the sophist to present himself as he 'is not'. This reading also suggests that *Sophist*, in spite of its metaphysical and linguistic concerns, is also a genuine investigation of sophistry. This draws it closer to the other dialogues in its dramatic sequence, because sophistry also holds a prominent place in both *Theaetetus* and *Statesman*. Finally, insofar as this interpretation discerns concrete connections between *Sophist* and so-called middle dialogues on sophistry, it should be welcome by those who favour a Unitarian reading of Plato.

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ENDNOTES

1   (A) Seligman ignores the definitions, writing them off as student practice in dialectic (Seligman, 1974, p. 12). (B) Zuckert thinks the definitions are inconclusive (Zuckert, 2009, p. 691). (C) Rickless thinks they collect together the sophist's appearances and are all completely wrong, but are useful in order to rule out the idea that he practices acquisition (Rickless, 2010). (D) Cornford thinks that they variously describe different historical persons, such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Hippias (Cornford, 1935, p. 173), and that taken together the five initial definitions serve as a Collection (187), referring to the method of Collection and Division, for the authoritative seventh definition, and is followed in this by Bluck (1975, pp. 52-53). However, Cornford also seems to think that none of the people described in the first six definitions are actually sophists in the fullest sense (187). He also has no idea why the sixth definition, which he thinks describes Socrates, is included, suggesting it was part of an unfinished plan and would have made sense had Plato written Philosopher (181-182). Wolff emphasises the broad scope of the name 'sophist', and thinks the definitions refer to various functions that received this name, practiced by people like Protagoras and Gorgias, but also by the Cynics or Megarians (Wolff, 1991, pp. 31-37). (E) Some think that the definitions, taken together, display all of the sophist's characteristics (Notomi, 1999, pp. 47-48, 65-66; Ambuel, 2007, p. 46). Narcy analyses each definition closely and connects it with a portrayal of sophistry from other dialogues (Narcy, 2013). But he takes this panoply of characters at face-value and does not connect them to the idea of false appearance. Dixsaut connects the multiplicity of appearances in the first six definitions with the preamble of the seventh, that the sophist can make himself seem wise in all branches of knowledge. The name sophist, she holds, doesn't have a fixed denotation, having only a relative meaning, dependent on how he appears to others. But Dixsaut doesn't explain why the Stranger articulates just these six aspects or how they fit together (Dixsaut, 2022, pp. 425, 429).

2   Some interpreters notice that the definitions present changing appearances, but simply remark that this shows that the sophist really is a maker of images (Rosen, 1999, pp. 107, 133-136; Benardete, 1984, p. II.84; Notomi, 1999, p. 81; Ambuel, 2007, pp. 46-47). Benardete, strangely, also thinks they show the sophist exhibiting all virtues, in order to show that they are not a unity (II.100-101). I think Bordoy is correct in seeing the sophist's many appearances as his attempts to evade capture, but Bordoy's interest is merely to establish this fact, with reference to Plato's allusions to false appearance in Homer. He doesn't actually discuss the appearances themselves (Bordoy, 2013).

3   Here and below single quotes will indicate a paraphrase rather than a quotation of the text.

4   "Imitation (*to mimêtikon*) of the contrary-speech producing (*enantiopoiologikês*), insincere (*eirônikou*) and unknowing sort (*doxastikês*), of the appearance-making kind (*phantastikou*) of copy-making (*eidôlopoiikês*), the word-juggling part (*en logois to thaumatopoiikon*) of production (*poiêseôs*) that's marked off as human and not divine..." (268c-d). Note that references to *Sophist* will be by Stephanus number only. References to all other dialogues will be by abbreviation and Stephanus numbers. The Greek text is Plato (1900-1907) and translations are taken from Plato (1997), occasionally modified.

5   This kind of enactment of what is analysed appears in a few other dialogues. Socrates states explicitly in the *Phaedrus* that the speeches Collect and Divide kinds of madness and kinds of love before he gives a technical discussion of Collection and Division (*Phdr.* 265e-266a). The inconclusive investigation of virtue in the *Meno* from *Men* 86c on is an example of what Socrates explicitly says is impossible, an investigation of the properties of something before one knows what that thing is.

6   Cf. Crivelli (2011, p. 22) and Tusi (2019, pp. 150-151).

7   My aim is to examine Plato's presentation of sophistry, which may or may not be accurate. For a similar approach, but with different conclusions, see Corey (2015, p. 7). See also Tusi (2019, p. 134).

8   White translates it as "appearance-making," in (Plato, 1997, p. 256).

9   Cf. 260c-d: "When he says that what's different is the same in a certain way or that what's the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise respect in which he's saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what's large appear small or something that's similar appear dissimilar—well, if someone enjoys constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that's not true refutation. It's only the obvious new-born brain-child of someone who just came into contact with those which are." See also 263d: "But if someone says things about you, but says different things as the same or not beings as beings, then it definitely seems that false

speech really and truly arises from that kind of putting together of verbs and names."

10   The fuller character of definition six is discussed below.

11   See, for example, the division of theoretical knowledge at *Plt.* 259d-260b.

12   Although my intention is to discuss Plato's presentation of sophistry rather than historical sophists, it is worthwhile to compare the brevity of the first five definitions in *Sophist* with Gorgias' technique in his *Defence of Palamedes*, (Graham, 2010, Grg50[F11], pp. 762-775). For example, "Someone might say that we guaranteed our actions by money — he paid me and I took his money. So, a little money? It is hardly likely I would take a little money for such big services rendered. A great deal of money then? How was it conveyed? How could <one man> convey it? Many then? If many conveyed it, there would be many witnesses to the plot; if one conveyed it, the payment could not have been much" (p.765). The options and the reasons for each option are presented so briefly that the listener doesn't have enough purchase on what is being proposed to object. Is there an amount small enough for a single man to carry, but large enough to entice Palamedes to betray the Greeks? We are not given time to speculate. Is it really impossible, as this argument suggests, ever to bribe someone into doing something shameful or illegal, simply because a large enough amount of money would necessarily involve witnesses? We are not given time to speculate. Similarly, in the first six definitions in Sophist, the divisions are so spare and made so quickly that we don't have the cognitive time to evaluate them.

13   It is tempting to read Plato's analogy in *Sophist* as claiming that (a) the sophist's true nature is what is ugly and (b) his false self-presentation is to make himself seem beautiful. But there are three terms in the sculpture analogy: (i) original, (ii) the distorted proportions of the sculpture that are ugly when seen up close, and (iii) the same proportions that seem beautiful from far away. So we have the (i) sophist, (ii) the distortions of the sophist's nature that are 'ugly' when investigated closely, and (iii) the same distortions that make him seem 'beautiful' if they are accepted uncritically.

14   For my argument, I will treat definitions 2-4 together: retailers, wholesalers, salesmen of their own production.

15   Unfortunately, White's translation of *eristikon* as 'debating' makes it sound innocuous (225c). Its denotation is 'eager for strife or battle', as between Achilles and Agamemnon in *Iliad* I.6, which is why it is a subdivision of the *machêtikês* and *agônistikês* (226a). But because most of the more appropriate English words also appear in his translation, I will retain White's term but render it "debating (eristics)."

16   Cf. also Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen*, in (Graham, 2010, Grg49[F10] (DK B 11), pp. 758-761).

17   For others who think this is Socrates, see Notomi (1999, p. 65). See also Ambuel (2007, p. 57), Zaks (2018), and Tusi (2019, p. 155). Dixsaut thinks this is Socrates, but she also thinks there is no difference between Socrates' 'elenchus' and sophistical 'antilogic', as opposed to 'eristic', even if what happens after the refutation is different (Dixsaut, 2022, pp. 414-418).

18   He uses a different term, but probably also assimilates the sophist as an athlete in contests of words to the chatterer, who is distinguished from him only by not making money (225d).

19   See Lachance (2017, p. 58) for a discussion of the 'antilogic' of the sophists: "[Les Antilogiciens] utilisent l'un des outils préférés de Socrate, à savoir l'*elenchos*. Or, ils l'utilisent de façon dévoyée : leur objectif est de vaincre leur interlocuteur, tandis que Socrate, lui, ne vise que la vérité. Les antilogiciens empruntent donc le masque du philosophe véritable et pervertissent ainsi la philosophie." See also Lachance (2018, pp. 152-153) and Ambuel (2011, p. 280).

20   Cf. the assimilation of "the compelling contests of words" and "the verbal competitions of philosophers" in Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, (Graham, 2010, Grg49[F10] (DK B 11), pp. 758-759).

21   For example, Cleon's claim about the attempt of the Mytilenians to defect to Sparta (the original) is that "no one state has ever injured [Athens] as much as Mytilene" (3.39). This is false/ugly, but Cleon wants his audience to think it is true/beautiful, to justify his contention that only their utter destruction can preserve the Athenian state (3.40). See Thucydides (1996, 3.37-3.40, pp. 176-179).

22   For an argument that sophistical and philosophical methods cannot be so easily distinguished, see McCoy, who thinks that what primarily differentiates a sophist from a philosopher is their moral character (McCoy, 2008, p. 5). Corey, as well, thinks that there is a strong affinity between Socrates and the sophists, and that Plato depicts various sophists in order to lead his readers to philosophy (Corey, 2015, pp. 5-6). However, Corey distinguishes sharply between sophists and rhetoricians, so he does not include among them "Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Callicles, Polus, Antiphon or Critias" (3, 29-33). A useful corrective to this position is Tusi, who, recognising the difference between rhetoric and sophistry in the classification in Gorgias, argues that in Plato's mind this distinction is less important than the fact that both professions corrupt human souls (Tusi, 2020, pp. 75-76). Note that Aristotle seems to consider Gorgias to be a sophist (*SE* 12.173a7-19, and perhaps 34.183b37).

23   Both are techniques for saying "different things are the same" (263d), the first by direct assertion and the second by implication. Compare Aristotle's final sort of merely apparent enthymeme, *Rh.* II.24.1402a3-1402a29: "[It is] based on a confusion

of the absolute with that which is not absolute." He gives examples of univocal senses of being and probability. "As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner…This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic." Compare also Aristotle's classification in Sophistical Refutations, especially homonymy, ambiguity, accident, expressions used either without qualification or with illicit qualification, and ignorance of what refutation consists in (*SE* 4.165b23-166a23, 5.166b37-167a37). See 7.169a22-25: "The error comes about in the case of arguments that depend on homonymy and the account because we are unable to distinguish the various senses (for some terms it is not easy to distinguish, e.g. one, being, and sameness)…" Aristotle claims that, while rhetoric was fairly advanced in his day, the systematic study of sophistical refutation was haphazard. It is possible, therefore, that even if Plato's characterisation of the sophists is accurate, their techniques of anti-Collection and anti-Division were not used systematically, and that his portrayal of them in this manner is the first step towards Aristotle's thorough treatment. See *SE* 34.183b34-184a4. Note that translations are from Aristotle (1984).

24   I take this to be implied by Hippias' manner of speaking about 'the fine', as well as by his complaint that Socrates "cuts up with words" things like 'the fine', things which are "naturally continuous bodies of being (*dianekê sômata tês ousias pephukota*)" (Hp. Ma. 301b). Admittedly, this phrase is unclear, but it seems to be marshalled against Socrates' practice of making distinctions within a single kind.

25   The unprincipled anti-Collection is displayed dramatically by the various appearances of the sophists at the house of Callias. Protagoras walks around giving speeches; Hippias sits on a high seat answering questions; Prodicus is still in bed, and what he says can't be made out by Socrates (*Prt.* 314e-315e). On the surface, these activities seem to have nothing in common.

26   Although the term sophist had had a wider application, in the *Protagoras* Plato makes it clear that Protagoras is aware of its current more specialised, negative connotation (*Prt.* 316d). See also Wolff (1991).

27   Later Protagoras will claim that wisdom, temperance, justice, and piety are "reasonably close" to each other, but courage is different. However, even there he gives no reason or principle that explains his assertion about these four virtues (*Prt.* 349d).

28   Cf. Aristotle, *SE* 17.175b28-175b39, where he points out that one must be able to make distinctions when replying to an argument dependent on ambiguity.

29   Technically, they say Gorgias should never have admitted that a rhetorician should teach justice to a student who is ignorant of it. But they hold this because of their conception of justice as something onerous.

30   Cf. Aristotle, *SE* 12.173a7-19, where he points out that the *nomos-physis* distinction was a common way of drawing men to make paradoxical statements, referring to the *Gorgias*.

31   Thrasymachus uses the same technique, not Dividing ruling from merely holding power in the city, and has to be forced to admit that those who hold power will not practice the art of ruling (*R.* 343b-347d). See also the historical Gorgias' use of the technique in his *Defence of Palamedes*, (Graham, 2010, Grg50[F11], pp.762-775), which presents a total system of possibilities where every case allows only a single meaning of the terms involved, in order to shut down any response. See also his *On What is Not*, (Graham, 2010, Grg38[F1a] and Grg39[F1b] (DK 16 B3), pp.740-751), where the term 'unlimited' shifts in meaning from time to space, without this being indicated (see pp.741, 747). In general the 'antilogic' argument form makes use of a univocal understanding of terms. See Brémond (2022, pp. 109-114) for Gorgias as the model for this sort of argument in *Parmenides* and for the reliance of antilogic on a univocal use of terms. See also Brémond (2019).

32   Cf. Aristotle, *SE* 23.179a11-25: "It is a general rule in dealing with arguments that depend on language that the solution always follows the opposite of the point on which the argument turns: e.g. if the argument depends upon combination, then the solution consists in division; if upon division, then in combination. Again, if it depends on an acute accent, the solution is a grave accent; if on a grave accent, it is an acute. If it depends on homonymy, one can solve it by using the opposite word; e.g. if you find yourself calling something inanimate, despite your previous denial that it was so, show in what sense it is animate; if you have declared it to be inanimate and he has deduced that it is animate, say how it is inanimate. Likewise also in the case of ambiguity. If the argument depends on likeness of expression, the opposite will be the solution. 'Could a man give what he has not got?' No, not what he has not got; but he could give it in a way in which he has not got it, e.g. one die by itself. 'Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that he knows, singly?' Yes, but not the things that he knows. Also a man treads, perhaps, on anything he walks through, but not on the time he walks through. Likewise also in the case of the other examples."

33   Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are clear that they have only a technique for contradiction, although they seem to think this is wisdom (*Euthd.* 275e, 276e). Protagoras, in spite of his claim to be wise, clearly knows what he is doing. His contest with

Socrates about Simonides' poem doesn't aim at a true interpretation. Instead, he quotes the poem selectively in order to make his false interpretation seem true (*Prt.* 339a-d). Gorgias claims that he can persuade a patient far more effectively than a doctor, even though he has no knowledge of medicine (*Grg.* 456a-c). In contrast, Hippias genuinely does seem to think he is wise, and he certainly has a prodigious memory. But he seems to take seriously Socrates' ironic equivalence between financial success and wisdom, indicating that his conviction of wisdom is due to his lack of it (*Hp. Ma.* 281d-283b).

34   The exception is the sixth definition, which I argued above isn't really of a sophist.

35   For someone who is convinced of this, see Dixsaut (2022, pp. 414-418).

36   "Claims" is *epaggellomenon*. I think the connotation is 'merely claims', i.e. claims falsely.

37   This is why Protagoras is so keen to leave the discussion at various points. He realises that, as advertising, his discussion with Socrates is a disaster.

38   See the applause for Protagoras' performance at *Prt.* 334c and 339e.

39   Dixsaut also thinks the six definitions exhibit the sophist presenting himself falsely, but differs in her analysis of what the falsehoods consist in: "Car le sophiste possède effectivement tous les arts qu'il prétend avoir, mais il les pratique à sa façon. C'est un chasseur qui pratique une chasse qui n'existe pas, une chasse aux animaux paisibles; un commerçant qui vend, de toutes les façons possibles, une marchandise qui n'en est pas une; un lutteur qui déploie une habileté sans pareille lorsqu'il jongle avec les mots, pour en arriver à ce que rien ne soit dit. Éducateur de jeunes gens riches, trafiquant de biens culturels en tous genres, virtuose inégalable du langage, le sophiste à la fois l'est et ne l'est pas, car en éduquant il pervertit, en diffusant la culture il la corrompt, et quant à sa maîtrise du discours, elle ne lui sert qu'à démontrer l'incapacité du langage à dire ce qui est vraiment" (Dixsaut, 2022, p. 421).

40   *Prt.* 316c-d: "Caution is in order for a foreigner who goes into the great cities and tries to persuade the best of the young men in them to abandon their associations with others, relatives and acquaintances, young and old alike, and to associate with him instead on the grounds that they will be improved by this association. Jealousy, hostility, and intrigue on a large scale are aroused by such activity."

41   Nails (2002, p. 153) tells us that Evenus was probably not a sophist, but Callias' uncritical willingness to sink five minas, "the net worth of all of Socrates' property," into expert training for his sons is of a piece with the vast sums he has already spent on sophists, "more money…than everybody else put together" (*Ap.* 20a).

42   Even in the *Encomium of Helen*, when Gorgias asserts that speech is a "great potentate" and like a drug for the soul, and that persuasion is effected by false speech, he stops short of advocating the use of this power. Ironically, although he himself teaches this technique, his *Encomium* pretends that Helen should be acquitted if she were the victim of pernicious persuasion. See (Graham, 2010, Grg49[F10] (DK 16 B11), pp. 758-761).

43   As we have seen above, the paired techniques of anti-Collection and anti-Division don't aim at knowledge. Rather, they are techniques for falsifying while escaping detection.

44   See their stories in Nails. See especially the entry for Meno, who was considered to be such a bad man he was tortured for a year before his execution (Nails, 2002, pp. 204-205).

Speech, Personification, and Friendship in Plato's *Crito*

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ABSTRACT

In this article, I propose novel answers to three longstanding questions in the scholarship on Plato's *Crito*: (1) Why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech?; (2) Why does this speech employ personification?; and (3) Why are the Laws, specifically, personified ? The answers to these questions will reveal Socrates' method of treating Crito and his worldview. The latter considers himself to be a good man for a twofold reason, namely, he is concerned not only about helping a friend but also about the possible negative consequences of doing so. Crito takes care not to harm anyone while saving his friend and wishes to use only legitimate means. But Socrates will ultimately show Crito how, in fact, he uses violence to achieve his goals; how he harms others in the process, and how he is not nearly as good a friend as he believes himself to be. The result is a new way of looking at the dialogue, and of Plato's message in composing it.

Keywords: Crito, Speeches, Friendship, Laws, Justice

1. INTRODUCTION.

My analysis begins with three questions: (1) Why does Socrates choose to answer Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech?; (2) Why does Socrates employ personification in this speech?;[1] and (3) Why have the Laws, specifically, been personified? As this article will show, posing each of these questions independently will improve our understanding of the dialogue.[2]

Regarding the first question—why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation with a speech—let us recall that some of Plato's dialogues, especially the so-called 'early dialogues', such as the *Euthyphro,* and the *Laches*, include no speeches at all. Not only is the existence of the speech in the *Crito* of interest, but also its length and centrality to the dialogue. While the speeches in other dialogues seem to serve a mostly clarificatory role (e.g., the myth of Er at the end of the *Republic*),[3] in the *Crito*, the Laws' speech constitutes nearly half of the dialogue and presents Socrates' final response to Crito's offer to jailbreak him. The second question—why does this speech employ personification—seems to be subsumed within the first, but it is not. Socrates could have delivered a speech without personifying anything or anyone. In such a case, he himself would have been the speaker, like he is in the *Phaedrus*. Concerning the third question—why are the Laws, specifically, personified—the Laws are not the only candidate for personification. Three other possibilities present themselves: a god, the polis, or simply impersonating a renowned Athenian speaker. I shall return to the third of these possibilities later in the article.[4]

In what follows, I argue that the answers to the aforementioned questions define Crito as the protagonist and prototypical person Plato

wanted to explore in composing the *Crito.* There are individuals who value good deeds with no regard to their potential negative consequences or the need to employ illegitimate means. Crito in the *Crito* is a different kind of person. He believes that trying to jailbreak his friend is a good act. But his evaluation of himself as a just and moral man concerns not only *what* he does but also *how* he does it. This concern is manifested in two ways. Crito not only performs an act of justice (helping his friend); he ensures that this good action entails neither harming others nor using illegitimate means. On the surface, such a Crito seems entirely positive. But perhaps this is a façade, behind which things are completely opposite. He would then become a most dangerous person. It is such a person, I argue, that interests Plato in the *Crito*.

2. WHY A SPEECH (RHETORIC)?

The appearance of a speech at 50c5, where the Laws' speech begins, can be readily understood. This conversation has already seen speeches, such as those delivered by Crito,[5] and allusions to rhetoric and persuasion, such as the use of the verb *peithein*, which, in its active form, means 'to persuade', and, in its passive form, 'to obey'.[6] The frequent appearance of this word[7] in a conversation which has coercion as one of its pivots should raise the suspicion that the author of the dialogue intended a play on the double entendre.

The appearance of rhetoric, persuasion, and speeches on both 'sides' of the conversation, namely, the Laws' speech and what precedes it, has prompted scholars to regard the Laws' speech as an answer to the speech that Crito delivers at 44e1-46a9.[8] This approach focuses on the content of the speeches, and argues that the Laws are answering Crito's

arguments by using the same facts to reach opposite conclusions. Let us take one example. In Crito's view, Socrates should attempt to escape from jail because, if he does not do so, his children will be orphaned (45c10-d4). The Laws use this very fact to persuade Socrates not to run away (54a2-8).[9]

My argument is of a different nature. Leaving aside for a moment the content of the speeches in the *Crito*, I want to focus on the use of a speech as the centerpiece of the dialogue. In jailbreaking Socrates, Crito pursues two main goals: the assurance of the wellbeing of his good friend and the maintenance of his own good reputation among the Many (44b6-c3). These goals cannot be achieved without Socrates being persuaded to accept Crito's offer and run away, and thus Crito has to use various means to make it easier for Socrates to make the 'right' decision. Among the means that Crito uses to persuade Socrates are his connections with the authorities (43a7), his wealth and that of others of Socrates' friends' (45a6-b7), and reliance on friends outside Athens (Thessaly), who will receive Socrates after the escape (45b7-c5). I would argue, a speech, especially a 'nice' (rhetorical) one, is no less a means of persuasion.[10] Socrates seeks to show Crito that persuasion accomplished through delivering a speech, especially a rhetorical speech, is a form of compulsion—and is thus illegitimate.[11] This was an important message in fifth to fourth century BCE Athens, where persuasion by means of a speech was considered not only a legitimate tool but also the best alternative to violence. For example, in defending Socrates from the accusation that he makes his students violent (*biaioi*), Xenophon answers (*Mem.* 1, 2, 10): "But I hold that they who cultivate wisdom and think they will be able to guide the people in prudent policy never lapse into violence: they know that enmities and dangers

are inseparable from violence, but persuasion (*to peithein*) produces the same results safely and amicably". Given their druthers, Athenians preferred persuasion to coercion. Hence, in 1, 2, 9, Socrates' accuser erred when he argued that Socrates' critique of democracy (i.e., that jobs are assigned on the basis of lots) leads to violence and a constitution conditioned on force.[12] As an Athenian, Socrates would not have chosen violence over persuasion because the dangers of such a choice would have been apparent to him.

One of the well-known stories told by Herodotus (8, 111) is about Themistocles. In response to the refusal of the people of Andros to give him and his army money, Themistocles threatens them and declares that the Athenians will fight them with two gods, Persuasion and Necessity/Compulsion (*Peithō te kai Anangkaiē*): "For the men of that place, the first islanders of whom Themistocles demanded money, would not give it; When, however, Themistocles gave them to understand that the Athenians had come with two great gods to aid them, Persuasion (*Peithō*) and Necessity (*Anagkaiē*), and that the Andrians must therefore certainly give money, they said in response, "It is then but reasonable that Athens is great and prosperous, being blessed with serviceable gods.""[13]

In Plutarchus, we find Theseus trying to unite Attica: "He visited them, then, and tried to win them over to his project township by township and clan by clan .... Some he readily persuaded (*epeithen*) to this course, and others, fearing his power, which was already great, and his boldness, chose to be persuaded (*peithomenoi*) rather than forced (*biazomenoi*) to agree to it".

An even more sophistical treatment of the tension between persuasion and compulsion can be detected among those engaged in

teaching rhetoric. Gorgias seems to agree that verbal persuasion enslaves, but justifies the act by claiming that the person so persuaded has entered into the agreement voluntarily. This at least, is the testimony of Plato's Protarchus in *Philebus* 58a7-b2: "I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion (*hē tou peithein technē*) far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion (*ou dia bias*), but of their own free will (*di' hēkontōn*)."[14]

A final example is taken, again, from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. At 1,2,40-46, we find Alcibiades and Pericles in conversation, the former arguing that rich Athenians are governed by violent compulsion, and not by law. Consider, in this regard, the following quotations: "But force (*bia*), the negation of law (*anomia*), what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion (*mē peisas*), but by force? ... Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion (*mē peisas*), is the negation of law? ... And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading (*mē peisantes*) the majority, but through using its power (*kratountes*), are we to call that force (*bia*) or not? ... Everything, I think, that men constrain (*anagkazei*) others to do 'without persuasion,' (*mē peisas*) whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force (*bia*)".

What becomes clear is that a superior can make an inferior do his bidding, be it through persuasion or violent compulsion. In the case of a tyrant who writes down his demands, the instructions are not considered law because they are not conveyed through persuasion. The rich of Athens obey the rules by violent compulsion because their obedience has not been shaped by persuasion. Accordingly, someone who is persuaded to follow the law, and does so, acts freely. It might appear, then,

that it is persuasion that transforms an edict into law, and that a law-abiding society is, by definition, free. Putting so much emphasis on a speech (the Laws' speech), and especially a speech which subverts another speech (Crito's speech at 44e1-46a9), is itself a proof that Socrates' critique aims not necessarily at what the speech says but at the very use of a speech to achieve obedience. It is this idea—speech and rhetoric as a legitimate means of persuasion—that Socrates seeks to subvert in the *Crito*.

Let us summarize our findings in this section. The Laws place before Crito a mirror. They take every theme that Crito used in his speech to persuade Socrates to escape and turn it on its head, now persuading Socrates to remain in jail. The message is that when violence is a means, one can never be sure who will emerge the winner. In other words, by presenting his answer in the form of a speech, Socrates informs Crito that two can play the game of violence, and that the second player—here, the Laws—can beat the first at his own game. Crito, who enters the ring with an arsenal of arguments wrapped in an impressive cloak of rhetoric, finds himself defeated.[15] But it is not only Crito who is vanquished; it is rhetoric, proven illegitimate, which is bested as well.

Taking all the above into account, we can now answer our first question in the beginning of this article—why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech. I suggest that in composing the *Crito,* Plato sought to undermine the prevailing notion of persuasion, by means of a compelling speech,[16] as the preferred legitimate tool for decision-making, reflecting a free action that characterized Athenian democracy in the days of Plato and his audience. For Plato in the *Crito*, using a rhetorical speech is similar to using violence.

3. WHY PERSONIFICATION (JUSTICE)

Socrates could have given a fine speech *in persona propria*, but he does not.[17] Instead, he has the Laws speak, ostensibly criticising him for trying to destroy the polis and themselves. Crito is supposed to give Socrates advice on how to answer the Laws' arguments. From a logical standpoint, the fact that Socrates chose to personify the Laws might hint to the idea that until this personification, Crito—to whom this speech is really directed—does not treat the Laws as human beings. But then, the question arises as to why Crito should have treated the Laws as human beings. The answer, I suggest, has to do with Crito's concept of justice, and especially the entities to whom this justice applies.

In helping his friend, Crito sees himself as performing an act of justice. At 45a1-2, we find Crito declaring that he and Socrates' other friends will be *dikaioi* in rescuing their friend, and a bit further, at 45c6-7, Crito asserts that not accepting his offer will be an *ou dikaion* act.[18] Socrates is also shown to understand that, for Crito, saving him is an act of justice. At 48b10-c2, he states that everything hinges on the question of whether such an escape is an act of justice. As to the nature of this justice, scholars have noted that Crito's act rests on the common code of behavior, 'helping friends and harming enemies'.[19] This code appears almost verbatim in Crito's words at 45c7-9 ("and you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you"), which echoes the version of this code found in the *Meno* (71e2-5).[20] My interest lies in the question of to whom this justice applies. Checking all appearances of the verbs 'committing justice' or 'injustice' (*dikaia prattein / adikein* respectively) throughout the *Crito*, which always refer to human beings and never to the polis or the laws, suggests that, for Crito, breaking the law and harming the polis is surely illegal but never an act of committing injustice (*adikein*).[21] A polis, however, is the sum total of its citizens, and its laws reflect the will of its citizens. This concept seems to be embodied in Greek thought, especially in democracies (and the *Crito*'s background is evidently a democratic polis). A few exceptions, all of them from opponents of democracy (Thrasymachus, for example, in the *Republic*) are exceptions that only testify to the rule. Recall, for example, Thucydides' famous words at 7.77.7.5: *andres gar polis, kai ou teichē oude nēes andrōn kenai* ("men make a city, not walls or ships empty of men"). Hence, breaking the law harms our fellow citizens by not following their will. However, Crito never reaches this conclusion. If he had, he would have understood that harming the polis (=violation of its laws) is actually harming human beings, i.e. his fellowmen in the polis. For Crito, as it turns out from the analysis of the dialogue, the polis becomes something separate from the collection of the citizens that comprise it. In my view, Plato molded Crito in our dialogue as someone who might, on a theoretical level, consider the polis as the sum of its citizens, but on a practical level, when it comes to breaking the law, see the polis as something else entirely. This 'something else entirely', whatever it may well be, is not a human being. Thus breaking the law is disconnected from committing injustice (*adikein*), which remains exclusively applicable to human beings. The result is that a polis cannot harm (*adikein*) a citizen and a citizen cannot harm the polis, although he can, indeed, break its laws or even destroy it.[22] This complex status of the polis in Crito's worldview can be proved in various ways, but I shall focus here on two.

At 44e1-46a9, in his third speech, Crito marshals a number of arguments in trying to persuade Socrates to escape from jail. Socrates would be neglecting his children if he did not do so (45c10-d7); he ought to prove his *aretē* (45d7-9); he has a place of refuge (45b6-c5). Left unsaid, however, is that Socrates has the right to flee, because the polis committed injustice against him by wrongly adjudicating his case. Someone who is harmed has every right to retaliate. I suggest that the reason for Crito not using this obvious excuse is simply that he cannot use it, since (as shown earlier) in his worldview, committing injustice (*adikein*) is applicable only to human beings, and the polis is not [yet] a human being. It is Socrates who will remind him of this possibility at 50c1-3. Indeed, only when Socrates personifies the polis and suggests this response to the Laws, who might accuse him of attempting to destroy them and the polis, does Crito accept the possibility. [23] Once Crito accedes to the idea that the polis harmed Socrates, the Laws can continue with their speech.

Crito's difficulty with seeing the polis and the Laws as human is evident also from Socrates' question at 49e9-50a3. This question caps a long section where Socrates attempts to elicit Crito's agreement that one should not commit injustice (*adikein*) even in retaliation for injustice (*antadikein*).[24] Assuming Crito's agreement, Socrates asks: "Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the polis, we are doing harm (*kakōs tinas poioumen*)[25] to *the very ones to whom* we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not" (emphasis mine). Crito is noncommittal: "I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand". That question implies that a human being would be harmed in the process of jailbreak, and

this is not clear to Crito. Note the words "to the very ones" (*tinas*), and "to whom" (*hous*). Crito, who apparently agreed that one should not harm anyone, even in retaliation, does not see any *one* being harmed by Socrates' escape. The polis or the Laws are not candidates for this identification.[26]

Let us sum up our discussion of this part, and answer our second question in the beginning of the article—Why does Socrates employ personification in this speech. The aim of using personification is to remind Crito of what he apparently knows but somehow forgets, namely, that the polis and the Laws are indeed human,[27] and hence, breaking the laws entails performing an act of injustice (*adikein*)—which, as we have already learned at 49b4-5, harms first and foremost the doer himself.[28]

4. WHY THE LAWS (FRIENDSHIP)?

As noted previously,[29] it is unclear why the Laws are the entity delivering the speech in which Socrates is accused of improper behavior. This is puzzling, primarily because there are seemingly equally plausible candidates, such as a certain goddess (Athena?) or even the polis itself. After all, it is not just the Laws but also the polis that is affected by the escape of Socrates (50b1-2). Why, then, did the Laws deliver the speech?

To address this question, we first need to decide where exactly the speech begins. The Laws are first cited at 50a8, but I argue that their speech starts only at 50c5. The entire passage at 50a6-c3 serves as an introduction to the speech. As we have already noted, at 50a4-5, Crito does not understand how by running away he will harm *someone*. In an effort to make this clear to Crito, Socrates raises the hypothetical possibility that the Laws[30] might

accuse him (Socrates) of attempting to destroy them, and then suggests an excuse: "The polis harmed (*hēdikei*) me and did not judge the case rightly". The implication is that Socrates is justified in retaliating against the polis for this injustice. Only then, when Crito accepts this excuse (50c4), do the Laws reappear and deliver their speech—which is almost entirely aimed at refuting this excuse. It is, therefore, the polis—against whom Socrates retaliates—who should have been personified and shown to attack Socrates.[31] That the Laws deliver the speech requires explanation.

First, let us note that the polis is present throughout the Laws' speech, mainly as a beleaguered entity.[32] It thus appears that the Laws are defending the polis, in parallel to Crito defending Socrates. The Laws seek to protect the polis from Socrates; Crito seeks to protect Socrates from the polis. I argue that juxtaposing these two spheres can shed light on friendship, since Crito considers himself Socrates' friend and what he does is precisely what friendship is all about. In like manner, the Laws can be seen as the friend of the polis, and its speech reveals to Crito the nature of true friendship.[33]

Each sphere consists of three components. In the first sphere, we find Socrates, Crito, and the polis, while in the second sphere we find Socrates, the Laws, and the polis. In the first sphere, Socrates is attacked by the polis, and Crito tries to help him. In the second sphere, the polis is attacked by Socrates and the Laws come to its aid. In both spheres, those who come to help the one under attack perceive themselves as also attacked. Crito and the Laws come to assist their friend but they experience themselves as under attack by the same entity. Crito is attacked by the polis, and the Laws are attacked by Socrates. In one sphere only is the effort to help a friend

successful, namely, the Laws' effort to save the polis from Socrates' attempt to destroy it. Crito fails to save Socrates. Why? The answer seems to be in the motives of each. Crito feels attacked by the polis not only because his friend is attacked. Crito has a motive that is independent of Socrates. Crito's reputation would be imperiled if Socrates died, but Crito knows that reputation among the Many is of no account to Socrates.[34]

In the second sphere, the Laws' only private motive is to save their friend, the polis. They also feel attacked, but only because the polis is being attacked. This should teach Crito what friendship, true and pure, is.

Let us sum up this section and answer our third question in the beginning of the article— Why are the Laws, specifically, personified? As Crito wants to save Socrates from the polis, which seeks to destroy him, the Laws want to save the polis from Crito (or formally, from Socrates), who wants to destroy it. Crito does seek to save Socrates but, apparently, is even more motivated to save his reputation among the Many. The Laws want to save the polis, but they also want to save themselves. The difference between the two cases is that while Crito and Socrates are distinct entities, the Laws and the polis are one and the same.[35] Crito fails to save Socrates (his good friend, in his view) and himself (his reputation among the Many); the Laws apparently save themselves and the polis, and they succeed exactly where Crito's fails, and by the same instruments—rhetoric and speeches.

CONCLUSION

Taking together the three themes—friendship, personification, and speeches—we can now point to their common denominator: justice.

Justice is the thread that runs through the entire conversation that takes place between Crito and Socrates. As we showed earlier,[36] it is in the name of justice that Crito encourages Socrates to accept his plan. Crito even claims that for Socrates not do so would be *ou dikaion*. It is justice that Socrates invokes in considering his escape, and it is justice that the Laws invoke in urging Socrates to reject Crito's offer.

Friendship, personification of the laws, and the form of a speech, I argue, are in our conversation all aspects of justice. Friendship reflects the *object* of justice—helping Socrates escape from jail. The personification of the Laws reflects the *scope* of justice for Crito—committing injustice is applicable to human beings alone. The use of a speech reflects the *means* by which Crito exerts justice—a persuasive speech reflects free will and thus is a justifiable tool.

The Laws' speech shows Crito three things. First, unlike the Laws, whose wish to help the polis comes from a pure place, as the Laws and the polis are one and the same, Crito's wish to save Socrates is tainted. Second, by breaking the laws, Crito in fact harms humans. And third, what seems to be a justified tool to effect Socrates' escape—speech—is revealed as a terrible tool that fails to find justification.[37]

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ENDNOTES

1   The personification of abstract concepts is certainly not a novelty of Plato's *Crito*. In poetry, we encounter the personification of *nomos* in Pindar, and even in Plato's own works, justice is personified in the *Parmenides*. What intrigues me here is precisely how the personification of the Laws aids Socrates in addressing Crito's problem.

2   The secondary literature often fails to distinguish between these three questions. Instead, the 'personification of the Laws' is seen as a single question (e.g. Polansky, 1997, p. 63; Weiss, 1998, p. 84; Moore, 2011, p. 1021; Garver, 2012, p. 2). To the best of my knowledge, mine is the first treatment in the scholarship of the question of why the laws, specifically, are personified (Mahoney, 1998, p. 1–22 explains why the Laws appear as the main speaker, but not as against another candidate). But beyond all this, as far as I can tell, no one has taken all three questions together, to convey a single message. See my Conclusion on p. 125-126.

3   Importantly, in each case, only a thorough analysis of the whole dialogue can determine one opinion or another. But even without going into an in-depth analysis, it is easy to see that the speech of the Laws is unlike other speeches that appear in other dialogues of Plato. It is also the only speech in Plato's dialogues that deals with what Socrates should do, or in an Aristotelian taxonomy, a deliberative speech. See Harte, 1999, p. 130; Brouwer, 2015, p. 20.

4   See p. 124-125 below.

5   Crito delivers three speeches at 43b3-9, 44b6-c5, and 44e1-46a9.

6   A point emphasized also by Garver, 2012, p. 6 and n. 12-13.

7   This word has received a great deal of scholarly attention since the appearance of Kraut's (1984) famous thesis, which tries to find a way for a citizen to disobey the law provided that he attempts to persuade the authorities of his righteousness (esp. pp. 71-73). Even before the Laws' speech, however, the word *peithein* appears regularly (45a3, 46a8, 46b5, 47c1, 47c6, 47d10). On Kraut's view, see Penner, 1997, p. 157.

8   See Allen, 1972, p. 562: "The speech also meets, point by point, the prudential considerations that Crito urged in favor of escape"; Garver, 2012, p. 4:

"Socrates' representation of the speech of the laws … rebuts Crito's own arguments point by point". See also Brouwer, 2015, p. 23. Moore, 2011, p. 1021 argues that the whole of the Laws' speech is organized to address Crito's speech at 44b6-c5 and actually answers it with opposite conclusions in order "to persuade Crito to examine and work on his inadequate view of justice".

9   For a full list of parallels see Garver, 2012, p. 4.

10 Cf. Grg. 479c1-4: ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν·("And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion")(emphasis mine).

11 Moreover, rhetoric might be the most dangerous form of violence since the violent element in it is disguised under the cloak of free action.

12 Which I take to refer to tyranny. See context further on. Thus, the accuser considers democracy a defence against a regime which is based on *bia*.

13 See also Plut. *Them*. 21 where *peithō* is contrasted with *bia*.

14 Recall Socrates' statement to Crito at 48e4-5 that "it's very important to act in these matters with your consent (*peisas se*), but not against your will (*mē akontos*)".

15 Crito does not seem to fully accept the message of the Laws' speech, and responds in a vague way ("I have nothing to say, Socrates", 54d9). Yet, one thing is clear. The dialogue ends with Socrates still imprisoned.

16 Weiss, 1998, p. 84-95 points to the comment made by Socrates at 50b6-7: *polla gar an tis exhoi, allōs te kai rētōr, eipein* … ('For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator …') and sees here a hint from Plato to the reader not to take too seriously what the Laws are about to say, as it is not Socrates' own view. From a dramatic perspective, however, this comment is addressed to Crito, who really believes that using a good orator is a legitimate and preferable means.

17 Scholars who hold 'the separation thesis' (as against 'the integration thesis', first introduced by Brickhouse & Smith, 2006), which does not see the Laws' speech as Socrates' mouthpiece (e.g. Hyland, 1968; Young, 1974; Brown, 1992; Miller 1996; White 1996; Harte 1999; Garver, 2012) must ascribe the speech to someone other than Socrates, but they still need to explain why the dramatist uses personification and not a character. On the need to personify the Laws, specifically, see the next section of this article.

18 This term - *dikaios* - is usually translated in our context as 'right' (see Adam, 1888, p. 36), and still, like

all relevant derivatives of *dik-*, is not disconnected from justice. For a discussion of this term within the range of meanings of justice, see my article (Liebersohn, 2023).

19 See Weinrib, 1982, p. 103; Weiss, 1998, p. 4; Emlyn-Jones, 1999, p. 7; Stokes, 2005, p. 93; Miller, 1996, p. 122; Congleton, 1974, p. 432-446. The fullest account of this code, its origin and derivative is still that of Blundell, 1989, p. 26-59.

20 The similarity between *kakōs poiein anthrōpous* at 49c7 and the words *tous men philous eu poiein, tous d' echthrous kakōs* in the *Meno* 71e4 is striking. See also R. 332d7, 335a7, 362c1; X. Hier. VI12, 2, and Sol. fr. 13, 5. See also Dover, 1974, p. 180-184.

21 My argument relates to these verbs alone. This is not the place to discuss the term 'justice' in the *Crito* in its own right (derivatives of *dik-* appear in the *Crito* no fewer than forty-eight times). Suffice it to say that *Crito* has a complicated worldview concerning justice (in its full range of meanings) and that this complexity is reflected in the terminological variants he uses (all have *dik-*). Within the wide range of meanings, all appearances of *adikein* and *dikaia prattein* in our dialogue - before the Laws' speech, of course (on which later) - refer to human beings alone (or do not refer to any object whatsoever: cf. 48c8-d6, 49c7, 49c10). Other terms, such as *dikaion*, or constructions, such as *dikaios + eimi*, can relate to human beings.

22 *How* Crito does not see in breaking the law an act of committing injustice is an interesting question, but one that is beyond the scope of our discussion.

23 Indeed, the absence of this excuse during Crito's speech, as against his acceptance of it when suggested to him by Socrates, proves his vacillation. On his own initiative, Crito could not even think of a polis harming (*adikein*) a citizen and vice versa. Only when the polis is first personified by others (Socrates) does it become a possibility. See immediately below.

24 This is a long section - 49a4-e8 - which needs to be analyzed in its own right, especially the question of whether Crito does agree that retaliation is totally forbidden, but it need not concern us here. For a discussion of this issue, see Brown, 1992, p. 77. See also Harte, 1999, p. 233.

25 Socrates' ultimate aim is to make Crito see that he (Crito) is committing injustice (*adikein*) to the polis. This occurs only at 50c1-3, so *adikein* is saved for 50c1-3, and *kakōs poiein* functions as a segue to *adikein*. Recall that these two terms, *adikein* and *kakōs poiein*, have been identified at 49c7-8: "So I suppose that harming people (*kakōs poiein*) is no different from behaving unjustly (*to adikein*) toward them. CR. You're right").

26 The Laws, we should recall, are not yet personified. Indeed, immediately upon having been personified,

we read at 50a9-b2: "Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies?".

27 Garver (2012):4 seems to approach this idea: "Personification is a way of speaking to Crito's social imaginary of persons. Personifying the laws has the advantage that it makes injury to them conceivable".

28 "Is not wrongdoing (*to adikein*) inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer (*tō adikounti*)?" (49b4-5).

29 p. 120 above.

30 In fact, it is the Laws and the *koinon tēs poleōs* ("commonwealth"). I suggest that this term is inserted for the end of this section where Socrates claims "the polis harmed (*adikein*) us". This is achieved by three stages, each having the Laws with the word 'polis' accompanied by an addition, *to koinon tēs poleōs* (50a8), *sumpasa hē polis* (50b2), and eventually *polis* (50c1-2). Indeed, from now own (50c5) to the end of the speech, it is only the Laws who speak.

31 Moreover, earlier in the question, and triggering the Laws' speech (49e9-50a3), the polis also appears alone: "Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the polis, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not".

32 E.g. 50d1, 51c1, 51d8, 51e3, 52b2.

33 In the ongoing discussion, the term 'true friendship' refers only to an activity that is entirely intended for the benefit of the friend, devoid of any additional motives.

34 Crito's self-focus and concern for his own needs are evident from his very first speech at 43b3-9: "No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful". (43b3-4). Crito wishes he would not be in such a state. Why is that so? Because in spite of Socrates' *sumphora* (=calamity) of being about to die, Crito is also amidst a *sumphora* (=calamity) which is wholly about himself, though it is caused by his friends' impending death. The fact that Socrates is about to die is incidental. What matters is that *he* is going to lose a good friend. He will be deprived of something he loves dearly – but whether that is Socrates or, say, a piece of chocolate, is quite irrelevant. Moreover, in his second speech (44b6-c5) Crito specifies two reasons, his friendship with Socrates and his taking care of his good reputation among the Many. It is easy to see that the reputation reason outweighs the friendship. First, although the friendship reason appears first, the reputation reason gets more emphasis. Secondly, in his reply at 44c6-9 Socrates mentions only the reputation reason and tries to reject it, while ignoring the friendship reason. Crito, in his answer at 44d1-5, does not seem to notice the absence of the

friendship reason. Had this reason been important to him, he would have corrected Socrates.

35 The Laws themselves state that they are to be identified with the polis: "Thus it's clear that the polis satisfied you far more than the rest of the Athenians, and presumably so did we the Laws. For, who would a polis without laws satisfy?" (53a3-6). The verb 'to satisfy' should not confuse us. The possibility of a polis without laws, even if it does not satisfy anyone, is impractical. The essence of a polis is its laws, regardless of whether or not these laws are good.

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37

Portraying the Philosophers as Chorus Members and Leaders Thereof in Plato's *Theaetetus* 172c-177c

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ABSTRACT

One of the most puzzling aspects of the portrait of the philosopher in the Theaetetus is that the depiction of this disengaged and aloof character is at odds with the depiction of Socrates himself both in this dialogue and in others. In this paper I follow thinkers like Dorter, Sedley, and Blondell, who argue that the philosopher-leader is an abstract that is not meant to be understood as a character in flesh and blood, but I aim to go beyond what they have done so far by enlarging the scope of the question and elaborating on it. More specifically, I want to explore the significance of this double-tiered assessment of the philosopher in terms of the philosopher in flesh and blood as philosopher of the chorus (οἳ ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε χορεθύοντες, 173c1-2) and this abstract image of the philosopher-leader of the chorus (οἳ κορμφαίοι, 173c6-7). I ask specifically why we need such a figure especially in a context in which Plato's Socrates is offering us God as ultimate model to follow ("becoming as like God as possible" 176a-b). Whom is a philosopher like Socrates supposed to be taking as model: the idealized figure of the philosopher-leader, the God, or both? And, if both, then isn't the figure of the philosopher redundant? Do we need the image of the philosopher at all?

Keywords: philosopher, Godlikeness, digression, chorus, leader of the chorus, model

At the heart of the *Theaetetus*, we come upon the famous "digression" (πάρεργα 177b8) that centers on distinguishing the philosopher from the orator (172c-176c). One of the most puzzling aspects of the portrait of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus* is that the depiction of this disengaged and aloof character is much at odds with the depiction of Socrates himself both in this dialogue and in others. While Socrates certainly shares several features with the philosopher here described, such as, for instance, recognizing the importance of leisure, interest in the *ti esti* questions, interest in the whole, little regard for reputation, nevertheless, Socrates is not as clumsy, as lost, and as detached when it comes to practical affairs as that philosopher-leader here described. Unlike him, Socrates knows well his way to the marketplace, just as he knows how to get to the law-court of King Archon (210d), he even attends parties with flute girls, as he famously did in celebration of Agathon's success in a tragedy contest (*Symposium*), he is aware of the ancestry of many fellow citizens, Theaetetus included (144c), and is even interested in it sometimes, though of course not as a matter of gossip and vain curiosity, but rather insofar as it might help him discern how best to engage his interlocutors in conversation. Moreover, Socrates has been actively involved in the public life of Athens when needed (*Apology* 17c) and constantly engaged in trying to make its citizens more virtuous (*Apology* 30a2-b2, 36c2-8, 36d9-e1). All this is so because Socrates understands himself as a midwife obedient to the god who has tasked him with assisting men who are pregnant in soul to give birth (*Theaetetus* 149a-151c).[1] Socrates both engages in solitary contemplation (*Symposium* 175a-b, 220c-d) and understands himself as a midwife whose main role is to bring forth

wisdom in others (*Theaetetus* 150b-151d), whereas the philosopher-leader of the chorus here described is engaged only in solitary contemplation for its own sake. How are we to make sense of these discrepancies?

Traditionally, scholars have opted for one or another of the following avenues to answer this question: (a) assume that Plato regards Socrates as one of these philosopher-leaders, but in this context he has Socrates purposefully comically exaggerate some of the features of the philosopher (German, 2017, Larsen, 2019, 13-19); (b) argue that Plato means this description of the philosopher-leader as an idealized abstraction, not as a description of a real life individual in flesh and blood (Dorter, 1994, 88, Blondell, 2002, 289-293, Sedley, 2004, 65-74); (c) argue that Plato considers the historical Socrates to belong to the philosopher-leader group of the wise, yet he "would never allow his character to regard himself so, and thus his Socrates could not possibly include himself in the class of the first rate philosopher-leaders" (Bossi, 2022, 182); (d) take the image of the philosopher leader to characterize a disengaged Theodorus, and thus to be meant ironically, while for Socrates we reserve good engagement with the important political issues of the day (Tschemplik, 2008, 142-7, Howland, 1998, Minz, 2011, Rue, 1993); (e) argue that the purpose of the digression is not only to show that the practical man needs to be dragged upwards, but also that the philosopher needs to be 'dragged downwards' (Rue, 1993, 199). Note that the avenues here listed are not mutually exclusive, but rather allow some overlap between them.

The view I am developing in this paper comes closest to option (b) above, taking the philosopher-leader as an abstract ideal, not as a character in flesh and blood. I aim to go beyond what has been done so far in

defending this view by enlarging the scope of the question and elaborating on it. More specifically, unlike Blondell, Sedley and others embracing this view, I want to explore *the significance of* this double-tiered assessment of the philosopher in terms of the philosopher in flesh and blood as philosopher of the chorus (οἳ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεθύοντες, 173c1-2) and this abstract image of a philosopher-leader of the chorus (οἳ κορυφαῖοι, 173c6-7). I want to explore why we need especially in a context in which Plato's Socrates is also offering us God as ultimate model to follow ("becoming as like God as possible" 176a-b). To state the issue more pointedly: Whom is a philosopher like Socrates supposed to be taking as model: the idealized figure of the philosopher-leader, the God, or both? And, if both, then isn't the figure of the idealized philosopher redundant? Do we need the image of the idealized philosopher at all? What kind of philosophical work does this image do here?

The view I am going to defend comprises two broad claims. To begin with, I argue that the portrayal of the philosopher-leader is to be taken seriously, not ironically, despite its exaggerated features bordering on something comical. That portrayal is meant to depict in more concrete ways what a philosopher's becoming as like God as possible looks like. Becoming like God as much as possible is a task for *all people*, not only for philosophers (176b-d), while the portrayal of the philosopher-leader imagines what it is specifically for philosophers to become as godlike as possible. Secondly, I argue that proposing the idealized figure of the philosopher-leader of the chorus does not mean at all that Plato advocates the philosopher's disengagement from all the social and political responsibilities in the city. On the contrary, in line with what he advocates also in the *Republic* about

the philosopher's duty to return to the cave to educate others, here too, in the *Theaetetus*, Plato remains committed to the importance of the philosopher's active engagement with the life of the community he belongs to. Plato's philosopher has a central role to play in discussing and elucidating the important issues of social and political governance precisely because he, more than anyone else, is in touch with the Good and the Just (175d) while being also genuinely humble and aware at every step that the practical implementation of these values will inevitably fall short of the ideal that he contemplates.

1. SUMMARY OF THE TEXT

The portrait of the philosopher (172c-176c) comes in two parts, a first one in which Socrates describes philosophers generally (οἳ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεθύοντες, 172c-173c), and a second one, in which he restricts his comments to the depiction of the philosopher-leaders of the chorus (οἳ κορυφαῖοι, 173c-176c). While both parts depict philosophers in clear contrast with the orator or the practical type of man, it will be important to figure out why Plato chooses to have Socrates give this two-tiered assessment of the philosopher.

We begin with the initial impression of philosophers generally (172c-173c). Unlike the practical man, who is always running out of time for everything, always in a hurry when he talks, and therefore must speak with one eye on the clock, the man brought up in philosophy has plenty of time, appreciates leisure, talks in peace and quiet. True, the man brought up in philosophy will make a fool of himself when he appears as a public speaker in the law-courts (172c), but he is no less free because of that, for the laughter of the many

about his own clumsiness in daily affairs leaves him undisturbed. The philosopher is a free man in every way, whereas the man of the law-courts is a slave with respect to time, to the subject on which he speaks, to the person that he converses with (172e). The main aim of the philosopher is to "hit upon that which is" (172d)[2], and to get there he cannot be rushed or constrained. The practical man, on the other hand, "is constantly being bent and distorted, and in the end grows up to manhood with a mind that has no health in it, having now be-come – *in his own eyes* - a man of ability and wisdom" (emphasis is mine, 173b).

Up to this point Socrates has been refer-ring to the group of philosophers as one to which he, along with Theodorus (173b3-4), belong as well, and Theodorus has been con-senting to that all along. Socrates does not protest to Theodorus' likening himself and Socrates to these free men who have no jury or audience sitting in control of them and determining what they are to discuss, how, and for how long (173c):

> Theod: Well, we have plenty of time, haven't we, Socrates?
> Soc: We appear to…Because the one man always has what you mentioned just now, - plenty of time. When he talks, he talks in peace and quiet, and his time is his own. It is so with us now: here we are beginning on our third new discussion, and he can do the same, if he is like us, and prefers the newcomer to the question in hand. It does not matter to such men whether they talk for a day or a year, if only they may hit upon that which is (172c1-173d)[3]

The beginning of the second part of the portrayal of the philosopher is marked by a clear break with what Socrates and Theodorus have done up till now. Socrates explicitly de-clares that from now on they should confine their account to the philosopher-leaders of the chorus (οἴ κορυφαίοι 173c7), for "why bother with the second-rate (the common sort, οἴ φαύλοι 173c7) specimens" of those preoccupying themselves with philosophy?

The portrait of the philosopher-leaders is quite unique, and for a moment it makes us wonder if we even want to be part of their group: (a) they grow up "without knowing the way to the market-place, or the whereabouts of the low courts, or the council-chambers, or any place of public assembly" (173d); (b) completely unaware of laws and decrees (173d); (c) uninterested in social functions, dinners, parties with flute girls (173d); (d) completely ignorant of and uninterested in the pedigree of their fellow citizens (174b); (e) unaware even of their own ignorance in these matters, for it is only their body that lives in the city, while their mind flies freely "throughout the universe, 'in the deeps beneath the earth' studying the geometry of planes, 'and in the heights above the heaven', studying astronomy, and tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, never condescending to what lies near at hand" (173e);[4] (f) compared to stargazers (174a4), like Thales; (g) totally unaware of their next-door neighbor, yet constantly preoccupied to find out, what is a Human Being, what is Justice, what is the Good (174b, 175d), always eager to explore reality as a whole, while totally unaware of what lies at their feet and before their eyes, their clumsiness and lack of inter-est for trivial matters makes them an object of mockery for the many; (h) while good for nothing when confronted with menial tasks, they are neither discouraged by the judgment and derision of the many, nor do they envy their fellows anchored in contingent matters;

instead, they think of them as practicing "a dim and limited vision, an inability, through lack of education to take a steady view of the whole" (174e).[5]

By contrast to both philosophers of the chorus and to philosopher-leaders, the practical man of the law-courts has no leisure (172e); is not free (172e); knows lots about practical affairs, but is completely ignorant about the gods as well as about discourses that befit the life of gods and of happy men (175e-176a); thinks himself wise, but in reality is not (173a-b) and is ridiculous in any attempt to address truly philosophical questions (175d).

The interlocutors agree that, if the view here presented could convince everyone as it has convinced Theodorus, there would be more peace and less evil on earth, for even though evil cannot be fully eradicated from our world, it would nonetheless be reduced. This is why, Socrates concludes, "a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as much like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with understanding." (176a-b)

2. WHY DOES PLATO CHOOSE TO INTRODUCE THE IMAGE OF THE PHILOSOPHER IN THIS DOUBLE-TIERED FASHION AS CHORUS AND LEADER THEREOF?

With this succinct summary of the text in front of our eyes, we now turn our attention to why Plato chooses to introduce the image of the philosopher in this double-tiered fashion and why do we need the philosopher-leader model at all when we also have God as ultimate ideal to follow. To answer these questions, we need to first look more closely at the general characterization of the activity of the philosopher, his object of investigation, who is part of the chorus and why, and what qualifies a philosopher-leader as such. Only after that will we be able to figure out the relation between the philosopher-leader of the chorus and God himself.

Plato's Socrates stresses the philosopher's preoccupation with questions regarding the essence of things: What is a Human Being? (174b), What is Justice? What is human happiness? (175c), and the holistic nature of his approach: the philosopher looks at the whole earth (174e4-5), looks always at the whole (εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν 175a1-2), disdains the business of the city because he concentrates instead on seeking "in every way, the entire nature of each whole among the beings" (πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ερευνώμενη τῶν οντῶν ἑκάστου ὅλου, 174a1, an expression that reminds us of the dialectician's preoccupation with the whole in the *Phaedrus* 270c-d.). The investigation of these profound and difficult matters goes hand in hand with the pursuit of a life of justice and piety with understanding (δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετά φρονήσεως γενέσθαι 176b2). In fact, these two, pursuit of virtue and investigating the essence of things, are two sides of the same coin, two aspects of a truly philosophical life. To know the Good is for Plato's Socrates to do the Good, and, therefore, intellectual access to the Good and the divine sphere is a guarantee that this insight will be translated into practice and will transform one's daily life. Insight into the Good shapes our lives accordingly.[6]

In what sense do Socrates and Theodorus count as philosophers of the chorus? The initial portrait of the leisurely philosopher characterizes their joint approach in this

conversation (173b-d). Judging by his behavior in their earlier part of the conversation, Theodorus doesn't seem to be a philosopher in the true and heavy sense of the word, at least not according to Plato's standards: he is unable to realize that Protagoras' relativism would annihilate geometry as a universal science (169a1-5) and is conspicuously lazy about engaging in dialogue (146b3, 165a1-3). Nevertheless, Theodorus is a skilled geometer, with interests branching out into astronomy, arithmetic, and music (145d). In their exchange, Theodorus demonstrates that he can listen carefully to arguments and can be reflective on philosophical matters (179b6-9), is aware of philosophical directions (179d6-9) and able to criticize philosophical positions of the Heracliteans (180a3-6) and is even confident enough to correct Socrates on occasion (180b8-c1).[7] Moreover, in his current exchange with Socrates, Theodorus behaves like a freeman unconstrained by external masters or temporal boundaries, eager and genuinely interested in the distinction between the philosopher and the orator. At the end of this exchange, he says that he likes this kind of *logos* much more than arguments: "As a matter of fact, Socrates, I like listening to this kind of talk; it is easier for a man of my years to follow. Still, if you like, let us go back to the argument." (177c). Even so, Theodorus is only semi-philosophical here: for one thing, because he prefers *to listen* to Socrates talking, rather than himself making much of a positive contribution to the topic, and for another, because he misunderstands the philosophical way to relate to arguments. On his view "our arguments are our own, like slaves; each one must wait about for us, to be finished whenever we see fit" (173c). Socrates, on the other hand, is ready to follow the argument wherever it goes, and freely places himself in the service of *logos*, without thinking that this makes him any less free ("wherever the argument, like a wind, tends, there we must go" (*Rep.* 394d; Cf. *Phaedo* 107b); moreover, to keep himself safe from ever falling into misology, Socrates questions what is wrong with himself rather than distrusting valid arguments that he might have a hard time following (*Phaedo* 90e-91a).

Socrates is philosophical throughout the *Theaetetus*, as he is in every other Platonic dialogue, so there is no mystery as to why he is recognized as such in the digression. If anything, in his case we may wonder why he regards himself a mere philosopher of the chorus and not a leader thereof. Socrates' account of himself as midwife (149a-151b) as well as his active search for the nature of knowledge throughout the *Theaetetus* clearly display his philosophical nature: the leisure he has, the desire to hit upon the things that are, the constant preoccupation with τί ἔστί questions, the interest in the whole and not in small contingent matters.

What does it mean to say that Socrates along with Theaetetus belong to a chorus of philosophers? What are we to make of the fact that Plato envisions a multitude of philosophical minds, in fact, some quite unlike others, like Socrates' and Theodorus'? And how to conceive of a chorus of philosophers that is so vast that it includes, at one end people like Theodorus, who is only occasionally philosophical, and, at the other, thinkers like Socrates, whose exemplary life seems to propel him into a category beyond the chorus? How can they all pertain to one and the same chorus and perform in harmony, despite their divergent orientations? Besides, Socrates and Theodorus seem to be in a relatively large and valuable company in that chorus. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates discusses explicitly views

of thinkers like Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Melissus, and their respective followers on issues concerning rest and motion, Being and becoming (183b-184b). They too seem to belong to the philosophical chorus.

The idea of the possibility of a chorus of philosophers is not unique to the *Theaetetus*. In the *Sophist*, this idea is implicit in the Eleatic Stranger's talk about the earthborn Giants and the Friends of the Forms, each of these being internally harmonized groupings of thinkers, the former dragging everything down to the earth and to what can be grasped with the hands (246a-247e), the latter risking to go to the extreme of recognizing only what is, at the expense of becoming (248a-249d). In his imagined dialogue with each group, the Eleatic Stranger manages to harmonize each of them internally around the notion of Being as power (δυναμις) to act or to be acted upon, and thus succeeds to create the space for a possible dialogue between the two camps. In such dialogue, while both schools would adhere to a conception of Being as power to act or be acted upon, they would each understand the weight of this claim in different ways: materialists, true to their orientation, would continue to privilege becoming over Being, while Friends of the Forms would do the opposite, privileging Being over becoming. The Eleatic Stranger's contribution through casting their respective position in terms of δυναμις, whereby both schools recognize that we need both Being and becoming, stability and change, is to make it possible for them *to freely converse with one another*, to bring arguments in favor of their respective positions and defend their side as more potent than the alternative. The Stranger thus makes possible the emergence of choral harmony that does not annihilate the respective differences between the two orientations.[8]

In the *Phaedrus* we get glimpses of what the psychological and ontological reasons for a chorus of philosophers might be and why Plato welcomes this idea. Even though the *Phaedrus* remains vague on whether there is an intelligible Form of the soul, the dialogue suggests ways in which we can comprehensively analyze various types of soul by means of collections and divisions of Forms, given that each soul is knowable by reference to distinct character-types in imitation of one of the twelve gods, and to the objects that it takes as nourishment. Thus, when Socrates talks about the dialectical rhetorician's need to list all the possible kinds of souls (273d–e) we understand him to mean that the rhetorician will have to know how to determine the type of soul he is addressing while assessing it simultaneously in terms of (a) the cluster of intelligible Forms determining each temperamental character of the gods that are followed (one of twelve), (b) the type of life that the person has chosen to reflect their vocation (one of nine types), (c) the types of objects this soul desires, whether sensible or intelligible, and finally (d) the extent to which the soul is prone to recollect them. We can envision, for instance, an appetitive person whose soul is in complete turmoil for having chosen a contemplative life for which that soul is not equipped, or an Ares type misguidedly dedicating his life to philosophy instead of a military career, a rational type in full harmony for having chosen to pursue philosophy, and everything else in between. Along these lines, we can understand that among those choosing the vocation of philosophers some souls are followers of Zeus, others of Apollo, and others yet of Ares, and even those among philosophers following in the footsteps of the same god, say Zeus, succeed in varying degrees. The very possibility of there being a chorus

of philosophers seems to rely on the intrinsic diversity of the talents and inclinations of the various souls that embrace preoccupation with questions regarding the essence of things.

The instances mentioned above are only some of the numerous occasions when Plato explicitly has his characters allude to philosophical trends, or schools, groups of thinkers investigating Being. Philosophers belong to a chorus because the practice of philosophy is fundamentally dialogical and therefore communal. On several of these occasions Plato signals the internal diversity of the philosophical community comprising thinkers at opposite ends of the spectrum, like Parmenides and Heraclitus, and philosophical characters as distinct in their approaches as Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger, respectively. Thus, it makes sense that in the *Theaetetus* Plato would allow even Theodorus' inclusion in the chorus of philosophers, not so much as a committed philosopher, but more as a mathematician and astronomer who appreciates the leisure and the freedom that it brings its way, and who sometimes lingers thoughtfully while listening to philosophical discussions, even if not contributing much of his own original thought.[9] After all, the philosopher-leader after whom Theaetetus also takes is someone skilled at geometry and astronomy, yet someone who studies these in the most holistic and profound way:

> his mind [...] pursues its winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the depths beneath the earth', doing the geometry of planes', and in the heights above the heaven', doing astronomy, and tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, never condescending to what lies near at hand. (173e)

It is a sign of inclusiveness on Plato's part to make room for such a vast array of individuals among the philosophers of the chorus. It will be the respective differences in the extents to which each of them resembles (becomes like) God that will make all the difference in terms of how the various thinkers in the chorus fare.

Turning now to the philosopher-leader of the chorus, first we need to try to clarify what type of character we are looking at. Here is the opening characterization of his outlandish nature:

> To begin with (πρῶτον μὲν) the philosopher grows up without knowing the way to the marketplace, or the whereabouts of the law courts or the council-chambers or any other place of public assembly. [Furthermore, δέ d3] laws and decrees, published orally or in writing, are things he never sees or hears. [Also, δέ d4] the scrambling of political cliques for office, social functions, dinners, parties with flute-girls – such doings never enter his head even in a dream. [Moreover, δὲ d6] so with questions of birth – he has no more idea whether a fellow citizen is highborn or humble, or whether he has inherited some taint from his forbears, male or female, than he has of the number of pints in the sea as they say (additions in square backets are mine, 173c-e)

It is hard to find all these four ways of detachment, clumsiness and aloofness taken literally present in any real flesh and blood living being, however profound a thinker this person might be. I suggest that the figure of the philosopher-leader here described is an archetype with no corresponding match in reality, an abstraction, a regulative idea of what a philosopher that has become as like God

as possible would be like, and not a concrete fellow human being.[10] In other words, while the members of the chorus are flesh and blood individual thinkers, as divergent as Socrates and Theodorus, Parmenides and Heraclitus, Pythagoras and thinkers like Anaxagoras or Empedocles, the philosopher-leader is an abstraction that illustrates what a philosopher's life looks like once he has become as godlike as humanly possible. The philosopher leader's excessive clumsiness and aloofness as well as his absolute detachment from the concrete landscape of politics show that we are not talking about a real person, but rather an abstraction in a philosopher's mind. As a blueprint or archetype for philosophers, he is naturally depicted in most abstract terms. He cannot be partisan of one philosophical orientation or another, and he transcends all spatial and temporal connotations.[11]

If this interpretation is correct, we can make sense of the numerous discrepancies between the Socrates we encounter in Plato's dialogues and the purely aloof philosopher-leader. The purely aloof philosopher-leader is the abstract idea that Socrates, along with every other philosopher of the chorus, have in mind as they aspire to become as godlike as possible. As lover of wisdom, the philosopher has an erotic intellect, in constant aspiration to become as like God as possible.[12] What it would be like to fulfill this aspiration can be imagined in the abstract image of the philosopher-leader of the chorus.

Plato's choice to have this two-tiered introduction of the philosopher is motivated at once by (a) the dramatic context of the conversation, (b) the analogy with the chorus and leader of Greek tragedies, and (c) metaphysical reasons.

To begin with, the chorus and leader image fits the dramatic context of the *Theaetetus*. Socrates is thereby exhorting and encouraging Theodorus to keep aspiring towards a loftier way of doing geometry, astronomy, and music – for there is, on the one hand, the geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music of the many and, on the other, the geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and harmony of the philosophers (*Republic* 525a-531c, *Philebus* 56d-57e). With this he hopes to win over at once Theodorus and his student, Theaetetus, helping their conversion towards a real philosophical mindset in dealing with mathematics.

There is however, even more to the significance of this double-tiered description of the philosopher, first, insofar as Plato chooses specifically the relation between chorus members and leader thereof, as opposed to any other sort of leadership relation, such as for instance that between an army and its general, a *polis* and its statesman, etc.; and secondly, insofar as this double tiered portrayal of the philosopher must be also situated in relation to the ultimate ideal of the God. In what follows I develop my thoughts on these two aspects.

It is not at all accidental that Plato chooses to talk about a "chorus" of philosophers and its leader rather than any random idea of a community, *polis*, or army and its statesman or general. The dynamic at play between leader and lead in the respective cases is very different. On the one hand, as long as we take this to be representative of a dramatic Greek chorus staging a play, we have in the leader a voice that speaks for the whole chorus expressing the chorus' own judgment and interpretation of the action unfolding on stage, on the other, we have a ruler who keeps the people he governs accountable to following clearly set rules, laws, and instructions.[13]

As we lean more closely into the image of the dramatic chorus, we see how close and intertwined the involvement of the chorus is in the action unfolding on stage – a most

suitable image for how Plato's Socrates would understand his own involvement as a philosopher in the city. As Bacon writes:

> In the same way that members of a real--life chorus were part of the event in Greek society, the members of a stage chorus are not just spectators or witnesses but actors, part of the onstage event. Although to us a chorus may seem an artificial stage convention, they represent the social reality I have been describing, that concerned group that comes together to respond to an event of critical importance. When the event is of paramount concern to the chorus members they become principal actors, as in Aeschylus' Suppliants and Eumenides and Euripides' Suppliants. Their role depends on their identity and the nature of the event. They have as many and as varied functions on stage as choruses had in real life. Choral participation in dramatic action ranges from mere observation and sympathetic comment to necessary ritual gesture and direct involvement as important or principal actors. Ritual gestures, which are attempts to influence the action by involving the gods, are one of the most frequent forms of choral action. But whatever the nature of their participation, all dramatic choruses are deeply involved, in the sense that their attitudes or lives will be permanently affected by the outcome of the action. They are present, as they would be in daily life, because they are involved. A choral performance is an action, a response to a significant event, and in some way integral to that event. (Bacon, 1994, 17-18).

In addition to commenting on the moral or immoral character of the situation at hand, the Greek dramatic chorus is also charged with expressing to the audience what the main characters could not say, their hidden fears and secrets, which looks remarkably similar to the role ascribed to a philosopher like Socrates in the city:

> [T]hrough choral dance and song, the transitory anguish of individuals is placed in a larger context and achieves the coherence that unites the Athenian audience, and all subsequent audiences, in assimilating the many-sided implications of the event and integrating them into their experience (Bacon, 1994, 20).

Furthermore, since partaking of the chorus was a civic duty for Athenian citizens, by choosing this image Plato may want to suggest that joining the philosophers' chorus is itself a civic duty for those who can partake of it. Even the fact that in dramatic staging, members of the chorus enter during the first choral song from two entrance ramps (πάροδοι) on the opposite sides of the orchestra and remain for the entire performance, matches what I described above as internal diversity and divergence of views pertaining to members of the philosophical chorus.

In the *Laws* Plato has the Athenian Stranger talk extensively about the dramatic chorus as a principal means of education as well as medium through which mortals can relate to the gods and share with each other the values of their society (*Laws* 653c-654b, and 672e). Hence, it is not surprising that in the *Theaetetus* Plato chooses to depict philosophers as members of a chorus. Plato's philosopher has a central civic role to play insofar as his mission is to explore and discuss moral virtue and its place in the social and political community, just as Socrates has been doing throughout

his life. In so doing, the philosopher secures the community's connection to the divine. A philosopher is best equipped for this role precisely because he explores the essences of things and is genuinely humble about his knowledge. The dual aspect of *phronesis,* at once theoretical and practical, justifies the philosopher's active role in the city. Growing in likeness to the divine does not mean running away from responsibilities here and now, but rather encourages us to live with full responsibility a life of justice and piety with understanding (176b2).[14]

Metaphysically speaking, the image of a chorus gathered around its leader trying to emulate God as much as possible reminds us of the way in which in the *Timaeus* the planets and the starts dance around the body of the universe and are thus engaged in motions regulated by the World Soul (*Timaeus* 36d-39d). The 'choir' resembles the planets and stars (the 'lesser gods' in the *Timaeus*) circling around in a movement that organizes the physical world.[15] Plato hints at this cosmic reading when saying that the philosopher studies "in every way, the entire nature of each whole among the beings" (πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ερευνώμενη τῶν οντῶν έκάστου όλου, 173e6-174a1 " and " his mind […] pursues its winged way, as Pindar says, throughout the universe, 'in the depths beneath the earth', doing the geometry of planes', and in the heights above the heaven', doing astronomy, and tracking down by every path the entire nature of each whole among the things that are, never condescending to what lies near at hand." (173e). Accordingly, philosophers are called to both follow the divine (i.e. the World Soul, the lower deities, the Demiurge) and to help organize the world around them. Philosophers are like divine planets wandering in their circuits both in the world of men and in the cosmos at large, becoming as Godlike as possible. They should, if permitted, apply laws as universals that structure society, just as the planets apply physical laws that structure the world around us. However, unlike the planets, actual philosophers also wobble and are subject to possible corruption. Correspondingly then, becoming like God is for us an imperative for a whole lifetime, and not some sort of milestone achievable once and for all. As long as our soul is embodied, there remains a certain distance between us and the truth we seek, and even the best among philosophers can only come most near to it (*Phaedo* 65e4, 67a3).

3. DOES THE IDEAL OF GODLIKENESS RENDER THE ABSTRACT IMAGE OF THE PHILOSOPHER-LEADER REDUNDANT?

If the ultimate model to imitate is God, do we still need the figure of the philosopher-leader? The concern here is that the abstract idealized figure of the philosopher leader might be redundant. Here is why I believe it is not: The image of God is meant as ultimate aspiration for us all insofar as we are human beings, while the abstract version of the philosopher leader helps specifically philosophers to envision what becoming as like God as possible means for them as philosophers.

Note that becoming like God is introduced as task and desirable aim for any and all human beings, not only for philosophers.[16] For it is on account of (διό) the inevitability of evil haunting our earthly abode, that Socrates claims that one "should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man

becomes like God when he becomes just and pious with understanding." (ὅμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι 176b2-3). Hence, it is human beings at large that are summoned to embark on this journey; being human just is to be response-able to the call to enlighten ourselves and become as godlike as we can. Socrates continues by acknowledging the difficulty of persuading men generally (οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι 176b3) that we are called to this high a task, and that the reason why we ought to become godlike by practicing virtue should not be the usually supposed reasons of escaping bad reputation and gaining a good one instead (176b4-7). This call to godlikeness concerns us all, philosophers and non-philosophers alike insofar as we are human. This does not mean that Plato would want all people to become philosophers, but rather that, in whatever station of life they are, given their distinctive natures, talents, and education, they ought to practice virtue to the highest extent they are capable of. *Theaetetus* 176c-d clearly indicates that Plato envisions a large array and various levels of accomplishment and lack thereof, everything between "genuine wisdom and goodness" (σοφία καὶ ἀρετή ἀλετηινή 176c4-5) and complete "folly and wickedness" (ἄγνοία ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής 176c5). It is in the degree to which one can become as just as it is possible for a human being to be that we can determine whether one is a truly capable man (ἀλεθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς 176c3) or a man of nothing and a nonentity (οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία 176c4). Socrates is clearly alluding to the vast range of common, popular understanding of wisdom and justice, as he mentions explicitly the decayed versions thereof that we encounter in those eager for political power or in those whose lives are fully absorbed by manual work. What they

practice becomes its own punishment, as the ignorance they express ends up fixing them firmly in the state whereby their entire life manifests deepest unhappiness (176d-177a). These considerations are about a whole life lived a certain way or another, not about moments of glory achieved here and there (177a-b). In other words, Socrates' concern here is not with scoring high on occasion, but rather with cultivating a life of virtue, whereby one practices what he preaches day in day out, as best as he can, even while knowing that their practice will always fall short of the ideal. Socrates offers this image to Theodorus in the hope of winning him over to philosophy. The image drawn illustrates how, in its ultimate consequences, Protagoras' teaching cripples his followers' souls, while philosophy frees souls and leads them to a life of virtue and happiness.[17]

4. WHY DOES PLATO THINK IT WELCOME OR INDEED NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THIS SKETCH OF WHAT BECOMING LIKE GOD MEANS FOR PHILOSOPHERS?

I argued so far that, since godlikeness is called for from us all, the image of the philosopher-leader depicts what becoming godlike looks like specifically for the philosopher. Why does Plato think it welcome or indeed necessary to provide this sketch of what becoming like God means for philosophers? This question invites a good amount of speculation, but I think we can keep the speculative character of a response in check from randomness, if we look around at other dialogues connected with the *Theaetetus* or at least belonging to the same relatively late

period as it does. It is quite plausible that this move to offering some sort of midway between God and the real life philosopher is rooted in Plato's realization that his middle dialogues' generic injunction that we should imitate the Forms or partake of the Good remains vague and uninformative as long as it is not anchored in some clearer guidelines for how this can be done or at least in some descriptive images of what that might look like. The group of dialogues typically accepted as late modulate this and specify in more concrete terms and images what such emulation of the Forms might look like. I believe that the presence of the philosopher-leader of the chorus abstraction is part and parcel with such attempts throughout Plato's late dialogues to convey some of these intermediary steps meant to guide our practice of virtue as purification. In what follows I'll reflect on just one of the most obvious examples that occurs in the *Statesman*.[18]

The *Statesman* is the third installment in the trilogy that has the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* as its prequels. Early on in that dialogue, the Stranger offers the myth of cosmic reversal.[19] According to this story, a Demiurge is responsible for the creation and maintenance of the universe, during the two ages, of Cronus and of Zeus, respectively. The universe is said to be a living being, having a soul and a body harmoniously conjoined in a display of organic order and beauty (269c). This constitution of the universe reflects its composition from wisdom (269d1) and necessity (269d3). Having a body, the universe cannot display the constancy of the most divine things that have served as its model, yet being as close as possible to the divine, it deviates from the perfect circular motion by the smallest possible variation, which consists of rotating at times in reverse direction (269d-

270a). The opposition of the two directions of motion results from the two forces at play: wisdom and necessity. The universe oscillates between the direct governance of God and being left on its own. The age guided by the Demiurge is the age of Cronus, the other one is the age of Zeus. The Demiurge, responsible for fashioning the universe and for protecting it from complete destruction, is a third god, identifiable neither with Cronus, nor with Zeus, who is interweaving the opposite threads of motion that correspond to these two ages.[20]

The myth does not explicitly mention intelligible Forms (εἴδη), but it alludes to something like intelligible Forms under the designation 'the most divine things of all' (τοίς παντοίς θειωτατοις), described as 'remaining permanently in the same state and condition' (269d5-6). They serve as the model that the Demiurge imitates in fashioning our world. Due to its share in body, the universe must partake of some change, yet on account of its likeness to its model, the smallest variation of movement, that of reverse rotation (269e). The imperfections and limitations of the universe and of all the particulars inhabiting it are due to the preexistent innate desires (272e) associated with the matter that the Demiurge used in fashioning a world of many fine things and occasional evils (273c). The Cronus-Zeus alternating cycles illustrate the presence both of order and of the inherent tendency towards disintegration.

We don't need to get into any more detail about the story or the rest of the *Statesman* to realize that here too, we are faced with a similar question as in the *Theaetetus:* which one is the model that the statesman ought to follow? Is it the Demiurge? Or is it the Forms? Of course, the ultimate model to follow are and remain the Forms, but to grasp what it means for a flesh and blood statesman to imi-

tate the Forms, we need some intermediary paradigms. The Demiurge serves that function here, as he is successively characterized as a steersman (273c), a father (273b), a master-builder delivering instructions to lower deities (274a), a shepherd (271d-e, 273c), a doctor, and a moral reformer dealing with cosmic maladies and imbalance (273d-e). And notice that there are lower deities too, and they too serve as stepping-stone model for us and for the statesman, insofar as they are obedient to instructions received from the Demiurge. The multiplicity of images united in the persona of the Demiurge suggests their possible coexistence in the true statesman as well. Indeed, the statesman in due course is likened to a teacher of music or harmony (304a-d), a doctor or a gymnastic trainer (295c-d, 297e 298e), a shepherd (294e, 295e), a steersman (297a, 297e-298e), a weaver (305e-311c), and a moral reformer in the name of justice and happiness (306a-311c).

While neither the Age of Cronos, nor that of Zeus is ideal, their juxtaposition encourages us to conceive of the ideal statesman as borrowing elements from each and weaving them together: order and leisure from the age of Cronus and responsibility and autonomy from the age of Zeus. It would also combine some of the softness and passivity of the former with the boldness and autonomy of the latter. Not surprisingly, then, at the dialogue's end, the statesman emerges as someone who weaves together courage and self-control in the souls of the citizens that he governs. The myth prefigures a problem in the later scenario, the difficulty of combining elements that seem opposed to each other. The statesman can reconcile these through understanding a series of factors: the difference between virtue proper and civic virtue, the importance of education and the need to

eliminate the incorrigible elements (308c-e), the priority of the divine bond of true opinion over the human bond of marriage (310a, e). The statesman thus realizes that courage and moderation are opposed only in their excessive or deficient manifestations rather than in their measured articulations. The human bond of marriage is not external coercion of opposites since it comes into play *only after* the souls of citizens have been educated and bound by shared opinions about the fine, the just, and good, that is, after the divine bond has been secured (309c, 310a, e). The marriage of the moderate with the courageous is the natural consequence of what individuals seek for their own flourishing.

Once we see the care for detail that Plato places on offering in the persona of the Demiurge a blueprint for the statesman to follow for him to be actually imitating "the most divine things of all' (269d), we might think that this is enough. But wait, the story of these interposed mediating models is far from over. Between the Demiurge and the statesman in flesh and blood Plato's Stranger interpolates yet another model: the true statesman who rules on account of *episteme,* and whose wisdom exceeds the governance by laws.

The argument of *Statesman* 292b-301e takes the following trajectory: (a) the Stranger argues for the absolute superiority of rule by knowledge (ἔπιστέμη) (b) he then explains why and how rule by law comes about; (c) the Stranger and Young Socrates realize that, though it is, absolutely speaking, only a second best (δεύτερος πλους) falling short of rule by episteme, *rule of* law is for us the very best that we can count on; (d) however, it is important not to confuse the law with the absolutely best, but rather realize humbly that, even maintaining over time a just regime ruled by laws requires that the lawmakers keep

their gaze constantly on the absolutely best rule by episteme, and never give up aspiring towards that.

Knowledge of statesmanship is the ultimate criterion, while all other considerations, whether he rules with laws or lawlessly, whether the rule is by one, or few, or many, even whether the ruler is accepted willingly or by force by the people – all these are secondary or irrelevant by comparison (292b-d). To make his case, the Stranger draws an analogy with the physician: when he cures by art, it does not matter whether he does so with or without the consent of his patients, causing his patients pain, or by using written rules or not, as long as he preserves his patients and improves their condition (293b-c). Similarly, he argues, the right form of government is that in which rulers are discovered to be truly possessed of knowledge, whether they rule with laws or without them, over willing or unwilling subjects, rich or poor. As long as the statesman acts on the basis of knowledge and of what is just, preserving the state and making it better, his rule is the correct form of government (293d-e).

Knowledge of statesmanship presupposes sensitivity to due measure regarding everything from the rightful content and length of speeches (mythical and dialectical ones), to discerning the characters of the citizens (306a-311c), the proper ways of interweaving complementary aspects of character, sensitivity to the right time/opportunity (καιρός) for action in rhetoric, generalship, and the art of the judge, and penetrating insight into the Good which allows the statesman to imitate the Demiurgic harmonization of a κόσμος that is good and beautiful (269c-274e). It is by virtue of such knowledge that the statesman makes the community better than it was so far as he can and understands temperance

and courage both in themselves and in their manifestation in the souls of the citizens (306a-311c). The statesman can discriminate between the true statesman and the charlatans, and between the true philosopher and the sophists; is inquisitive, non-dogmatic, and invites questioning from others, always ready to respond the various challenges and to give an account of himself. He is flexible and ready to accommodate changes in the circumstances, sensitive to the distinction between perceptible likenesses and verbal imitations (277a-c, 285d-286b) knows the difference between opinion and knowledge; often misunderstood or simply not understood by the masses, being too subtle for them, his actions end up easily confused with complete anarchy or charlatan imitation.

Compared with this, the rule of law is far from ideal because the law speaks only to the general/class, not to individuals, ignoring differences between individuals and shifting circumstances (294b-295b). The greatest danger occurs when the many believe that a set of laws can be equal in value to a statesman's knowledge, i.e. that they can fully and exhaustively codify a statesman's wisdom into a set of laws that could not be misused. It is then because they misunderstand the true status of the laws and their relative value that they would oppose any inquiry into them. In other words, as long as lawmakers understand the rule of law as a second-best they keep attention focused on an absolutely best. When, on the contrary, they delude themselves into thinking that the laws can fully capture the wisdom of a statesman, they become dogmatic and closed off.

The epistemic statesman here envisioned is not so much a real person in flesh and blood, as more of a regulative ideal: he is supposed to be wise and good (ὅ σοφός και αγαστός άνερ 296e, 297a7-b1, cf. Marquez, 2012, 360). Even

philosophers are not yet wise, but merely lovers of wisdom. In the here and now real world that we live in, the statesman is at best some sort of philosopher with deep love of wisdom, not someone already wise. Similar to the image of the philosopher-leader of the chorus in the *Theaetetus*, the blueprint of a statesman who rules on account of *episteme* is equally a regulative idea, and not an identifiable flesh and blood character, for a couple of reasons. For one, only someone who is already of that stature could recognize an epistemic statesman, while others could be easily deceived; and since *episteme* is so rare, even if a handful would have it and would even recognize one another as possessing it, it would be impossible to convince the mass of citizens to subject themselves to him. For another, even if the citizens could somehow be convinced to subject to the wise rule of an epistemic statesman on one occasion, it would not be desirable, for the next time around, someone who merely pretends to have *episteme* while lacking it could promote himself as such a leader and would take the city to its ruins.

The epistemic statesman remains however the immediate model that a good government by laws is tasked to follow. Just as in the *Theaetetus*, Plato does not rule out in principle the possibility that someday a real-life philosopher leader of the chorus looking just like the idealization here portrayed might come about, he doesn't rule out that an *epistemic* statesman in flesh and blood exactly like this model could or will ever come about. What he is mainly interested in though is to articulate some intermediary steps between the here and now and the ultimate ideals of Justice and Goodness, such as to offer us some sort of roadmap or scaffolding to help us navigate our calling to become as like the God and like the Forms as possible for human beings.

CONCLUSION

To conclude then, the *Theaetetus*' depiction of the philosopher in this double tiered fashion as chorus member and philosopher leader gives Plato the opportunity to reflect on several aspects, such as the internal diversity and richness of the philosophical tribe, the need to model what becoming as godlike as possible looks like for a philosopher specifically, the need to modulate the ideal and to provide intermediary paradigms that can somehow concretize the task for us. Furthermore, this stratified and diverse image of the chorus of philosophers, gives Plato himself the opportunity to reflect on how he communes with and how he takes distance from his own teacher, Socrates.

If the above interpretation is correct, far from recanting his high-flown metaphysic of the middle dialogues, Plato's late dialogues provide further grounding and concretization for those high-flown metaphysical ideals. Yet this all is not done at the price of advocating the philosopher's flight away from responsibilities in the city, but rather by virtue of indicating in ever more concrete steps and images how the philosopher instantiates the Good and the Just in this life here and now.

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ENDNOTES

1   For a complete list of discrepancies between Socrates and the philosopher-leader here depicted see Sandra Peterson, 2011, 61-62. Peterson also offers a good survey of textual evidence from Plato's early dialogues' portrayals of Socrates that clearly clash with the image of the detached philosopher-leader (62-66). The solution I offer to understanding these discrepancies in this paper differs from the one she proposes.

2   For a strong defense of the view that the referents of these objects are typical Platonic Forms, see Maffi, 2019, 147-60.

3   Unless otherwise specified, translations from the Theaetetus are M. Levett's.

4   It is worth noting that geometry and astronomy are the very subjects taught by Theodorus, yet in the philosopher-leader's approach these subjects are studied more holistically than Theodorus has been

approaching them: searching in every way for every nature of each whole of the things that are (πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ερευνώμενη τῶν οντῶν ἑκάστου ὁλου, 173e6-174a1).

5   As Bossi notes, some of these features are clearly echoed also in the portrait of the philosopher voiced in the opening of the *Sophist* (216c2-d2), where philosophers too "visit the cities" like gods do, behold from above the life of these below, while the ignorant judge them as of no worth (Bossi, 2022, 186).

6   For more on this view see Polanski, 1992, 145, Bossi, 2022. As Larsen rightly puts it, the important contrast here is between the philosophical and the political life as typically understood, and not simply between the life of contemplation and that of action, if only because, for Plato, theory always translates into practice, for to him to know the Good is to do the Good (Larsen, 2019, 17).

7   I am grateful to George Rudebusch for drawing to my attention these instances as evidence for Theodorus' openness to philosophical thinking. For more on Theodorus' character see Blondel, 2002, 278-283.

8   This characterization raises the question of whether the Stranger himself is member of the chorus or is rather a philosopher-leader of the chorus. Rudebusch adopts the latter view, arguing that that philosopher leaders are themselves flesh and blood characters, and figures like the Eleatic Stranger, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Thales etc. belong to that class. For reasons that will become clear later, I take a different route, by situating the Stranger, Heraclitus, Parmenides etc., along with the rest of flesh and blood thinkers within the vast chorus and reserving the position of philosopher-leader of the chorus to a generic idealized abstract figure.

9   I take the insistence on the "wholeness" of the philosophical chorus indicative especially of its vastness and diversity. "What about our own set, τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ 173b4)?; "we who move in such circles", or better, we who belong to our sort of chorus, οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῶδε χορεθύοντες 173c1-2) meaning the whole philosophical tribe, and not just one sect of philosophy to which both Socrates and Theodorus belong. As such, it certainly allows a hierarchical composition, some philosophers like Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras are much better than their followers, and certainly better than Theodorus. Just as among the "chorus" or network of Forms some are greater kinds than others, and the Good is greatest of them all, so too, this comprehensive chorus of philosophers includes all thinkers who recognize the value of leisure and dedicate their lives to the pursuit of wisdom and justice.

10   This view has been defended also by Dorter, 1994, 88, Sedley, 2004, 65-74, Blondel, 2002, 289-293. That Thales is explicitly named in this context insofar as, being so absorbed in abstract reflections of astronomy he fell into a well (174a4-5), and therefore

has some share of the detachment characteristic of the philosopher leader, is not sufficient argument for saying that Plato intends us to take Thales to be a/the philosopher-leader of the chorus. Any given real flesh and blood philosopher of the chorus might well be so detached from particularities that he'd be a fair illustration of a philosopher leader in one or two or three respects, but to argue that one embodies the philosopher leader of the chorus literally would require evidence of aloofness in all the respects that this character has.

11   The philosopher-leader here described in relation to the philosophers of the chorus does not seem to be someone who relates to the chorus the way a conductor relates to the orchestra. For a particular conductor is always assigned to one chorus/orchestra and cannot lead several orchestral groups at the same time. The philosopher-leader here envisioned, on the other hand, is not leader of one chorus of philosophers, say followers of Heraclitus or followers of Parmenides, but rather leader of an all-encompassing chorus of philosophers. There is, nevertheless, one difficulty for the interpretation I propose here, namely the fact that the philosopher-leaders are referred to in the plural, as οἱ κορμφαίοι, 173c6-7, and not in the singular, and I admit I don't have a fully satisfactory solution to it.

12   For an insightful account of the *Theaetetus* Digression that links the image of the philosopher here portrayed with the onto-epistemological background of the middle dialogues and argues convincingly about the inherent limitations of the knowledge achievable by the real-life philosopher, see Maffi, 2019,147-60. It is along these lines that I understand German's comments: "Socrates can be aware that there is a god's eye perspective, one that is complete and synoptic where the human perspective is partial and fractured, and this awareness is a kind of liberation achieved this side of the grave. However, it is not achieved by escaping or erasing the limits of our mortal nature. Throughout the dialogues, Socrates' consistent recourse to dream, image, myth, and hearsay in conveying his thinking about the highest topics is evidence that the philosopher cannot completely jettison his partial perspective and encompass or assimilate himself to the whole in thought. The truth does not set Socrates free in that sense. Nevertheless, we have seen that Socrates' dream-like knowledge involves some comprehension of the reasons why this is so and must always remain so. It can do this only if it is expressing, in the distorted medium of human perspective, at least something of what would be visible from a vantage point that is free of those distortions. The Digression is a deliberate exaggeration, then, but not a lie." (German, 2017, 639).

13   The discrepancy between the two types of dynamics at play tells against the attempt to identify the Eleatic Stranger with the philosopher-leader,

and more in favor of reserving the image of the philosopher leader as intended abstract ideal. For the Stranger behaves in relation to his interlocutors less like a leader of the chorus in relation to the members of the chorus, and more like a general that guides his battalion on a road he's travelled before and instructs his battalion what to do when.

14 For more on this view see Annas, 1999, Sedley, 1999, Larsen, 2019 24-25, Armstrong, 2004, German, 2017.

15 I am grateful to Dana Miller for orienting my reading of the image of the chorus in the direction of the *Timaeus*.

16 For an insightful account of the ideal of godlikeness across various Platonic dialogues, see Armstrong, 2004.

17 Socrates' protreptic speeches intended to attract Socrates' interlocutors towards the philosophical life. As Larsen suggests, such speeches use images, arguments and analogies tailored each time to appeal to the specific interlocutors. "as we have seen, the picture of philosophy emerging from the digression, focused as it is on contemplation, seems partly tailored to Theodorus. But such a strategy is not unique to the Theaetetus. In the *Phaedrus*, philosophy is presented as the ultimate foundation of rhetoric (see 259e4-6, 260e5-261a5, 262c1-3, 269e4-270c2) to the rhetorically oriented *Phaedrus* (228a5-c5), in the *Republic* the philosopher is presented as the ultimate ruler to the politically oriented Glaucon and Adeimantus." Larsen, 2019, 21.

18 A similar case could be made about the *Timaeus*, where, while the ultimate object to imitate remains the Good and with it the eternal model of the Animal, we are offered in turn the Demiurge, the secondary gods, the World Soul as models to follow. See for instance, Armstrong, 2004, Druart, 1999.

19 I offer a detailed account of the metaphysical model hidden behind the vail of myth and metaphor in Ionescu, 2014, Ancient Philosophy 34, 29-46.

20 Though scholars have taken the Demiurge to be identical with Cronus, several factors suggest otherwise. First, the craftsman that puts the universe together and preserves it from complete destruction cannot be either Cronus or Zeus, for while the events in the reigns of the two Olympian gods repeat themselves cyclically, the fashioning of the universe is a unique non-repeatable act. Second, at 272e-273e we are told that the steersman of the universe retreats to his post when the universe is left on its own. The steersman cannot be Cronus, for Cronus has no role whatsoever during the age of Zeus, while the steersman from his retreat readily intervenes during the age of Zeus to prevent the threatened dis- integration of the universe. Thus, the Demiurge never actually leaves the scene (cf. Dorter, 1994, 193-194, Brisson, 2000, 181-182, Márquez, 2012, 159). Third, if Cronus were identical with the Demiurge, we would expect Zeus to be just as much in charge of the universe in his age as Cronus is during his age. But this undermines the idea of a cycle during which the universe is left to rotate on its own without much divine intervention. The Demiurge as a third god allows the universe left on its own in the reign of Zeus, for we then regard Cronus and Zeus not so much as steersmen, but rather as symbols of the kind of life available in each age.

BOOK
REVIEWS

Review of André Laks, *Plato's Second Republic. An Essay on the* Laws, Princeton University Press, New Jersey/ Oxford, 2022.

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In the past decade, the *Laws* have achieved a prominent position in scholarship on Plato: the number of recent monographs and collections on this work is considerable.[1] After his *Médiation et coercition. Pour une lecture des Lois de Platon* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2005) André Laks, a leading expert on the *Laws*, has now published a second monograph on the dialogue. The new book aims to "articulate the conceptual net that the *Laws* weave around the term 'law'" (p. 154), but shares with the earlier one a very similar scholarly perspective and a focus on persuasion and the preambles.[2] The book is subdivided into an introduction, ten chapters, a summary, followed by three appendices, notes, bibliography, and two indices.

In **Chapter 1 ("The Form of the Laws: An Overview")** Laks singles out two "focal points around which the entire dialogue revolves" (p. 17, cf. p. 26): the introduction of the preambles (722a7–723b6) and the retreat from the ideal paradigm forced by an acknowledgement of human nature (739a1–e5). Further pillars of Laks' analysis are the theological foundation of true law, with the notion of the 'divine' moving from traditional conceptions to a philosophical level (p. 17–18; cf. Laks, 2005, p. 22), as well as the distinction between the rational, *nous*-derived *content* of the law and its irrational *form* based on order, threat, and violence (p. 19–20; cf. Laks, 2005, p. 23 and 72). Given that structure is the subject of this chapter, I would have expected to read more about what I consider to be a major problem of interpretation, namely the difficult relationship between the first three books, defined as "prologues" (20) by Laks, and the remainder of the dialogue: what is the status of the first three books and in what way is their content related to or integrated into the *Laws*' political project (which comes into view only in Book

4)? And what is the meaning of the cesura at the end of Book 3?

In **Chapter 2 ("Paradigms and Utopias")**, Laks focuses on the concept of "possibility" in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*. He observes that the *Republic* introduces a "revisionist" concept of possibility which makes something possible when the realisation is "closest" (ἐγγύτατα) to the model (p. 39 and 44, cf. *R.* 473a5–b1). While emphasising the ambivalence of the text, Laks favours a strong interpretation of this novel concept according to which a realisation of the *Republic*'s project would differ considerably from its model. This revisionist notion of possibility undermines (cf. p. 166) the *Republic*'s fundamental claim that the coincidence of philosophical knowledge and political power is indeed possible (cf. *R.* 499b1–d5, 502c5–7): "what is logically possible may in fact not be feasible" (p. 40). Laks further argues that this reading opens the way to the *Laws*, where a coincidence of knowledge and power is said to be possible only "for a short period" (an apt translation of κατὰ βραχύ, *Lg.* 875d3) and where the "first city" is a city for gods and children of gods (cf. 739d6) but not for human beings of the present day.[3] The chapter ends with a defence of the (anachronistic) use of the term "utopia" to describe both Callipolis and the *Laws*' first city. Laks' position, well-known from earlier works[4], has been variously criticised by specialists (especially Francisco Lisi[5]). Indeed, given that the paradigms of the two dialogues differ from each other (cf. ch. 3, p. 60–62), I wonder whether Laks' conclusion does not take the comparison too far: "in the light of 'possibility,' namely human or real possibility […] it is in the *Laws*, not in the *Republic*, that we find Plato's picture of the *really* […] best city" (p. 64). Yet doubtless the analysis undertaken in this chapter is astute and stimulating: one need not follow Laks' strong reading in order to acknowledge that taking the ambivalent concept(s) of possibility as an anchor point for a comparison between the *Republic* and the *Laws* brings the complexity of their relationship neatly to the fore. The exploration of this relationship "in terms of paradigm and approximation" (p. 62) is continued in **Chapter 3 ("Paradigm and Retreats")**. Laks now concentrates on the use of the term 'paradigm' in the *Laws* (which is applied both to the first and to the second city, p. 54, cf. 739e1 and 746b7), and on the ways in which the interlocutors step back from both these paradigms. Following his observations in Chapter 1 he concludes, somewhat cryptically, that "the very setting of the *Laws* as a whole can be counted as a global retreat" (p. 59) and that focusing on the laws "is itself a consequence" (p. 63) of this.

The reason why retreat becomes such a dominant figure in the *Laws*, according to Laks, is the "basic anthropological view […] according to which human nature […] is under the compulsion of pleasure and pain" (p. 59–60). This is the focus of **Chapter IV ("What is Human?")**, a chapter that, in my view, considering the relevance of the *Laws*' anthropology for the book's subject, is too superficial. The puppet in *Laws* 1 (644b6–645c6) and the nature of choral dance are here interpreted as occasions of 'wonder' (θαῦμα, 644d7) in which "the constitutive irrationality" of human beings and rationality "happen to converge" (p. 72–73, cf. Laks, 2005, p. 85–92). Laks' observations on the term θαῦμα (p. 67–68) are valuable but, regrettably, the interpretation of the puppet, which he takes to be "Plato's fullest exposition in the *Laws* of what a human being is" (p. 65) – a claim that would require more evidence than is provided[6] –, engages only narrowly with the vastness of scholarly literature on the image and does not

offer an analysis of the psychological functioning of the puppet. The extremely brief discussion of choral dance leads to the questionable conclusion that choral dance "is an inchoate form of rhetoric" (p. 71). Even granted that the discursive content of song is indeed very important in the *Laws*, this interpretation neglects both the emphatic description of musical art as a kind of *Gesamtkunstwerk* in Book 2 (669a7–670b6) and the prominence of corporality in the treatment of dance in Book 7 (814d7–816d2). Laks' bipartite reading of the *Laws*' psychology receives some more support in **Appendix B** (p. 169–176), where he argues that the *Republic* "ultimately rel[ies], too, on a dichotomic scheme" (p. 176). Many things, however, remain unclear to the reader, for example the relation between the virtue of σωφροσύνη and the said convergence of irrationality and rationality. And what does "happen to converge" mean: a spontaneous incident (cf. p. 147)? Is moral excellence not a matter of personal effort (cf. 718e2–6)?

Chapters 5 and 6 share a focus on the notion of freedom (cf. Laks, 2007[7]). **Chapter 5 ("The Multiplication of Goals")** offers a concise but interesting discussion of the differing goals of legislation that the Athenian mentions at various places in the dialogue. Laks' primary finding is that at one point σωφροσύνη replaces freedom (cf. 693b4 and c2) as one of the goals, suggesting that in Plato's view the political notion of freedom in terms of the independence of a city may be incomplete, leaving open what freedom means "at the civic level, within the city and for the citizen" (p. 84). The first part of **Chapter 6 ("Mixtures, Blends, and Other Metamorphoses")** is dedicated to a scrutiny of the *Laws*' 'mixed' constitution. Laks argues that the terms 'mixture' (σύμμεικτος, κεκραμένος) and 'middle' (μέσον) "convey two different,

though surely related meanings" (p. 87). While the notion 'mixed constitution' aptly describes the Spartan constitution (p. 87, cf. p. 78), the *Laws*' constitution, by contrast, strives for a middle point between monarchical despotism and democratic freedom, thus creating "a perfect blend rather than a simple mix" (p. 95). As the author admits, this reading is "speculative" (p. 95), because the terminology is not strict. But in view of the importance the term μέσον gains in the *Laws*,[8] it is not implausible. The second part of this chapter is perhaps the most revealing section of the book. In continuation of the argument of the previous chapter, Laks suggests that there is an implicit "re-conceptualization" (p. 102) of freedom at work in the *Laws*. He shows that the notion of 'free man' becomes progressively associated with a voluntary servitude to law and reason, thereby re-defining 'true' freedom: "[…] Plato, while still operating with a traditional conception of freedom, is opening the way to a view according to which to be virtuous, i.e., obedient to reason, *is* to be free in a nonconcessive sense" (p. 99). The ascription to Plato of a 'positive' concept of freedom must be handled with caution.[9] Yet in its subtlety I find Laks' reading convincing.

Chapters 7–9 concentrate on the preambles. The primary function of the preambles, the author persuasively writes in **Chapter 7 ("Construing the Preambles")**, is "to strip the command from its tyrannical character" (p. 123). By reducing the coercive dimension of law, the preambles thus help to minimise the contradiction between its rational content and its irrational, violent form (mentioned above, see my text on ch. 1). The "lawgiver's ideal", yet only within the scope of a "legislative utopia", would be "to dispense with the law altogether" in favour of a philosophical discourse (ibid.). Of course, whether the idea

of rendering the laws superfluous is really ideally imaginable for the Athenian is entirely speculative, given that even Callipolis has laws. **Chapter 8 ("A Rhetoric in the Making")** looks closer into the "flexible nature of the preambles" (p. 30), their "scalarity" (p. 125), with regard to both their persuasiveness and their intellectual level. On the basis of several examples Laks distinguishes between preambles that appeal to reflection, those that draw on praise and blame, others that bring in 'incantations', and a final, almost law-like group that reintroduces threat. The aim of this (probably not exhaustive) list is to show "the tension between extreme forms of persuasive discourse" (p. 133) and to prove that the preamble is "an open form" (p. 133). This, in Laks' view, "is the only way to respond to the rather confused debate about whether Plato's preambles are 'rational' or 'irrational'" (p. 125). While Laks is right to emphasise the diversity of the preambles, I am not fully convinced by his rejection of this very influential debate: for example, does not the preamble on marriage (721b6–d6), which according to Laks appeals to reflection, also address religious feelings? And if so, in what way is a reflection induced on the basis of feelings and the desire for immortality 'rational' or not? **Chapter 9 ("Two Exceptional Preambles")** is dedicated to the general preamble in Books 4–5 (cf. Laks, 2005, 138–146) and the preamble to the law on impiety in Book 10. The interpretation of the general preamble is based on a structuring which is, I believe, mistaken: Laks assumes that there is a subdivision into "A. Relationships" (ὁμιλήματα) and "B. Personal character" (ποῖός τις ὢν αὐτός, 730b1–5). This structure is present in the text (and it implies a notable two-fold perspective on the self, cf. p. 138), but it is subordinate to a different subdivision into a 'divine' and a

'human' (pleasure-based) perspective on the good life.[10] This also affects Laks' claim (p. 138) that sections A and B are modelled on the Aristotelian difference between things to be honoured (τίμια) and praiseworthy things (ἐπαινετά, NE 1101b10–27): rather, both notions form part of the divine perspective which deals with (a philosophical hierarchy of) values whose observance brings a good reputation (εὐδοξία, 733a1) to each citizen. In fact, τίμιος reappears in Laks' section B (730d2–4). Too little space is dedicated to the 'human perspective'. The respective paragraph contains only a blunt rejection of the – much-debated – view that the Athenian's argument here is based on (ethical) hedonism (p. 141). Concerning the preamble to the law on impiety, Laks argues that it is a "rational preamble" (p. 148) which, despite some disanalogies, virtually reproduces the free doctor's conversation with his patient (p. 146, cf. the medical analogy: 719e7–720e6, 857b9–e1). It therefore is closest to a philosophical discourse and to realising a 'legislative utopia' (148).

Chapter 10 ("Plato's Best Tragedy") is a shortened version of Laks, 2010[11] and argues that the *Laws*' constitution is "a tragedy in the more usual sense of the term 'tragic'" (p. 152) both because it deals with serious matters and because it contains a law-code which stipulates that transgressions are followed by punishment. In the lawgiver's perspective, this is 'tragic' also in the sense that punishment, due to human nature, is inevitable. The book closes with a helpful summary **("In Retrospect")**, in which Laks emphasises especially his position regarding the fundamental consistency between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and three appendices, two of which I have already mentioned: **"On the Status of the Statesman"** (A), **"On a Supposed Evolution of Plato's Psychology"** (B), and **"Aristotle**

and Posidonius on Plato's Preambles" (C, cf. Laks, 2005, p. 126–128).

Although heavily based on earlier work, Laks' monograph remains a valuable contribution to current debates on the *Laws*, offering a more complete picture of his influential perspective on the *Laws* as well as some new arguments for claims that have been criticised in the past. Some of the author's claims are convincing, others are too speculative but still thought-provoking. With a view to the importance of anthropology and human motivation for the focus of this book, I would have welcomed a more thorough examination of these issues in the respective chapters (ch. 4, 8, and 9). Especially in this context, several important debates are too hastily put aside. In addition, the book would have benefitted from closer involvement with some recent publications:[12] Folch, 2015 (who has a chapter on the puppet image) as well as the collections by Recco & Sanday, 2013 (with a paper on the Great Preamble) and Knoll & Lisi, 2017 are entirely absent from the bibliography. And the challenging claims of Bartels, 2017 deserved more attention than two brief footnotes: as Laks observes himself (p. 198, note 6), her position is opposed to his own regarding the *Laws*' relation to Plato's earlier work, and she has much to say both on the dialogue's moral psychology and on its structure.[13]

ENDNOTES

1   In order of appearance: Peponi, A.-E. (ed.) (2013). *Performance and Culture in Plato's* Laws. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Horn, C. (ed.) (2013). *Platon: Gesetze – Nomoi.* Berlin, Akademie Verlag; Recco, G.; Sanday, E. (eds) (2013). *Plato's Laws: Force and Truth in Politics.* Bloomington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press; Prauscello, L. (2014). *Performing Citizenship in Plato's* Laws, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Mai, H. (2014). *Platons Nachlass:*

Zur philosophischen Dimension der Nomoi. Freiburg/München, Alber; Folch, M. (2015). *The City and the Stage: Performance, Genre, and Gender in Plato's* Laws. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Meyer, S. S. (ed.) (2015). *Plato: Laws 1 and 2* (translated with introduction and commentary). Oxford, Oxford University Press; Schofield, M. (ed.) (2016). *Plato: Laws* (translated by T. Griffith). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Bartels, M. (2017). *Plato's Pragmatic Project: A Reading of Plato's* Laws. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner; Knoll, M.; Lisi, F. (eds) (2017). *Platons* Nomoi: *Die politische Herrschaft von Vernunft und Gesetz.* Baden-Baden, Nomos; Friedland, E. (2020). *The Spartan Drama of Plato's* Laws. London, Lexington Books; Noack, L. (2020). *Religion als kultureller Ordnungsrahmen in Platons* Nomoi. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz; Centrone, B. (2021). *La seconda polis: Introduzione alle* Leggi *di Platone.* Roma, Carocci; Reeve, C. D. C. (ed.) (2022). *Plato: Laws* (translated, with introduction and notes). Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett; Ballingall, R. A. (2023). *Plato's Reverent City: The* Laws *and the Politics of Authority.* Cham, Palgrave Macmillan; Pfefferkorn, J. (2023). *Platons tanzende Stadt: Moralpsychologie und Chortanz in den* Nomoi. Leiden, Brill.

2   The new book contains "several self-quotations of variable length" (8) from the 2005 monograph and other published articles. While I will occasionally indicate parallelisms to Laks' 2005 book, a comparison between both monographs is beyond the scope of this review. I mostly take the book as it stands. The practice of extensive self-quotation may be questionable but doubtless Laks' new book will have a greater readership.

3   See also **Appendix A** ("On the Status of the Statesman") where Laks argues that the *Statesman* opens the way to the *Laws*.

4   Apart from Laks, 2005, 79–84, see also e.g. Laks, A. (2000). The *Laws*. In: Rowe, C.; Schofield, M. (eds). *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 258–292; and Laks, A. (2001). In what sense is the city of the *Laws* a second best one?. In: Lisi, F. (ed.). *Plato's* Laws *and its Historical Significance.* Sankt Augustin, Academia, p. 107–114.

5   Cf. e.g. Lisi, F. (2004). Héros, dieux et philosophes. *Revue d'Études Anciennes* 106, p. 5–22, and Violence and Law in Plato's Second-Best Constitution. In: Bosch-Veciana, A.; Monserrat-Molas, J. (eds) (2010). *Philosophy and Dialogue: Studies on Plato's Dialogues.* Vol. 2. Barcelona, Barcelonesa d'Edicions, p. 157–168.

6   For the opposite view cf. e.g. Frede, D. (2010). Puppets on strings. Moral psychology in *Laws* Books 1 and 2. In: Bobonich, C. (ed.). *Plato's Laws: A Critical Guide.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 108–126: "the 'puppet analogy' serves only a limited purpose and may not fully disclose Plato's

psychology in the *Laws*" (p. 118). I side with Laks, but I think it cannot be taken for granted, cf. Pfefferkorn, 2023, esp. ch. 3.

7   Laks, A. (2007). Freedom, Liberality and Liberty in Plato's *Laws*. In Keyt, D.; Miller, F. (eds): *Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 130–152.

8   See e.g. 728d6–e4 on the good body or 792c8–d4 on the good state of mind.

9   Cf. Coope, U. (2020). *Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 8–18 (not referenced by Laks).

10 This seems clear to me because in the sentence that marks the transition between the divine and the human perspective (732d8–e3) – B1 to B2 in Laks' structure – both 'ways of conduct' and 'personal character' are mentioned (περὶ μὲν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷα χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου, ποῖόν τινα χρεὼν εἶναι, λέλεκται σχεδὸν ὅσα θεῖά ἐστι). Consequently, the divine perspective extends beyond Laks' section B and includes the entire first part of the general preamble (as well as the address to the citizens in Book 4). Cf. Pfefferkorn, 2023, p. 140–141 with note 86.

12 Laks, A. (2010). Plato's 'truest tragedy' (*Laws*, 817a-b). In: Bobonich, C. (ed.). *Plato's* Laws*: A critical Guide*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 217–231. See Pfefferkorn, 2023, p. 284–285 with notes for a critical assessment of this paper.

12 See note 1 for the bibliographical references.

13 I am very grateful to Stephen Halliwell for reading a draft of this review and for his support.

Review of *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato*, 2nd edition (2023), edited by Gerald A. Press and Mateo Duque

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What is retrospectively called the first edition of the *Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato* was published as *The Continuum Companion to Plato* in 2012,[1] edited by Gerald A. Press. I supplied the following blurb for the cover of that edition: 'The editor has assembled a remarkable range of contributors, able to cover – as successfully as any team could, within the space of a single volume – the outlines of the complex and fissiparous world of Plato, Platonism, and Platonic interpretation up to the present day. The book represents a unique resource for advanced students and professional scholars alike'. The back of the new edition says that the new edition is 'fully updated … [and] includes nineteen newly commissioned entries on [a range of topics not previously treated]': cf. p.1, which talks of 'add[ing] several articles dealing with areas of research on Plato that have blossomed since the first [edition]', which has incidentally allowed the editors 'to expand the already broad reach of the first edition with articles by younger scholars and those in parts of the world not previously represented among contributors … [I]t also features revisions to the majority of articles from the first edition, including eight which have been completely rewritten, and twelve which have had the references substantially revised'.

I now move on from the role of advocate/ publicist[2] to that of journal reviewer, in order to give a more in-depth perspective on the project as a whole: eleven years on, it remains essentially the same project. I stand by my judgement that the contributors 'cover … the outlines', etc., and that the volume represents 'a unique resource for advanced students and professional scholars alike'; there is certainly nothing else quite like the *Handbook*.[3] What I shall do here is to talk about its limitations as well as its virtues, and in particular about

what exactly students and scholars will and will not find in it.

That the 'reach' of the volume is deemed to include breadth of representation, as between young and old(er) contributors, and between different parts of the world, confirms what I think to be true in any case, namely that the *Handbook* is intended as much as a guide to work on Plato as to Plato himself (the title, *Handbook of Plato* is ambiguous between the two, as I suppose *Companion to Plato* was too). This becomes explicit on p.6, near the end of the Introduction: 'Contributors include not only philosophers but specialists in classics, comparative literature, English, Greek, history and political science; and they are professors in [fifteen countries]. – Rather than a small number … of long articles on a proportionately limited array of subjects, we have gathered together a rather large number – more than 160 – on a very large array of subjects. And rather than articles that share a single methodology or interpretive approach, we have been pluralistic, seeking to include many approaches. In fact, our aim was to have all of the current approaches represented in order to give as complete a picture as possible of the current state of knowledge and research about Plato. Pluralism in interpretation is not only a fact; … it is, importantly, how error and vacuity are avoided (Heath 2002 [= Malcolm Heath, *Interpreting Classical Texts*, no page reference given]).'

This reference to Heath seems to me to misrepresent him. 'Pluralism', as I understand his argument, has to do with the proposal that progress in the understanding of ancient texts often arises from, perhaps even requires, interaction between different interpretations and interpretative approaches; merely listing or contrasting such approaches, in the manner of the *Handbook* (given that – not least for

reasons of space – it excludes more or less all comment on this or that approach), is hardly an example of pluralism in Heath's sense. Further, Heath's book is about literature rather than about history, and about literature rather than about philosophy. Now of course the Platonic dialogues count as literature as well as philosophy. Plato is uncontroversially one of the greatest writers of antiquity. But he is also undoubtedly a philosopher, that is (to put it as uncontroversially as possible, and even if the *Handbook* sometimes comes as close as it could to denying it without actually doing so: see below), someone who is concerned with wisdom and knowledge and with finding a path to or towards those goals, in the service of which he constructs *arguments*. One of the largest omissions from the *Handbook* – I shall come back to this observation, and its explanation – is a sense of that argumentative aspect of Plato; perhaps even necessarily, since even the entries for particular dialogues, except for the *Republic*, are limited to two to three pages (*Republic* gets about twice as much; *Laws* just the same as the rest), and apart from forty or so pages on 'Important Features of the Dialogues' (there are twenty such listed), the largest part is devoted to 'Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues'. The consequence is that the reader gets an idea of the subjects (concepts, themes and topics) that come up in the course of Plato's argument, but little or no sense of the reasoning that either accounts for their introduction or justifies their presence. The whole strikes this reader as a classic case of not seeing the wood – as in *bois, bosco, Wald* – for the trees. (One of the first things I looked for even in 2011/2012 was an index of passages. Its absence is symptomatic: textual references for the most part serve just to locate 'concepts', etc., so that references to the text can be dis-

covered via the index to concepts, and do not need to be listed separately. Again, there is no discussion *of* passages, only a juxtaposition of rival interpretations involving the same passage within a single entry, or more usually a description of a particular interpretation as 'controversial', vel sim., or else the accidental appearance of a rival interpretation in a different part of the volume.)

But that, again, is part of the design of the *Handbook*. The idea is not to allow us access to *an* understanding of the whole wood,[4] but rather to the range of different understandings of and approaches to it from antiquity to the present day, with a distinct bias towards the modern. Chapter 5, the last part of the volume, on 'Later Reception, Interpretation and Influence of Plato and the Dialogues', gives us twenty-three brief summaries of different ways of seeing or approaching Plato: 'Ancient hermeneutics', 'Aristotle', 'Academy of Athens (ancient history of)', 'Jewish Platonism (ancient)', 'Neoplatonism and its diaspora', 'Medieval Islamic Platonism', 'Medieval Jewish Platonism', 'Medieval Christian Platonism', 'Renaissance Platonism', 'The Cambridge Platonists', 'Early modern philosophy from Descartes to Berkeley', 'Nineteenth-century German idealism, 'Nineteenth-century Plato scholarship', 'Developmentalism', 'Compositional chronology', 'Analytic approaches to Plato', 'Vlastosian approaches', 'Continental approaches', 'Straussian readings of Plato', 'Plato's unwritten doctrines', 'Esotericism', 'The Tübingen approach', and finally 'Anti-Platonism, from ancient to modern'. Modern approaches receive more space than pre-modern ones: ancient Platonism down to Plotinus, a.k.a. 'Academy of Athens', and Neoplatonism, for example, are each given the same number of pages as Tübingen or Strauss, while Strauss, along with Tübingen, gets a second bite under

'Esotericism', Tübingen even a third bite under 'unwritten doctrines'. The prominence allowed to Tübingen only partly counters the trace of Anglo-Saxon/US bias evident in the tiny space allotted to the 'Continental' tradition (itself perhaps understood somewhat differently in the Introduction, p.4), which is equal to that given to Vlastos, or to Strauss, neither of whom is likely nowadays to feature prominently in the landscape of Plato interpretation outside the US (and perhaps decreasingly even there); the first might well seem already sufficiently covered under 'Developmentalism' and 'Analytic approaches', the second under 'Esotericism'.[5]

The singling out of nineteenth-century German scholarship makes it look intended as a turning point, which indeed in classical studies generally it surely is. But in the *Handbook*'s order of things, it is just another moment among many others. In Gerald Press's view, Plato studies had taken a decisive turn in the recent past. The 'dominant approach', he proposed in 2018, can be summed up as 'the continuing decline of dogmatic and nondramatic [sc., or including, philosophical?] interpretation and the expansion and ramification of the more literary, dramatic, and nondogmatic "New Platonism". What was a growing insurgency twenty years ago can now be described as a, if not the, dominant approach': a sentence I cite from the abstract to Press, 'The State of the Question in the Study of Plato: Twenty Year Update', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 56/1 [2018], 9-35, which itself refers back to, and takes up 'The State of the Question in the Study of Plato' (*SJPh* 34/4) from 1996. Press's approach to Plato is genuinely universal, taking into account *all* literature on Plato, that is, whether literary, historical, philosophical, or whatever.[6] From such a perspective, the lack of interest in Plato's argument (see above) is not surprising.

It is still less surprising when we go back to Press's 1996 article. We need to distinguish, he suggests there, 'among the diverse purposes for which scholars study Plato's dialogues. For a substantial amount of the Plato literature is essentially concerned with discovering Plato's answers to the questions of concern to contemporary scholars and researchers, or, more plainly, "the enterprise of mining Plato for the purposes of one's own philosophising" [cited from R.H.Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, 1973]. Guthrie is correct that there is nothing intrinsically better about what he calls, on the other hand, "the historical approach" or "a scholar's approach" [the reference is to W.K.C.Guthrie, *Twentieth Century Approaches to Plato*, 1967], but the difference is often overlooked. The historical and scholarly approach has its own aims and uses, and is the concern here' (p.507) – as it is, in terms of overall emphasis, in the *Handbook*.

It will be helpful here to dwell a little longer on Press's admirably scholarly and wide-ranging 1996 article. He there sums up 'the state of the question at mid-[20th]century' by saying that beginning in the late 1950s 'the question had changed, from something like (1) What were Plato's doctrines and how did they develop, as revealed by analysing the arguments alone in the dialogues taken to be essentially treatises? to something like (2) Should we take literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues into consideration in trying to understand Plato's thought?' (p.511). 'Dogmatic' interpretation, or, less provocatively, interpretation that attributes certain theories to Plato, is in this context implicitly associated with philosophical analysis of the arguments for those theories. Press recommends a quite different approach to the arguments: 'The question about the arguments is not simply whether they are valid or invalid, but why

does Plato make *this* character present *this* argument – valid or invalid, clear or ambiguous – in these dialogical circumstances?' (p.515). Then, in the final section of the paper, 'Questions for the research agenda', Plato's arguments more or less disappear from the map altogether – as they do, in the way I have suggested, from the *Handbook* itself.

I have already identified myself clearly enough with what Press calls the 'dogmatic' or 'doctrinal' line of interpretation, though I prefer to talk of 'explorations'[7] (Plato, on my view, has *general* positions that he will die for, like Socrates, e.g., about what makes for a good human life, but no doctrines or dogmas as such). My question now, a quarter of a century on from Press's statement of the research agenda, is how far that agenda has been taken up. As we have seen, he himself, in 2018, described something like it as constituting the 'dominant approach'. If, like Press, we take into account the whole spectrum of work on Plato, across the world and across a multitude of disciplines, he may well be right. If he is right, and if that 'dominant approach' involves the suppression of, or a decline of interest in, Plato's arguments *as* arguments, and in whether they are valid or invalid, or, more broadly and helpfully, persuasive or unpersuasive, then I would regard that as a wholly retrograde step. Plato's Socrates (say: the Socrates of the *Apology*, the *Crito*, or the *Theaetetus*), like all Plato's other leading characters, is concerned with finding the best argument available, and it is surely not a big leap to suppose that Plato himself shared the same concern. Of course we can and must take account of dialogue form, the issue of anonymity, and the whole gamut of issues listed in the *Handbook*, and maybe others besides. But I urge that we must at least begin by trying, not just to identify the

structure of each dialogue, but to *understand* both its argument as a whole – because every dialogue is a whole – and any particular argument or arguments it includes, as arguments (for the most part quite rational arguments, too, whatever admixture there might be, on occasion, of wit, provocation, or anything else that he may happen to add to the mix: see below). If we do not do this, then we shall be in danger of missing the very thing that Plato himself takes care, through his characters and the interplay between them, to place centre stage: philosophy, understood as the search for wisdom and knowledge. (Assessment of the *quality* of Plato's arguments will also be important: we owe it to him as much as to ourselves. But it can come later.) In the 'ancient quarrel' between philosophers and poets, Plato firmly locates his Socrates, his Eleatic Visitor, …, and – I propose, even insist – himself among the former (cf. p.254 of the *Handbook*, in an entry on 'Hermeneutics'). Plato also, of course, belongs among the poets, and indeed in the presentation of his own arguments/the arguments of the dialogues he can often deploy poetic and dramatic techniques. But to treat him *just* as a poet or dramatist is like calling a chess playing, strategically astute football manager *just* a chess player, even though we might well want to analyse his chess playing as well as his football management (and assess how his grasp of chess strategy helps him manage his team on the football field).

If, again, we add together all the publications on any aspect of Plato from across the world over, say, the past thirty or forty years, it could be that Press is right about the presently 'dominant approach', i.e., on a purely arithmetical reckoning. But of that vast number of publications a significant proportion is concerned precisely with the sort of examination of Plato's arguments that I have described as es-

sential, many of them written by authors[8] who might once have been termed 'analytic philosophers', as in the *Handbook*, but now more usually call themselves plain 'philosophers'.[9] Paradoxically, given the mere three pages the *Handbook* devotes to 'Analytic approaches', and the implicit and explicit downplaying of the importance of philosophical analysis, many of its own contributors are such authors and philosophers, and the bibliography is stuffed full of their books, chapters and articles. The reason for the contradiction is clear. Like the author of the entry for 'Analytic approaches',[10] the *Handbook* in general restricts itself to a narrow view of the analysis of arguments, identifying it with the deployment of a particular set of 'techniques … involv[ing] recasting portions of the dialogues as concisely stated deductive arguments, exploring questions relating to validity as well as to truth, exposing contradictions and equivocations, and making explicit all essential assumptions' (p.406). But we have now emerged from what Terry Penner once termed 'the age of diagnosticism',[11] in which only '[sc. properly] logically structured' arguments,[12] largely missing in Plato, are deemed worthy of philosophical attention.[13] The lack of arguments of such a type does not indicate a lack of arguments in general;[14] Plato's dialogues *teem* with arguments, sometimes spread over dozens if not hundreds of pages, and many of them are poorly understood – not surprisingly, if their very existence has regularly been put in doubt.[15]

I now turn to more particular aspects of the *Handbook*. Chapter 1, 'Plato's life, historical, literary and philosophic context', is largely unexceptional. We have entries on Plato's life, 'Aristophanes and intellectuals', 'Comedy' (on Plato's alleged use of 'the techniques of Old Comedy': but did Plato really need to borrow parody and satire from there?), 'Education'

(including the sophists), 'Eleatics', 'Isocrates and logography', 'Orality and literacy' (including a sideswipe at 'the widespread but waning practice of "rationally reconstructing" arguments alleged to be implicit in texts from the history of philosophy', p.25: a reference to 'analytic approaches'?), 'Poetry (epic and lyric)', 'Pre-Socratic philosophers', 'Pythagoreans' (an outstanding piece), 'Rhetoric and speechmaking', 'Socrates (historical)', 'Socratics (other than Plato)', 'The sophists' (an entry that reappears, without explanation, in Chapter 4, at pp.344-7), and 'Xenophon'.

Chapter 2, which begins with an essential piece on 'The Platonic corpus and manuscript tradition', is mostly a mix of summary and the briefest discussion of individual dialogues (with one item covering 'Dubia and Spuria', except for *Epinomis*, which gets its own section), usually with a few references to the literature. This part of the volume, then, is like a tourist guidebook for someone thinking of visiting a particular area for the first time, with indications of the most interesting sights – but, on occasion (to continue the metaphor), with some views closed off, for a few of the entries tend to shut discussion down rather than open it up. Thus, for example, the entry for the *Apology* translates 30b2-4, without comment, as 'from virtue comes money and all good things for men in public and private' (p.55), instead of what John Cooper, *Collected Dialogues* (announced by the *Handbook* editors as the default translation used), gives in the main text: 'excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men …'. Admittedly, the *Handbook* does not explicitly commit Socrates to the view that wealth is a good, as the alternative translation in Cooper does (taking *ta alla agatha* as 'the other goods' rather than as 'the goods besides'), but a reader might well ask why, then, it should matter that

money should come from virtue/excellence or not, if it is not a good? The Platonic Socrates certainly shows no interest in money himself, and in *Theaetetus*, for example, he is quite dismissive of it. The way we take the *Apology* sentence (on which see Burnyeat, *JHS* 2005) makes a fundamental difference, not marked by the *Handbook* entry, for our understanding of Socrates in the dialogues. Or, for another example of problematic summary, take that of the *Politicus*: 'the Eleatic expresses concern that the statesman might become hidden in a group described as "the greatest enchanters among the sophists" (291c). This danger is forestalled by dividing governors into leaders of genuine and imitative (303c) polities, including kingly and tyrannical monarchies, aristocracies and oligarchies, and lawful and lawless democracies' (p.113). On the face of it, the pair 'genuine and imitative', followed by three pairs of constitutions, suggests that the first of each of the pairs of constitutions is meant to be 'genuine' (cf.[16] the entry under 'Law, convention (*nomos*)' in chapter 4, on the same dialogue, and referring to the same context: 'a city without an expert ruler should [according to the Eleatic Visitor] stick rigidly its laws, even if the processes by which those laws are chosen are not particularly rational', p.271). But all six types of constitution are declared to be 'difficult to live with', and 'not correct' (303b4-5), and the *politikoi* in them not *politikoi* but *stasiastikoi* (303c1-2); in which case the *politeiai* themselves are precisely *not* 'genuine'. But perhaps after all this is what the *Handbook* entry intends (cf. the entry on 'Politics and the (figure of the) *Politicus*', later in chapter 4, which is admirably clear on the point): the danger of the statesman's being hidden among those 'enchanters' and 'sophists' is 'forestalled' by the identification of the one genuine statesman, and his separation

from all the rest, i.e., all existing 'statesmen'. Unfortunately, one would probably have to be aware of the issues already to notice the ambiguity in the entry.[17]

In chapter 3, the 'Important Features of the Dialogues' are 'Anonymity', 'Characters', 'Comedy' (overlapping with 'Comedy' in chapter 1, 'Humour' in this chapter; 'comedy' here includes 'absurdity', read as 'funny' rather than as provocative), 'Drama', 'History', 'Emotions', 'Humour', 'Irony' (three types distinguished), 'Language' (a mixed bag of subjects), 'Literary composition' (*inter alia*, on literature vs philosophy in the dialogues; Vlastos compared with Strauss), 'Musical structure', 'Myth', 'Pedagogical structure', 'Pedimental structure', 'Play (*paidia*)', 'Proleptic composition', 'Reading order', 'Socrates (the character)', 'Tragedy'. Philosophy, I suppose, is not included because philosophical approaches will be covered separately in chapter 5; but it will come as no surprise if I say that I miss an item on 'Argument'.

Finally, to chapter 4, 'Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues' (chapter 5 I shall consider as sufficiently discussed above). Many of the entries necessarily deal in 'dogmas' and 'doctrines' – necessarily, at least insofar as these 'dogmas/doctrines' are embedded in the literature, even if for one reason or another we are not to identify them with Plato. 'Aesthetics' is followed by '*Akrasia* (incontinence, weakness of will)', curiously not cross-referenced either with the entry for 'Intellectualism', even though 'Socratic intellectualism' is mentioned at the end, or with that for 'Desire';[18] then come 'Animals' (how clear is it, in light of *Timaeus*, that for Plato a certain 'animality' is essential to the makeup of human beings [p.185]?), then 'Antilogy and eristic', 'Aporia' (useful on the positive value of *aporia* in Plato), 'Appearance and reality', 'Art', 'Beauty', 'Being and becoming (*on*, *onta*;

gignesthai)' – an entry consisting mainly of examples of the contrast from *Timaeus*, *Theaetetus, Republic*: what more could be done in two pages?; then we have 'Cause' (focused on forms as causes), 'Cave (the allegory of)', 'Character' (mainly ethical), 'City (*polis*)' (mainly on *Republic*), 'Cosmos' (mainly a summary of *Timaeus*), '*Daimôn*' (three pages on Plato's uses of *daimôn* and *daimonios*), 'Death' (including immortality), 'Desire' (cross-referenced with 'Intellectualism', and actually giving a clearer understanding of that topic; on the other hand, not everyone agrees that *Republic* and other later dialogues 'make room for irrational desires bringing about actions'); then 'Dialectic', 'The divided line' (taking up the same space as the next topic, 'Education'), 'Elenchus (cross-examination, refutation)' (including a short critique of Vlastos's theory of 'the elenchus'), 'Epistemology (knowledge)', 'Eschatology', 'Ethics' (Plato as ethical reformer, moral critic, perhaps throughout the dialogues), and 'Excellence (virtue, *aretê*)'. The entry on 'Forms (*eidos*, *idea*)' does not attempt to 'arbitrate disputed issues', but neither does it state most of them. But then again, who could do better, on such a challenging subject, in just over two pages? Well, actually, the authors of the coming entries on 'Ontology (metaphysics) and 'Participation', which both refer back to 'Forms', though the compliment is not returned). After 'Forms', we have 'Friendship' (more than half on *Lysis* [q.v. in chapter 2]), 'Gender' (a thoughtful survey), 'Goodness (the good, *agathon*)', then 'Happiness (*eudaimonia*)'. One would have expected the two things, 'goodness/good' and 'happiness' to be connected, but neither entry refers to the other. 'For the Platonic Socrates, the good is that for the sake of which everything is done', starts the former; 'Plato takes it as uncontroversial that all of

us wish to be happy', says the latter: so just what is the relationship between the two? The former entry is preoccupied with the form of the good, the latter with eudaemonism; *inter alia* it may have helped throw light on the role of forms (q.v., a subject left more than a little mysterious, at least so far) to bring the two somehow into dialogue. But that is one of the costs of dividing everything up into small pieces. Next, 'Hermeneutics' (questions raised include whether Plato means to endorse a polysemic reading of his texts: a crucial issue, especially for the *Handbook*), 'Image' (mostly on 'imitation' of forms; referring to *mimêsis* but not cross-referenced with the entry on it), 'Inspiration', 'Intellectualism' (see above on 'Desire'), 'Justice …' (almost all on justice in the *Republic*), another entry entitled 'Language', covering some of the same ground as the entry in chapter 3, but achieving greater depth – and twice the length), 'Law, convention' (on which see on chapter 2 above), 'Logic' (on logic in Plato/Plato's use of logic, 'there is still much to do': hear hear! say I (and have said: since we ceased openly patronising Plato on this score, we have barely begun). After 'Logic' there is 'Logos (account, argument, definition)' (on the uses of a term), 'Love', 'Madness and possession', 'Mathematics (*mathêmatikê*)' (Plato's knowledge/understanding/use of), 'Medicine', 'Metatheatre' ('self-reflexive' theatre, Plato's dialogues as), 'Method', '*Mimêsis* (imitation)' (half on the *Republic*; positive and negative paradigms of 'imitation'), 'Music', 'Mysteries', 'Myth', 'Nature (*phusis*)' (as in 'the study of nature': *Timaeus*), 'Non-propositional knowledge', 'The one (*to hen*)' (the entry – roughly on how much of Plotinus was already in Plato? – might easily have been in chapter 5), 'Ontology (metaphysics)' (in effect the second entry on forms: see above), 'Orphism', '*Paid-*

erastia (pederasty)', 'Participation' (the third entry on forms), 'Perception and sensation', and 'Philosophy and the philosopher', which comes to the following – dazzling – conclusion: 'If sophists find refuge in the darkness of not-being, philosophers are difficult to see because of "the dazzling brightness of the region where they reside" ([*Sophist*] 254a). That is why the sophist may claim that *he* is the philosopher, and the statesman hold that public affairs demand a realism that the philosopher is devoid of. When it comes to those three "kinds", the difference between them is not to be found in a definition (that may be why Plato never wrote the dialogue of the *Philosopher*, alluded to in [*Sophist*] 254b), but ever again in Socrates, who is not a philosopher but *the* philosopher, a subject eluding the predicate. He might have been no more than a disinterested slightly eccentric sophist, if his bite had not startled Plato awake and opened the history of Western philosophy' (p.324). Finally come 'Piety', 'Pleasure', 'Poetry', 'Politics' (see above: another paradigmatic entry, along with 'Philosophy …'), 'Reason' (three pages), 'Recollection' (also three pages), 'Rhetoric (*rhetorikê*)', 'Self-knowledge', 'The Sophists' (repeated from pp.42-5), 'Soul', 'The sun simile' (Sarah Broadie's *Plato's Sun-Like Good*, Cambridge 2021, is not mentioned), 'Theology', 'Time', 'Vision', 'Women' – nicely balanced, with references to controversies but no actual bibliographical references, and 'Writing' – no references, or cross-references to controversies, and no bibliographical ones either, but still, like 'Women', a useful short introduction to the subject. Here are two places, among others, where the *Handbook* really is to Plato rather than to the ways we conceive, use – and misuse – him.

Despite its apparent length (more than eighty pages out of about five hundred in total)

the bibliography is understandably patchy, since it is based – as its title, 'References', tells us – on individual entries in the preceding chapters, and the authors of those entries are often highly selective in their references to the literature (occasionally, as we have seen, giving none at all; they were evidently not given a clear brief).

But like the *Companion*, the *Handbook* remains a 'unique resource',[19] despite its weaknesses and mis-steps. I am not sure that it is the 'essential reference text' it claims to be (on its back cover), not just because of the availability of the internet,[20] but (1) because among its 'scores of lucid and authoritative essays'[21] are some middling ones, and some that I think are positively misleading, in ways that I have illustrated, and (2) because, as I have indicated, I think the *Handbook*'s agenda for the study of Plato fundamentally mistaken. That agenda, however, is hardly so obtrusive, overall, as to prevent the *Handbook* from being thoroughly useful for a wide variety of readers.

ENDNOTES

1   The Continuum International Publishing Group was taken over by Bloomsbury Publishing in 2011, with Continuum titles being published under the Bloomsbury name from late in 2012; the Companion evidently missed the cut. While the Handbook calls itself a 'second edition', and refers to the first, it nowhere identifies the latter as the Companion (even on the copyright page).

2   In return for which role I was not offered a copy of the volume, a fact I mention not as a complaint but as an explanation of my inability to cross-check with the first edition (the voluminous typescript that was sent to me long since went into the recycling; the published version was, and is, expensive [it is currently on offer on a well-known site for well over $200] – as is its successor).

3   Which stands, then, as a suitably solid memorial for its creator (Gerald A. Press, 1945-2022). I gather that the volume was completed before his death; Mateo Duque, listed as co-editor, evidently saw it to, and through, the press, as well as adding something to the Introduction (see below).

4   If there is such a thing as 'the' wood at all: yes, I say; no, it seems, according to the Handbook (because that would amount to a 'dogmatic'/'doctrinal' interpretation, a mode that is now apparently passé, even though the volume includes numerous illustrations of it). See below.

5   The first page of the Introduction indicates that perceived 'stature' played a part in editorial policy; perhaps it has some influence here.

6   In principle, too, in all languages, though the Handbook's bibliography is thin on work in any language other than English, even if more non-native English-speakers may have been recruited for the new edition.

7   Press, 1996, p.514, citing the late Tom Robinson.

8   Mainly adorning philosophy departments, but not necessarily so (as in my own case, classicist as I am by training, largely self-taught as a philosopher)

9   My own experience of philosophy (and classics) departments in North, Central and South America, Japan and Korea, the Antipodes, in Europe generally, and now in China confirms the patent respect and attention now paid to Plato as a philosopher, whatever state of affairs may have obtained in the past. See further below.

10   Presumably one of the original cohort, in the first edition, since he refers to the period since 1954 as 'the past half-century'.

11   'If Plato is held to be committed to the belief that the Form of Largeness is itself a large object, he is being held to be committed to something that … makes no sense … – How can such beliefs be attributed to a great philosopher like Plato? The answer from within the tradition of Vlastos, Owen, Ryle and others is roughly this: because of conceptual confusions and mistakes of logical grammar. Real enough human disappointments, compounded by misleading analogies that are deep within language, tempt to metaphysical extravagance, generating all sorts of queer and mysterious entities and theories, with all sorts of unnoticed absurdities. It is the duty of the clear-headed reader of Plato [so Vlastos and the rest propose], while appreciating his great pioneering work, to track down the symptoms of his confusions and to diagnose his errors. I think of this period of the last fifty years or so within this particular Anglo-American tradition of the study of Plato as an age of diagnosticism.' (Terry Penner, *The Ascent from Nominalism*, (Dordrecht 1987), p.xiii).

12   '[I]n focussing attention on texts that lend themselves to logical analysis we run the risk of slighting other important, if less logically structured, aspects of Plato's thought …', 'Analytic approaches …' p.409; quotation continued in n.14 below.

13   See Brian Leiter's introduction to Leiter (ed.), *The Future of Philosophy* (Oxford 2004), pp.11-12: 'In light of the great variety of substantive and methodological approaches surveyed above, it is time to pronounce the "bogeyman" of analytic philosophy

laid to rest: so-called "analytic" philosophers now include quietists and naturalists [as Leiter has defined these]; old-fashioned metaphysical philosophers and twentieth-century linguistic philosophers; historians of philosophy and philosophers who show little interest in the history of the field. Given the methodological and substantive pluralism of Anglophone philosophy, "analytic" philosophy survives, if at all, as a certain style that emphasizes "logic", "rigor", and "argument" – a stylistic commitment that does little to demarcate it, of course, from Kant, Hegel, Descartes, or Aristotle'. What serves to excludes Plato from this latter list is no more than his lack of systematic engagement with logic.

14   As the entry on 'Analytical approaches' comes close to implying: 'But in focusing attention on texts that lend themselves to logical analysis [such as the ones mentioned from *Parmenides, Republic, Euthyphro, Theaetetus*?], we run the risk of slighting other important aspects of Plato's thought. It would clearly be an error, for example, to develop an interpretation of a Platonic dialogue without attending to details relating to setting and characterisation …'.

15   A last remark on the editorial policy of the Handbook. 'The editors continue to believe that the major developments in … the last forty to fifty years are the decline in developmentalism, expansion of literary and dramatic study, appreciation of the complexity of Plato's character, Socrates, and the clarification of the essential difference between the philosophy in Plato's dialogues and that of the generations after him who invented and elaborate the Platonism that has had a sustained influence on all subsequent thought' (Introduction, p.2). This does not seem much of 'a process of significant reorientation', as it is then called, whichever fifty years are in question; items 2 and 4, at least, are hardly new, and developmentalism never took root in many parts of the world. (After another six lines, the 'first edition Introduction' is apparently repeated: 'We continue to believe what was said in the first edition Introduction, which follows'.)

16   The Handbook regularly writes 'q.v.' for 'cf.' (as, e.g., in 'q.v. Dubia and Spuria', p.71).

17   For a discussion of the two interpretations, see now Anders Sorensen, 'The Second Best City and its Laws in Plato's Statesman', *AGPh* 104/1 (2022), 1-25. Sorensen calls the interpretation I think intended by the Handbook entry on the *Politicus* (and alluded to under 'Law …') 'traditional', and sets out to defend it against the sorts of objections I raise above; the defence is complex, and to my mind unsuccessful.

18   'Many scholars [claims the author of the entry under 'Akrasia …'] believe that Plato denied the possibility of akrasia … on the grounds that desire is a species of practical reason (e.g. Penner 1991)': so far as I know, Penner – who is more accurately represented under 'Desire' – never suggested such an idea, in his 1991 or anywhere else, nor can I think of anyone else who has.

19   See the opening paragraph of this review.

20   Far be it from me to divert readers away from printed books, which continue to be essential to my life, and I hope will to the whole of academia and beyond. Printed journals, I gather, may be on the way out, but books, surely, will survive and flourish.

21   The description is from one of the three cheerleaders (taking on the role I played with the 'first edition': see above) cited on the cover. My own summing up would be that there are some really exceptional entries, from the brilliantly laconic to the fully magisterial (or both).

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

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Gill 2012, 5-6.

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Gill 2012: Gill, M. L., *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2012.

CHAPTER IN BOOK:

A.H. Armstrong, *Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus's Account of Nous*, in P.-M. Schuhl – P. Hadot (ed.), *Le Néoplatonisme*, CNRS, Paris 1971, 67-74.

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G.E.L. Owen, *The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues*, «Classical Quarterly» 3 (1953), 79-95.