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Vita di Romolo 28, 4-10:una nascolta polemica anticristiana?

[*Plutarch, Life of Romulus 28,4-10: Hidden Anti-christian Controversy?*]

da

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Riasunto

Plutarco polemizza contro quanti credono che il corpo possa salire allo stato divino insieme all'anima. La posizione di Plutarco è naturalmente tipicamente platonica. Tuttavia l'enfasi posta su questa tematica, che solo parzialmente si giustifica con il racconto della divinizzazione di Romolo, potrebbe spiegarsi col desiderio dello scrittore di reagire a certe idee, che ho suggerito potessero essere cristiane, che circolavano e delle quali poteva aver colto un'eco, sebbene mediata e forse confusa: in Plutarco infatti non ci sono tracce sicure di una conoscenza del Cristianesimo.

Parole-Chiave: Plutarco, Cristianesimo, Religione dell'età imperiale.

Abstract

In *Vita Romuli*, 28, 4-10, Plutarch argues against those who believe that the body may raise to a divine condition with the soul. Plutarch's position is of course consistent with his Platonic belief. Nevertheless the emphasis he seems to devote to such a topic, which only in part seems to be explained by the criticism on Romulus' deification, could be explained with a polemic reaction against some odd ideas that were circulating in those times. I suggest that these ideas could come from Christian environment, although until now we do not possess any certain evidence that Plutarch could know Christianity.

Key-Words: Plutarco, Christianity, Religion in the imperial age.

Per quanto gli studiosi si siano affaticati a cercare nell'opera di Plutarco un qualche accenno di una conoscenza del Cristianesimo, queste indagini sembrano essere sempre approdate a risultati negativi: Plutarco pare aver totalmente ignorato l'esistenza del Cristianesimo¹. Data la non trascurabile diffusione che il questa religione raggiunse al tempo di Plutarco, soprattutto nei territori orientali ellenofoni dell'Impero, una tale non conoscenza è francamente sorprendente. Due celebri scrittori romani, legati, come Plutarco, al ceto alto della società della

capitale, Tacito e Plinio il Giovane, sostanzialmente contemporanei di Plutarco², che scrissero nello stesso periodo della maturità del biografo di Cheronea, ci hanno lasciato importanti documenti di conoscenza del Cristianesimo³. Non è molto credibile che un uomo colto, curioso ed "internazionale" come Plutarco ignorasse totalmente l'esistenza del Cristianesimo⁴. Molto più probabilmente ne aveva notizie mediate e confuse, e soprattutto questo fenomeno religioso non dovette destare alcun interesse nel dotto filosofo, pur profondamente interessato a tematiche religiose e morali⁵. Del resto

¹ Cfr. ZIEGLER 1965, 367-368. Cfr. ALMQVIST 1946, 2 "Ob das Christentum dem Plutarch überhaupt bekannt war, lässt sich aus seinen Schriften nicht entscheiden", BETZ 1975, IX "And most probably (Plutarch) did not know of its (Christianity) existence". BRENK 1996, 240; 248-249; R. HIRSCH-LUIPOLD 2016, 1022, 1034-1035. I paralleli tra pensiero etico plutarcheo e il Nuovo Testamento sono raccolti e studiati da ALMQVIST 1946.

² Ignoriamo le date esatte di nascita di Tacito e Plinio e, d'altra parte anche quella di Plutarco. Tacito potrebbe essere nato intorno al 56-58 e Plinio nel 61-62. Sulla base di un passo dell'autore stesso (*De E apud Delphos* 1, 385b), nel quale fa menzione del viaggio di Nerone in Grecia nel 66-67 al tempo in cui era un giovane discipolo di Ammonio ad Atene, Plutarco dovrebbe essere nato intorno al 45.

³ Cfr. Tac., *Ann.* 15, 4, 2-5, Plin., *Ep.* 10, 96-97.

⁴ Sarebbe interessante poter accettare se i fatti del 96, che videro coinvolti l'ex console Flavio Clemente e la moglie Flavia Domitilla, in una accusa di ateismo e costumi giudaizzanti, conclusasi con l'esecuzione capitale di Clemente e l'esilio di Domitilla, avessero a che fare, come sostiene Eusebio (*Hist. eccl.* 3.18,4), con la eventuale fede cristiana dei due nobili romani, parenti dell'imperatore Domiziano. Di questi episodi trattava Dione Cassio (*Hist Rom.* 67.14,1-3), che possiamo tuttavia leggere solo nell'epitome di Giovanni Xifilino il Giovane. Certamente l'episodio, immediatamente precedente all'uccisione di Domiziano e forse con essa collegato, dovette avere grande risonanza nell'ambiente romano del tempo, con il quale Plutarco era in strettissimo contatto. Purtroppo i contorni della vicenda sono sfuggenti e non è affatto sicuro che Clemente avesse propensione per il Cristianesimo.

⁵ Sul pensiero religioso e filosofico di Plutarco si veda ZIEGLER 1965, 361-369. La sua visione filosofico-religiosa, improntata al medio platonismo, presenta numerose consonanze con quella dei primi scrittori cristiani, anch'essi notoriamente influenzati da Platonismo e Stoicismo; per paralleli contenutistici tra opere di Plutarco e scritti del primo Cristianesimo

anche all’Ebraismo Plutarco non sembra aver riservato una particolare attenzione⁶. Il suo mondo spirituale è del tutto circoscritto nell’ambito della tradizione ellenica o a fenomeni che in questa tradizione erano ormai profondamente integrati⁷.

Tuttavia c’è un passo nella *Vita di Romolo* (28.4-10)⁸ che potrebbe essere preso in considerazione a questo proposito e che a mio avviso potrebbe rivelare qualche conoscenza da parte di Plutarco, approssimativa e indiretta quanto si vuole, del tema cristiano della risurrezione, nel duplice aspetto della risurrezione di Gesù Cristo e della resurrezione finale di tutti gli uomini, e la volontà precisa di negare a queste idee cittadinanza nel mondo della filosofia e della religione elleniche. La forte e dettagliata polemica plutarchea sembrerebbe infatti troppo impegnata per essere diretta semplicemente verso antichi e poco importanti racconti. Casomai possiamo leggervi in filigrana anche una presa di posizione contro la

divinizzazione degli imperatori defunti, ma anche questo elemento mi sembra non sufficiente a giustificare il tono e il dettato plutarcheo. Nella divinizzazione degli imperatori non si insisteva particolarmente sulla loro ascesa in corpo ed anima al cielo: si celebravano infatti i riti funebri e si costruivano tombe nelle quali seppellire i resti mortali.

Esaminiamo ora il passo della *Vita Romuli*. Il capitolo 27 è tutto dedicato alla fine del regno di Romolo ed alla sua morte, sulla quale Plutarco mette subito le mani avanti, dicendo che non abbia- mo notizie sicure:

οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν βέβαιον οὐδὲν ὄμολογούμενον πυθέσθαι περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἀπολιπών⁹.

Questo permette al biografo di riferire due versioni: secondo la prima, alla quale lo scrittore sembra accordare la sua preferenza da un punto di vista storico, Romolo, che nell’ultima parte del suo regno avrebbe progressivamente

si vedano i saggi sui singoli scritti plutarchei raccolti in BETZ 1978. Si veda anche ALMQVIST 1946, 1-29, FLACELIÈRE 1974, 273-280, BRENK 1987, 249-349, GALLO 1996.

⁶ Cfr. *De superst.* 8, *Quaest. conv.* 4,4; 5,6, *De Stoic. rep.* 38. Cfr. ZIEGLER 1965, 368, BRENK 1996, 240-248.

⁷ In questo quadro si colloca l’interesse per la religione egiziana quale appare dal *De Iside et Osiride*. La religione egiziana, ovviamente filtrata ed interpretata, era ormai entrata a far parte del mondo spirituale greco fino da quella grande monografia sull’Egitto che costituisce il secondo libro delle *Storie erodotee*.

⁸ La data di composizione delle *Vite di Teseo e Romolo* ci è ignota, ma la si può ragionevolmente collocare dopo il 96 (morte di Domiziano) e prima del 116 (possibile anno della morte di Sosio Senecione al quale le *Vite* sono dedicate, cfr. JONES 1995, 114). Cfr. JONES 1995, 112-113.

⁹ Plut., *Rom.* 27.4. Forse con una certa lieve ironia Plutarco ricorda che, neppure di un fatto molto più recente come la morte di Scipione Africano minore, conosciamo con esattezza le circostanze; cfr. AMPOLO 1988, 336.

accentuato il carattere tirannico ed antisensorio del proprio modo di governare, sarebbe stato ucciso in una sorta di colpo di stato operato dai *patres* ed il suo corpo, smembrato, sarebbe stato fatto sparire¹⁰. L'altra, che sarebbe diventata poi la versione “ufficiale”, narrava che Romolo sarebbe stato assunto fra gli dei. A fare da raccordo tra queste due versioni, Plutarco inserisce con grande abilità narrativa, la menzione di una tempesta e di strani fenomeni atmosferici che si sarebbero verificati in concomitanza dell'assemblea convocata da Romolo presso il Vulcanale¹¹, nel corso del quale egli sarebbe sparito. Quest'aura straordinaria soprannaturale avrebbe favorito la nascita, chiaramente caldeggiata dai senatori, della storia della sparizione misteriosa di Romolo e quindi della sua ascesa al cielo. E' chiaro che nel giudizio di Plutarco cade sui senatori il forte sospetto di aver messo in giro ad arte questo racconto: essi infatti avrebbero cercato di abbuiare la cosa scoraggiando ogni tipo di indagine¹². A suffragare la versione della divinizzazione del re, si sarebbe poi aggiunto il racconto di un in-

timo amico di Romolo, l'albano Giulio Proculo, un antenato della gens Iulia, che avrebbe affermato, sotto giuramento, di aver incontrato Romolo in città, splendidamente rivestito dell'armatura e trasfigurato in aspetto divino¹³, che gli avrebbe rivelato di essere tornato tra gli dei, dai quali era stato inviato ($\thetaεοῖς ἔδοξε... τοσοῦτον ήμᾶς γενέσθαι μετ' ἀνθρώπων χρόνον$) con la missione di fondare la gloriosa Roma ($πόλιν ἐπ' ἄρχῃ καὶ δόξῃ μεγίστη$) e che da allora in poi sarebbe stato per i Romani il dio Quirino¹⁴.

Il racconto di questa seconda versione sulla fine di Romolo offre a Plutarco l'opportunità di una digressione, non particolarmente necessaria al contesto narrativo, ma evidentemente di grande importanza per l'autore e per le sue convinzioni filosofiche e religiose. Si tratta appunto del passo che intendiamo commentare (*Rom.* 28.4-10).

Ricollegandosi dunque al racconto della divinizzazione di Romolo, Plutarco nota una certa affinità con tradizioni greche ($\nuφ' Ἑλλήνων... μυθολογουμένοις$) riguardanti la sparizione

¹⁰ Cfr. AMPOLO 1988, 337.

¹¹ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 27.6 $\epsilon\pi\tau\omega \iota\epsilon\rho\phi \tau\omega \text{Ή}\phi\alpha\text{ί}σ\tau\omega$. L'episodio è anche in Liv., I 16, D. H., II 56. Della tempesta parla Cic., *De rep.* 2.10,17, Plut., *De fort. Rom.* 320 b-c. Cfr. AMPOLO 1988, 337.

¹² Cfr. Plut., *Rom* 27.8: si racconta che i senatori $\o\pi\kappa\text{t}\omega \text{τ}\omega\text{v}\text{v}$ δυνατοὺς $\dot{\epsilon}\zeta\epsilon\tau\alpha\zeta\text{v}\text{v}$ οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶν παρακελεύεσθαι πᾶσι καὶ σέβεσθαι Πομύλον, ὃς ἀνηρπασμένον εἰς θεοὺς καὶ θεὸν εὐμενὴ γενησόμενον αὐτοῖς ἐκ χρηστοῦ βασιλέως.

¹³ Da notare che in questa apparizione Romolo si esprime con un solenne plurale maiestatis: ήμᾶς ... κτίσαντας ... ἐκεῖθεν ὄντας.

¹⁴ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.1-3. Si veda anche Liv., I 16.5-8, D. H., II 63.3, Ovid., *Fast.* 2.499. Cfr. AMPOLO 1988, 337.

misteriosa del corpo di alcuni morti: in particolare egli cita i casi di Aristea di Proconneso e di Cleomede di Astipalea, ai quali aggiunge poco più avanti la tradizione della sparizione del corpo di Alcmena e della sua sostituzione con una pietra. Va subito notato lo scetticismo di Plutarco nei confronti di questi racconti espresso nel participio μυθολογούμενοις, che trasferisce queste storie nel mondo μῆθος, cioè in una dimensione fuori di un vero controllo razionale da parte del narratore, in quella terra incognita della quale ha parlato ampiamente all'inizio della *Vita di Teseo*, terra che appartiene ai poeti e ai μυθογράφοι, e per lo sconfinamento nella quale Plutarco sembra quasi scusarsi¹⁵.

Va osservato che i μυθολογούμενα riferiti qui da Plutarco non appartengono certo alla “grande” tradizione del pensiero greco, ma piuttosto ai racconti popolari. Il primo si riferisce ad un ce-

lebre personaggio, non greco, ma celebre in Grecia come taumaturgo e legato al mondo nordico, Aristea di Proconneso, un personaggio sospeso tra leggenda e realtà¹⁶; dopo la sua misteriosa morte ἐν τίνι κναφείῳ, il suo corpo sarebbe sparito; alcuni poi avrebbero raccontato di averlo visto vivo camminare per le vie di Crotone. Di stampo ancora più “popolare” il racconto su Cleomede di Astipalea: si tratta di un personaggio realmente esistito, vincitore nel pugilato nei giochi Olimpici del 492 a.C.¹⁷, che Plutarco definisce ἔμπληκτόν τε τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ μανικὸν ὄντα, e che si sarebbe dato ad atti di teppismo, causando infine, con la propria smisurata forza, il crollo del tetto di una scuola e la morte degli studenti¹⁸; inseguito dai suoi concittadini, si sarebbe rifugiato dentro una cassa dall'interno della quale bloccava con la sua forza il coperchio e nessuno riusciva ad aprirlo; sfasciata

¹⁵ Cfr. Plut., *Thes.* 1.1-4.

¹⁶ Di Aristea di Proconneso ci parla Erodoto, IV 13-15, con notizie più ampie e con dettagli differenti rispetto al breve accenno plutarcheo. Il cuore del racconto tuttavia è lo stesso: la sparizione misteriosa del corpo dello “sciamano” e la sua ricomparsa in luoghi diversi, cfr. CORCELLA 19992, 232-241. Si veda anche AMPOLO 1988, 338-339.

¹⁷ La data della vittoria è fornita da Pausania, VI 9.6; cfr. MADDOLI, NAFISSI, SALADINO 1999, 241-242.

¹⁸ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.5. Secondo Pausania, VI 9.6, la pazzia di Cleomede sarebbe stata causata dall'ira violenta in seguito al rifiuto dei giudici della gara di assegnargli la vittoria, perché nel combattimento aveva causato la morte dell'avversario. Il racconto di Pausania appare più benevolo nei confronti del pugile, mentre in Plutarco ed in numerosi altri autori, anche cristiani, che citano l'episodio il giudizio, implicito o esplicito, è più severo; Plutarco infatti attribuisce l'azione di Cleomede ad un suo carattere violento, senza menzionare il motivo scatenante della pazzia. Cfr. MADDOLI, NAFISSI, SALADINO 1999, 241-242.

la cassa, i concittadini non vi trovarono dentro nessuno. L'oracolo di Delfi, interrogato sullo strano fatto, avrebbe risposto: “Ultimo degli eroi Cleomede Astipaleo”¹⁹. Mi pare evidente la natura locale del racconto che di un personaggio reale ha fatto una sorta di eroe spaccamontagne, assimilandolo alla fine a quanto pare agli eroi.

Sono due esempi accomunati dalla sparizione del corpo dopo la morte, senza peraltro che si affermi apertamente la sopravvivenza del corpo stesso assieme all'anima in una condizione superiore a quella umana. Aristea infatti sarebbe apparso in diverse circostanza, ma non viene detto come; di Cleomede si dice che fu localmente venerato come eroe, senza che questo comporti una qualche sopravvivenza del corpo e tantomeno l'ascesa del corpo stesso alla condizio-

ne eroica. La tradizione greca è piena di racconti di tombe di eroi e perfino di traslazione dei loro resti mortali da un luogo ad un altro²⁰. Esempi, che come vedremo, sono solo lontanamente congruenti con la discussione sull'ascesa del corpo ad una dimensione eroica o divina che Plutarco proporrà di lì a poco.

Ai due esempi citati se ne aggiunge subito un terzo: quello del sepolcro di Alcmena, la madre di Eracle²¹. Il corpo di Alcmena sarebbe sparito durante il funerale (έκκομιζομένης) ed al suo posto sarebbe apparsa sul letto funebre una pietra (λίθον δὲ φανῆναι κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ κλίνῃ). Plutarco fornisce ulteriori dettagli nel dialogo *De daemone Socratis*²², più particolareggiati rispetto a questo suo accenno nella *Vita di Romolo*. Secondo il racconto di uno degli interlocutori del dialogo, Fidolao, le “reliquie” di Alcmena²³

¹⁹ Pausania, VI 9.8 riporta una versione più ampia dell'oracolo: due versi, il secondo dei quali, omesso da Plutarco, invitava i cittadini di Astipalea a tributare a Cleomede onori eroici. Secondo Origene, *Contr. Cels.* 3.25, si sarebbe trattato addirittura di onori divini, cfr. MADDOLI, NAFISSI, SALADINO 1999, 242.

²⁰ Cfr. Si veda ad esempio Hdt., I67-68, dove si narra del ritrovamento a Tegea delle ossa di Oreste e del loro trafugamento a Sparta, in modo da assicurare a questa la vittoria su Tegea. In questo caso si tratta chiaramente di un culto eroico, in quanto il possesso delle ossa dell'eroe è garanzia di successo militare, cfr. ASHERI 1988, 310.

²¹ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.7.

²² Cfr. Plut., *De daem. Socr.* 5.577 E - 578 B.

²³ Appunto τὰ λείψανα. Purtroppo il testo nell'elenco di questi λείψανα è lacunoso (vd. Plut., *Moralia*, III, edd. PATON-POHLENZ-SIEVEKING, Lipsiae, 1972, p. 467, ad loc.). Quanti aprirono la tomba avrebbero constatato che εὑρέθη δ’οὖν ... σώματος, e poi un braccialetto bronzeo non grande e due anfore di terracotta piene di terra; cosa del corpo sia stato ritrovato non è dunque certo; Wilamowitz, sulla base del racconto tradizionale, integrava <λίθος ἀντὶ τοῦ> σώματος, ma non è l'unica possibilità ed è troppo breve per il numero di lettere mancanti: 40 in E, 33 in B, secondo PATON-POHLENZ-SIEVEKING, 37-33

sarebbero state trasportate da Agesilao a Sparta²⁴, destando non poco disappunto tra i Tebani per questa violazione di sepolcro; un oracolo poi ne avrebbe ordinato un nuovo trasporto ad Aliarto ed il restauro della tomba di Alcmena²⁵.

Questi tre *mythologoumena* e anche altri (*πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογούσι*), riferiti con evidente disappunto di Plutarco, sono connessi, da un punto di vista logico, soprattutto con il racconto della sparizione del corpo di Romolo: vengono infatti presentati come paralleli “greci” del racconto romano. La loro menzione, tuttavia, offre, come si è detto, anche l’occasione per passare a discutere, anche se brevemente, un tema a lui, seguace di Platone, molto caro, cioè la contrapposizione anima/corpo e di conseguenza l’assurdità dell’idea che il corpo, assieme all’anima, possa raggiungere la natura eroica, demonica o addirittura divina.

E’ evidente il grande interesse di Plutarco per questa tematica, dal momento

che egli forza un po’ l’andamento logico del discorso imponendo per così dire una connessione con gli esempi di racconti mitici appena citati e, se vogliamo, anche con quello della divinizzazione di Romolo, sulla quale Plutarco non si pronuncia chiaramente. E’ casomai interessante notare che nel racconto di Giulio Proculo, che avrebbe riferito un incontro con Romolo dopo la sua scomparsa, il personaggio del primo re di Roma viene presentato, non tanto come un uomo asceso agli onori divini, quanto come un dio (o *δαίμων*) sceso tra gli uomini per compiere una importante missione di valore universale, la fondazione di Roma, e quindi ritornato nella sfera divina dalla quale era disceso²⁶. Romolo dunque non sarebbe stato divinizzato, ma sarebbe stato per sua natura un essere divino (dio o meglio *δαίμων*), quindi al riparo, per così dire, delle critiche plutarchee sull’apoteosi dei monarchi.

Invece il cuore della breve, ma intensa riflessione di Plutarco (*Rom*, 28.7-10) è costituito dal disappunto

secondo DE LACY-EINARSON (1968) e HANI (1980); sono state avanzate alcune congetture: <*λείψανον μὲν οὐδὲν τοῦ*> opp. <*πλὴν ἡ λίθος λείψανον οὐδὲν τοῦ*> (CASTIGLIONI), <*ἐν μὲν τῷ μνήματι πλὴν λίθου λείψανον οὐδὲν τοῦ*> (DE LACY-EINARSON), <*ἐν τῷ μνήματι λίθος μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ*> (CORLU, accolta da HANI); come si vede le parole possono variare ma il concetto è sempre lo stesso. Secondo il racconto del *De daemon Socratis*, così come risulta accogliendo queste integrazioni, sembra che non si accennasse alla comparsa della pietra già al tempo del funerale di Alcmena.

²⁴ Plutarco dà un riferimento cronologico, *De daemon. Socr.* 5.577 E: ὅτε πέμψας Ἀγεσίλαος εἰς Σπάρτην τὰ λείψανα μετεκόμιζε.

²⁵ Plut., *De daemon. Socr.* 5.578 A-B.

²⁶ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.2: Θεοῖς ἔδοξεν ὁ Πρόκλε τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι μετ’ ἀνθρώπων χρόνον, καὶ πόλιν ἐπ’ ἀρχῇ καὶ δόξῃ μεγίστῃ κτίσαντας, αὗθις οἰκεῖν οὐρανόν, ἐκεῖθεν ὄντας.

creato in lui da coloro che παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἐκθειάζοντες τὰ θνητὰ τῆς φύσεως ἄμα τοῖς θεοῖς²⁷. Una affermazione che a prima vista può apparire sorprendente e in qualche modo dissonante rispetto a quello che lo stesso scriverà di lì a poco, se la intendiamo indicare la natura umana nel suo insieme: infatti nell'uomo esiste un'impronta divina, che è la virtù, la cui origine divina ἀπογνῶνται μὲν οὖν παντάπασι ... ἀνόσιον καὶ ἀγεννές²⁸. Segue una citazione dal settino *Threnos* di Pindaro, fr. 131 b Maehler, che ci aiuta a capire dove Plutarco voglia arrivare:

Il corpo di tutti segue la morte invincibile, / ma rimane ancora una vivente immagine di vita; / questa solo viene dagli dei.

Vediamo ora chiaramente che τὰ θνητὰ τῆς φύσεως altro non è che il corpo dell'uomo. Plutarco dunque, dai racconti di sparizioni misteriose di corpi di personaggi superiori (Aristea) o in qualche modo inerenti la condizione eroica (Cleomedes, Alcmena), sposta la sua attenzione al problema teologico-filosofico di quale parte dell'uomo possa sopravvivere dopo la morte in una sfera

superiore. Non si tratta dunque di una non meglio definita “trasmutazione” della persona, quale sembra essere presupposta nei *mythologoumena*, ma di un vero e proprio argomento filosofico che Plutarco affronta in breve, ma con grande fermezza. Questa “vivente immagine di vita” (ζωόν ... αἰώνος εἶδολον) è infatti di natura urania: viene dal cielo e al cielo ritorna, ma, si badi, oὐ μετὰ σώματος. Siamo, come si vede, in un contesto pitagorico-platonico, al quale sempre Plutarco si è attenuto trattando di tali argomenti²⁹: quando questa “immagine di vita” (chiaramente l'anima, come dirà subito dopo) si allontana dal corpo diviene καθαρὸν παντάπασι καὶ ἀσαρκὸν καὶ ἀγνόν³⁰. L'affermazione è confermata ricorrendo ad un passo di Eraclito, che Plutarco non cita letteralmente³¹; in esso trova una specie di giustificazione “fisica” della leggerezza dell'anima separata dal corpo, che subito utilizza inserendola nella propria concezione: il corpo sarebbe una specie di vapore pesante δυσέξαπτος e δυσανακόμιστος. L'idea è quella ben nota di ascendenza pitagorica, ripresa da Platone, che vede nel corpo la prigione

²⁷ Plut., *Rom.* 28.7.

²⁸ Plut., *Rom.* 28.7.

²⁹ Cfr. FLACELIÈRE 1948, 95.

³⁰ Plut., *Rom.* 29.8.

³¹ Si tratta del fr. 118 D-K = 68 MARCOVICH. Il testo del frammento, citato da molti autori antichi con sensibili varianti, è stato oggetto di intenso lavoro filologico, almeno dall'età dell'Umanesimo, per stabilirne l'esatto dettato; sulla complessa tradizione del frammento cfr. MARCOVICH 1967, 371-378, MARCOVICH 1978, 259-265. Plutarco utilizza anche in altre opere questo frammento, cfr. FLACELIÈRE 1949, 96-97.

o la tomba dell'anima³²: tanto è vero che Plutarco arriva ad affermare, in un altro scritto, che l'unione dell'anima con il corpo è un'unione παρὰ φύσιν, contro natura³³. La breve ma netta esposizione plutarchea, dunque non fa altro che ribadire i convincimenti teologici e filosofici dello scrittore di Cheronea, saldamente incardinati nella tradizione medio platonica. Il corollario che ne discende è perentorio: è un grave errore filosofico far salire i corpi dei giusti al cielo, perché, ancora una volta, ciò sarebbe παρὰ φύσιν³⁴. A questo punto i *mythologoumena* di Aristea, Cleomede e Alcmena sono ormai messi da parte, perché la loro relazione con l'argomento che più sta a cuore a Plutarco è molto labile: di nessuno di essi, infatti, si dice esplicitamente che sono ascesi in cielo con il corpo; oltretutto Cleomede, soprattutto come lo presenta Plutarco, difficilmente potrebbe essere definito ἀγαθός. Il discorso di Plutarco procede dunque secondo la propria via filosofica e la vis polemica contro la teoria dell'ascensione del corpo alla sfera divina ha preso ormai la mano al filosofo platonico,

che vuole combattere idee dal suo punto di vista inaccettabili. Per lui l'unica possibilità di ascendere al divino è dato alle anime dei buoni ed alle loro virtù: esse possono, questa volta κατὰ φύσιν καὶ δίκην θείαν, attraverso un processo di purificazione, passare dalla condizione di uomini a quella di eroi, e poi a quella di δούλους, e se totalmente santificate (ἀν καθαρῶσι καὶ ὄσιωθῶσι), alla condizione divina. Questo percorso di elevazione — Plutarco non dice se sia legato alla reincarnazione — viene assimilato a quello dell'iniziazione dei misteri e non dipende se non dalla progressiva purificazione dell'uomo³⁵.

Una frecciata alla pratica di divinizzazione degli imperatori defunti e più in generale alla prassi ellenistica di divinizzare i sovrani, si coglie sicuramente in quella precisazione οὐ νόμῳ πόλεως³⁶: attraverso la purificazione infatti si ascende al cielo e non per decreto politico!³⁷

Tuttavia a me pare che la seria discussione plutarchea non possa esaurirsi nella velata polemica contro la pratica di divinizzare, con decreto dello

³² Cfr. ad esempio Plat., *Crat.* 400 c, *Gorg.* 493 a. Sull'origine di questa celebre immagine cfr. DODDS 1959, 300. In Plat., *Phaed.* 81 b-c si afferma che il corpo è una fonte di contaminazione per l'anima, la quale quindi, separandosene, realizza la sua propria vocazione.

³³ Cfr. Plut., *De anima*, fr. 178, 4, 69; 85-93; cfr. BETZ 1975, 321.

³⁴ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.10: οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀγαθῶν συναναπέμπειν παρὰ φύσιν εἰς οὐρανόν.

³⁵ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.10.

³⁶ Cfr. FLACELIÈRE 1948, 94-98, BRENK 1987, 346-347.

³⁷ Cfr. Plut., *Rom.* 28.10. Si veda in proposito FLACELIÈRE 1948, 97.

stato, re e imperatori. Infatti nella divinizzazione di re e imperatori non si poneva certo l'accento sulla loro ascesa al cielo anche con il corpo: re e imperatori sono seppelliti secondo i riti, anche con la cremazione del corpo, e le loro tombe sono visibili e venerate.

Sono convinto invece che qui Plutarco reagisca molto fermamente ad idee, delle quali forse non individua gli esatti portatori, ma che ha sentito circolare, a riguardo della risurrezione dei morti³⁸ e in particolare della risurrezione di un morto, il quale sarebbe salito al cielo addirittura ottenendo una condizione divina. E' questo il punto fondante del Cristianesimo. La resurrezione di Cristo è tema centrale nella predicazione paulina, in quanto fondamento della fede che è il requisito unico per la salvezza:

εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται,
κενὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρυγμα ἡμῶν, κε-
νὴ καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν, ... εἰ δὲ
Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται, ματαία
ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν, ἔτι ἐστὲ ἐν ταῖς
ἀμαρτίαις ὑμῶν³⁹.

E' noto che proprio questa dottrina costituì uno dei punti più ostici per la cultura greca, come dimostra il celebre

episodio di Paolo all'Areopago ad Atene⁴⁰; nella prima parte del suo discorso infatti Paolo ottiene una grande attenzione da parte del suo uditorio composto di intellettuali⁴¹: infatti svolge il tema dell'esistenza di Dio secondo schemi ed argomenti filosofici ormai comuni al pensiero greco, citando addirittura autori greci; quando però passa al nodo della risurrezione, i suoi ascoltatori se ne vanno delusi:

Ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀνάστασιν νε-
κρῶν οἱ μὲν ἐγλεύαζον, οἱ δὲ εἴ-
παν· ἀκουσόμεθά σου περὶ τοῦτο
καὶ πάλιν (*Act. 17, 32*).

Questa difficoltà da parte dei Cristiani nel fare accettare al pensiero greco il fondamento della loro fede, e l'ostilità che questa dottrina invariabilmente riceveva da parte degli intellettuali greci, dei quali Plutarco è certamente un esempio illustre, spiega la grande cautela sul tema della risurrezione di corpi che troviamo nelle prime opere di Cristiani destinate a "quelli di fuori" cioè agli Elleni. Giustino, ad esempio, passa abbastanza rapidamente sul tema della risurrezione; ne parla elencando le profezie che si riferivano a Cristo e

³⁸ La resurrezione dei morti, o forse meglio dei giusti alla fine della storia era dottrina professata anche all'interno dell'Ebraismo dalla corrente dei Farisei.

³⁹ Cfr. *1Cor. 15,14* e 17.

⁴⁰ Cfr. *Act. 17,16-32*.

⁴¹ Cfr. *Act. 17,18*. Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων καὶ Στοικῶν συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ. Vanno ad ascoltare Paolo "anche" alcuni Epicurei e Stoici, filosofi molto lontani, per motivi diversi, dall'idea dell'immortalità del corpo, i quali potevano sollevare obiezioni all'esposizione dell'Apostolo con argomenti diversi da quelli platonici di Plutarco.

che divennero pienamente intelligibili anche ai discepoli dopo la morte e la risurrezione, accontentandosi di un rapido accenno: gli Apostoli avrebbero creduto quando lo videro ascendere al cielo⁴²; la frase, credo è volutamente generica e può essere interpretata anche come riferimento ad una glorificazione senza troppe precisazioni. Anche Atenagora, nella *Legatio*, cerca di non impantanarsi in una discussione sulla possibilità o meno della resurrezione dei corpi. Dice che sarebbe fuori luogo (*περίεργον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος*) intavolare una dimostrazione a tale proposito, per mostrare, non è ben chiaro su quali fondamenti, che la resurrezione dei corpi sarebbe ammessa οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων. Grazie alla figura retorica della *praeteritio* appena annunciata (*περίεργον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δεικνύειν*), si esime dal parlарne, toccando tuttavia i punti tradizionali della ‘metafisica’ platonica che dimostra di conoscere⁴³, ma li menziona di passaggio ἵνα μὴ ἔξαγωνίους τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπεισάγειν δοκῶμεν λόγους. Un confronto su questo tema non è probabilmente ancora pensabile. Atenagora si contenta di dimostrare ai propri interlocutori che credere nella risurrezione non è un atto di malvagità, ma semmai di innocua stoltezza ed autoinganno!⁴⁴.

⁴² Cfr. Iust., *Apol.* 1.50,5.

⁴³ Cfr. Athen., *Legat.* 36.

⁴⁴ Cfr. Athen., *Legat.* 36. Si veda anche Tatian., *Ad Graec.* 25. 15 Cfr. Plut., *Thes.* 1.1-4.

Concludendo, mi sentirei di suggerire che il bersaglio polemico plutarcheo non fosse in primis né i racconti più o meno mitici su Aristea, Cleomedes e Alcmene, e neppure la prassi dell’apoteosi dei sovrani, ma la difesa della concezione platonica della contrapposizione fra anima e corpo, alla quale Plutarco aderisce senza riserve, probabilmente di fronte a certe nuove dottrine, delle quali non si interessa particolarmente, ma che si vanno diffondendo e che il filosofo di Cheronea ritiene assurde e pericolose nei confronti del pensiero teologico-filosofico greco.

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Enterrando a los Héroes Griegos: Funerales Heroicos en las Vidas Griegas de Plutarco

[*Burying the Greek Heroes: Heroic Funerals in the Greek Lives of Plutarch*]
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Resumen

En este artículo se presenta un análisis de las características de los funerales heroicos en las *Vidas* griegas de Plutarco, así como de sus diferencias respecto a los funerales de personas comunes, y de qué manera se vale el autor de este ritual para retratar a sus personajes. Una lectura atenta de varios pasajes mostrará patrones en la descripción de Plutarco del funeral de sus héroes y la representación de sus cuerpos. En este trabajo se analizarán los funerales de Arato, Filopemén, Hefestión, Pelopidas, Teseo y Timoleón.

Palabras clave: Plutarco, Biografía, *Vidas* griegas, Rituales funerarios.

Abstract

In this paper, I will analyse the features of heroic funerals in Plutarch's *Greek Lives*, their differences with the funerals of common people, and how the author makes use of the ceremony to portray each character. A close reading of various passages will show patterns in Plutarch's description of the burial of heroes and his depiction of the hero's body. This work will examine the funerals of Aratus, Philopoemen, Hephæstion, Pelopidas, Theseus and Timoleon.

Key-Words: Plutarco, Biography, *Greek Lives*, Funeral rituals.

Las *Vidas Paralelas* de Plutarco ofrecen datos interesantes acerca la religión y la muerte en la antigua Grecia. Muertes de personajes ilustres, recuperaciones de cadáveres, tumbas famosas, funerales, historias de fantasmas o preceptos en ma-

teria de legislación funeraria son solo algunos ejemplos.

Las descripciones de la muerte y el duelo de los personajes de las *Vidas* son especialmente interesantes. Ninguno de los funerales de las *Vidas* griegas de Plutarco puede describirse como

un funeral común, como tampoco lo son sus protagonistas, importantes estrategos, héroes y oradores. Las honras fúnebres sirven al queronense para el retrato biográfico de los personajes, encontrándonos con exquisitos y multitudinarios funerales que dan fe de la notoriedad de los difuntos (por ej. Demetrio, Hefestión, Timoleón, etc.), o con todo lo contrario, con personajes ilustres caídos en desgracia que no reciben unas honras acordes a su figura, dando así a su final un matiz claramente trágico (Nicias, Demóstenes, Foción o Agis son algunos ejemplos).

Los funerales de héroes, esto es, aquellos personajes en torno a los cuales surge culto de tipo heroico tras su muerte, son especialmente significativos. En el presente artículo haré un análisis de los elementos comunes en la descripción de funerales heroicos en las *Vidas* griegas de Plutarco, así como de sus diferencias con lo que en cada contexto se esperaría de un funeral de una persona corriente¹.

1. Elementos comunes en las honras fúnebres de los héroes plutarqueos

En la narración de los sucesos inmediatamente posteriores a la muerte de los héroes, y especialmente en el funeral, se repiten diversas características:

- La celebración de costosas honras fúnebres, con un gran número de asistentes, así como la construcción de suntuosos monumentos funerarios. Esto es significativo debido a que a finales de época arcaica y a lo largo de época clásica, se sucedieron por toda Grecia diversas leyes de tipo funerario y suntuario que limitaban el tiempo que se debía invertir en los entierros, el número de asistentes, los tipos y cantidad de ofrendas, el tamaño y coste del monumento funerario, etc.²
- El funeral ya no es un evento luctuoso, sino una celebración del muerto. Los asistentes festejan al muerto en lugar de llorarlo, o a la vez que lo lloran, y se cantan peanes y coros en lugar de cantos de duelo.
- Los asistentes portan coronas y van vestidos de blanco. Lo usual era que el difunto fuera vestido de blanco y coronado con laurel o apio durante la *prothesis*³, y que los asistentes fueran vestidos de negro o gris, como símbolo de luto⁴. Tanto la vestimenta blanca como las coronas son símbolos de pureza. Esta es la razón por la que

¹ Para el texto griego, he seguido la edición teubneriana de K. Ziegler. Las traducciones son de la autora.

² Sobre este tema, véase R. GARLAND 1989.

³ La *prothesis* la constituyen los preparativos previos al funeral, durante los cuales se lavaba y vestía el cuerpo del difunto y se exponía para el duelo. Sobre el uso de vestimenta blanca y coronas, véase R. GARLAND 2001: 24 y M. ALEXIOU 2002: 5.

⁴ M. LEE 2015: 228.

el cadáver es lavado, vestido de blanco y coronado antes del funeral, como una forma de purificar simbólicamente el cuerpo, que se creía fuente de contaminación⁵. El hecho de que los asistentes al funeral vayan también de blanco y coronados, unido a la celebración del muerto, puede deberse a la nueva dimensión religiosa que adquiere el ritual: el funeral ya no es solo un evento de duelo, sino parte de una fiesta en honor del héroe con motivo de la recuperación de sus restos.

- Levantamiento de la prohibición del enterramiento intramuros en ciudades en las que los funerales debían tener lugar fuera de los límites de la ciudad. El enterramiento extramuros puede tener varias motivaciones: como una medida de higiene, a fin de evitar el riesgo de enfermedad; como una medida religiosa, por el riesgo de contaminación; como una medida política, para evitar la ostentosa exhibición de riquezas dentro de la ciudad; como una medida socioeconómica, por la falta de espacio edificable o por varios de estos motivos⁶. El carácter sagrado del héroe hace innecesarias estas medidas, en tanto que el cuerpo heroico y su sepelio no se ven como causa de infección, contaminación o

discordia política, sino como parte del culto colectivo de la ciudad.

- La celebración del muerto con honras póstumas como sacrificios, procesiones, juegos, himnos, etc., que se establecen a perpetuidad y se repiten regularmente. Excepcionalmente se mencionan supuestos sacrificios humanos. El culto al héroe puede surgir de forma natural o llevarse a cabo a instancias de un oráculo, que aporta legitimidad divina a dicha decisión.
- En ocasiones se denomina al héroe “padre” (*πατήρ*), “salvador” (*σωτήρ*) o “fundador” (*οἰκιστής*) de la ciudad, apelativos muy repetidos en héroes de época helenística.

A continuación veremos algunos ejemplos de funerales de héroes en las *Vidas* griegas.

2. *Funerales heroicos en las Vidas griegas: Arato, Filopemén, Hefestión, Pelopidas, Teseo y Timoleón.*

Vida de Arato 53.1-4

Οὗτοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐν Αἴγιῳ, τὸ ἐπτακαιδέκατον στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτιμουμένων ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι ταφὰς καὶ μνήματα πρέποντα τῷ βίῳ τοῦ ἀνδρός, Σικυώνιοι συμφορὰν ἐποιοῦντο μὴ παρ' αὐτοῖς τεθῆναι τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀχαιοὺς ἔπεισαν ἐφιέναι, νό-

⁵ R. PARKER 1983: 35.

⁶ R. GARLAND 1989: 7.

μον δ' ὄντος ἀρχαίου μηδένα θάπ-
τεσθαι τειχῶν ἐντός, ισχυρᾶς τε τῷ
νόμῳ δεισιδαιμονίας προσούστης,
ἔπειμψαν εἰς Δελφοὺς ὑπὲρ τού-
των ἔρησόμενοι τὴν Πινθίαν. ἡ δ'
αὐτοῖς ἀναιρεῖ τὸν χρησμὸν τόνδε
βουλεύῃ Σικυών ζωάγριον αἰὲν

Ἀράτου
ἀμφ' ὁσίῃ θαλίῃ τε κατοιχομένοιο
ἄνακτος;
ώς τὸ βαρυνόμενον τῷδ' ἀνέρι
καὶ τὸ βαρῦνον
γαίης ἔστ' ἀσέβημα καὶ οὐρανοῦ
ἡδὲ θαλάσσης.

κομισθείσης δὲ τῆς μαντείας, οἵ
τ' Ἀχαιοὶ σύμπαντες ἥσθησαν
διαφερόντως, καὶ οἱ Σικυώνιοι
μεταβαλόντες εἰς ἑορτὴν τὸ
πένθος εὐθὺς ἐκ τοῦ Αἰγίου τὸν
νεκρὸν ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ λευ-
χειμονοῦντες ὑπὸ παιάνων καὶ
χορῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀνῆγον,
καὶ τόπον ἐξελόμενοι περίοπτον
ῶσπερ οἰκιστὴν καὶ σωτῆρα τῆς
πόλεως ἐκήδευσαν.

Murió así en Egio, en su decimoséptima vez como estratego. Los aqueos deseaban celebrar los funerales y construir el monumento fúnebre allí, preparándolos con la correspondiente dignidad a la vida de tal hombre, pero a los sicionios les parecía una ofensa el hecho de que el cuerpo no recibiera sepultura en su tierra. Persuadieron a los aqueos de que lo enviaran, pero había una ley antigua que

determina que nadie debe recibir sepultura de murallas para adentro, y a esta ley se une una fuerte superstición, por lo que enviaron heraldos a Delfos a preguntar a la Pitia por estas cuestiones. Ella les dio el siguiente oráculo:

“¿Vacilas, Sición, en dar honras y
festejos perpetuamente a Arato,
señor que ha partido hacia el infra-
mundo, en pago por tu salvación?
Pues el ser molestado por este
hombre y el molestar
es un acto impío en la tierra, en el
cielo y en el mar”.

Una vez recibido este oráculo, todos los aqueos se alegraron enormemente, y especialmente los sicionios, quienes, transformando su pena en celebración, llevaron al muerto coronados y vestidos de blanco directamente desde Egio a la ciudad entre peanes y coros. Y tras escoger un lugar bien visible lo enterraron como a un fundador y salvador de la ciudad.

Arato, general de la Liga Aquea, murió en Egio en el 213 a. C., envenenado por Filipo V de Macedonia. Según narra Plutarco, los sicionios pidieron que el cuerpo del general fuera devuelto a Sición, a fin de celebrar los funerales en su tierra natal, pero había una ley que establecía que no podía enterrarse dentro de la ciudad, ley sujeta, además, a una fuerte superstición⁷. Llama la

⁷ Plutarco utiliza el término δεισιδαιμονία (“escrúpulo religioso”, “superstición”) para referirse a la prohibición del enterramiento intramuros en Sición. Este término es también

atención la aparente necesidad del enterramiento intramuros, que llevaría a los sicionios a consultar el oráculo, cuando los restos de Arato podrían simplemente haber sido llevados a Sición y enterrarse en las inmediaciones, como cualquier otro cadáver. Esto se explica por el estatus heroico de Arato, que la respuesta del oráculo y los acontecimientos posteriores confirman: el oráculo manda tributarle honras y festejos a perpetuidad (αἰὲν Ἀράτου ἀμφ’ ὄση θαλήι τε), lo llama κατοιχομένοιο ἄνακτος, “señor que ha partido hacia el inframundo” y señala que el perturbarlo era considerado un “acto impío” (ἀσέβημα). Hace referencia, además, a que las honras de la ciudad son “en pago por su salvación” (ζωάγριον), aludiendo posiblemente a la liberación de Sición de la tiranía de Nicocles, urdida por Arato (Plu., *Arat.* 7-9). Esto explica que, según Plutarco, los sicionios enterraran a Arato como a un “salvador y fundador de la ciudad” (οἰκιστὴν καὶ σωτῆρα τῆς πόλεως).

Los sicionios reciben la noticia con alegría y llevan el cadáver del héroe para enterrarlo en su ciudad, en un lugar bien visible, posiblemente el ágora. El cambio de tono del evento es claro: el duelo (πένθος) se vuelve una fiesta (έορτή), los asistentes al cortejo fúnebre van vestidos de blanco y coronados, y cantan peanes y coros en lugar de cantos de duelo.

Plutarco añade que al lugar donde lo enterraron lo llamaron *Arateion* (pro-

bablemente se trate de un *heroon*), y que se llevaban a cabo sacrificios en su honor anualmente, uno en el mes de su nacimiento y otro en el mes en que liberó a la ciudad (Plu., *Arat.* 53.5-7). Estas honras también son mencionadas por Polibio, quien las atribuye no solo a Sición, sino a toda la Liga Aquea (Plb., VIII 12.7-8). Pausanias menciona la muerte de Arato, el traslado de su cuerpo desde Egio a Sición y el *heroon* en su honor, pero nada del oráculo (Paus., II 9.4). Comenta, además, que los sicionios llegaron a considerar a Arato hijo de Asclepio (Paus., II 10.3 y IV 14.8). Conservamos incluso una inscripción en su honor en el *Asclepeion* de Epidauro, en la cual se menciona la dedicación de una estatua suya (*IG IV², 1 622*).

Vida de Filopemén 21.3-9

Τὸ δὲ σῶμα καύσαντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ λείψανα συνθέντες εἰς ύδριαν ἀνεζεύγνυσαν, οὐκ ἀτάκτως οὐδ’ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπινίκιον τινα πομπὴν ἄμα ταῖς ταφαῖς μείξαντες. ἦν μὲν γάρ ἐστεφανωμένους ἰδεῖν, ἦν δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ δακρύοντας, ἦν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δεσμίους ἀγομένους. αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν ύδριαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ταινιῶν τε καὶ στεφάνων μόλις ὄρωμένην ἐκόμιζεν ὁ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν παῖς Πολύβιος καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν οἱ πρώτοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται <καθ>ωπλισμένοι μὲν αὐτοί,

utilizado por el queronense en la *Vida de Licurgo* para hablar del miedo a la contaminación por el contacto con cadáveres o tumbas (Plu., *Lyc.* 27.1), por lo que la ley sicionia pudo promoverse bajo la misma idea.

τοῖς δ' ἵπποις κεκοσμημένοις ἐπη-
κολούθουν, οὐθ' οἷον ἐπὶ πέν-
θει τοσούτῳ κατηφεῖς, οὔτε τῇ
νίκῃ γαυριῶντες, ἐκ δὲ τῶν διὰ
μέσου πόλεων καὶ κωμῶν ἀπαν-
τῶντες, ὥσπερ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ στρα-
τείας ἐπανιόντα δεξιούμενοι, τῆς
ὑδρίας ἐφῆπτοντο καὶ συμπρο-
ῆγον εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν. ὡς οὖν
συνανεμείχθησαν αὐτοῖς οἱ πρεσ-
βύτεροι μετὰ γυναικῶν καὶ παι-
δῶν, ὀλοφυρμὸς ἥδη διὰ παντὸς
ἐχώρει τοῦ στρατεύματος ****
εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιποθοῦσαν τὸν
ἄνδρα καὶ βαρέως φέρουσαν, οἰο-
μένην συναποβεβληκέναι τὸ πρω-
τεύειν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ἐτάφη μὲν
οὖν ὡς εἰκὸς ἐνδόξως, καὶ περὶ τὸ
μνημεῖον οἱ τῶν Μεσσηνίων αἰχ-
μάλωτοι κατελεύσθησαν.

Tras quemar su cadáver y de-
positar los restos en una hidria,
los trajeron de vuelta, no de forma
desordenada ni de cualquier ma-
nera, sino combinándose a la vez
una cierta pompa triunfal con los
funerales. ¡Había que verlos lle-
vando coronas, y también lloran-
do y a los enemigos llevados con
cadenas! La misma hidria, apenas
visible por la multitud de cintas y
coronas, la llevaba Polibio, hijo del
general de los aqueos, y en torno a este,
los principales aqueos. Los
seguían los propios soldados, que
iban completamente armados con
los caballos engalanados, ni abati-

dos, como se esperaría por tan gran
dolor, ni ufanos por la victoria. Sa-
lían a su encuentro en medio de
ciudades y aldeas, como si le die-
ran la bienvenida al volver de una
expedición, tocaban la hidria y se
encaminaban juntos hacia Mega-
lópolis. Cuando se les unieron los
ancianos junto a las mujeres y ni-
ños, un lamento se extendía ya por
todo el ejército hasta la ciudad⁸,
que añoraba al hombre y sufría
amargamente, pues pensaba que
había perdido el dominio entre los
aqueos. Así pues, fue enterrado en-
tre honores, como es lógico, y los
prisioneros mesenios fueron lapi-
dados en torno a su tumba.

En el 183 a. C., tras una batalla contra Mesenia, que se había rebelado contra la Liga Aquea, Filopemén fue capturado por el enemigo y obligado a beber veneno (Plu., *Phil.* 20). Los aqueos, tras enterarse de la noticia, tomaron Mesenia y celebraron sus honras fúnebres.

El funeral de Filopemén combina a la vez duelo y celebración. Plutarco habla del acto como una mezcla de pompa triunfal y funeral (ἐπινίκιον τινα πομπὴν ἄμα ταῖς ταφαῖς μείζαντες), mezclándose el dolor por la muerte del general y la recién conseguida victoria sobre Mesenia. La hidria, engalanada, es llevada por Polibio⁹ y los generales

⁸ Ziegler señala una posible laguna en este pasaje. En todo caso, el sentido del texto está claro.

⁹ Historiador del s. II a. C., autor de las *Historias*. Polibio era hijo de Licortas, estratego de la Liga Aquea que sucedió en el poder a Filopemén.

aqueos. Los miembros de la procesión van coronados, acompañados de soldados armados, caballos y prisioneros mesenios encadenados, una imagen que recuerda a los funerales homéricos o a las representaciones arcaicas de procesiones fúnebres con guerreros, jinetes y carros. El cortejo fúnebre es multitudinario y no hay restricciones de ningún tipo: hombres, mujeres y niños se unían a ellos conforme iban pasando por las ciudades, adquiriendo la procesión fúnebre una dimensión pública especialmente notable. La lapidación de los prisioneros mesenios en la tumba de Filopemén podría tener además un significado sacrificial¹⁰.

La idea de que Filopemén pudo ser objeto de culto está atestiguada por las fuentes. Según Diodoro, se le tributaron honores heroicos (*ισοθέους τιμάς*), aparte de los que le dio la Liga Aquea: se le erigió una estatua, se sacrificaba cada año un toro en su honor y, mientras tenía lugar el sacrificio, se cantaban himnos en honor de Filopemén (D.S., XXIX 18). Tito Livio dice que en sus funerales participó toda la Liga Aquea y que incluso le rindieron honores divinos (Liv., XXXIX 50.9), sin embargo, quizá estos *diuini honores* puedan entenderse en términos más bien heroicos, como una traducción del término *ισόθεοι*. Finalmente, conservamos una inscripción que asocia la figura de Filopemén

a la de Zeus Soter y que muestra que recibió un santuario, sacrificios y juegos en su honor¹¹.

Hefestión, *Vida de Alejandro* 72.3-5

τοῦτ' οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος Ἀλέξανδρος ἡνεγκεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς μὲν ἵππους τε κεῖραι πάντας ἐπὶ πένθει καὶ ἡμίονους ἐκέλευσε, καὶ τῶν πέριξ πόλεων ἀφεῦλε τὰς ἐπάλξεις, τὸν δ' ἄθλιον ιατρὸν ἀνεσταύρωσεν, αὐλοὺς δὲ κατέπαυσε καὶ μουσικὴν πᾶσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πολὺν χρόνον, ἔως ἐξ Ἀμμωνος ἤλθε μαντεία, τιμᾶν Ἡφαιστίωνα καὶ θύειν ὃς ἥρωι παρακελεύουσα. τοῦ δὲ πένθους παρηγορίᾳ τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέφετο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. τοῦτο δ' Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. τύμβον δὲ καὶ ταφὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν περὶ ταῦτα κόσμον ἀπὸ μυρίων ταλάντων ἐπιτελέσαι διανοούμενος, ὑπερβαλέσθαι δὲ τῷ φιλοτέχνῳ καὶ περιτῷ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὴν δαπάνην, ἐπόθησε μάλιστα τῶν τεχνιτῶν Στασικράτην, μεγαλουργίαν τινὰ καὶ τόλμαν καὶ κόμπον ἐν ταῖς καινοτομίαις ἐπαγγελλόμενον.

Alejandro sobrellevó esta desgracia de forma irracional, pues inmediatamente mandó que rapan a todos los caballos y mulos

¹⁰ Sobre este tema, véase M. GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ 2019: 174-176.

¹¹ C. JONES 2010: 34 y 105, nota 27.

en señal de duelo, y retiró las fortificaciones de los alrededores de la ciudad; mandó crucificar al desdichado médico y prohibió por mucho tiempo los *auloi* y toda música en el campamento, hasta que vino un oráculo de Amón que ordenaba honrar a Hefestión y ofrecerle sacrificios como a un héroe. Y sirviéndose de la guerra como consuelo a su dolor, salió en expedición como si fuera en persecución y caza de hombres, sometió al pueblo de los coseos y mató a todos aquellos que habían pasado la juventud. A esto se lo llamaba “el sacrificio en honor de Hefestión”. Teniendo en mente gastar diez mil talentos por la tumba, el funeral y el adorno necesario para ello, y queriendo superar en arte y derroche el gasto de los preparativos, prefirió a Estasícrates antes que a cualquier otro artista, pues prometía en sus invenciones cierta magnificencia, atrevimiento y ostentación.

Hefestión murió en Ecbatana en torno al 325 a. C., apenas dos años antes de la muerte de Alejandro. Este último encajó mal la muerte de su fiel compañero y celebró unas exquisitas honras en su honor. Veamos los detalles:

El rapar los caballos y mulas es una muestra de duelo presente en otras *Vidas* de Plutarco (Plu., *Arist.* 14.8, *Nic.* 27.8-9 y *Pel.* 33.3) y se remonta al menos hasta época clásica¹². La retirada de las fortificaciones parece seguir la misma idea, pues en Plu., *Pel.* 34.2 el Querónense comenta que Alejandro mandó rapar caballos y mulos y retirar las empalizadas, “de manera que pareciera que las ciudades también estaban en duelo adoptando una apariencia rapada en vez de su forma anterior”. En todo caso, esta metafórica explicación solo está presente en Plutarco, por lo que seguramente sea interpretación suya.

Otras muestras del duelo de Alejandro por Hefestión fueron la prohibición de música¹³ y la construcción del costoso monumento funerario, obra de Estasícrates. Si bien solo Plutarco menciona a Estasícrates, otros autores coinciden en la suntuosidad de la obra. La cantidad de diez mil talentos mencionada por Plutarco es repetida por Arriano, quien sin embargo añade que otros historiadores la consideraron más alta aún (Arr., *An.* 7.14,8). Diodoro y Justino llegan a darle un valor de doce mil talentos (D.S., XVII 115.5 y Iust., XII 12.12).

¹² En *Alcestis* ya aparece, cuando Admeto, en duelo por su esposa, pide a los tesalios que se corten los cabellos, vistan una túnica negra, corten las crines de sus caballos y no se oiga flauta ni lira alguna por doce lunas (E., *Alc.* 425-431).

¹³ Arriano, por el contrario, menciona la celebración de un costoso y multitudinario certamen gimnástico y musical en honor de Hefestión (Arr., *An.* 7.14,10). Sobre la prohibición de música como expresión de duelo, véase la nota anterior.

Las costosas honras fúnebres celebradas en honor de Hefestión son, en todo caso, resultado del alto estatus social de que gozaba el difunto, y no necesariamente consecuencia de su heroización, si bien es posible que su magnífica tumba y honras fueran un importante punto de partida para su culto. Arriano comenta que la mayoría de historiadores coincidían en que Alejandro ordenó hacerle sacrificios como a un héroe, y que otros afirman que envió una embajada a preguntar a Amón si Hefestión debía ser honrado como un dios y este contestó que no (Arr., *An.* 7.14,7; 7.23,6). Añade que Alejandro construyó un *heroon*, el “Hefestión”, en Alejandría, y otro en la isla de Faros (Arr., *An.* 7.23.7). Diodoro, Luciano y Justino, por el contrario, afirman que Alejandro ordenó que se le rindieran honores divinos, y según Diodoro esto fue además ratificado por Amón (D.S., XVII 115.6, “θεῷ παρέδρῳ”; Luc., *Cal.* 17, “παρέδρῳ καὶ ἀλεξικάκῳ θεῷ”, y Iust., XII 12.12, “ut deum”).

Lo más probable es que dicho culto no fuera de tipo divino, sino heroico. Prueba de esto es un pasaje

de un discurso de Hiperides (*Hyp., Epit.* 21) que critica la práctica macedonia de hacer sacrificios y erigir imágenes, templos y altares, no a dioses, sino a hombres, viéndose obligados los atenienses a “honrar como a héroes a los sirvientes de estos” (καὶ [τ]οὺς <τού>των οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν ἡμᾶς ἀναγκαζομένους)¹⁴. Asimismo se encontró un relieve en Pela que data en torno al 315-300 a. C. y que reza “Διογένης Ἡφαιστίωνι ἥρωι”, “Diógenes en honor del héroe Hefestión”¹⁵.

Pero volviendo al pasaje inicial de Plutarco, una idea interesante es el denominado “sacrificio en honor de Hefestión”. Probablemente la invasión del país de los coseos nada tenía que ver con Hefestión, ni mucho menos era un sacrificio. La idea del sacrificio humano en honor del macedonio parece ser una reinterpretación de los hechos por la tradición, siguiendo la idea de que Hefestión fue objeto de culto, y evocando asimismo el ejemplo de Aquiles¹⁶. Este, tras la muerte de Patroclo, no solo llevó a cabo una gran matanza de troyanos al volver a incorporarse a la batalla (*Il.* 20.381 y

¹⁴ P. TREVES 1939: 56.

¹⁵ SEG 40:547. Véase O. PALAGIA 2000: 168.

¹⁶ Alejandro trató de asimilar su figura a la de Aquiles, entre otros personajes miticos, véase B. ANTELA-BERNÁRDEZ 2007: 90-94. Eso y la supuesta relación amorosa del rey con Hefestión le valió a la pareja su comparación con Aquiles y Patroclo, ya desde la antigüedad. Un ejemplo es el episodio de la visita de Alejandro y Hefestión a la tumba de Aquiles y Patroclo (Arr., *An.* 1.12,1-2 y Ael., *VH.* 12.7), véase M. GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ 2018a: 93-94.

ss, 21.17 y ss), sino que capturó a doce troyanos para sacrificarlos en la pirra funeraria (*Il.* 21.26-28, 23.22-23, 23.175 y ss).

La expedición contra el país de los coseos es mencionada por otros autores, aunque con ligeras diferencias. Polieno cuenta la toma del país de los coseos por Alejandro y dice que la empresa tuvo lugar tras la muerte de Hefestión y consoló a Alejandro (Polyaen., IV 3.31). Claudio Eliano no especifica que se enfrentara a los coseos, pero comenta que Alejandro arrasó la acrópolis de los ecbatanos poco después de la muerte de Hefestión, juzgando que Alejandro se comportó “a la manera griega” al cortarse los cabellos por Hefestión¹⁷, pero que lo hizo como un bárbaro al expresar su dolor atacando la ciudad (Ael., *VH* 7.8). En otros autores no se relaciona la batalla con la muerte de Hefestión (D.S., XVII 111.4-6; Str., XI 13.6 y Arr., *An.* 7.15,1-3).

Vida de Pelópidas 33.1-6

Tὸ μὲν οὖν Θηβαίων τοὺς παρόντας ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ Πελοπίδου τελευτῇ βαρέως φέρειν, πατέρα καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ διδάσκαλον τῶν μεγίστων καὶ καλλίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποκαλοῦντας ἐκεῖνον, οὐ πάνυ θαυμαστὸν ἦν· οἱ δὲ Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι πᾶσαν ἀνθρωπίνην πρέπουσαν ἀρετῇ τιμὴν τοῖς ψη-

φίσμασιν ὑπερβαλόντες, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπεδείξαντο τοῖς πάθεσι τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα χάριν. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ παραγεγονότας τῷ ἔργῳ λέγουσι μήτε θώρακα θέσθαι, μήθ’ ὑπὸν ἐκχαλινῶσαι, μήτε τραῦμα δήσασθαι πρότερον, ὡς ἐπύθοντο τὴν ἐκείνου τελευτήν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων θερμοὺς ιόντας ἐπὶ τὸν νεκρόν, ὥσπερ αἰσθανομένου τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ σῶμα σωρεύειν λάφυρα, κεῖραι δ’ ὑπουρούς, κείρασθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτούς, ἀπιόντας δὲ πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σκηνὰς μήτε πῦρ ἀνάψαι μήτε δεῖπνον ἐλέσθαι, σιγὴν δὲ καὶ κατήφειαν εἶναι τοῦ στρατοπέδου παντός, ὥσπερ οὐ νεικηκότων ἐπιφανεστάτην νίκην καὶ μεγίστην, ἀλλ’ ἡττημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ καταδεδουλωμένων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἀπηγγέλθη ταῦτα, παρῆσαν αἴ τ’ ἄρχαι καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν ἔφηβοι καὶ παιδες καὶ ιερεῖς πρὸς τὴν ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ σώματος, τρόπαια καὶ στεφάνους καὶ πανοπλίας χρυσᾶς ἐπιφέροντες, ὡς δ’ ἔμελλεν ἐκκομίζεσθαι τὸ σῶμα, προσελθόντες οἱ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἤτουντο τοὺς Θηβαίους δι’ αὐτῶν θάψαι τὸν νεκρόν.

El desconsuelo por parte de los tebanos presentes por la muerte de Pelópidas, al que llamaban “padre” y “salvador” y “maestro de los más grandes y hermosos

¹⁷ Plutarco solo incluye en la escena el rapado de los animales, pero otros autores mencionan, además, que el mismo Alejandro se cortó los cabellos y se los ofreció al difunto (Arr., *An.* 7.14,4 y Ael., *VH*. 7.8), detalle que sin duda evoca el duelo de Aquiles por Patroclo, véase nota 19 del presente artículo.

bienes”, no era muy de sorprender. Los tesalios y los aliados, que habían excedido con sus decretos toda honra atribuible a la virtud humana, demostraron todavía más su agradecimiento al hombre en su duelo. Pues dicen que los que habían estado presentes en la batalla ni se quitaron la coraza ni desembridaron los caballos ni se vendaron las heridas al principio cuando supieron de su muerte, sino que acudieron ante el cadáver con las armas y acalorados, como si todavía pudiera verlos, apilaron los despojos de la guerra en círculo en torno a su cuerpo, cortaron las crines a los caballos e incluso se raparon a sí mismos. Y muchos, cuando se fueron a sus tiendas, ni encendieron fuego ni comieron. Había silencio y abatimiento en todo el campamento, como si no hubieran logrado la más célebre e ilustre de las victorias, sino que hubieran sido derrotados por el tirano y esclavizados. Cuando les llegó la noticia, acudieron de las ciudades los magistrados con efebos y niños y sacerdotes a recibir el cadáver, llevando trofeos, coronas y armaduras de oro. Y cuando llegó el momento de enterrar el cuerpo, los más ancianos de los tesalios se acercaron para

rogarles a los tebanos que les dejaran sepultarlo a ellos mismos.

Murió Pelópidas en la batalla de Cinoscéfalas del 364 a. C., en su lucha contra el tirano Alejandro de Feras. Plutarco no deja claro dónde se celebró el duelo y se dio sepultura a Pelópidas, si bien estas ceremonias pudieron tener lugar en el mismo campo de batalla¹⁸.

La descripción de la escena tiene claros tintes homéricos: los hombres, aún armados, salieron al encuentro de su general y le ofrecieron coronas (como era lo usual), trofeos (símbolo de la victoria) y armaduras, además de los despojos de la guerra probablemente en la idea de que fuera incinerado o enterrado con ellos. Los hombres ni encendieron fuego ni comieron, gesto que evoca el ayuno de Aquiles tras la muerte de Patroclo (*Il.* 19.209-210 y 305-307). Sobre el rapado de los animales como gesto de duelo ya he hablado anteriormente en relación al funeral de Hefestión, pero además los hombres de Pelópidas se raparon a sí mismos, costumbre que encontramos igualmente en el duelo de Aquiles y sus compañeros por Patroclo, y que está ampliamente atestiguada en el mundo antiguo¹⁹.

El funeral de Pelópidas es multitudinario, acudiendo niños, efebos y sa-

¹⁸ W. K. PRITCHETT 1985: 220.

¹⁹ El cortarse los cabellos y ofrecerlos al difunto es un gesto muy repetido en Homero (*Il.* 23.135-136, 140-142, 152-153, y *Od.* 4.198) y en la tragedia (A., *Ch.* 6-7; S., *El.* 52, 449-451; E., *Tr.* 1182-1183...), y pervivió en época clásica (véase Aeschin., III 211 y Lys., II 60).

cerdotes de las ciudades próximas. La presencia de sacerdotes en el funeral es especialmente significativa, pues en general estos tenían prohibida la asistencia a los funerales debido a la contaminación procedente del cadáver. Vemos aquí, pues, el mismo patrón ideológico que veíamos antes en el funeral de Arato, pues las ideas sobre la contaminación procedente de los cadáveres no se aplican al cuerpo del héroe. Así pues, la asistencia de sacerdotes en el acto puede verse en clave religiosa y cultural, y no solo por el duelo en sí.

El desconsuelo de los tebanos por la pérdida de su general fue grande. Según Plutarco, estos tenían a Pelópidas como a un padre (*πατέρα*), un salvador (*σωτῆρα*) y un maestro de los más grandes y hermosos bienes (*διδάσκαλον τῶν μεγίστων καὶ καλλίστων ἀγαθῶν*), títulos muy en la línea de los héroes helenísticos. Pero, además, al dolor de los tebanos se une el de los tesalios, que, en una escena de gran simbolismo, expresan ante los tebanos su deseo de dar entierro ellos mismos a Pelópidas, en la idea de que si ellos habían perdido a su general, aquellos habían sido privados de él y de su libertad (Plu., *Pel.* 33.7-10).

Teseo, en *Vida de Cimón*, 8.5-7

πυνθανόμενος δὲ τὸν παλαιὸν Θησέα τὸν Αἰγέως φυγόντα μὲν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν εἰς Σκῦρον, αὐτοῦ δ' ἀποθανόντα δόλῳ διὰ φόβου ὑπὸ Λυκομήδους τοῦ βασιλέως, ἐσπούδασε τὸν τάφον ἀνευρεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἦν χρησμὸς Ἀθηναίοις, τὰ

Θησέως λείψανα κελεύων ἀνακομίζειν εἰς ἄστυ καὶ τιμᾶν ὡς ἥρωα πρεπόντως, ἀλλ' ἡγνόουν ὅπου κεῖται, Σκυρίων οὐχ ὁμολογούντων οὐδ' ἐώντων ἀναζητεῖν. τότε δὴ πολλῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τοῦ σηκοῦ μόγις ἐξενρεθέντος, ἐνθέμενος ὁ Κίμων εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ τριήρη τὰ ὄστα καὶ τάλλα κοσμήσας μεγαλοπρεπῶς, κατήγαγεν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ δι' ἐτῶν σχεδὸν τετρακοσίων. ἐφ' ὃ καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡδέως ὁ δῆμος ἔσχεν.

Conocedor de que el antiguo Teseo, hijo de Egeo, se desterró de Atenas a Esciros, y que fue asesinado allí, con engaño, a manos del rey Licomedes por temor, puso empeño en encontrar su tumba. Pues los atenienses conservaban un oráculo que ordenaba devolver los restos de Teseo a la ciudad y honrarlos adecuadamente como a un héroe, pero no sabían dónde reposaban, puesto que los escirenses no lo revelaban ni les dejaban investigar. Entonces Cimón, con un gran deseo de gloria, tras hallar con dificultad el lugar de la tumba, poner los huesos en su trirreme y disponer lo demás con magnificencia, los trajo a la ciudad tras casi cuatrocientos años. Por esto sobre todo el pueblo tenía una buena disposición hacia él.

La misma noticia se halla en Plu., *Thes.* 36.1-5, donde Plutarco cuenta la recuperación de los restos de Teseo y da información acerca de la ubicación de

su tumba y las festividades atenienses en su honor. El oráculo puede fecharse en torno al 476-475 a. C., durante el arcontado de Fedón. En el relato de los hechos de la *Vida de Teseo*, se suma al oráculo cierta señal divina que ayudó a Cimón a encontrar la tumba, pues un águila comenzó a picotear y arañar el lugar donde se hallaba el sepulcro.

El mismo oráculo está atestiguado por Pausanias, pero no cuenta que este mandara dar culto al héroe, sino que decía que si no repatriaban los restos de Teseo, Cimón no se haría con Esciros (Paus., III 3.7). En cambio, según Plutarco, Cimón intervino en Esciros a fin de liberar el Egeo de la piratería de los dólopes, y, una vez que se hubo hecho con el control de la isla, emprendió la búsqueda de los restos de Teseo (Plu., *Cim.* 8.3-4).

La búsqueda de los restos de un héroe a instancias de un oráculo no es un episodio novedoso. Durante la guerra entre Esparta y Tegea, hacia el año 550 a. C., un oráculo reveló a los espartanos que solo vencerían si eran capaces de encontrar los huesos de Orestes en la propia Tegea y darles debida sepultura (Hdt., I 67-68, D.S., IX 36.3 y Paus., III 3.5-6). Este episodio es

más parecido a la versión de Pausanias que a la de Plutarco, en tanto que en el primero el oráculo sirve como forma de dar legitimidad divina a la invasión, y en el segundo, la recuperación de los restos de Teseo sirve al deseo de honores (*φιλοτυμία*) de Cimón. Aunque el *topos* es el mismo (la recuperación de los restos de un héroe por orden de un oráculo), Plutarco se vale de la anécdota para retratar a Cimón, al cual compara con el mismo Teseo en varias partes de su biografía por medio de diversas anécdotas y hazañas, como si fuera una emulación del héroe²⁰.

Cabe destacar, en todo caso, que la historia sobre la recuperación de los huesos de Teseo no puede datarse más allá del s. IV a. C. y su conexión con Cimón no surge hasta época imperial con Plutarco. Así pues, la vinculación de la figura de Cimón con la recuperación de los restos es tardía y puede no tener base histórica²¹.

De cualquier forma, pese al uso meramente biográfico y propagandístico de la anécdota, es significativa la descripción que hace Plutarco del enterramiento de Teseo. La necesidad de enterramiento y culto al héroe va iniciada por

²⁰ Ejemplos del uso de la figura de Teseo para retratar a Cimón son la generosidad y filantropía de ambos personajes (Plu., *Thes.* 36.4 y *Cim.* 10); la hazaña de Cimón de liberar el Egeo de piratas, similar a la matanza de malhechores que Teseo llevó a cabo en su camino a Trecén (Plu., *Cim.* 8.3-4 y *Thes.*, 8-11), o el hecho de que ambos recibieron culto tras su muerte (Plu., *Thes.* 36.3-5 y *Cim.* 19.5).

²¹ Véase M. ZACCARINI 2015, a propósito de la tradición de la historia de la recuperación de los huesos de Teseo, así como M. GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ 2018b: 139-144.

la aparición del oráculo y es acompañada por señales divinas, como el águila que mostró la tumba a Cimón. La descripción del cuerpo es clave, pues Plutarco cuenta que los huesos de Teseo eran de gran tamaño²², e iban acompañados por una lanza y una espada. La identificación de Teseo con el enorme esqueleto sigue la concepción antigua sobre la excepcionalidad del cuerpo heroico, que a menudo viene distinguido por ser de gran tamaño, por estar formado por una sólida osamenta de una sola pieza o por otras cualidades igualmente singulares²³.

El cuerpo es recibido por los atenienses y transportado a la ciudad entre procesiones y sacrificios, en una fiesta en honor del héroe (Plu., *Thes.* 36.3) y Teseo es enterrado en la ciudad, como demuestra el hecho de que Plutarco sitúa su tumba en el centro de Atenas, junto al gimnasio (Plu., *Thes.* 36.4). Sus honras se fijan el ocho del mes pianepsión, día en que Teseo volvió de Creta, además de los días ocho del resto de meses, bien porque volvió de Trecén el día ocho del mes hecatombeón, o bien porque el número ocho se relaciona con Posidón, padre de Teseo (Plu., *Thes.* 36.4-6).

Vida de Timoleón 39.1-6

Ἐν τοιάτῃ δὲ γηροτροφούμενος τιμῇ μετ' εὐνοίας ὥσπερ πατὴρ κοινός, ἐκ μικρᾶς προ-

φάσεως τῷ χρόνῳ συνεφαψαμένης ἐτελεύτησεν. ἡμερῶν δὲ δοθεισῶν, τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις εἰς τὸ παρασκευάσται τὰ περὶ τὴν ταφήν, τοῖς δὲ περιοίκοις καὶ ξένοις εἰς τὸ συνελθεῖν, τά τ' ἄλλα λαμπρᾶς χορηγίας ἔτυχε, καὶ τὸ λέχος οἱ ψήφῳ τῶν νεανίσκων προκριθέντες ἔφερον κεκοσμημένον διὰ τῶν Διονυσίου τυραννείων τότε κατεσκαμμένων. προῦπεμπον δὲ πολλαὶ μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ὃν ὄψις μὲν ἦν ἑορτῇ πρέπουσα, πάντων ἐστεφανωμένων καὶ καθαράς ἐσθῆτας φορούντων, φωναὶ δὲ καὶ δάκρυα, συγκεκραμένα τῷ μακαρισμῷ τοῦ τεθνηκότος, οὐ τιμῆς ἀφοσίωσιν οὐδὲ λειτουργίαν ἐκ προβουλεύματος, ἀλλὰ πόθον δίκαιον ἐπεδείκνυντο καὶ χάριν ἀληθινῆς εὐνοίας. τέλος δὲ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὰν τεθείσης, Δημήτριος, ὃς ἦν μεγαλοφωνότατος τῶν τότε κηρύκων, γεγραμμένον ἀνεῖπε κήρυγμα τοιούτον· “ὁ δῆμος τῶν Συρακοσίων Τιμολέοντα Τιμοδήμου Κορίνθιον [τόνδε] θάπτει μὲν <ἀπό> διακοσίων μνῶν, ἐτίμησε δ' εἰς τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον ἀγῶσι μουσικοῖς ἵππικοῖς γυμνικοῖς, ὅτι τοὺς τυράννους καταλύσας, καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καταπολεμήσας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας τῶν ἀναστάτων πόλεων <ἀν>οικίσας, ἀπέδωκε τοὺς

²² Al igual que los de Orestes (Hdt., I 68.3), que supuestamente medían siete codos, esto es, algo más de tres metros.

²³ A. COPPOLA 2008: 15-17 y 26.

νόμους τοῖς Σικελιώταις". ἐποιῆσαντο δὲ τὴν ταφὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐν ἀγορᾷ, καὶ στοάς ὑστερὸν περιβαλόντες καὶ παλαίστρας ἐνοικοδομήσαντες, γυμνάσιον τοῖς νέοις ἀνῆκαν καὶ Τιμολεόντειον προσηγόρευσαν.

Honrado en su vejez con tal clase de dignidad y afecto, como si fuera un padre común, murió por un motivo pequeño que se sumó a su edad. Tras darse unos días a los siracusanos para que hicieran los preparativos del entierro y a los lugareños y los extranjeros para que acudieran (en lo demás el gasto fue grandioso), los designados por sorteo de entre los jóvenes llevaron el féretro ya adornado por los palacios de Dionisio, por aquel entonces destruidos. Lo acompañaban muchas miríadas de hombres y mujeres, cuya apariencia era la propia de una fiesta, pues todos portaban coronas y llevaban vestimenta blanca. Y mezclándose las voces y los llantos con la celebración del muerto, no lo hacían con la formalidad ni la ritualidad propia de las resoluciones públicas, sino que mostraban un justo amor y gratitud de sincera buena voluntad. Al final, tras colocar el féretro sobre la pira, Demetrio, que era entonces de entre los heraldos el que tenía la voz más potente, anunció la siguiente declaración, puesta por escrito: "el pueblo de los siracusanos enterra a Timoleón, hijo de Timodemo, corintio,

con doscientas minas, y acuerda honrarlo para siempre con competiciones musicales, de caballos y gimnásticas, pues tras acabar con los tiranos y vencer a los bárbaros, así como repoblar las principales ciudades devastadas, dio sus leyes a los siracusanos".

Llevaron a cabo la sepultura de su cuerpo en el ágora, y más tarde, tras rodearlo de pórticos de columnas y construir palestras, levantaron un gimnasio para los jóvenes y lo llamaron "Timoleoncio".

Timoleón fue el general al mando de la expedición corintia en Sicilia que derrocó el régimen de tiranía de Dionisio II, Mamerco e Hicetes, y rechazó la presencia cartaginesa en la isla. Tras salir victorioso y hacerse con el control de Sicilia, Timoleón llevó a cabo numerosas reformas legislativas y proyectos de repoblación, y se estableció en Siracusa, donde murió en el 336 a. C., al parecer por causas naturales.

El pueblo siracusano celebró unos fastuosos funerales en su honor. La magnificencia del funeral de Timoleón no solo la determinan los "grandiosos gastos" (*λαμπρὰ χορηγίαι*), sino el tiempo empleado en su preparación y el número de asistentes, detalles que parecen contravenir lo que conocemos sobre la legislación funeraria siracusana. Según Diodoro, los siracusanos habían prohibido por ley los funerales excesivamente suntuosos, ley que supuestamente el tirano Gelón quiso que

fuerá cumplida incluso para su propio funeral (D.S., XI.38.2-5).

En el funeral de Gelón todo el pueblo participó en la procesión, pese a que el lugar del entierro estaba a doscientos estadios (probablemente esto sea una exageración por parte de Diodoro), le erigieron un espléndido monumento y le tributaron honores propios de un héroe. Puede parecer paradójico que Gelón, que había pedido que su funeral siguiera la ley siracusana, tuviera un funeral tan suntuoso, sin embargo esto puede explicarse por el culto heroico a su figura, al igual que vemos en el caso de Timoleón. El funeral de Timoleón sigue el mismo patrón que el de Gelón, e incluso es posible que el retrato que Plutarco hace del corintio siga de cerca la figura del tirano²⁴.

Al suntuoso funeral de Timoleón acuden numerosos hombres y mujeres, extranjeros incluidos. La *prothesis* dura varios días y es seguida por la procesión, formada por jóvenes que llevan al difunto por los destruidos palacios de Dionisio, probablemente como símbolo de la victoria de Timoleón sobre el tirano. La es-

cena hace especial énfasis en el cariño que los siracusanos guardaban hacia Timoleón. Según Plutarco, muchos “lo querían como a un fundador” (ώσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἡγαπᾶτο, Plu., *Tim.* 35.3), y lo honraron “como si fuera un padre común” (ώσπερ πατὴρ κοινός, Plu., *Tim.* 39.1), no con la formalidad de un acto público, sino con verdadero amor y gratitud. Era común que los οἰκισταί fueran enterrados en el ágora de la ciudad que habían fundado, razón por la cual Timoleón no fue repatriado y enterrado en su patria de origen, Corinto, sino honrado en Siracusa.

Durante el funeral se repiten motivos estéticos como las coronas y la vestimenta blanca de los asistentes, que les dan la apariencia de estar en una fiesta (έοπτή, el mismo término que veíamos en el caso de Arato). La celebración del difunto se mezcla con el duelo en su honor y la heroización de Timoleón se hace efectiva cuando su cuerpo es enterrado en el ágora y el heraldo hace público el compromiso de la ciudad de honrarlo para siempre con competiciones musicales, de caballos y gimnásticas. Finalmente, la

²⁴ Las vidas de ambos hombres poseen numerosos puntos en común: ambos lucharon contra tiranos y cartagineses en Sicilia (Hdt., VII 165-166, D.S., XI 21-22 y Plu., *Tim.* 12, 16-21, 25-31 y 34); los dos llevaron a cabo una gran labor de traslado y reasentamiento de población en Siracusa (Hdt., VII 156 y Plu., *Tim.* 23); tanto uno como otro se convirtieron en dirigentes, y, al final, ambos murieron a una avanzada edad por causas naturales, fueron enterrados por la ciudad y recibieron culto como héroes (D.S., XI 38.2-5 y Plu., *Tim.* 39.1-7). Plutarco incluso menciona que Gelón fue honrado por su victoria sobre los cartagineses en Hímera, hasta el punto de que, una vez que Timoleón derrocó el régimen tiránico de Siracusa, se vendieron todas las estatuas de los tiranos salvo la suya (Plu., *Tim.* 23.8).

construcción del gimnasio “Timoleoncio” sigue la tradición por la cual los monumentos erigidos en honor de un héroe (especialmente sus templos, ήρωα) recibían su nombre.

3. Conclusiones

La descripción del funeral de los personajes de las *Vidas* griegas sirve a Plutarco para hacer un vivo retrato de ellos por medio de las honras de que son objeto, así como del efecto de su pérdida en los asistentes. Esto es especialmente notable en el caso de los enterramientos de personajes en torno a los cuales surge un culto de tipo heroico. Los funerales de héroes en las *Vidas* griegas repiten una serie de rasgos que se diferencian de lo que, en cada contexto, se esperaría de un funeral de una persona corriente. Un análisis de estas características permite comprender las ideas antiguas acerca del cuerpo del héroe y el culto heroico.

La concepción del cadáver del héroe refleja diversas ideas antiguas sobre la muerte y contaminación. El enterramiento del héroe es el punto de partida para su culto, razón por la cual se da tanta importancia a la recuperación de sus restos y su funeral. El héroe es enterrado en la ciudad, muchas veces en el ágora, lo cual es particularmente significativo en el caso de ciudades cuya legislación funeraria prohibía el enterramiento intramuros, como es el caso de Sición. Tanto esto como la presencia de sacerdotes durante el funeral (como veímos en el caso de Pélopidas) muestran que el carácter sagrado

del cuerpo del héroe hace impensable que sus restos sean causa de contaminación.

Otras restricciones procedentes de leyes funerarias o suntuarias no se aplican en el funeral heroico, cuya procesión adquiere un carácter monumental y una dimensión pública especialmente notable: en el funeral participan numerosos asistentes, a veces vestidos de blanco y coronados, haciendo del enterramiento una verdadera fiesta en honor del héroe. A partir del funeral, el difunto pasa a ser objeto del culto público de la ciudad, la cual invierte importantes sumas de dinero tanto en la procesión como en la construcción de monumentos en su honor (tumbas, templos, gimnasios...), y se compromete, explícita o implícitamente, a honrarlo a perpetuidad.

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Il malintenso della nipote (Plut. Cons. ux. 608B)

[*The Misunderstanding about the Granddaughter (Plut. Cons. ux. 608B)*]

da

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Riassunto

L'inizio della *Cons. ux.* consente di capire che il messo inviato dalla moglie di Plutarco, a comunicargli la brutta notizia della morte della loro figlioletta, andò prima a Tanagra e poi si avviò verso Atene, fiducioso di incontrarlo per la strada. Ma l'incontro non avvenne: e così Plutarco apprese la notizia a Tanagra *παρὰ τῆς θυγατριδῆς*. Molti studiosi hanno osservato che questa non può essere una nipote di cui Plutarco è nonno (all'età di 40 anni o poco più) e hanno argomentato che forse può essere una nipote di cui è zio (cioè figlia di uno dei suoi fratelli); Babut ha pensato invece che potrebbe essere indicata così una nuora di Plutarco. L'articolo discute il problema e indica una nuova soluzione per l'enigma della nipote che abitava a Tanagra.

Parole-Chiave: Plutarco, *Consolatio uxoris*, Famigliari, Parenti, Nipote, Nuora.

Abstract

At the very beginning of the *Cons. ux.*, we gather that the messenger sent by Plutarch's wife, to tell him about their child's death, went first to Tanagra and then left for Athens, expecting to meet Plutarch on the way. The meeting, however, did not occur, so that Plutarch only heard of the news *παρὰ τῆς θυγατριδῆς*, when he arrived at Tanagra. Several scholars maintain that this girl can hardly be a granddaughter of Plutarch (who was about forty at that moment) and assume she might be his niece (i.e. a daughter of one of his brothers); Babut, instead, believes that by this Greek term Plutarch refers to one of his daughters-in-law. This paper discusses the whole problem and suggests a new explication for the misunderstanding concerning the granddaughter who lived in Tanagra.

Keywords: Plutarco, *Consolation to his wife*, Family's terminology, Relatives, Granddaughter, Niece, Daughter-in-law.

 lutarco inizia la sua *Consolazione alla moglie* con una frase molto nota e ripetutamente citata (608B):

Πλούταρχος τῇ γυναικὶ εὐ πράττειν.

1. “Ον ἔπεμψας ἀπαγγελοῦντα περὶ τῆς τοῦ παιδίου τελευτῆς, ἔσκε δημαρτηκέναι καθ' ὄδὸν εἰς Ἀθήνας πορευόμενος· ἐγώ δ' εἰς Τάναγραν ἐλθὼν ἐπυθόμην παρὰ τῆς θυγατριδῆς.

Plutarco saluta sua moglie.

L'uomo che hai mandato ad avvertirmi della morte della bambina mi ha mancato, pare, lungo la strada e ha proseguito per Atene: così io, giunto Tanagra, l'ho saputo da mia nipote.

Ho riportato per chiarezza la traduzione di Giuliano Pisani (2017), che è certamente la migliore delle traduzioni italiane recenti; ma anche quella di Impara-Manfredini (1991) termina con le parole “l'ho appreso da mia nipote”. Parole analoghe s'incontrano in quella di Adele Vaghi (1993) e in quella di Francesco Chiossone (2010)¹. È doveroso però aggiungere che in italiano la parola “nipote” è sempre

equivoca, perché può indicare sia la nipote di uno zio che la nipote di un nonno. Lo stesso, per di più, si può dire per il latino: si veda, a titolo di esempio, la traduzione di W. Xylander (1570) “de nepte inaudivi” e quella di F. Dübner (Didot, 1841) “ex nepte inaudivi”.

Non c'è dubbio invece che il greco θυγατριδῆ signifICA specificamente “figlia di figlia” e quindi indica con precisione esclusiva la nipote del nonno materno. Il termine non è mai usato in altre accezioni, come confermano il LSJ (e gli altri dizionari), i lessici antichi compatti (Hesych.: θυγατριδῆ· ἐγγόνη. θυγάτηρ θυγατρός²) e anche il paziente controllo di tutte le 61 occorrenze segnalate dal TLG³. Sembrano dunque corrette la traduzione inglese di De Lacy-Einarson 1959 (581) “I learned of it from my granddaughter” (seguita, in sostanza, da R. Warner 1971, 176, da R. Waterfield in Kidd 1992, 365, e da S. Pomeroy 1999, 78), quella francese di Hani 1980 “j'ai appris la nouvelle par ma petite fille”, e quelle spagnole di R.M. Aguilar 1996, 313 “me enteré por mi nieta” e di R. Caballero 2005, 42 “por nuestra nieta”.

Tuttavia – fin dal Cinquecento – ha sempre fatto difficoltà concettuale am-

¹ Queste ultime sono due (trascurabili) traduzioni-strenna, uscite rispettivamente nella Collana “Libri di una sera” (La Spiga-Meravigli, Vimercate 1993: “giunto a Tanagra, ho appreso la notizia da nostra nipote”) e da Il Nuovo Melangolo (Genova 2010: “non appena giunsi a Tanagra, appresi la notizia da mia nipote”).

² Cfr. *Synagogē*, Phot., Suid., *Etym. Magn.* etc. (s.v.).

³ Ringrazio vivamente gli amici e colleghi Augusto Guida ed Enrico Magnelli, che mi hanno ripetutamente supportato nella consultazione del TLG e nei relativi controlli.

mettere che Plutarco, padre della bimba di due anni che è appena morta, sia al tempo stesso nonno di una nipote già adulta, abitante a Tanagra, dalla quale ha appreso la notizia. Per questo molti dei grandi traduttori ‘storici’ di Plutarco preferivano ‘tagliare’ il problema. Già J. Amyot (1572) traduceva: “Celuy que tu m’avois envoyé pour m’apporter la nouvelle de la mort de nostre petite fille, à mon advis, m’a failly par le chemin, estant allé droict à Athenes: mais arrivé à Tanagre j’en ay esté adverty”. Così la nipote spariva del tutto dal testo⁴. Seguirono la stessa linea la traduzione di Marcello Adriani il Giovane (fatta alla fine del Cinquecento, ma pubblicata nel 1819 da F. Ambrosoli) “arrivato che fui a Tanagra, subito intesi il tutto” e quella di Ricard (1844) “j’en ai reçu la nouvelle en arrivant à Tanagre”. Ancora B. Snell (1948) traduceva: “... und daher habe ich erst bei meiner Ankunft in Tanagra von diesem Verlust gehört”; e M. Hadas (1957, 93) “... and

consequently I learned about the child only when I arrived in Tanagra”.

La questione aveva avuto in realtà una prima svolta importante nel 1889, quando Wilamowitz, nel suo *Commentariolum Grammaticum* III (23 s.)⁵, sentenziò che era giusta l’ipotesi fatta vent’anni prima da Volkmann (1869, I 29), che in quel brano Plutarco usasse il termine θυγατριδῆ non nel consueto senso di “Enkelin”, ma in quello di “Nichte”, per indicare la figlia di uno dei suoi fratelli (Lampria e Timone), cioè una nipote di cui era zio (non nonno). La conclusione sembrò a molti inevitabile ed ebbe anche l’avallo decisivo di Ziegler, nella *RE* (1951), 651 = 1965 (tr. it.), 24 s.⁶.

Di conseguenza, diversi traduttori si pronunciarono esplicitamente in questo senso: ad esempio, O. Apelt (Leipzig 1926, II 114) traduceva “durch unsere Nichte”, M. Pinnoy (Leuven 1979, 69) “van onze nicht”⁷ e ancora D. Russell (1993) traduce: “from my niece”⁸. S’aggiunga che la traduzione di Russell

⁴ WYTTENBACH (1797), annotando la traduzione latina di Xylander, sospettava che si dovesse correggere (in μητραδελφῆς o simili) e aggiungeva: “Amiotus plane omisit”.

⁵ Riproposto in *Kleine Schriften* IV (1962), 648 s.

⁶ MARTIN-PHILLIPS 1978, 395, n. 5 e HANI 1980, 176 rimandano anche a W. Christ (- W. Schmid - O. Stählin), *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, 2.1, München 1911⁵, 368 (=1920⁶, 486), ma si tratta di un errore: lì non si parla della θυγατριδῆ.

⁷ Un vivo ringraziamento all’amico Luc van der Stockt per avermi procurato questo utile contributo (che presenta testo, traduzione e commento) e per avermi supportato nella comprensione della lingua fiamminga.

⁸ Si noti però che RUSSELL 1993 traduce così a p. 297, ma a p. 382 scrive in nota che *thugatridē* significa spesso “granddaughter”, ma può anche significare “niece” o “daughter-in-law” (in verità due ipotesi: la seconda fatta da Babut 1981, come vedremo), e probabilmente “it is one of these here”, perché è ben difficile che Plutarco avesse in contemporanea una bimba di due anni e “a grown-up grandchild”.

è riproposta anche a p. 59 del volume curato nel 1999 dalla Pomeroy, che però ne prende le distanze nel suo “Commentary”, a p. 78 (salvo poi accettarla a p. 80).

Una seconda svolta si è avuta in verità nel 1981 con la presa di posizione di un altro grande studioso, Daniel Babut, il quale, affrontando nel suo complesso la questione dei figli di Plutarco, concludeva in modo perentorio – sulla base di *Cons. ux.* 608C – che il Cheronese ebbe cinque figli (e non di più): nell’ordine, prima quattro figli maschi (Soclaro, morto a 12-15 anni, Autobulo, Plutarco junior e Cherone, morto in tenera età) e poi l’unica femmina, Timossena, morta a due anni.

Alla luce di queste conclusioni (che in verità negli anni successivi sono state parzialmente rivedute e corrette⁹) – considerando che sicuramente Plutarco non ebbe figlie adulte – Babut ha avanzato l’ardita ipotesi che nella *Cons. ux.* usasse il termine θυγατριδῆ nel senso di “belle-fille”, cioè di “nuora” (o “daughter-in-law”), e indicasse così la moglie di uno dei figli sposati (probabilmente Autobulo). L’ipotesi è piaciuta a B. Puech

1992 (4882, n. 195) e a D. Harvey (nella “Bibliography” di Pomeroy 1999, 208), ma è stata apertamente criticata dalla stessa Pomeroy, perché non ci sono paralleli di θυγατριδῆ usato in quel senso.

Proprio da qui è bene riprendere le fila della questione: e, di necessità, bisogna riprenderle proprio a partire dalla lingua greca con alcuni punti fermi.

1. Otto Apelt (1926, II 163) e Sarah Pomeroy (1999, 78) parlano di una θυγατρίς di Plutarco: ma probabilmente questo è solo un banale ‘lapsus’ per θυγατριδῆ. Il sostantivo θυγατρίς non è attestato nel greco classico (e non c’è nei dizionari, né nel LSJ né altrove): ricorre solo una volta in epoca bizantina (in Teodoro Studita, *PG* 99, 893a) e significa “figlia”¹⁰.

2. L’aggettivo sostantivato θυγατριδῆ (sott. παῖς)¹¹ è un termine preciso, direi quasi tecnico, che significa “figlia della figlia” e il suo maschile θυγατριδοῦς (sott. παῖς) indica specificamente il “figlio della figlia”. Suppongo che il neutro θυγατριδοῦν (sott. τέκνον) si usasse

⁹ Le sue conclusioni sono state ulteriormente precise (e corrette) da TEODORSSON 1990, 65-66 e PUECH 1992, 4880-82): i due studiosi hanno convincentemente argomentato che il primogenito (indicato come τέκνον, senza distinzione di sesso) con ogni probabilità morì alla nascita; seguirono poi i quattro maschi (Autobulo, Plutarco jr, Soclaro e Cherone, morto bambino) e poi la povera Timossena. I figli di Plutarco dovevano dunque essere sei, e tre maschi raggiunsero l’età adulta (anche Soclaro), come dimostra *QC* 8.6, 725F, dove i due figli più giovani (probabilmente Plutarco jr e Soclaro) arrivano in ritardo a cena perché sono stati a teatro: cfr. in proposito TEODORSSON 1996, 216-7; FRAZIER 1996, 64, n. 11; BRACCINI-PELLIZER 2014, 249.

¹⁰ Cfr. E. Trapp, *Lexicon zur byzantinischen Gräzität*, s.v.

¹¹ È un aggettivo contratto (cfr. θυγατριδέος in Hdt. 5.67.4, 69.1 ecc.) e quindi va scritto con l’accento circonflesso: invece HANI 1980, 176-177 lo scrive ripetutamente con accento acuto.

quando non si voleva fare distinzione di sesso. Non ci sono attestazioni con significato diverso. Plutarco impiega spesso questo termine, sia nelle *Vitae* che nei *Moralia* (tre volte al femminile¹², venti volte al maschile¹³), sempre con la massima precisione. Sono quindi scorrette e insostenibili linguisticamente sia l'ipotesi di Volkmann-Wilamowitz che quella di Babut. Pertanto non c'è dubbio che qui si parla di una "Enkelin", non di una "Nichte": detto in inglese, è una "granddaughter", non una "niece"; in spagnolo, è una "nieta", non una "sobrina". Per essere chiari anche in italiano, questa è una nipote di nonno, non di una nipote di zio: per la precisione, è una nipote del nonno materno.

Sarah Pomeroy 1999, 78 tenta di argomentare che la moglie di Plutarco, Timossena, verso i 40 anni poteva essere madre della bimba morta a due anni e nonna di una nipote abitante a Tanagra (con la mamma: e Plutarco potrebbe

aver saputo la triste notizia addirittura da una bambina). Ma questa è una chiara forzatura ed è in clamorosa contraddizione con quanto l'autore afferma nel cap. 2 della stessa *Consolatio* (608C):

τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι καὶ σοὶ ποθούσῃ θυγάτηρ μετὰ τέσσαρας νιοὺς ἐγεννήθη κάμοι τὸ σὸν ὄνομα θέσθαι παρέσχεν ἀφορμήν, οἵδα¹⁴ ἀγαπητὸν διαφερόντως γενόμενον ("e a questa bimba so che noi volevamo un bene straordinario, perché per te, dopo quattro maschi, era nata la figlia che desideravi tanto e a me aveva portato la possibilità di darle il tuo nome").

Qui è perfetta l'argomentazione di Babut 1981, 56: non occorrono troppe parole per capire che (almeno a quella data) Plutarco e Timossena non avevano altri figli. Lo scrittore non aveva mai avuto la possibilità di dare il nome Timossena ad una figlia¹⁵: non può mentire o prendersi gioco della moglie!

¹² Arist. 27.3 e 6; *Cons. ux.* 608B.

¹³ Thes. 17.7; Numa 9.7; Cor. 1.1; De garr. 508A, De sera 563A, ecc. Per brevità non sto ad elencarli tutti: mi limito a citare un solo caso, particolarmente significativo. In Dion 56.1 troviamo che (forse) Dione voleva come successore Apollocrate, ἀδελφίδον τῆς γυναικός, θυγατρίδον τῆς ἀδελφῆς: "nipote della moglie e nipote della sorella". Grazie alla terminologia precisa, si capisce che era (per Dione) figlio del fratello di sua moglie e della figlia di sua sorella! La lingua greca è molto specifica per i discendenti diretti (nipoti di nonno), non così per i nipoti indiretti (figli di fratello o sorella).

¹⁴ Accetto il testo stabilito da Hani (e traduco di conseguenza), ma anche espungendo οἵδα (con Wilamowitz e Sieveking, Teubner 1929) e facendo reggere la frase dal precedente οὗθα δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ, non cambia assolutamente l'intenso valore umano della proposizione.

¹⁵ HANI 1980, 177 scrive: "Mais celà implique-t-il qu'il n'avait jamais eu de fille auparavant? Nous ne le pensons pas". Il ragionamento è insinuante e inutilmente malizioso: la cosa dimostra sicuramente che Plutarco e Timossena non avevano mai avuto una bambina prima.

La cosa è confermata poi al cap. 5 (609D), quando Plutarco ricorda che la moglie ha già dato prova della sua forza d'animo quando ha perduto il primo-genito ($\tauὸ\ \piρεσβύτατον\ τῶν\ τέκνων$). L'uso del superlativo (insieme alle due considerazioni sul desiderio e sul nome) esclude categoricamente che ci fosse una loro figlia più anziana abitante a Tanagra, nata in epoca precedente.

Ciononostante la Pomeroy (1999, 78) ritiene possibile che Plutarco e Timossena avessero una figlia ‘anteriore’ di cui lo scrittore non parla mai. Anzi, considera ancora la ‘veccchia’ possibilità (affacciata da H. Heinze 1886, pp. v-viii, e giustamente criticata già da Wilamowitz e da Ziegler¹⁶, ma ripresa anche da Ian Kidd 1992, 360¹⁷) che Plutarco e Timossena avessero complessivamente, oltre ai quattro maschi, anche quattro figlie femmine, perché nelle *Questioni Conviviali* l'autore parla di

tre γαμβροί, ritenuti tre “generi”¹⁸.

Tuttavia – per riassumere in breve le ovvie obiezioni – queste tre figlie

a) non possono essere nate dopo la *Cons. ux.*¹⁹, perché non possono essere cresciute fino a sposarsi prima delle *Questioni Conviviali*²⁰;

b) non possono essere nate da Plutarco e Timossena prima dei quattro maschi, ricordati nella *Cons. ux.*, perché in tal caso l'autore non avrebbe potuto scrivere che lui aveva avuto finalmente l'occasione di dare ad una figlia il nome Timossena (se aveva già perso ben tre occasioni), né che la moglie desiderava avere una figlia (se ne aveva già tre ed era alla nona gravidanza!);²¹

c) non possono essere nate prima del matrimonio di Plutarco²², altrimenti cambierebbe completamente l'immagine dello scrittore, sposatosi giovane

¹⁶ WILAMOWITZ 1889, 23; ZIEGLER 1965, 21.

¹⁷ Nella Introduzione alla traduzione di Waterfield.

¹⁸ Considerazioni analoghe in CABALLERO 2005, 41, note 1 e 2.

¹⁹ Scritta certamente attorno al 90 d.C., come (quasi) tutti riconoscono di comune accordo: cfr. ZIEGLER 1965, 94; JONES 1971, 136; HANI 1980, 177; AGUILAR 1996, 309; POMEROY 1999, 76. La datazione alla prima decade del II secolo (“como poco”), proposta da CABALLERO 2005, 41, n. 2 non è compatibile con la recente maternità di Timossena (che suppongo coetanea, o poco più giovane, di Plutarco).

²⁰ I primi tre libri sono databili all'anno 99 e i successivi ai primi anni del II secolo: cfr. CASANOVA 2017, 335 ss. E – si noti – i tre γαμβροί compaiono già nei primi due libri.

²¹ Io credo che l'argomentazione sarebbe totalmente differente se l'autore dovesse consolare la moglie per la perdita della loro quarta figlia, ottava (o nona) nella classifica complessiva della loro famiglia!

²² KIDD 1992, 360 considera anche la possibilità che Timossena non fosse la prima moglie per Plutarco!

con Timossena per amore (e con qualche difficoltà tra i loro genitori, come si racconta nell'*Amatorius*, 749B ss.) e legato esclusivamente a lei per tutta la vita (come si può inferire dalla *Vita di Catone minore* 7.3)²³.

Ma su questo non vorrei soffermarmi a lungo, anche perché io ho già dimostrato altrove che questi tre γαμβροί nominati nelle *QC* sono tre “cognati”, non tre “generi” (con buona pace di Heinze). Significano solo che molto probabilmente Timossena aveva uno o più fratelli, cognati di Plutarco, e forse anche che Plutarco aveva una sorella, o magari persino due, sposate²⁴: e Plutarco – complessivamente – aveva (almeno) tre cognati²⁵.

La conclusione è inevitabile e sicura: Plutarco – purtroppo per lui – non ebbe mai una figlia adulta e quindi non ebbe nessuna “figlia di sua figlia”.

Ma, allora, come si spiega la “granddaughter” di cui si parla del nostro passo? Qui la spiegazione potrà forse essere deludente, ma somiglia molto al proverbiale uovo di Colombo. A mio

avviso bisogna rendersi conto che il nonno di questa nipote non è Plutarco, ma è il messaggero che Timossena ha mandato da Cheronea. Rileggiamo insieme il brano senza pregiudizi:

L'uomo che tu hai mandato ad avvertirmi della morte della bambina, a quanto pare, mi ha mancato lungo la strada²⁶ e ha proseguito verso Atene: così io, giunto a Tanagra, l'ho saputo dalla nipote.

Nell'indicazione παρὰ τῆς θυγατριδῆς il possessivo non c'è: ovviamente è sottinteso un genitivo, ma – dopo quanto si è visto – non può esserci sottinteso né ἐμοῦ né ἡμῶν. Con ogni evidenza bisogna intendere αὐτοῦ: e nella sua esposizione l'autore potrebbe aver sottinteso “di lui” perché parla “di lui” nelle due righe precedenti, fin dall'inizio. Del resto entrambi, sia lo scrivente che il destinatario della lettera, sanno di non avere una nipote “figlia della figlia”: quindi non c'è equivoco possibile.

Tuttavia, in un'opera letterariamente elaborata e rifinita, è chiaro che per

²³ Cfr. HANI 1980, 175.

²⁴ ZIEGLER 1965, 23 scrive che Plutarco non aveva sorelle. Io credo che sia una conclusione frettolosa. Plutarco non parla mai né di sua madre né di sue sorelle: questo però non significa che non ne abbia avute.

²⁵ Come già aveva ipotizzato VOLKMANN (1869, I, 57-58: “vielleicht Schwager”), smentito in proposito da Wilamowitz, il quale preferiva pensare che Plutarco chiamasse *gambroi* i mariti delle nipoti, figlie dei suoi fratelli. Hanno pensato a cognati anche i due maggiori commentatori delle *QC*, Zofia ABRAMOWITZOWNA 1960 e TEODORSSON 1989, 42 e 1996, 38.

²⁶ Sicuramente il testo non significa “ha sbagliato strada” (come, se capisco bene, traducevano KOSTER 1954, 87 e AGUILAR 1996, 313): cfr. PINNOY 1970, 80, che per καθ' ὁδόν, “lungo la strada”, rimanda giustamente al parallelo di Hdt., I 111.

dire “l’ho saputo da *sua* nipote” Plutarco avrebbe dovuto aggiungerci il genitivo αὐτοῦ, ed è quindi logico che noi dovremmo inserire a testo <αὐτοῦ>, con due belle parentesi uncinate, e congetturare che sia caduto nella trasmissione dell’opera perché tralasciato, per distrazione, da un copista antico che riteneva già finita la frase.

C’è però anche una (non piccola) possibilità che sia stato lo stesso Plutarco ad omettere quel genitivo, per rapidità di espressione narrativa. La *Cons. ux.* è uno scritto non finito e frettoloso, “redactado de forma improvisada y a vuela pluma, por así decir, en su breve estancia en Tanagra”, come ha scritto R. M. Aguilar (1996, 310). Tra l’altro, si noti che già all’inizio il testo dice ἔσκε διημαρτηκέναι e l’espressione sottintende di fatto ἐμοῦ (come ha osservato M. Cannatà Fera 1991, 318 n. 20) oppure ἡμῶν (come sospetto io, perché penso che Plutarco non viaggiasse da solo). A giudizio della Cannatà, l’omissione di questo genitivo “rivelava una costruzione poco curata” e, insieme ad altri particolari, “tradisce la fretta della composizione”. Pertanto anche

l’omissione di αὐτοῦ potrebbe essere dovuta a rapidità di stesura e rientrare nell’ambito di quelle considerazioni.

In ogni caso però – comunque la si voglia spiegare – sono assolutamente convinto che l’assenza del genitivo αὐτοῦ ha provocato l’imbarazzo dei grandi traduttori da Amyot e Adriani fino a Snell e Hadas (e i disperati tentativi ermeneutici degli studiosi da Wytttenbach a Babut): e questo mi conferma che qui si parla della nipote del messo.

L’accaduto è a mio avviso ricostruibile nelle sue linee generali e – sostanzialmente – abbastanza semplice. Timossena ha mandato un messo ad avvertire (ἔπεμψας ἀπαγγελοῦντα) Plutarco (anche questo sottinteso per brevità). Dove l’ha mandato? Sembra di capire a Tanagra e ad Atene: evidentemente la donna sa che Plutarco ha un lungo impegno (ad esempio, un ciclo di lezioni) a Tanagra, ma prima (forse in preparazione) è andato ad Atene, e quindi pensa che il messo lo troverà o a Tanagra o ad Atene.

Tanagra è a nord di Atene (a 70 km circa) e a ovest di Tebe (circa 25 km), sulla strada che collega le due città²⁷: è in

²⁷ Cfr. MARTIN (-PHILLIPS) 1978, 394 n. 2. Al contrario, IMPARA-MANFREDINI 1991, 79 e POMEROV 1999, 78 (forse riprendendo un’osservazione di BABUT, *RPh*, 55 (1981) 323-324 sul commento di Hani) ritengono che Tanagra “non fosse affatto sulla strada tra Atene e Tebe”: e questo è un vero e proprio errore geografico (che rivela una scarsa conoscenza della Grecia). La strada ‘naturale’ per Atene scende da Tebe verso oriente, seguendo la valle del fiume Asopo fino a Tanagra, poi svolta verso sud passando il confine di regione col valico collinare del Parnete (o Parnes) e arriva ad Atene via Acarne (anche oggi Οδός Αχαρνῶν). Forse qualcuno obietterà che da Tebe si può anche prendere verso sud e passare per Platea, arrivando ad Atene via Eleusi: ma è più lunga ed è sconsigliata anche oggi da Google Maps (e dalle carte stradali).

Beozia, ma vicina al confine dell'Attica. È quindi a circa 80 km da Cheronea: è, più o meno, a metà strada tra Cheronea e Atene, e il viaggio di certo richiede più giorni²⁸.

Chiaramente il messo è stato prima a Tanagra, dove ha appurato che Plutarco non è ancora arrivato: è atteso da un giorno all'altro, ma per ora non c'è. L'uomo ha passato la notte a casa di sua nipote e naturalmente le ha spiegato la situazione, le ha detto della bimba morta e le ha anche raccontato del funerale avvenuto, del dolore composto di Timossena e altri particolari, per cui l'autore può scrivere nel cap. 4 (608F): "Chi era lì con te riferisce stupito che tu non ti sei vestita a lutto... e al funerale non c'era apparato sontuoso... ecc.". Chi ha riferito queste cose è ovviamente il messo, naturalmente alla nipote, e questa le ha poi ripetute a Plutarco.

Il giorno dopo l'uomo non è rimasto ad aspettare a Tanagra, ma ha deciso di andare ad Atene per portare a termine il suo compito, convinto che, se Plutarco si fosse trasferito da Atene a Tanagra proprio quel giorno, si sarebbero incontrati lungo la strada (*καθ' ὁδὸν*), facendo la stessa via in senso opposto. Purtroppo, però, dev'essere successo un qualche imprevisto. Secondo me Plutarco non viaggiava da solo: immagino che con lui ci fosse almeno qualche servo e magari anche

qualche alunno o collaboratore. Lungo la strada forse si sono fermati a un punto di ristoro (o anche ad un semplice casolare) per una breve sosta (per andare in bagno, per abbeverare i cavalli, per mangiare qualcosa, o altro) e in quei momenti il messo inviato da Timossena è passato per la strada, in direzione opposta, non li ha visti ed ha proseguito verso Atene. Così l'uomo li ha mancati (*ἔσκε διημαρτηκέναι*) e l'incontro non c'è stato: e Plutarco, ripreso senza alcun sospetto il suo viaggio, è giunto tranquillamente a Tanagra, nella "scuola" dove deve tenere un ciclo di lezioni o conferenze. Lì, però, qualcuno lo avverte di andare subito a casa della nipote del messo o, più probabilmente, manda a chiamare la donna: e così il filosofo viene informato da lei.

Naturalmente sui particolari di questo viaggio ho fatto diverse piccole congetture a titolo puramente esemplificativo, ma ho scelto sempre la più semplice e verisimile sulla base degli indizi offerti dal testo. In particolare, ho fatto l'ipotesi che Plutarco avesse a Tanagra un impegno preciso e protratto (ad es. un ciclo di lezioni, ma ci sono ovviamente altre possibilità) per la semplice ragione che, appresa la notizia, non partì subito per Cheronea, ma scrisse lì, in pochi giorni²⁹, gli

²⁸ Cfr. MARTIN (-PHILLIPS) 1978, 394: "Tanagra is approximately fifty miles, a journey of one to two days, from Chaeronea" (ed aggiunge in nota: "Tanagra is located on the road running from Chaeronea to Athens, roughly midway between the two cities").

²⁹ Sulla fretta della composizione (e sulle scarse probabilità che lo scritto sia stato rielaborato successivamente) vd. ZIEGLER 1965, 191 ss.; CANNATÀ FERA 1991, 318 ss.; ROSKAM 2013, 385 ss.

undici capitoli della *Consolatio*, che forse mandò alla moglie (naturalmente tramite una persona di sua fiducia), o forse le consegnò personalmente quando finalmente potè andare da lei³⁰.

La cosa può forse essere deludente per qualcuno, ma per me la nipote di cui si parla è quella del messo di Timossena. Io ne sono così convinto che quasi mi sembra indifferente che dopo παρὰ τῆς θυγατρίδης il genitivo αὐτοῦ sia caduto per errore nella tradizione o sia stato omesso dall'autore per rapidità di stesura. In effetti, però, la sua mancanza ha provocato purtroppo il malinteso ormai plurisecolare della nipote di Plutarco.

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³⁰ Mi fa propendere per questa ipotesi il fatto che la *Cons. ux.* non sembra perfettamente finita: nei capitoli 10 e 11 (a parte le lacune dei manoscritti) mi sembra che le argomentazioni non siano sviluppate in modo completo e definitivo.

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***Reading History Ethically:
Plutarch on Alexander's Murder of Cleitus (Alex. 50-52.2)*
[Leer la Historia Moralmente: Plutarco a propósito del Asesinato de Clito
por Alejandro (Alex. 50-52.2)]***

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Abstract

This paper offers a close reading of Plutarch's treatment of Alexander's murder of Cleitus in the Life of Alexander (50-52.2), analyzing the specific narrative techniques that Plutarch employs to draw his readers to reflect on several aspects of Alexander's character and actively engage them with the complexities involved in the process of moral evaluation. Though Alexander's murder of Cleitus constitutes a pure stain on Alexander's moral record, I argue that Plutarch's narrative offers a repertoire of thought-prompts that further readers' understanding of Alexander's character and morally disconcerting actions.

Key-Words: Plutarch, Biography, Narrative technique, Moral reflection, Characterization.

Resumen

Este artículo ofrece una lectura estricta del tratamiento que da Plutarco al asesinato de Clito por Alejandro en la *Vida de Alejandro* (50-52.2), analizando las técnicas narrativas concretas que utiliza Plutarco para invitar a sus lectores a reflexionar sobre diferentes aspectos del carácter de Alejandro e involucrarlos activamente en las complejidades que rodean el proceso de valoración moral. Aunque el asesinato de Clito constituye una mancha negativa en el registro moral de Alejandro, defiendo que el relato de Plutarco ofrece un repertorio de sugerencias que permiten a los lectores entender el carácter y acciones desconcertantes de Alejandro.

Palabras clave: Plutarco, Biografía, Técnica narrativa, Reflexión moral, Caracterización.

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ver the last few decades, scholars have decisively called attention to the challenging and interrogatory nature of the moralism of Plutarch's biographies as well as their narrative sophistication, an important aspect of which is how they produce an active, committed sort of reader response¹. It has already been observed that in the *Lives* Plutarch is not simply concerned with 'protreptic' and 'expository' moralism—in the form of "do that" or "do not do that", "this is what is good" or "this is what is bad"—but rather with 'descriptive' and 'exploratory' moralism, which points towards, and prompts reflection on, ethical "truths about human behaviour and shared human experience"². It has also been noticed that Plutarch "assumes a mature, discerning reader able to grapple with the moral challenges" presented by the characters of the *Lives*³; and that in the *Lives* he develops and employs a wide range of narrative techniques in order to encourage his readers to assume a special sort of empathetic picture of

historical agents and their character as well as actively engage them with the complexities involved in the process of moral evaluation⁴.

In this paper I will focus on a paradigmatic episode from Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, Alexander's murder of Cleitus (*Alex.* 50-52.2), and analyze some of the narrative strategies that Plutarch uses to encourage readerly reflection and engagement. Though Alexander's killing of Cleitus might be taken as a stain that mars Alexander's moral record⁵, in Plutarch's *Life* it offers, as we shall see, much opportunity for ethico-political reflection that advances readers' understanding of Alexander's character and morally disconcerting action.

Plutarch introduces the story about Alexander's killing of Cleitus with a striking distinction between two kinds of readers: those 'casual readers' who are satisfied with being simply informed about what had happened (cf. ἀπλῶς πυθομένοις) and those 'serious readers' who are willing to get involved

¹ See esp. C. PELLING, 1988, pp. 10-18; C. PELLING, 1995, pp. 206-208 (= repr. 2002, pp. 237-239); P. STADTER, 1997 (= repr. 2015, pp. 215-230); T. DUFF, 1999; P. STADTER, 2000 (= repr. 2015, pp. 231-245); P. STADTER, 2003 (= repr. 2015, pp. 331-340); T. DUFF, 2004; D. LARMOUR, 2005; T. DUFF, 2011; C. CHRYSANTHOU, 2018.

² C. PELLING, 1995, p. 208 (= repr. 2002, p. 239).

³ T. DUFF, 2004, p. 285.

⁴ See esp. T. DUFF, 2011; C. CHRYSANTHOU, 2018.

⁵ Cf. A. WARDMAN, 1955, p. 101: "The events which most perplexed him (i.e. Plutarch) were the destruction of Thebes and the murder of Cleitus. The latter has disturbed everyone, whether he admires Alexander or not".

in an investigation (cf. λόγῳ μέντοι συντιθέντες) of the reasons (cf. τὴν αἰτίαν) and the circumstances (cf. τὸν καιρόν) of Cleitus' murder (50.1)⁶. The former, Plutarch says, will find that the affair of Cleitus was just more savage than that of Philotas (50.1)—recounted in the preceding chapters, cf. *Alex.* 48-49—while the latter (to whom Plutarch appears to include himself through the use of the first-person plural) will find (cf. εὑρίσκομεν) that “it was some misfortune (cf. δυστυχίᾳ τινὶ) rather than a deliberate act (cf. οὐκ ἀπὸ γνώμης), and that it was Cleitus' evil genius (cf. τῷ Κλείτου δαίμονι) which took advantage of Alexander's anger and intoxication to destroy him” (50.2)⁷. Plutarch signals here the importance of the following episode as well as its exploratory and interrogatory character: it is one on which his ideal reader should spend time, joining Plutarch in a serious investigation of the reasons and the circumstances of Alexander's action. To this end, as we shall see, Plutarch uses multiple narrative means of arousing readers' interest and engaging them further.

Plutarch begins with a depiction of the background of the drinking party, offering his reader an insight into the

events surrounding and preceding the conflict between Alexander and Cleitus. We are told that some people came to bring Alexander a gift of Greek fruit; that Alexander was impressed by its beauty and perfection and thus called Cleitus to see and have a share in it too (50.3). Cleitus, Plutarch proceeds to tell, left the sacrifice he offered at the time and came, while three of the sheep on which libations had already been poured came after him (50.4). Alexander asked the advice of his soothsayers on this incident, who interpreted it as a bad omen. Accordingly, Alexander ordered that a sacrifice should be offered quickly for the safety of Cleitus (50.5), especially as two days before he saw a portentous dream about Cleitus (50.6). Before the completion of the sacrifice, nevertheless, Cleitus hastened to dine with Alexander (50.7).

It is worth noticing that Plutarch's account lavishes too much attention on the presence and workings of superhuman forces (omens, dreams, and other divine signs) on Alexander and Cleitus, giving the scene a tragic ring and allowing the two men to emerge as tragic figures or at least to have tragic potentialities. The idea of divine inevitability and human futility that resonates in Plutarch's

⁶ On similar distinctions in Plutarch's *Lives*, see C. PELLING, 2002, pp. 272, 276. Cf. T. DUFF, 2004, pp. 278-279 who draws a distinction between ‘casual’ (aligned with the physical senses) and ‘ideal’, ‘serious’ readers (aligned with reason) in the *Demetrius-Antony* prologue. See also *Alex.* 35.16; *Tim.* 15.11; *Tim.* 36.4.

⁷ For the translation of Plutarch's *Alexander*, I follow that of I. SCOTT-KILVERT & T. DUFF, 2012, adapted at some points. For the translations of other texts, I adopt, with some alterations, those of the Loeb editions.

account is uppermost in tragedy—one might think, for example, of Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Dionysus' control over Pentheus in the *Bacchae*—or even historiography (cf. Adrastus' story in Herodotus 1.35ff.)⁸. Arrian's corresponding account (*An.* 4.8.1-9.6) gives little stress to the workings of divine forces (e.g. at 4.9.5-6)⁹; and Justin has nothing of this theme (*Epit.* 12.6.1-4).

This initial tragic sense in Plutarch deepens in the following chapters of Plutarch's narrative of Cleitus' murder, where several Dionysiac themes, theatrical motifs and imagery come together to sketch the heated quarrel between Alexander and Cleitus and offer a detailed reconstruction of the onlookers' reactions¹⁰. The latter constitutes a favourable technique of Plutarch in the *Lives* of making his story more engaging; it re-enacts the climate of the times and draws readers into the atmosphere of the

actions, comments, thoughts and feelings of contemporary observers, which on occasions are used to guide, or at least problematize, the readers' moral response and characterize historical agents¹¹. Here we are told, on the one hand, of the annoyance and railing of the elder Macedonians (cf. τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων δυσχεραινόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων) at those who shamed and ridiculed with their songs the people who had recently been defeated by the Barbarians (50.8-9); and on the other hand, of the delight and enthusiasm (cf. ἡδέως ἀκροωμένων καὶ λέγειν κελευόντων) of Alexander and his circle (50.9).

Amidst such contrasting responses, Plutarch introduces a brief sketch of Cleitus. He makes some general remarks about his natural harshness in respect of his anger (cf. φύσει τραχὺς ὁν πρὸς ὄργην) and stubbornness (cf. αὐθάδης), bringing into relief his current state of

⁸ See J. MOSSMAN, 1988, pp. 88-89 (= repr. 1995, pp. 219-220); D. PAPADI, 2007, p. 171 with nn. 33 and 34 also referring to the same theme in epic poetry. Cf. R. LIPAROTTI (2014) 184–185.

⁹ See J. MOSSMAN, 1988, p. 89 (= repr. 1995, p. 220). Cf. Curt. 8.2.6.

¹⁰ See C. PELLING, 1999 (= repr. 2002, pp. 197-206) on how Dionysus is used in Plutarch's biographies to prompt the readers' reflection on people and their complex character. He notices that Plutarch's more thought-provoking and morally problematic biographical narratives are rich in Dionysiac allusions and imagery. Cf. A. GEORGIADOU, 2014, p. 262 on Plutarch's use of Dionysiac vocabulary for the exploration of “moments of collective madness or extreme sorrow”.

¹¹ On this technique, see C. PELLING, 1988, p. 335 (index 2. subjects, s.v. characterization by reaction); T. DUFF, 1999, p. 421 (index of themes, s.v. onlookers as mouthpiece for author); T. DUFF, 2011, pp. 65-67, 71-72; A. NIKOLAIDIS, 2014, p. 361; M. DE POURCQ & G. ROSKAM, 2016, pp. 168-170; C. CHRYSANTHOU, 2018, pp. 66-102.

intoxication (cf. ἥδη μεθύον) and strong anger (cf. ἡγανάκτει μάλιστα), which foments Alexander's passion (50.9). While Cleitus supports, as Plutarch tells us, those Macedonians who fell, suggesting that they were far better than those who laughed at them (50.9), Alexander accuses Cleitus of pleading his own case by misleadingly presenting cowardice as misfortune (50.10). Then Cleitus, so Plutarch says, rose and spoke:

Yes, it was my cowardice that saved your life, you who are the son of the gods (cf. τὸν ἐκ θεῶν), when you were turning your back to Spithridates' sword. And it is the blood of these Macedonians and their wounds which have made you so great that you disown your father, Philip, and claim to be the son of Ammon! (50.11).

Cleitus' emphasis on Alexander's divinity prompts the readers to look back to Plutarch's narrative of Alexander's life in order to understand what exactly provokes Alexander's anger here. In the preceding chapters Plutarch has many times referred to Alexander's divine origin (2.6-3.6; 27.5-11; 33.1), but he also stressed that Alexander "was not at all vain or deluded but rather used belief in his divinity to enslave others" (28.6); "in general, Alexander adopted a haughty and majestic bearing towards the barbarians, as a man who was fully convinced of his divine birth and pa-

rentage, but towards the Greeks he was more restrained, and it was only on rare occasions that he assumed the manner of divinity" (28.1). It is no wonder that Cleitus' one-sided, bold assertion about Alexander's conception of divinity infuriates Alexander. Closely relevant to this is also Cleitus' highly ironical stance towards Alexander here, calling attention to Alexander's "god-born nature" (cf. τὸν ἐκ θεῶν) in order to bring all the more sharply into relief his own contribution to Alexander's salvation in the Battle of the Granicus.

Cleitus' mention of the Battle of the Granicus¹², in fact, may bear further implications than simply reminding Alexander of Cleitus' previous service. There Plutarch stresses that Alexander "seemed to be acting like a desperate madman rather than a prudent commander" (cf. 16.4: ἔδοξε μανικῶς καὶ πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ στρατηγεῖν. Cf. 16.14: ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ πρῶτος ἐμβαλών). Plutarch's account of the Battle of the Granicus may also have some interesting reminders of Xerxes' building of the two bridges across the Hellespont. In both instances Hellespont is personified: Xerxes reviles and punishes Hellespont for having wronged its master (Hdt., VII 35), while Alexander rejects Parmenion's opposition to the crossing of the river, highlighting that "the Hellespont would blush for shame if, once he had

¹² Cf. Arr., *An.* 4.8.6-7; Curt., 8.1.41.

crossed it, he should shrink back from the Granicus" (*Alex.* 16.3)¹³. Xerxes' neglect of Artabanus' cautious advice (Hdt., VII 46–52) and the foreboding signs (Hdt., VII 57) might be called to mind in parallel as well. In Aeschylus' *Persae*, moreover, Darius' ghost maintains focus on the madness and youthful recklessness of Xerxes (719; 744; 750-751). If such a link between Xerxes and Alexander is activated in readers' minds, then Xerxes provides a useful comparandum for Alexander's demeanour of derangement and insanity. Xerxes' paradigm might cast a shadow over readers' attitude to Alexander's character and morality, thereby asking probing questions of them: Will Alexander be able to avoid a Xerxes-like fate? Will he be able to comport with his superior ethical standards? In fact, as the *Life* progresses and Alexander moves eastwards, a clear-cut polarity between Alexander and barbarian rulers is profoundly challenged and qualified¹⁴.

¹³ Cf. Arr., *An.* 1.13.6 where it is Alexander who feels ashamed, not the Hellespont. Cf. J. HAMILTON, 1969, p. 39 ad loc.

¹⁴ See T. SCHMIDT, 1999, p. 297; T. WHITMARSH, 2002, pp. 182-191; J. BENEKER, 2012, pp. 136-139; C. CHRYSANTHOU, forthcoming. It is highly suggestive that at *Alex.* 37.5 we hear that Alexander stops before a gigantic statue of Xerxes and talks to it: "Shall I pass by and leave you lying there because of the expedition you led against Greece, or shall I set you up again because of your magnanimity and your virtues in other respects?". Plutarch goes on to mention that Alexander passed on, after he communed with himself for a long time in silence (*Alex.* 37.5). At this point Xerxes' example is used to illuminate Alexander's philhellenism and philosophical *paideia*—see J. MOSSMAN, 2006, p. 291; C. PELLING, 2017, pp. 22-23; C. CHRYSANTHOU, 2018, pp. 73-74. Keeping that in mind, a reminder of Xerxes in Plutarch's account of Alexander's crossing of the Granicus might be used to reveal Alexander's multifarious and contradictory moral character in the *Life of Alexander*. On Plutarch's portrayal of Alexander's complex character in the *Life*, see R. LIPAROTTI (2014), esp. pp. 179–187 on the Cleitus' episode.

ἐλευθέρους καὶ παρρησίαν ἔχοντας): it would be better for him to spend his time among barbarians and slaves, who would prostrate themselves before his white tunic and his Persian belt” (51.5)—notice here the striking contrast between ἐλευθερία/παρρησία and barbarism.

Alexander, so Plutarch moves on to tell, was unable to control his anger anymore and so threw an apple at Cleitus, hit him, and looked around for his sword (51.5). While the rest of his comrades were trying to restrain him, Alexander “leapt to his feet (cf. ἀναπηδήσας) and shouted out in Macedonian (ἀνεβόα Μακεδονιστί) for his corps of guards, a signal that this was an extreme emergency” (51.6). “Shouting out in Macedonian” has been rightly stressed as a significant marker of Alexander’s temperament: “when in the grip of emotion he is portrayed as reverting to a less sophisticated self”¹⁵.

It has long been recognized that Plutarch’s description of Alexander’s enraged reaction includes an accumulation of echoes of Plutarch’s earlier account of Alexander’s conduct at the drinking party of Philip’s wedding to a new wife (9.5-10)¹⁶. Just as there Alexander is incensed (cf. παροξυνθεὶς ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος) at Attalus “who had drunk too much at the banquet”

(cf. ἐν τῷ πότῳ μεθύων) and “urged the Macedonians to pray that a legitimate successor should be born from Philip and Cleopatra” (9.7-8), so here Alexander is furious (cf. 51.1: παροξυνθεὶς οὖν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος) at the drunken Cleitus (cf. 50.9: ὁ Κλεῖτος ἥδη μεθύων). In both instances, moreover, Alexander responds in similar ways (consider the very close verbal cross-echoes): “Villain, do you take me for a bastard, then?” (cf. 9.8: “ἡμεῖς δέ σοι κακὴ κεφαλὴ νόθοι δοκοῦμεν;”) ~ “You scum,” he cried out, “do you think that you can keep on speaking of me like this?” (Cf. 51.1: “ἢ ταῦτ’” εἶπεν “ὦ κακὴ κεφαλὴ σὺ περὶ ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε λέγων... νομίζεις;”). Alexander, in addition, throws a cup at Attalus (cf. 9.9: ἔβαλε σκύφον ἐπ’ αὐτόν), just as later he throws an apple at Cleitus (cf. 51.5: μήλων παρακειμένων ἐνί βαλὼν ἔπαισεν αὐτόν)¹⁷.

Strikingly, Alexander’s reaction in the Cleitus’ episode recalls not only his own attitude in the wedding party but also Philip’s own response¹⁸:

At this Philip lunched to his feet against him (i.e. his son) (ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον ἔξανέστη) with drawn sword (cf. σπασάμενος τὸ ξίφος), but fortunately for them both he was so overcome with drink and with rage that he tripped and fell headlong (9.9).

¹⁵ T. DUFF, 2012, p. 596 n. 130. Cf. T. WHITMARSH, 2002, p. 183.

¹⁶ J. O’BRIEN, 1992, p. 139; J. MOSSMAN, 1995, p. 215; P. STADTER, 1996, p. 302; T. WHITMARSH, 2002, p. 187; J. BENEKER, 2009; J. BENEKER, 2012, pp. 135-136.

¹⁷ J. BENEKER, 2012, p. 135.

¹⁸ J. BENEKER, *ibidem*.

We may remember and compare here Alexander who out of anger at Cleitus “looked around for his sword” (51.5) and “leapt to his feet and shouted for his corps of guards” (51.6). Moreover, it was due to good fortune for both (cf. εὐτυχίᾳ δ’ ἐκάτεπον) that Philip tripped and fell when he drew his sword against his son (9.9). Compare Plutarch’s mention that the affair of Cleitus happened through some misfortune (δυστυχίᾳ τινὶ) of Alexander (50.2)¹⁹. J. Beneker rightly notes that the association of Alexander with Philip in the episode of Cleitus’ murder may be hinting at the fact that Alexander becomes at this point more like his father, a “more ordinary king”²⁰. Here there is a revelation of Alexander’s spasmodic mental derangement, “the concomitant rejection of philosophical ideals”, which “vividly illustrates the power of Alexander’s θυμός and also marks the beginning of his decline as king”²¹.

The rest of the scene encourages further reflection on Alexander’s character. Cleitus’ friends, as Plutarch relates, try to push him out of the banqueting room, but he does not give in (51.8). Rather, he tries to come in again and recites “in a loud and contemptuous voice this line from Euripides’ *Andromache* (693): ‘Alas, what evil customs reign in Greece’” (51.8). Here

as elsewhere in Plutarch quotations from tragedy (and intertextuality in general) are significant bearers of characterization through encouraging comparison and contrast. Euripides’ *Andromache* is a play particularly apposite to mark, intensify, and enrich Plutarch’s account at this point: the constant accusations heaped upon Andromache of Eastern habits²², the anger, jealousy, brutality, and treachery that prevail throughout the play suggest a wider tragic framework within which we can think again more profoundly about the character and actions of Cleitus and Alexander.

Readers who know of the context of the quotation from the *Andromache* may recall that in these lines Peleus talks to Menelaus and expresses his displeasure with the fact that a general receives the greatest honour for a military success, although he does no more than a single warrior (*Andr.* 694-698)²³. The quotation from the *Andromache*, thus, attributed to Cleitus sets up a tragic link between Cleitus and Peleus and Alexander and Menelaus. Both Peleus and Cleitus appear to devalue Menelaus’ and Alexander’s conducts accordingly. It is worthy to remember that earlier in the *Life of Alexander* Peleus has been associated with Philip by one of Alexander’s teachers, who also linked

¹⁹ See J. BENEKER, 2009, pp. 193–194, 198.

²⁰ See J. BENEKER, 2012, pp. 136–137.

²¹ J. BENEKER, 2009, p. 200.

²² By Hermione (e.g. 155–160; 168–180) and Menelaus (e.g. 645–671).

²³ See also Curt., 8.1.28–29. Cf. Arr., *An.* 4.8.5 (the same meaning but without the quotation).

Alexander with Achilles and himself with Phoenix (5.8). Such an epic tone has been especially appropriate for the early chapters of the *Life* where Alexander's distinguished self-restraint, seriousness of purpose and ambition are heavily brought out²⁴. In Plutarch's account of Cleitus' murder, on the other hand, the tragic tone is a fine touch to flag Alexander's departure from those earlier high-minded thoughts. His association with Menelaus is by no means complimentary²⁵.

Plutarch narrates next Alexander's murder of Cleitus in a highly vivid manner—notice the use of present tense (cf. 51.9: ἀπαντῶντα τὸν Κλεῖτον ὥτῳ καὶ παράγοντα τὸ πρὸ τῆς θύρας παρακάλυμμα διελαύνει)—and details his reactions:

With a roar of pain and a groan (cf. μετὰ στεναγμοῦ καὶ βρυχήματος), Cleitus fell, and immediately the king's anger left him. When he [i.e. Alexander] came to himself and saw his friends standing around him speechless, he snatched the weapon out of the dead body and would have plunged it into his own throat if his bodyguards had not forestalled him by seizing his hands and carrying him by force into his chamber (51.10-11).

²⁴ See J. MOSSMAN, 1995, pp. 214-215.

²⁵ On Euripides' negative characterization of Menelaus in the *Andromache*, see e.g. P. STEVENS, 1971, pp. 13-14; D. KOVACS, 1995, pp. 270-271.

²⁶ Cf. J. MOSSMAN, 1995, pp. 219-220. See also *Alex.* 13.4 on the role of the divine in Cleitus' murder: "Certainly he [i.e. Alexander] used to claim that the murder of Cleitus, which he committed when he was drunk, and the cowardly refusal of the Macedonians to cross the Ganges...were both caused by the anger and revenge of the god Dionysus".

Plutarch moves on to stress Alexander's terrible remorse and deep groans and the fact that he was unable to say a word, being exhausted by his cries and lamentation:

He paid no attention to what any of them (i.e. his friends) said, except that when Aristander the diviner reminded him of the dream he had had concerning Cleitus, and its significance, and told him that these events had long ago been ordained by fate, he seemed to accept this assurance (52.2).

We end, then, where we began, and all of these themes (lamentations, cries and wailings, attempt at suicide and divine inevitability) bring the tragic ring of the scene to full circle²⁶.

A thing that is worthy to note in conclusion is Alexander's 'speechlessness' (cf. ἄνασδος ἔκειτο) and 'silence' (cf. τὴν ἀποσιώπησιν) that come in for special attention in Plutarch's account (*Alex.* 52.1). In Justin (*Epit.* 12.6.5-14), Alexander contemplates the character of the dead, the occasion of his death, his own unbridled agitation, and feels shame towards his nurse, the sister of Cleitus. He also considers what remarks and

odium he must have caused among his army and conquered nations, what fear and dislike of himself among his friends, also remembering several murdered Macedonian nobles. In Curtius we similarly hear, amidst a very tragic atmosphere (cf. 8.2.3-9), of Alexander's lament about the dead Cleitus (8.2.2) and his nurse (8.2.8-9) as well as his wondering whether the crime was committed due to the anger of the gods (8.2.6). Similar things are mentioned in Arrian (4.9.3-4).

Plutarch, then, although he has an excellent opportunity to disclose the internal struggle that Alexander has plausibly experienced at the time²⁷, prefers Alexander to keep silence. Plutarch's choice, I suggest, might be designed to activate the reflection of the readers by implanting in them the desire to fill up the hidden mind by extrapolation from the wider and preceding narrative as well as from Alexander's overall behaviour²⁸. After all, as we saw throughout this paper, Plutarch used a wide range of narrative devices in the earlier scene of Cleitus' murder, which have been highly effective in putting us empathetically in Alexander's shoes and making us think about the cause ($\tauὴν οἰτίαν$) and the circumstances ($\tauὸν καιρόν$) of the murder (cf. *Alex.* 50.1-2)

as well as about the bitter consequences of Alexander's anger and propensity for drinking in the way in which Alexander himself might now have been thinking or talking about them²⁹. This is precisely the sort of active, engaging and reflective reading that Plutarch, as noted at the very outset of Cleitus episode (*Alex.* 50.2), appropriates for himself and his serious, ideal reader.

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²⁷ L. FULKERSON, 2013, pp. 98-113 argues that Cleitus' death and Alexander's remorse do not result in any real change in Alexander's behaviour.

²⁸ On Plutarch's use of this technique in the *Lives*, see C. CHRYSANTHOU, 2018, pp. 72-74.

²⁹ Cf. Arrian's explicit judgement (*Anab.* 4.9.1): “I myself strongly blame Cleitus for his insolence towards his king, and pity Alexander for his misfortune, since he then showed himself the slave of two vices, by neither of which is it fitting for a man of sense to be overcome, namely, anger and drunkenness”.

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Silencing Plato's Text. On Plutarch's III Platonic Question

[*Plutarco e il “silenzio” di Platone: sulla III Questione Platonica*]

from

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Abstract

Among Plutarch's *Moralia*, the *Platonicae Quaestiones* are ten exegetical exercises on both contradictory and obscure passages of text by Plato. In the third *quaestio* (1001c-1002e), Plutarch examines a theoretical problem related to the similarity of the “Divided Line” (*Resp.* 509d6-511e5), i.e. whether the sensible segment is “greater” (*meizon*, 1001d) than the intelligible one, or *vice versa*. In briefly summing up the content of the Platonic similarity, Plutarch surprisingly leaves out Plato's reference to the “criterion” which should mark the difference between the upper and the lower segments of the line: the *sapheneia* (*Resp.* 511e: ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὗτοι ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν). How are we expected to understand this “silence”? My purpose is to demonstrate that Plutarch's omission is voluntary, since this is meant to provide the *quaestio* with a more original, step-by-step analytical development, along with a clearer solution. Plutarch's initial silence gives him the opportunity to accurately argue against any quantitative or materialistic reading of the word *meizon*. Any interpretation of Plato's ontology which reduces the intelligible dimension to an “elementary” level (i.e. to one based on *elachista*) should be rejected. The difference between the sensible segment and the intelligible one (and, hence, the superiority of the latter over the former) has to be described in *ontological terms*. But *sapheneia* had this precise meaning in its original Platonic context: so, its omission at the very beginning of the *quaestio* turns out to be of use to Plutarch in order to guide the reader gradually towards the solution of the *zetema*.

Key-Words: Omission, Plutarch, Plato, Ontology, Divided Line.

Riassunto

Le *Questioni Platoniche* raccolgono dieci esercizi esegetici plutarchei condotti su passi platonici oscuri o contraddittori. Nella terza *Quaestione* (1001c-1002e), Plutarco esamina un problema teorico relativo alla similitudine della “Linea Divisa” (*Resp.* 509d6-511e5): quale segmento è “più grande” (*meizon*, 1001d), quello sensibile o quello intelligibile? Nel sintetizzare il contenuto della similitudine platonica, Plutarco omette sorprendentemente il riferimento, presente nel testo di Platone, al “criterio” che dovrebbe sancire la differenza tra il segmento superiore e quello inferiore: la *sapheneia*

(*Resp.* 511e: ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ὀληθείας μετέχει, οὗτο ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν). Come dovremmo interpretare questo “silenzio”? Il mio obiettivo è dimostrare che l’omissione di Plutarco potrebbe essere volontaria, poiché mira a conferire alla *quaestio* uno sviluppo argomentativo più originale, graduale e analitico, nonché una risoluzione più perspicua. In particolare, il silenzio iniziale di Plutarco gli offre l’opportunità di argomentare accuratamente contro qualsiasi interpretazione quantitativa o materialistica del termine *meizon*. Qualsiasi lettura dell’ontologia platonica riduca la dimensione intelligibile a una realtà “elementare” (cioè, a una basata su *elachista*) deve essere rifiutata. La differenza tra il segmento sensibile e quello intelligibile (e, pertanto, la superiorità del secondo rispetto al primo) deve essere posta in termini *ontologici*. Ma la *sapheneia* aveva esattamente questo significato nel suo contesto platonico di provenienza: quindi, la sua omissione al principio della *quaestio* si rivela funzionale, per Plutarco, a guidare gradualmente il lettore/allievo verso la soluzione dello *zetema*.

Parole-Chiave: Omissione, Plutarco, Platone, Ontologia, Linea Divisa.

1

The objective of this paper is to deal with a philosophically remarkable case of Plutarchean silence. The text I will be commenting on is the third *Platonica Quaestio*, presumably a scholastic exercise², which extensively tackles an exegetical problem related to Plato’s *Republic*. What I hope to demonstrate is that the omission that can be detected at the very beginning of the *Quaestio* is necessary for the *Quaestio* itself to be settled and developed. That is why, at the end, I will suggest that such a

silence might be considered as voluntary by Plutarch - or, at least, as one which Plutarch could not be unaware of.

2

Let’s start with Plato’s very own words. At 509d ff. of Stephanus’ edition, Socrates compares the two genres of “what is visible” and “what is intelligible” (*ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὄπατόν, νοητόν*) to the sub-segments of a divided segment of line³:

You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible

- 1 This paper was read for the first time at the annual meeting of the International Plutarch Society of North America, which took place in Logan and Park City in 05.2019. I am so grateful to the organizer, Professor Fran Titchner, for her kindness and hospitality, to the scholars who took part in the discussion and to Professor Fronterotta for reading the first version of this paper. I would like to dedicate this paper to Mara, for everything she says and does.
- 2 For other interpretations of the nature of these notes, see H. CHERNISS, 1976, 2 ff.; F. ROMANO, 1994; J. OPSOMER, 1996 and 2010.
- 3 On this topic, see Y. LAFRANCE, 1987 and N.D. SMITH, 1996; more recently, see M.-H. YANG, 1999; F. TRABATTONI, 2010; F.F. REPELLINI, 2010 and 2003; R. NETZ, 2003; A.P.D. MOURELATOS, 2012; M. MIGLIORI, 2006; R. FOLEY, 2008; F. FERRARI, 1999 and 2006; Y.H. DOMINICK, 2010.

ble.” “I do.” “Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections (*ώσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβόν ἄνισα τμήματα*) and cut each section again in the same ratio (*πάλιν τέμνε ἐκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*) - the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order (*τὸ τε τοῦ ὄρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοούμένου*) -, and then, as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity (*καὶ σοὶ ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα*), you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images etc. (trans. after P. Shorey)

As Socrates makes clear, the two sub-segments are unequal⁴: *γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβόν ἄνισα τμήματα*. Therefore, given that these sub-segments represent the ontological genres of “the visible” and “the intelligible” mentioned above, these latter ones too should be considered to be “unequal”. But that is not all. For, Socrates says that the two sub-segments need to be divided in turn “according to the same ratio” (*ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*)⁵. That is to say - one should conclude - even the “parts” of each sub-segment are required to be “unequal”.

⁴ To tell the truth, this is a varia lectio, as the mss. quoted in Burnet's critical apparatus show: see the discussion by S.R. SLINGS, 2005, 112 ff.

⁵ On the nature of this ratio - whether it is continuous or discontinuous -, see V. KARASMANIS, 1988, 153-154.

⁶ This question must have been very common in the ancient Platonic tradition: see A. ULACCO, 2017 for a running commentary on two pseudo-pythagorean treatises which deal with this problem.

At this point, one might ask what the unequal length of the two sub-segments exactly means and implies. Since they represent two ontological genres, as is made clear by Socrates himself (see *τέμνε ἐκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα [...] τὸ τε τοῦ ὄρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοούμένου*), one could wonder, first of all, which of the two sub-segments - and hence, genres - is to be deemed as “bigger”⁶. Moreover, a legitimate doubt could arise also as far as the precise terms of such a primacy are concerned. To state it more clearly, Socrates is somehow expected to identify the criterion according to which each sub-segment/genre can be described as being, so to speak, “bigger” or “smaller”.

As a matter of fact, through the means of Socrates, Plato seems to tell us what this criterion could be. For, once the second subdivision has been made, Socrates rather abruptly alludes to *σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ*, “clearness and absence of clearness”, as to potentially adequate parameters to evaluate the relationship both between each part of every sub-segment and the other part, and between each sub-segment and the other; as Socrates himself puts it, “[...] as an expression of the ratio of their *comparative clearness and obscurity* etc. (*καὶ σοὶ ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα κτλ.*)”.

However, a problem arises as to what such a “clearness” (and its absence) might precisely mean - mainly as far as the visible and the intelligible genres are concerned. Now, in light of the very end of the sixth book of the *Republic*, I think these criteria are to be read as being both ontologically and veritatively revealing. In other words, σαφηνείᾳ and ἀσαφείᾳ are likely to mark a difference in the degree of being - and, analogously, in the degree of truthfulness⁷ - of the components of both the intelligible and the visible realm. As a consequence, the kind of knowledge related to each and every part of the divided line reaches a degree of “clearness” which varies in accordance with the truth peculiar to each ontological class. As Socrates puts it, “they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality (ώσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὗτοι ταῦτα σαφηνείας [...] μετέχειν)”. So, the difference in length of each sub-segment might be thought to allude to the difference in truth and being which characterizes each ontological class:

[...] assume these four affections occurring in the soul (τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ): intellection or reason for the highest (νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ), discursive reasoning for the second (διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ); assign belief to the third, and to the last picture-

thinking or conjecture (τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίᾳ), and arrange them in a proportion, considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality (τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὗτοι ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν).

(trans. after P. Shorey, slightly modified)

3

Let’s now turn to Plutarch. At the beginning of the *Quaestio*, when he sums up the similitude of the divided segment of line, he seems to be rather accurate in his introductory sketch. The whole passage is worth mentioning:

In the *Republic*, he likens the sum of things to a single line that has been divided into two unequal segments; again divides into two in the same ratio each of the two segments, that of the visible class and that of the conceptual (ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, τοῦ παντὸς ὥσπερ μιᾶς γραμμῆς τετμημένης ἄνισα τμῆματα, πάλιν τέμνων ἐκάτερον τμῆμα εἰς δύο ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὸ τε τοῦ ὄρωμένου γένος καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοούμένου), and, having made four in all, declares first of the intelligible segment that of the primary ideas, second the mathematical (τέτταρα τὰ πάντα ποιήσας, τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ πρῶτον

⁷ On the coalescence of being and truth in Plato’s thought, see B. CENTRONE, 2014.

ἀποφαίνει τὸ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἰδῆ, δεύτερον τὸ μαθηματικόν), and first of the perceptible segment the solid bodies and second the semblances and images of these (τοῦ δ' αἰσθητοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ στερέμνια σώματα, δεύτερον δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας καὶ τὰ εἶδωλα τούτων). Also to each of the four he assigns its own peculiar criterion⁸ (κριτήριον ἔκαστω τῶν τεττάρων ἀποδίδωσιν ἴδιον): intelligence to the first, and thought to the mathematical segment, and to the perceptibles belief, and conjecture to matters of images and semblances (νοῦν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ, διάνοιαν δὲ τῷ μαθηματικῷ, τοῖς δ' αἰσθητοῖς πίστιν, εἰκασίαν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὰ εἶδωλα καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας).

(trans. after H. Cherniss)

Before moving on, a few peculiarities deserve to be highlighted and commented on. First of all, it is “the universe” (τοῦ παντὸς) that proves to be represented by the whole segment of line (τοῦ παντὸς ὥσπερ μιᾶς γραμμῆς τετμημένης). This, it seems to me, implies that the line does include whatever “is”, regardless of its potential ontological eminence; that is to say, it ends up including the Idea of the Good⁹ too. But there is also another aspect which is worth pointing out. The intelligible objects corresponding to the

upper half of the intelligible sub-segment, i.e. the Ideas, are described as “primary” (τὸ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἰδῆ). It goes without saying that, should there be some “primary” intelligible objects, there have to be some “secondary” ones as well; as is made clear soon after, these latter are to be identified with the mathematical entities (διάνοιαν δὲ τῷ μαθηματικῷ). Now: one could not help but notice that, at the very least, the terminology (but presumably the resulting hierarchy as well) cannot be immediately traced back to Plato. On the contrary, it proves to be peculiar to the Platonic tradition¹⁰.

Soon after this, in Plutarch's text two pivotal questions arise, which are likely to require a carefully and deeply meditated answer:

What, then, did he have in mind when he divided the sum of things into unequal segments (τί οὖν διανοηθεῖς εἰς ἄνισα τμήματα τὸ πᾶν ἔτεμε)? And which of the segments is larger, the intelligible or the perceptible (πότερον τῶν τμημάτων, τὸ νοητὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητόν, μεῖζόν ἐστιν)? For he has not made it clear himself (αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε).

(trans. after H. Cherniss)

As is evident, we are now presented with the same questions we posed a few minutes ago when reading Plato's

⁸ On this term and its history, see G. STRIKER, 1996.

⁹ On this hotly debated topic, see now M. VEGETTI, 2017/2018.

¹⁰ See H. CHERNISS, 1976, 38 ff.

own words. But, unlike Plato, Plutarch does not provide us with any clue as to which might be the answer. For, there is a striking silence, a surprising omission in Plutarch's summary: no mention at all happens to be made of "clearness" and "absence of clearness". Actually, there is not even a trace of any *criteria* of the kind of those which were alluded to in the *Republic*, and seemed to be considered there as the possible means to draw a comparison between each part of the divided segment and the other.

4

At this point, one should consider the reason for such an omission to occur, and whether this is to be deemed as voluntary by Plutarch, or if, nevertheless, it is one Plutarch could not be unaware of. I think that there is only one way to try to find a solution: giving a brief yet precise account of the answer Plutarch himself provides us with at the very end of the *Quaestio*. For, only by understanding what, according to Plutarch, is the right clue for explaining the alleged "reticence" of Plato's text (see αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ δεδήλωκε), one will also be given the opportunity to appreciate the real significance of the initial omission.

So, which is the "bigger" sub-segment of the divided line? And - what is even more important - what does "bigger" exactly

mean here? Plutarch extensively deals with these questions throughout the *Quaestio*. Firstly, he tests the possibility that the "bigger" sub-segment is the sensible one; later on, in the second and last half of the text, he puts the other "candidate", i.e. the intelligible, under scrutiny. In all this, the main difficulty the reader needs to tackle is the fact that the author does not explicitly declare the theoretical option he sides with. Hence, before continuing the examination, a hermeneutic criterion needs to be established - at least, should Plutarch's own position be detected. As a matter of fact, the scholars, and especially professor Opsomer¹¹, have been drawing attention to a trend in Plutarch's *Quaestiones*: when not clearly stated otherwise, the solutions favoured by the author are likely to be the final ones. As a consequence, also in the third *Platonica Quaestio* scholars usually read the second half of the text as the core of Plutarch's thought, thus concluding that, according to him, it is the intelligible which is somehow "preeminent"¹². Besides, the arguments previously employed to argue in favour of the "majority" of the sensible are actually defective. For, each of them mirrors a wrong conception of the relationship between the intelligible and the sensible realm, in so much as each of them is likely to exploit quantitative or materialistic criteria, or a markedly "continualist" approach¹³. For example, at 1001d we

¹¹ See J. OPSOMER, 1996 and 2010.

¹² See L. NAPOLITANO VALDITARA, 1992; F. FERRARI, 1999.

¹³ An example of argument mirroring a continualist approach is represented by the following passage (1001f-1002a): ἔτι τῶν εἰδῶν νόησιν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως καὶ περικοπῆς σώματος ἐπάγει, τῇ

are told that the sensible sub-segment is “bigger” than the intelligible one because the “substance” of the latter is “contracted into something little and pure (*εἰς βραχὺ συνηγμένη καὶ καθαρόν*)”. As is rather undisputable, a corporeal consistence is necessary for a substance to be described as “concentrated” (*συνηγμένη*) into something “narrow” (*βραχὺ*):

On the face of it the perceptible segment would seem to be larger (*δόξει δ’ αὐτόθεν μὲν εἶναι μεῖζον τὸ αἰσθητόν*), for the indivisible and invariably identical being of the intelligibles is narrowly and purely concentrated (*ἡ γὰρ ἀμέριστος οὐσία καὶ κατὰ ταῦτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα τῶν νοητῶν ἐστιν εἰς βραχὺ συνηγμένη καὶ καθαρόν*), whereas the perceptible was provided by the dispersed and erratic being of bodies [*ἥ δὲ σκεδαστὴ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ περιπλανῆς τὸ αἰσθητὸν παρέσχεν*].

(trans. after H. Cherniss, slightly modif.)

Anyway, the problem with this kind of arguments can be summed up as follows: it is illegitimate to draw a comparison between two ontological classes through the means of a criterion which doesn't properly suit both of them. But, according to Plutarch, should “bigger” ever be understood in strictly physical terms, one would be end up exploiting exactly that kind of inadequate criterion (see 1002b, 1002d):

To the contrary, however, one might say first that, in comparing <the> perceptibles with the intelligibles, we are in a way putting mortal things on a level with the divine (πρὸς δὲ τούναντίον εἴποι τις ἂν πρῶτον ὅτι συγκρίνοντες τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς τρόπον τινὰ τὰ θνητὰ τοῖς θείοις ἐξισοῦμεν), for God is among the intelligibles (*ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς*)¹⁴. [...] And, besides, it is silly to judge of things incorporeal from things corporeal (καὶ ἄλλως εὑηθές ἐστι τοῖς σω-

τῶν μαθημάτων τάξει καταβιβάζων ἀπὸ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς ἐπὶ γεωμετρίαν, εἴτα μετὰ ταύτην ἐπὶ ἀστρολογίαν, ἐπὶ πάσαις δὲ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν τιθείς: γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν γεωμετρούμενα, τοῦ ποσοῦ μέγεθος προσλαβόντος τὰ δὲ στερεά, τοῦ μεγέθους βάθος: τὰ δ’ ἀστρολογούμενα, τοῦ στερεοῦ κίνησιν: τὰ δ’ ἀρμονικά, τῷ κινουμένῳ σώματι φωνῆς προσγενομένης, ὅθεν ἀφαιροῦντες φωνὴν μὲν τῶν κινουμένων κίνησιν δὲ τῶν στερεῶν βάθος δὲ τῶν ἐπιτεύδων, μέγεθος δὲ τῶν ποσῶν, ἐν αὐταῖς γενησόμεθα ταῖς νοηταῖς ιδέαις, οὐδεμίαν διαφορὰν ἔχοντες πρὸς ἄλληλας κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ μόνον νοούμενον. οὐ γάρ ποιεῖ μονάς ἀριθμόν, ἀν: μὴ τῆς ἀπείρου δυάδος ἄνηται: ποιήσασα δ’ οὕτως ἀριθμόν, εἰς στιγμᾶς εἴτα γραμμᾶς ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ βάθη καὶ σώματα πρόεισι καὶ σωμάτων ποιότητας ἐν πάθεσι γιγνομένων. Through a gradual process of “elimination”, starting from the most complex sensible objects, it is possible to reach the Prime Principles, which appear to be a kind of “minimal entities”. The process proves continuous, for it is free from any ontological “gap”. On this passage, see J. OPSOMER, 2007.

¹⁴ On the notion of God in Plutarch, see recently F.E. BRENK, 2005, 2012, 2014.

ματικοῖς τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων).

(trans. after H. Cherniss)

Therefore, a fresh start is required. And, in order to reach a new perspective of inquiry, it is a new reading of the word “bigger” that is necessary. Such a reading is now expected to mirror the following methodological principle: it is not legitimate to “draw inferences” (τεκμαίρεσθαι) from characteristics of the corporeal to characteristics peculiar to the intelligible. In light of this, Plutarch is finally given the opportunity to draw the comparison on a correct basis. To conclude on this point: were the intelligible to reveal itself to be “preeminent”, such a preeminence should be established in accordance with an ontologically valid criterion, i.e. not with a quantitative or materialistic one (1002c ff.):

Moreover, body is said to be without parts and indivisible because of minuteness (καὶ μὴν ἀμερές γε λέγεται καὶ ἀμέριστον τὸ μὲν σῶμα μικρότητι)¹⁵, but the incorporeal and intelligible because of its simplicity and purity and freedom from all diversity and difference (τὸ δ' ἀσώματον καὶ νοητὸν ὡς ἀπλοῦν καὶ εὐλικρινὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἀπάσης στερεότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς). And, besides, it is silly to judge of things incorporeal from

things corporeal (καὶ ἄλλως εὐηθές ἔστι τοῖς σωματικοῖς τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων).

(transl. after H. Cherniss)

So, it is thanks to its simplicity, purity and its being untouched by any kind of corporeality, that the intelligible is proven to be ontologically superior.

5

It is now time to return to the omission of σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ὀσαφείᾳ at the very beginning of the *Quaestio*. Is it possible to identify the exact reason why Plutarch could choose to be silent about these criteria? I think that it is, mainly in light of the development of the *Quaestio* itself. First of all, given the structure of the text, it seems reasonable to think the following: the communicative aim of Plutarch, when writing this text, was likely to be that of gradually showing how improper it would be to compare intelligible and sensible objects on the basis of a quantitative or materialistic parameter, or even adopting a continualist approach. But, were such an objective to be reached, it would be counter-productive for Plutarch to mention a proper criterion (like the ontological one of “clearness”) from the very beginning of the text. For, in that case, Plutarch should have immediately explained what that

¹⁵ Here it is possible to detect a sign of Plutarch's polemic against Xenocrates, if - as I believe - the allusion is to Xenocrates' “minimal parts”; on the matter, see M.I. PARENTE, 2006, 9 ff. and 47-48; as another example of this criticism, see Procr. an. 1022e: ή μὲν οὖν ἀμέριστος οὐσία καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὠσάντως ἔχουσα μὴ μικρότητι, καθάπερ τὰ ἔλαχιστα τῶν σωμάτων, νοείσθω φεύγοντα τὸν μερισμόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ καθαρὸν αὐτῆς καὶ μονοειδὲς ἀμερές εἴρηται καὶ ἀμέριστον. I set out to elaborate on the philosophical relationship between Plutarch and Xenocrates (and Speusippus) in an other paper.

criterion precisely meant, and thus the *Quaestio* too would have immediately reached a solution. Whereas, through the means of the initial silence, both the reader and the writer are given the opportunity to test each argument and each theoretical option with an open mind. And as is rather evident from the reading of the *Quaestio*, the inquiry always appears in doubt, throughout the whole text, as to which argument will in the end turn out to display the fully right solution. Besides, what is at issue here is likely to be something terrifically important, I would venture to say vital, for a philosopher¹⁶: *i.e.* how not to draw inferences in order to describe the intelligible objects. And maybe it is not by chance that some of the mistakes Plutarch condemns were presumably made by an authoritative Plato's follower, one Plutarch often criticises: I mean Xenocrates¹⁷. So, in light of all this, the initial omission could be deemed as also polemically pregnant¹⁸, since it is functional to the gradual and hence impressive demonstration of the inadequateness of Xenocrates' philosophy.

Now: is this silence the product of a voluntary omission? Or does Plutarch simply rely on an already written *Quaestio*, where the omission was present? In my opinion, it would be not cautious to definitively side with one of these

options, as we lack a definitive piece of evidence on the matter. Nevertheless, there are at least two aspects which should be taken into account. First, Plutarch and the other Middle Platonists used to "tamper" with the texts of the sources they quoted

- Plato included¹⁹. This makes it all the more probable that Plutarch simply eliminated the reference to σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ from his text. But, even if he did not tamper with Plato's words on his own - maybe because he relied on an already available material -, he could not help but directly revise the source. For, Plutarch had a philological and first-hand approach to - along with a deep knowledge of - Plato's dialogues²⁰. So, it is possible to conclude that, at the very least, Plutarch could not be unaware of the omission present in his introductory summary. But, as a matter of fact, he must have realised that such a silence could turn out to be unexpectedly useful.

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¹⁶ But, if the scholastic nature of the zetema were the case, one should rather say: an aspiring philosopher.

¹⁷ On Plutarch's debt to Xenocrates, see J. DILLON, 1999 and n. 12 above.

¹⁸ For Plutarch as a polemicist, see J. DILLON, unpublished.

¹⁹ See J. DILLON, 1989 and F.M. PETRUCCI, 2018.

²⁰ See e.g. F. FERRARI, 2004.

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Plutarch's Omission of Sulla's Legislative Reforms

[*Omissione di Plutarco delle Riforme Legislate di Silla*]

from

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Abstract

Plutarch in his *Life of Sulla* hardly mentions Sulla's extensive legislation after becoming dictator. This article examines this omission. There was no lack of sources for Plutarch, but Plutarch's own hypomnema for the life may have omitted this material. Plutarch may also have tried to strengthen the comparison and contrast with Lysander, especially in terms of his own ethical purpose, through the omission. Moreover, a major factor would have been Sulla's apparent omission of his legislation in his *Memoirs*.

Key-Words: Sulla, Legislation, Sources, Memoirs, *Hypommata*, Omissions, Lysander, Ethical purpose.

Riassunto

Plutarco nella sua *Vita di Silla* appena ricorda l'abbondante legislazione di Silla dittatore. Quest'articolo esamina quest'omissione. A Plutarco non mancavano le fonti, ma forse il suo hypomnema ometteva questo materiale. È possibile anche che Plutarco volesse sottolineare i suoi propositi etici nel paragonare Lisandro e Silla. Inoltre, un fatto importante sarebbe stato l'apparente omissione di questa sua legislazione nelle *Memorie* di Silla.

Palabras clave: Silla, Legislazione, Fonti, Memorie, *Hypommata*, Omissioni, Lisandro, Propositi etici.

ne of the more exasperating omissions in Plutarch's biographies is found in his *Life of Sulla*. Everyone studying Sulla's career discovers that the report of Sulla's dictatorship in chapters 29-34, treating the years 82 to 80 B.C., is notoriously incomplete. A rapid overview of those

chapters will reveal the issue. Plutarch narrates the battle of the Colline Gate, which Sulla feared he had lost, even after his desperate appeal to Apollo (in the form of his golden statue). He then moves to the surprise of Sulla's victory and his ensuing massacres of his opponents at Antemnae and the

6000 captives in the Circus, slain while Sulla spoke unmoved to the senate (*Sull.* 30.3-4). At this point, overwhelmed by his own account, Plutarch denounces the monstrous tyranny which Sulla exercised at Rome and puzzles over the character of the man who could do it (30.5-6). The biographer then sets out the worst atrocities of his proscriptions: Sulla “turned to slaughter” (*πρὸς τὸ σφάττειν τραπομένου*, 31.1). Chapters follow on his viciousness at Praeneste (32) and on the arrogant and tyrannical manner of his dictatorship (33). Finally, after chronicling all this bloodbath, the narrative turns to more positive material, reporting how Sulla celebrated his triumph and proclaimed his good fortune (*εὐτυχία*, 34.1). Sulla celebrated publicly the favor the gods had bestowed on him by officially making Felix (or in Greek, Epaphroditos) part of his name. Moreover, as further testimonies to this good fortune, he named his children Faustus and Faustina. Thereupon, confident in his achievements, Sulla laid down his dictatorship, assumed the role of a private citizen, and allowed Rome to return to a consular regime (34.6).

1. The problem

What is missing from this narrative is any mention of what Sulla may have considered his greatest and most lasting

political achievement, his legislation reforming the functioning of the Roman state. As dictator, Sulla had full powers to remake Roman government as he saw fit, and he did so. The list of his changes is long and strike at the heart of the Roman state as it had functioned in the previous generations¹. He added some 300 knights to the senate, effectively doubling its size, and established the quaestorship as a requirement for entrance into the senate. The number of quaestors chosen each year was raised from ten to twenty, and the number of praetors from six to eight. By his *lex annalis*, he established the order and interval between magistracies. He required a ten year wait before a consulship could be repeated. He severely limited the veto of the tribunes, took away their right to initiate legislation, and blocked tribunes from holding further office. The courts were reformed, and seven standing *quaestiones* set up. Knights were excluded from serving on the courts. Laws were written to restrain provincial governors and to regulate coinage and sumptuary spending. Finally, he abolished the corn dole, and wrote laws depriving towns and individuals hostile to him of citizenship. These changes were a sweeping effort to re-

¹ The reforms are conveniently listed in T. R. S. BROUGHTON, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, II (New York, 1952, rep. Atlanta, 1984) 74-5. See also A. KEAVENNEY, *Sulla the Last Republican*, 2nd ed., London, 2005, 140-55; F. SANTANGELO, *Sulla, the Elites and the Empire*, Leiden and Boston, 2007 and “Sulla and the Senate: a Reconsideration”, *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz*, 17 (2006, publ. 2008) 7-22; J. ALISON ROSENBLITT, *Rome after Sulla*, London, 2019.

structure Roman institutions to avoid exactly the troubles that had plagued Rome since the tribunates of the Gracchi and the multiple consulships of Marius. It was these changes and other minor adjustments in the Roman government, alongside the slaughter of large numbers of his political enemies, which allowed Sulla to believe that he had set Rome on the right course, so that he could confidently resign his dictatorship and return to private life.

Plutarch, it is true, does mention briefly a sumptuary law of Sulla's which was intended to limit expenses – but which Sulla himself ignored². The same law is perhaps referred to in the syncrisis to *Lysander-Sulla*, 3.3, where Plutarch writes, quoting Sallust, that Sulla introduced

laws on marriage and modesty, while he himself was a lover and an adulterer (τοὺς περὶ γάμων καὶ σωφροσύνης νόμους τοῖς πολίταις, αὐτὸς ἐρῶν καὶ μοιχεύων, *Comp. Lys.-Sull.* 3.3)³.

However, these brief references to his moral legislation are introduced solely to illustrate Sulla's contradictory and tyrannical behavior, not as a significant reform. All his other laws,

which the dictator may have thought the capstone of his career, Plutarch completely ignores.

This omission is especially noteworthy because in the parallel *Life* Plutarch describes at length Lysander's plans to introduce a constitutional change, that is, to open the kingship to those outside the direct line of descent from the Heraclids (*Lys.* 24-26, 30.3-4, *Ephorus FGrHist* 70 F 207). In the syncrisis, Plutarch defends Lysander's plans for change, noting that it was basically a just modification, and that Lysander chose to work by persuasion rather than by arms (*Comp. Lys.-Sull.* 2.1-4).

2. A source issue?

There are several possible avenues to explain Plutarch's silence. I will look first at his sources, then in turn at his ethical purpose, the balance between the Lysander-Sulla pair, and, perhaps most important, the end of Sulla's *Memoirs*.

To begin with sources. In searching for the reasons behind Plutarch's glaring omission, we might be inclined to blame the silence of his sources. However, we know that Sulla's legislation was reported by historians, now lost, whom Plutarch drew upon elsewhere, among

² Plutarch's reference is in the context of the funeral for his wife Metella, *Sull.* 35.3: τὸν δὲ τῆς ταφῆς ὄριζοντα τὴν δαπάνην νόμον αὐτὸς προεισενηνοχώς παρέβη, μηδενὸς ἀναλόματος φεισάμενος.

³ This passage is Sallust, *Hist.* 1.61 Maurenbrecher. Cf. also *Sull.* 35.4-5, referring to his violation of his own rules on the expense of meals (παρέβαινε δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς εὐτελείας τῶν δείπνων ὡς' αὐτοῦ τεταγμένα). Further on Plutarch mentions again Sulla's efforts to "make the city more temperate" (ἐσωφρόνιζε τοὺς πολίτας, *Comp. Lys.-Sull.* 3.8)

whom were Livy and Sallust⁴. Much later Appian, in the mid second century, was able to give a report, fortunately still extant, on major changes introduced by Sulla⁵. Thus we can be sure that there were historians available to Plutarch who had documented Sulla's drastic innovations and attempts to return to a simpler past. Moreover, the biographer had no hesitation in citing Roman historians in this *Life*: he refers to Livy (6.19), Juba (16.15), Strabo (26.4), Fenestella (28.14), and Sallust (*Comp.* 3.2)⁶.

It has long been recognized that Plutarch employed Sulla's memoirs, or *Hypomnemata*, as a major source for his *Life*, citing them explicitly eleven times, and referring to them implicitly on other

occasions⁷. Much of the *Life*'s narrative must derive from Sulla's account, which seems to have been especially full on two subjects prominent in this *Life*, Sulla's campaigns and the many signs of divine favor he received⁸. However, neither Plutarch nor other authors offer us fragments of Sulla's *Hypomnemata* which describe his legislation, although Plutarch knew of Sulla's legislation and referred to it occasionally (*Cic.* 12.2: καινοτομίας δὲ γενομένης καὶ μεταβολῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει τοσαύτης, *Cic.* 10.2: τῆς ὑπὸ Σύλλα γενομένης μεταβολῆς, and the passage on Metella's funeral at *Sull.* 35.3 mentioned above). However, these references tell us little of the Sullan reforms.

⁴ Cf. Livy, *Per.* 89, on Sulla's restriction of the tribunate, enlarging of the pontifical and augural colleges, creation of new senators (found also in Sallust, *Hist.* 1.55.21 M [the oration of Lepidus] and *Cat.* 37.6), and settling of his soldiers in the Italian cities. Plutarch cites Sallust three times (twice in *Lucullus*, 11.6 and 33.3, and once here in *Sulla* 41.3, all from the *Histories*, and Livy twelve times).

⁵ Appian, *Bellum civile* 1.100 (465-70). See the commentary by E. GABBA, *Appiani bellorum civilium liber primus* (Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1967).

⁶ Citations of these historians in other *Lives* may be found in the index to Ziegler's Teubner edition of the *Lives*.

⁷ See T. J. CORNELL, ed. *The Fragments of the Roman Historians (FRomHist)* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) I.282-87 (Introduction to Sulla's *Memoirs*), II.472-92 (fragments), III.289-99. The fragments according to *FRomHist* are *Sull.* 4.1-5 (F7), 5.1-3 (F10), 6.7-10 (F11, 12, 13, 14a), 6.11-13 (F15), 14.1-3 (F19), 14.10 (F20), 16.1 (F21), 17.1-4 (F4), 19.7-9 (F22), 23.1-5 (F23), 27.5-13 (F24), 28.15 (F25), and 37.1-3 (F6). Other scholars count the fragments differently but agree that Sulla was a major source. Plutarch also cites Sulla in *Luc.* 1.4 (T2a = F1), 45 (T2b), 23.6 (F14b), *Mar.* 26. 6-7 (F8), 26.3-7 (F9), 35.2-4 (F18), and in *Old Men in Politics (An seni respublica gerenda sit)* 786 DE. Other fragments are found in Gellius (F2, 3), Cicero (F17), Pliny the Elder (F16), and Priscian (F5).

⁸ *FRomHist* I, 282-87. See C. SMITH, "Sulla's Memoirs," in C. SMITH and A. POWELL, eds., *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus and the Development of Roman Autobiography*, Swansea, The Classical Press of Wales, 2009, 65-85.

Christopher Pelling and other scholars have demonstrated that Plutarch regularly prepared a rough historical narrative of a given period, a *hypomnema*, before writing a *Life* or set of *Lives*, as is particularly apparent from the *Lives* treating the last century of the Roman republic⁹. We may hypothesize that Plutarch, in preparing his *hypomnema* for the *Life of Sulla*, did not include a full summary of Sulla's legislation, but only a few jottings, which might have made it easy for him to flow directly from the Battle of the Colline Gate, to Sulla's ruthless suppression of his opposition, his pride in his good fortune, and his retirement from public life. Such a gap might have precluded him from going into detail on the many innovations Sulla introduced.

3. Ethical education

The omission of Sulla's legislation might also be tied to the notoriously problematic ethical agenda of the *Lysander-Sulla* pair¹⁰. While both men combined unusually successful military careers with character weaknesses, the case was particularly acute with Sulla. The biogra-

pher had to combine the apparent divine support which Sulla enjoyed in so many battles with his licentious life style and his vicious slaughter of his fellow citizens. Plutarch notes with some emphasis and, I suspect, puzzlement that even the rain which was expected for the day of the funeral held off until the body was already cremated, so that "his Fortune seemed to wait beside his body and join in the burial" (ὅστε τὴν Τύχην αὐτοῦ δοκεῖν τὸ σῶμα συνθάπτειν παραμένουσαν, *Sulla* 38.5). The fundamental ethical theme of the pair is that such contrasts can exist: bad men may be successful generals, and even rise to absolute dominance in a city. However, the danger which the success of a violent and unrestrained general may bring to his fellow citizens impresses upon the reader the desirability, indeed the necessity, of a leader combining military skills with reasoned, virtuous behavior. In presenting this view of Sulla's strengths and weaknesses, Sulla's political reforms were irrelevant. The contrast between military brilliance and savage treatment of fellow citizens was Plutarch's central theme. Sulla's political legislation does not relate to this either positively or

⁹ Cf. C. PELLING, "The *Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum* and Plutarch's Roman Lives," in C. PELLING, *Plutarch and History* (London, Duckworth, 2002) 65-90 and C. PELLING, *Plutarch Caesar* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 36-42; P. STADTER, "Plutarch's Compositional Technique: the Anecdote Collections and the *Parallel Lives*," *GRBS* 54 (2014) 665-86, esp. 683-86.

¹⁰ Cf. P.A. STADTER, "Paradoxical Paradigms: Lysander and Sulla," in STADTER, *Plutarch and his Roman Readers*, Oxford, 2015, 258-69, originally in STADTER, *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*, London and New York, 1992, 41-55, and T. DUFF, *Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford, 1999, 161-204.

negatively, it is outside Plutarch's ethical framework, and therefore Plutarch might have thought it could be omitted.

4. *The Lysander-Sulla parallel*

As I have noted, Lysander's plan to change the Spartan constitution to allow those not in the direct royal line to become king, though elaborate, never got off the ground. But Plutarch's treatment of the plan and its possible ramifications may be useful to explain his silence on Sulla's laws. Lysander's plan was to remove the kingship from its age-old limitation to members of two families, the Eurypontidae and the Agiadae, and to make it open to all those families descended from the Heraclidae (or as some say, all Spartans). Being himself descended from the Heraclidae, he felt sure that his achievements, when the two-family limitation was removed, would mean that he would be elected king (*Lys.* 24.3-6). He first began to persuade citizens privately, and also prepared a speech that he could use to make his case, but then decided stronger measures were in order. He planned to use oracles and responses from Apollo to convince the Spartans to make the change he desired. This involved his unsuccessful attempts to corrupt not only the oracle of Delphi, but also those at Dodona and Siwah. Plutarch also reports an elaborate subterfuge involving a woman in Pontus said to have been made pregnant by Apollo and fake oracles, but this plan too fell through (*Lys.* 25-26). In the end, Lysander was killed at Haliartus before he could achieve any change in the royal succession. In sum, Lysander

planned to revise the constitution to benefit himself, and attempted to get the support of Apollo's and other oracles, but in the end achieved nothing.

Contrast Lysander's attempted revolution with the dictatorship of Sulla, as presented by Plutarch. He defeated his enemies with the constant help of Apollo and other gods, slaughtered masses of Roman citizens, and established himself as dictator, thus assuming more powers than those of any Spartan king. Then he resigned his post, and later died as a private citizen. Plutarch omits the numerous changes in Roman governmental structure, which were not in fact for Sulla's personal benefit, but for his conservative view of how Rome should be governed. It is clear that Plutarch intends to draw a sharp contrast on several levels between the two men and their actions, with the key element being how they treated their fellow citizens, not structural changes to government. Lysander was hesitant to act unless he could persuade the Spartans, by deception and by arousing superstitious fear (*Lys.* 25.2). Sulla instead not only defeated his enemies in battle but slaughtered them indiscriminately. This contrast is brought out in the final comparison (*Comp. Lys.-Sull.* 2.1): Lysander used milder and more legal methods ($\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$ καὶ $\nu\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$), persuasion, not weapons, and aimed not at making wholesale changes, but only the choice of kings. Plutarch even goes farther to defend Lysander's intended reform as more just,

and we might say, philosophical (*Comp. Lys.-Sull.* 2.2-4). Moreover, Lysander attempted to use political reform to bring himself to power, whereas Sulla relied on military force to become dictator. With Plutarch's focus on gaining power, the political reforms of Sulla would not make a clear parallel with Lysander's reforms.

A possible reason for Plutarch's omission of Sulla's reforms, then, might be to maintain the neat opposition between Lysander and Sulla concerning their behavior toward their city. Lysander attempted to become king through political reform, while Sulla achieved the dictatorship based on his military prowess. Plutarch apparently considered Sulla more as a commander than as a reformer. A full, or even partial, presentation of Sulla's changes to the Roman constitution, he may have felt, would have hurt the neat contrast of characters and behaviors which he wished to present. Nor would it have been easy to relate Sulla's reforms to basic philosophical principles of justice and equity, as he was able to do with Lysander's. If Pelling's observation is correct, that the late Republican lives

were composed to be a cross-referential set, then Plutarch may also have wished to reserve constitutional questions to other late Republican lives¹¹.

5. *The End of Sulla's Memoirs*

Given Plutarch's silence, it appears probable that Sulla's memoirs never treated the legislation he put into effect while dictator. Plutarch writes that Sulla died two days after he stopped writing the twenty-second book (γράφων ἐπαύσατο, *Sull.* 37.1). We cannot ascertain whether Sulla purposely ended his memoirs after he had described his last campaign, the battle of the Colline Gate¹², or whether he had planned to continue further but was interrupted by his death¹³. In any case it appears most likely that Plutarch did not have an account from Sulla of his legislation.

However, Plutarch's silence is not the whole story. The Chaeronean can be very selective, as is revealed by a fascinating fragment from Sulla's *Memoirs* found in his *Old Men in Politics*. Plutarch there writes,

Sulla, when he first entered Rome after cleansing Italy of the

¹¹ Cf. C. PELLING, "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives", in PELLING, *Plutarch and History*, London 2002, 1-44 and "Plutarch's 'Tale of Two Cities': Do the Parallel Lives combine as Global Histories?" in N. HUMBLE, ed., *Plutarch's Lives: Parallelism and Purpose*, Swansea 2010, 217-35.

¹² That Sulla considered this victory a moment of exceptional triumph and joy is clear from his words reported by Plutarch in *An seni* 786DE: see below.

¹³ Cf. *FRomHist* I, xxx. See also T4, Suetonius *Gram.* 12, on the work of Epicadus in completing what Sulla had left incomplete.

civil wars, did not sleep a bit that night, he was so blown away in spirit by joy and enormous delight. This he has written about himself in his *Memoirs*" (ο δὲ Σύλλας, ὅτε τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων τὴν Ἰταλίαν καθήρας προσέμιξε τῇ Ρώμῃ πρῶτον, οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ κατέδαρθεν, ὑπὸ γῆθους καὶ χαρᾶς μεγάλης ὥσπερ πνεύματος ἀναφερόμενος τὴν ψυχήν. Καὶ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ γέγραφεν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν. *An seni* 786 DE = F26).

Plutarch's silence on this exultation in *Sulla* indicates that in the life he chose to highlight Sulla's violence rather than his joy. It reflects an authorial decision which reveals the writer's focus on the contrast between generalship and violence in Sulla's character. Sulla himself, however, must have celebrated the joy of his total victory and the divine favor which allowed it. In fact, we might hypothesize, given the absence of evidence that his

Memoirs treated his dictatorship, that Sulla's *Memoirs* ended at this high point, the victory at the Colline Gate and the following night, when Sulla was sleepless for joy. Joy which left no need to record the massacres that followed victory. Plutarch's silence on Sulla's legislation, it appears, originated in Sulla's own silence, but left room for atrocities which undoubtedly Sulla never recorded.

Conclusion

To conclude, there are several possible reasons why Plutarch might have omitted Sulla's reform legislation, especially his desire to make Sulla's life a closer parallel to Lysander's and his ethical purpose in writing the life. This decision was reinforced by Sulla's own silence in his *Hypomnemata*, which gave Plutarch an excuse for the omission of Sulla's constitutional changes and permitted him to develop his own view of Sulla's contradictory character¹⁴.

¹⁴ I am grateful to Prof. Jeff Beneker for his advice on an earlier draft of this paper and to the journal's anonymous readers. They are not responsible for the shortcomings which remain.

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In Defence of Poetry: Intertextual Dialogue and the Dynamic of Appropriation in Plutarch's De audiendis poetis*

[*Em Defesa da Poesia: O Diálogo Intertextual e a Dinâmica da Apropriação em De Audiendis Poetis de Plutarco*]

by

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Abstract

Intertextuality may be defined as the interaction between different texts, a dialogic relationship found especially in literary works and which the reader is asked to decipher. The absorption and tacit transformation of other texts in Plutarch's work suggests that the intertextuality in *De audiendis poetis* can be approached as literary intertextuality, making it both critical and creative. The allusion to other texts is the most important thread that weaves argumentative discourse and evidences together, in other words, the benefits that can be drawn from reading the poets.

Keywords: Plutarch, Poetry, Intertextuality.

Resumo

Pode-se definir Intertextualidade como a interacção entre diferentes textos, uma relação dialógica característica sobretudo de textos literários, que o leitor é chamado a descobrir. A absorção de outros textos e a sua transformação tácita na obra de Plutarco permite uma abordagem literária intertextual, que revela o carácter simultaneamente crítico e criativo de *De audiendis poetis*. Com efeito, a alusão a outros textos é o mais importante fio de que se tece o discurso argumentativo e põe em evidência os benefícios que se podem retirar da leitura dos poetas.

Palabras-chave: Plutarco, Poesia, Intertextualidade.

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Intertextuality, understood as the interaction between different texts, represents a certain continuity of literary tradition; it is therefore unsurprising that this is a marked aspect of the written production of the Ancient Greeks, for whom memory was, as it were, the anchor of their own identity¹. In the case of Plutarch's work, which to some extent condenses a long literary, philosophical and rhetorical tradition, one can discern a permanent and, generally speaking, explicit engagement with texts² of this tradition. It is true that the modern concept of intertextuality, coined by J. Kristeva, refers mainly to the constitutive dialogical relationship between specifically literary texts, and that the work of Plutarch – namely, *De audiendis poetis* – is perhaps closer to what we nowadays mean by critical or essayistic discourse. Nevertheless, it is also possible to speak of intertextuality in this type of

work, especially when, as Perrone-Moisés says of intertextuality in critical discourse, criticism ceases to be metalinguistic to itself become writing³. In such cases, the critic does not refer to his sources, but absorbs them tacitly, constructing a new text. Indeed, a significant part of the *De audiendis poetis* reveals a dialogical relationship of this kind.

If “the first condition of intertextuality is that literary works should remain unfinished, that is, that they ask and allow themselves to be continued”⁴, there is no doubt that Plato's work – due to the dialectical method by which it is characterised – is particularly inclined towards intertextual dialogue. With regard to the discussion on poetry in the *Republic* and its role in educating the guardians of the polis, the conclusions reached by Socrates and his interlocutors clearly have a provisional nature, presented as the necessary result of the chosen

¹ On the relevance of the intertextual approach to ancient literature, see, e.g., G.B. CONTE, 1986, and D. FOWLER, 1997.

² J. KRISTEVA (1969, pp. 84-85) explains the concept of intertextuality by stating that «tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citations, tout texte est absorption et transformation d'un autre texte.» From the point of view of literary composition, the modern concept of intertextuality may perhaps come close to *mutatis mutandis*, that of μίμησις or *imitatio* ‘imitation’, in the sense in which these terms are used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus or Quintilian, that is, as a process of personal creation derived from models. From the point of view of reception, the intertextual reading is a hermeneutic exercise that regards the text as a tapestry in which the threads of other texts are intertwined, seeking in them a wider meaning. Intertextual reading, as M. Riffaterre says, “is the opposite of linear reading.” See M. RIFFATERRE, 1978.

³ L. PERRONE-MOISÉS, 1976. The author, of course, refers to works like Butor's on Baudelaire. However, I think that some of her observations are also relevant to the present case.

⁴ L. PERRONE-MOISÉS, 1975, p. 72.

method of analysis⁵. Indeed, from the tenth Book⁶, it becomes clear that the matter remains open and unfinished, awaiting further revision⁷:

And we might also allow her defenders, who are lovers of poetry but not themselves poetical, to make a prose speech on her behalf, to show that she is not only pleasing (ἡδεῖα) but useful (ὠφελίμη) for government and human life; and we shall be glad to listen. After all, it will be our gain if she turns out useful as well as pleasing.

It is precisely to this challenge that Plutarch seems to respond in *De audiendis poetis*, a treatise written in identical terms to those followed by Plato in his discussion of poetry⁸. In this work, Plutarch seeks to solve the “old quarrel between poetry and philosophy”⁹, radicalized in the *Republic* and suppressed in the *Poetics*, where Aristotle advocates the philosophical nature of poetry, as opposed to History¹⁰. Plutarch re-addresses this topic, departing from Socrates’ position on that Platonic dialogue, as he reflects on the place of

poetry in educating young people. His proposal, however, is to defend and demonstrate the pedagogical potential of poetry, as well as its propaedeutic role in relation to philosophy, which is the highest aspiration in Hellenistic paideia. Furthermore, the *topoi* used in defence of his thesis — the useful and the pleasant — are the same as those of the *Republic*, along with the definition of poetry as ψεῦδος and μίμησις.

However, if Plutarch writes *De audiendis poetis* under the influence of Plato with the aim of continuing his dialogue, the truth is that he does not at any moment affirm this purpose. His treatise does not respond to the Platonic challenge in a straightforward way; he neither quotes his master’s words nor refers directly to his theory. Plato’s name is mentioned a few times throughout the treatise –very few indeed, if compared to Homer– but not as a direct interlocutor, a fact that is all the more significant given the abundance of direct quotations in the treatise, as well as the regular rebuttal of several authors’ viewpoints. His ideas are presented in

⁵ *Rep.* 388d-e: ‘If our young men heard things like this in earnest and did not laugh at them as unworthy remarks (...) They would mourn and lament freely, without shame or restraint, at small accidents. (...) But they ought not to do so, as our argument just now showed – and we ought to be convinced by it, until someone convinces us with a better one.’

⁶ *Rep.* 607d-e.

⁷ I use the translations of D. RUSSELL and M. WINTERBOTTOM, 1988.

⁸ The relation of this treatise to Plato’s *Republic* is in general recognized by the critics. Cf. e.g., S. HALLIWELL, 2002, p. 296; R. HUNTER, 2009, p. 175.

⁹ *Rep.* 29d-e.

¹⁰ *Po.* 1451b.

a rather diffuse and tacit manner. The same is true of the part of the argument that seems to be of Aristotelian or, more generally, Peripatetic influence¹¹. Plutarch grasps, absorbs and transforms ideas, adapting them to this new context of reflection on the importance of poetry in the curriculum of young people. And he does this within a sort of dialogue among peers, within a relationship of equality from which the new text, avowedly critical, is actually a personal rewriting, only possible within a firmly established tradition. This absorption and tacit transformation of other texts suggests that the intertextuality in *De audiendis poetis* can be approached as literary intertextuality, shaping it as both critical and creative. He does not write about those previous texts, but rather departs from them, driven by a desire for conciliation but, by no means, for a breach. In fact, the treatise intends not to be contentious with regard to Plato and Aristotle¹²; it is, rather, a revisiting of their ideas. He establishes what we may call a dialectical cooperation with

their ideas, the outcome of which is a degree of conciliatory synthesis. We will now recall aspects of this intertextual dialogue with the originals.

Plutarch does not ignore the moral and psychological issues that justified Plato's rejection of the educational value of poetry, On the contrary, he seems to share the philosopher's concerns.

The first line of thought to be defended is the actual pedagogical value of remarkable narratives in the training of young men, primarily in the context of learning philosophy. The argument is that fictional narratives provide enthusiasm and pleasure ($\chiαίρουσι \dots μεθ' \etaδονης \epsilonνθουσιωσι$ – 14e), therefore promoting study of the densest philosophical content. In line with the precepts of rhetorical art and the weight given to *pathos* as a means of persuasion, the author recognizes the impossibility and inconvenience of repressing emotions. Instead, he argues that they should be oriented towards the learning of good and virtue. The

¹¹ Although it is not at all certain that Plutarch knew Aristotle's *Poetics*, it seems very clear to me that the definition of poetry as *pseudos* and *mimesis* in this treatise echoes Aristotelian thinking. In fact, although these are also the terms that define poetry in Plato, it is Aristotle's view, as we recognise from the *Poetics*, that emerges in *De aud. poet.* 16b-d; 17d; 18a-f. It also seems very likely, as A. ROSTAGNI and other critics have argued, that behind these excerpts lies Aristotle's lost treatise *On the Poets*. Halliwell sees with much reluctance the possibility of a direct connection with the Stagirite, but states that "we should allow for a Peripatetic strand in the argument of *De audiendis poetis*." See S. HALLIWELL, 2002, 299. On the presence of Aristotle's work in Plutarch, see A. ROSTAGNI, 1955, pp. 255-322; H. FLASHAR, 1979, pp. 79-111; F.H. SANDBACH, 1982, pp. 207-232; A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, J. GARCÍA LÓPEZ & R. M. AGUILAR, 2000; G. ROSKAM, 2009, pp. 25-44.

¹² Cf. A. ZADORJNYI, 2002, p. 298.

pleasure derived from listening to poets may have beneficial effects.

At first glance, this could not be more distant from Plato. However, in further defending the need for careful vigilance over this kind of pleasure, Plutarch is admitting the dangers of a naive and unprepared reading of poetry, thus aligning himself with some assertions in the second Book of the *Republic*¹³. Here, Socrates was open to the possibility that *mythoi* could serve for the education of children, but only those that could convey proper values or the truth. He therefore proposed an act of surveillance or censorship on the future authors of these narratives, so that they would only compose fables bearing an edifying morality. Plutarch's proposal is different because his immediate objectives were also different. His text is not a speculative, theoretical exercise on education, nor is it, like Plato's *Republic*, an exercise in imagination in the search for the ideal¹⁴. In fact, although he could have composed a literary dialogue in the

Platonic manner, he opted for a non-fictional text to respond to a concrete historical situation – that of the moment in which he lives. That is why the first rebuttal is that “it is neither useful nor perhaps possible to keep boys of the age of my Soclaros or your Cleandros away from poetry”¹⁵. Instead of prohibiting, he therefore integrates, and his proposed surveillance¹⁶ takes a new direction: that of guiding young people in reading poems so that they will be able ἐν τῷ τέρποντι τὸ χρήσιμον ζητεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν, “to seek and to love that which is useful in that which gives pleasure”¹⁷.

Plutarch therefore shares Plato's moral concerns, for he recognizes the potentially negative effects of pleasure derived from reading poetry, and even seeks to thwart them. Moreover, like his master, he bases his thesis on knowledge of the human psyche, particularly that of the young¹⁸. But it is, so it seems, a knowledge founded on the personal experience of his being both a father and a teacher, as opposed to on a philosophical study of the soul and the

¹³ Cf. 377a-c.

¹⁴ In *Rep.*376d Socrates invited the other participants to join the dialogue with words that leave no doubts about this: οὐδὲν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντες τε καὶ σχολὴν ἀγοντες λόγωπαιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας “Come, then, just as if we were telling stories or fables and had ample leisure, let us educate these men in our discourse.” Cf. HUNTER, 2009, p. 175.

¹⁵ *De aud. poet.* 14d.

¹⁶ The words are: φυλάττωμεν αὐτούς ‘let us protect them’.

¹⁷ *De aud. poet.* 14f. HALLIWELL, 2009, p. 297, speaks of “a sort of self-censorship, replacing the political censorship proposed in Plato's *Republic*.”

¹⁸ *De aud. poet.* 15a.

effects of emotion on human behaviour. Hence, the result is necessarily different.

Plutarch conciliates his moral and psychological concerns with Aristotle's more detached perspective, rejecting factual and philosophical truth as a criterion for the evaluation of good poetry: ποιητικῆ μὲν οὐ πάνυ μέλον ἔστι τῆς ὀληθείας, “poetry is not concerned with truth”¹⁹. The understanding of poetry as *pseudos* is a starting point taken by the author without moral reservations, because in the realm of poetry, the meaning of the word is “fiction”, that is, τὸ πλαττόμενον λόγων, “that which is configured by words”²⁰. And this is the very essence of art. For this reason, the verses of Empedocles or Parmenides are designated as *logoi*, as opposed to the *mythoi* that characterize poetry worthy of that name.

It is not difficult to hear the echoes of Aristotelian views in these examples, adduced to distinguish fictional poetry from discourses that merely imitate formal aspects of poetic elocation. Indeed, the very centrality of *mythos* in poetry inevitably brings to mind

passages from *Poetics*²¹. This is not, however, a clear evocation. The intertext is perceived in a very diffuse manner, as a reminiscence, in which the same words acquire different meanings depending on their context. The concept of *mythos* in Aristotle's *Poetics* has more to do with “plot” or “concatenation of actions,” whereas in these excerpts of *De audiendis poetis* its sense is less technical, instead moving closer to a meaning of “fictional narrative” which is more “Platonic”²². It is nonetheless possible to perceive both figures, the Academic philosopher and the Lycian philosopher, as traditional authorities in the field of poetics, albeit filtered, so to speak, by Plutarch's own ideas and scope in the composition of his treatise.

It is certainly not by chance that, to support his opinion, he quotes Solon's well-known statement πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί, “poets tell many lies”, whilst also drawing on the example of Socrates himself (16c):

This is why Socrates, the life-long striver for truth, found himself, when he set about composing poetry in obedience to a

¹⁹ *De aud. poet.* 17d. Aristotle himself does not exclude moral expectations from aesthetic experience. See e.g. *Poetics* 1452b-1453a. As S. Halliwell remarks, “Aristotle, while avoiding such outright moralism [i.e. Plato's], still expects tragedy (and mimetic art in general) to be conformable to a moral understanding of the world.” Cf. S. HALLIWELL, 1998, p. 5. On the possible debt of *De audiendis poetis* to Aristotle, see supra n. 6.

²⁰ *De aud. poet.* 16b.

²¹ See Arist., *Po.* 1447b; 1450a-1450b; 1451b. R. Hunter and D. Russell note that Empedocles “had been a paradigm of verse which was not poetry (ποίησις) since Aristotle, *Poetics* 1447b18”. See R. HUNTER & D. RUSSELL, 2011, p. 88.

²² I mean platonic in the sense that it is used in *Rep.* 376d or 377a. See supra n.11.

dream, no very convincing or gifted maker of lies; he therefore put Aesop's fables into verse, on the principle that where there is no fiction there is no poetry.

In a treatise aiming to reconcile the teaching of poetry with that of philosophy, Plutarch quotes a poet and a philosopher, but not just any philosopher. To quote from Socrates is to bring Plato into dialogue, and, what is more, as an abetting witness in a case against those who reject the falsities of fictional narratives. This is a rhetorical device used by Plutarch throughout the treatise, one that seeks to answer Plato's objections with the philosopher's own statements or, as in this case, with the example of his beloved and admired master Socrates. Supported by these authorities, he presents part of the solution to the initial problem: to prevent uncritical adherence to some of the bad words and actions presented in poems of all kinds, we must inevitably make young people understand that there is no poetry without fiction or falsehood.

This is the reason why, like Aristotle, Plutarch insists on the concepts of verisimilitude (*eikós*) and adequacy (*tò πρέπον*)²³, arguing that poetry should be judged according to poetic criteria. The most important of these derives from poetry being defined as mimesis, as an imitation that only makes sense

and arouses emotions if it is credible or plausible. Recognition of the similarities with reality in that which is represented in art is itself a source of pleasure. It is thus the quality of verisimilitude that is at issue in the evaluation of poetic mimesis. Without ever explicitly citing Aristotle, but rather with arguments similar to those of *Poetics*, Plutarch censors those who merely repeat Simonides' words, "poetry is a spoken painting and painting a silent poetry". He adds the fundamental assertion that *mimesis* cannot aim to beautify that which is ugly, but rather to represent things according to what is appropriate. And the appropriate representation is one that respects the characteristics of the represented.

This painting analogy already had a longstanding tradition in the time of Plato and Aristotle, but they are the ones who, in different and even antagonistic ways, drew profound theoretical and philosophical conclusions from these images. Aristotle, for example, points to the transfiguring quality of art, when speaking of the pleasure that repulsive, real-life images elicit when artfully worked²⁴. Plutarch adopts the same ideas, with examples taken from painting, sculpture and poetry²⁵:

We avoid a sick or ulcerated man as a disagreeable sight, but we enjoy looking at Aristophon's

²³ *De aud. poet.* 18a.

²⁴ *Po.* 1448b.

²⁵ *De aud. poet.* 18c.

'Philoctetes' or Silanion's 'Jocasta', which are made to resemble the sick and dying. Similarly, when the young man reads what Thersites the buffoon or Sisyphus the seducer or Batrachos the brothel-keeper is represented as saying or doing, he should be taught to praise the technique and skill of the imitation, but to censure and abuse the habits and activities represented.

Again, these lines of thought bring Plato and Aristotle together. In a passage that seems to follow ideas and statements from the *Poetics*, Plutarch opens the door to Plato by recalling the example of Thersites, a Homeric character²⁶. By denoting Thersites a γελωτοποιός, "buffoon", Plutarch echoes a passage of the *Republic* where the philosopher narrates the myth of Er²⁷. In this way, the author subtly suggests not only that Plato himself created myths, but also that he has not refrained from including in those myths immoral figures of the epic tradition. Thersites's final destiny in this eschatological myth is to become a monkey, which means that the story of this character is one of guilt and punishment. It is precisely here that Plutarch offers a moral lesson, designed to prevent young people from being influenced by exam-

ples of bad mythical characters, and to show that bad actions ultimately hurt those who practise them²⁸.

In this way, Plutarch interweaves both Platonic and Aristotelian perspectives into his text and sews them, so to speak, with his own proposal – to limit the potentially dangerous effects of poetry through critical judgement, teaching young people how to read and interpret poetic texts.

However, whilst the ideas of Plato and Aristotle serve as the primary intertext, which emerges as though it were a palimpsest, other figures from both poetic and philosophical Greek tradition are also employed. The author openly engages with them through quotations or paraphrases²⁹.

In terms of quotations, we find distinct types: some serve to exemplify methods of reading and interpreting poems, while others illustrate or confirm the author's ideas. In some of these cases, the words of consecrated authors are invoked as appeals to authority. It is nonetheless curious that, in the case of quoted poets, this authority is understood as neither intrinsic to their very nature nor derived from their belonging to a particular canon. Authority is based, rather, on the possibility of

²⁶ Thersites appears in *Il.* 2. 212-277. He is there presented as a physical and morally inferior character. In later tradition, he remains the mythical paradigm of the insubordinate.

²⁷ *Rep.* 620c. This Platonic echo is pointed out by HUNTER & RUSSELL, 2011, p. 102.

²⁸ *De aud. poet.* 20b.

²⁹ C. PERRI (1978, pp. 303-304) rightly states that even direct citations, because they appear in a different context, are distortions of reference texts.

convergence and reconciliation with the moral standards conveyed by some philosophers, above all by Plato³⁰. Plutarch bridges the gap between poetry and philosophy, displaying an eclecticism that exemplifies, in practice, his main theory that only knowledge grants the ability to distinguish between what is or is not beneficial, and to choose the best option accordingly. Both in poetry and in philosophy.

By calling several texts and authors into this discussion, Plutarch clearly opts for the dialectical method, proceeding in the manner of the Platonic Socrates as he guides the “conversation” to its intended ends. This procedure has an argumentative feature, in the sense that it supports the thesis he defends, according to which poetry can be valuable as propaedeutic to philosophy, as long as young men are duly guided so as to distinguish the benefits it encloses. We can therefore say that the intertextual composition is in itself a subtle rhetorical strategy intended to persuade.

I will seek to illustrate this argument with an analysis of the first chapter, since it presents –almost as a prologue– Plutarch’s thesis and the main points of the reasoning he will later expound. It bears, furthermore, the marks of a text interwoven with the threads of other texts, giving birth to a third and different one.

It is not surprising that a treatise which advocates poetry in the syllabus of young people should open with a quotation by a poet – Philoxenus. What is perhaps odder is that the author invokes a smaller poet and a somewhat vulgar image to support his starting idea. As we know, however, this light humour is not at all alien to Plutarch’s style, and also not completely innocuous. This peculiar opening fulfils several purposes: it introduces the metaphor that shapes further discussion – education is feeding – and at the same time, it subtly starts to bring poets and philosophers closer together. In the same sentence, he quotes a poet and a thinker, Cato, and in the following one, he transfers the “poetic” gastronomic image to the context of philosophy. Just as in the feeding of the body, it is best to mix flavours and textures; thus, in the feeding of the spirit, whose main food is philosophy, it is best to mix it with poetry. More importantly, a crucial point of the defence of poetry is found here, in the conditional sentence that has the effect of suspending the very idea of truth³¹:

If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say, that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish, have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those persons of whom Cato said that

³⁰ This idea is explicitly stated by the end of the book, 35f.

³¹ Translated by F.C. BABBITT, 1957. I use here this translation because the author maintains in english the conditional sentence.

their palates are more sensitive than their minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more enjoyable by the very young...

Despite its lightness, the opening sentence is the first symptom of down-playing the concept of truth in the context of poetry, since the author seems unconcerned with this aspect.

Throughout the treatise, the citation of poets as a strategy to illustrate and support philosophical insights not only sustains the argument for confluence between poets and philosophers, but also seems to signal something else about poetic language. It may be that, because it is directed at both *reason* and *emotion*, it has the ability to say more and to say it better.

An expressive example serves to reinforce and illustrate the dual nature of poetic art with respect to its effects on the listener / reader. Plutarch quotes a line from *Odyssey* on Egyptian drugs – φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλά μεμειγμένα πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά, “many drugs that are good mixed with many that are bad”.

One could hardly overlook the Platonic echoes of the first word in this line –φάρμακα. However, while Plato emphasizes the negative element of φάρμακον, Plutarch seems to valorise ideas of mixture and symmetry (πολλὰ μὲν ... πολλὰ δέ). Hence, Plutarch paves the way for resolving poetry’s harmful effects —not by avoidance but rather by κρίσις³², the capacity for critical thought.

This quotation from the *Odyssey* is immediately followed by one from the *Iliad* which again resonates with Plato:

therein is love and desire and the intimacies
that cheat and steal the hearts
even of the wise³³.

Socrates also said that Poetry is capable of corrupting, with few exceptions, even men of character and virtue³⁴. The tacit relationship between Homer and Plato points to the convergence of thought between them. This happens, however, through a kind of chronological inversion. Instead of presenting the *Iliad* as Plato’s intertextual model, the opposite occurs. For the reader of Plutarch, behind these Homeric verses lies the Platonic text. Accordingly, we can say that its evocation

³² L. VAN DER STOCKT (1990, pp. 23-31), points out that « la krisis qu'il recommande (15d) lui permet de sauver l'expérience esthétique ». In fact, if for Plato as well as for Plutarch the whole educational effort was directed towards ethics, in this treatise, an intellectual objective is devised at the service of ethics – the development of κρίσις, or the capacity of discernment that lets one enjoy the pleasant and in it find what is useful and healthy (τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ σωτήριον διώκειν).

³³ *De aud. poet.* 15c.

³⁴ *Rep.* 605c.

and resonance have an argumentative intention, highlighting the possibility of reconciliation between poetic discourse and philosophical thought. In this case, it is no longer simply a matter of exhibiting the aesthetic qualities of poetic language, but of showing how its beauty and the pleasure it conveys can be a vehicle for fostering serious ideas.

The path to reconciliation continues with an association between the thinking of the poet Simonides' and that of the Sophist Gorgias. Both maintain that accepting the deception of poetry is a sign of intelligence and wisdom. The following examples, however, indicate that philosophical discourse is not always more accurate than poetic discourse. In fact, through this confrontation between Homer and Epicurus, the latter is – from the author's perspective - defeated. This passage is, moreover, symptomatic of Plutarch's conciliatory attitude towards Plato:

What then ought we to do?
Stop the young men's ears, like
the Ithacan sailors', with some
hard, insoluble wax, and force
them to set sail with Epicurus, and
steer clear of poetry? Or fix and
settle their judgment with rational
arguments, not letting pleasure
distract it into harm, and so pro-
tect them and guide them aright?

Epicurus' paraphrase echoes Plato's own ideas about the place of poetry in

educating the guardians of the polis. Plutarch, however, does not criticize them directly. On the contrary, he even seems to justify them tacitly. These rhetorical questions are those of someone who is thinking about education in the real world, his own world, and not, as in the *Republic*, in an imaginary and fictitious one. The question here is, if all is possible in an imaginary world, then the same cannot be said about the real one.

Moreover, as a reader of Homer, Epicurus does not have the interpretative skills that Plutarch thinks should be learned by young people. Indeed, in the episode of the Odyssey evoked here, it is not the forced deafness of the sailors that is praised, but rather the curiosity of Ulysses, his desire to access the knowledge granted by the Sirens' song. This is one of the features of his *arete*, attested in the opening lines of the poem. Ulysses' instructions to his companions –to cover their own ears with wax and tie him to the ship's mast so that he could hear the Sirens without danger– exemplify their intelligence and wisdom. Herein lies the symbolic value of the episode, in its expressive power to discuss the duplicity of poetry and the responses given to it. While praised in other parts of *De audiendis poetis*, Epicurus is here blamed in favour of Homer³⁵.

Plato is quoted in this chapter only once and in a rather surprising way. Having been quietly present from the beginning, only

³⁵ See *De aud. poet.* 37a.

now is he directly named as if all the previous segments did not use him as a point of reference. The author quotes a passage from the *Laws* (733d) in which the philosopher employs the image of mixing water with wine to symbolise, in this specific context, the advantages of having parents who differ in character. Plutarch takes up this same image and uses it as a metaphor for the best way of dealing with poetry:

When unmixed pleasure makes its fabulous and theatrical elements wax wanton and luxuriant, blustering violently for reputation, let us take hold and prune and constrain: but when it touches poetry with its grace, and the sweet attractions of the style are fruitful and purposeful, let us introduce some admixture of philosophy.

Again, Plutarch does the same thing he has already done in several other passages of the treatise: uses Plato to answer Plato.

The chapter concludes with the quotation of a fragment of Sophocles that, once again, leaves behind lingering echoes of Socrates' words in the *Republic* on the importance of first learning.

Poetry and philosophy hand in hand: at the end of the first chapter, this is the prevailing idea. Those which follow will develop, deepen, and demonstrate this desirable union within a work where the echoes of other texts are continuously being heard.

³⁶ *Rep.* 377a-b.

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NOTES & VARIA

1. NECROLOGICA

Luísa, a académica, a colega, a amiga

O Grupo de Estudos Clássicos da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra sofreu, mal começava o mês de Abril, um revés pesado. Com a chegada da primavera que a Luísa tanto prezava – como mulher sempre ligada à terra de onde provinha, o Fundão -, foi-se-lhe a vida, de uma forma inesperada e rápida que a todos abalou profundamente. Como compreender a intervenção de um destino que cortava, na plenitude, a existência de alguém com um caminho ainda tão longo pela frente? Mistérios que continuam insondáveis e que os mortais, apesar da sua condição, não

conseguiram ainda entender e, só com muito sofrimento, podem aceitar.

A Prof. Luísa de Nazaré da Silva Ferreira fez em Coimbra toda a sua carreira académica e, com certeza, uma boa parte do seu trajeto pessoal. Pôs, ao serviço dos Estudos Clássicos, o melhor da sua energia e capacidade. Empenhou-se, como helenista, em aprofundar os temas que mais a seduziam. Em primeiro lugar, os líricos gregos, a que dedicou a sua tese de doutoramento; depois Plutarco, a cuja sociedade passou a pertencer; e, como paixão mais recente, foi sobretudo a receção dos clássicos na imagem, em pintura e tapeçaria, que lhe cativou a atenção. Tudo o que sabia



procurou transmiti-lo a já múltiplas gerações de alunos, entre quem fez muitos discípulos e amigos.

Tudo em apenas 48 nos de vida ... Morrem cedo aqueles a quem os deuses amam! Para os que não vêem além da perspetiva humana fica a suspensão atónita perante os mistérios do destino e a saudade de uma companheira e amiga.

Maria de Fátima Silva
UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA

2. NEW EDITION OF PLUTARCH'S *DE FACIE* (DOCTORAL THESIS UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, THE NETHERLANDS).

Luisa Lesage Gárriga, *Plutarch. De facie quae in orbe lunae appareat. Textual Edition with Commentary*. University of Groningen / Universidad de Málaga, 2019.

Last 20 June 2019, Luisa Lesage defended her doctoral thesis at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. A Double Degree from University of Groningen - University of Malaga co-supervised by Prof. dr. Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta, Dr. Carlos Martín Alcalde and Prof. dr. Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, the doctoral thesis received the highest mark (*cum laude*). Regular members of the assessment committee were: Prof. dr. Ch. Jeden (University of Groningen), Prof. dr. J. F. Martos Montiel (University of Málaga), Prof. dr. R. Hirsch-Lüpold (University of Bern), Prof. dr. M. A.

Harder (University of Groningen); Extraordinary members of the Assessment Committee were: Prof. dr. Vicente Ramón Palerm, Prof. dr. Delfim F. Leão, and Dr. Geert Roskam. During the defence Lesage answered the numerous questions posed by the following members of Defence Committee: Prof. dr. M. Popovic, Prof. dr. Ch. Jeden and Prof. dr. M. A. Harder (University of Groningen), and Prof. dr. J. F. Martos Montiel and Dr. R. Caballero-Sánchez (University of Málaga); Prof. dr. em. Jan Bremmer and Prof. Dr. em. G. Luttikhuizen (University of Groningen).

Since 1800 seven critical editions of Plutarch's treatise *De facie quae in orbe Lunae appareat* by the following scholars have seen the light: J. G. Hutten (Cotta, Tübingen, 1801, vol. XIII, pp. 27-98); J. B. Dübner (Didot, Paris, 1841, vol. II, pp. 1126-1157); G. N. Bernardakis (Teubner, Leipzig, 1893, vol. V, pp. 402-472); P. Raingeard (doctoral thesis; Imprimerie Durand, Chartres, 1934); M. Pohlenz (Teubner, Leipzig, 1955, vol. V, fasc. 3, pp. 31-89); H. Cherniss (Loeb, Cambridge-Mass., 1957, vol. XII, pp. 2-223); P.-L. Donini (*Corpus Plutarchi Moralium*, Napoli, 2011). To these one should add the editions that appeared between the 16th and the end of the 18th centuries, such as the *editio princeps* (1509), known as "the Aldine edition" (by Aldo Moro, Venice, pp. 930-953); the edition Basel 1542 (by Frobenius and Episcopius in Basel, pp. 778-797);

Géneva 1572 (by Stephanus, vol. III, pp. 1696-1742; the second edition [Frankfurt, 1599] of which includes Xylander's Latin translation and is the origin of modern pagination of Plutarch's works, vol. II, pp. 920A-945E); Basel 1574 (by Xylander, pp. 601-616); and Oxford 1797 by D. Wytténbach (vol. IV2, pp. 721-828).

Despite the numerous editions, a new critical edition was highly necessary. Especially during the last two centuries, but also ever since its first edition by Aldo Moro and subsequent publications, the text of *De facie* was seriously affected by a large number of emendations, conjectures, and alterations that tended to modify the text transmitted by the only two manuscripts at our disposal, namely E and B. The six chapters, bibliography and two appendices included in this thesis provide an important step forward in the *constitutio* of the text and the understanding of Plutarch's treatise. To begin with, the first Chapter offers an overview of *De facie*'s textual transmission, in which the author tackles the rather chaotic situation of the text. This was partly due to the confusing way in which modern editions attempted to integrate the marginal notes by 16th century humanists, such as those by Amyot in his exemplar of the *editio Basilensis*. Dr. Lesage's introductory and exhaustive study of these marginal notes not only helped clarify the humanists' contributions to the text of Plutarch's *De facie*, but also managed to establish on a solid basis the attribution and authorship

of these readings. There follows Chapter 2: a literary analysis that introduces all the characters of the work and presents the main aspects of the discussion around *De facie*'s text. Occupying the central place of the thesis, Chapter 3 offers the critical edition proper including the exhaustive critical apparatus in which Dr. Lesage also integrates the above mentioned marginal notes of the humanists, something that up to the date was never done in a systematic and scrupulous way. As to the fourth Chapter, it includes a rich commentary to the previous critical edition. In it Dr. Lesage duly presents, comments upon, and discusses thirteen passages with textual problems and/or difficulties. She ponders textual choices by previous scholars and/or editors and evaluates their pros and cons before proceeding to provide a well-reasoned explanation of each of her interventions (or decision not to do so) in the text transmitted by mss. E or B. The discussion of each passage closes with an English translation of the text proposed. The fifth Chapter, "A Philosophy of the Moon," introduces a commentary on the conceptual peculiarities of Plutarch's treatise organized around key aspects, such ontology, mythology, habitability, and orography of the moon. Against the general tendency of 20th century scholarship, Dr. Lesage emphasizes the unity of Plutarch's treatise and in so doing highlights the frequent links and connections that Plutarch wisely intersperses in the so-called "scientific" and "mythological" parts. The sixth Chapter, finally, recapitulates the

conclusions of her study. The thesis also includes a complete bibliography and two appendices, in which Dr. Lesage offers a synoptic overview of the disagreements between mss. E and B (appendix I) and all

the corrections each copyists introduced in them (appendix II).

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez
Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta
Carlos Alcalde Martín

BOOK REVIEWS

S. XENOPHONTOS, *Ethical Education in Plutarch. Moralising Agents and Contexts. Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, Bd. 379, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston, 2016, ix+276 p. [ISBN: 978-3110350364].*

La *paideia* es, según Plutarco, un aprendizaje ético y un entrenamiento moral de larga duración. Esta es al menos la hipótesis que plantea la autora y a cuya demostración dedica este cuidado e inteligente estudio de la obra plutarquea, mostrando cómo en ocasiones *Vidas Paralelas* y *Moralia* tienen un carácter complementario mientras que, en otros casos, el énfasis en el aspecto ético varía de un *corpus* a otro. El volumen tiene una estructura muy clara que anima a la lectura desde el principio y, pese a ser resultado de una revisión de su Tesis Doctoral, está felizmente libre de esas largas notas a pie que tan a menudo obstaculizan la lectura sin aportar nada de sustancia al argumento. Las notas son pertinentes e informativas y la bibliografía muy completa.

En la idea de que estamos ante un ejercicio, ante un proceso de aprendizaje y mejora a través de todas las etapas de la vida, la estructura del libro recorre las edades y los escenarios en los que esa práctica tiene lugar, poniendo el foco tanto en los espacios privados como en los públicos y tanto en los que aprenden como en sus maestros.

El capítulo 1 presenta el marco filosófico en el que se inserta la que puede reconstruirse como teoría plutarquea sobre la educación ética. Plutarco adopta en unas ocasiones, y negocia en otras, con los presupuestos éticos de Platón, Aristóteles y los estoicos. El objetivo de la educación ética es la formación del carácter, desde una naturaleza moralmente neutra, por medio de los hábitos y del contexto social. Es interesante la referencia que hace la autora a una obra perdida de Plutarco, Περὶ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πόνων, de la que tenemos el resumen de Focio: “Sobre cómo muchos en muchas ocasiones han trabajado duro para corregir una naturaleza poco dotada, mientras otros han echado a perder una buena por negligencia; también sobre cómo algunos hombres en su juventud dieron a todos la impresión de ser lentos y necios, pero cuando alcanzaron la madurez un cambio repentino de su naturaleza los hizo rápidos e inteligentes”. En ese resumen se concentran ya las ideas centrales de Plutarco sobre la educación ética y la dicotomía entre naturaleza (*physis*) y educación o crianza (*paideia*) para advertir de que los menos dotados por naturaleza pueden igualmente, mediante el esfuerzo, corregirse y mejorar, mientras que los naturalmente mejores corren, no obstante su ventaja, el riesgo de malograrse. El

modo correcto de vivir depende de una enseñanza adecuada y la *paideia* somete a la *physis* mediante el “cambio” (*metabole*) y la “corrección” (*epanorthosis*). Introduce la autora, aunque no lo desarrolla, el problema de distinguir exactamente qué es lo que cambia la educación, si la naturaleza (*physis*) o el carácter (*ethos*), algo que no queda demasiado claro.

El capítulo 2 analiza la educación que los niños reciben de sus padres. Es especialmente interesante el estudio que hace la autora de la influencia de las madres en la formación de los hijos. En este caso, la diferencia entre *Moralia* y *Vidas* es significativa. En el primer *corpus* nos encontramos con una especie de madre silenciosa encargada del cuidado físico de los hijos, mientras que en el segundo las madres de los personajes biografiados tienen una participación más activa y pronuncian discursos influyentes en la acción de sus hijos (se dedica un detallado estudio a Volumnia, madre de Coriolano). La interpretación que hace Xenophontos de este hecho es muy persuasiva: el concepto de maternidad en Plutarco es una combinación del pasado griego y el ideal romano contemporáneo. Así, la ausencia de un papel activo en las madres atenienses de las *Vidas*, con un papel limitado a parir hijos y el cuidado del hogar, frente a la inclusión de las madres espartanas, más próximas al modelo de la matrona romana de finales de la República e inicios del Imperio, sería muestra de un modelo de moralidad “multigravitacional”, con valores centrales tanto en el mundo griego como en el romano.

El capítulo 3 se ocupa de la educación recibida de parte de pedagogos y maestros. En una primera parte se detalla de qué modo están interrelacionados dos escritos de Plutarco, *De audiendis poetis* y *De audiendo*. Según la autora, ambos tratados son complementarios y desarrollan la idea de cómo la poesía y la filosofía también lo son y el poeta y el filósofo actúan como educadores morales. Si en esa primera parte Plutarco se aparta del rechazo platónico hacia la poesía, en la segunda parte del capítulo, las figuras de Alcibíades y Dión sirven para reflexionar sobre el modelo platónico de educación filosófica. Si en los mencionados tratados de *Moralia* se concentraban prescripciones morales para los estudiantes, en *Vidas* la atención se desplaza hacia ejemplos concretos de maestros y estudiantes del pasado histórico: en primer lugar, los maestros que aparecen en los capítulos iniciales de las biografías, que se ocupan de los años de la infancia; en segundo lugar, y más importante, los consejeros que ofrecen una guía moral a esos mismos personajes en su edad adulta cuando ya están implicados en la política. El análisis de la influencia ejercida por Sócrates en Alcibíades y por Platón en Dión, es decir, por dos filósofos sobre dos políticos ya adultos, prueba esa idea de que para Plutarco la *paideia* es una labor de toda la vida, no circunscrita a los años de la infancia. Esta misma idea sigue desarrollándose en los capítulos siguientes.

Los capítulos 4-7 tratan la aculturación de los adultos en diferentes escenarios. La educación de las mujeres, más específicamente de las esposas, es el asunto del ca-

pítulo 4. En lo que a *Moralia* se refiere, Xenophontos analiza *Coniugalia praecepta*, *Consolatio ad uxorem* y *Mulierum uirtutes* y, en relación con el objeto de estudio, el principal es el primero, donde se deja claro cómo la educación de la mujer debe ponerse en manos del marido. La mujer queda en un permanente estado de subordinación, lo que contrasta con el *cursus* de los varones. La modestia, o αἰδώς, es en la mujer un rasgo paralizador que le impide tomar la palabra ante los varones; si el estudiante masculino al que Plutarco se dirige en *De audiendo* tiene que escuchar a su maestro en silencio pero puede, cuando éste acaba de hablar, plantearle sus dudas, la mujer, como Xenophontos recuerda mencionando a la Eunemis de *Septem sapientium convivium*, debe permanecer en silencio en todo caso (a título de curiosidad: la gran figura de la antropología y los estudios clásicos, Jane Harrison, perteneció a la primera generación de mujeres admitidas en la universidad británica, a finales del XIX; al principio podían asistir a las clases como oyentes e incluso examinarse, pero no recibían un título oficial, situación que se mantuvo hasta 1948). Esto en cuanto a la educación recibida, por lo que se refiere a cómo las mujeres puedan ser ellas maestras de virtud, en *Moralia* no lo son, habitualmente, a través del *logos*, sino convirtiéndose en paradigma mediante su acción. Por lo que se refiere a las *Vidas*, los pocos ejemplos de mujeres que tanto de palabra como de obra muestran a sus maridos el camino a seguir lo hacen en casos excepcionales, cuando la debilidad de los varones así lo exige.

En el capítulo 5 se muestra cómo la educación filosófica del hombre de estado

lo prepara para ser maestro ético de la ciudadanía. Los tratados analizados son *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* y *An seni respublica gerenda sit*. Siguiendo con la idea de que la *paideia* es un ejercicio constante en el que, en el caso de los hombres, los papeles no son estáticos, nos encontramos en este capítulo con aquellos varones bien educados que ahora están en condiciones, desde su lugar político, de ser a su vez maestros de ética para sus conciudadanos. Esa función educativa la desempeñarán con mayor éxito los políticos más ancianos y experimentados, una idea que podemos relacionar con la visión positiva de la vejez que se encuentra en este autor.

En el capítulo 6 se estudia el modo en el que Plutarco presenta a figuras militares que ejercen una autoridad moral sobre sus subordinados. Para ello Xenophontos se fija en las parejas *Paulo Emilio-Timoleón* y *Sertorio-Eumenes*. No parece casual que en esta ocasión la figura romana preceda a la griega, ya que Plutarco se extiende más en la educación moral ejercida por Paulo Emilio, entusiasta de la *paideia* helénica, sobre su tropa y por Sertorio sobre los bárbaros a los que somete, aunque sea a costa de reelaborar las fuentes (Polibio y Salustio respectivamente), mientras que las figuras griegas tienen en este aspecto un desarrollo menor. En cualquier caso, para Plutarco hacer la biografía de un general no supone extenderse en su fortaleza marcial, sino ofrecer más ejemplos de liderazgo ético.

Finalmente, el capítulo 7 se sitúa en el simposio, otro lugar fundamental para la socialización del varón griego. En este ca-

so la autora analiza los proemios de los nueve libros que forman las *Quaestiones conuiuales*, donde se concentran las ideas morales del queronense, así como el contenido de los dos primeros problemas del Libro I, y defiende que el sentido de este tratado es más ético que sofístico.

A lo largo del volumen, la socialización se muestra como un elemento clave en la transmisión de las enseñanzas éticas. El estudio, ordenado de acuerdo a dos parámetros que se interrelacionan, las etapas de la vida y los espacios de socialización, analiza el papel del varón como receptor o como agente de la educación ética y el capítulo 4, dedicado a la educación de las mujeres, confirma ese papel protagonista. El hogar es un espacio más (como la arena política, como la guerra, como el banquete) donde los varones griegos socializan y actúan, y la autora pone el foco en uno de los aspectos más importantes de esa capacidad humana: la transmisión de los valores.

El estudio de Sophia Xenophontos responde perfectamente al título y ofrece un interesante panorama de los agentes y los contextos de una educación ética en la obra de Plutarco.

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ANGELO POLIZIANO, Traduzione delle Amatoriae narrationes di Plutarco a cura di Claudio Bevegni, Edizione nazionale delle opere di Angelo Poliziano. Testi, vol. 7.2,4, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 2018, xliv+42pp. [ISBN: 978-8822265883].

Le *Amatoriae narrationes*, una piccola raccolta di storie e leggende di argomento amoroso, furono tradotte da Poliziano nel 1479 durante il suo soggiorno a Fiesole nella villa che gli era stata messa a disposizione da Lorenzo de' Medici. Il testo tradotto fu inviato a Pandolfo Collenuccio “come pegno concreto e durevole” a legare i due umanisti.

Nella lunga Introduzione, Bevegni affronta i vari problemi che il testo pone ed egli non può prescindere dall'esame, sia pure sintetico, della lingua plutarchea, una koinè che -come afferma Giangrande- se da un lato rispecchia la lingua parlata, dall'altro è influenzata dall'Atticismo: è la cosiddetta “Literarische Koine”, che mescola sapientemente Atticismi e lingua d'uso (p.XI).

Circa poi il manoscritto usato da Poliziano, Bevegni ricorda che è il cod. Laur. 80.21, databile al XIV o al XV secolo (Lo studioso cita anche gli altri due codd. laurenziani che veicolano le *Amatoriae narrationes*, ossia il Laur. 80.5 e il Laur. 80.22) e, a riprova di ciò, riporta un passo delle AN IV.774 D, p. 403.2-4 e la sua traduzione Latina, ANLat. IV 1.1-2.

Indicato dunque il manoscritto utilizzato da Poliziano, è necessario avverte Bevegni mettere in luce il suo *modus vertendi*: egli, nella sostanza, fa proprio quanto affermava S. Girolamo (ep. 57.V.2-5) “*Ego enim non solum fateor sed libera voce profiteor me in interpretatione Graecorum (...) non verbum e verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu*”.

Le traduzioni umanistiche, cioè, dovevano ‘ammaliare’ il lettore nel rispetto dell’originale, perché tradurre non signi-

ficava tradire. Ciò avveniva grazie ad alcuni ‘accorgimenti’ che Bevegni esamina con acribia, e sui quali si sofferma proponendo di volta in volta esempi che meglio chiariscono la volontà dell’umanista-traduttore.

Un capitolo di grande interesse tratta del Poliziano filologo, ossia del suo approccio ad alcuni *loci* certamente corrotti con i quali anche l’umanista si è dovuto confrontare: anche in questo caso, l’esame è particolarmente accurato (pp. XXIX-XXXVI).

Della traduzione poliziana delle *Ama-toriae narrationes* non sono conservati manoscritti: né l’autografo, né copie da quello derivate, sicché ogni edizione moderna non può prescindere dal testo conservato nella *editio princeps* degli *Omnia opera Angeli Politiani*, edizione curata da Alessandro Sarti (XXXVIII-XL).

Segue, dopo la lettera di dedica a Pandolfo Collenuccio, il testo latino con appa-rato critico.

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CH. S. CHRYSANTHOU, Plutarch’s Parallel Lives: Narrative Technique and Moral Judgement. Trends in Classics, Supplementary volumes, vol. 57, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2018, x+228 p. [ISBN 978-3-11-057298-8].

Correspondendo, em grande medida à tese de doutoramento, orientada por C. Pelling, o livro de Chrysanthou reflecte sobre a construção do moralismo de Plutarco, nas biografias, e como ele é apresentado à au-

diência-aos leitores por meio da técnica narra-tiva, comparando, várias vezes, essa técnica com a usada por historiadores ou em outros géneros literários, como a tragédia ou o romance. A problematização do moralismo, num complexo puzzle de valores, motiva várias reavaliações, pois Plutarco procura aprofundar o *ethos*, conduzindo o leitor por uma interessante viagem intertextual. Recupera, assim, uma temática já tratada por diversos autores, como C. Pelling, P. Stadter, A. Zadorojny ou T. Duff, procurando concentrar-se mais nas estratégias que Plutarco desenvolve na sua narrativa e como as adapta ao contexto. É essa a matéria que o A. organiza em seis capítulos: 1 – Introduction: Plutarch’s *Lives*, Moralism, and Narrative Technique), 2 – Life-Writing in Triangles, Plutarch, Readers, and the Men of History, 3 – Emotion, Perception, and Cognition: The Individual and Society, 4 – A Life without End?, 5 – “It Remains to Consider the Lives in Parallel” (Ag./ Cleom.-Gracchi 1.1), 6 – Conclusion: On the Malice of Plutarct?

Na Introdução, além de se explicar o conteúdo de cada um dos capítulos, percep-bemos o objectivo geral do livro em reflectir sobre a representação do moralismo nas biografias e a metodologia narrativa, nem sempre uniforme, que é usada por Plutarco, pois muitas vezes procede-se a uma adaptação das técnicas ao contexto e objectivos da própria narrativa. De algum modo, essa plasticidade narrativa ajuda Plutarco a relacionar-se com a audiência, mantendo a sua autoridade de narrador, no âmbito daquilo a que chama “life-writing in triangles”: Plutarco, a audiência (leitor) e as figuras históricas da narrativa. Este

triângulo será determinante para a análise do A. ao longo dos vários capítulos, seguindo, por um lado, a dinâmica do par biográfico e da *synkrisis*, um momento relevante para o julgamento moral, e, por outro, remetendo várias vezes para os *Moralia*. Além disso, procura-se interpretar até que ponto Plutarco tenta moldar o juízo moral dos destinatários ou receptores das biografias, recorrendo, por exemplo, a processos de manipulação temporal. Para o A., no entanto, interessam sobretudo as ocorrências do ‘temporal displacement’ (p. 9), pela relação que a narrativa estabelece com elementos históricos externos. Como base teórica para a análise dos processos narrativos, o A. recorre, entre outros, a G. Genette, W. Iser ou De Jong/Nunlist, a par de estudos que se dedicam mais especificamente à obra de Plutarco, no âmbito da reflexão sobre a forma como se desdobram as dimensões indivíduo-colectivo e privado-público na narrativa e da sua relação com os leitores, que nas biografias teriam mais maturidade para fazerem uma interpretação autónoma. Na parte final, para exemplificar os processos narrativos de Plutarco e o objectivo deste livro, o A. testa a sua aproximação ao texto com a biografia de Sólon: o encontro de Sólon com Creso (27) e o discurso de Creso a Ciro (28).

O Segundo Capítulo é dedicado ao diálogo entre Plutarco/narrador, a audiência/leitor e as personagens históricas, em especial no prólogo de algumas biografias (*Dem.-Cic., Alex.-Caes., Thes.-Rom., Cim.-Luc., Aem.-Tim. e Per.-Fab.*). Embora não seja esse o objectivo central do A., acaba por aprofundar o papel que o prólogo desempenha no contexto do par biográfico e da sua relação com os capítulos finais das biografias

e, em particular, com as *synkrisis*. Nestes prólogos, salientam-se, sobretudo, referências autobiográficas, marcas de ligação aos leitores, técnicas narrativas próximas da historiografia, interconexão de mito e história, momentos de cumplicidade entre o narrador e a audiência. De facto, ao recuperar o passado, o narrador, a audiência e as personagens históricas acabam envolvidas e até cúmplices, a par da afirmação de autoridade por Plutarco, pelo facto de “they are all assumed to belong to an ‘imagined community’, based on a set of common features, moral, ideological, and cultural values and concerns” (p. 43). Naturalmente que Plutarco usa recursos retóricos em todos estes processos, não tanto por razões estilísticas, mas essencialmente para atingir um fim ético. Acrescente-se que os modelos de virtude visam produzir um efeito mimético junto da audiência, mas não imediato, até porque muitas vezes Plutarco é ambivalente nos seus conceitos. Dessa forma, a audiência questiona ou julga os princípios morais, conforme a técnica narrativa que é usada. Isso mesmo sucede nos três exemplos analisados: *Caes.* 56.7-9, *Demetr.* 19.4-10 e *Luc.* 38.5.

No Terceiro Capítulo, o A. aprofunda a dupla dimensão indivíduo-colectivo, ouse já, como o herói se (auto)projecta e na comunidade, e como se gera essa interacção. Nesse sentido, desenvolve-se neste capítulo aspectos relacionados com o *ethos* dos heróis biografados, enquanto figuras históricas complexas, que têm de fazer escolhas e tomar decisões, à semelhança do que sucede em outros géneros literários, como a épica e a tragédia. Sem dúvida que Plutarco usa diversas técnicas de caracterização dos heróis, privilegiando um tom moralizante. Exemplifica o A. essa complexidade ou am-

biguidade do *ethos* com as biografias de Dión (33.4-5) e Cícero (19.5-20.1). Nestes casos, são identificados momentos de dramaticidade expressa e de dramaticidade silenciosa, mas que se repetem em várias biografias, como nas de Alexandre, César e António. Segundo o A., estes momentos têm consequências na própria percepção dos leitores, até porque as fraquezas dos heróis são apresentadas por Plutarco também para terem um efeito didáctico junto dos leitores. Além disso, como este estudo salienta, há, por vezes, diferenças nos pares biografados, como sucede com Crasso e Níctias: Crasso tem uma dimensão mais individual e Níctias mais colectiva. Por conseguinte, este Capítulo revela, sobretudo, a espessura mental dos biografados, a par da descrição dos principais momentos em que participaram de forma decisiva.

O tema do Quarto Capítulo é a análise da parte final das biografias. Como se constata, nem sempre Plutarco aborda o tema da morte nos capítulos finais das biografias. Além disso, convém relacionar essa parte conclusiva com o prólogo e a própria *synkrisis*. É também nesta fase conclusiva que, muitas vezes, se concentram elementos morais e se formulam algumas questões que interpelam o leitor. São interpretados, em particular, quatro aspectos nestes capítulos conclusivos: o recurso a elementos anedóticos (*Alc.* e *Lys.*); a projecção do *post mortem* e a projecção da própria *polis* (*Thes.* e *Lyc.*); os finais com elementos alusivos, sejam morais ou filosóficos (*Phoc.*, *Cat. Mi.*, *Crass.* e *Nic.*); ou finais com ‘insight distorted’ (*Demetr.-Ant.* e *Pyrrh.-Mar.*). Realce-se que várias vezes Plutarco oferece ao leitor duas alternativas de leitura de um acontecimento ou opta por uma percepção moral

mais geral. Além disso, os vícios dos heróis são justificados por uma deficiente *paideia* ou um *logos* desequilibrado. Quanto à relação dos capítulos finais com a *synkrisis*, realça o A. dois interessantes aspectos: o final da segunda biografia do par tem mais ligações com a *synkrisis* e a *synkrisis* é mais problemática que o final das biografias.

No Capítulo Quinto, a *synkrisis* é o elemento central de análise. Enquanto o prólogo das biografias realça, em geral, as semelhanças, na *synkrisis* sobressaiem as diferenças. É na *synkrisis*, por ser mais reflexiva e de marcado questionamento, que o narrador pode influenciar o leitor na sua avaliação moral, reforçando, assim, a relação com o destinatário. Como se salienta, não é função da *synkrisis* eliminar a ambiguidade, mas levar o leitor a reconsiderar o seu julgamento. Parece-nos que poderiam ter sido abordados mais elementos morais que se projectam nas *synkrisis* e que remetem, ou não, para a narrativa das biografias. Inclui-se neste Capítulo uma reflexão sobre a razão para alguns pares biográficos não terem *synkrisis*, considerando o A. que é, provavelmente, uma omissão deliberada.

Para concluir, o Sexto Capítulo demonstra como as técnicas historiográficas que Plutarco critica a Heródoto são usadas nas biografias, uma temática já abordada em vários estudos (cf. p. 160, n. 4). Por um lado, se Plutarco assim procede, é porque a narrativa é construída em função da caracterização moral dos heróis. Por outro, o género biográfico partilha várias características com a historiografia, um aspecto que poderia ter merecido uma maior atenção por parte do A., até para se perceber se

os leitores de Plutarco devem imitar a metodologia de análise que foi usada para avaliar Heródoto, sendo certo que o contexto dos *Moralia* é distinto das *Vitae*.

Estamos na presença de um livro que conduz o leitor por uma interessante reflexão e com uma estrutura bem delineada, ainda que tenha algumas repetições temáticas dentro dos próprios capítulos, como sucede em especial no Segundo Capítulo. O texto está bem anotado, com recurso a bibliografia diversa e actualizada, revelador do conhecimento que o A. tem da obra de Plutarco, em especial das *Vitae*. Estranha-se o facto de o A. não ter justificado o *corpus* central do seu estudo, pois privilegia claramente alguns pares biográficos na sua análise. Tendo em conta a temática do livro, com a identificação de várias técnicas narrativas, poderia o A. ter dedicado uma parte do seu estudo, talvez na Conclusão, ao tema da apreciação moral maior ou não entre biografias de heróis gregos e romanos, aproveitando a análise que faz das *synkrisis*. Acrescente-se, ainda, que pela forma como valoriza a relação entre a narrativa e a audiência/leitor, seria recomendável uma melhor definição de quem é o leitor das biografias, num contexto cultural e político muito complexo. Por fim, como demonstram as abundantes referências a estudos de C. Pelling ou T. Duff, à uma base temática deste livro já bastante explorada, mas o A. procurou percorrer novos caminhos de investigação, deixando aos estudiosos das *Vitae* um contributo muito positivo.

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NEW COLLECTIVE PUBLICATIONS

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**D. F. LEÃO & L. ROIG LANZILLOTA (eds.),
A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth and Magic. Essays in Honor of Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, Leiden, Brill, 2019.**

ISBN: 978-90-04-40435-9, 361 p.

La comunidad de plutarquistas, representada en este volumen por ciertos estudiosos de la obra del Queronense, ofrece un sentido homenaje al profesor Aurelio Pérez Jiménez. En realidad y como señalan los editores, he aquí un doble tributo: a Plutarco y al profesor Pérez Jiménez, ya que ambos, mediante su producción científico-literaria, han guiado a los lectores por las vías del saber. Tras el prefacio y una nota de reconocimiento sobre Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, el libro presenta dieciocho colaboraciones científicas con arreglo a un amplio espectro de temas que, mediante una metodología filológica, inciden en aspectos culturales, religiosos, filosóficos e históricos inherentes a la producción de Plutarco. Organizado en torno a dos secciones centrales (estudios relativos a las *Vidas*, contribuciones correspondientes a los *Moralia*), la publicación se cierra con la obra bibliográfica de Pérez Jiménez y con los índices pertinentes. Estos son los contenidos del volumen:

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S. XENOPHONTOS & K. OIKONOMOPOULOU (eds.), *Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Plutarch*, Leiden, Brill, 2019. ISBN: 978-90-04-40944-6, 693 p.

En el marco de la prestigiosa serie de la ‘Brill’s Companions to Classical Reception’ y con el número vigésimo de la misma, las editoras han compilado un inventario de colaboraciones, debidas a especialistas de talla internacional en la producción de Plutarco, con el propósito de ofrecer una panorámica de la recepción que la obra plutarquea ha merecido secularmente. Este *opus magnum* muestra un análisis exhaustivo de la recepción que ha experimentado la labor del Queronense desde Época Romana hasta nuestra Época Contemporánea. Los treinta y siete capítulos de que consta el volumen exploran la trascendencia y el grado de aceptación con que el pensamiento de Plutarco ha repercutido en la tradición literaria e intelectual de Europa, Norteamérica, África del Norte y Oriente Medio. El libro, que presenta inicialmente una introducción de las editoras, consta del siguiente índice:

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VOLUMES REVIEWED IN THIS SECTION

ABBREVIATIONS

- *Natural Spectaculars* = M. Meeusen & L. Van der Stockt (eds.), *Natural Spectaculars. Aspects of Plutarch's Philosophy of Nature* (Plutarchea Hypomnemata), Leuven, Leuven University Pr., 2015.

A. BERNABÉ PAJARES, «*Ambigüedad espacial en Plutarco fr. 178 Sandbach y en el papiro de Derveni*», en J. Ángel y Espinós, J.M. Floristán Imízcoz, F. García Romero & M. López Salvá (eds.), *Τρίετα καὶ γέλως. Homenaje a Ignacio Rodríguez Alfageme*, Zaragoza, 2015, 83-96.

Un estudio comparado del contenido pertinente en el fragmento plutarqueo y del que, al respecto, presenta el papiro de Derveni demuestra la existencia de paralelismos entre ambos textos, no obstante el lapso temporal que media entre ellos. En tal sentido, los documentos exponen la

iniciación como un espacio concreto que conecta este mundo con el Más Allá. Con probabilidad mediante el rito, el iniciando adquiría el conocimiento de la suerte que experimentaba el alma ultratumba. Asimismo, el rito proporcionaba pureza y liberación del miedo ante la muerte, factor que distinguía a los iniciados de los no iniciados. (V.R.)

G. BOURKE, «*Classical Sophism and Philosophy in Pseudo-Plutarch on “The Training of the Children”*», en *HSPh* 108 (2015) 377-402.

Convencionalmente se ha venido defendiendo que el tratado pseudo-plutar-

queo Περὶ παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς presenta una notable deuda doctrinal respecto de la tradición socrática (especialmente Jenofonte) y de los filósofos socráticos correspondientes al período helenístico. Sin merma de esta tradición, Bourke acentúa el peso que la μίμησις (es decir, la emulación que merecen los grandes hombres del pasado) ostenta en el contenido del tratado, una categoría inherente a la pedagogía sofística en una línea que puede trazarse desde Protágoras a Isócrates (S.V.).

A. CASANOVA, «Are Women Colder or Hotter than Men? (*Quaest. conv. 3,4*)», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 75-85.

El profesor Casanova efectúa un eficaz análisis de cierta cuestión que concita el interés de varios amigos en un ámbito simposiaco: ¿Es el cuerpo de las mujeres más frío o más caliente que el de los hombres? Casanova expone las respectivas posiciones que defienden los interviniéntes e incide en los problemas textuales que el contenido de la cuestión plantea, la cual afecta a clarificaciones sobre las enseñanzas de Aristóteles. En síntesis, el médico Atriito de Tasos defiende la tesis aristotélica en el sentido de que el cuerpo de las mujeres es más cálido, tesis que es refutada por Floro, defensor de la opción contraria. (V.R.)

J. M. CERVANTES MAURI, «Sobre la riqueza de Pùblicola», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 12 (2015) 3-16.

Las fuentes sobre la prosopografía de Pùblicola suelen destacar la pobreza inherente al mandatario. Sin embargo, en la composición biográfica de Plutarco detectamos que el de Queronea subraya la condición de su riqueza. En realidad, los

trazos de Plutarco pretenden subrayar que a Pùblicola no importaba tanto el dinero cuanto el uso del mismo. El héroe muestra generosidad y filantropía, cualidades que cultiva para destinarn su hacienda al cuidado de los más necesitados, factor biográficamente relevante que Plutarco desea enfatizar. (S.V.)

B. DEMULDER, «From Chaos to Cosmos (and Back Again). Plato's *Timaeus* and the Composition of *De animae procreatione* and *De facie in orbe lunae*», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 199-214.

Este capítulo contiene un estudio de la interpretación plutarquea del diálogo Timeo de Platón a través de ejemplos procedentes de dos obras, De animae procreatione y De facie in orbe lunae. A primera vista Plutarco seleccionó y organizó los pasajes del diálogo platónico sirviéndose de distintos métodos en cada una de las dos obras mencionadas, lo cual se halla en relación, por otra parte, con el hecho de que en el primer tratado Plutarco comenta directamente los escritos de Platón y en el segundo los usa para desarrollar su propia perspectiva filosófica. Partiendo de estas premisas se analiza la forma de selección, introducción, tratamiento y desarrollo de un pasaje de Timeo (53b) en el diverso contexto de ambas obras plutarqueas. (A.V.)

T. E. DUFF, «Aspect and Subordination in Plutarchan Narrative», en R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography*, Oxford, 2015, 129-148.

Duff identifies and explores two cha-

racteristics of Plutarchan narrative by means of a close analysis of syntax. The first is the tendency for events in which the subject of a Life is not involved to be told in subordinate clauses and with imperfective verb forms: grammatical features which have the effect of 'backgrounding' the content. This creates a grammatical "hierarchy" in which the broader historical context is relegated to the grammatical background, where it sets the scene against which the action of the biographical subject, told in main verbs in the aorist tense, stands out. The second characteristic is the predomination, at key moments, of imperfective verb forms; such forms have the effect of creating a vivid slow-motion tableau, in which events are described as though from the perspective of a participant; that is, in such scenes narrative perspective changes from 'external' (or 'diegetic') to 'internal' (or 'mimetic'). For Duff, the speeding up and slowing down of narrative pace introduced by these two techniques create a distinctively Plutarchan narrative rhythm and texture. Analysis of a passage from De gloria (347a-c) shows that Plutarch himself was aware that the second technique was associated both with an internal perspective and with a slowing of narrative time, and that Plutarch saw both as features of vividness (*évépseia*) in historical writing. Duff's broader argument is that verbal aspect is something with much to reveal about the meaning and generic identity of texts, and about how ancient readers experienced them. (L.F.)

- L. EGGER, «Die Schlacht um Placentia oder die 'Erfindung' eines Tages: Überlegungen zu Plut. Otho 5-6 und Tac. Hist. II,17-22», en R. Lafel & K. Stro-

bel (eds.), *Antike Lebenswelten: althistorische und papyrologische Studien*, Berlin-Boston (Mass.), 2015, 292-319.

Las diferencias en las descripciones de la batalla de Placentia en Plutarco y Tácito no se explican según L.E. por el uso de fuentes diferentes, pues ambos autores parece que utilizan la misma fuente, sino por una distinta intención, concepción y estrategia narrativa. El autor analiza en este sentido diferentes pasajes que en Tácito aparecen más desarrollados que en Plutarco y lo atribuye a una mayor elaboración del autor romano para conseguir un contraste moral más marcado entre las facciones enfrentadas. (A.G.)

F. FERRARI, «Le système de causes chez Plutarque», *RPhA* 33 1 (2015) 95-114.

Con la base que proporciona la tradición platónico-aristotélica de la doctrina de las causas (y muy especialmente merced al Timeo de Platón), Plutarco contribuye en los diferentes tratados de su obra ensayística a precisar efectivamente algunas cuestiones sobre el sistema de las causas: entre las tradicionales causas divinas y causas naturales de sello platónico, Plutarco introduce las causas individuales de la tradición. En cualquier caso, el Timeo de Platón resulta central en la reflexión cosmológica y metafísica de Plutarco. (S.V.)

A. FERREIRA, «The Power of Nature and Its Influence on Statesmen in the Work of Plutarch», in *Natural Spectaculars*, 155-165.

La contribución de Ferreira incide en apartados de la obra plutarquea donde un estadista puede verse condicionado por los fenómenos de la naturaleza

(generalmente meteorológicos, astronómicos, geológicos; y también relativos a las plantas, a los animales, al agua). Con atención a los pasajes seleccionados, la autora concluye que los fenómenos naturales están insertados para caracterizar la reacción de los respectivos personajes ante los mismos; y, de paso, para proveer un modelo (coyunturalmente negativo, como ocurre en la Vida de Nicias) con intención didáctica. (A.V.)

- L. FOTHERINGHAM**, «*Plutarch and Dio on Cicero at the Trial of Milo*», in R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography*, Oxford, 2015, 193-207.

This paper examines the incident of the trial of Milo as narrated by Plutarch (Cicero 35) and Cassius Dio (Roman History 40.48–55) and offers useful insights into the methods of work of the two authors. It is shown that Plutarch structures the Life of Cicero in a careful manner, assuming audience knowledge of history and presenting a picture of Cicero which mixes positive and negative elements, reflecting at the same time overarching themes of the Life or even of the book (e.g. the fear or timidity of the orators). On the other hand, it is suggested that Dio plays with annalistic structure and uses this event in order to reflect his concern with the political breakdown of the time as well as construct a picture of Cicero in close relation to his context. (C.C.)

- M. FOX**, «*Plutarch's Numa and the Rhetoric of Aetiology*», in R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and In-*

famy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography, Oxford, 2015, 177-192.

This paper takes as test case Plutarch's Life of Numa in order to examine the 'mutability of aetiology' and its rhetorical possibilities in Plutarch's biography. By looking comparatively at some earlier accounts of the king (mainly Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Ovid), it shows the way in which these accounts manipulate the tradition about Numa in order to serve their own purposes. It also demonstrates the sophisticated manner in which Plutarch handles his material in order to present Numa as a fully fledged Pythagorean, allowing his rhetorical skill and his position as an outsider at Rome to emerge as central to the reinterpretation of the king. A key argument of the present paper is that more than other treatments of Numa, Plutarch's account refuses to subdue the more absurd and chaotic elements of the tradition in the service of history, thus exemplifying how the rhetoric of aetiology can point to new ways of interpretation. (C.C.)

- I. GAMLATH**, «*Plutarch's Animal and Vegetarian Treatises and the Concept of Maghata in Sinhalese Culture*», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 12 (2015) 17-40.

Se trata de un estudio que permite establecer las conexiones entre los escritos de Plutarco sobre la actitud hacia los animales y la noción del término Maghata (que, en pali, significa 'no matar', con especial atención a los animales) en la cultura cingalesa. Gamlath recoge los testimonios plutarqueos que instan a un modo de vida sencillo, ajeno a la ostentación, para establecer paralelismos con

el trato dispensado a los seres vivos en las prácticas cingalesas, donde resulta dominante la actitud categórica de 'no violencia' (V.R.)

- A. GOSTOLI, «Un'antica fonte magno-greca nel *De musica* attribuito a Plutarco: Glauco di Reggio», *Plutarchos N.S.* 12 (2015) 41-54.

El tratado De musica, que figura entre las obras atribuidas a Plutarco, cita al estudioso Glauco de Reggio como una de las fuentes capitales para reconstruir la historia de la música griega y de la poesía lírica de la Antigüedad. La autora del artículo procede a una exhaustiva revisión de la documentación pertinente para concluir que, en efecto, Glauco debe considerarse un teórico principal de la producción poético-musical en la Antigüedad; y el primer autor antiguo en desarrollar tratados de esta naturaleza, el πρῶτος εὐρέτης de la historiografía sobre música y poesía. (V.R.)

- F. F. GREWING, «‘Hellenismos’ und ‘virtutes dicendi’ in der stoischen Sprachphilosophie: zu Diogenes Laertius 7,59 und Ps.-Plutarch, Hom. 16-26», in H. Kugelmeier (ed.), *Translatio humanitatis: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Riemer*, St. Ingbert, 2015, 381-404.

El autor analiza el pasaje de Diógenes Laercio 7,59 en el que se habla de cinco virtutes dicendi; el número de cinco, en contraste con las cuatro de Teofrasto y su posterior tradición, sería específico de la teoría estoica del lenguaje. Controvertida es la interpretación de la terminología usada por Diógenes Laercio que no deja claro si el Ἑλληνισμός debe ser considerada la virtus principal a partir

de la cual se desarrollan las cuatro restantes, o si por el contrario todas cinco virtutes se encuentran en el mismo nivel de importancia. Comparando este pasaje con la teoría estoica de los tropos transmitida principalmente en Ps.-Plutarco, Hom. 16-26 el autor llega a la conclusión que el término Ἑλληνισμός es usado en un sentido doble (Zwitterfunktion) por lo que define tanto la corrección del lenguaje en sí, es decir la premisa para un buen discurso, como su perfeccionamiento, es decir una de las cinco virtutes dicendi. (A.G.)

- F. GUIDETTI, «Silla e la dea della notte: nota a Plutarco, *Vita di Silla* 6, 11-13», *SIFC* 13 1 (2015) 95-107.

Nella parte iniziale della Vita di Silla, Plutarco ricorda che, nel momento in cui l'esercito comandato da Silla partiva per la guerra sociale, “si aprì nel terreno una vasta voragine e da essa scaturì un gran fuoco e una fiamma splendente si innalzò verso il cielo”. Il prodigo avvenne περὶ Λαβέρνην. Lo studioso si sofferma ad esaminare “l'enigmatica localizzazione” e il tempo in cui tale prodigo è accaduto (non secondo Guidetti il 91 a. C. ma il 90 a. C.). Dopo aver discusso le proposte di Mommsen, di Peter e dopo aver richiamato i testi di Orosio e di Giulio Ossequiente, Guidetti passa ad analizzare il testo plutarcheo che, a suo avviso, non è stato finora approfondito. Circa la dea Lavinia, egli ricorda come ella presiedesse tutte le attività che si svolgevano nell'oscurità della notte. In effetti, Lavinia era una dea ctonia legata all'oscurità, un laevum numen che trova conferma in una coppa di ceramica a vernice nera risalente al III sec. a. C., rinvenuta nella necropoli dei Cappuccini di Orte. Lo studioso ipotizza,

- poi, che l'episodio narrato da Plutarco possa trovare la sua collocazione non già lontano da Roma ma, piuttosto, appena fuori dalla città ossia nel bosco sacro situato sulla via Salaria. (P.V.)*
- M. HILLGRUBER**, «*Eine Anspielung auf die Lehre vom Recht des Stärkeren in der plutarchischen Theseusvita*», in H. Kugelmeier (ed.), *Translatio humanitatis: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Riemer, St. Ingbert*, 2015, 515-528.
- M.H. analiza las reminiscencias platónicas en la Vida de Teseo de Plutarco, especialmente en el pasaje 8-11. En él se trazan referencias al Gorgias y Protágoras para presentar al joven Teseo como un héroe que persigue en sus acciones el bien de la comunidad. La imagen que se muestra de sus acciones de juventud anticipa por lo tanto el papel que Plutarco le otorga en los capítulos posteriores de introductor y defensor de la democracia en Atenas. (A.G.)*
- K. A. JAŻDŻEWSKA**, «‘Like a Married Woman’: The Kingfisher in Plutarch’s *De sollertia animalium* and in the Ps.-Platonic *Halcyon*», *Mnemosyne* 68 3 (2015) 424-436.
- La autora estudia el retrato de etopeya que, sobre el alción, Plutarco proporciona en su obra zoológica De sollertia animalium (982E – 983E). El antecedente documental de Plutarco se encontraría en el tratado pseudo-platónico Alción (compuesto probablemente en el siglo II a.C.). De este modo, el Queronoense habría delineado las características del alción, el cual sintetizaría en manera moralista las virtudes que deben caracterizar a una mujer: protección amorosa del marido, de los hijos, de la vivienda. (A.V.)*
- K. A. JAŻDŻEWSKA**, «Tales of Two Lives in Xenophon’s “Hiero”, Plutarch’s “Gryllus”, and Lucian’s “Cock”», *Hermes* 143.2 (2015) 141-152.
- En esta contribución se analizan las semejanzas entre tres obras de índole dialógica. En primer lugar se aborda la relación entre el Grilo y Hierón de Jenofonte, obra de cuya estructura se nutre Plutarco a la hora de trazar la comparación entre la vida humana y la vida animal que comprende el eje medular de su tratado. Por otro lado, se describen las analogías temáticas y formales no solo entre El Gallo de Luciano y el escrito plutarqueo, sino también la posible inspiración de Luciano en la lectura del Hierón debido a la aparición de reminiscencias jenofonteadas están presentes en el Grilo. (S.V.)*
- D. F. LEÃO**, «*Plutarch on Solon’s Simplicity Concerning Natural Philosophy: Sol. 3,6-7 and Frs. 9 and 12 West*», in *Natural Spectaculars*, 227-238.
- Contrariamente a otras fuentes, en la Vida de Solón Plutarco presenta al político, legislador y primer poeta ático como un pensador simplista, lo cual se infiere de cuanto el biógrafo indica en los versos de los fragmentos 9 y 12. Probablemente, Plutarco pretende subrayar el modo ‘naturalístico’ con que Solón concibe la polis: en efecto, el hombre no puede cambiar los fenómenos meteorológicos pero puede intervenir en los fenómenos sociales y políticos. (V.R.)*
- L. LESAGE GÁRRIGA**, «The Light of the Moon: An Active Participant on the Battlefield in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 145-153.
- Como es sabido, la mención de la luna y de sus efectos resulta generalizada en*

la obra de Plutarco (baste recordar que un tratado, De facie in orbe lunae, está consagrado al estudio de la misma). En esta ocasión, la autora examina las manifestaciones lunares más destacadas que operan circunstancialmente en las Vidas (con mención de pasajes que atañen, por ejemplo, a eclipses y la luna llena) a fin de comprobar cómo inciden estas en el desarrollo de los respectivos personajes implicados. El trabajo se cierra con el estudio de un caso peculiar, correspondiente a la Vida de Arato 21-22, donde los cuatro pasajes examinados justifican una análisis estilístico-estructural en el que prima la oposición luz/oscuridad. (V.R.)

M. LINDER, «Plutarch's use and mention of famous artists in the Parallel Lives», *AncSoc* 45 (2015) 53-81.

Linder's article surveys the references to ancient artists – sculptors, painters, and architects – in Plutarch's Parallel Lives. He identifies 25 instances where artists are mentioned in the Lives and discusses each passage to reveal the reason for mentioning the artist(s) in the specific context. Linder demonstrates that Plutarch is never interested in these artists for their own sake and that Plutarch keeps the information about the artists to a minimum. This approach is explained by Linder partly in terms of Plutarch's negative assessment of artists (see Per. 2.1), which is an attitude in keeping with the prevailing opinion of Plutarch's day and past periods, and partly in terms of Plutarch's wider aims in the Parallel Lives. Linder sees Plutarch as primarily concerned with the representation of characters in the Lives and thus information about painters is included only incidentally when it is relevant to the

character and circumstances of the biographical subject. In the conclusion, Linder suggests nine specific reasons for mentioning artists. Linder, finally, suggests that while Plutarch is not interested in artists for their own sake, his mentions of artists in the Lives can provide useful art historical information. (L.F.)

J. MARINCOLA, «Defending the Divine: Plutarch on the Gods of Herodotus», *Histos Supplement* 4 (2015) 41-83.

Esta contribución se centra en la crítica que articula Plutarco en su ensayo De Herodoti malignitate contra el tratamiento de lo divino por parte de Heródoto, un aspecto que constituye uno de sus argumentos de peso para censurar a dicho historiador. Según el polígrafo, en su Historia Heródoto tergiversó información inherente a la naturaleza de la divinidad y omitió en buena parte de su narración intervenciones divinas significativas en el transcurso de las Guerras Médicas. Como contrapunto, se subraya la visión plutarquea sobre lo divino, incidiendo en la forma en que reelaboró los datos proporcionados por el relato herodoteo y cómo los amoldó a los ideales de su discurso teológico-filosófico. (S.V.)

J. MARINCOLA, «Plutarch, Herodotus, and the Historian's Character», in R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography*, Oxford, 2015, 83-95.

Marincola sets Plutarch's De Herodoti Malignitate within the context of ancient historiographical thought, showing that Plutarch's ideas in this treatise not only

accord well with Greek and Roman discussions by Polybius, Cicero and Lucian, but also that these ideas fit with Plutarch's wider views about the purpose of history: to show distinguished and exemplary actions. Marincola analyses the eight distinctive signs of an historian's malicious character outlined by Plutarch at the beginning of the *De Herodoti Malignitate* to show how each one finds parallels in other historiographers. He argues, moreover, that a uniform approach to the writing of history underlies all of these signs. Marincola demonstrates that within ancient historiographical thought, the historian's character, as it is revealed by his history, is an important element of historical writing, and that Plutarch's ideas in discussing Herodotus' character are not at variance with Plutarch's own approach elsewhere: Plutarch can occasionally include negative actions or judgments in his writing because he does not do so habitually and when he does, it is to some pedagogical purpose; what Plutarch criticises in *De Herodoti Malignitate*, Marincola argues, is the historian who habitually gives a negative assessment of character and action. (L.F.)

M. MEEUSEN, «A note on croaking frogs: Plu. Q.N. 2.912C», *Mnemosyne* 68 1 (2015) 115-120.

This article focuses on Plutarch's *Quaestiones Naturales* 2.912C. It suggests that the word ἔκεινον has anaphoric value, referring back to 'the water of the pond' (*τὸ λιμναῖον <ῦδωρ>*). It also examines the seed imagery and proposes a link between the term σπέρμα and the introductory explanation of the problem by Laetus, whereby an aetiological ring-composition is produced. (C.C.)

M. MEEUSEN, «Plutarch Solving Natural Problems: For What Cause? (The Case of *Quaest. nat.* 29,919AB)», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 129-142.

Un análisis pormenorizado de la cuestión 29 permite a Meeusen incidir en algunas consideraciones de importancia sobre las razones de Plutarco para acometer estos escritos y sobre la intención de los mismos. Una posibilidad es que Plutarco compusiera las *Quaestiones* como ejercicio retórico para πεπαιδευμένοι y una segunda opción (por la que se decanta Meeusen) es que, mediante el análisis racional de los problemas de la naturaleza, Plutarco procurase dejar las cuestiones naturales al margen de la superstición (posibilitando, de paso, una devoción racional hacia lo divino). (V.R.)

A. MERIANI, «Notes on the Prooemium in *Musicam Plutarchi ad Titum Pyrrhynum* by Carlo Valguglio (Brescia 1507)», *GRMS* 3 (2015) 116-136.

El Proemio que Carlo Valguglio consagró a su traducción al latín del tratado *De musica*, atribuido a Plutarco, constituye la primera versión latina que articula los conocimientos sobre la música griega en la Época Moderna. El Proemio, basado en fuentes griegas que proceden en su mayoría de Porfirio (In Ptol. Harm., fuente primaria de Valguglio), facilita una preciosa documentación que resultó determinante para los teóricos posteriores de la disciplina musical. El estudio que Meriani consagra a ciertos pasajes que constan en el Proemio patentiza que este último es una obra fundamental de erudición musical basada en el conocimiento directo de fuentes griegas, y esta fue capital para los musicólogos posteriores que no podían acceder a los tex-

tos genuinos, ya por imposibilidad material, ya por impericia idiomática. (V.R.)

- S. MINON**, «*Plutarque (Thém. 24) transpose Thucydide (I 136): de l'harmonie austère au péan delphique. Pragmatique et rythmique de deux modèles de composition stylistique*», *REG* 128 1 (2015) 29-99.

Mediante un meticuloso estudio de comparación sintáctica y rítmico-estilística, la autora perfila un modelo analítico que indaga en la estructura y en las microestructuras de la prosa griega, adoptando a Tucídides y a Plutarco como paradigmas contrastables merced a la transposición, por parte del Queronense, de los períodos que presenta Tucídides en cierto capítulo. En realidad, la complejidad de los períodos es mayor en Plutarco, quien exhibe ocasionalmente un manejo de la prosa donde la cadencia de ritmo dáctilo-trocaico da paso inmediato a la expresión crético-peonia, la cual intensifica el significado de los miembros y redunda armónicamente en la creación de una prosa poética. (V.R.)

- J. MOSSMAN**, «*Dressed for Success? Clothing in Plutarch's Demetrius*», in R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography*, Oxford, 2015, 149-160.

Mossman discusses the importance and functioning of clothing in the Demetrius, arguing that Plutarch's description of Demetrius' clothes adds a level of subtlety to Demetrius' characterization. Mossman starts from Demetr. 41.5-8, in which Plutarch describes Demetrius' extravagant attire, and argues that, while this

passage is often discussed for its overtones of theatricality, Demetrius' clothing is not simply about superficiality but reflects also his internal character. Mossman surveys the importance of clothing throughout the Demetrius to provide context for understanding the discussion at 41.6-8 and analyses this passage in detail to reveal the significance of the various elements of Demetrius' outfit. She quotes Demetr. 2.2-3 to show Plutarch's early link between Demetrius' appearance and character and goes on to suggest that throughout the Life Plutarch complicates an easy distinction between inner and outer aspects of Demetrius. Mossman argues that 41.6-8 is similar to other instances where Demetrius' showiness is justified, mitigated or qualified by reference to his better qualities. She contrasts discussion of clothing in Alcibiades to show that dress in Demetrius is special. For Mossman, clothing in Demetrius can indicate theatricality but it can also point to some of his inner qualities, many of which are not false but actually laudable. (L.F.)

- I. MUÑOZ GALLARTE**, «*Chassing Butterflies: The Conception of the Soul in Plutarch's Works*», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 167-178.

En ciertos pasajes de Plutarco aquí examinados, la crítica ha pretendido coyunturalmente identificar la presencia de la mariposa con el alma humana. El autor concluye la inexistencia documental de este hecho, ya que el único pasaje en que concurre la relación entre el alma y la mariposa (procedente de *Quaestiones convivales* 636C) posee un mero valor metafórico y, para sostener la identificación antedicha, sería preciso un apoyo textual de solidez. (V.R.)

I. P. C. NETO, «Mistério e repetição no mito de Ísis e Osíris», *Cadmo* 24 (2015) 51-67. *El autor explora el simbolismo de los dioses descritos en Isis y Osiris y su vínculo con los ritos místicos de regeneración y resurrección partiendo de las perspectivas teóricas planteadas por tres estudiosos reconocidos: por un lado, Schelling y su consideración de los sistemas mitológicos de cada pueblo como variantes de una única verdad religiosa; por otro lado, Kierkegaard y su concepción de la doctrina de la repetición en la especulación sobre el devenir humano y los problemas anejos a su existencia; y por último, las aportaciones del mitólogo Eudoro de Sousa, quien aúna las dos posturas filosóficas anteriores para definir las características fundamentales de los ritos místicos.* (S.V.)

J. OPSOMER, «Plutarch on the Geometry of the Elements», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 29-55.

Como platonista, Plutarco estaba interesado en el atomismo geométrico y consideraba el Timeo como libro modélico. Con todo, el análisis de los pasajes pertinentes que constan en los tratados filosóficos permite concluir que la pericia del Queronense sobre la cuestión es ciertamente limitada. (V.R.)

F. PADOVANI, «Problemi di identità: Ismenodora nell' ‘Amatorius’ di Plutarco tra storia, finzione e precettistica erotica», *Maia* 67 3 (2015) 538-552.

The essay shows the problematic relationship between the episode of Ismenodora and the divine status of Eros in Plutarch's Amatorius. To what extent can the Thespian widow be considered paradigmatic according to Plutarch's erotic theory? The analysis focuses on the

ambiguous character of Ismenodora, considering both her possible historical existence and the way Plutarch employs her in his highly refined literal construction, which seems comparable with Achilles Tatius' novel: the tension between reality and fiction is typical of the Second Sophistic and permeates Plutarch's dialogue as well. (Abstract Published)

F. PADOVANI, «Il nome di Osiride nella riflessione di Plutarco», *MD* 74 (2015) 119-142.

Negli ultimi anni della sua produzione letteraria, Plutarco approfondisce temi di natura religiosa, tra i quali destaca il suo interesse, in particolare, l'interconnessione tra le espressioni religiose e cultuali greche ed egiziane. Plutarco, ribaltando le affermazioni erodotee, sostiene che alla base dei nomi delle divinità egiziane ci siano termini greci, che tuttavia non risultano evidenti perché è mutata notevolmente la facies linguistica nella cultura di arrivo. Attraverso una precisa disamina dell'etimologia dei vari attributi con cui è designato Osiride, Plutarco si sofferma sulle interdipendenze tra Osiride da un lato e Serapide e Ade dall'altro. Lo studioso passa quindi ad analizzare gli aspetti che sembrano accomunare Osiride a Dioniso, partendo dal testo di Erodoto, il quale lo considerava divinità equivalenti nelle due religioni, tesi avvalorata da Plutarco. Quest'ultimo riconosce un aspetto condiviso dalle due divinità, l'elemento umido. Osiride era associato, oltre che al Nilo, alla pioggia, cui era messo in relazione anche il dio greco; entrambi sono dunque correlati alla funzione generativa. (S.C.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «Plutarch and Transgressions of Nature: Stylistic Analysis

of *De facie in orbe lunae* 926CD», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 215-226.

Como ocurre en otros pasajes del *De facie* (y en buena parte de la producción de Plutarco), la intensidad del debate filosófico se ve complementada por la utilización profusa de recursos estilísticos. En esta ocasión, Pérez Jiménez efectúa un pormenorizado análisis estilístico de la exposición que efectúa Lamprias (personaje que encubre la figura de Plutarco) frente a Fárnaces, representante de la escuela estoica y firme opositor de la naturaleza térrea de la luna, una condición esencial en el planteamiento doctrinal y metafísico que defiende Plutarco. (V.R.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «Los Campos Elíseos: Espacios reales e imaginarios de la superficie celeste de la Luna (*De facie* 944C-945B)», en J. Ángel y Espinós, J.M. Floristán Imízcoz, F. García Romero & M. López Salvá (eds.), *Υγίεια καὶ γέλως. Homenaje a Ignacio Rodríguez Alfageme*, Zaragoza, 2015, 645-658.

Tras la ‘primera muerte’ que experimentan los hombres (al quedar alma e intelecto exentos del cuerpo) y para ilustrar el itinerario de las almas hacia la luna a fin de convertirse en démones, Plutarco –por mediación de Sila– esboza una elaborada descripción literaria de los accidentes que presenta la geografía lunar, accidentes que se corresponden, gracias a una eficaz comparación, con la topografía real de la tierra (lo cual permite incidir en la consideración térrnea de la luna). Al respecto, Pérez Jiménez expone un cuidadoso comentario literario en el cual podemos apreciar

los procedimientos de índole retórica, métrica, lingüística y estilística con los que el Querónense modela la morfología del espacio lunar donde residen los démones previamente a la ‘segunda muerte’. (V.R.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «En el reino de las Moiras. Comentario estilístico de *Plu., De facie in orbe lunae* 945C-945D», *GIF* 67 (2015) 181-213.

Finalizada la ascensión al sol del intelecto tras la ‘segunda muerte’ (la que separa el intelecto del alma), Plutarco –merced a Sila en su exposición final del mito– describe la escatología descendente del hombre, itinerario en el que el sol aporta el intelecto y la luna (que toma del sol el intelecto) transmite la nueva alma a la tierra, la cual contribuye con un nuevo cuerpo. En tal sentido, Plutarco refiere la acción que desarrollan las tres moiras: Átropos (con sede en el sol) imprime el comienzo de la generación; Cloto, en torno a la luna, combina y anuda; y Láquesis participa en la tierra de la unión. El caso es que, siendo el intelecto autónomo y el cuerpo inanimado, el alma se halla en posición medial entre la inteligencia y el cuerpo, como la luna se encuentra en la misma situación respecto del sol y de la tierra. El desarrollo de esta reflexión tiene su correlato en la exquisita disposición de los recursos estilístico-literarios que emplea Plutarco (concienzudamente analizados por Pérez Jiménez), donde observamos que la doctrina de las moiras en este ensayo resulta diferente a la que presenta en otros tratados, debido ello a que Plutarco subordina aquí el perfil filosófico-metafísico de las moiras a la parcela lingüístico-literaria. (V.R.)

F. RODRÍGUEZ GARCÍA, «Las referencias a Pitágoras en el *De Homero 2* de Ps. Plutarco», *Habis* 46 (2015) 281-295

En este artículo se propone una interpretación novedosa sobre la gran cantidad de datos que el texto pseudoplutarqueo *De Homero 2* incluye acerca de Pitágoras y de las distintas teorías propugnadas por su escuela filosófica. Así, frente a la común opinión de que la inclusión del filósofo en esta composición respondería al auge del neopitagorismo durante los siglos II-III d.C., el autor plantea la posibilidad de que dicha aparición se justifique – junto con las del resto de autoridades filosóficas mencionadas en *De Homero* – por la estimación de Homero como precursor de la literatura, de la ciencia y de la filosofía griega. (S.V.)

L. ROIG LANZILLOTA, «Plutarch's Anthropology and Its Influence on His Cosmological Framework», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 179-195.

El estudio de las exposiciones mitológicas que Plutarco establece en *De genio Socratis* y en *De facie in orbe lunae* muestra esencialmente un pensamiento unitario del Queronense. En realidad, las perspectivas antropológica y cosmológica están interrelacionadas y comparten en Plutarco unos objetivos comunes: la percepción del alma como un punto medio entre el cuerpo y el intelecto se basa en una concepción ética del ser humano, cuya vida debe hallarse ajena a las pasiones corporales; y la visión del cosmos también adquiere una dimensión ética, dada la posición asimismo medial de la luna. En conclusión, el hombre y el cosmos anhelan un mismo fin, acceder a la existencia del intelecto. (V.R.)

D. ROMERO GONZÁLEZ, «Griegos y Bárbaros, una Relación Intercultural», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 12 (2015) 55-64.

En ciertas Vidas el Queronense trae a colación determinados ejemplos de aculturación y barbarización que afectan a los individuos implicados. Se trata de los pasajes pertinentes que constan en Tim. 17.3, Lys. 3.2, Pyrrh. 1.4 y Arat. 38.6. A la luz del estudio que propone Romero, detectamos que la barbarización incidental de la cultura griega puede deberse a tres motivos: la invasión militar de un pueblo bárbaro, el contacto constante con un pueblo bárbaro y la propia decadencia de la cultura griega. En todos los casos, el remedio para recobrar el sello helénico será la aplicación de una categoría inherente a la condición de la cultura griega: la philanthropía. (A.V.)

G. ROSKAM, «An Exegetical Note on Plutarch, *Isis and Osiris* 351E», *Emerita* 83 1 (2015) 157-164.

Roskam proporciona y comenta un pasaje ciertamente complejo de Plutarco donde el Queronense parece indicar que los acontecimientos humanos no escapan al conocimiento de la divinidad o incluso que esta conoce previamente los acontecimientos que han de producirse. Tras una valoración crítica de las diferentes interpretaciones en el seno de la tradición histórico-filológica (y filosófica), Roskam infiere que, en el pasaje implicado, Plutarco propone la existencia de un dios providencial cuyo conocimiento de las contingencias particulares no afecta a la felicidad eterna ni a la propia esencia de la condición divina. (V.R.)

G. ROSKAM, «Plutarch's Yearning after Divinity the Introduction to *On Isis and*

Osiris», CJ 110.2 (2014-2015) 213-239.
En este estudio se destaca la importancia de la lectura y el análisis de la parte introductoria de Isis y Osiris para comprender con mayor facilidad las ideas que Plutarco plantea en esta composición. De tal forma, la introducción traza las líneas generales de lo que se va a desarrollar a lo largo de la obra, donde destaca el método filosófico de la ζῆτησις –de claro influjo platónico– con el cual se buscaba alcanzar el conocimiento verdadero, en este caso la investigación de distintas prácticas rituales y religiosas para poder conseguir el conocimiento de lo divino. (S.V.)

S. SAÏD, «Athens as a City Setting in the Athenian Lives», Lexis 33 (2015) 342-362.

Los excelentes estudios que se han publicado sobre el sello de la herencia ateniense en la Grecia Antigua han prestado escasa atención, hechas las excepciones, a la importancia de los edificios públicos y lugares privados. En el presente artículo se analizan las Vidas plutarqueas sobre héroes atenienses (comenzando por Teseo) para concluir que el biógrafo se halla escasamente interesado en el espacio físico propiamente dicho sino que este sirve de marco contextual para la caracterización ético-política de los mandatarios biografiados. (A.V.)

A. SAPERE, «Implicancias lingüísticas y retóricas de la descripción del ostracismo en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco», Fortunatae 26 (2015) 137-149.

A través de un análisis pormenorizado sobre las comparecencias que la práctica del ostracismo merece en la producción biográfica de Plutarco, la autora patentiza

que el de Queronea es ajeno a una explicación o valoración sobre el sistema del ostracismo y, contrariamente, se detiene en la dimensión ético-retórica que exhibe el procedimiento del ostracismo (con la afección correspondiente para los mandatarios biografiados), lo cual parece comprensible considerando la actitud moralista de Plutarco. (S.V.)

A. SAPERE, «Sentidos y usos del mito en la obra biográfica de Plutarco», Myrtia 30 (2015) 77-98.

Mediante un estudio léxico-semántico del término μῦθος y sus derivados en las biografías de Plutarco, la autora concluye que existen tres sentidos básicos por parte del Queronense: en primer lugar, los vocablos pueden aludir a leyendas con elementos fantásticos o sobrenaturales; en segundo, los términos comportan un significado de mera verosimilitud ficticia; en tercero, la acepción se vincula a narraciones antiguas que resultan compartidas por una comunidad. Al decir de Sapere, los dos primeros casos muestran un cariz negativo, mientras que el tercer registro (el mejor explorado por Plutarco) incidiría positivamente en el interés del biógrafo por subrayar que el discurso mítico dota de cohesión al sentimiento histórico de un pueblo. (S.V.)

J. SCHERR, «Die Jünglinge von Osca: Bemerkungen zu Plutarch, Sertorius 14,1-4», en R. Lafel & K. Strobel (eds.), *Antike Lebenswelten: althistorische und papyrologische Studien*, Berlin-Boston (Mass.), 2015, 282-291.

La Vida de Sertorio de Plutarco está marcada por un proceso de transformación de gobernante benefactor a dominador cruel. Por consiguiente, sus ac-

ciones civilizadoras descritas en 14,1-4 hacia los jóvenes rehenes de Osca no deben ser leídas, según J.S., como fuente histórica de las acciones civilizadoras de los romanos hacia los pueblos sometidos, sino únicamente como imagen literaria para la construcción del personaje. La voluntad educadora de Sertorio en este pasaje prepara el contraste con sus acciones vengadoras para con los jóvenes rehenes en 25,4-6. (A.G.)

J. W. G. SCHROPP, «Der zweite Kaiser oder ein zweiter Caesar: Überlegungen zu Plu. *Numa* 19,6 und App. III. 13,39», *Mnemosyne* 68 (2015) 1003-1007.

En esta nota miscelánea el autor rebate la interpretación habitual de Plu. *Numa* 19,6 según la cual este pasaje demostraría que Plutarco inicia la lista de emperadores romanos con Julio César y no con Octavio Augusto, y aboga por una nueva interpretación donde Augusto, citado por Plutarco en sus obras con el nombre de César Augusto, es definido como el segundo únicamente para diferenciarlo de su homónimo Julio César. (A.G.)

CH. SCHUBERT, A. WEISS, «Die Hypomnemata bei Plutarch und Clemens: ein Textmining-gestützter Vergleich der Arbeitsweise zweier ‘Sophisten’», *Hermes* 143 4 (2015) 447-471.

En este estudio se muestran las posibilidades de un análisis automático de citas en Plutarco y Clemente de Alejandría, cuyas obras fechan para ambos autores en el siglo II d.C. Los autores del trabajo han escogido obras consideradas misceláneas: por parte de Clemente de Alejandría los Stromata, por parte de Plutarco la Consolación a Apolonio. Ch.S. y A.W. identifican en

ellas estructuras coincidentes de citación en ambos autores. (A.G.)

A. G. SCOTT, «The Spartan heroic death in Plutarch’s ‘Laconian aphorisms’», *Hermes* 143 1 (2015) 72-82.

Scott examines four aphorisms within Plutarch’s *Apophthegmata Laconica* which all include a similar verbal formulation representing death in battle (a participle of fighting (e.g. μαχόμενος) with a verb meaning to die (e.g. ἀποθανεῖν). Scott traces this formulation back to Thucydides (4.40). He proceeds to examine the four examples of this verbal phrase in Plutarch’s Ap. Lac. At 222f, 219c, 222a and 219b (in that order), placing emphasis on the fact that all four are based on an historical or quasi-historical situation from the Classical or Hellenistic period, which he suggests means that the aphorisms provide a window into the construction and reception of Spartan behaviour in battle. Scott compares Plutarch’s presentation of the four aphorisms with those in other sources such as Xenophon and Diodorus. He argues that Plutarch gives an idealised depiction of Spartan behaviour in this text and that the ‘to die fighting’ aphorism is often employed to mask individual’s shortcomings. He suggests that Plutarch’s Ap. Lac. Provides insight into Spartiate psychology and the ideology of the state. (L.F.)

A. SETAIOLI, «The Moon as Agent of Decay (Plut., *Quaest. conv.* 3,10; Macr., *Sat.* 7,16,15-34)», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 99-111.

Es conocido el interés que en su producción ensayística muestra Plutarco por mostrar la influencia de los cuerpos celestes (y especialmente la luna) en los fenómenos terrestres: los aspectos

científicos se ven en él combinados con registros de índole literaria. El caso es que Macrobio, en los pasajes pertinentes, parece ajustarse al criterio científico del Queronense, mientras que observa mayor originalidad en el uso literario, particularmente en el tratamiento de la forma dialógica. (V.R.)

S. SIERKSMA-AGTERES, ‘Say Goodbye to Opinions!’ Plutarch’s Philosophy of Natural Phenomena and the Journey to Metaphysical Knowledge», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 57-71.

Nos hallamos ante un análisis pormenorizado de los modelos que la tradición histórico-filológica ha propuesto para examinar la relación que existe en Plutarco entre el mundo sensorial, perceptible, y el mundo inteligible; y para detectar la posición del Queronense en el par opinión vs. conocimiento. En última instancia, Siersma-Agteres considera que en el pensamiento de Plutarco existe una conexión ontológica entre el mundo de lo sensible y de lo inteligible, de manera que la aproximación al conocimiento metafísico arrancará desde el conocimiento del mundo sensorialmente perceptible. (V.R.)

PH. STADTER, «Barbarian Comparisons», *Ploutarchos N.S.* 12 (2015) 65-82.

Stadter estudia las Vidas plutarqueas en las que los mandatarios biografiados se enfrentan a bárbaros. Para ello, se detiene en los pares Pyrrh.-Mar., Them.-Cam., Cim.-Luc., Alex.-Caes., con especial incidencia en las tres últimas (ya que la figura de Pirro adopta características peculiares). El análisis comparado permite colegir que Plutarco

amplifica los puntos de conexión entre el bárbaro (el ‘otro’) y el individuo griego, con la particularidad sorprendente de que ese ‘otro’ permite trazar rasgos definitorios de las ciudades y de los héroes griegos. A la postre, la distinción entre griego y bárbaro no se antojaría taxativa, lo cual Plutarco deslizaría para recordatorio moralizante del lector imbuido de la paideia helénica. (V.R.)

PH. STADTER, «‘The Love of Noble Deeds’: Plutarch’s Portrait of Aratus of Sicyon», en R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds.), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography*, Oxford, 2015, 161-175.

This chapter shows how Plutarch presents Aratus in his biography as a paradigm for Polycrates’ children and other contemporary readers more generally. It first examines Plutarch’s critical use of Aratus’ Memoirs as a source, then the structure of the Life and Plutarch’s own comments of praise and blame concerning Aratus’ deeds. It concludes with the lessons that Plutarch draws for his readers. Throughout the biography, Plutarch cares to stress Aratus’ virtuous conduct, his resistance to tyranny, and his creation of harmony within and among the cities. All these are lessons that are especially important for Plutarch’s Greek audience living under Roman rule, who should be taught by Aratus’ example about the need for concord between the leaders of the Greek cities and for giving the representatives of Roman rule no cause to intervene in local affairs. (C.C.)

- F. TANGA, «Some notes on Plutarch's *Quaestiones naturales*», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 113-128.

Mediante una exhaustiva revisión históricoliteraria de las *Quaestiones naturales* y comentarios relativos a ciertas cuestiones seleccionadas, Tanga concluye que el objetivo fundamental de Plutarco (en la línea enciclopédica de la mejor tradición platonico-aristotélica) reside en presentar las noticias sobre ciencia y naturaleza con arreglo a un esquema de divulgación inteligente. Así, el Queronense concede prioridad al comentario, explicación y difusión de los hechos naturales para beneficio de un lector culto pero no necesariamente versado en cuestiones técnicas sobre la naturaleza y la ciencia. (V.R.)

- G. VANOTTI, «Cimone, Lacedemonio e la madre nelle testimonianze di Plutarco e della sua fonte, Stesimbroto di Taso», *AncSoc* 45 (2015) 27-51.

According to Plutarch, the mother of Cimon's twin sons, Lacedaemonius and Eleius (Oulius), was called Kleitoria. This name (or nick-name) has aroused strong discussions among scholars, but they have not agreed on a proper explanation of its real meaning. The woman is mentioned in some Plutarch quotations going back to Stesimbrotus, who denounced the Periclean malice towards Cimon's sons, mainly Lacedaemonius, entrusted with a difficult mission in Corcyra on the eve of the Peloponnesian war. Considerations about this aspect can lead to a better understanding of Stesimbrotus's testimony and opinion on Lacedaemonius, on his father Cimon and on their philo-laconism. (Abstract Published)

- P. VOLPE CACCIATORE, «Plutarch and the Commentary on the *Phaenomena* of Aratus», en *Natural Spectaculars*, 87-97. La autora estudia cuatro fragmentos plutarqueos de la obra debida a Arato y detecta un cambio importante en la concepción de los fenómenos naturales. Mientras que el poeta se limita a una labor meramente descriptiva de lo que sucede en el cielo, Plutarco incide en interpretaciones exegéticas, en la idea de que la pura percepción sensorial a menudo confunde el análisis de los datos. Plutarco es consciente de la tradición científica que subyace al tema y, en su estudio, presenta una aproximación exegética de naturaleza ecléctica con elementos que derivan del platonismo, del aristotelismo y del estoicismo. (S.V.)

- S. XENOPHONTOS, «Plutarch», en W. M. Bloomer (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Education*, Chichester – Malden (Mass.), 2015, 335-346.

Este capítulo nos ofrece una visión general del modelo educativo de Plutarco, basado en una paideia ético-filosófica donde lo racional se debe imponer a lo pasional. Si bien es cierto que este ideal filosófico-pedagógico galvaniza toda la producción literaria del Queronense, la autora de esta contribución se centra en tres aspectos significativos: la importancia otorgada en Cómo debe el joven escuchar la poesía al aprendizaje de la literatura como paso previo al acceso a la filosofía; la información que se desprende de Consejos Matrimoniales sobre la educación de la mujer en la época imperial; y el valor que Plutarco concede a la educación moral del político en los Praecepta con el objetivo de garantizar el bien común y la correcta gestión del Estado. (S.V.)

- S. ZINCONE, «Cimone come benefattore panellenico e campione di concordia: una proiezione di Plutarco?», *SMSR* 81 1 (2015) 118-127.

The image of Cimon as a historical figure is in large part determined by Plutarch's biographical narrative, which depicts him as an emblematic representative of the traditional aristocracy and as a champion of concord among his fellow citizens as well as the Greeks in general. This portrait lacks plausibility in so far as it does not match the political setting of the fifth century BC, i.e. the logic of

Athenian 'imperialism' and the workings of the democratic system. Considering the scarcity of information on Cimon's career and the inherent contradictions of the historical tradition, it is unlikely, however, that Plutarch set out to distort greatly the limited data available to him; rather it appears that he sought to adapt and elaborate the material in such a way as to present a consistent interpretation relevant to his contemporary world.
Keywords: Cimon, Plutarch, aristocratic politicians, euergetism, pan-Hellenism.
(Abstract Published)

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CONSTITUTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PLUTARCH SOCIETY

1. **Purpose of the Society.** The Society exists to further the study of Plutarch and his various writings and to encourage scholarly communication between those working on Plutarchan studies.
2. **Organization.** The Society is constituted of national sections formed by the members of the Society living in each country. The national sections may function as independent units, with their own officers, constitutions and by-laws.
3. **Duties of the Officers.** The President is the official head of the Society and is responsible for planning and implementing programs to further the Society's goals. His chief duty is to see that regular international meetings are planned. The responsibility for hosting and organizing the details of the meetings belongs to the national society hosting the meeting.
4. **The President of the Society** is selected by the heads of the national sections from among their own number, for a term of three years. The Editor of *Ploutarchos* & of *Ploutarchos, n.s.*, the Secretary-Treasurer, and the President-Elect are likewise chosen by the heads of the national sections for a term of three years. The terms of the Editor and Secretary-Treasurer may be renewed. The heads of the national sections serve as an advisory board to the President.
5. **The President-Elect** assists the President, and succeeds automatically to the Presidency at the end of his three-year term. The outgoing president will remain as Honorary President for the following period of three years.
6. **The Editor of *Ploutarchos*** is responsible for the preparation and production of *Ploutarchos* (electronic Bulletin) and *Ploutarchos, n.s.* and arranges for its distribution, either directly to members or through the national sections. The Editor and the President jointly appoint the Book Review Editor.
7. **The Secretary-Treasurer**, who may be identical with the Editor, is responsible for the general correspondence of the Society, for maintaining the membership list, and for collecting dues and disbursing money for expenses. The chief expense is expected to be connected with the distribution of *Ploutarchos, n.s.*
8. **Amendments.** This constitution may be amended, or by-laws added, by a majority vote of the national representatives.

**XIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PLUTARCH SOCIETY.
PLUTARCH AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES. SHARING THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(CARDINAL STEFAN WYSZYSNSKI UNIVERSITY IN WARSAW, POLAND)**

1) From 3 to 6 September 2020, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (Poland) will host the 12th International Congress of the International Plutarch Society titled “Plutarch and his Contemporaries. Sharing the Roman Empire”.

2) Organizing Committee: Katarzyna Jazdzewska, Joanna Komorowska, Filip Doroszewski (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Faculty of Humanities).

3) Scientific Committee: Jeffrey Beneker (Madison, United States), Philip Bosman (Stellenbosch, South Africa), Aristoula Georgiadou (Patras, Greece), Anna Gineistí Rosell (Eichstätt, Germany), Delfim Leão (Coimbra, Portugal), Geert Roskam (Leuven, Belgium), Maria Vamvouri Ruffy (Lausanne, Switzerland), Alexei Zadorozhny (Liverpool, UK).

4) Conference announcement: Plutarch lived in the multicultural yet increasingly interconnected world of the Roman empire: a world in which diverse local, linguistic, religious, and political identities were combined with a common education and culture as well as shared everyday experiences. This sense of interconnectedness is apparent in Plutarch's works in a number of ways, such as in the inclusion of speakers from various backgrounds in dialogues and the exploration of Roman history and culture alongside that of Greece. There is an abundance of parallels between Plutarch and other imperial-period writers with backgrounds that differed from his, reflecting their shared cultural participation. This conference seeks to discuss Plutarch's works within the broader context of imperial-period literature and to explore overlaps and points of intersection between Plutarch and other ancient authors of the 1st and 2nd c. CE, including Greek and Roman as well as pagan and Christian writers (including, for instance, Dio Chrysostom, Arrian, and Lucian; Seneca, Quintilian, the two Plinies; Christian apologists and the early Church Fathers).

We welcome contributions of a comparative nature investigating convergences and variations, parallels and modifications in themes, formats, and literary techniques in Plutarch and other authors of the early empire. We also invite submissions reflecting on the value and potential of such a perspective: does it allow us to identify the cultural and literary background Plutarch and other authors shared and distinguish it from their individualizing modifications, agendas, and preoccupations? To what extent does it allow us to define distinctive features of the Plutarchan *corpus* and thought? And, more generally, how does a comparative approach contribute to our understanding of the literary and intellectual culture of the early imperial period?

5) Topics of interest include, but are not limited to, the following: philosophical and religious concepts and ideas; use of literary motifs, *topoi*, and *exempla*; use of genres, literary formats, rhetorical and narrative strategies; stylistic and linguistic characteristics and tendencies; attitudes towards Rome and Roman domination; attitudes towards the Greek past and its cultural heritage.

6) Submissions Paper proposals of ca. 300 words are to be sent to plutarch2020@gmail.com before the deadline of December 1, 2019. The participants will be notified of the acceptance of their proposals by March 1st 2020. Membership of the International Plutarch Society is not required.

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GUIDELINES FOR *PLOUTARCHOS N.S.*

- 1. Languages.** Manuscripts may be written in any of the official languages of the IPS: English, French, German, Italian, Latin, Modern Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish.
- 2. Abstracts & Key-Words:** Articles will be sent together with key-words and two abstracts (one in English and other in another official language) not longer than seven lines.
- 3. Format:** Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced on Times-New Roman 11. The length of manuscripts must not exceed 15000 words without previous agreement with the editors. Manuscripts must be sent in electronic version (PC Microsoft Word Windows) as an attached file to an e-mail message.
- 4. Bibliography:** The text of the paper should be followed by a list of references, including at least those works cited more than twice in the notes.
- 5. Quotations in notes:** Names of ancient authors should not be capitalized, names of modern authors should be written in versalitas only when in notes or in the bibliography: K. ZIEGLER (note), but K. Ziegler (main text).
 - A) Frequent quotations** (more than twice): Refer to bibliography, citing by author's name, year of edition, and pages: e.g. K. ZIEGLER, 1951, col. 800.
 - B) Single quotations:** Either follow the procedure indicated in 5 A) or incorporate the entire reference in the notes, according to the following conventions, which are the same as for the bibliography (with the single exception that in the bibliography the surname should precede the initial, e.g. ZIEGLER, K., "Plutarchos von Chaironeia", *RE* XXI (1951), cols. 636-962.
 - a) Books:** Author (in the case of joint authorship, separated by a comma, with the final name preceded by &), comma, title of work in italics, comma, volume in Roman numerals (where applicable), comma, place of publication, comma, year (with superscript number of editions if not the first, and year of the first edition in parenthesis), comma, and quoted pages:
 - D. A. RUSSELL, *Plutarch*, London, 1973, pp. 3-5.
 - b) Articles:** Author, comma, title in quotation marks, comma, name of the journal (for the abbreviations of journals follow the conventions of L'Année Philologique), comma, volume number in Arabic numerals, year in parenthesis, and pages (without abbreviation if they correspond to the entire article):
 - C. P. JONES, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works", *JRS*, 56 (1966) 61-74.
 - C. P. JONES, "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works", *JRS*, 56 (1966), p. 65.
 - c) Works in collaborative volumes:** Cite as with articles, followed by the quotation of the collaborative work (if cited several times, according to the same conventions as under 5A above): e.g.: F. E. BRENK, "Tempo come struttura nel dialogo Sul Daimonion di Socrate di Plutarco", in G. D'IPPOLITO & I. GALLO (eds.), *Strutture formali dei Moralia di Plutarco. Atti del III Convegno plutarcheo, Palermo, 3-5 maggio 1989*, Napoli, 1991, pp. 69-82.
- 6. Quotations from ancient authors:** Author, comma, work, book (Arabic numerals), full stop, chapter (Arabic numerals), comma, paragraph (Arabic numerals), or: Author, comma, book (Roman numbers), chapter or verse (Arabic numerals), full stop, paragraph (Arabic numerals).
 - a) Abbreviations of Greek works and authors:** for preference, cite according to conventions of the Liddell & Scott or of the *DGE* edited by F. R. Adrados & others.
 - b) Abbreviations of Latin works and authors:** follow the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*.
 - c) Examples:**
 - Authors cited with title of work: X., *Mem.* 4.5,2-3; Plu., *Arist.* 5.1; Hom., *Od.* 10.203.
 - Authors cited without title of work: B., I 35; Paus., V 23.5; D. S., XXXI 8.2.
- 7. Notes references:** References (in Arabic numbers) to the footnotes must precede always the signs of punctuation, e.g.: "...correspondait à l'harmonie psychique¹. Dans le *Timée*² et la *République*³, ..."
- 8. Greek & non-Latin Fonts:** For Greek and other non-Latin texts, use Unicode fonts.

