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Vocación política y oratoria en las *Vidas de Foción, Catón el Menor y Catón el Mayor*

[Political Vocation and Oratory in the
Lives of Phocion, Cato Minor and Cato Maior]

por

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Abstract

The pair of biographies *Phocion – Cato the Younger* begins by establishing, in the *Life of Phocion*, a comparison between the two protagonists that is illustrated and developed in the internal comparison that Plutarch implicitly traces throughout the two *Lives*. This can be seen, among other aspects, in their political vocation and in the description of their character and oratory. There is also a close parallel between these biographies and that of Cato the Elder, reinforced by the comparison of their protagonists with Socrates, which evokes the ideal image of the politician inspired by philosophy.

Key-Words: *Lives of Phocion, Cato the Younger and Cato the Elder*. Political vocation, Character description, Oratory.

Resumen

El par de biografías *Foción -Catón el Menor* comienza estableciendo, en la *Vida de Foción*, una comparación entre los dos protagonistas que se ilustra y desarrolla en la comparación interna que Plutarco va trazando de forma implícita a lo largo de las dos *Vidas*. Se puede comprobar, entre otros aspectos, en su vocación política y en la descripción de su carácter y su oratoria. Existe además entre estas biografías y la de Catón el Mayor un estrecho paralelismo, reforzado por la comparación de sus protagonistas con Sócrates, lo que evoca la imagen ideal del político inspirado por la filosofía.

Palabras-clave: *Vidas de Foción, Catón el Menor y Catón el Mayor*, Vocación política, Descripción del carácter, Oratoria.

La comparación entre Foción y Catón el Menor no se limita al proemio de sus *Vidas* (*Phoc.* 1-3), pues a lo largo de ambas se encuentran numerosos paralelismos. De ellos se analizarán aquí solo los relacionados con dos tópicos de las biografías de Plutarco: la προαίρεσις o vocación política y el λόγος, la oratoria, muy relacionadas entre sí. De los paralelismos entre estas dos *Vidas* surge la comparación con una tercera: la *Vida de Catón el Mayor*.

1. Vocación política

Para este estudio se pueden tomar como punto de partida los *Preceptos políticos*, obra que comienza tratando de la προαίρεσις (*Praec. ger. reip.* 798 C):

En primer lugar, debe servir de base a la actividad política, como fundamento firme y sólido, la vocación con discernimiento y razón.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑποκείσθω πολιτεία καθάπερ ἔδαφος βέβαιον καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ἢ προαίρεσις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα κρίσιν καὶ λόγον.

Seguidamente, Plutarco va indicando cómo debe ser la vocación y entrada en la vida pública (*Praec. ger. reip.* 798 C- 799A): no hay que dedicarse

a la política por motivos tales como la “vanagloria” (ὕπὸ δόξης κενῆς), “por azar” (ἀπὸ τύχης), “con ánimo de lucro y enriquecimiento” (ἐπ’ ἐργασίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμῷ), “casualmente y sin pensar” (αὐτομάτως καὶ παραλόγως).

Por el contrario, se debe hacer “con determinación y de forma razonada” (ἀπὸ γνώμης καὶ λογισμῷ), “como resultado de una preparación y razonamiento” (ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ) y “teniendo el bien común como única y exclusiva finalidad de los actos” (τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο τῶν πράξεων ἔχοντας τέλος)¹.

1.1. La προαίρεσις de Foción (*Phoc.* 7.5-6) se ajusta a lo establecido en los *Preceptos*: mientras que sus contemporáneos se repartían la actividad política y la militar “como por sorteo” (ὥσπερ ἀπὸ κλήρου, expresión equivalente a ἀπὸ τύχης, que leemos en los *Preceptos*) y “para engrandecerse a sí mismos” (αὐξοντας ἑαυτούς, equivalente a ἐπ’ ἐργασίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμῷ que leemos en los *Preceptos*), Foción se propuso imitar a los grandes estadistas del pasado (Pericles, Aristides y Solón) que aunaban en su persona la faceta política y la militar, e incluso se inspiraba en la propia Atenea, guerrera al mismo tiempo que política². Comienza su actividad

¹ Tratan extensamente sobre la προαίρεσις A. E. WARDMAN, 1974, pp. 107-115. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 1995.

² *Phoc.* 7.5-6: “Veía que quienes gestionaban por entonces los asuntos públicos se habían repartido, como por sorteo, la jefatura del ejército y la tribuna de los oradores y que unos, entre los cuales estaban Eubulo, Aristofonte, Demóstenes, Licurgo e Hiperides, sólo

política después de prepararse para ello: tras recibir una formación filosófica, ejercitarse en las más nobles normas de conducta y comenzar sus actividades militares y políticas bajo la dirección de Cabrias, como se relata en los capítulos precedentes de la biografía³. Por tanto podríamos decir que, como aconseja Plutarco en los *Preceptos*, decidió dedicarse a la actividad pública como resultado de una preparación y razonamiento (ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ).

También es significativo que, antes de tratar de la προαίρεσις de Foción, Plutarco hace la caracterización de su oratoria, que veremos más adelante, ya que la considera también una preparación para entrar en la vida pública.

1.2. La προαίρεσις de Catón se ajusta igualmente a las condiciones expuestas en los *Preceptos*. Se estuvo preparando antes de emprender la carrera política, y no solo en la oratoria, como veremos más adelante. Desempeñó el cargo de tribuno militar, adquirió una formación filosófica⁴ y recorrió Asia (*Cat. mi.* 12.2). Comenzó la carrera política como cuestor solo después de aprender en qué consistía la magistratura (*Cat. mi.* 16.2). Tras la narración de sus actuaciones como cuestor, a modo de resumen, Plutarco define expresamente su προαίρεσις contraponiendo, como en el caso de Foción, su actitud y conducta al comportamiento corrupto de otros contemporáneos suyos (*Cat. mi.* 19.3):

hablaban al pueblo y proponían decretos; y otros, como Diopites, Menesteo, Leóstenes y Cares, se engrandecían con el generalato y la guerra. Él quería recobrar y restaurar la política de Pericles, Aristides y Solón, como un conjunto equilibrado en ambas facetas. 6) En efecto, cada uno de estos personajes parecía, como dice Arquíloco,

*a la par siervo del dios Enialio
y versado en el grato don de las Musas.*

Y observaba también que la diosa es guerrera al mismo tiempo que política y así se la invoca". ὁρῶν δὲ τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράσσοντας τότε διηρημένους ὥσπερ ἀπὸ κλήρου τὸ στρατήγιον καὶ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν λέγοντας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντας μόνον, ὃν Εὐβουλος ἦν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶν καὶ Δημοσθένης καὶ Λυκοῦργος καὶ Ὑπερείδης, Διοπέιθι δὲ καὶ Μενεσθέα καὶ Λεωσθένη καὶ Χάρητα τῷ στρατηγεῖν καὶ πολεμεῖν αὐξοντας ἑαυτοὺς, ἐβούλετο τὴν Περικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Σόλωνος πολιτείαν ὥσπερ ὁλόκληρον καὶ διηρμοσμένην ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ἕκαστος ἐφαίνετο κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίλοχον (fg. 1 Diehl)

ἀμφοτέρων, θεράπων μὲν Ἐνναλίῳ θεοῖο,
καὶ Μουσέων ἐρατᾶν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος,

καὶ τὴν θεὸν ἑώρα πολεμικὴν θ' ἅμα καὶ πολιτικὴν οὔσαν καὶ προσαγορευομένην.

³ Cf. *Phoc.* 4.2-4, 6-7.1.

⁴ *Cat. mi.* 4.2, 10.1-2. Sobre la conveniencia de la formación filosófica del político, cf. *Plut. Cum princ. philos.* 777A, pasaje en el que se alude expresamente a Catón.

no fue por deseo de gloria ni por codicia ni casualmente y por azar, como algunos otros, por lo que entró en la política, sino que tras escogerla como ocupación propia de un buen ciudadano, pensaba que debía atender a los asuntos públicos más que la abeja al panal.

οὔτε γὰρ δόξης χάριν οὔτε πλεονεξίας οὔτ' αὐτομάτως καὶ κατὰ τύχην ὥσπερ ἕτεροί τινες ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τὸ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ὥς ἴδιον ἔργον ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐλόμενος, μᾶλλον ᾔετο δεῖν προσέχειν τοῖς κοινοῖς ἢ τῷ κηρίῳ τὴν μέλιτταν.

La correspondencia con los *Preceptos*, incluso en el léxico, es evidente:

δόξης χάριν = ὑπὸ δόξης κενῆς;

πλεονεξίας = ἐπ' ἐργασίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμῷ αὐτομάτως καὶ κατὰ τύχην = ἀπὸ τύχης.

Por último, el motivo que impulsa su vocación y entrada en la política coincide con la norma de conducta anteriormente citada de los preceptos: “teniendo el bien común como única

y exclusiva finalidad de sus actos”. Tal finalidad exclusiva se realza con el símil de la abeja y el panal. Esta predisposición natural de su carácter que lo mueve a dedicarse exclusivamente a procurar el bien a su ciudad se reitera en otros pasajes de la biografía (*Cat. mi.* 19.6): “dedicándole a ella todas sus acciones y su actividad política” (ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πάντα ποιῶν καὶ πολιτευόμενος).

Por tanto, la motivación de su προαίρεσις es diferente a la de Foción, que desea imitar y restituir la política de personajes del pasado y toma como modelo incluso a la misma Palas Atenea⁵. Pero podemos concluir que, en lo fundamental, Catón el Menor y Foción coinciden en su forma de escoger su dedicación a la política: con preparación y razonamiento y sin perseguir la gloria o el enriquecimiento personal⁶, diferenciándose así de otros muchos⁷.

2. La oratoria

En los *Preceptos políticos* se muestra con claridad la estrecha relación entre προαίρεσις y λόγος, vocación política

⁵ Sobre las distintas motivaciones para la προαίρεσις, cf. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 1995.

⁶ Además, en los *Preceptos políticos* (*Praec. ger. reip.* 804D) se dice que hay dos vías de entrada en la política: una rápida y fulgurante, pero peligrosa, y otra más prosaica y lenta (relacionada con la preparación requerida), pero más segura. Se menciona a varios personajes ilustres, Foción entre otros, que escogieron la entrada segura y lenta (*Praec. ger. reip.* 805E). No se menciona a Catón el Menor, aunque es evidente, por lo que leemos en su biografía, que también la hizo así. Se cita, en cambio, a Catón el Mayor, que también hizo la entrada lenta.

⁷ El contraste con “otros” es importante para destacar la acción o el carácter del héroe: cf. F. FRAZIER, 2016, pp. 94-96.

y oratoria⁸, y Plutarco deja patente la importancia que concede a esta última en un extenso pasaje (801C-804C).

Después de la προαίρεσις, Plutarco trata del carácter y la palabra del político, los dos medios con los que se logra la adhesión del pueblo⁹ (801C):

No hay que descuidar en absoluto el encanto y la eficacia de la palabra, por depositar toda la confianza en la virtud ... pues (tan persuasivo) es el carácter como la palabra.

Οὐ μὴν ἀμελητέον γε διὰ τοῦτο τῆς περὶ τὸν λόγον χάριτος καὶ δυνάμεως ἐν ἀρετῇ θεμένους τὸ σύμπαν ... καὶ γὰρ ὁ τρόπος καὶ ὁ λόγος.

Τρόπος (ο ἥθος) y λόγος son, por tanto, inseparables.

Entre otras afirmaciones que resaltan el poder de la oratoria como instrumento, cabe señalar las siguientes: 801F “el político debe reunir en su persona tanto la inteligencia que pilota como la palabra que imparte las órdenes” (ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ μὲν ὀφείλει τὸν κυβερνῶντα νοῦν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲ τὸν ἐγκελευόμενον λόγον). 802B “El intérprete de Atenea Políade y de Temis Consejera... gobierna la ciudad con la palabra como único instrumento” (ὁ δὲ τῆς Πολιάδος Ἀθηναῖς καὶ τῆς Βουλαιᾶς

Θέμιδος ... προφήτης, ἐνὶ χρώμενος ὀργάνῳ τῷ λόγῳ ... κοσμεῖ τὴν πόλιν). 802D “A un pueblo y una ciudad hay que conducirlos precisamente por las orejas” (δῆμον δὲ καὶ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν ὠτῶν ἄγειν δεῖ μάλιστα).

Seguidamente, Plutarco dice cómo considera que debe ser la oratoria del político (*Praec. ger. reip.* 802E-803A):

La oratoria del político no debe ser novedosa ni teatral ... y no deben destacarse para elogiarla su fluidez, estilo o distinciones de matices; su oratoria debe estar llena de carácter sincero, de sentimiento verdadero, franqueza heredada de los antepasados, previsión y solícita comprensión y debe añadir a su nobleza el encanto y atractivo derivados de una expresión grave y unos pensamientos originales y convincentes.

Ὁ μέντοι λόγος ἔστω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ μήτε νεαρὸς καὶ θεατρικός ... μηδ' εἰς ἔπαινον αὐτοῦ τιθέσθω τὸ ἐκτικῶς ἢ τεχνικῶς ἢ διαιρετικῶς, ἀλλ' ἦθους ἀπλάστου καὶ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ παρρησίας πατρικῆς καὶ προνοίας καὶ συνέσεως κηδομένης ὁ λόγος ἔστω μεστός, ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ τὸ κεχαρισμένον ἔχων καὶ ἀγωγὸν ἐκ τε σεμνῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ νοημάτων ἰδίων καὶ πιθανῶν.

⁸ Cf. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 2002, p. 260.

⁹ Sobre el liderazgo político, cf. L. de BLOIS, 1992, pp. 4600-4611.

Siguiendo estos criterios Plutarco, al tratar de la oratoria de los protagonistas de las *Vidas*, resalta su valor ético y político¹⁰ y, por el contrario, no se muestra interesado en el estilo literario de los discursos¹¹. Podemos comprobarlo en las *Vidas de Foción y Catón el Menor* que son el objeto de este estudio¹².

2.1.Oratoria de Foción

Ningún otro autor habla de la oratoria de Foción¹³, lo que prueba la importancia que Plutarco otorgaba a este tópico en

las *Vidas* de personajes políticos. Define el carácter de Foción con rasgos que contrastan con la expresión de su rostro:

Phoc. 5.1-2: “de carácter muy agradable y humano” (τῷ δὲ ἦθει προσηγέστατος ... καὶ φιανθρωπότατος), “por el rostro insociable y hosco” (ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου δυσξύμβολος ... καὶ σκυθρωπός)¹⁴.

Por asociación de ideas¹⁵ (nótese el término ὁμοίως), Plutarco pasa a la oratoria, cuya forma y contenido presentan también rasgos contrapuestos¹⁶:

¹⁰ Cf. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 2002, pp. 257-258.

¹¹ Así lo dice expresamente en el proemio a las *Vidas de Demóstenes y Cicerón* (*Dem.* 2.2-3.2) y en la *Vida de Catón el Mayor* (*Cat. ma.* 7.2-3).

¹² Prueba de la importancia que para Plutarco tenía la oratoria de los dos personajes que nos ocupan es que en los *Preceptos políticos*, al enumerar las distintas características que considera que debe tener la oratoria del político, menciona a Foción para ejemplificar el empleo de metáforas en los discursos políticos (*Praec. ger. reip.* 803A) y como ejemplo de concisión (*Praec. ger. reip.* 803E). Cita también a Catón el Menor como ejemplo de elocuencia ejercitada en la potencia de voz y vigor de la respiración, lo que le permitía estar hablando un día entero (*Praec. ger. reip.* 804C).

¹³ Esto pone en entredicho la fiabilidad del testimonio de Plutarco. Sin embargo, L. A. TRITLE, 1988, pp. 22-27 se detiene en el examen de la oratoria de Foción aceptando sin reservas la caracterización de la misma que hace Plutarco y comenta las fuentes que debió de tener.

¹⁴ Esta era la expresión que debía de tener cuando hablaba en público, como muestra la siguiente anécdota: “Una vez que Cares estaba haciendo reír a los atenienses refiriéndose a las cejas de Foción, este dijo: «Ningún daño os ha causado este ceño; pero la risa de éstos ha hecho llorar mucho a la ciudad»”.

¹⁵ Sobre la función estilística de este recurso literario, cf. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ 1994, pp. 262-265.

¹⁶ Cf. también *Phoc.* 5.4-8: “Lo mismo que Zenón decía que el filósofo debe proclamar su palabra impregnándola de sentido, así el discurso de Foción tenía muchísimo sentido en una brevísima dicción. Por tener eso en cuenta, a lo que parece, Polieucto de Esfeto dijo que el mejor orador era Demóstenes, pero Foción el más eficaz. Así como el mérito de la moneda es tener el mayor valor en el menor volumen posible, igualmente la eficacia

Phoc. 5.3: De modo semejante, la oratoria de Foción era salvífica por sus hallazgos y pensamientos de provecho y tenía una concisión imperiosa, severa y áspera.

ὁμοίως δέ πως τοῦ Φωκίωνος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐπὶ χρηστοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι καὶ διανοήμασι σωτήριος, προστακτικὴν τινα καὶ αὐστηρὰν καὶ ἀνήδυντον ἔχων βραχυλογία.

La total adecuación de la oratoria al carácter del personaje se confirma con la siguiente anécdota, seguida de una reflexión del propio Plutarco¹⁷:

Phoc. 5.9-10: Demóstenes sentía un gran desprecio por los demás oradores, pero cuando Foción se levantaba, solía decir susurrando a sus amigos: “aquí está el hacha de mis discursos” (ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς πάρεστιν). Pero quizás haya que atribuir esto a su carácter (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως πρὸς τὸ ἦθος ἀνοιστέον),

puesto que una sola palabra y señal con la cabeza de un hombre bueno inspiran igual grado de confianza que innumerables razonamientos y períodos.

Este comentario de Plutarco está en total consonancia con la cita ya vista antes de *Praec. ger. reip.* 801C: “tan persuasivo es el carácter como la palabra”.

Los numerosos apotegmas de la *Vida de Foción*¹⁸ ilustran la definición de su oratoria y muchos pueden proceder de sus discursos ante la asamblea o el consejo, lo que a veces indica Plutarco, quien, mediante las palabras de Foción, traza no solo las líneas fundamentales de su política sino también las de su carácter¹⁹. No se puede deducir de esto que Plutarco conociera algunos discursos de Foción, que posiblemente no se habían conservado, y los apotegmas citados podrían provenir de fuentes históricas que

del discurso parece que es tener mucho significado en pocas palabras. Cuentan que Foción mismo en cierta ocasión, mientras se llenaba el teatro, paseaba al pie de la escena ensimismado en sus pensamientos y que uno de sus amigos le dijo: «Foción, parece que estás meditando»; y él contestó: «Sí, por Zeus, medito si puedo quitar algo del discurso que voy a pronunciar ante los atenienses»”.

¹⁷ Sobre la importancia de los comentarios de orden moral de Plutarco, cf. F. FRAZIER, 2016 pp. 70-71.

¹⁸ No es extraña su gran abundancia si tenemos en cuenta lo que dice Plutarco en *Cat. Ma.* 7.3: “se hace visible la manera de ser de los hombres, mucho más que por el rostro, ... por la palabra”.

¹⁹ Sobre el recurso a los apotegmas, cf. A. E. WARDMAN, 1971, pp. 255-257. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 2002, pp. 266-7. Los pequeños sucesos (incluyendo anécdotas y dichos) reciben mucha atención por parte de Plutarco, ya que con ellos se consigue mayor penetración en el carácter de un personaje: cf. PELLING, 2002 (1), pp. 102-103. Mediante ellos se representa, entre otros ejemplos, su política ante la hegemonía de Macedonia: cf. *Phoc.* 16.5-7, 17.2-4, 21.1-2, 22.6, 23.4.

Plutarco habría resumido previamente²⁰, aunque además de esta posibilidad tampoco se pueden descartar otras, como el recurso a colecciones de anécdotas y dichos recopilados por otros autores.

Foción era el que más se oponía a los deseos del pueblo (8.3), y por tal motivo sus discursos tenían poca aceptación.

Esto se ejemplifica en un conjunto de apotegmas, a menudo sin contexto preciso, que lo caracterizan, de forma sistemática y sin orden cronológico, como un orador que no practica la demagogia (8.3-10.2)²¹.

A partir de los dichos de Foción, Plutarco extrae unas conclusiones sobre

²⁰ Según STADTER, 1914, pp. 676-677, de estos resúmenes elaborados por el propio Plutarco provendrían también las anécdotas recogidas en *Reg. et imp. apoph.*, que aparecen en el mismo orden en las *Vidas*, aunque en estas el número de anécdotas citadas es mayor.

²¹ Cf. *Phoc.* 8.4: “En otra ocasión en que expresaba su parecer ante el pueblo y tenía aceptación y veía que todo el mundo por igual aprobaba su discurso, se volvió a sus amigos y les dijo: «¿No habré dicho algún disparate sin darme cuenta?»”. Cf. *Phoc.* 9.3-10: “En otra ocasión, le exhortaban los atenienses a que los condujera contra los enemigos y, como no quería, lo tachaban de cobarde y poco hombre. «Ni vosotros -les dijo- podéis hacerme atrevido, ni yo a vosotros cobardes. Pero ya nos conocemos». 9.4) En una situación de peligro, el pueblo se irritó mucho con él y le reclamó que rindiese cuentas de su cargo de estratega; él les dijo: «Primero poneos a salvo, benditos». 9.5) En el curso de una guerra, estaban abatidos y asustados; pero una vez hecha la paz, se envalentonaban y lanzaban gritos contra Foción porque, según ellos, les había privado de la victoria. «Tenéis la suerte -les dijo- de contar con un estratega que os conoce, porque habríais podido perecer hace mucho tiempo». 9.6) Los atenienses rehusaban aceptar un arbitraje con los beocios por una cuestión territorial y preferían combatir; él les aconsejaba luchar con las palabras, en lo que eran superiores, no con las armas, en lo que eran inferiores. 9.7) Estaba una vez hablando y no aprobaban sus palabras ni consentían escucharlas, por lo que les dijo: «Vosotros podéis forzarme a hacer lo que no quiero, pero no me obligaréis a decir contra mi parecer lo que no conviene». 9.8) Uno de los oradores opuestos a su política, Demóstenes, le dijo: «Los atenienses te matarán, Foción, si tienen un ataque de locura». «Y a ti si estás en su sano juicio», le contestó. 9.9) Viendo a Polieucto de Esfetos que, en plena canícula, aconsejaba a los atenienses que hicieran la guerra a Filipo, y que luego, presa de un gran ahogo y sudor, porque además era muy grueso, trasegaba agua sin cesar, dijo: «Es conveniente que confiéis en éste y votéis la guerra. ¿Qué creéis que hará dentro de la coraza y con el escudo cuando los enemigos estén cerca, si ahora, al pronunciar ante vosotros un discurso que trae preparado, corre el riesgo de ahogarse?». 9.10) Una vez que Licurgo profería muchas injurias contra él en la asamblea, sobre todo por su consejo de entregar a los diez ciudadanos que Alejandro reclamaba, dijo: «Yo he dado a éstos muchos consejos buenos y convenientes, pero no me hacen caso»”.

su carácter volviendo a resaltar los rasgos contrapuestos y refiriéndolos a su vida pública y su vida privada:

Phoc. 10.4-5): Así que causa asombro cómo y por qué un hombre tan rudo y hosco (τραχὺς καὶ σκυθρωπός) adquirió el apelativo de bueno (χρηστός)²². Es difícil, aunque no imposible, que, como un vino, también la misma persona sea a la vez agradable y seca (ἰδὺν ἅμα καὶ αὐστηρὸν).

Phoc. 10.7:.. En sus actuaciones en bien de la patria, era rudo, indómito e inexorable (τραχύς, δυσεκβίαστος, ἀπαραίτητος); pero en la vida privada era benévolo, afable y humano con todos (εὐμενῇ πᾶσι καὶ κοινὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον).

2.2.Oratoria de Catón el Menor

En los tres primeros capítulos de la *Vida de Catón el Menor*, Plutarco va describiendo su carácter, que se manifiesta ya en su infancia y juventud²³. Hay un contraste entre su vida privada y su actitud ante una virtud fundamental para un político, la justicia (*Cat. mi.* 3.9-10): “en su régimen de vida era sobrio y contenido” (περὶ τὴν δίαιταν ἦν ἀκριβὴς καὶ σύντονος). En cambio,

Cat. mi. 4.2: practicaba toda clase de virtud como si estuviera poseído por una inspiración y se apasionó sobremanera por el tipo de bien que es rígido en lo referente a la justicia y no cede a la indulgencia o el favor.

περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν ἀρετὴν ὥσπερ ἐπιπνοία τινὶ κατάσχετος γεγὼνώς, διαφόρως δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀτενὲς καὶ ἄκαμπτον εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ χάριν ὑπερηγαπηκώς.

También en este caso, inmediatamente después de detallar tales contrastes, Plutarco habla de la oratoria de Catón como un instrumento necesario para su futura actuación política:

Cat. mi. 4.3: Se ejercitaba también en la oratoria como instrumento para dirigirse a las masas por considerar que, como en una gran ciudad, es conveniente que la filosofía política disponga también de una fuerza de combate.

Ἦσκει δὲ καὶ τὸν ὀργανικὸν εἰς πλήθη λόγον, ἀξιῶν ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει μεγάλῃ τῇ πολιτικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ μάχιμον εἶναι τι παρατρεφόμενον.

Cuando se refiere al primer discurso que pronunció Catón antes de dedicarse

²² En la Antigüedad era conocido como “Foción el bueno”. Según Nep., *Phoc.* 1.1, recibió el apelativo de *bonus* por su *integritas vitae*. *Sud.* 769 informa de que la asamblea decidió por votación concederle este título. El honor debió de serle otorgado por servicios importantes a la comunidad, mas no conocemos las circunstancias en que se produjo. Cf. L. A. TRITLE, 1988, pp. 143-145. Sobre la equivalencia de χρηστότης y φιλάνθρωπία, cf. *Cat. ma.* 5.1-5.

²³ Cf. J. GEIGER, 1993, pp. 310-15.

a la política, Plutarco hace ya la definición general de su oratoria, que también reúne rasgos contrapuestos debido al carácter del personaje²⁴:

Cat. mi. 5.3-4: Dio una muestra admirable tanto de su elocuencia como de su sensatez. Y es que no era en absoluto el discurso de un novel, lleno de artificios, sino directo, vehemente y áspero. Sin embargo, un encanto²⁵, por el que daba gusto oírlo, recorría la aspereza de sus pensamientos, y su carácter, unido a ello, confería a la seriedad cierto agrado y una sonrisa amable²⁶.

καὶ πεῖραν ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ φρονήματος δούς, ἐθαυμάσθη. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος νεαρὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ κομπὸν εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ὀρθίος καὶ περιπαθὴς καὶ τραχύς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ χάρις ἀγωγὸς ἀκοῆς ἐπέτρεχε τῇ τραχύτητι τῶν νοημάτων, καὶ τὸ ἦθος αὐτοῦ καταμειγνύμενον ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ μειδίαμα τῷ σεμνῷ παρεῖχεν οὐκ ἀπάνθρωπον.

Por tanto, también la oratoria de Catón el Menor presenta rasgos opuestos, como *τραχύς* y *χάρις*, e igualmente su carácter

mezcla el agrado con la seriedad: τὸ ἦθος αὐτοῦ καταμειγνύμενον ἡδονὴν ... τῷ σεμνῷ. Por esa mezcla de rasgos opuestos, su oratoria es similar a la de Foción, aunque con algunas diferencias: la oratoria de Foción estaba desprovista de *χάρις* y Plutarco no alude a la potencia de su voz. Frente a la concisión de Foción, destaca la capacidad de Catón para hablar durante un día entero, aunque no por charlatanería sino con la finalidad estratégica de impedir el éxito de sus rivales políticos: cf., por ejemplo, *Cat. mi.* 31.5.

Hay en la *Vida de Catón el Menor* otras importantes referencias a su oratoria en relación con su carácter:

Cat. mi. 21.10: En la tribuna (ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος) y en el senado era intransigente y terrible en su defensa de la justicia (*χαλεπὸς* ... καὶ φοβερὸς ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων), pero después trataba a todo el mundo con amabilidad y consideración (εἶτα πᾶσιν εὐνοϊκῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως προσφερόμενος)²⁷.

La semejanza con Foción, en un pasaje ya citado antes (*Phoc.* 10.7), es evidente, en concordancia con los ras-

²⁴ Sobre la coincidencia entre oratoria y carácter, cf. Chr. PELLING, 2002 (2), p. 340.

²⁵ Sobre esta virtud (*χάρις*), cf. F. FRAZIER, 2016, pp. 335-8.

²⁶ Plutarco aprueba la atención a la forma del discurso, pues también puede ayudar a la persuasión. Además en el caso de Catón el Menor también valora su voz potente e infatigable: cf. *Cat. mi.* 5.4-5.

²⁷ Otros rasgos de la oratoria, y también del carácter, de Catón el Menor no se encuentran en Foción: en concreto, “la cólera y el apasionamiento”. Así, el único discurso conservado

gos comunes del carácter de ambos mencionados en la comparación del capítulo 3 de la *Vida de Foción*²⁸.

Por último, otro rasgo que comparte Catón el Menor con Foción es el poco éxito de sus palabras, aunque resultaban proféticas y los acontecimientos posteriores demostraban que tenían razón: *e.g.* *Phoc.* 16.5-7, 23.1-6. *Cat. mi.* 52.1-2.

3. *Catón el Mayor*

La *Vida de Catón el Menor* comienza con el tópico del γένος y la mención de su bisabuelo Catón el Mayor (*Cat. mi.* 1.1): “La fama y gloria de la familia provienen de Catón el Mayor a causa de su virtud”. Tal comienzo anuncia las numerosas comparaciones implícitas con su antepasado, a quien solo se nom-

brará una vez más a propósito de la participación de Catón el Menor en la guerra de los esclavos²⁹, en la que este “manifestó ... que no era en absoluto inferior a Catón el Mayor” (*Cat. mi.* 8.1-3)³⁰. En lo tocante a su virtud, en ambas biografías se alude de la misma manera a la admiración que sentían los romanos por cada uno de ellos: usando su nombre en plural para negar que fueran Catones quienes no llegaban a igualar las virtudes de uno y otro: *Cat. ma.* 19.7, *Cat. mi.* 12.6, 19.9, 64.5.

Por los numerosos paralelismos entre las dos biografías, parece necesario prestar atención también a la *Vida de Catón el Mayor*, pero nos centraremos solo en las coincidencias que nos parecen más importantes y están relacionadas también con Foción.

todavía en tiempos de Plutarco, y que pronunció en el senado en contra de César, que se inclinaba por la clemencia con Catilina y sus secuaces, lo pronunció μετ’ ὀργῆς καὶ πάθους (*Cat. mi.* 23.1). De la misma manera habló en un enfrentamiento con Metelo y el senado no dio la razón a ninguno de los dos, pero veía en Catón “el entusiasmo de una virtud que luchaba por el bien y la justicia”: (*Cat. mi.* 26.5) ἡ δὲ Κάτωνος ἀρετῆς ἐνθουσιασμός, ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων ἀγωνιζομένης. Por tanto, ὀργή, πάθος, ἐνθουσιασμός son características exclusivas de la oratoria y del carácter de Catón que podemos considerar justificadas por la búsqueda del bien y de la justicia pero que, en sí, no son positivas.

²⁸ *Phoc.* 3.8: Mezcladas en igual medida la austeridad y la humanidad, ..., la prevención ante la vileza y el esfuerzo por la justicia ... ἴσῳ μέτρῳ μεμειγμένου πρὸς τὸ αὐστηρὸν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου, ... καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ αἰσχρὸν εὐλαβείας, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον εὐτονίας ...

²⁹ Aunque Catón desempeñó cargos en el ejército, participó en pocas batallas. Plutarco refiere solo dos. En la segunda, que tuvo lugar en Dirraquio entre las tropas de Pompeyo y las de César, no se destaca la acción militar de Catón sino la eficacia de su oratoria para enardecer el valor de los soldados: cf. *Cat. mi.* 54.7-10.

³⁰ Con el deseo de engrandecer a Catón el Menor, Plutarco lo compara, por su modesta participación en una campaña, con su bisabuelo, protagonista de acciones militares más importantes.

Como Foción y Catón el Menor, Catón el Mayor tampoco practicaba la demagogia ni buscaba agradar al pueblo (*Cat. ma.* 16.4-8), y él mismo, desde la tribuna, “pedía que la mayoría de los ciudadanos, si eran sensatos, escogieran no al médico más complaciente sino al más severo” (*Cat. ma.* 16.6).

Aún más se aprecia la similitud de Catón el Mayor con el Menor y con Foción en sus costumbres (similares a las de Sócrates): todos ellos solían desplazarse a pie, descalzos, ligeramente vestidos, y seguían un régimen de vida austero (cf. *Phoc.* 4.4, 17.3, *Cat. mi.* 5.6-7, 6.6, 44.1, *Cat. ma.* 1.9-2.4, 3.2, 4.2-6, 6.1-4). Todos (también Sócrates, cf. *Pl. Symp.* 220 b-d) despertaban con estas sobrias costumbres la admiración de los soldados.

También los aproxima a Sócrates la formación filosófica, previa a la entrada en la vida pública, que influiría tanto en su estilo de vida como en su προαίρεσις y su oratoria³¹: Foción se formó con Platón y Jenócrates (*Phoc.* 4.2-3), Catón el Menor con filósofos estoicos (*Cat. mi.* 4.2), y Catón el Mayor con el neopitagórico Nearco de Tarento, que le transmitió enseñanzas de tipo platónico (*Cat. ma.* 2.3-4).

3.1. Vocación política y oratoria de Catón el Mayor

La primera referencia a la oratoria de Catón el Mayor se encuentra al principio de su biografía, en una significativa secuencia: tras la descripción de su fortaleza física, encontramos la primera referencia a su oratoria y a su carácter, todo ello como rasgos adecuados del hombre de Estado. Como en el caso de Catón el Menor, Plutarco también considera la oratoria de Catón el Mayor “un instrumento imprescindible” para la acción política³²:

Cat. ma. 1.5 τὸν δὲ λόγον ὥσπερ δεύτερον σῶμα καὶ τῶν καλῶν μονονοῦκ ἀναγκαῖον ὄργανον ἀνδρὶ μὴ ταπεινῶς βιωσομένῳ μηδ’ ἀπράκτως ἐξηρτῆετο.

Preparaba su oratoria como un segundo cuerpo y un instrumento de nobles actividades casi imprescindible para un hombre que no iba a llevar una vida oscura y ociosa.

Cat. ma. 1.6 μᾶλλον τοῖς χρωμένοις κατεφαίνετο βάρος τι καὶ φρόνημα³³ περὶ αὐτὸν ἦθους, πραγμάτων μεγάλων καὶ πολιτείας δεόμενον ἡγεμονικῆς.

³¹ Sobre la influencia de la *paideía* en estos dos tópicos de las biografías, cf. Chr. PELLING 2002 (2), pp. 339-347.

³² Sobre la oratoria como “instrumento” (ὄργανον), cf. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 2002, 263-4.

³³ Sobre esta cualidad de complejo significado, propia del personaje superior al común de los mortales, cf. F. FRAZIER, 2016, pp. 276-279.

para quienes trataban con él era cada vez más manifiesta una dignidad y grandeza de su carácter que requería asuntos importantes y liderazgo político.

Su προαίρεσις, por tanto, está estrechamente ligada a su oratoria y a su carácter, como se vuelve a manifestar más adelante cuando hace su entrada efectiva en la vida pública. Al principio, fue Valerio Flaco quien lo animó a dedicarse a la política al enterarse de (*Cat. ma.* 3.2) “su templanza y moderación y de algunos dichos sentenciosos” (ἐπιείκειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μετριότητα καὶ τινας καὶ λόγους ἀποφθεγματικούς) y (*Cat. ma.* 3.3) observar que tenía “un carácter amable y gentil” (κατανοῶν ἡμερον καὶ ἀστεῖον ἥθος). Pero, cuando bajó la ciudad, pronto adquirió admiradores y amigos gracias a sus discursos judiciales (διὰ τῶν συνηγοριῶν), lo que, junto al apoyo de Valerio Flaco, le permitió emprender la carrera política.

Sin embargo, aunque era considerado el Demóstenes romano, adquirió mayor fama su austero modo de vida:

Cat. ma. 4.1 Aumentó mucho el poder de Catón gracias a su oratoria y la mayoría lo llama-

ba el Demóstenes romano, pero era más renombrado y famoso su modo de vida.

Τῷ δὲ Κάτωνι πολλὴ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δύναμις ἠϋξήτο, καὶ Ῥωμαῖον αὐτὸν οἱ πολλοὶ Δημοσθένη προσηγόρευον, ὁ δὲ βίος μᾶλλον ὀνομαστός ἦν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιβόητος.

Sigue la descripción de su vida austera (*Cat. ma.* 4.2-6) que, como hemos visto, tiene su paralelismo con las *Vidas de Foción y Catón el Menor*.

En la *Comparatio* hay otra referencia a su προαίρεσις en la que se vuelve a destacar el papel fundamental de su oratoria que (como la de Foción y Catón el Menor) estaba al servicio de la justicia (*Cat. ma.* 28 (1).3-4): se lanzó a la política en Roma “... sin tener otro punto de apoyo más que una voz que hablaba con franqueza en defensa de lo que era justo” (... μηδὲν ὀρμητήριον ἔχοντα πλὴν φωνὴν παρρησιαζομένην ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων)³⁴.

La importancia de la oratoria en su vida fue fundamental, como se destaca en un juicio del propio Plutarco. Mientras que la “virtud” (ἀρετή) de Foción y Catón el Menor no obtuvo el reconocimiento que merecía a causa de

³⁴ Sobre la justicia como virtud esencial del político, cf. A. E. WARDMAN, 1974, pp. 124-132. A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, 2004, pp. 127-136. J. PINHEIRO, 2010, pp. 43-49. F. FRAZIER, 2016, pp. 255-258 explica su relación con la φιλανθρωπία y la χρηστότης. Sobre el origen de esta virtud de Foción en su formación filosófica, cf. L. A. TRITLE 1988, pp. 142-145.

una “fortuna” (τύχη) adversa³⁵, Catón el Mayor contó con la defensa de su oratoria y la τύχη no le afectó negativamente:

Cat. ma. 29 (2).5 pues tenía como defensa de su vida y enérgico instrumento su oratoria, a la que con más justicia que a la fortuna o a su genio tutelar se podría atribuir el que no sufriera nada contrario a su dignidad.

πρόβλημα τοῦ βίου καὶ δραστήριον ὄργανον ἔχων τὸν λόγον, ᾧ δικαιότερον ἢ τις ἢ τύχη καὶ δαίμονι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν παρ’ ἄξιαν ἀνατιθεῖται.

En cuanto a su carácter, es definido también como una mezcla de rasgos contrapuestos muy parecidos a los de Foción y Catón el Menor (*Cat. ma.* 6.4): en la vida privada era “afable y sencillo” (εὐκόλος καὶ ἀφελής), pero en su vida pública “inexorable en lo concerniente a la justicia” (ἀπαραίτητος ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ) y “rígido y severo” (ὀρθὸς καὶ αὐθέκαστος).

Como en el caso de Foción y de Catón el Menor, también por asociación de ideas, sigue la definición de la

oratoria mediante el esquema ya visto de rasgos opuestos en consonancia con los del carácter, y esta es la razón por la que Plutarco compara a Catón el Mayor con Sócrates³⁶:

Cat. ma. 7.1 Parece que la oratoria del personaje tenía una índole semejante (sc. a la del carácter): en efecto, era a la vez encantadora y terrible, agradable e impetuosa, burlona y severa, sentenciosa y polémica, como Platón afirma³⁷ que, a los ojos de quienes se lo encontraban, Sócrates tenía, por fuera, un aspecto vulgar, de sátiro e insolente, pero que, por dentro, estaba lleno de seriedad y de pensamientos que provocaban las lágrimas de los oyentes y conmovían su corazón.

Τοιαύτην δέ τινα φαίνεται καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰδέαν ἔχειν· εὐχαρὶς γὰρ ἅμα καὶ δεινὸς ἦν, ἡδὺς καὶ καταπληκτικὸς, φιλοσκώμμων καὶ αὐστηρὸς, ἀποφθεγματικὸς καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸς, ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων τὸν Σωκράτη φησὶν ἔξωθεν ἰδιώτην καὶ σατυρικὸν καὶ ὕβριστήν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαινόμενον, ἔνδο-

³⁵ Cf. *Phoc.* 1.4-6 y 3.4-5. Sobre la importancia de estos dos conceptos para establecer la comparación de las *Vidas de Foción y Catón el Menor*, cf. FRAZIER, 1987, p. 67. T. DUFF, 1999, 136-7. D. F. LEÃO, 2010, pp. 187-189. M. do C. FIALHO, 2010, p. 67.

³⁶ La presencia de Sócrates es explícita en otros dos pasajes de la *Vida*, pues Plutarco cuenta que Catón el Mayor manifestaba dos opiniones diferentes sobre Sócrates: lo admiraba porque trataba con bondad y dulzura a una mujer difícil y unos hijos estúpidos (*Cat. ma.* 20.3) pero lo acusaba de corromper las costumbres de los ciudadanos y de infringir las leyes (*Cat. ma.* 23.1).

³⁷ Pl. *Symp.* 215a.

θεν σπουδῆς καὶ πραγμάτων μεσ-
τὸν εἶναι δάκρυα κινούντων τοῖς
ἀκρωμένοις καὶ τὴν καρδίαν
στρεφόντων.

Por una parte, esta comparación con Sócrates se refiere aparentemente solo a la oratoria de Catón el Mayor pero también se debe entender que afecta a su carácter, dada su estrecha conexión con la oratoria. Por otra parte, Sócrates es el referente principal para situar al máximo nivel la virtud de Foción y de Catón el Menor en sus respectivas *Vidas*. La comparación de estos con Sócrates está implícita en muchos pasajes y se hace explícita al narrar la muerte de ambos³⁸. De esta forma se resalta su caracterización como filósofos y la injusticia del fin que sufrieron, a la vez que se fortalece el tono moral y el paralelismo entre ambas *Vidas*. Por tanto, el paralelismo que se establece entre ellos y Catón el Mayor por medio de Sócrates llega a ser extraordinario.

4. Conclusiones

La comparación de Foción y Catón el Menor con Sócrates posiblemente proviene de las fuentes de Plutarco³⁹. En cambio, la de Catón el Mayor con el filósofo griego probablemente se debe al propio Plutarco⁴⁰, que la realiza quizás por un doble motivo: por una parte, su deseo de conectar a un personaje modelo de virtudes romanas con la παιδεία griega a pesar de que se manifestaba abiertamente contrario a la misma⁴¹. Por otra parte, Plutarco estaba influido quizás por los datos que pudo ir recogiendo sobre Catón el Menor cuando estaba escribiendo la *Vida de Catón el Mayor*⁴², lo que favorecería numerosas conexiones entre ambas *Vidas*. Sea como fuere, el resultado es que la *Vida de Catón el Mayor* está presente, no solo por el nombre y el parentesco, sino sobre todo por las semejanzas establecidas, en la mente del lector de las *Vidas de*

³⁸ Sobre los pasajes en que se establece la comparación de Foción y Catón el Menor con Sócrates, cf. C. BEARZOT 1985, pp. 237-239. C. ALCALDE-MARTÍN, 1999, pp. 167-171. T. DUFF, 1999, pp. 141-145. M. B. TRAPP, 1999, pp. 487-499. Sobre su muerte, cf. A. RONCONI, 1966, cols. 1261-1262.

³⁹ Cf. J. GEIGER, 1993, pp. 303-304. T. DUFF, 1999, p. 147.

⁴⁰ Así R. FLACELIÈRE & É. CHAMBRY, "Notice", en Plutarque, *Vies*, tome V, Paris 1969, p. 69.

⁴¹ Cf. *Cat. ma.* 23.1. Pero también en otros pasajes procura Plutarco este acercamiento de Catón el Mayor a la παιδεία griega: su conocimiento de la filosofía platónica gracias al neopitagórico Nearco, el uso para su oratoria de Tucídides y sobre todo de Demóstenes (era llamado el Demóstenes romano), y el aprendizaje del griego en la vejez: cf. *Cat. ma.* 2.3-6, 4.1.

⁴² Compuesta con anterioridad. Cf. *Cat. mi.* 1.1.

Foción y Catón el Menor y, cuando se observan los rasgos del carácter y la oratoria de estos, se piensa en el primer Catón y sobre todo en su comparación con Sócrates. El filósofo se convierte así en el vínculo más sólido entre las tres biografías, pues simboliza la conjunción de rasgos opuestos en el carácter y la oratoria de sus protagonistas a la vez que los acerca al ideal del gobernante inspirado por la filosofía.

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Four Exegetical Notes on Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love*

[Cuatro Notas Exegéticas sobre el *Diálogo del Amor* de Plutarco]

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Abstract

These notes offer interpretations of Plutarch, *Dialogue on Love* 756D, 764C-D, 764E, and 770A-B.

Key-Words: Plutarch, *Dialogue on Love*. Textual criticism.

Resumen

Estas notas ofrecen interpretaciones sobre Plutarco, *Diálogo del Amor* 756D, 764C-D, 764E, y 770A-B.

Palabras-clave: Plutarco, *Diálogo del Amor*. Crítica textual.

ialogue on Love 756D

πόρρω γὰρ
οὐκ ἄπειμι τὴν δ'
Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ
ὀρᾷς ὅση θεός;
ἥδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σπείρουσα καὶ διδοῦσα
ἔρον, οὗ πάντες ἐσμὲν οἱ κατὰ
χρόν' ἔκγονοι. (Teubner ed.¹)

I do not go far

Do you not see how mighty is
the goddess Aphrodite [= Euripi-

des, fr. 898.1 TrGF]?

She sows and gives that love

From which all we upon this
earth are born [= Euripides, *Hippo-
lytus* 449-450]. (Loeb² tr. modified)

The phrase πόρρω γὰρ οὐκ ἄπειμι has
caused problems for some translators
and interpreters. Both the Budé³ ('[s]
ans aller plus loin') and the Loeb edition
(‘not to go farther’) translate as if πόρρω

¹ C. HUBERT, 1938.

² E.L. MINAR – F.H. SANDBACH – W.C. HELMBOLD, 1961.

³ R. FLACELIÈRE – M. CUVIGNY, 1980.

were a comparative⁴. H. Görgemanns, although offering a correct translation, comments that the meaning of the phrase within the context is unclear⁵. D. Russell correctly translates 'I go not far away'⁶ and rightly observes elsewhere that the phrase does not indicate the return from a digression, as the Budé and Loeb translations suggest, but, on the contrary, a promise to go further along the lines of the argument⁷. As a matter of fact, γάρ suggests that these words even mark the *beginning* of a digression. Indeed, the whole part on Aphrodite and Eros and their relation as cosmic gods is structurally speaking a digression; the *return* from this digression is indicated by οὖν at 756f⁸. This fits into Plutarch's strategy of underemphasising the most important parts of his speech in the *Dialogue on Love* (cf. 762a-b; 763f; 770b)⁹. The interpretation of the sentence is not a problem if we keep in mind the general point which Plutarch is making here (i.e. that questioning the existence of one god has important implications for the other gods). The concrete example

is that, if Eros is undermined, Aphrodite suffers from this as well and the unity of the Greek pantheon is threatened. The jump from Eros to Aphrodite is indeed not πόρρω: both gods are closely associated (cf. e.g. 756e, 752a-b).

Dialogue on Love 764c-d

πλὴν ἐκείνη γε δόξειαν ἄν διαφέρειν, ἣ δείκνυσιν ἥλιος μὲν ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχροὶ τοῖς ὀρῶσιν, Ἔρως δὲ μόνων τῶν καλῶν φέγγος ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἀναπείθει βλέπειν καὶ στρέφεσθαι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων περιορᾶν. (Teubner ed. modified [underlined])

Yet, there is, it seems, a difference to be pointed out: on earth the sun exhibits both the beautiful and the ugly to men's eyes, while Love illumines only what is beautiful. Only this does he persuade lovers to contemplate and turn to; everything else they must overlook. (Loeb tr. modified)

The *Dialogue on Love* is preserved in only two manuscripts: Parisinus gr.

⁴ Cf. also M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ – H. RODRÍGUEZ SOMOLINOS – C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, 2003, 68: 'Pues sin ir más lejos'.

⁵ H. GÖRGEMANN, 2011, 155 n. 132. Cf. W. SIEVEKING, 1940, 99.

⁶ D. RUSSELL, 1993, 259.

⁷ D. RUSSELL, 1997, 101. Moreover, he notes the iambic rhythm of the phrase and suspects that it is a quotation from an unknown dramatic source (D. RUSSELL, 1997, 110 n. 10; cf. D. RUSSELL, 1993, 378); this does not strike me as particularly compelling.

⁸ For this structuring function of γάρ and οὖν see C.M.J. SICKING, 1993, 20 and 27; I.J.F. DE JONG, 1997; S.R. SLINGS, 1997.

⁹ Cf. P. VAN NUFFELEN, 2007 on rhetorical silence in Plutarch.

1672 (E) and Parisinus gr. 1675 (B)¹⁰. These manuscripts read ἐπὶ γῆς, as I do here along with G.N. Bernardakis¹¹, A. Barigazzi¹² and M. Valverde Sánchez in his translation¹³. A.J. Kronenberg's emendation ἐπίσης ('equally'), however, has now become generally accepted¹⁴. Barigazzi states that '[a] prima vista la correzione [sc. to ἐπίσης] sembra imporsi', while I even fail to see the problem with the reading of the manuscripts. Although I follow his reading, I differ very slightly from Barigazzi in the interpretation of the passage. He defends ἐπὶ γῆς 'perché suggerisce il cammino che si percorre, secondo Plutarco, sotto la guida di Eros, dalle cose belle sulla terra verso gli intellegibili del mondo iperuranio'. However, the procession from the sensible to the intelligible will only become relevant later in the comparison (764d-e) and it is not necessary to import this further development here in order to make sense of the passage. The opposition between the

sun and ἔρως explored here is an opposition which plays out squarely in the sensible world and is quite trivial (like the examples given just before this passage, 764b-c): on earth the sun illuminates both beautiful and ugly, whereas the lover will be focussed on the beautiful on earth. The later opposition between the sun as guide towards the sensible and Eros as guide towards the intelligible has not yet come into play here¹⁵.

Dialogue on Love 764e

ἀποστρέφει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, χάριτι καὶ λαμπρότητι τῆς ὄψεως γοητεύων καὶ ἀναπείθων ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐτέρωθι δὲ μηθέν· (Teubner ed. modified [underlined])

For it is the sun that turns our attention from intelligibles to sensibles, bewitching it by the charm and brilliance of vision,

¹⁰ M. MANFREDINI, 1976 offers the most extensive discussion of the (uncertain) relation between these two manuscripts.

¹¹ G.N. BERNARDAKIS, 1892.

¹² A. BARIGAZZI, 1986, 245.

¹³ M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ – H. RODRÍGUEZ SOMOLINOS – C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, 2003, 98.

¹⁴ A.J. KRONENBERG, 1924, 88 is followed by Teubner; Budé; Loeb; W. SIEVEKING, 1940, 134; D. RUSSELL, 1993; G.N. BERNARDAKIS – P.D. BERNARDAKIS – H.G. INGENKAMP, 2011; H. GÖRGEMANN, 2011.

¹⁵ The difference between the two oppositions becomes clear if we look at the persuasive effects of ἔρως and the sun in both instances. In the passage under discussion ἔρως persuades (ἀναπείθει) us to look at and turn to (στρέφεσθαι) beauty *on earth*. In the later, more Platonically coloured development (see next exegetical note) it is the sun which persuades (ἀναπείθων, 764e) our διάνοια to look for truth on earth and turns it towards this earthly beauty (ἀποστρέφει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητά), while Eros does the opposite this time.

and urging it to seek truth and everything else in her or in her realm, and not in any other place. (Loeb tr. modified)

The verb αἰτεῖσθαι, which is the reading of the manuscripts, is generally regarded as corrupt¹⁶. Following G.N. Bernardakis¹⁷ and the Budé edition, which keep αἰτεῖσθαι, I would disagree. If the reason is that the exact expression does not occur elsewhere and that αἰτεῖσθαι is used rather freely, then it should be noted that in these pages of the *Dialogue on Love* Plutarch often resorts to creative language, even to the extent of using *hapax legomena* – not unlike Plato in Socrates' second speech in the *Phaedrus* (244a-257b). An unfamiliar construction or a not quite straightforward meaning alone are surely no reasons for emendation. The Budé keeps αἰτεῖσθαι, translating '[le soleil] tâche à nous persuader de ne chercher qu'en lui et autour de lui la vérité et tous les autres biens, sans jamais nous adresser ailleurs'¹⁸. There is no need, however, to make 'nous' the subject of αἰτεῖσθαι: Plutarch is still talking about the διάνοια (εἶοικε

[...] φαρμάττειν τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ ἥλιος, 764f), as D. Russell's translation rightly suggests¹⁹. The generally accepted conjecture (κεῖσθαι) obscures this.

Dialogue on Love 770A-B

καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος βοηθεῖ καὶ γεννήσεως κοινῆς <οὔσης> καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς Ἑρῶτος ἡ φύσις ἀποδείκνυσι δεομένους. οὕτω γὰρ ἔρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν' οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι καὶ γῆς οὐρανόν, ἔρᾶν δ' ἥλιον σελήνης οἱ φυσικοὶ καὶ συγγίνεσθαι καὶ κυεῖσθαι· καὶ γῆν δ' ἀνθρώπων μητέρα καὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν ἀπάντων γένεσιν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπολέσθαι ποτὲ καὶ σβεσθῆναι παντάπασιν, ὅταν ὁ δεινὸς ἔρως ἡ μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἀπολίπη καὶ παύσῃται ποθοῦσα καὶ διώκουσα τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀρχὴν καὶ κίνησιν; (Teubner ed. modified [underlined])

The law, in fact, assists since procreation too is a shared undertaking; and nature shows that the gods need eros. It is in this sense, then, that the poets say that 'the earth loves rain' [Eur., fr. 898.7 *TrGF*] and that heaven loves earth; and in this sense, too, natural

¹⁶ The Teubner edition places a *crux*. D. WYTTEBACH, 1797, 65 SUGGESTED READING αἰωρεῖσθαι, κεῖσθαι (which was adopted in the Loeb edition, as well as in W. SIEVEKING, 1940, 136 AND H. GÖRGEMANN, 2011) or διατᾶσθαι.

¹⁷ G.N. BERNARDAKIS, 1892; G.N. BERNARDAKIS – P.D. BERNARDAKIS – H.G. INGENKAMP, 2011.

¹⁸ Cf. also M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ – H. RODRÍGUEZ SOMOLINOS – C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, 2003, 99: 'INDUCIÉNDONOS A BUSCAR EN él y en torno a él la verdad y lo demás, y a no buscar nada en otra parte'.

¹⁹ D. RUSSELL, 1993, 272.

philosophers assert that the sun loves the moon and that they unite and that she conceives. And since earth is the mother of all men and a source of generation for all beasts and plants, will she not be destined to perish at some time or other and be completely extinguished if ever the mighty Eros or a part of the god abandons matter and if ever she stops longing for and pursuing the principle of her motion which derives from that source? (Loeb tr. modified)

(1) The two manuscripts read γεννήσεως κοινῆς²⁰. The text does not seem to be intelligible without addition. Therefore, I adopt A. Barigazzi's conjecture <οὔσης>, which is also printed by H. Görgemanns. As Barigazzi points out, γεννήσεως κοινῆς <οὔσης> is more readily explained as a haplography than

other proposals which boil down to the same meaning²¹. However, I depart from Barigazzi and Görgemanns by reading γεννήσεως κοινῆς <οὔσης> with ὁ νόμος βοηθεῖ instead of with the following clause²². Just stating that 'the law assists' without giving any further information seems abrupt and a bit unclear. Greek legal concern with procreation within marriage is well documented, both in Plutarch and elsewhere²³. Moreover, only this reading places the passage in the context of Plutarch's description of the ideal marriage as a mutual endeavour (769e-770a).

(2) For ἐρᾶν δ' ἥλιον σελήνης οἱ φυσικοὶ καὶ συγγίνεσθαι καὶ κυεῖσθαι (the reading of one of the manuscripts²⁴), which is adopted in the Loeb and Budé editions, some editors accept J. J. Reiske's emendation ἐρᾶν δ' ἡλίου σελήνην, thus switching subject and

²⁰ M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ – H. RODRÍGUEZ SOMOLINOS – C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, 2003, 118 retains the reading of the manuscripts (which is also printed by G.N. BERNARDAKIS, 1892), interpreting γεννήσεως κοινῆς along with Ἐρῶτος as an object of δεομένων (cf. also D. WYTTEBACH, 1797, 86). This, however, would make for an odd word order. D. RUSSELL, 1993, 281 suggests a lacuna; G.N. BERNARDAKIS – P.D. BERNARDAKIS – H.G. INGENKAMP, 2011 suspects a gloss.

²¹ A. BARIGAZZI, 1986, 262. The Teubner, Budé, and Loeb editions add <ἐνεκα>; cf. also W. SIEVEKING, 1940, 162.

²² The Loeb translation seems to take the two word groups together but translates rather freely: 'The law, in fact, assists Eros in bringing about procreation in all societies (γεννήσεως κοινῆς <ἐνεκα>)'.

²³ In *On Affection for Offspring* 493e Plutarch mentions various legal sanctions against childlessness. For passages in other authors see K. PRAECHTER, 1901, 144. The marital function of procreation is particularly important in the (Middle-)Stoic conception of the city; see e.g. I. RAMELLI, 2009, 120. For the use of this argument in rhetoric see, e.g., Libanius' *Whether one should marry* 9-12.

²⁴ This is the reading of E. B, the other manuscript, has ἥλιον δὲ σελήνης, adopted by D. WYTTEBACH, 1797, 86.

object²⁵. Reiske's argument 'κυεῖσθαι de sole nequit dici' (in the Teubner apparatus) seems compelling: κυέω (LSJ: 'bear in the womb, be pregnant with [...] [m]ed., bring forth [...] abs., to be big or pregnant') cannot be said of a male subject²⁶; the passive is only said 'of the embryo or foetus' (LSJ)²⁷. Agreeing with this argument but resisting the ensuing conjecture, I suggest that the subject changes twice: the subject of ἐρᾶν is the sun, the subject of συγγίγνεσθαι are both the sun and the moon²⁸, the subject of κυεῖσθαι is, indeed, the moon²⁹. This once again ties in with the emphasis on reciprocity³⁰.

The abrupt change of subject is rather fitting given the context. It occurs again (and this time with certainty) in the next example: ἀπολίπη καὶ παύσεται – the subject of the first verb is the male principle (akin to the sun), while the subject of the second verb is the female principle (akin to the moon).

(3) Instead of the manuscripts' μέρος, editors have unanimously printed H. Stephanus' 1572 emendation ἕμερος. I wonder whether this is as compelling as it seems. After all, in the *Platonic Questions* (2.1001c) Plutarch has no problem with calling the rational part of the world soul a τοῦ θεοῦ [...] μέρος. Although the

²⁵ Reiske is followed by G.N. BERNARDAKIS, 1892; W. SIEVEKING, 1940, 162; H. GÖRGEMANNS, 2011; G.N. BERNARDAKIS – P.D. BERNARDAKIS – H.G. INGENKAMP, 2011, and by the current Teubner edition.

²⁶ A notable exception is Plato's use at *Symp.* 206c, where metaphorical pregnancy is extended to include males (πάντες κυοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι). See G. VLASTOS, 1981, 21 n. 59. Cf. also D.D. LEITAO, 2012.

²⁷ Pace M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ – H. RODRÍGUEZ SOMOLINOS – C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, 2003: 118: 'el Sol ama a la Luna y se une a ella y la fecunda'; cf. D. WYTTEBACH, 1797, 86.

²⁸ Cf. *Amat.* 765c for a similarly abrupt shift in subject involving the same verb: οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολὺς χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ τό τε σῶμα τὸ τῶν ἐρωμένων παρελθόντες ἔσω φέρονται καὶ ἄπτονται τοῦ ἡθους, ἃ ἐκκαλούμενος τὰς ὄψεις καθορᾶσι καὶ συγγίνονται διὰ λόγων πολλὰ καὶ πράξεων ἀλλήλοις. The ἐρασταί are the subject of the first three main verbs (φέρονται, ἄπτονται, καθορᾶσι). The word ἀλλήλοις makes it clear that the subject of συγγίνονται are both the ἐρασταί and the ἐρώμενοι. Cf. G. PASQUAL, 1997, 218. (On the *crux* in this passage, which does not affect the argument here, see A. BARIGAZZI, 1986, 249–250; H. GÖRGEMANNS, 2011, 180 n. 330).

²⁹ Similarly, A. BARIGAZZI, 1986, 262 keeps the texts of the manuscripts on the argument that 'il soggetto dei due infiniti non è espresso'. However, instead of assigning subjects, he considers the infinitives to be generic (translating 'e avviene che ci sono unioni e gravidanze'); cf. D. RUSSELL, 1993, 281 ('the sun is in love with the moon and joins with him, and conception follows'). This is possible, but it draws away from the point Plutarch is making here: love is reciprocal.

³⁰ Cf. *De Is. et Os.* (e.g. 356a, 372d-f), where mutual love between Osiris (the demiurgic figure akin to the sun) and Isis (the matter-like figure akin to the moon) drives the cosmos. Cf. also my next remark sub 3.

context of the passage under discussion is obviously less technical, it is not a stretch to suspect that Plutarch is thinking along the same lines here. The god Eros, who plays the role of Platonic demiurge in the *Dialogue on Love* (esp. 756d-f), is somehow present in matter while remaining a divinity. Through his presence he provides ἀρχή καὶ κίνησις, which is indeed what the world soul does (cf. e.g. *De an. procr.* 1024c-e). In this regard, Eros can be compared to Osiris, who is the demiurgic figure in *On Isis and Osiris* (cf. esp. 374b-c, where Osiris' identification with the demiurgic Eros is brought to the fore). Isis, who is associated with matter (cf. 382c), is the one who desires and pursues Osiris (ποθοῦσαν καὶ διώκουσαν, 371a; cf. 374f-375a), who as a demiurgic divinity is also present in matter through his efflux, which constitutes the rational part of the world soul (371a-b). Similarly, matter in the *Dialogue on Love* desires and pursues (ποθοῦσα καὶ διώκουσα) Eros, of whom a part (μέρος) is present in matter. On this interpretation, which ties in with Plutarch's general views on cosmology, it makes sense to read the manuscripts' μέρος instead of the rather redundant conjecture ἥμερος.

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Plutarch and the Law of Reflection: Critical and Literary Commentary to *De facie* 930A-C

[Plutarco y la ley de reflexión: Comentario crítico y literario a *De facie* 930A-C]

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Abstract

In 930A-C, Plutarch introduces and immediately rejects the law of reflection because, in his view, the theory is not self-evident nor unanimously accepted. To reinforce this rejection, he provides two examples taken from the field of catoptrics: 1) the images resulting from convex mirrors and 2) those resulting from folding mirrors. Up until now, the slightly corrupted state of the transmitted text and the technical language of the theory and the examples discussed in the passage have prevented scholars from reaching a sound interpretation of the passage. In this paper, I will first address the issues concerning the state of the text, in order to later discuss its problematic content, to wit, whether Plutarch's rejection of the theory that all reflections occur in equal angles was meant to be taken seriously, as resulting from a confrontation between this theory's assumptions and reality, or was due to his interest in conveying an ideal image of the moon, a specific interest that could not fit with this theory's statements.

Key-Words: *De facie*, Textual criticism, Catoptrics, Optics, Rhetoric.

Resumen

En 930A-C, Plutarco introduce y desecha inmediatamente la ley de reflexión porque, en su opinión, la teoría no es evidente por sí misma ni hay unanimidad en su aceptación. Para reforzar su abandono, proporciona dos ejemplos del campo de la catóptrica: 1) las imágenes que resultan en los espejos convexos y 2) las que resultan de los espejos dobles. Hasta ahora, el corrupto estado del texto transmitido y el lenguaje técnico de la teoría y los ejemplos discutidos en el pasaje han impedido a los estudiosos ofrecer una interpretación sólida. En este artículo me centraré primero en las cuestiones relativas al estado del texto para discutir luego su contenido problemático, a saber, si el abandono por Plutarco de la teoría de que todas las reflexiones suceden en ángulos iguales ha de ser tomado en serio, como resultado de una inadecuación entre la formulación de la teoría y la realidad, o se debe a su interés en transmitir una imagen concreta de la luna que entraría en conflicto con los principios de esta teoría..

Key-Words: *De facie*, Textual criticism, Catoptrics, Optics, Rhetoric.



Introduction

The field of catoptrics is a branch of optics concerned with reflection, especially the formation of images by mirrors. One of the principles of the field is the law of reflection, which states that all reflections occur in equal angles, namely that the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection. This law is discussed and rejected in *De facie* 929E-930D¹. First (929E-930A), Sulla raises the problem of the half-moon as the result of the application of the law. According to him, the shape of a half-moon should never be seen from earth, on the grounds that the rays coming from the sun and reflected on the moon would glance off in the opposite direction and never reach the earth². If, because of the angle in which it is reflected, the ray of light cannot meet our sight, the only natural consequence is that we should not be able to see the half of the moon that is illuminated³.

To this, Lucius replies that such a law is not self-evident nor accepted by all, and proceeds to reject it on the grounds of the images reflected in two specific types of mirrors (930A-C). The first example involves the images reflected in convex mirrors (τῶν κυρτῶν κατόπτρων) and the second one those reflected in folding mirrors (τοῖς διπτύχοις κατόπτροις). According to him, given that neither of these result from reflection in equal angles, the law is proved to be incorrect.

Unfortunately, the manuscripts have preserved this part of the conversation with quite some textual difficulties, which have hindered the proper understanding of the passage's content. Furthermore, its highly technical language has also hindered a sound interpretation of Plutarch's true intentions when including the law of reflection, convex mirrors and folding mirrors in his text.

1. Text and Critical Commentary

According to the manuscripts, the text runs as follows (930A-C):

¹ I would like to thank Dr. R. Tobey for reading the passage and providing some notes on it, and Dr. J. A. Koster, whose clarification on the actual functioning of reflecting surfaces, both curved and plane, contributed in great measure to offer new insights on Plutarch's intentions.

² 929E-930A, "Πάνυ μὲν οὖν" ὁ Σύλλας εἶπεν "ἔχει γάρ τινα λόγον τὸ πάσης ἐν ἴσαις γωνίαις γινομένης ἀνακλάσεως ὅταν ἡ σελήνη διχοτομοῦσα μεσουρανῇ, μὴ φέρεσθαι τὸ φῶς ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ ὀλισθαίνειν ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς." The Greek text corresponds to that in preparation for my PhD project: *Critical Edition of Plutarch's treatise De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet with critical, literary and philosophical commentaries*.

³ See Image n. 1 in section "4. Images."

5 ἀνάγκη δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι τὸ πρὸς ἴσας τείνεσθαι γωνίας ἀνάκλασιν πᾶσαν, οὔτε φαινόμενον αὐτόθεν οὔτε ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διαβάλλεται μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν κυρτῶν κατόπτρων ὅταν ἐμφάσεις ποιῇ μείζονας ἑαυτῶν πρὸς ἓν τὸ τῆς ὀψεως σημεῖον, διαβάλλεται δὲ τοῖς διπτύχοις κατόπτροις ὡς ἐπικριθέντων πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ γωνίας ἐντὸς γενομένης ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐπιπέδων διττῆς 5 ἔμφασιν ἀποδίδωσι καὶ ποιεῖ τέτταρας εἰκόνας ἀφ' ἑνὸς προσώπου, δύο μὲν ἀντιστρόφους τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἀριστεροῖς μέρεσι, δύο δὲ δεξιοφανεῖς ἀμαυρὰς ἐν βάθει τῶν κατόπτρων, ὧν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν αἰτίαν Πλάτων ἀποδίδωσιν.

1 εἶπεν] εἰπεῖν Wyt. in app. | ἴσας] τὰς add. ante Steph. et alii⁴ | τείνεσθαι] γίνεσθαι RJ94 et alii | 3-4 *iteratio sententiae* ὅταν ἐμφάσεις ... διαβάλλεται δὲ et lac. 14 lit. E, 11 lit. B | 4 ὡς] ὧν RJ94 et alii | ἐπικριθέντων] ἐπικλιθέντων RJ94 et alii | 5 διττῆς] διττὴν I.22 et alii | 7 τοῖς] ἐν add. ante τοῖς Emp. et alii | ἀριστεροῖς] ἀριστεροῖς del. Emp. et alii: σαφεστέρας Schmidt: ἐναργεστέρας Raing. | ἀλλ' add. post δεξιοφανεῖς Poh. | 7-8 ἐν βάθει] τῷ βάθει Emp. | 6-8 δύο μὲν ἀριστερὰς, δύο δὲ δεξιοφανεῖς, τὰς μὲν ἀντιστόφους τοῖς ἔξωθεν μέρεσι, τὰς δὲ ἀμαυρὰς ἐν βάθει τῶν κατόπτρων Wyt. in app.

The passage can be roughly split into three sections, each of them dealing with specific issues: 1) textual problems included in the sentence that states the law of reflection; 2) issues included in the sentence that proposes the first example to discredit the theory, beginning with ἀλλὰ διαβάλλεται μὲν; and 3) issues in the sentence that proposes the second example, starting with διαβάλλεται δέ.

Section 1) The first correction of the text concerns the verb εἶπεν transmitted by both manuscripts. In this case the correction into εἰπεῖν proposed by Wytttenbach is necessary⁵. The personal form transmitted by the manuscripts plays no syntactic role in the sentence, being just an aside to remind the speaker. However, the following substantive clause ὅτι τὸ πρὸς ἴσας τείνεσθαι γωνίας ἀνάκλασιν πᾶσαν, οὔτε φαινόμενον αὐ-

⁴ *Et alii* is used to indicate that an intervention in the text has generally been accepted by scholarship. The designations I.22 and RJ94 refer to the handwritten annotations included in the copies of the Aldine edition belonging to Forteguerrri and Turnebus respectively. For the remaining scholars listed above, see the Bibliography.

⁵ The confusion between personal forms/participles and infinitives is frequent along the treatise. See, for instance, 931F, with πέφυκε corrected into πεφυκέναι by RJ94; 932C, ἀντιφράξαι into ἀντιφράξῃ by RJ94; 934A, ποιεῖν into ποιεῖ also by RJ94; 934C, ἀμείβειν into ἀμείβει by RJ94 and others; 936E, ἀνακλασθέν into ἀνακλᾶσθαι by Kepler, into ἀνακλασθεῖσα by Amyot, and into ἀνακλασθῆναι by Emperius; 937B, ὁρᾶται into ὁρᾶτε by RJ94 and others; and 943D, εὐκέναι into εὐκυῖαι by Wytttenbach.

τόθεν οὔτε ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστίν lacks a verb on which to depend. With the substitution of εἶπεν with εἰπεῖν, the infinitive functions both as subject of the sentence and as verb of the substantive clause, ἀνάγκη functions as attribute, and the clause as object. Then comes the addition of an article to modify ἴσας, by Stephanus, who was followed by scholars of the 16th, 18th and 19th centuries. While it improves the syntax, it is not required by the text. Finally, the verb τείνεσθαι is substituted by an annotation in the Aldine that belonged to Turnebus for γίνεσθαι – an intervention also accepted by several editors. With this modification, the text parallels the formulation of the law of reflection as it appears a few lines above and below: 929F, πάσης ἐν ἴσαις γωνίαις γινομένης ἀνακλάσεως; 930C, οὐ δυνατόν ἐστίν ἐν ἴσαις γωνίαις γίνεσθαι πάσας ἀνακλάσεις. As pertinent as the intervention may be, the verb τείνω (“to stretch,” “to spread”), which according to *LSJ* can be applied to light and sound, fits the context.

Section 2) The first issue at stake is that both manuscripts repeat a sentence, from ὅταν ἐμφάσεις το διαβάλλεται δέ, after which they add a blank that occupies approximately 10 to 15 letters depending on each manuscript. The repetition of a sentence in both manuscripts clearly

shows the difficulty of the passage. In this sense, the lacuna should be interpreted as the realization on behalf of the copyist that something was off, not as reflecting the loss of part of the text.

Beside the iteration, the main difficulty concerns the type of mirrors being described. The term κυρτῶν has traditionally been interpreted to mean “convex spherical.” This is problematic because such mirrors reflect an image smaller than the original, not bigger as the text states (ἐμφάσεις ποιῇ μείζονας)⁶. As Cherniss pointed out, what the text really means is “convex cylindrical” mirrors⁷. This type of mirrors offer a reflection that is shrunk in one sense and regular in the other, so the image appears as long and narrow. This is what ἐμφάσεις ποιῇ μείζονας ἑαυτῶν πρὸς ἓν is meant to express: images that are bigger just in one respect, namely not proportionally magnified in general. The adjective μείζονας, then, no longer poses a problem.

Section 3) This represents the most problematic part of the passage. The first issue concerns the manuscripts’ reading ὡς ἐπικριθέντων: the meaning of the verb, “to decide about or against,” “to choose,” does not seem to fit the context, and the adverb seems somehow out of place, reason why both were modified by an annotation in Turnebus’

⁶ See H. CHERNISS, 1951, p. 142 and notes 26-28, for some interventions in the text derived from this misunderstanding.

⁷ H. CHERNISS, 1951, pp. 142-143. Plutarch does refer to convex spherical mirrors elsewhere in *De facie* (937A), but in such case he describes them as τὰ δὲ κυρτὰ καὶ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ.

Aldine into ὧν ἐπικλιθέντων. The relative pronoun refers to the antecedent τοῖς διπτύχοις κατόπτροις and the verb's meaning, "to lean on," "to bend toward," is a simple but effective emendation. While I agree with the replacement of a verb that made no sense in the present passage, I have reservations about the modification of the adverb. It is true that ὧν improves the syntax of the sentence, but ὥς is not *per se* a bad reading, reason why I maintain the manuscripts' text in this case.

A second issue concerns the form διττῆς: given that it modifies the noun ἔμφασιν, it must be corrected into an accusative, as Forteguerrri first suggested⁸. Raingeard, however, maintains the manuscripts' reading and points (in his commentary) that it modifies γωνίας ἐντὸς γενομένης⁹. In that case the subject of the main clause

(ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐπιπέδων) breaks the genitive absolute in two pieces, which is highly doubtful. Furthermore, it is more plausible that the numeral modifies the noun that immediately follows it rather than a noun mentioned a while earlier.

Then comes the problematic nature of the images created by the folding mirrors. These, being inclined to each other and having formed an inner angle, are said to give a double image of a single object and to create four likenesses, two of a kind, and the other two of another¹⁰. The first two images are ἀντιστρόφους, "reversed," and are located τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἀριστεροῖς μέρεσι, in "the parts that are outer left." The first issue at stake is that the two left parts of two folding mirrors cannot both be at the same time "outer"¹¹. The other two images are ἀμανράς, "dim," "faint," located ἐν βάθει τῶν

⁸ While the correction is accepted by most modern scholars, they all attribute it to Turnebus. As I have argued elsewhere (L. LESAGE GÁRRIGA, 2018, 250-251), this is not an uncommon mistake. Many editors include Forteguerrri's corrections in their text, but no single one ever attributed such corrections correctly. Consequently, Forteguerrri's contribution to *De facie* has not yet been acknowledged in modern apparatuses.

⁹ P. RAINGEARD, 1934, p. 101. The Aldine edition (1509) reads γενομένοις instead of γενομένης, a mistake probably due to iotacism and soon corrected by Forteguerrri, Leonicus and Turnebus in their personal copies.

¹⁰ As Dr. Tobey pointed out to me, it should be noted that only curved optics, namely concave or convex mirrors or lenses, can make images; plane surfaces, such as the mirrors described in this part of the passage cannot. The reason why human beings can see an image in the (flat) mirror is that we have a lens in the eye. Also, it should be taken into account that there will be four images only if two conditions are met: 1) the angle formed by the two mirrors must be of a certain degree, and 2) the object must be close enough so that it appears reflected both in the inner and outer parts of each mirror. See Image n. 2, at the end of the paper, and also the drawing in L. LEHNUS, 1991, p. 143 n. 136.

¹¹ See Image n. 2.

κατόπτρων, “in the depth of the mirrors.” But they are also said to be δεξιοφανείς, an adjective that has two different meanings: “shown straight,” namely not reversed (thus opposed to ἀντιστρόφους above), and “shown on the right side” (thus opposed to ἀριστεροῖς, above)¹². Some scholars have interpreted in its second meaning¹³, which in turn poses the same problem as ἀριστεροῖς: the two right parts of two folding mirrors cannot both be in depth, in the inner angle. This allows for the exclusion of δεξιοφανείς’ second meaning, but the problem with ἀριστεροῖς still remains.

Scholars have tried to solve it differently. First, Wytttenbach reorganized most of the sentence into δύο μὲν ἀριστεράς, δύο δὲ δεξιοφανείς, τὰς μὲν ἀντιστρόφους τοῖς ἔξωθεν μέρεσι, τὰς δὲ ἀμυράς ἐν βάθει τῶν κατόπτρων. While his conjecture provides the passage with sense, it is difficult to explain how the text could corrupt from this to the reading transmitted by the manuscripts. Emperius corrected several parts: he added the preposition ἐν before the syntagma τοῖς [...] μέρεσι, secluded the problematic ἀριστεροῖς – which should be seen as a gloss integrated in the text

following a misinterpretation of the meaning of δεξιοφανείς –, and turned the preposition ἐν before βάθει into the article τῷ. The text then reads:

δύο μὲν ἀντιστρόφους <ἐν> τοῖς ἔξωθεν [ἀριστεροῖς] μέρεσι, δύο δὲ δεξιοφανείς ἀμυράς τῷ βάθει τῶν κατόπτρων.

Most scholars accept his reconstruction of the text, but in my view it includes too many interventions. The first intervention improves the syntax but is unwarranted, and the third is simply needless. In what regards the main one, the seclusion of the problematic term, while appearing as the easiest solution, it actually presumes two different mistakes: 1) the misinterpretation of the following term δεξιοφανείς, and 2) the wrong inclusion of a gloss meant to parallel that term. A few scholars solved the problem differently. Schmidt suggested to modify ἀριστεροῖς into σαφεστέρας, meaning “clearer,” “more distinctive;” and Raingeard, in the same line, into ἐναργεστέρας, meaning “clearer,” “more visible.” And Pohlenz, while accepting only the seclusion by Emperius, added ἀλλ’ after δεξιοφανείς, which is superfluous.

¹² Plutarch’s description agrees with reality: the reversed image is in the outer part of the mirror and the straight one in the inner part [see Image n. 3]. This is due to the fact that the inner image is the result of a reflection from a reflection. It should be noted, however, that modern mirrors create four images of the same quality. The techniques with which ancient cultures elaborated their mirrors, differently, implied a great loss of quality. This would entail a great distortion and dimness particularly in the two images placed in the inner part, because they are a reflection from a reflection.

¹³ J. AMYOT, 1572, p. 619; A. O. PRICKARD, 1911, p. 29; and D. WYTTTENBACH, 1797, p. 764.

In my view, the meaning of Schmidt's and Raingeard's corrections fits the context, but the solution of the latter is the most suitable from a palaeographic perspective: *ἐναργεστέρας* would have been corrupted into *ἀριστεροῖς* by the loss of the first syllable (*ἐν*) due to haplography with the ending of the previous word (*ἔξωθεν*), and by the attraction to the case of the surrounding words, all in dative (*τοῖς [...] μέρεσι*). I thus accept Raingeard's *ἐναργεστέρας*.

With these few interventions, the text acquires meaning. The Greek text reads:

ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ πρὸς ἴσας τείνεσθαι γωνίας ἀνάκλασιν πᾶσαν, οὔτε φαινόμενον αὐτόθεν οὔτε ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διαβάλλεται μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν κυρτῶν κατόπτρων ὅταν ἐμφάσεις ποιῇ μείζονας ἑαυτῶν πρὸς ἓν τὸ τῆς ὀψεως σημεῖον, διαβάλλεται δὲ τοῖς διπτύχοις κατόπτροις ὡς ἐπικλιθέντων πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ γωνίας ἐντὸς γενομένης ἐκάτερον τῶν ἐπιπέδων διττὴν ἔμφασιν ἀποδίδωσι καὶ ποιεῖ τέτταρας εἰκόνας ἀφ' ἐνὸς προσώπου, δύο μὲν ἀντιστρόφους τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐναργεστέρας μέρεσι, δύο δὲ δεξιοφανεῖς ἀμαυρὰς ἐν βάθει τῶν κατόπτρων, ὧν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν αἰτίαν Πλάτων ἀποδίδωσιν.

Translation: "Yet it must be said that the proposition 'all reflection occurs at equal angles'

is neither self-evident nor an admitted fact, but it is refuted in the case of convex mirrors, when the point of incidence of the visual ray produces images that are bigger in one respect; and it is refuted by folding mirrors, as each of the planes inclined to each other and having formed an inner angle exhibits a double image and creates four likenesses of a single object: two reversed, clearer in the outer parts, and two straight, dim in the depth of the mirrors; the cause of the production of these Plato explains."

2. *Literary Commentary: then, what is the problem with catoptrics?*

Once the textual issues have been resolved, one might think that the passage has been sufficiently elucidated. Lucius replies to Sulla's concerns about the half-moon, which rely primarily upon the law of reflection¹⁴. To do so, he discredits the law on the grounds of the type of images created by convex mirrors and by folding mirrors. The issue is that the images described in both examples are in fact the result of the application of the law of reflection. In other words, the two examples used by Lucius do not disprove the law at all!

While most scholars commenting on the passage neglect to mention this unexpected fact, some simply note the

¹⁴ For a general approach to the law of reflection and to the field of catoptrics, see the diachronic study of A.M. SMITH, 2014.

incongruence without looking for a cause¹⁵. The easiest interpretation would be that there is no cause for this mistake, that Plutarch thought the examples he was using were proof of the law's inadequacy. It is true that the images created both by convex and folding mirrors could be taken as the result of angles of reflection that are not equal to those of incidence. The long, narrow figure resulting in the first case, and the four likenesses of a single object projected by two mirrors in the second can indeed be confusing in this sense. This interpretation, however, is problematic. On the one hand, to assume the author's ignorance as the explanation for a difficult text is in my view too simplistic.

On the other, Plutarch's sloppiness in this passage clashes with the overall elevated tone of the treatise. Throughout *De facie*, the discussion of theories belonging to the theoretical sciences –arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, philosophy– proves an accurate understanding and a high level of precision regarding these sciences. The use of two inadequate examples when disproving a theory is doubtful. Furthermore, despite the inadequacy of the examples for the specific purpose they were being used, the accurateness of the description as to how the two types of

mirrors work implies solid knowledge of the phenomenon of reflection. This, in turn, would contradict the assumption that Plutarch was unfamiliar with catoptrics.

For these reasons, I am inclined to think that Plutarch was in fact aware that these examples were not adequate to reject the law of reflection. This, however, does not solve the difficulties involved in the passage, given that it raises the question as to why he would try to disprove a theory on grounds that he knew were wrong. My suggestion is that he was not trying to disprove the law of reflection altogether, hence the useless examples. A first argument in favor of this hypothesis is that Plutarch's main objective for most of the treatise consists in the defense of the moon's earthiness. Given that the law of reflection accounts for the lunar phenomena if the moon's surface is presumed to be rugged and uneven, as that of the earth, I highly doubt that he would have truly meant to discredit this valuable law¹⁶.

A second argument in favor of the hypothesis is that there is evidence suggesting his familiarity with the work of thinkers that determined the universality of the law of reflection. Among these thinkers were Euclid (3rd c. BCE), and Hero of Alexandria (1st half of the 1st c. CE)¹⁷.

¹⁵ V. RAMÓN PALERM, 2001, p. 159; B. MOTA, 2010, p. 59; and A. LERNOULD, 2013, p. 41 do not signal Plutarch's mistake. A. O. PRICKARD, 1911, p. 56; and H. CHERNISS. 1951, p. 143 simply mention that the law does apply in these cases too.

¹⁶ I owe this clarification to Dr. J. A. Koster.

¹⁷ See O. NEUGEBAUER, 1938, pp. 21–24 and T. HEATH, 2013, pp. 353–354.

It has been suggested that Plutarch's wording when stating the law in *De facie* parallels the words of Hero's extant fragments of the *Catoptrica*, which points to the fact that Plutarch might have read Hero and knew about the legitimacy of the law of reflection¹⁸. Furthermore, the proposition 19 of Euclid's *Optics* assumes this law and states that it had been explained in his *Catoptrica*¹⁹. As Cherniss noted, this proposition is supposed to have been part also of Euclid's *Dioptrica*, which Plutarch explicitly quotes in *Non posse suaviter vivi* 1093E²⁰.

At this point, one question remains: if Plutarch was aware of the uselessness of the examples that he was providing, and was in fact not even trying to discredit the law of reflection, what is the purpose of the passage? The point of attention is not focused on "real," physical, problems within the field of catoptrics; Plutarch's concerns, I argue, are rhetorical. The context supports the argument that Plutarch's rejection of the law is in fact a rhetorical device. As stated above, the law of reflection is presented by Sulla as the foundation for the problem of the half-moon. Lucius' primary goal in this passage is to convincingly refuse the problem of the half-moon and his

best argument is to reject the very law that according to Sulla lies as its base. Thus, his rejection is not an end in itself but simply serves as a means. It is reasonable to think that Plutarch should be concerned by the problem of the half-moon rather than by the law of reflection. The latter, as stated above, advocates for the moon's earthy nature. The former, however, is a strong argument against the defenders of an earthy moon, because if a moon that is earthy cannot show only one half illuminated and yet we do see this happening twice every month, the logical consequence is that the moon cannot be earthy. This consequence Plutarch cannot allow, given that he seeks to prove the earthiness of the moon for most of the treatise.

The argument that the rejection of the law is a rhetorical device seems to be further supported by the following lines of the text (930CD). Lucius proceeds to turn around his line of argument and decides to accept the law of reflection, only to later restrict its use to some specific cases²¹. To corroborate this view, he includes a case in which the law cannot be applied: the uneven and rugged surfaces, such as that of the moon, because, according to him, "in

¹⁸ See L. NIX & W. SCHMIDT (eds.), 2010, pp. 313-314.

¹⁹ T. HEATH, 1963, p. 267. B. MOTA, 2012, pp. 469-502, highlighted the connections between astronomy and the *Catoptrica* in light of sources such as Plutarch.

²⁰ H. CHERNISS, 1957, pp. 106-107 n. d. *Non posse* 1093E: τίνες οἴομεθα καὶ πηλίκας ἡδονὰς ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας δρέπεσθαι καὶ ἀστρολογίας Εὐκλείδην γράφοντα τὰ διοπτικά.

²¹ 930C, Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ εἰ δεῖ τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι τῇ πολλὰ δὴ φίλῃ γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δοῦναι.

this type of surfaces the rays would be multifariously reflected and intertwined, coming to us as if proceeding from many mirrors.”²² It should be noted that, again, just as with the examples of two types of mirrors in the first part of the passage, the example chosen by Plutarch to embody the law’s exception is incorrect: the rugged surface of the moon does not advocate for the inadequacy of the law, on the contrary, it shows its accuracy.

This overturning of position shows that the rhetorical strategy consists in a bipartite attack: 1) plain rejection of a theory, and 2) acceptance with objections that apply in particular cases and that still discredit the theory. The parallel structures, with the inclusion of examples to corroborate each part of the bipartite attack, strengthen the effect. Plutarch seems to be fond of this rhetorical strategy, given that it appears elsewhere in *De facie*²³. It serves as a powerful tool against any theory. In this case, if the law of reflection is false, there is no issue concerning the half-moon; if the law is reasonable but does not always apply, there still is no issue concerning

the half-moon. The particularity of this case is that, for his argument against the problem of the half-moon, Plutarch chooses to disprove a theory that he is not against. This explains why he includes examples that do not invalidate the law of reflection. The two types of mirrors in the first case and the rugged and uneven surface of the moon in the second not only are completely useless for the chosen purpose, but even corroborate the opposite arguments: 1) that the law is correct and 2) that it applies in all cases. Of course, only a readership fully versed in catoptrics could have noticed the fine rhetorical strategy at play.

3. Conclusions

After disentangling the highly technical tone of the passage and solving the textual difficulties, a better understanding of the text can be reached.

The first conclusions concern the textual corruptions and their plausible emendations. It has become clear that, despite the elevated number of interventions by previous scholarship, not many were actually indispensable. Given that the manuscripts provide a

²² 930CD, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡκριβωμένων ταῖς λειότησι συμπίπτειν ἐσόπτρων, εἰκός ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ σελήνη πολλὰς ἀνωμαλίας ἔχει καὶ τραχύτητας ὥστε τὰς αὐγὰς ἀπὸ σώματος μεγάλου προσφερομένας ὕψειν ἀξιολόγοις ἀντιλήμψεις καὶ διαδόσεις ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων λαμβάνουσιν, ἀνακλᾶσθαι τε παντοδαπῶς καὶ περιπλέκεσθαι καὶ συνάπτειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἀνταύγειαν οἷον ἀπὸ πολλῶν φερομένην πρὸς ἡμᾶς κατόπτρων.

²³ See, for instance, 934AD, where the issue whether τὸ ἀνθρακῶδες is the moon’s particular color or not is discussed. In this occasion the strategy is employed by Lamprias, who can be considered a mentor figure to Lucius in the treatise.

legitimate text, one should avoid unwarranted interventions. With the corrections εἰπεῖν, ἐπικλιθέντων, διττήν and ἐναργεστέρως, the textual problems have duly been assessed and solved in a way that is both effective and respectful to the readings of the manuscripts.

Two further conclusions concern the interpretation of the contents. Firstly, the passage does not result from Plutarch's insufficient knowledge or misunderstanding of catoptrics. In fact he was not rejecting the law of reflection, as it first appears, but was creating a rhetorical strategy. Secondly, this strategy has to be placed within the boundaries set by real and ideal constructions of reality. What is at play in the passage is Plutarch's interest to convey a specific

image of the moon, namely a moon of earthy nature. The idealistic image that he tries to promote – regardless whether it corresponds with the moon's true nature or not – enters in conflict with the problem of the half-moon raised by Sulla, reason why Lucius objects to the foundation of this problem, namely the law of reflection. However, given that there is no real attempt to disprove the law, the two examples he uses are unreal, but in order to appear as convincing as possible they are presented in a highly (confusing) technical language. In the dialogue between Lucius and Sulla there is no real trouble with catoptrics, there is a rhetorical use of notions of catoptrics for the sake of the moon's ideal image.

4. Images




Image 1

Visual example of Sulla's argument based on H. Görgemanns' drawing (1970, p. 72).

**Image 2**

Reflection of four images in folding mirrors.

**Image 3**

Reversed and straight reflections in folding mirrors.

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***Parallela Graeca et Romana* 20A: Sources and Narrative Structure**

[*Parallela Graeca et Romana* 20A: fonti e struttura narrativa]

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the Greek tale of *Parallela Graeca et Romana*'s chapter 20. The differences in the Greek story between the direct and the indirect tradition perhaps depend on the intent of *Parallela*'s author to emphasize its parallelism with the Roman tale. As for the source, the direct tradition indicates Euripides' *Erechtheus*, while the indirect tradition (Stobaeus and Clement of Alexandria) indicates Demaratus' *Tragodoumena*. The Greek tale is probably founded on the account of *Erechtheus*' plot in Lycurgus' *Adversus Leocratem* 98-100, perhaps integrated with information from other sources. The divergence between the direct and the indirect tradition regarding the source can be explained (according to Jacoby's theory) by the presence in the originary text of both the names of Demaratus and Euripides (the latter introduced by μέμνηται, as in the pairs of sources in *De fluviis*). It is possible that in the originary text Demaratus was introduced to justify the presence in the story of information missing in Euripides.

Key-Words: Plutarch, *Parallela Graeca et Romana*, Euripides, *Erechtheus*, Demaratus, Indirect tradition.

Riassunto

Il contributo si occupa della narrazione greca del capitolo 20 dei *Parallela Graeca et Romana*. Le differenze nella narrazione greca tra la tradizione diretta e la tradizione indiretta dipendono forse dall'intento dell'autore dei *Parallela* di enfatizzare il parallelismo con la narrazione romana. Per quanto riguarda la fonte, la tradizione diretta indica l'*Eretteo* di Euripide, la tradizione indiretta (Stobaeo e Clemente Alessandrino), invece, i *Tragodoumena* di Demarato. La narrazione greca si basa probabilmente sull'esposizione della trama dell'*Eretteo* in Licurgo, *Contro Leocrate* 98-100, forse integrata con informazioni provenienti da altre fonti. Le divergenze tra tradizione diretta e tradizione indiretta nell'indicazione della fonte possono essere spiegate (concordemente con la teoria di Jacoby) con la presenza nel testo originario sia del nome di Demarato che di quello di Euripide (quest'ultimo introdotto da μέμνηται, come nelle coppie di fonti citate nel *De fluviis*). È possibile che nel testo originario il nome di Demarato fosse stato introdotto per giustificare la presenza nel racconto di informazioni assenti in Euripide.

Parole-chiave: Plutarco, *Parallela Graeca et Romana*, Euripides, *Eretteo*, Demarato, Tradizione indiretta.

The pseudo-Plutarchan work *Parallela Graeca et Romana*¹ consists, as is known, of a brief introduction and 41 pairs of tales, one regarding the Greek world and the other the Roman world². It came down to us both through the direct tradition³, a part of which (family Σ) is in the form of an epitome, and through the indirect tradition, primarily through Stobaeus, John Lydus and (in some cases) Clement of Alexandria. With respect to the indirect tradition, the

Parallela offer a generally more concise presentation, although there are cases in which they contain information not present in the indirect tradition or where there are qualitative differences⁴. These relationships between the direct tradition and the indirect tradition have been explained by Jacoby under the hypothesis that there exists a single recension, on which depend both Stobaeus and John Lydus as well as (through an epitome) the text of the *Parallela* in its more complete form and in the further epitomated form of the Σ family⁵.

¹ The work is generally considered not authentic on the basis of external (cf. above all Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2012) and internal criteria (cf. D. WYTTEBACH, 1821, pp. 78-79; K. ZIEGLER, 1965, pp. 276-277; E. VALGIGLIO, 1992, p. 4024; M. CANNATÀ FERA, 2000, p. 388; B. SCARDIGLI, 2004; *contra* cf. G. D'IPPOLITO, 1999, p. 340, who thinks that the work can be considered authentic because it belongs to the genre of paradoxography).

² On the nature and the subject of the work, cf. A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 21-27.

³ The text of the work is included in the *corpus Plutarcheum* already in Par. gr. 197 (F), X-XI sec., used thereafter by Planudes for his Plutarch's edition in Ambr. 126 C inf. (α), 1294-1295; cf. Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2016, p. 27; Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2017, pp. 341-343 (both with previous bibliography). The inclusion of the *Parallela minora* in the *corpus Plutarcheum* has been explained on the basis of its topics, which probably seemed analogous to that of *Vitae parallelae*, but perhaps also to those of *Aetia Graeca* and *Aetia Romana* (cf. C. MÜLLER, 1861, p. LII; F. JACOBY, 1940, pp. 79-81; F. CARLÀ-UHNIK, 2017, p. 2610). The work is generally identified with διγγήσεις παράλληλοι, Ἑλληνικαὶ καὶ Ῥωμαϊκαί, n. 28 in Lamprias' catalogue, but, if the identification is correct, it can prove only that in the III-IV sec. d.C. the work was attributed to Plutarch (cf. A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 18-19; and, for the problematic nature of the catalogue, Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2012, p. 160).

⁴ For a *status quaestionis* on the relationship between the direct and indirect tradition and a description of the manuscripts cf. A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 82-139.

⁵ F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 143. The reconstruction of the relationship between the direct and indirect tradition proposed by Jacoby has recently been accepted by A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 86-89; however, he refutes the hypothesis (made by Jacoby) that underlying the tradition there is a συναγωγή, "quale testo dotto, infarcito di informazioni e citazioni accumulate senza un criterio compositivo" and also expresses doubts on the hypothesis of a single recension. Also R.M. PICCIONE, 1998, pp. 170, 174-177, 180 thinks that the text of the *Parallela* and of Stobaeus depend autonomously on a common source.

Of the numerous sources cited in the text of the *Parallela* and in the indirect tradition, many are probably invented authors (*Schwindelautoren* in Jacoby's definition⁶) and only a few can definitely be held to be authentic⁷; among these is Euripides, who is cited in 20Aa⁸, 310D and in 26A, 312A (with an indication of the title of the works, the *Erechtheus* and the *Meleager*, respectively) and in 24A, 311D (with no indication of the title, but with a clear reference to the plot of the *Hecuba*)⁹. As for what concerns the sources, the text poses two main problems: 1) to establish which of the otherwise unknown authors are fictitious and which are actually existed; 2) for the already known authors, to establish if the tales are really taken from their works (eventually in combination with other sources) or are (partially or totally) invented (this problem concerns also the unknown authors recognized as real ones)¹⁰.

The aim of this paper is to examine the case of 20A, 310D, which is of particular interest as we possess the indirect tradition both for the Greek tale (Stob., III 730 =

20Ab and Lyd., *Mens.* 4.147 = 20Ac) and for the Roman tale (Lyd., *Mens.* 4.147 = 20Bb; Clem.Al., *Protr.* 3.42,7 = 20Bc). The Greek tale summarises the central episode of Euripides' *Erechtheus*, where the character of the same name sacrifices a daughter in obedience to an oracle that prophesied his victory in the war against the Thracians led by Eumolpus¹¹ if he did so, while the parallel Roman tale reports that Marius at the time of the war with the Cimbri acted in the same way following a warning received in a dream.

Below, we report the text of the direct and the indirect tradition of the Greek and Roman tales:

20Aa Ἐρεχθεὺς πρὸς Εὐμόλπον πολέμων ἔμαθε νικῆσαι, ἐὰν τὴν θυγατέρα προθύσῃ, καὶ συγκοινωνήσας τῇ γυναικὶ Πραξιθέα προέθυσεν τὴν παῖδα. μέμνηται Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἐρεχθεῖ¹².

When Erechtheus was at war with Eumolpus, he learned that he would conquer if he sacrificed his daughter before the battle, and, communicating this to his wife Praxithea, he sacrificed his

⁶ Cf. F. JACOBY, 1940.

⁷ Cf. K. ZIEGLER, 1965, pp. 274-277; A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 39-49.

⁸ For the numbering of the chapters, we will follow A. DE LAZZER, 2000.

⁹ A. DE LAZZER, 2000, p. 69.

¹⁰ Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2004-2005, pp. 30-31; Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2010, p. 56.

¹¹ On this version of the myth of Eumolpus cf. R.M. SIMMS, 1983, pp. 201-203.

¹² For the text of the *Parallela*, both in the direct and the indirect tradition, we follow A. DE LAZZER, 2000.

daughter. Euripides records this in the *Erechtheus*¹³.

20Ab Stob., III 730 Δημαράτου ἐν τρίτῳ Τραγωδομένων. Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Εὐμόλπον τὸν Θρακῶν βασιλέα πόλεμον ἔχόντων, Ἐρεχθεὺς ὁ τῆς Ἀττικῆς προΐσταμενος χρησμὸν ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικήσει τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ἐὰν τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θυγατέρων Περσεφόνη θύσῃ. παραγενόμενος [ὁ] δ' εἰς Ἀθήνας Πραξιθέα τῇ γυναικὶ τὴν πυθόχρηστον μαντεῖαν ἀπήγγειλεν· εἰθ' οὕτω τὴν κόρην προσαγαγὼν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ συμβαλὼν τὸν πόλεμον ἐγκρατὴς ἐγένετο τῆς νίκης.

Demaratus in book III of *Tragodoumena*; when Eumolpus, king of Thracia, was at war with Erechtheus, lord of Attica, he learned from an oracle that he would defeat his enemies if he sacrificed his eldest daughter to Persephone. On reaching Athens, he told his wife Praxithea of the prophecy of the Pythia and led his daughter to the altars where he sacrificed her; he was then victorious in battle.

20Ac Lyd., *mens.* 4.147 Ἐρεχθεὺς δὲ ὁ τῆς Ἀττικῆς προΐστά-

μενος οὐκ ὀνειρώ ἀλλὰ χρησμῷ πεισθεὶς τοῦτο ἔπραξε καὶ νενίκηκε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς.

Erechtheus, lord of Attica, performed this deed, out of trust not in a dream but an oracle, and defeated his enemies¹⁴.

20Ba Μάριος¹⁵ πρὸς Κίμβρους πόλεμον ἔχων καὶ ἡττώμενος ὄναρ εἶδεν, ὅτι νικήσει, ἐὰν τὴν θυγατέρα προθύσῃ· ἦν δ' αὐτῷ Καλπουρνία· προκρίνας δὲ τῆς φύσεως τοὺς πολίτας ἔδρασε καὶ ἐνίκησε. καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν βωμοὶ εἰσὶ δύο ἐν Γερμανίᾳ, οἱ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἦχον σαλπύγων ἀποπέμπουσιν· ὥς Δωρόθεος ἐν τετάρτῳ Ἰταλικῶν.

When Marius was fighting the Cimbri and was being worsted, he saw in a dream that he would conquer if he sacrificed his daughter before the battle; for he had a daughter Calpurnia. Since he placed his fellow-citizens before the ties of nature, he did the deed and won the victory. And even to this day there are two altars in Germany which at that time of year send forth the sound of trumpets. So Dorotheus in the fourth book of his *Italian History*¹⁶.

¹³ Translation of this and other passages from the *Parallela* in F.C. BABBITT, *Plutarch. Moralia*, IV, Cambridge (Mass.) – London, 1936.

¹⁴ The translations of the passages from Stobaeus and John Lydus are mine.

¹⁵ Μάριος is transmitted only by families Φ and Σ, whereas the other manuscripts have Μάνιος. Μάριος is also the reading of the indirect tradition.

¹⁶ The text of the epitome is here omitted as it is outside the scope of the present paper.

20Bb Lyd., *mens.* 4.147 Ὅτι Μάριος ὁ μέγας πολεμῶν Κίμβροις καὶ Τεύτοσι κατ' ὄναρ εἶδε κρατῆσαι τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα θύσει ἀποτροπαίοις· καὶ προκρίνας τῆς φύσεως τοὺς πολίτας τοῦτο ἐποίησε καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐκράτησεν.

When Marius the great was fighting the Cimbri and the Teutons, he saw in a dream that he would defeat his enemies, if he sacrificed his daughter to the Averters of evil. By placing the interests of his fellow-citizens before those of his family, he did the deed and defeated his enemies.

20Bc Clem. Al., *Protr.* 3.42,7 Ἐρχθεὺς δὲ ὁ Ἀττικὸς καὶ Μάριος ὁ Ῥωμαῖος τὰς αὐτῶν ἐθυσά-την θυγατέρας· ὣν ὁ μὲν τῇ Φερεράτῃ, ὡς Δημάρατος ἐν πρώτῃ Τραγωδομένων, ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἀποτροπαίοις, ὁ Μάριος, ὡς Δωρόθεος ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ Ἰταλικῶν ἱστορεῖ.

Erechtheus the Athenian and Marius the Roman sacrificed their own daughters: the former to Persephone, as Demaratus relates in the first book of his *Subjects of Tragedy*, the latter, Marius, to the “Averters of evil”, as Dorotheus relates in the fourth book of his *Italian History*¹⁷.

As far as the Greek tale is concerned, the text of the *Parallela* is (as usual) more concise than that of Stobaeus. However, the many differences or omissions do not seem to be random but, rather, tend to emphasize the parallelism of the Roman and the Greek tales, which is consistent with the aim of the work to select similar events (ὁμοία 305B):

1. the use of the generic ἔμαθε instead of the reference to the oracle (χρησμὸν ἔλαβεν) eliminates the difference with respect to the Roman tale, where Marius receives the information in a dream (ὄναρ εἶδεν; cf. also John Lydus κατ' ὄναρ ... οὐκ ὀνειρώ ἀλλὰ χρησμῶ)¹⁸;

2. the indication τὴν θυγατέρα, with the omission of Stobaeus' specification that it was the eldest daughter who is sacrificed (τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θυγατέρων), corresponds to the identical expression present in the Roman tale of the *Parallela* (similarly in the indirect tradition of the Roman tale τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα in John Lydus, τὰς αὐτῶν ... θυγατέρας in Clement of Alexandria, with reference to the daughters of both characters);

3. the use of προθύω¹⁹ in both the Greek and the Roman tales (compared to the simple θύω in the indirect tradition and, only in the Greek tale, in the epitome):

¹⁷ Translation by G.W. BUTTERWORTH, *Clement of Alexandria. The Exhortation to the Greeks. The Rich man's salvation and the fragment of an address entitles to the newly baptized*, London - Cambridge (Mass.), 1919.

¹⁸ Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2014, p. 145 n. 44 observes that in the Roman tale the substitution of the oracle with the dream is part of the ‘Romanisation’ of the event.

¹⁹ A. MARTÍNEZ DíEZ, 1975, p. 219 rightly attributes a temporal meaning to προ-.

in this case, it seems uncertain whether this is a conscious choice on the part of the author of the *Parallela* or whether the compound verb was already present in the originary text and the preverb was omitted in the indirect tradition (and, for the Greek tale, in the epitome);

4. finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that in the direct tradition the omission of the different deities to whom the two girls had been sacrificed (Persephone for the daughter of Erechtheus in Stobaeus and Clement of Alexandria and the Averters of evil [ἄποτροπαίους] for the daughter of Marius in John Lydus and Clement of Alexandria) is also attributable to the desire to make both tales as similar as possible.

Just how complex the situation is and why we cannot talk about coherent epitomation²⁰ for the text of the *Parallela* is indicated by two cases (in the Roman tale) in which, compared to the indirect tradition, we find further information²¹ that cannot be explained as interventions or 'inventions' of the author of the *Parallela*:

1. the indication of the name of Marius' daughter, Calpurnia (while the daughter of Erechtheus remains anonymous);

2. the reference (totally extrinsic to the core of the parallel tales) to the altars which emit the sounds of the σάλπιγξ.

It is likely, then, that the Roman tale of the *Parallela* provides us with information present in the originary text but omitted in the indirect tradition, which usually offers a fuller and more detailed account.

A particularly major problem regards the source of the Greek tale, which the *Parallela* identify as the *Erechtheus* of Euripides. An initial hypothesis might indicate an indirect knowledge of the tragedy through the oration *Against Leocrates* of Lycurgus (98-101, p. 67 f. Conomis)²², which also contains the citation of an ample *rhesis* made by Erechtheus' wife Praxithea in favour of the sacrifice of their daughter (fr. 12 Sonnino = 14 Jouan = 360 Kannicht)²³. The following arguments support this hypothesis:

1. a substantial coincidence between the account of the plot in Lycurg., 98-99 (which mentions the war against Eumolpus, Erechtheus' wife - Praxithea -, the oracle, the sacrifice of their daughter, the fact that the enemies were subsequently driven from the region χρήσαντος δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν θυγατέρα εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὸ

²⁰ A. DE LAZZER, 2000, p. 85.

²¹ F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 115.

²² Cf. F. JOUAN - H. VAN LOOY, 2002, p. 96 (the *Erechtheus* is edited by F. Jouan).

²³ According to L. DI GREGORIO, 1980, p. 55 the *rhesis* became famous after its citation by Lycurgus.

στρατοπέδω, κρατήσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ τῷ θεῷ πιθόμενος τοῦτ' ἔπραξε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστρατευομένους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐξέβαλε “The god’s answer to him was that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides engaged he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the invaders from the country”²⁴) and the tale of the *Parallela* and of the indirect tradition;

2. in the Roman tale (which is not otherwise recounted and which, as in other cases²⁵, seems to have been invented along the lines of the Greek story²⁶) the observation that Marius placed the interests of his fellow-citizens before those of his family (προκρίνας ... τῆς φύσεως τοὺς πολίτας) presents a clear analogy with the text of Lycurgus, in which Euripides is praised for choosing to represent a myth that provides the citizens with an incentive to love their country (τὸ τὴν πατρίδα φιλεῖν 100, τοὺς γ' ἄνδρας ἀνυπέρβλητόν τινα δεῖ εὖ νοῖαν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἔχειν 101 “men should show towards their country a devotion which cannot be surpassed”) in the same way as Praxithea, who loved her country more than her daughters (τὴν πατρίδα μᾶλλον τῶν παίδων φιλοῦσαν

101)²⁷. The expression προκρίνας τῆς φύσεως τοὺς πολίτας seems to echo the vocabulary of the *rhesis* of Praxithea cited by Lycurgus, which contains several references to the πόλις (ll. 5, 8, 11, 16, 21, 23, 27, 40, 42, 47, 52) and to the πολῖται (ll. 13, 50) and where in l. 38 the woman states that her daughter is not her πλὴν <εἰ> φύσει “except in nature’s way”²⁸ (cf. also φύσει γὰρ οὐσῶν φιλοτέκνων πασῶν τῶν γυναικῶν 101 “All women are by nature fond of children”).

If the hypothesis that the Greek tale is derived from the text of Lycurgus is correct, the expression εἰ θύσειε πρὸ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὸ στρατοπέδω (Lycurg., 99) might have led to the use of the compound προθύω in the *Parallela* and (perhaps) in the originary text as well.

On the contrary, other elements seem to cast doubt on the use of Lycurgus’ text:

1. the fact that Erechtheus refers the content of the oracle to his wife (present both in the *Parallela* and in Stobaeus), although implicit in the *rhesis* of Praxithea (from which it may theoretically have been deduced), is absent in Lycurgus’ account of the plot;

²⁴ Translation by J.O. BURTT, *Minor Attic orators*, II, Cambridge (Mass.) – London, 1954.

²⁵ Cf. Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2010, p. 57 and n. 8; Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2014, p. 145.

²⁶ On the Roman tale and, in particular, on the elements that may have formed the basis of its elaboration, cf. *FGrH* IIIa, 390-391 and now A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 340-341, *ad loc.*

²⁷ On the meaning of Euripides’ choice of this myth cf. J.B. CONNELLY, 1996, pp. 79-80.

²⁸ On the value of the expression, the text of which is corrupted, cf. M. SONNINO, 2010, pp. 280-281, *ad loc.*, which considers as being noteworthy the integration εἰ of F. FERRARI, 1978, p. 234.

2. the title of the Euripides' tragedy, present in the *Parallela*, is not mentioned by Lycurgus: it is unlikely that the compiler of the text on which the *Parallela* depend or the author of the *Parallela* himself may have deduced it from the mere mention of Erechtheus, unless it is conceivable that they were aware of the existence of a tragedy of this name in some other way.

We thus cannot exclude the possibility that underlying the Greek tale (instead of or as well as the text of Lycurgus) is a knowledge of the story of the *Erechtheus*²⁹, either first-hand or (more probably) through the mediation of another source that has since been lost. That the tragedy (or at least its plot) was known in the first few centuries AD (probable time in which the *Parallela* were written)³⁰ is shown first of all by the citation (partially integrated, but virtually certain) of the work in a commentary on Thucydides, found in a papyrus scroll (*POxy* VI, 853, col. X 2 ad 2.15.1 [... ἐν Ἐρε]χθεῖ Εὐριπί[δης ...]) dating from the 2nd century AD and written probably in the 1st century AD, and secondly by a concise allusion to the plot in Aristid., *Panathen.* 87:

λέγεται γὰρ Ἐρεχθεὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Εὐμόλπον τούτῳ πολέμῳ τὴν θυγατέρα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιδόῦναι, τοῦ θεοῦ χρήσαντος, προσαγαγεῖν δ' αὐτὴν κοσμήσασα ἢ μήτηρ ὥσπερ εἰς θεωρίαν πέμπουσα·

Erechtheus is said in this war against Eumolpus to have given his daughter on behalf of the city because of the god's oracle; and her mother is said to have led her forth after adorning her as if for a festival³¹.

That Aelius Aristides may have been the source of the Greek tale can probably be excluded, firstly because the passage makes no mention of Euripides or the tragedy and, secondly, because they lack such elements as the name of Erechtheus' wife and his victory over his enemies, while the active role played by the girl's mother does not seem to find correspondence in the *Parallela* or in Stobaeus³². The mention of the myth in Aelius Aristides as an example of the ability to set aside personal interest in favour of Athens (*Panathen.* 86)³³ and the citation of fr. 13 Sonnino = 15 Jouan = 360a Kannicht (φιλῶ τέκν', ἀλλὰ πατρίδ' ἐμὴν μᾶλλον φιλῶ "I love my children,

²⁹ Thus M. SONNINO, 2010, pp. 101-102.

³⁰ F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 91 dates the *Parallela* between 125 and 190 AD.

³¹ Translation by CH.A. BEHR, 1986.

³² *Contra* A. MARTÍNEZ DÍEZ, 1975, p. 231 thinks that in Stobaeus προσαγαγὼν has a causative meaning.

³³ Aristides inaccurately includes Erechtheus among Athens' meritorious foreigners; cf. CH. A. BEHR, 1986, p. 433 n. 120 *ad loc.*

but I love my country more”)³⁴ in Plu., *Praec. ger. reip.* 809D (with no indication of the source)³⁵, regarding the opportunity of overcoming hatred towards political adversaries out of love for one’s country, show however that the exemplary value and exceptional nature of the event (already highlighted by Lycurgus) must have been recognised between the late 1st and the 2nd centuries AD³⁶; this would explain the presence of the tale in the *Parallela*, which aimed to include ancient stories containing paradoxical actions (305A τὰ παράδοξα τῆς πράξεως).

The most problematic aspect of the source of the Greek tale is that Stobaeus and Clement of Alexandria attribute

it to Demaratus’ *Tragodoumena*. It is important to establish first if this author can be considered authentic or invented, like many others unknown authors cited as sources in the *Parallela* and in the indirect tradition (cf. *supra*, p. 45). Other works by Demaratus are cited as sources in the *Parallela* (16A, 309D-E = 42 F5 Jacoby) and in the *De fluviis* (9.5; 9.3 = 42 F6-7 Jacoby), a pseudo-Plutarchan work characterised by considerable similarities to the *Parallela* (collection of isolated mythological tales, citation of otherwise unknown sources – some of which common to the *Parallela* – , presence of rare expressions and of particular syntactic turns)³⁷ and which,

³⁴ Translation by H.N. FOWLER, *Plutarch. Moralia*, X, Cambridge (Mass.) - London, 1936). The line (doubtfully attributed to the *Erechtheus* already by R. PORSON, 1812, p. 226) is paraphrased in Lycurg., 101 (... ταύτην ἐποίησε τὴν πατρίδα μᾶλλον τῶν παίδων φιλοῦσαν ...) after the citation of the *rhesis* of Praxithea (fr. 12 Sonnino = 14 Jouan = 360 Kannicht) and thus probably belongs to the same dramatic context; cf. CH. COLLARD - M.J.CROPP - K.H. LEE, 1995, in the apparatus (the *Erechtheus* is edited by M.J. Cropp); L. DI GREGORIO, 1980, p. 55 n. 76; M. SONNINO, 2010, p. 288.

³⁵ The verse has been transcribed several times in the margins of the text of the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* in the Par. gr. 1957; cf. J.-C. CARRIÈRE, 1984, p. 104.

³⁶ The citations of this and other passages from the *Erechtheus* in Plutarch (*Nic.* 9 = fr. 10,1 Sonnino = 369 Kannicht; *De ad. et am.* 63A; *De Al. Magn. fort.* 337F = fr. 16 Sonnino, 18-20. 29-31 = 362 Kannicht; *De exilio* 604D = fr. 12, 7-10 Sonnino = 360 Kannicht: this is a section of the *rhesis* recorded also by Lycurgus, for which, see *supra*) and in Clem.Al. (*Strom.* 6.2.7, 1 = fr. 3 Sonnino = 367 Kannicht; 6.2, 9, 5 = fr. 11 Sonnino = 365 Kannicht) are not necessarily proof that the two authors had direct knowledge of this tragedy, as they could have found them in anthological collections; see P. CARRARA, 1977, p. 12; L. DI GREGORIO, 1980, p. 55 (who notes that the citation of fr. 13 Sonnino = 15 Jouan = 360a Kannicht in Plutarch shows that it must have been well known in the early 2nd century AD); M. SONNINO, 2010, p. 249. Whereas A. TUILIER, 1968, pp. 82-88 envisaged a first-hand knowledge of many of Euripides’ tragedies (including the *Erechtheus*) on the part of Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria; *contra* cf. H. VAN LOOY, 1970, p. 531.

³⁷ Cf. CH. DELATTRE, 2011, p. 8

some claim, is attributable to the same author³⁸. Demaratus is also attributed, in the scholia on Apollonius Rhodius and in the *Bibliotheca* of Pseudo-Apollodorus, with some fragments regarding the saga of the Argonauts (42 F1-3 Jacoby)³⁹. Initially, Jacoby had hypothesised that these fragments might belong to the *Tragodoumena*, thus implicitly admitting the authenticity of Demaratus and this work⁴⁰; but he later accepted Wendel's proposal⁴¹ to attribute them to the mythographer Demaretes⁴², based on the fact that the manuscript tradition of F 1-2 Jacoby presents the form Δημαρέτης (-ετος), while Δημάρτος is conjectured⁴³. If the fragments 42 F1-3 Jacoby of Demaratus are attributed to Demaretes, falls the main argument for the authenticity of Demaratus himself, cited only in the *Parallela* and in

the *De fluviis*⁴⁴; he is therefore likely to be an invented author⁴⁵.

This passage is hence one of the five cases in the *Parallela* in which the direct and the indirect tradition cite completely different sources⁴⁶, which in this case are authentic (Euripides) and probably invented (Demaratus). These cases were explained by Jacoby⁴⁷ under the hypothesis that the originary text contained an indication of both sources, an indication maintained in the Roman tale of the first and of the penultimate chapter of the work (1B, 305D ... καθάπερ ἱστορεῖ Ἀριστείδης ἐν πρώτῃ Σικελικῶν, παρ' οὗ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔμαθε Διονύσιος ὁ Σικελιώτης. "This Aristeides the Milesian relates in the first book of his *Sicilian History*; from him Dionysius Siculus learned the facts";

³⁸ Cf. R. HERCHER, 1851, pp. 5-6, 30-32; F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 80 (implicitly); A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 31-33 (who does not take up a clear position); A. DE LAZZER, 2003, pp. 30-44 (with *status quaestionis*).

³⁹ Sch. A.R., I 45 = 42 F1 Jacoby; Apollod., I 118 = 42 F2a Jacoby; Sch. A.R., I 1289 = 42 F2a Jacoby; in the Sch. A.R., I 224 = 42 F3 Jacoby the manuscript tradition offers the form Δημάγητος, for which Jacoby doubtfully conjectures Δημάρτος in the apparatus.

⁴⁰ *FGrH* Ia, 520.

⁴¹ C. WENDEL, 1931, pp. 465-467.

⁴² *FGrH* IIIa, 386-387; see also *FGrH* Ia, 555.

⁴³ The conjecture is that of Janus Lascaris for the scholia on Apollonius, and Benedetto Egio for Apollodorus.

⁴⁴ Cf. A. DE LAZZER, 2000, p. 63.

⁴⁵ Whereas M. SONNINO, 2010, p. 101 and n. 181 claims that Demaratus was a truly existing source and the testimony was significant for the reconstruction of the plot of the *Erechtheus*.

⁴⁶ Cf. F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 128; A. DE LAZZER, 2000, p. 41.

⁴⁷ F. JACOBY, 1940, pp. 132-133.

40B, 315F ... ὥς Ἀριστείδης Μιλήσιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πολυῆστορ ἐν τρίτῳ Ἰταλικῶν. “So Aristeides the Milesian, and also Alexander Polyhistor in the third book of his *Italian History*”), where the epitomation activity may have been less significant. In the passage in question, Jacoby’s hypothesis seems to be supported by the introduction of the reference to Euripides through the verb form μέμνηται, which is an *unicum* in the *Parallela*, where the reference to the source is generally introduced by ὥς, καθά ο καθάπερ, at times accompanied by ἱστορεῖ or φησιν⁴⁸. In the grammatical and erudite tradition, μέμνηται is often used to introduce the reference to a source after giving some information and, in particular, in those cases where an author mentions facts that are also (or primarily) known through another, previously cited author; particularly significant in relation to this passage is the sch. E., Tr. 228, which reports the information acquired by Parmeniscus (ὥς Παρμενίσκος φησιν) regarding the existence of two rivers named Crathis and then points out that Euripides (in the passage to which the comment refers) mentions the second of

the two (οὗ νῦν μέμνηται ὁ Εὐριπίδης). As Jacoby observed⁴⁹, in the *De fluviis* it is a highly common practice to juxtapose two authors as sources, introducing the second through the indication μέμνηται δὲ τούτων⁵⁰. Similarly, in this case we can hypothesize that the mention in the originary text of Demaratus as the source was followed by the indication μέμνηται Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἐρεχθεῖ: the indirect tradition conserved only the first reference and the *Parallela* only the second⁵¹.

The attribution of the tale to a fictitious source (Demaratus) and only secondarily to the authentic one (Euripides) in the text on which both the *Parallela* and the indirect tradition depend could explain the presence in the latter of some elements that (inasmuch as can be deduced from the fragments and the testimony in our possession) seem to be absent in the *Erechtheus* and of which there is in any case no trace in the text of Lycurgus. Specifically:

1. the indication of Persephone as the goddess to whom the daughter of Erechtheus is sacrificed⁵². According to Diggle and Collard, this information might

⁴⁸ Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2012, p. 163 and n. 20 seems to underestimate the difference.

⁴⁹ F. JACOBY, 1940, pp. 133-134.

⁵⁰ *De fluv.* 1.3; 9.3; 9.4; 9.5; 11.4; 14.3; 17.4; 18.3; cf. also A. DE LAZZER, 2003, pp. 64-66.

⁵¹ Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2012, pp. 162-163 hypothesises that the indication of the *Erechtheus* of Euripides as the source in the *Parallela* might have been inserted by the epitomator who, in summarising a well-known story, may have preferred to make reference to an important and famous author instead of an almost unknown writer like Demaratus.

⁵² On the presence of this element in the indirect tradition cf. Á. IBAÑEZ CHACÓN, 2012, p.

lie in the words Δηοῦς κάρα in fr. 17, 34 Sonnino = 22 Jouan = 370 Kannicht (see also Δηοῦς fr. 17, 109 Sonnino = 22 Jouan = 370 Kannicht), as Δηώ is a name sometimes used to indicate Demeter and κόρα could be conjectured for κάρα⁵³; the text, handed down in *PSorb* 2328, is however fragmentary and certainty cannot be guaranteed. The sacrifice of a virgin to Persephone is also recorded in E., *Heracl.* 408-409⁵⁴.

2. the specification that the eldest daughter was sacrificed: fr. 12 Sonnino = 14 Jouan = 360 Kannicht cited by Lycurgus mentions two other daughters (δύο ... ὁμοσπόρω) in l. 36 but does not specify which was destined for the sacrifice. Moreover, the information contrasts with the testimony of Apollod., III 15.4, who

indicates that the youngest of the daughters (τὴν νεωτάτην) was sacrificed⁵⁵.

It is therefore possible that the compiler of the originary text started from the version of the myth present in Euripides (which he probably knew through the mediation of Lycurgus and/or other authors) and expanded it with the inclusion of these elements (invented or gleaned from other sources unknown to us). The divergence between the direct and the indirect tradition regarding the source can be explained (according to Jacoby's theory) by the presence in the originary text of both Demaratus *Tragodoumena* (probably invented to justify the presence in the story of information missing in Euripides⁵⁶) and Euripides *Erechtheus* (introduced, as in the pairs of sources in *De fluviis*, by

162. According to A. MARTÍNEZ DÍEZ, 1975, p. 237, ἐὰν τὴν πρεσβυτάτην τῶν θυγατέρων Περσεφόνη θύσῃ (Stobaeus) can be interpreted in the sense that «la hija al morir pasaría a ser considerada potencia ctónica, o equivalente del simple hecho del morir».

⁵³ Cf. Ch. Collard and J. Diggle *apud* CH. COLLARD - M.J. CROPP - K.H. LEE, 1995, p. 188 *ad loc.* (Cropp does not put the conjecture in the text); J. DIGGLE, 1997, p. 106. The proposal was taken into consideration by M. SONNINO, 2010, p. 361 *ad loc.*, who highlights the relationship that could be established with the testimony of 'Demaratus' (cf. *supra*, n. 45).

⁵⁴ On the reasons for the sacrifice to Kore in the *Heraclidae* and on the possible analogies with the *Erechtheus* cf. J. WILKINS, 1995, pp. 104-105 *ad loc.*

⁵⁵ On the various versions of the myth with regard to the overall number of Erechtheus' daughters and to the ones involved in the sacrifice cf. A. MARTÍNEZ DÍEZ, 1975, pp. 232-234; J.B. CONNELLY, 1996, pp. 60-61 and n. 52; F. JOUAN - H. VAN LOOY, 2002, p. 97; M. SONNINO, 2010, pp. 100-102.

⁵⁶ Cf. A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 46-47, in the exposition of F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 135. A similar case is that of 21A, 310E, where the *Parallela* present major differences compared to the text of Parthenius (indicated as the source), while in Stobaeus the tale is attributed to a

μémνηται, which does not imply an exact match between the tale presented and the Euripides tragedy).

At this point we can envisage two different hypotheses for the text on which the *Parallela* and the indirect tradition depend:

1. a single and more extensive tale, similarly to what we read in Stobaeus (containing therefore also the indications on Erechtheus' eldest daughter and Persephone). This would have been followed by the indication of the *Tragodoumena* of Demaratus as the source and the reference to Euripides introduced by μémνηται. The author of the *Parallela* (or the epitome from which the text of the work is derived) may then have summarised the tale, omitted some details (including those not present - as far as we know - in Euripides' text) and indicated Euripides alone as the source. This reconstruction has the advantage of a direct juxtaposition of the names of the two sources in the originary text (as in *Parallela* 1B and 40B and in various passages from the *De fluviis*⁵⁷); moreover, the presumed epitomation would

find ample confirmation throughout the *Parallela*.

2. A larger tale, attributed to Demaratus, may have been followed by a more concise tale, attributed to Euripides, following the *Erechtheus* more closely. Stobaeus would then have reported the first tale (summarised in Clement of Alexandria and John Lydus), while the *Parallela* would have followed the second. The fact that the *Parallela* lack that information which (as far as we know) did not even appear in Euripides' text would then not be the result of epitomation, but would depend on using Euripides as (direct or indirect) source. This reconstruction is in line with the hypothesis of Jacoby⁵⁸, according to which the cases of double citations might be explained as the result of the desire to juxtapose an invented story alongside the known tale of a known author or (as in our case) to tell it with the addition of variations.

Although the first reconstruction undoubtedly appears more plausible, the problem (which is likely to remain as such) nevertheless shows the com-

certain Sostratus, a probably fictitious author (or invented starting from the name of a real author): see the analysis of A. IBÁÑEZ CHACÓN, 2010, which on p. 63 hypothesises the existence of an intermediate source between Parthenius and the *Parallela* (cf. also F. JACOBY, 1940, pp. 130, 140-143).

⁵⁷ Cf. *supra* p. 53 and n. 50.

⁵⁸ F. JACOBY, 1940, p. 135. Jacoby's theory is questioned by A. DE LAZZER, 2000, pp. 46-49, above all with reference to the possibility of accurately identifying the origin and meaning of the double citations.

plexity of the relationship between the *Parallela*, the indirect tradition and the sources (true or fictitious) of the tales and suggests a more thorough assessment of the cases in which the *Parallela* and the indirect tradition cite different authors or works, also in light of the possible analogies with the *De fluviis*.

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Academic and Peripatetic Views on Natural and Moderate Passions and a Case of Intertextuality in Plutarch

[Puntos de Vista Académicos y Peripatéticos sobre las Pasiones Naturales y Moderadas y un Caso de Intertextualidad en Plutarco]

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Abstract

An example of intertextuality in Plutarch and Cicero shows the use of a common source stemming from the treatise *On Grief* of the Academic philosopher Crantor. The use made of this source in both authors reveals a line of reasoning advocating the natural character and utility of certain passions. The advocacy of the natural character of passions is further connected in both Plutarch and Cicero to the normative ideal of 'moderation of passions' (*metriopatheia*) and is contrasted to the Stoic ideal of 'absence of passions' (*apatheia*). This may be further linked to a Plutarchan hermeneutical approach which conflates Academic and Peripatetic ethical views for the sake of constructing an alternative to the Stoic approach towards the elimination of passions. This strategy, which has its starting point in passages in Cicero which draw on Antiochus, is indicative of the way Plutarch connected Platonic and Aristotelian/Peripatetic authority in the domain of ethics in order to answer to Stoic positions in ethics which he found unpalatable.

Key-Words: Plutarch, Cicero, *Metriopatheia*, *Apatheia*, Ethics.

Resumen

Un ejemplo de intertextualidad en Plutarco y Cicerón evidencia el uso de una fuente común que remonta al tratado *Sobre el dolor* del filósofo académico Crantor. El uso de esta fuente en ambos autores revela una línea de razonamiento que defiende el carácter natural y la utilidad de determinadas pasiones. La defensa del carácter natural de las pasiones está relacionada en ambos, Plutarco y Cicerón, con el ideal normativo de la 'moderación de las pasiones' (*metriopatheia*) y contrasta con el ideal estoico de la 'ausencia de pasiones' (*apatheia*). Este debe vincularse con una aproximación hermenéutica de Plutarco que confunde el punto de vista académico y peripatético con la intención de establecer una alternativa a la propuesta estoica de eliminar las pasiones. Esta estrategia, que arranca de pasajes de Cicerón inspirados en Antíoco, ilustra la forma en que Plutarco conectó la autoridad platónica y aristotélica/peripatética en el campo de la ética para dar respuesta a las posiciones éticas del estoicismo que consideraba insostenibles.

Palabras-clave: Plutarco, Cicerón, *Metriopatheia*, *Apatheia*, Ética.

1 . Crantor in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium and Tusculanae Disputationes*

The consolatory letter to Apollonius, which has come down to us in the Plutarchan corpus¹, contains a collection of quotations from famous poets and other accounts which all contribute to the theme of consolation for evils that befall humans. One of the multiple sources that Plutarch uses are also the philosophical views on the passions from the Academic philosopher Crantor, a member of Plato's Academy before its skeptical turn². Among them is a fragment of Crantor which is quoted at the beginning of the treatise:

μη γὰρ νοσοῖμεν” φησὶν ὁ ἀκαδημαϊκὸς Κράντωρ, “νοσή-
σασι δὲ παρήϊ τις αἴσθησις, εἴτ’

οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων
εἴτ’ ἀποσπῶτο. τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον
τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίγνε-
ται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθη-
ρίωσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα
τοιούτου ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχὴν.
(*Cons. Ap.* 102d7-d12³)

May we not become ill,” says Crantor of the Academy, “but if we are ill, may some sensation be present in us, whether one of our members be cut off or torn out. For this insensibility to pain comes to human beings only at a high price; for in the former case, one may assume that one's body has been brutalized, but in the latter case one's soul.

In the above passage, Crantor advocates the value of experiencing bodily pain, presumably because the ability to experience

¹ The treatise has been rejected as spurious on stylistic grounds, see e.g. R. VOLK-MANN, *Commentatio de Consolatione ad Apollonium pseudoplutarchea*, Halle 1867, a verdict which is adopted by many modern scholars, cf. e.g. POHLENZ, 1909, pp. 15-19. However, HANI, 1972, pp. 42-49, makes a case for the authenticity of the treatise and defends the view that the stylistic peculiarities of *Cons. ad Apoll.* are due either to the fact that the treatise was written in haste or constitute the preliminary notes for a consolatory work (p. 42). A further argument for the treatise's authenticity is that it makes reference to the concept of ‘moderation of passions’ (*metriopatheia*), which is prominent in a Plutarchan treatise (*De Virtute Morali*) whose authority is not questioned. Focusing on the latter concept, I will treat the *Cons. ad Apoll.* as Plutarchan material.

² POHLENZ, 1909, p. 16 suggests that the consolatory work which has come down to us under the name of Plutarch wholly depends on Crantor's *On Grief* and attempts in pp. 15-19 to offer a reconstruction of the latter. For a refutation of POHLENZ's view and the idea that we find in *Cons. ad Apoll.* only scattered fragments of Crantor's work, see HANI, 1972, pp. 46-47. BOYS-STONES, 2013, advocates the more broadly Platonic character of the major consolatory themes which appear in the work and reads it as an attempt to offer an ‘ethical pedagogy’ on the basis of the Platonic dialogues *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo*, as exemplified in the late Platonist Olympiodorus' reading of Plato.

³ I adopt here the punctuation of METTE, 1984, p. 17.

bodily pain is indispensably linked to the ability to experience pleasure as well. Applied to the soul, this alludes to the importance of experiencing psychic passions as indispensable indicators of values which constitute human happiness. The human condition, according to this view, necessarily involves the experience of passions but the latter may also be indispensable for reaching a higher state of human existence. The quotation is supplemented by a line of reasoning advocating the natural basis and corresponding utility of the passion of grief⁴. Thus, it is argued that the ‘the pain and pang felt at the death of a son comes from a natural starting point of grief (φυσικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λύπης), over which we have no control (οὐκ ἔφ’ ἡμῖν)’⁵. The idea is embedded into a short polemic against unknown opponents (apparently the Stoics) who ‘extol a harsh and callous lack of passions’ (τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν), however such a state is ‘both

impossible and unprofitable’ (ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὐσαν)⁶.

The impossibility of eradicating passions is premised in the text both on the idea that passionate feelings do not merely depend on us, i.e. on our reason, but have an independent source in the human psyche but also on what may be called a ‘functional’ explanation, according to which passions serve a particular purpose and human utility (as suggested by the use of the word συμφέρον). With regard to the latter, the author draws attention to the detrimental effects that an elimination of passions would have for human life. Thus, a total lack of passions would amount to the impossibility of experiencing states such as the ‘good will’ (εὐνοία), which results from the reciprocal exchange of friendly affection (φιλία) among human beings⁷. Such, however, it is further stated, ‘it is necessary to preserve above all else’ (τὴν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον), suggesting that

⁴ Although Plutarch’s text does not clearly signal this line of reasoning as deriving from Crantor, one may assume that it is an exact quotation or paraphrase from the same treatise from which the explicit quotation comes from. See also METTE, 1984, p. 17, who prints the whole sequence of the passage as a fragment from Crantor.

⁵ *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102c6-8 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀλγεῖν καὶ δάκνεσθαι τελευτήσαντος υἱοῦ φυσικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λύπης, καὶ οὐκ ἔφ’ ἡμῖν. Cf. *De virt. mor.* 451c: μέτεστιν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, καὶ σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀρχὴν, οὐκ ἐπεισόδιον ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίαν οὔσαν, οὐδ’ ἀναιρετέαν παντάπασιν ἀλλὰ θεραπείας καὶ παιδαγωγίας δεομένην.

⁶ *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102c5: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὔσαν.

⁷ On the way goodwill (εὐνοία) is dependent upon an underlying passion akin to empathy, cf. *De virt. mor.* 451e: φιλίας δὲ φιλοστοργίαν ἢ φιланθρωπίας ἔλεον ἢ τὸ συγγαίρειν καὶ συναλγεῖν εὐνοίας ἀληθινῆς οὐδὲ βουλόμενος ἂν τις ἀποσπάσειεν οὐδ’ ἀποτήξειεν.

it is an indispensable part of the human condition⁸. Accordingly, the state of *apatheia* is connected in the quotation of Crantor to the idea of a ‘brutal’ (θηριώδης) and, in Plutarch’s words, a ‘harsh’ (ἄτεγκτον) soul, which does not befit the image of the noble person.

Crantor’s views, as found in Plutarch’s consolatory treatise, are mirrored, with almost verbatim equivalents, in the third book of Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* which is devoted to the discussion of passions⁹. There, Crantor’s views are not embedded into a consolatory epistolary context (as in the case of Plutarch) but feature in a dialectical exercise on the nature and value of passions. Thus, in an exchange between the two interlocutors represented in the manuscripts by the letters A. and M. (in all probability standing for Antiochus and Marcus sc. Tullius Cicero) the latter attributes to his interlocutor the view that grief befalls even the sage¹⁰. The position is contrasted to the Stoic one, whereas Cicero assumes in the debate the role of the Academic sceptic who opposes the two camps in

order to examine the extent to which each position approximates the truth¹¹. As a rationale for the position that grief will befall even the sage, Cicero puts into the mouth of his character the same fragment that we encounter in Plutarch’s *Cons. ad Apoll.* in a Latin translation. The passage reads as follows:

There is some sense in what Crantor says, who was one of the most eminent members of our Academy. ‘I cannot by any means’, said he, ‘agree with those who extol some kind of insensibility (*indolentiam*). Such a thing is neither possible, nor beneficial (*quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet*). ‘Let me escape illness: should I be ill’, he said, ‘let me have the capacity for feeling I previously possessed, if some part of my body is to be cut open or even amputated. For this state of insensibility to pain (*nihil dolere*) comes at a high price (*non sine magna mercede*), namely cruelty in the soul and

⁸ *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102c5-d1: ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὐνοίαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασφῶζειν ἀναγκαῖον.

⁹ Crantor’s fragment is one among multiple themes that Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* shares with the *Cons. ad Apoll.*. For a listing of all the common themes between the two treatises, see GRAVER, 2002, Appendix A.

¹⁰ *Tusculan Disputations* 3.12: *Cadere, opinor, in sapientem aegritudinem tibi dixisti videri. -Et vero ita existimo.*

¹¹ Cf. Cicero’s remarks at *Tusculan Disputations* 4.47. For Cicero’s role in the *Tusculan Disputations* as an Academic sceptic who subjects every philosophical position to dialectical scrutiny, see GRAVER, 2002, p. 84.

callousness in the body (*inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore*). *Tusc.* 3.12-13¹²

In Cicero's restating of Crantor's views the polemical remark for those (sc. the Stoics) who praise 'insensibility' (*indolentia*), which, however, 'neither can nor should exist' (*quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet*) is attributed explicitly to Crantor himself. The phrase mirrors the Plutarchan ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατόυ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν and suggests that passions are, on the one hand, dependent upon a source which is not entirely under rational control, and, on the other hand, that they serve a 'functional' role, which suggests that they should not be eliminated. Cicero offers a further variation to Crantor's views by differentiating between two different undesirable effects that result

from insensibility in the case of the body and the soul (thus referring to *stupor* in the case of the body and *inmanitas* in the case of the soul), whereas Plutarch refers to both as a form of 'brutalising', making use of a single verb (τεθηριῶσθαι).

Cicero, similarly to Plutarch, connects the quotation from Crantor to a theory of 'natural' passions. Thus, reporting Crantor's view he states that 'it is nature that causes grief' suggesting that (to a certain extent) we cannot help but surrender to this passion¹³. In line with this, the words of Crantor in *Tusculan Disputations* 3.12 are prefaced by a reference to the 'tender and sensitive' aspect of our soul, which by nature (*natura*) is prone to be shaken by distress (*est natura in animis tenerum quiddam atque molle, quod aegritudine... quatiatur*)¹⁴. This position is, however, attacked by Cicero with polemical re-

¹² *nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime' inquit 'adsentior is qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. Nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore.'*

¹³ *Tusculan Disputations* 3.71: *natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquit, vester cedendum putat.*

¹⁴ One may compare to these ideas another fragment from Crantor, part of his consolation to a certain Hippocles for the death of his children, which Plutarch cites at *Cons. ad. Apoll.* 104c1-15. There (104c9-15) we find the idea that the mortal seeds participate in the portion of evil which is allocated to humans upon birth and which is responsible for the lack of natural power (ἀφύια) of the human soul, as also for diseases of the body and other calamities: ἥ τ' ἄδηλος αὐτῇ τύχῃ πόρρωθεν ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἡκολούθηκεν οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐνὶ ὑγιεῖ, φουμένους τε μίγνυται τις ἐν πᾶσι κακοῦ μοῖρα· τὰ γάρ τοι σπέρματα εὐθὺς θνητὰ ὄντα ταύτης κοινωνεῖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἐξ ἧς ἀφύια μὲν ψυχῆς, νόσοι τε καὶ κήδεα καὶ μοῖρα θνητῶν ἐκείθεν ἡμῖν ἔρπει." This seems to chime well with the Plutarchan view that the origin of the passions is to be found in the 'soul itself', i.e. the pre-cosmic soul, which is the source of irrationality and evil, see OPSOMER, 2012, pp. 316-17.

marks in the very next lines of *Tusculan Disputations* 3.13 as appearing to be indulging the ‘weak and soft parts of us’ (*sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini*)¹⁵.

Cicero also picks up on the theme of the functional role of passions which emerges from Crantor’s fragment, albeit offering us more ample examples to illustrate the case. In his presentation of the ‘Peripatetic’ view on passions at *Tusculan Disputations* 4.43-46, he discusses the way grief is ordained by nature for the sake of great utility (*non sine magna utilitate a natura... constitutam*), so that one may be pained at the rebuke or punishment or disgrace for wrongdoings¹⁶. By suffering bites of conscience, it is argued, one is aware of the

value of right conduct. Again, fear of laws, poverty, disgrace, death or pain leads, according to this line of argument, people to adopt a more careful conduct of their lives, directing their decisions towards the right kind of values¹⁷. The passage ends in a way reminiscent of the language in Crantor’s fragment by stating that ‘it is neither possible nor necessary’ (*nec posse nec opus esse*) to extirpate passions¹⁸.

2. *Metriopatheia* in *De Virtute Morali*

The idea that passions have a natural source and serve a useful aim (according presumably to a teleological plan of nature) underpins further in Plutarch the normative ethical ideal that passions should be moderated, rather than extirpated¹⁹. Thus, after reassuring

¹⁵ *sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini*. Cf. *ibid.* 4.38: *Quocirca mollis et enervata putanda est Peripateticorum ratio et oratio, qui perturbari animos necesse dicunt esse, sed adhibent modum quendam, quem ultra progredi non oporteat*.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 4.45: *Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et inmanem beluam fugiendam diximus, non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines castigationibus reprehensionibus ignominiis adfici se in delicto dolerent. impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore; morderi est melius conscientia*. On the educational role of fear and repentance cf. *De virt. mor.* 452c: αὐτούς γε μὴν τούτους ὁρᾶν ἔστι πολλάκις μὲν ἐπαίνοις τοὺς νέους παρορμῶντας πολλάκις δὲ νοουθεσίαις κολάζοντας, ὧν τῷ μὲν ἔπεται τὸ ἡδεσθαι τῷ δὲ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι (καὶ γὰρ ἡ νοουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην, ὧν τὸ μὲν λύπη τῷ γένει τὸ δὲ φόβος ἐστί), καὶ τούτοις μάλιστα χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις.

¹⁷ *Tusculan Disputations* 4.46: *metum vero si qui sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis qui leges, qui magistratus, qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 4.46: *Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optimam existiment*.

¹⁹ BECCHI, 2005, pp. 388-400 shows that Babut’s opinion that Plutarch in some passages contradicts his defence of *metriopatheia* by defending the total absence of passions

Apollonius that grief is a natural reaction to the loss of a son, Plutarch goes on to say that what is ‘against nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν) is when grief goes ‘beyond measure’ (πέρα τοῦ μέτρου) and results in a passionate exaggeration²⁰. The state that is commended is expressed in a single word with the concept of ‘moderation of passions’ (*metriopatheia*), a word which may well postdate Crantor himself²¹. This again finds an equivalent in Cicero. Thus, in the reconstruction of Old Academic views in the *Lucullus* 135 *metriopatheia* (translated in Cicero’s Latin as *mediocri-*

tas) is connected to Crantor’s treatise and to the ‘functional’ explanation of passions which was defended there²².

In the less rhetorical context of Plutarch’s treatise *De virt. mor.* one may find Plutarch’s preoccupation with the idea of the ‘right measure’ of passions, as also an attempt to present it as a fundamental tenet of both the Academy and the Peripatos²³. Although *metriopatheia* itself is a post-Aristotelian term²⁴, it seems applicable to a central idea found in Aristotle, namely that virtue of character is a kind of *mesotēs*

(*apatheia*) cannot be sustained. The commendable kind of *apatheia* turns out to be identical to the Academic (and Peripatetic) ideal of *metriopatheia*. This seems to result from the ambiguity of *pathos* as relating to both a neutral and an excessive state.

²⁰ Plutarch refers at *Cons. ad Apoll.* 113b9-13 to the ‘barbarian’ practice of mutilating parts of one’s body in order to gratify the dead as a passionate exaggeration which departs from the ‘moderation of passions which is according to nature in such cases’ (ἀπαρτῶμενοι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις μετριοπαθείας).

²¹ See METTE, 1984, p. 34.

²² *mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus. atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae.* Crantor’s treatise is also quoted at *Tusculan Disputations* 1.115; cf. D.L. 4.27. For the use of Crantor’s treatise as a source by Cicero see GRAVER, 2002, Appendix A. DILLON, 2003, p. 225 claims that there is a Polemonian underpinning for Crantor’s views relating to the idea that passions are according to nature (*kata physin*).

²³ On the way *De virt. mor.* incorporates Aristotelian/Peripatetic features, such as the bipartition of the soul into a rational and irrational element or the positive role of the passions, into an anti-Stoic polemic, see BECCHI, 1990, pp. 43-48, who also argues against the association of the treatise with ‘middle Platonism’ (ibid. pp. 37-43).

²⁴ As DILLON, 2003, p. 227, n.123 notes the word *metriopatheia*, as opposed to *apatheia*, is not attested before Philo of Alexandria (*Abr.* 255-7). He further notes, however, that we cannot be sure that it does not go back to the earliest phase of Academic opposition to Stoic *apatheia*. It first appears in (post) Hellenistic literature in connection with Aristotelian ethics in the Peripatetic doxography of Diogenes Laertius (5.31), where we read with reference to the Aristotelian sage: ἔφη δὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἀπαθῆ μὲν μὴ εἶναι, μετριοπαθῆ δέ.

(a mean state in a continuum with extremes of excessiveness and deficiency) which relates both to *pathē* and actions²⁵. Still, the Aristotelian position of a 'mean state' is more nuanced since it does not refer to an absolute mean state but one that is adjusted to the circumstances at hand in line with the dictates of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*)²⁶. The adjective 'moderate' (*metrion*) does not point to a mathematical intermediate such as the 'mean' (*meson*) and also does not necessarily presuppose two extreme points of exaggeration and deficiency. *Metriopatheia* is thus a more apt term to refer more generally to the idea of limitation and ordering, which seems to be applicable to both the traditions of the Academy and the Peripatets²⁷.

In *De virt. mor.* the idea of putting the right measure to passions is embedded into a larger context, which highlights

the way this view corresponds to a dualistic psychological model which differs fundamentally from the Stoic one. Throughout the treatise, Plutarch sees a fundamental agreement between Plato and Aristotle in that they both allow for the existence of a passionate part in the human soul, which should be subject to control rather than be eradicated²⁸. This is compatible with Plutarch's dominant Platonist orientation. Thus, the treatise shows how the moderation of passions corresponds to Platonic cosmological considerations about measure and limit as a principle of order. Accordingly, Plutarch refers to Plato's *Timaeus* and the double nature of the soul involving both a non-rational and a rational element (imposed by the Demiurge on the original soul), represented by the circles of the 'same' and the 'different'²⁹. This is followed by

²⁵ *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1106b16-18: λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον.

²⁶ On the differences between the *metriopatheia* ascribed by Cicero to the Peripatetics and the actual Aristotelian position see also GRAVER, 2002, p. 164.

²⁷ Plutarch uses both terms *metrion* and *meson* at *De prof. virt.* 84a: ἡμῶν δὲ δεῖται μὲν πῶς τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω περικοπῆς, εἰ μέλλομεν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι καὶ μέτριον. One may note that there are some Platonic passages, which seem to anticipate the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mean, see e.g. *Politicus* 284eff.: Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῦμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικὴν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη, ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχυτῆτας πρὸς τοῦναντίον μετροῦσιν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀφικίσθῃ τῶν ἐσχάτων.

²⁸ As DILLON, 1983, p. 511 notes, the main issue surrounding the debate of *metriopatheia* and its opposing term *apatheia* turns on the structure of the soul.

²⁹ *De virt. mor.* 441f. On the way the individual soul mirrors the cosmic soul and on the cosmological foundation of Plutarch's views on *metriopatheia* in *De virtute morali* see FERRARI, 2011, p. 34. Cf. OPSOMER, 2012, pp. 320-21.

a reference to the tripartite soul of the *Republic* and the suggestion that this tripartite division maps onto the bipartite Aristotelian division between a rational and a 'passionate' part of the soul³⁰.

At the same time, Plutarch resorts in particular to Aristotelian material to make a case for the moderation of passions³¹. He makes thereby use of the etymological derivation of *ēthos* (character) from *ethos* (habit), which prefaces Aristotle's discussion of moral virtue in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1³². The connection of *metriopatheia* with a dualistic moral psychology seems further to fit with the Aristotelian position that rationality supplements, directs and organizes passionate and motivational forces but does not substitute them. The latter still remain a necessary condition for virtuous action and provide orientation for reason to

process into full-fledged reasons for action. Plutarch refers in this context to the way judgment (*krisis*) needs impulse in order to bring about actions³³.

Further, Plutarch points in this context also to the difference between self-control and temperance on the one hand, and incontinence and vice on the other. This is a way to defend the dualistic moral psychology of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition on the basis of phenomenology and shared experience. Thus, the fact that we differentiate between these states is sufficient proof for him that there is a difference between a rational and non-rational part of the soul³⁴. Plutarch also uses the charioteer analogy from the *Phaedrus* in order to show that Plato anticipated Aristotle in making the relevant distinctions: thus, the passionate part of the soul of a temperate person is illustrated as guided by

³⁰ *Ibid.* 442b: ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δὴλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν· ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιληπῆσεως. On the introduction of the tripartition of the soul in *De virtute morali* on the basis of a consideration of Plato's *Republic* and on the way Plutarch 'shifts' this idea in a way that leads to the endorsement of the Aristotelian division of a rational and an irrational 'part' of the soul see OPSOMER, 2012, pp. 321-22.

³¹ For a general overview of Aristotelian/Peripatetic elements in Plutarch's ethics, see BECCHI, 2005.

³² *De virt. mor.* 443c: Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὠνόμασται τὸ ἦθος. ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος, ὠνόμασται δ' ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον.

³³ *Ibid.* 444a-b: τῷ δὲ πρακτικῷ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐκδεχομένην ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου συμπάροντος καὶ συνεφελομένου ταῖς κρίσεσιν. ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται.

³⁴ *De virt. mor.* 445b: Ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκεῖ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς πρὸς τὸ λογικὸν διαφορᾶς αὐτοῦ παρέχειν κατανόησιν, καὶ δεικνύειν τὸ πάθος ὡς ἕτερόν τι κομιδῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διέφερε σωφροσύνης ἐγκράτεια, καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀκρασία περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, εἰ ταῦτόν ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ ἐπιθυμεῖν ᾧ τε κρίνειν πέφυκε.

reason like a gentle animal obedient to the reins, willingly receptive of moderation and propriety³⁵. By contrast the self-controlled person while she directs her desire by reason, yet does not do so without pain, but resists, being full of internal struggle and turmoil³⁶. Reference to the Platonic simile ends with the idea that self-control is not a virtue in the absolute sense but ‘less than virtue’ (ἐλαττον ἀρετῆς)³⁷, which is reminiscent of the Aristotelian rejection of a virtue of *egkrateia*, the latter being characterised as a ‘middle state’ between virtue and vice³⁸.

The reference to specifically Aristotelian views on moral psychology concludes at *De virt. mor.* 443c with the statement that reason does not aim at completely eradicating passion but on imposing on it ‘some limit and order’ (ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν). The subsequent remark that ‘it is neither possible nor better (i.e. more expedient)’ (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατόν οὔτ’ ἀμεινόν) to eradicate passion completely is

again reminiscent of the phrase ‘both impossible and unprofitable’ (ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὔσαν), which we encountered in the *Cons. ad Apoll.* The passage ends by defining moral virtues as ‘due proportions and mean states’ (συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητος) which connects the Aristotelian idea of a ‘mean state’ with the mathematical ideal of ‘proportion’ (*symmetria*)³⁹. Later on in his treatise, Plutarch alludes to his ideas about the ‘original soul’ as the source of movement (and the origin of passions) by making explicit reference to the way reason limits the ‘passionate movement’ (παθητικὴν κίνησιν) and brings about in the irrational part of the soul the moral virtues which are mean states between deficiency and excess⁴⁰.

3. The ‘harmony’ of Plato and Aristotle and the value of passions

One may ask how Plutarch justifies the blending of Platonic and Aristotelian

³⁵ Cf. OPSOMER, 2012, p. 325.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 445c: οἷον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χειρόνος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ζυγομαχοῦντος ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον διαταράττοντος ἀντέχειν ὀπίσω καὶ κατατείνειν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεὶ.

³⁷ ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοτελεῆ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀλλ’ ἐλαττον ἀρετῆς εἶναι.

³⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.1128b34-35: οὐκ ἔστι δ’ οὐδ’ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή.

³⁹ *De virt. mor.* 443c: οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασι (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατόν οὔτ’ ἀμεινόν), ἀλλ’ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητος, ἐμποιοῦντος. At 444eff. Plutarch connects the idea of *symmetria* with musical harmony and attunement: γίνεται δὲ μεσότης καὶ λέγεται μάλιστα τῇ περὶ φθόγγους καὶ ἀρμονίας ὁμοίως. For Plutarch’s use of the harmony metaphor and the way in which he connects the latter with the Peripatetic doctrine of moral virtue as a mean see also OPSOMER, 2012, p. 326.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 444c: οὕτως δ’ ὀρίζων τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν ἐμποιεῖ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητος οὔσας.

views in his discussion about the nature of moral virtue. To be sure, Plutarch's primary philosophical allegiance is a Platonic one. He is a pioneer of Platonic exegesis in the way he reads Plato in his *On the Creation of the Soul according to the Timeaus* (*De An. Procr.*), attempting to establish unity and consistency among the dialogues, while also doing justice to the aporetic character of Platonic philosophy. However, his exegetical stance also grants him considerable freedom with regard to Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition as well. That is, even if Plato is recognized as the supreme philosophical authority, and as the originator of philosophical truth, there is still room to accommodate specifically Aristotelian, or more generally Peripatetic views, into his philosophical expositions. It seems that this is particularly the case in ethics, where Aristotelian/Peripatetic views may seem to systematize and develop in a more elaborate way Platonic insights⁴¹.

The origin of the hermeneutical stance which permits the connection of Peripatetic ideas with the exposition of

Academic philosophy may be detected in Cicero as well and, in all probability, reflects the teaching of Cicero's teacher Antiochus of Ascalon, the first one to turn to a dogmatic reading of Plato in the first century BCE. Thus, in Varro's (the spokesperson of Antiochus) exposition of the 'old Academic' system of philosophy in the second edition of Cicero's *Academic Books*, we find a similar attempt to present a unified system of doctrines for both the Academy and the Peripatos. A positive attitude towards the passions and an accommodation of them in the ideal of virtue is one of the points which are included in the fundamental doctrines of the 'Old Academy'. Thus, in a passage which contains the main headings of 'old Academic' views on ethics, passions are presented as 'natural' and in the same breath it is stated that the 'ancients' endorsed a psychological dualism which placed desire and reason in different parts of the soul; to this, Varro contrasts Zeno and his view that passions are voluntary and (merely) an outcome of judgments⁴². Even though the strategy of 'co-opting'

⁴¹ For the way Aristotle, as the founder of the Peripatetic philosophical tradition, functions as a 'privileged ally' for the 'Platonist' Plutarch and his attacks against other schools (especially in *De Virtute Morali*), see ROSKAM, 2009, pp. 41-42. Cf. OPSOMER, 2012, p. 316. For a further analysis of Plutarch's endorsement of the idea of Platonic and Aristotelian 'harmony' (especially in the case of ethics), see KARAMANOLIS, 2006, pp. 115-123. As ROSKAM, 2009, p. 28-29 argues, however, KARAMANOLIS does not do justice to the 'auxiliary' role that Aristotle's doctrines have for the elucidation of Plato's views. BECCHI, 1990, p. 46-48, on the other hand, defends the predominantly Aristotelian (or rather 'middle Aristotelian') character of *De virt. mor.*, leaving the aim of reconciliation with Platonic views aside.

⁴² *Academic Books* 38-9: *cumque perturbationem animi illi (sc. Academici et Peripatetici) ex homine non tollerent naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et effferri*

Aristotelian or Peripatetic ideas to convey the views of Plato (or, in the case of Antiochus, those of the old Academy as whole) is similar in both Plutarch and Antiochus, one should not overlook that there are crucial differences between the two thinkers with regard to their philosophical identity and their approach towards Plato's authority⁴³.

A last example from Plutarch's treatment of the topic of the moderation of passions suggests that his views, while aiming at conveying the (unified) tradition of the Academy and the Peripatos, developed in close interaction with the Stoic positions on the passions as well. This may be seen in

the way Plutarch endorses what one may call a cognitive explanation for excessive passions, which, contrary to their 'natural' counterparts, are reproachable and do not befit the sage. Thus, Plutarch argues explicitly that, in the case of excessive grief, passionate excessiveness results in the soul by virtue of a 'bad belief in us' (ὕπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης)⁴⁴. Whereas this excessive passionate reaction should be dismissed as 'injurious and base' (βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον) and 'not befitting the noble man' (σπουδαίσις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον), one should not disapprove of a 'moderation of passions' (*metriopatheia*)⁴⁵. Although

laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur. For a discussion of the passage see also BONAZZI, 2009, pp. 46-47.

⁴³ Antiochus' identity is more inclusive since he identifies himself as an '(old) Academic', whereas Plutarch identifies himself as a Platonist. For the peculiar approach of Antiochus towards Platonic authority see TSOUNI, 2018.

⁴⁴ For a parallel see Aspasius' *In EN* 44.20-24 Heylbut, where πάθος is described as 'an irrational movement of the soul owing to a supposition of good and bad' (πάθος εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν ἄλογον δι' ὑπόληψιν κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ). The cognitivist interpretation of excessive passions may also be traced at Cicero's *De Finibus* 5.28-9 as part of Antiochus' account of Peripatetic ethics. Antiochus' views suggest that in the case of grief, erotic passion, or excessive anger, the underlying cause of the passion is the supposition that such an attitude is 'most to the agent's interest', and is thus the mark of a vicious character: *neque enim, si non nulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos aut alia exitia quaerant aut ut ille apud Terentium, qui 'decrevit tantisper se minus iniuriae suo nato facere', ut ait ipse, 'dum fiat miser', inimicus ipse sibi putandus est. sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in mala scientes inruunt, tum se optime sibi consulere arbitrantur. itaque dicunt nec dubitant: 'mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac'*. Still, the Antiochean views (specifically) at *De Finibus* 5 do not suggest any endorsement of *metriopatheia*, see BRUNNER, 2014, pp. 199-202.

⁴⁵ *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102d2-7: τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι φημι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο

the passage fails to refer explicitly to the way in which such moderation is effected, we may assume that this role is played by (right) reason, which holds the passionate impulses ‘within bounds’.

It is suggestive that the concession that reproachable passions are due to false beliefs seems to derive from considerations coming from the Stoic camp⁴⁶. Thus, Cicero, reporting a Stoic line of reasoning at *Tusculan Disputations* 3, entertains the view that the belief (*opinio*) that one should mourn in an excessive way brings about ‘deep grief’ (*gravis aegritudo*)⁴⁷. The Stoic position considers passions as states of a single psychological aspect, which the Stoics identify with the leading part of the soul (*hēgemonikon*), which in humans is utterly rational. What underlies all passions according to the Stoic view is merely a rational impulse

guided by a false judgement, which takes hold of the soul becoming strong and overpowering⁴⁸. The ideal for the Stoic sage is to entertain no false beliefs and corresponding passions, a state captured by the word *apatheia*.

Further, by exploiting the ambiguity of the word *pathos* in its Academic/Peripatetic use (both as something which can be excessive and reproachable but also as something which can be natural and within bounds), Stoics polemically identified all the uses of *pathos* with its negative version. The implication of this strategy, most prominent in Ciceronian passages which dialectically advocate the Stoic position, was the claim that the idea of moderate passion makes no sense, since passions are *inherently* excessive⁴⁹. This sparked reactions of the type recorded in Plutarch, who stresses that excessive passions,

μὲν ἑατέον ὡς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον, τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκμαστέον.

⁴⁶ Cf. DILLON, 1983, p. 511.

⁴⁷ See *Tusculan Disputations* 3.61: *Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accessit oportere, rectum esse, ad officium pertinere ferre illud aegre quod acciderit, tum denique efficitur illa gravis aegritudinis perturbatio.*

⁴⁸ See the way Plutarch reports the Stoic position at *De virt. mor.* 441d: καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης. Cf. *ibid.* 447a.

⁴⁹ On this point is based the dialectic of the *Tusculan Disputations* at 3.22. There, the alleged absurdity of the Peripatetic position, consisting in the moderation of passions (*mediocritates*), is compared to the absurdity of praising the moderation of bodily illness: *nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, medicritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, malum est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate.* Cf. also *Ibid.* 4.41-42.

which occur under the influence of false beliefs, do not comply with the utility ordained by nature and are reprehensible states which should be differentiated from the measured passionate ones⁵⁰.

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Reading Plutarch's Women: Moral Judgement in the *Moralia* and Some *Lives**

[Lectura de las Mujeres de Plutarco: Juicio Moral
en los *Moralia* y en Algunas *Vidas*]

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Abstract

Plutarch has two distinct bodies of work: the *Moralia* and the *Lives*. Increasingly, however, questions about the unity of Plutarch's work as a whole have been raised, and it has become of some concern to scholars of ancient biography to establish the level of philosophical content in the *Lives*. A comparative study of the women of the *Lives* and those in the *Moralia* may provide some insight into Plutarch's greater philosophical project and narrative aims. Plutarch's writings on and for women in the *Conjugalia praecepta*, *Mulierum virtutes*, *Amatorius*, *De Iside et Osiride*, and *Consolatio ad uxorem* lays a firm groundwork for the role of Woman in society and the marital unit. The language in these works is consistent with the language used to describe women in the *Lives*, where historical women appear as exempla for the moral improvement of his female students. This case study of five prominent women in the *Lives* reveals an uncomfortable probability: Plutarch presents women in the *Lives* in accordance with the principles set out in the *Moralia* and uses certain concepts to guide his readers towards a judgement of the *exempla* that agrees with his views on the ideal Woman.

Key-Words: Plutarch, *Exempla*, Women, Moral education, Virtue.

Resumen

Plutarco tiene dos *corpora* distintos en su obra: los *Moralia* y las *Vidas*. Sin embargo, cada vez se plantea más la unidad de la obra de Plutarco como un todo y ha sido tarea de los estudiosos de la biografía antigua establecer el nivel de contenido filosófico en las *Vidas*. Un estudio comparado sobre las mujeres de las *Vidas* y de los *Moralia* puede arrojar cierta luz sobre el proyecto principalmente filosófico de Plutarco y sobre sus objetivos narrativos. Los escritos de Plutarco sobre y para las mujeres en *Conjugalia praecepta*, *Mulierum virtutes*, *Amatorius*, *De Iside et Osiride*, y *Consolatio ad uxorem* constituyen una obra básica en relación con el papel de las mujeres en la sociedad y en la unidad del matrimonio. El lenguaje en estas obras es coherente con el lenguaje utilizado para describir a las mujeres en las *Vidas*, donde aparecen mujeres históricas como *exempla* para la formación de sus estudiantes femeninas. Este estudio particular de cinco destacadas mujeres de las *Vidas* descubre una probabilidad incómoda: Plutarco presenta a las mujeres en las *Vidas* de acuerdo con los principios establecidos en los *Moralia* y utiliza determinados conceptos para conducir a sus lectores hacia un enjuiciamiento de los *exempla* que coincide con su visión sobre la Mujer ideal.

Palabras-clave: Plutarco, *Exempla*, Mujeres, Educación moral, Virtud.

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In the last two decades, the relationship between Plutarch's *Lives* and his *Moralia* has increasingly occupied scholars. Several publications have approached the topic in varying ways. Duff has shown that the *Lives* has a strong implicit moralistic purpose, while the more recent collection edited by Nikolaidis has made significant contributions to the study of the complex interplay between the two bodies of work¹. The collection contains five essays on themes relating to women, including marriage, a perennially popular topic. Elsewhere, discussions of the women that feature so prominently in both bodies of work have been relatively scarce. In some ways, this is not surprising. Plutarch is a remarkably versatile author and philosopher, who offers us a broad and complex range of texts to analyse.

Women do, however, occupy an important space within Plutarch's philosophy and he devoted enough time to discussions of womanhood, virtue and femininity to warrant dedicated study of their place in his conceptual world.

Five extant texts in the *Moralia* are especially relevant to the understanding of Plutarch's Woman: *Conjugalia praecepta*, *Mulierum virtutes*, *Consolatio ad uxorem*, *Amatorius*, and *De Iside et Osiride*. We can add a sixth if we include the spurious *Lacaenarum apophthegmata*². As for the women in the *Lives*, there are too many to mention. This paper focuses on five of the most well-known: Octavia, Cornelia, Cleopatra, Olympias, and Aspasia. I have chosen these five women not only because of their reputations, but because of their differences in class, culture and social status. This choice is a deliberate attempt to apply intersectionality theory to the work of one of the most prolific and generically diverse authors of the ancient world.

The breadth of Plutarch's extant corpus provides us a rare opportunity to study the characterization of women across a number of genres with markedly different content, context and aims. The sheer variety often makes it particularly difficult to reconcile what sometimes seems like contradictory views. We know far too little still of the place of women in Plutarch's conceptual world. Scholarship on the topic has yielded results ranging from

¹ T. E. DUFF, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*, Oxford, 1999, 55; A. G. NIKOLAIDIS (ed.), *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'*, Berlin, 2008. Russell also connected the *Moralia* and the *Lives*, but largely ignored any question of women; D. A. RUSSELL, "On Reading Plutarch's 'Lives'", *G&R* 13/2 (1966) 139-154.

² That these works form part of a coherent whole has not yet been adequately shown. However, Plutarch's interest in women, female virtue and conjugality is clear; see M. VALVERDE SÁNCHEZ, "Amor y matrimonio en el Erótico de Plutarco", in J. M. NIETO IBÁÑEZ (ed.), *Lógos Hellenikós. Homenaje al Profesor Gaspar Morocho Gayo*, vol. I, León, 2003, p. 442.

Walcot's excessively negative assessment of Plutarch's views on women to Nikolaidis' rather optimistic analysis that Plutarch was, in fact, a proto-feminist³. While I disagree with Nikolaidis' view on the feminism of Plutarch, it also seems unlikely that he was wholly negative towards women as a category. It is my view that in reality, his interactions with women were varied and informed by ideology, his philosophical views, and a number of other factors we could deduce (if only in part)

from his work. Intersectionality theory suggests that it is perhaps unreasonable, and certainly unfair, to treat women as a monolithic category which can be studied as such⁴. Instead, it suggests an approach that considers women at the intersection of oppression(s) including (but not limited to) gender, class, ethnicity and race, geopolitical circumstance, sexuality and so forth⁵. This paper will discuss the language Plutarch uses in the *Moralia* in comparison with the language used to describe five

³ A. G. NIKOLAIDIS, "Plutarch on Women and Marriage", *WS*, 110 (1997) 27-88, esp. pp. 87-88; P. WALCOT, "Plutarch on Women", *SO*, 74 (1999) 163-183. See also F. LE CORSU, *Plutarque et les femmes dans les Vies parallèles*, Paris, 1981; K. BLOMQUIST, "From Olympias to Aretaphila: Women in Politics in Plutarch", in J. MOSSMAN (ed.), *Plutarch and His Intellectual World*, London, 1997, pp. 73-98; S.B. POMEROY (ed.), *Plutarch's 'Advice to the Bride and Groom' and 'A Consolation to His Wife': English translations, commentary, interpretive essays, and bibliography*, Oxford, 1999; V. CASTELLANI, "Plutarch's 'Roman' Women", in E. N. OSTENFELD (ed.), *Greek Romans and Roman Greeks: Studies in Cultural Interaction*, Aarhus, 2002, pp. 142-155; J. MCINERNEY, "Plutarch's Manly Women", in R. M. ROSEN & I. SLUITER (eds.), *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity*, Leiden, 2003, 319-344; B. BUSZARD, "The Speech of Greek and Roman Women in Plutarch's 'Lives'", *CP*, 105 (2010) 83-115; E. J. HÅLAND, "Women, Death, and the Body in Some of Plutarch's Writings," *Mediterranean Review*, 4 (2011) 1-48.

⁴ Rabinowitz notes that it has long been a tendency in classical scholarship to treat 'women' as "some pre-existent singular entity". In recent scholarship, especially that of feminist classicists, much work has been done to abolish this idea and move towards a more complex understanding of women in the ancient world. Even so, studies of homoeroticism tend to focus on male homosexuality and especially pederasty, while similar studies of lesbianism are in short supply; Rabinowitz argues that feminist classicists have turned to gender studies, because "it is safer; by never studying women without men, such studies avoid the specter of lesbianism"; N.S. RABINOWITZ, "Introduction", in N. S. RABINOWITZ & A. RICHLIN (eds.), *Feminist Theory and the Classics*, New York, 1993, p. 11.

⁵ K. CRENSHAW, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics", *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989) 139-167; K. CRENSHAW, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color", *Stanford Law Review*, 43 (1991) 1241-1299. Intersectionality theory has been slow to

women in the *Lives*. It is, above all, an attempt to further our understanding of Plutarch's characterization of women the *Lives*, not only in relation to men but in relation to other women⁶. It is unlikely that we will learn anything new about the women themselves. Instead, using intersectionality as a theoretical framework, I suggest that we might gain valuable insight into Plutarch's conscious and subconscious treatment of women, and therefore the complexity of gendered oppression in the ancient world.

Women in the Moralia

Before we can address the characterisation of women in the *Lives*, we should attempt to formulate some idea of ideal

Womanhood. What does Plutarch say about women in the *Moralia*⁷? As far as theory goes, *De Iside et Osiride* and *Amatorius* both present a fairly positive picture, as does *Mulierum virtutes*, that women are fully capable of virtue⁸. That is not to say that Plutarch is throwing gender roles out of the window. Believing that women are *capable* of the same things as men and believing that they *should* do the same things as men are not one and the same. This is what makes Plutarch so wonderfully complex and infuriatingly elusive. Rather than attempting to interpret Plutarch's views at this point, I will present instead an overview of recurring themes in the *Moralia*, highlighting some contradictions and incongruities and pointing out

make its way into ancient studies in a formal way, although several recent publications have made use of intersectionality as a theoretical framework. See for example M. B. KARTZOW, *Destabilizing the Margins: An Intersectional Approach to Early Christian Memory*, Oregon, 2012; A. GARCÍA-VENTURA, "The Sex-based Division of Work versus Intersectionality: Some strategies for engendering the Ur III textile work force", in B. LION & C. MICHEL (eds.), *The Role of Women in Work and Society in the Ancient Near East*, Berlin, 2016, pp. 174-192; R. AASGARD, "How close can we get to ancient childhood? Methodological achievements and new advances", in C. LAES & V. VUOLANTO (eds.), *Children and Everyday Life in the Roman and Late Antique World*, New York, 2016, pp. 318-331; R. AASGARD & C. HORN (eds.), *Childhood in History: Perceptions of Children in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds*, London, 2017.

⁶ Durán Mañas argues that Plutarch's representation of female characters in the *Lives* reveal his attitudes toward women; M. DURÁN MAÑAS, "Las mujeres en la Vida de Pericles", in L. VAN DER STOCKT, F. TITCHENER, H. G. INGENKAMP & A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ (eds.), *Gods, Daimones, Rituals, Myths and History of Religions in Plutarch's Works*. Studies devoted to Professor Frederick E. Brenk by The International Plutarch Society, Málaga-Logan, 2010, p. 144, cf. p. 159.

⁷ There is, of course, significant overlap between Plutarch's views, especially those set out in the *Coniug. praec.*, and other *peri gamou* literature. Chapman provides an excellent overview of these influences in Plutarch; A. CHAPMAN, *The Female Principle in Plutarch's Moralia*, Dublin, 2011, pp. 15-31.

⁸ *De Is. et Os.* 373c, 383a; *Amatorius* 766d-767a, 769c; *Mulier. virt.* 243a; See also P. A. STADTER, "Philosophos kai philandros: Plutarch's View of Women in the 'Moralia' and the 'Lives'", in POMEROY (ed.), 1999, p. 175.

concepts and phrases we might expect to find elsewhere.

In the *Moralia*, Plutarch argues for equal ability while also betraying himself as somewhat sceptical. According to Gilabert Barberà, his arguments in the *Amatorius* oppose those that believe that women aren't capable of *erōs* because he believes the Realm of Truth is genderless and does not discriminate⁹. Plutarch is essentially arguing that women are no different from men, while elsewhere in the *Moralia* he adds, *except when they are*. Perhaps this is why the *Conjugalia praecepta*, one of his most important moral-philosophical texts for women,

is primarily aimed at the bride. Out of the 47 precepts in the treatise, 25 are aimed directly at Eurydice, while only 7 are aimed at Pollianus (the remainder are mutual)¹⁰. 23 of the exempla are women, highlighting the aim of the letter in reinforcing Plutarch's ideas about gendered virtue¹¹.

What emerges from these works is a view of Woman's role in the household which sees her as primary domestic peacekeeper¹². The philosophical basis for this assumption lies in *De Iside et Osiride*, where Isis, as the "female principle of nature"¹³, acts as harmoniser between Osiris and Typhon (369b-f; 372f)¹⁴. In

⁹ P. GILABERT BARBERÀ, "Love in Plutarch: The Necessary Platonic Correction of Plato", in J. M. NIETO IBÁÑEZ & R. LÓPEZ LÓPEZ (eds), *El amor en Plutarco. Actas del IX Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas*, León, 28-30 September 2006, León, 2007, p. 124.

¹⁰ Chapman's count is slightly different; according to her analysis 28 precepts are aimed at the bride, 11 at the groom and the remainder "focus on the partnership aspect of marriage". The result, however, remains the same: the *Coniug. praec.* has a disproportionate focus on the role of the wife in maintaining marital harmony; CHAPMAN, 2011, p. 15.

¹¹ Female exempla are never appropriate for men, unless they are used to shame them by pointing out how *a woman* can be virtuous/courageous etc. while they are failing at the task. This is a particularly harsh method; cf. I. VEGGE, *2 Corinthians – A Letter about Reconciliation. A Psychagogical, Epistolographical and Rhetorical Analysis*, Tübingen, 2008, pp. 115-117; R. LANGLANDS, "Roman *Exempla* and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero *de Officiis*", *JRS*, 101 (2011) p. 104.

¹² This attitude is not unique to Plutarch, and in fact has much in common with the Pythagorean women's letters. Theano also appears at *Coniug. praec.* 142d as a model of virtue and temperance. See for example Perictione, *On the Harmony of Women*, 77; Phytis, *On the Chastity of Women*, 84-85; Theano, *Letter to Nicostrate*, 73. Stoics like Hierocles and Musonius Rufus saw harmony as the joint effort of husband and wife; see Muson. fr. 13a-b, 89-91 (tr. Lutz); Hierocles, *On Marriage*, 75-77, *Household Management*, 93-95.

¹³ All translations are from the Loeb edition of Plutarch's works.

¹⁴ J. OPSOMER, "Plutarch on the One and the Dyad," *BICS*, 50 (2007) 379-395, esp. p. 386.

Conjugalia praecepta, Plutarch says the aim of the collection is to “render [husband and wife] gentle and amiable toward one another” and to help them attain harmony in their marriage “through reason, concord, and philosophy” (διὰ λόγου καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας; 138c-d)¹⁵. The onus of harmony falls almost squarely on the bride, however, who is told to eat a quince before bed “that the delight from lips and speech should be pleasant and harmonious at the outset” (138d)¹⁶. The husband is advised to be patient with his wife’s “irritability and unpleasantness” (table 1), because she will likely grow out of it (138e). Precept 14 rather ominously suggests that the wife “should have no feeling of her own” but should match her mood to that of her husband (139f)¹⁷.

Keeping her mood in check is very important, thus Plutarch advises that she put aside her bad temper and appear “accommodating, inoffensive, and agreeable” (141b) to her husband. Precept 27 invokes Hera in a further attempt to

persuade the bride that it is her duty to be pleasant at all times (141f). If she is too disagreeable, her husband would be right to seek pleasure elsewhere. Plutarch supplies the maxim “I cannot have the society of the same woman as both wife and paramour” for the husband whose wife is too grumpy for his liking (140b). The precept reads as a tacit condoning of extramarital affairs for men in ‘extreme’ cases. As such it stands in contrast to his argument in the *Amatorius* that women are capable of both erotic love and *philia*, and that the conjugal relationship is the most sacred and beneficial union.

Of course, women who live with uncompromising men don’t have the same recourse. They are in all cases expected to be faithful and modest. Precept 18 recommends that the wife should always be receptive of her husband’s sexual advances, though she should never take the initiative in the bedroom (140d), and Precept 39 suggests that the wife use the bedroom as a means to avoid and resolve

¹⁵ Tsouvala sees harmony in marriage as a blending of sexual pleasure and reason. She argues that love and marriage in Plutarch is a harmonising political relationship that transcends “ancestral feuds, philosophical factions, local competitions, and any type of discord in the *polis* and the empire.” G. TSOUVALA, “Love and Marriage,” in M. BECK (ed.), *A Companion to Plutarch*, Malden, 2014, pp. 191-206.

¹⁶ Goessler, in her analysis of *Coniug. praec.*, says a woman’s husband “should be her main concern”. L. GOESSLER, “Advice to the Bride and Groom: Plutarch gives a detailed account of his views on marriage”, in POMEROY, 1999, p. 99.

¹⁷ Beneker also touches on this theme when discussing the behaviour of Porcia in the *Brutus*. He argues that the wife can be a good partner if she shares in her husband’s joys and troubles without being overbearing or overly curious. It is the husband’s choice how much he wishes to share with her, and she should respect that; J. BENEKER, “Plutarch on the Role of *Eros* in a Marriage,” in NIKOLAIDIS, 2008, pp. 689-700.

conflict (143e). She should, however, be careful to appear neither too eager nor too unaffectionate towards her husband. In *Mulierum virtutes* Plutarch relates the story of the women of Ceos, who were so well-behaved that there wasn't a single case of adultery or seduction in 700 years (249d-e), implying that intemperance is ultimately the fault of women.

A good sense of shame is helpful for keeping women modest and temperate. McInerney notes that a large number of the exempla in *Mulierum virtutes* revolve around women's bodies, and often their virtuous action is a result of shame for what is improper¹⁸. Indeed, in the case of their bodies, Plutarch says a virtuous woman should become even more modest in the nude (*Coniug. praec.* 144b), and recalls the tale of the women of Miletus, who were prone to suicide until they were threatened with disgrace: they would be carried nude through the agora to their funeral (*Mulier. virt.* 249c-d; cf. *Apophth. Lac.* 242c). The thought of that shame prevented them from committing any further suicides. Similarly, the women of Egypt, deprived of luxuries, stay at home all day, and Plutarch suggests that this would be the case with most

women (*Coniug. praec.* 142c). The list of things women aren't supposed to have or wear is extensive. Plutarch mentions expensive clothes and jewellery, gold, emeralds, scarlet, gold-embroidered shoes, bracelets, anklets, purple, pearls¹⁹, and silk (table 1)²⁰. These luxuries are likely to anger their husbands, like bulls who are angered at the sight of red (144e), and therefore Plutarch advises the bride to set aside her indulgences in favour of household harmony. The husband is also advised not to indulge, at least not in the presence of his wife²¹.

Staying at home means that women's primary function is domestic. We see this play out in the *Mulierum virtutes*, where Plutarch tells the stories of many virtuous women acting in domestic contexts. Though their actions might at times take place outside of the home, they are always in service of harmony or in support of their husbands or fathers²². The Trojan women make the decision that it is time to settle in Italy (243f), and the Phocian women vote in favour of the men's proposal to die should the battle against the Thessalians be lost (244b-e). Elsewhere

¹⁸ McINERNEY, 2003, p. 328.

¹⁹ Cf. *Cons. ad ux.* 609c, which also mentions perfume.

²⁰ See also Melissa, *Letter to Cleareta*, 83 on eschewing luxuries; Theano, *Letter to Euboule*, 70 on domestic duty; Muson. fr. 3, 41 on self-control and chastity; Phytis, *On the Chastity of Women*, 85; Diog. Laert. 6.7.97-98 on Hipparchia; Sen. *Helv.* 14.2 on "womanly" weakness; Xen. *Oec.* 7.14 on temperance as a virtue.

²¹ *Coniug. praec.* 140b, 140c, 144d, 145b.

²² Cf. STADTER, 1999, pp. 177-79, 182.

women act in defense of their chastity (245c, 249f, 250a, 253d-e), or with the help of men (258e-f, 261a-c). At times Plutarch ascribes this agency to divine inspiration, as in the case of Telesilla and the women of Argos (245e). In doing so he devalues the initiative of women and transposes it instead to something beyond their control. What results is a picture of women as vessels for the actions of others.

Only in extraordinary circumstances does Plutarch condone women acting in the public or political sphere. One revealing anecdote is the story of Valeria and Cloelia relayed at *Mulierum virtutes* 250c-f. Plutarch seems genuinely caught between commending them for their bravery after escaping Porsena's camp and admonishing them for their foolishness for meddling in men's affairs. After all, at the end he tells the reader that the women were sent back to Porsena's camp. Their escape ultimately would have ruined the reputations of the men who offered them as captives in the first place. Women who take public action in the political sphere usually meet an untimely or unpleasant end²³. Lampsace dies of an illness shortly after

her act of bravery, intervening on behalf of the Phocians because her father is away (255b-c). Polycrite, though acting in private, suffers the same fate (254f). Aretaphila, however, gets extra special treatment. She uses spells and potions to topple a brutal and murderous tyrant and as a result she gets tortured (255f-257d). Plutarch lauds her not only for bearing her punishment courageously, but also for declining a seat in government and instead spending the rest of her life "quietly at the loom" when the whole affair is over²⁴.

Aretaphila is a particularly enlightening case, because Plutarch disapproves of the use of spells and potions in the strongest terms (table 1)²⁵. In *Coniugalium praecepta* Plutarch warns that women are especially prone to superstition, much like their wombs are prone to developing cysts. They should avoid using φίλτρα ('love potions') and γοητεία ('witchcraft'), unless they want to have power over "dull-witted and degenerate fools" (139a). Women who catch men's attention are easily suspected of using φάρμακα ('drugs' or potions; 141c), but if they're well-educated, they will be able to prove that they have no need

²³ McInerney discusses the resolution for women who possess *andreia*, arguing that the best they can hope for is a noble death; McINERNEY, 2003, p. 325; see also C. RUIZ MONTERO & A. M. JIMÉNEZ, "Mulierum Virtutes de Plutarco: aspectos de estructura y composición de la obra", *Myrtia*, 23 (2008) 101-120.

²⁴ K. BLOMQUIST, 1997, pp. 84-85 offers a good analysis of Plutarch's treatment of Aretaphila.

²⁵ See also *De superstitione*, esp. 165c, where Plutarch says that superstition is an emotional state of false reason.

for magic²⁶. Along with magic comes outlandish superstitions (ξέναις δεισιδαιμονίαις; 140d) and participation in strange rituals. Plutarch especially disapproves of association with Dionysos and Cybele. Instead of relying on magic, a woman should rely on her charm and character, which will garner respect from her husband and ensure a good reputation.

Plutarch's idea of what a woman should be is evident also in his writing on grief²⁷. He advises her to grieve neither excessively nor publically, but instead focus on the happy (if short) life of the deceased. These are the recommendations he gives to his wife Timoxena in the *Consolatio ad uxorem* (608d-610d). Elsewhere, he praises women for grieving virtuously. In the *Mulierum virtutes* Camma is lauded for not grieving ostentatiously (257f-258c), as is Timocleia (259e), and a great number of the *Lacaenarum apophthegmata* praise Spartan mothers for the pride they show when their sons die in battle, rather than grief for having lost them²⁸.

The image of ideal womanhood that Plutarch creates in the *Moralia* (see table 1) suggests that women are capable of achieving a state of virtue on par with men, but that their virtue should be performed in

accordance with gender roles. Plutarch's women are restricted primarily to the domestic sphere and must always act in a supportive role for the men in their lives. In the *Lives* we see the application of this ideal. That is not to say Plutarch's women are not complex, on the contrary, they are often multidimensional characters in their own right.

Women's virtue and vice in the Lives

Plutarch's methodology in the *Mulierum virtutes* is similar to that of the *Lives*. He argues that comparison is the best tool through which to judge virtue and vice in both men and women (243c):

And actually it is not possible to learn better the similarity and the difference between the virtues of men and of women from any other source than by putting lives beside lives and actions beside actions, like great works of art, and considering whether the magnificence of Semiramis has the same character and pattern as that of Sesostris, or the intelligence of Tanaquil the same as that of Servius the king, or the high spirit of Porcia the same as that of Brutus, or that of Pelopi-

²⁶ Plutarch praises Timoxena for not being prone to excess and superstition (περιεργίας και δεισιδαιμονίας; *Cons. ad ux.* 608b).

²⁷ Though there are few extant examples of *consolatio* to women, Plutarch's contribution here bears many similarities to other such letters, in particular Seneca's *Ad Helviam* and *Ad Marciam*, and some themes are repeated elsewhere, e.g. Musonius Rufus fr. 3.40.

²⁸ See *Apophth. Lac.* 240c, 240f, 241a, 241c, 242a, 242b. On the gendered nature of consolation literature; A. WILCOX, "Exemplary Grief: Gender and Virtue in Seneca's Consolations to Women," *Helios*, 33 (2006) 73-100.

Virtue/Vice	Positive	Negative	Reference
Harmony	ἐμμέλειαν, ἁρμονίας (εἰρήνης)		<i>Conj. praec.</i> 138c-d (cf. <i>Mulier. virt.</i> 246c)
		χαλεπότητα, ἀηδῖαν	<i>Conj. praec.</i> 138e
	ὑποτάττουσαι	ἀηδίας, ὀλιγορίας	<i>Conj. praec.</i> 142e, 140a
	εὐάρμοστα, ἄλυπα, προσφυλῇ		<i>Conj. praec.</i> 141b
	αὐστηρὰ, σώφρωνος	ἄκρατος, ἀνήδυντος	<i>Conj. praec.</i> 142c
Temperance	σεμνότητος, εὐταξία, αἰ- δοῦς	ἱμάτια καὶ πλόκια τῶν πολυτελεῶν	<i>Conj. praec.</i> 141e
	ἀδοξίας, αἰσχύνης	Καλλωπισαμένη, ἡδονὰς, πολυτέλειαν	<i>Mulier. virt.</i> 249d, <i>Cons. ux.</i> 609a
		χρυσὸς, σμάραγδος, κόκκος	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 141e
	σεμότερον	ὑποδήματα διάχρυσα... καὶ ψέλλια καὶ περισκελίδας καὶ πορφύραν καὶ μαργαρίτας	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 142e, 142c
	παιδείαν, φιλοσοφίαν	σηρικά	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 145f, 146a
		μύροῦ, πορφύρας	<i>Cons. ad ux.</i> 609c
Superstition		φίλτρα, γοητεία	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 139a
		βακχεύμασι	<i>Cons. ad ux.</i> 609a
		κυμβάλους καὶ τυμπάνους	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 144e
	εὐνοίαν, ἀρετὴ		<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 141c
		δαισιναιμονίας	<i>Coniug. praec.</i> 141d, <i>Cons. ad ux.</i> 608b

Table 1: Harmony, temperance and superstition in the *Moralia*; grouped according to concepts with positive and negative connotations in the texts. All concepts are cited as they appear in the texts of the LCL.

das the same as Timocleia's, when compared with due regard to the most important points of identity and influence.

This comes with the caveat that virtues are different in different people because of nature and custom, and it is on this basis also that Plutarch examines the virtues and vices of men and women in the *Lives*. In the following section, we'll consider the characterisation of five women based on the criteria from the *Moralia* (table 2). Two women are praised for their virtue without reservation. Cornelia was highly educated Roman nobility, the daughter of Scipio Africanus and mother of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus. Much like Cornelia, Octavia's reputation for virtue would become intimately entwined with the men in her life. She was also a Roman noblewoman, the sister of Octavian (who would later become Caesar Augustus) and wife to Mark Antony. The other three women also have something in common, as Blomqvist has observed²⁹. Aspasia was a *metoikos* and *hetaira* in Athens and the mistress of Pericles. Olympias was the zealous Macedonian queen, wife to Philip II and mother of

Alexander the Great. Cleopatra was an Egyptian ruler of Greek descent in the middle of one of the most infamous wars in Roman history. Not one of them was considered truly Greek or Roman³⁰.

Cornelia

Plutarch wastes no time telling his reader that Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, is σώφρων, the greatest testament to a woman's virtue. He praises her for loving her children (φιλότεκνον), being magnanimous (μεγαλόψυχον) and the exceptional education she gave Tiberius and Caius, which greatly contributed to their virtue (*TG* 1.4-5). As they got older, Plutarch suggests that Cornelia continued to guide the Gracchi in their political careers. Her reputation was so untarnished that Caius was able to use it against his enemies. One particularly harsh example is Caius' response to a man who was accused of pederasty: "all Rome knows that Cornelia refrained from being with men longer than you have, though you are a man" (*CG* 4.4). Cornelia was well-known for her virtue and temperance, and Plutarch says that she declined offers from other suitors to focus on raising her children.

²⁹ Blomqvist notes that Plutarch treats Aspasia, Olympias and Cleopatra as outsiders and barbarians, highlighting the aspects of their characters that were non-Greek; K. BLOMQVIST, 1997, p. 82.

³⁰ Nikolaidis suggests that Plutarch considers the Greek claim to virtue superior, and he highlights several character traits that are typically barbarian, including boldness, superstition, excessive grief, intemperance, licentiousness, jealousy and cowardice; A. G. NIKOLAIDIS, "Ελληνικός - βαρβαρικός: Plutarch on Greek and Barbarian Characteristics," *WS*, 99 (1986) 229-244.

After the death of Tiberius and Caius, Plutarch praises Cornelia for bearing her misfortunes in a noble and magnanimous spirit (εὐγενῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως; CG 19.3) and being pleasant to all her visitors. She made no change to her lifestyle, but continued to engage in literary and philosophical discussions. Her most admirable quality was speaking about her sons without grief or tears (CG 19.1-3). Plutarch has no bad words for Cornelia. While he does include snippets of what others said about her, he corrects them afterwards or frames the comments in such a light as to highlight her virtue.

Octavia

Octavia is similarly praised for her character. Like Cornelia, she doesn't appear too often in the narrative. Like Cornelia too, Plutarch ends his *Life* with her. Octavia's role is somewhat different, because she appears first and foremost in the context of the conjugal union, a major theme in the *Life of Antony*. In fact, Octavia was married to Antony to facilitate and preserve the peace between him and Augustus. The very first thing Plutarch tells us about her is that Augustus was incredibly fond of her and that she was "a wonder of a woman" (*Ant.* 31.2-3). Octavia is praised for her

beauty, intelligence and dignity (31.2), characteristics that should attract Antony and bring about peace. She did her job well (35.2-4), mediating between her brother and husband at certain points in the *Life* to avert war and even getting them to trade soldiers³¹. She also looked after Antony's children by his previous wife, Fulvia, while they were married (54.1-3).

After Antony abandoned her in favour of his mistress, Octavia remained devoted to him. She refused to leave his house until Antony himself sent orders that she do so and lobbied her brother for peace on behalf of her husband. Her reputation was so pure that she made Antony look even worse for treating her so cruelly (54.1-3), and she was loved by the people of Rome and Athens. After Antony's death, she took care of all his children, even those he had with Cleopatra, and married them into noble families who eventually became emperors of Rome (87.1-2; 87.4). Octavia played her part in the marital unit well, but there was always one thing in her way: Antony's love for Cleopatra.

Cleopatra

Plutarch has much to say about Cleopatra. He undoubtedly saw her as one of the great influences on the course of Antony's life, and he explicitly refers

³¹ Women's role as peacekeepers and mediators are central to Plutarch's conception of the relationship between the sexes; Octavia takes on this role in the *Antony* in opposition to Cleopatra. See also *Mulier. virt.* 246c, where the Celtic women arbitrate between factions. As a result of their fairness the women were consulted on political matters henceforth. Several other passages in this text highlight the importance of women's support; cf. e.g. 246f-247a, 249a, 254a-b.

to Antony's passion for Cleopatra as a "dire evil" (*Ant.* 36.1), which destroyed whatever good was left in him. When he introduces her to the narrative, the very first thing he says is that Antony's love for Cleopatra was the "crowning evil" of his life (25.1). Beneker argues that it is Antony's lack of self-control that ultimately caused his ruin³², and while this may be partly true, it is hard to deny that Plutarch places at least some of the blame on Cleopatra. When Antony abandons the Battle of Actium, Plutarch writes that he "hastened after the woman who had already ruined (ἀπολωλεκυῖαν) him, and would make his ruin still more complete (προσαπολοῦσαν)" (66.5). Despite such harsh words, Cleopatra is a complex character. Plutarch tells us that she was a good conversationalist and praises her δεινότητα and πανουργίαν (25.2). He could be referring to her 'subtlety' and 'cleverness' (as Perrin translates in the Loeb edition of the *Life of Antony*), but could also mean that she is 'shrewd' and 'forceful'. Only a few paragraphs later he describes her as unrestrained and bold,

so perhaps the ambiguity is intentional³³. He goes on to say that conversing with her was charming and that she knew many languages. Education was a sign of nobility and virtue³⁴, and thus one might be forgiven for expecting a largely positive portrait of an eloquent ruler.

However, Cleopatra is frequently in competition with Octavia. In addition to her linguistic prowess, she is κάλλος – either noble, beautiful, or both (27.2). Plutarch describes Octavia as κάλλος as well, but he makes a distinction between the two women. Unlike Octavia, he says Cleopatra's beauty was neither incomparable nor striking and that she was "haughty and astonishingly proud in the matter of beauty" (73.2)³⁵. If he had stopped there, we might be satisfied with a subtle comparison between Antony's wife and his mistress. Instead, Plutarch goes on to say that those Romans who had seen Cleopatra sympathised even more with Octavia, because they knew that she was inferior in both youth and beauty (57.3). This can hardly be more

³² J. BENEKER, "Sex, Eroticism, and Politics," in M. BECK (ed.) *A Companion to Plutarch*, Malden, 2014, p. 508.

³³ According to Plutarch, Cleopatra observed Antony's demeanour, which was that appropriate to a soldier, and adopted this manner towards him ἀνειμένως and κατατεθαρρηκότως (*Ant.* 27.1).

³⁴ Education is another common theme in ancient moral-philosophical works on women and the household. See for example Xen. *Oec.* 3.11; Muson. fr. 3, 40.18-33; Sen. *Helv.* 17.3 and *Marc.* 4.2 with a good deal of scepticism of women's ability to put their education to good use at *Helv.* 14.2 and *Marc.* 1.1.

³⁵ Cf. *Coniug. praec.* 141b-d, where Plutarch implies that noble birth and beauty is a great advantage to the virtuous woman.

than a bare-bones summation of opinions at best, while at worst it equates youth and beauty/nobility with virtue³⁶.

Cleopatra also falters in other areas. Plutarch says that she put her confidence in the “charms and sorceries” of her character (25.4). He uses μαγγανεύμασι και φίλτροις, which lends him some measure of ambiguity. We do find φίλτρον specifically in a negative context in *Conjugalia praecepta*, but here Plutarch says the magic lies in Cleopatra’s character. This recalls the anecdote in *Conjugalia praecepta* in which Olympias suspects an unnamed Thessalian woman who had caught Philip’s attention of witchcraft, but upon inspection instead exclaims that she has her magic charms in herself (141c; see below). Elsewhere, Plutarch straight-up accuses Cleopatra of witchcraft. In his view, she manipulated Antony through secret rites (53.4) and used “certain

drugs or witchcraft” (37.4) to render him incapable of rational action.

Her intemperance is also a recurring theme, and upon introduction Plutarch takes great care to describe her arrival to meet Antony. She travelled in luxurious extravagance, her barge covered in gold, silver and purple, accompanied by music. She herself was dressed like “Aphrodite in a painting” (26.1-2; cf. 26.4), while the smell of incense drifted over the water. It is impossible to cover everything Plutarch says about Cleopatra here. He calls her a flatterer surrounded by flatterers (*Ant.* 53.4-5), which is clearly not a good thing³⁷. He furthermore says that she was jealous of Octavia and actively tried to keep her and Antony apart³⁸, perhaps because she wanted the war to happen (56.2-3). He accuses her of cowardice, and of fleeing before the battle had been decided at Actium (63.5)³⁹. Her grieving

³⁶ Ramon Palerm & González Almenara argue that youth is secondary to social status. Pericles, however, weaponises age against the criticism of Elpinice, the sister of Cimon, essentially telling her she is too old to be meddling in politics (*Per.* 28.5). Plutarch seems well aware of the attractiveness of youth regardless of social status here as well as at *Demetr.* 26.4, where he says the prostitute Lamia was past her prime; V. M. RAMÓN PALERM & G. GONZÁLEZ ALMENARA, “Heteras, concubinas y jóvenes de seducción: la influencia femenina en las vidas plutarqueas de Solón, Pericles y Alcibiades”, in P. GÓMEZ CARDÓ, D. F. LEÃO, M. A. DE OLIVEIRA SILVA (eds.), *Plutarco entre mundos: visões de Esparta, Atenas e Roma*, Coimbra, 2014, p. 215.

³⁷ On that he wrote a whole treatise, *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*.

³⁸ Women in the *Mulier. virt.* tend to refuse the honours voted to them, as in the case of Aretaphila (see above) and Xenocrite (262d), while Cleopatra seeks out honours and new territories throughout the *Antony*, sometimes out of jealousy of Octavia (cf. 57.1).

³⁹ Compare the story of the Persian women at *Mulier. virt.* 246a-b. The men retreat to the city after a lost battle against the Medes, whereupon the women ridicule them for being cowardly by lifting their garments. Cleopatra, in taking the lead in flight, fails in her supportive role as Antony’s wife.

after Antony's death is long and violent; she beats her breasts and tears out her hair, smears his blood on her face and refuses to eat for a long time afterwards (77.2-3). Some have seen this as her redemption, her final act of devotion to Antony⁴⁰, but given Plutarch's views on grief in the *Moralia*, it's hard to argue that she's acting virtuously, and in committing suicide she leaves behind her children⁴¹. Even so Plutarch, through the mouth of Augustus, admires her nobility (86.4).

Olympias

Another noble woman who is neither Greek nor Roman plays a significant role in another *Life*. Olympias is in some ways similar to Cleopatra. Plutarch says Philip feared that his wife might be using spells and magic, and thus stopped sleeping with her as often as he used to (*Alex.* 2.4). Like all the women in those parts, Olympias was addicted to Bacchic rites

and superstitions, but Plutarch says she pursued them more zealously than anyone else (2.6)⁴². He highlights her foreignness with the words βαρβαρικώτερον and ὀμῶς, and later speculates that she used potions to harm Arrhidaeus, a contender to the Macedonian throne (77.5). She is also ill-tempered, jealous and sullen (9.4), and makes no attempt to keep the peace at court. In *Conjugalia praecepta*, Olympias is set up against an unknown Thessalian woman accused of using φάρμακα to garner the affections of Philip. The woman proves herself so virtuous that Olympias exclaims, "Away with these slanders! You have your magic charms in yourself" (141c). Olympias thus believes her character is so virtuous that she does not need to use spells or potions. At first glance this might seem to be a positive depiction of Olympias⁴³, but according to Plutarch she tried to "get the woman into her power", which is in keeping with the

⁴⁰ Stadter sees Cleopatra's role after the defeat at Actium as wholly changed. In this stage of their lives he sees her as a loyal partner and affectionate lover to Antony, and thus as a woman who has finally "assumed her proper role"; P. A. STADTER, 1999, p. 181; P. A. STADTER, "'Subject to the Erotic': Male Sexual Behaviour in Plutarch", in D. C. INNES, H. HINE & C. B. R. PELLING (eds.), *Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday*, Oxford, 1995, 221-236, esp. 235-236.

⁴¹ Cf. the tale about the women of Miletus at *Mulier. virt.* 249c-d (discussed above); see also *Apophth. Lac.* 242c. In his own life, Plutarch took pride in the fact that Timoxena raised their children herself (*Cons. ad ux.* 608c, 609e). Plutarch also relates the story of Stratonice, who was childless and arranged for her husband to have children by another woman, who she then raised as her own (*Mulier. virt.* 258d). These anecdotes emphasise women's role as child-bearers and caretakers.

⁴² Nikolaidis notes that her excessive superstition characterizes Olympias as barbarian; NIKOLAIDIS, 1986, p. 235.

⁴³ This is Carney's view; E. CARNEY, *Olympias: Mother of Alexander the Great*, New York, 2006, p. 134.

depiction of her character in the *Alex.* as a jealous woman who would do anything to ensure the throne for her son.

Plutarch also tells us that the paternity of Alexander was under question, but neither confirms nor denies it, implying that Olympias may have been the partner of some “superior being” (τὴν ὁμλίαν ὡς κρείττονι συνούσης; *Alex.* 2.2-2.6). Lack of temperance is a severe judgement against the character of women and as such it is difficult to gain a reputation for virtue alongside sexual experience or promiscuity⁴⁴. Caesar famously divorced Pompeia purely on the grounds of suspicion, refusing to remain married to a woman whose virtue was under question (*Caes.* 11.6). Pompeia, it was said, used the festival of the Bona Dea as a cover to consort with her lover. Naturally, these rituals were also said to have had an Orphic element (*Caes.* 9.1-10.2).

Aspasia

As far as chastity goes, no other woman of the five we treat here is more well-known for her sexuality than Aspasia. Plutarch compares her to the Ionian courtesan Thargelia, who was a great beauty and quite intelligent, or perhaps shrewd (again

δεινότητος; *Per.* 24.2). Thargelia used her influence with powerful men to “sow the seeds of Persian sympathy” in Greek cities (25.3). Aspasia apparently emulated Thargelia, and so Pericles admired her for her “rare political wisdom” (24.3), as apparently did Socrates (24.5). Despite her reputation for being intelligent, she was also well-known for being the mistress of a house of young courtesans. A reputation is no bad thing for a woman, as long as that reputation is based on her virtue (*Coniug. praec.* 142d). Plutarch admires Aspasia, like Aretaphila, for her wisdom and political acumen (cf. *Mulier. virt.* 255e). Aretaphila, however, only involves herself in politics to free the people of Cyrene and then retires (*Mulier. virt.* 257e), while Plutarch introduces Aspasia as a courtesan and instigator of the Samian war.

By comparing Aspasia to Thargelia, Plutarch very unsubtly insinuates that she was sexually (and therefore probably also generally) deviant, and he implies that she and Pericles did not share equal affection for one another. Beneker argues that the couple shared genuine love for each other based on intellectual rather than erotic attraction⁴⁵. Plutarch says that Pericles

⁴⁴ See *Mulier. virt.* 258e-f, in which a Roman soldier rapes a Galatian woman, who eventually has his head for the deed. The woman, Chiomara, delivers the head to her husband with the words, “it is a noble[r] thing that only one man be alive who has been intimate with me.”

⁴⁵ Beneker draws on the *Amatorius*, but not *Coniugalia praecepta*, to inform his reading of the relationship, arguing that Plutarch “arrang[ed] his material so that her loving companionship with Pericles is solidly established before her questionable lifestyle is brought to the foreground.” Plutarch compares Aspasia to Thargelia before turning to her relationship with Pericles, so it is rather likely that the notion of the influential courtesan is of some concern to Plutarch here; J. BENEKER, “Eros and Intellect: Plutarch’s Portrait of Aspasia and Pericles,” in NIETO IBÁÑEZ

appears to have been genuinely in love with Aspasia, while she continued to entertain men and took a lowly sheep-dealer as a lover after Pericles' death (24.4)⁴⁶. The shamefulness of the relationship is highlighted by the comedies Plutarch quotes, in which he says she was styled as Omphale, Deianira and Hera (24.6). Pericles apparently went to war against the Samians to please Aspasia (24.1), echoing Plutarch's sentiments about Cleopatra, that other intemperate woman, who inflamed the war between Antony and Augustus⁴⁷. In his introduction to Aspasia, Plutarch says it's worth wondering what kind of art or power this woman had to influence so many statesmen. The implication is clear: sexually liberated women are dangerous⁴⁸.

Conclusion

The *Moralia* makes it clear that meddling in men's affairs is forbidden for women, who must at all times try and keep the peace. In the table below there is a notable distinction between the two Roman and three non-Roman women. As they become further removed from axes of power (class, ethnicity, geopolitical location), their characterization seems to change. Plutarch highlights different aspects of their characters; here there is a particular focus on the sexuality of the latter three women. Olympias is superstitious and perhaps even the illicit lover of some god. Aspasia is sexually deviant, a prostitute. Cleopatra, by far the most complex of these characters, is a beautiful and intemperate seductress (see table 2).

& LÓPEZ LÓPEZ (eds.), *El amor en Plutarco*, p. 252. The *hetaira* is a literary character with significant power and influence exercised primarily through seduction; on this cf. V. M. RAMÓN PALERM & G. GONZÁLEZ ALMENARA, "Heteras, concubinas y jóvenes de seducción: la influencia femenina en las vidas plutarqueas de Solón, Pericles y Alcibiades", in P. GÓMEZ CARDÓ, D. F. LEÃO & M. A. DE OLIVEIRA SILVA (eds.), *Plutarco entre mundos: visões de Esparta, Atenas e Roma*, Coimbra, 2014, p. 210. Aspasia, however, is styled as a *παλλακή* and *πόρνη* in the comedies Plutarch quotes at *Per.* 24.6, though he never directly calls her a courtesan or prostitute. Durán Mañas points out that Plutarch chose the material he presented in his biographies in line with his own views; M. DURÁN MAÑAS, "Las mujeres en la *Vida de Pericles*", in L. VAN DER STOCKT, F. TITCHENER, H. G. INGENKAMP & A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ (eds.), *Gods, Daimones, Rituals, Myths and History of Religions in Plutarch's Works*. Studies devoted to Professor Frederick E. Brenk by The International Plutarch Society, Málaga-Logan, 2010, p. 159.

⁴⁶ The sheep-dealer was "a man of low birth and nature" (*ἀγεννοῦς καὶ ταπεινοῦ τὴν φύσιν*) who gained some influence in Athens through his relationship with Aspasia (*Per.* 24.4).

⁴⁷ Plutarch also blames the war in Egypt partly on Caesar's love for Cleopatra (*Caes.* 48.2). Beneker disagrees, arguing that Plutarch withholds judgment and depicts Caesar as self-controlled and unaffected by the power of *erōs*; J. BENEKER, 2011, p. 507; cf. K. BLOMQUIST, 1977, p. 77.

⁴⁸ Several times in *Mulier. virt.* women use their bodies and their sexuality as lethal traps for men who cannot control their passions; see e.g. the story of Eryxo at 261a-b.

Who?	Positive	Negative	Virtue/vice
Cornelia	σώφρονα , φιλότεκνον, μεγαλόψυχον (TG 1.5); εὐγενῶς, μεγαλόψυχως (TG 19.1); ἡδίστη, (θαυμασιωτά- τη) ἀπενθής, ἀδάκρυτος (TG 19.2); εὖφυντας, καλῶς, ἀρετῆς (TG 19.3)		<i>Virtue</i> (agreeable, temperate, magnanimous, noble, grief, intelligent)
Octavia	χρήμα θαυμαστόν... γυναικὸς (Ant. 31.1); κάλλει, σεμνότητα , νοῦν (Ant. 31.2); σεμνότητι , ἡδονὴν ὀμιλεῖν, θεραπεύειν (Ant. 53.3); καλῶς, μεγαλοπρεπῶς (Ant. 54.2)		<i>Virtue</i> (beauty, reserve, dignity, intelligence, devotion, harmony)
Cleopatra	[δεινότητα, πανουργίαν] (Ant. 25.2); [μαγγάνευμασι και φίλτροις] (Ant. 25.4); κάλλος (Ant. 26.2); εὐγένειαν (Ant. 86.4)	τελευταῖον κακὸν, ἡ δεινὴ συμφορά (Ant. 25.1, 36.1); [δεινότητα, πανουργίαν] (Ant. 25.2); χρήματα, κόσμον , [μαγ- γάνευμασι και φίλτροις] (Ant. 25.4); ἐμπράττετο, φαρμάκων τινῶν ἢ γοητείας (Ant. 53.4, 37.4); χρυσόπρυμνος , ἄλουργός, ἀργυραῖς, κεκοσμημένην βασιλικῶς (Ant. 26.1); κολακεῖαν (Ant. 29.1); ζηλοτυποῦσα (Ant. 62.1); λύπης (Ant. 82.1); λαμυρᾶς (Caes. 49.2)	<i>Virtue</i> (beauty (avg.), nobility, intelligence) <i>Vice</i> (Intemperance, flattery, jealousy, grief, sexuali- ty, sowing discord, ma- gic and superstition)
Olympias	[τὴν ὀμιλίαν ὡς κρεῖττονι συνούσης] (Alex. 2.2)	μαγείας, φάρμακα (Alex. 2.4); Ὀρφικοῖς, Διόνυσον ὀρ- γιασμοῖς , ζηλώσασα, βαρ- βαρικώτερον (Alex. 2.5); φαρμάκοις (Alex. 77.5); ὑποχείριον, ὡμῶς (Alex. 10.4), [τὴν ὀμιλίαν ὡς κρεῖττονι συνούσης] (Alex. 2.2)	<i>Vice</i> (superstition, disagreeable, sowing discord, sexuality)
Aspasia	σοφὴν ... πολιτικὴν (Per. 24.3)	ζηλώσασαν (Per. 24.2); οὐ κόσμιον προεστῶσαν ἐργασίας οὐδε σεμνῆς (Per. 24.3); παλλακὴν (Per. 24.6); πόρνης (Per. 24.6)	<i>Virtue</i> (intelligence) <i>Vice</i> (sexuality)

Table 2: Some concepts used to describe, or in relation to, each of these women in the relevant *Lives*. Overlap in terminology between the *Moralia* and *Lives* indicated in bold (cf. table 1).

There are significant connections between the descriptive language of the *Moralia* and that of the *Lives*. Further study might reveal much deeper ties than this paper can address. Plutarch's women are complex, but on balance, a picture of moral judgement emerges (though it is very often not black-and-white). It is also very likely that certain factors influence Plutarch's depiction of women in the *Lives*, including ethnicity, class and sexual status. What is not clear is whether or not Plutarch does so intentionally or subconsciously. I suspect, however, that most Plutarch scholars nowadays would argue that he chose his words with care. And what then, if these women were secondary and he chose his words haphazardly?

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BOOK REVIEWS

PAOLO DESIDERI, *Saggi su Plutarco e la sua fortuna*. Edited by Angelo Casanova. Studi e Testi di Scienze dell'Antichità, 29. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2012., 406 pp. Print edition: €29.90; ISBN 978-88-6655-178-2. Online PDF: €19.90, available at <http://digital.casalini.it/9788866551799>. [ISBN 978-88-6655-179-9].

Para homenagear Paolo Desideri, pelos seus setenta anos, e como forma de reconhecer o trabalho de investigação de um dos mais conhecidos filólogos italianos, decidiu, em boa hora, o Conselho do Departamento de Ciências da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e do Renascimento e Linguística, da Universidade de Estudos de Florença, reunir uma selecção de estudos (vinte e um no total) da sua autoria. Foi Angelo Casanova responsável pela edição deste volume, que não se limitou a uma simples colação de estudos, mas que revela um criterioso processo de selecção dos estudos, uma notável uniformização das normas de publicação, além da recolha, no final, de uma exaustiva bibliografia e de dois índices, um de nomes e outro de passos citados. Os vinte e um estudos não estão dispostos por ordem cronológica, mas por cinco partes temáticas: 'Il Contesto Culturale', 'La Politica', 'La Storia', 'Plutarco nella Cultura Europea' e 'Tra Passato e Futuro'.

Os estudos que integram a Primeira Parte abordam diversas temáticas culturais. Uma das mais relevantes é a reflexão sobre a complexa relação cultural entre a Grécia e

Roma. Relembra o A. a noção de *humanitas* de Cícero, valor que não está reservado para os Romanos por direito genético, mas que se pode estender a outros povos. De facto, embora valorize o património cultural romano, Cícero defendeu a cultura grega em Roma. Dionísio de Halicarnasso (cf. 1.61-2), por sua vez, desenvolveu a hipótese de os Romanos descenderem dos Gregos. Para Plutarco (cf. 824C), a Grécia é a base da estrutura, sobre a qual se misturam os valores, na perspectiva do A., que realça o facto de a atitude de Plutarco em relação ao poder romano ser semelhante à de Arriano, Apiano e Cássio Dión. Para o estudo da identidade grega, o A. remete ainda para o *Panegírico* de Isócrates e, no período do Império Romano, para a obra *A Roma* de Élio Aristides, um discurso muito importante para se entender o processo identitário. Nesse sentido, defende a ideia da proximidade cultural e mesmo da 'integração funcional' entre a cultura romana e a grega, facto que foi decisivo para a formação da Europa e que é o resultado de dois fenómenos convergentes: reconhecimento dos Romanos da superioridade da cultura grega, sem que eles renunciem à sua identidade; reconhecimento dos Gregos da superioridade dos Romanos no campo da organização política e a aceitação da estrutura política criada, que permitiu a continuação do funcionamento da antiga célula da política grega, a *polis*, enquanto espaço aberto e cosmopolita em constante reconfiguração. Ainda no âmbito desta reflexão sobre os dois povos, o A. recorda o

argumento de Eratóstenes, segundo o qual os homens se distinguem pelo seu valor e capacidade de se organizarem, ideia presente em Estrabão e, de alguma forma, também em Políbio, que considerava ser digna de elogio a ordem política romana. Na verdade, como Estrabão (9.2.2) enfatizou, quando se combate um povo culto apenas o uso da força não é suficiente, concepção que Plutarco também desenvolve nas biografias e nos tratados, por meio da apologia do *consortium imperii*, ou seja, o equilíbrio entre o domínio romano e a liberdade grega. Um outro tema interessante que o A. desenvolveu no seu trabalho filológico foi a forma como os intelectuais gregos do Império se empenharam na actividade política. Além de Plutarco, realça-se o papel de Díon de Prusa e da sua oratória para a mobilização da opinião pública, no contexto da Segunda Sofística. De facto, Díon faz um apelo aos valores universais, mas ao mesmo tempo apresenta-os como pertencentes ao mundo helénico, quase como seu património genético, no interior do mundo romano. Logo, parece ser uma tentativa de recriação da ‘identidade cultural helénica’, que não se contrapõe à cultura romana porque Díon pouco nos diz sobre esta última. Na verdade, tanto Díon quanto Plutarco reivindicam para os Gregos o primado da realização cultural.

Na Segunda Parte, dedicada ao tema da ‘Política’, os cinco trabalhos que integram esta parte abordam várias perspectivas. Desde logo, a actividade política das *poleis* durante o Império, nomeadamente os mecanismos legislativos e de controlo ou o nível de autonomia. No entanto, segundo o A., Plutarco pouco se refere aos problemas sociais das *poleis*, pois o seu objectivo é transmitir uma mensagem de concórdia e de valorização do papel do *politikos* (aprendizagem, exercício e transmissão do saber). Dois exemplos estudados pelo A. são os de Licurgo e Alexan-

dre, que desenvolveram a sua actividade em circunstâncias distintas, representando, também por isso, modelos diferentes.

Nos estudos agrupados na Terceira Parte, o A. retoma, entre outros, o tema dos limites entre o género biográfico e o historiográfico. Para Plutarco (cf. 596D-E), o elemento de maior interesse na história é o conhecimento dos pormenores da acção, das motivações, do papel da virtude e da fortuna. Mais do que o resultado da acção, marcado pela incerteza da fortuna, interessa perscrutar o carácter dos intervenientes. Por isso, o A. define Plutarco como “uno dei più affascinanti e partecipi storici dell’antichità” (p. 197). Quanto à actividade historiográfica, considera-se que a pesquisa histórica é o reino da liberdade, enquanto a vida corrente é o reino da necessidade; além disso, entende-se o valor da história enquanto livre reconstrução do passado (“sta appunto nel fatto di consentire l’evasione dal negativo del presente, e soprattutto di dare la possibilità di rendersi conto, come dall’esterno, di questo stesso negativo” (p. 202). A opção pelo registo biográfico justifica-se por ser o melhor modo de se fazer história (“perche fare storia significava ritrovare la ragioni e il gusto dell’azione” (p. 218)), enfatizando o A. a construção de modelos éticos. Na sua reflexão sobre a questão do género literário, entende o A. que “non si tratta dunque di sostituire alla ‘totalità’ storica una “selezione” biográfica, ma di costruire una diversa totalità” (pp. 222-3), realçando a exigência histórica da biografia e o seu valor didáctico. Em resumo, define a biografia de Plutarco como um “complesso sistema di pensiero” (p. 226).

Os quatro estudos da Quarta Parte dedicam-se ao tema da recepção da obra de Plutarco, reflectindo-se sobre vários assuntos relacionados com a transmissão (edições, traduções, comentários, entre outros), de forma a comprovar o valor do

pensamento plutarquiano na cultura europeia. Desde logo, a forma como Maquiavel, para quem Plutarco era um “gravissimo scrittore” (*Discorsi*, II), aproveita os preceitos políticos, adaptando-os a um novo contexto. É também a matéria política que o A. estuda na obra de Jean Bodin, não só de Plutarco, mas também de Dionísio de Halicarnasso, Políbio e Tácito. Para Bodin, Plutarco é, sem dúvida, uma fonte histórica essencial para a reconstrução das formas de comunidade humana mais antigas, anteriores à institucionalização do Estado, em particular a figura de Licurgo e a constituição espartana, além da acção política de Alexandre. Por fim, o A. dedica um estudo à valorização que Centofanti faz da obra de Plutarco, enquanto meio privilegiado para se indagar o valor que pode ser atribuído ao Cristianismo como ponto de referência para uma identidade nacional e também a necessidade de superar o confronto intercidadino e interétnico. Note-se como para o A. as biografias revelam uma profunda concepção da dignidade e do valor da identidade cultural romana, a que os Romanos podem aspirar, mas se houver um esforço de integração e sem que haja movimentos de apropriação. A grande dúvida, tão actual, é como se podem conciliar princípios universais (religiosos ou outros) com valores nacionais.

Na Quinta Parte, a menos extensa por incluir apenas um estudo, o A. volta a valorizar a leitura histórica dos diálogos délficos, por considerar que denotam os princípios inspiradores da actividade historiográfica de Plutarco, dando o exemplo da reorganização do Santuário de Apolo.

Estamos na presença de um volume que reúne, sem dúvida, estudos que revelam um conhecimento filológico e cultural muito profundo da obra de Plutarco e do contexto histórico e social da sua época. É também digno de nota o facto de não haver a tendência

para isolar o texto plutarquiano, mas de o colocar em diálogo com vários autores, como Políbio, Dionísio de Halicarnasso, Tácito ou Dión de Prusa, entre outros. Tendo noção clara do complexo contexto cultural e procurando reabilitar o valor histórico da obra de Plutarco, Paolo Desideri coloca vários *problemata* que continuam a merecer reflexão intensa por parte dos estudiosos.

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LAUTARO ROIG LANZILLOTA (ed.), *Frederick E. Brenk on Plutarch, Religious Thinker and Biographer: “The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia” and “The Life of Mark Anthony”* (Brill’s Plutarch Studies, 1), Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2017, 344 pp. [ISBN 978-90-0434876-9].

Bajo la cuidada edición de L. Roig Lanzillota, un nuevo volumen publicado en 2017 recoge conjuntamente dos artículos de la extensión de un libro del profesor F. E. Brenk (los dos únicos artículos «book length» del estudioso norteamericano, en palabras del editor). Ambos publicados originalmente en la colección *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* (ANRW) bajo la dirección de W. Haase respectivamente en 1987 y 1992, el primero llevaba originalmente por título «An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia» (II.36.1, pp. 248-349) y el segundo «Plutarch’s Life ‘Markos Antonios’: A Literary and Cultural Study» (II.33.6, pp. 4347-4469 [*Indices*, pp. 4895-4915]).

Lo cierto es que la elección de publicar conjuntamente estos dos estudios de Brenk no se debe solamente a la longitud de ambos trabajos, sino también a la voluntad de agrupar en un solo volumen las dos principales facetas de Plutarco, la de pensador religioso en los *Moralia* y la de biógrafo en las *Vidas*, en una aproximación in-

tegral al corpus plutarqueo. Como veremos al analizar detenidamente ambos trabajos, la motivación que mueve a Plutarco en cada una de las vertientes de su producción y que permite comprenderlas como un todo unitario, es más bien de naturaleza filosófica. Por otra parte, la publicación de este libro destaca la figura de un estudioso de la talla de Brenk, cuya principal virtud es su admirable capacidad de síntesis de la erudición anterior que le permite llevar la investigación un paso más allá partiendo siempre de una perspectiva multidisciplinar.

El contenido del libro es el que consta a continuación. En primer lugar, nos encontramos con una introducción debida a L. Roig Lanzillota y a D. F. Leão (pp. 1-4), los cuales son conjuntamente los responsables de esta serie de la editorial Brill dedicada a los estudios plutarqueos. Esta introducción sirve como justificación a la reedición y reunión de los dos trabajos de Brenk en un solo volumen y también destaca y analiza la importancia y sentido de cada uno de los estudios individualmente. Sigue a continuación la reproducción de los artículos propiamente dichos: «The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironeia» (pp. 5-129) y «The Life of Mark Anthony: A Literary and Cultural Study» (pp. 131-266). El siguiente apartado es el que corresponde a la bibliografía (pp. 267-312) que, como puede observarse por el número de páginas, presenta un volumen ciertamente notable. En este sentido, hay que tener en cuenta que a la ya muy nutrida selección que ofrecía Brenk en sus artículos se suma aquí la actualización bibliográfica que aporta el editor para suplir ese vacío que suponen las tres décadas que median entre los originales y su reedición en este volumen, años sin duda fecundos para los estudios plutarqueos. Además de su inclusión en este apartado final, la nueva bibliografía se aduce también (diferenciándola de la

original) en las abundantes referencias que sustentan ambos estudios, conforme a la aludida capacidad de Brenk para asumir y resumir las consecuencias de la investigación precedente. Al final de la publicación aparecen los índices, entre los que constan un índice de autores y textos citados (pp. 313-327), un índice de personajes históricos (pp. 328-331) y, por último, un índice de materias (pp. 332-344).

De la cuestión bibliográfica se deduce un posible defecto del libro que tenemos entre manos, y es su obvia desactualización, porque a pesar del meritorio parche editorial de la actualización bibliográfica, el texto de Brenk ha quedado, como no podía ser de otra manera, intacto. Ni está prevista la obsolescencia en las Humanidades ni es ese el valor de esta publicación, sino que su principal adquisición es la de situar la obra del estudioso norteamericano como clave de bóveda indispensable en los estudios plutarqueos, de tal manera que ningún especialista en Plutarco pueda prescindir de lo que a continuación pasamos a valorar, esto es, el contenido de cada uno de los dos trabajos de Brenk recogidos en el volumen. El primero de ellos, tal y como reza su título, se ciñe a la exposición de los aspectos religiosos presentes en la obra de Plutarco. No obstante, hay que tener en cuenta que, conforme a la vocación enciclopédica de la ANRW, este estudio se publicó originalmente en el tomo relativo a la filosofía durante el Principado (se trata del tomo II.36, que lleva por nombre *Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik*) y, particularmente, en el primer volumen, que aborda la introducción histórica a la materia y la cuestión del platonismo (*Historische Einleitung; Platonismus*). De hecho, en el prefacio a dicho volumen, el editor califica el estudio de Brenk como *Philosophiegeschichtliche*. Y es que, en la obra plutarquea los problemas religiosos son un pretexto para tratar aspectos filo-

sóficos o, por mejor decir, las cuestiones religiosas y las cuestiones filosóficas están indisolublemente ligadas.

Si bien en la introducción Roig Lanzillota afirma que el estudio dedicado al pensamiento religioso de Plutarco se refiere fundamentalmente («mainly») a los *Moralia*, lo cierto es que, descontando la introducción y un primer capítulo dedicado a la biografía del queronense (pp. 7-16), si bien en una primera parte el autor se dedica a dicha sección del corpus plutarqueo (pp. 17-80), una segunda parte está dedicada al pensamiento religioso que subyace a las *Vidas* (pp. 81-129). El artículo se abre con una introducción a la cuestión religiosa en Plutarco. En efecto, el trascendentalismo y el teísmo de este autor responden a una doble vía: a una evolución de los elementos divinos del platonismo que se suman a lo que suponía la experiencia de lo sobrenatural en la cultura griega. En este sentido, en Plutarco la idea de divinidad providencial a la que estaba abocado el politeísmo griego confluye con las nociones platónicas del demiurgo y el Uno. Así pues, Plutarco se incluye en la tendencia típica de su época, por la que el immanentismo propio de la primera filosofía helenística deja paso al trascendentalismo de la filosofía helenístico-imperial. Prosigue Brenk con un apartado también de tipo preliminar acerca de la vida del queronense. Lo más significativo aquí son los problemas y las incógnitas que plantea la trayectoria vital de Plutarco, sobre todo en lo relativo a su formación, a su círculo intelectual y a su producción. En cuanto al primer aspecto, si bien sabemos que el maestro de Plutarco se llamó Amonio y que se formó en la Academia, Brenk se pregunta acerca de las características y circunstancias de la Academia en esta época y pone en tela de juicio su misma existencia. En segundo lugar, es claro que Plutarco perteneció a un mundo

a la vez griego y romano, pero son muchas las lagunas que existen acerca de su relación concreta con Roma y del carácter de los viajes que realizó a la urbe. El último problema que se relaciona con la biografía de Plutarco es el de la cronología de sus obras, en torno a la cual la incertidumbre es causante de graves problemas de interpretación.

Después de estos apartados preliminares pasa Brenk a valorar la posible evolución en las ideas religiosas de Plutarco teniendo en cuenta que la erudición decimonónica estimó que entre sus obras se daba un desarrollo desde posiciones escépticas hasta las de un pensador religioso. A esta postura opone Brenk la condición neopitagórica (y, por lo tanto, trascendentalista) de Plutarco desde sus orígenes y lo incluye en una corriente contemporánea de renacimiento del platonismo y del pitagorismo y confusión de ambos, dando lugar a un tipo de platonismo pitagórico que identificaba al Dios supremo con las Ideas de Platón. En este sentido, basándose en la obra de Dörrie, Brenk posiciona a Plutarco como un innovador que superó la esterilidad de la Academia tardía haciendo de Dios el *télos* del alma y considerando de esta manera a la filosofía como *magistra vitae*.

Esta idea es fundamental para valorar el siguiente apartado del artículo de Brenk, que examina la idea de Dios de Plutarco a la luz del Platonismo Medio del que formó parte. El estudioso parte de la base de la falta de sistematicidad de Platón a la hora de organizar los elementos divinos de su obra. Entre estos se encuentran las Ideas, pero también las nociones de *kósmos*, *noûs* o *lógos*. En términos generales puede decirse que la divinidad es en Platón un poder universal de autoorganización del cosmos. Plutarco asume los diversos elementos que se relacionan con lo divino en la obra de Platón y los reconfigura de acuerdo con las polémicas de su propia época. En primer

lugar, comparece en la obra plutarquea una revisión de la idea de creación en el *Timeo*, entendiéndola como temporal, con origen (y quizás con final) en un instante determinado. Se opone en esto a otros platonistas de su época, entre los que Brenk trae a colación a Filón, para quien la creación era eterna. Asume aquí el estudioso que lo que afecta al alejandrino es una distorsión aristotélica del pensamiento platónico, si bien, desde mi punto de vista, el judaísmo del autor debió de ejercer una notable influencia en esta idea. Precisamente se opone Brenk a otros estudiosos, tales como Dörrie y de Vogel, al afirmar que Plutarco cree en una divinidad trascendental pero no personal al modo judío alejandrino. Por otro lado, la *eulábeia* socrática de Plutarco hace que su idea de la divinidad sea compatible tanto con el platonismo como con el estoicismo y, de hecho, la influencia de Posidonio es notable.

El siguiente capítulo, dedicado a la demonología, es también de enjundia en el pensamiento religioso de Plutarco. No obstante, este no es un demonologista y es en general hostil a los demonios malvados del folklore, de tal manera que su teoría está más bien incluida en la antropología platónica, entendiendo a los demonios como almas sin cuerpo en un marco teórico escatológico. Explicaciones demonológicas de esta naturaleza aparecen tanto en el *De defectu* como en el *De Iside*. No obstante, la *eulábeia* filosófica de Plutarco en estos tratados no le impide usar a los monstruos fabulosos del folklore en las *Vidas*, donde el recurso a motivos dramáticos de origen popular parece justificado. No obstante, este uso no es sino anecdótico respecto al tratado que para Brenk condensa el pensamiento demonológico de Plutarco, el *De genio*. En este punto el estudioso sigue a Babut, cuya integración de las distintas partes demonológicas del *De genio* como piezas armonizadas en torno a un discurso moral

demuestra que la demonología plutarquea funciona como explicación de la paulatina purificación del alma hacia la *theiotes*. Por último, ve Brenk una evolución de las ideas plutarqueas sobre los demonios a lo largo de su trayectoria, desde el *De defectu* hasta el *De sera*, según la cual los demonios, que son las almas humanas, oscilan desde la noción de reencarnación hasta la de destino eterno.

Comparece a continuación un capítulo dedicado específicamente al tratado *De Iside et Osiride*, que sirve a Brenk como piedra de toque de las nociones de sincretismo y alegoría en la obra de Plutarco. Dos hechos son aquí especialmente remarcables. El primero de ellos es el uso plutarqueo de la progresión desde las interpretaciones más bizarras hasta la de tipo más intelectual. Así pues, en el tratado sobre estas divinidades egipcias se da una dinámica interpretativa ascendente, partiendo de una explicación evemerística, siguiendo con una de tipo demonológico (que mezcla sincréticamente lo griego con lo persa) y acabando con la explicación platónica que presumiblemente suscribe Plutarco. Se deduce de aquí una opinión que ha llegado a ser general en los estudios plutarqueos, que de las múltiples interpretaciones que el queronense ofrece en sus tratados, la última es la del propio autor. Sin embargo, es preciso decir aquí que esta afirmación cuenta con notables excepciones (*De genio Socratico*, e. g.). El segundo gran hecho que se deduce del tratado de Plutarco según el estudio de Brenk es el desprecio del autor por la religión más allá de las fuentes literarias y de la interpretación filosófica. En este sentido se acerca Plutarco a Filón, a Juan o a grupos gnósticos para quienes la aproximación al material religioso se da a través del tamiz de la filosofía griega. A Plutarco, como al Lucio del *Asno de Oro* de Apuleyo, no le interesa el isismo contemporáneo sino como alegoría platónica, porque para él la única

aproximación adecuada a lo divino es la del Platonismo Medio. Cierran esta sección del estudio dedicada a la religión en los *Moralia* unas breves notas acerca de la relación de Plutarco con el estoicismo: Brenk decide que Plutarco es en términos generales ajeno al sistema estoico, que utiliza si acaso como contrapunto a las ideas que expresa.

El resto del estudio sobre los aspectos religiosos de la obra de Plutarco está ya exclusivamente dedicado a las *Vidas*. Como no podía ser de otra manera en trabajos de un tenor tan filológico como los que se presentan en este volumen, las afirmaciones de carácter general se sustentan profusamente en el análisis detenido de los pasajes relevantes en cada caso. Esto, que en general es el modo adecuado de proceder en filología, tiene el riesgo, en el que a veces cae Brenk, de perderse en lo particular y errar en la deducción de consecuencias generales (como también le ocurre a menudo, por otra parte, al propio Plutarco). Abre esta sección un capítulo sobre dos nociones divinas (o divinizadas) capitales en las biografías de Plutarco: *Daímon* y *Týche*. Estas son tratadas de manera diversa en cada una de las dos secciones del corpus plutarqueo, porque mientras la primera tiene en los *Moralia* el significado trascendente de «divinidad» o «espíritu» y en las *Vidas* comparece más bien el de «destino», en el caso de *Týche*, en la sección biográfica adquiere unas connotaciones divinas de las que carece en el resto de la producción plutarquea. Para tratar acerca de estas cuestiones parte Brenk de los estudios de Walbank sobre la noción de *Týche* en Polibio, noción que heredaría Plutarco según su mezcla de asunción de la ideología de sus fuentes y la del contexto contemporáneo. De esta manera, *Týche* se convierte en las *Vidas* de Plutarco en la Providencia que guía a sus héroes hacia el destino que está dispuesto para ellos, igual que en Polibio

era la fuerza que explicaba el imparable ascenso del Imperio de Roma. No obstante, a veces en Plutarco la *Týche* es esa fuerza y a veces es el azar subordinado a ella. A través del ejemplo concreto del *Bruto*, concluye Brenk que la relación de *Týche* y *Daímon* tiene que ver con una orientación escatológica de las *Vidas* de Plutarco, que de esta manera se convierten en ejemplos prácticos del destino de las almas.

Siguen a continuación dos capítulos más bien breves que tratan de la función en las *Vidas* de prodigios y portentos, por una parte, y de los sueños, por la otra. En cuanto a lo teratológico, destaca Brenk la moderación de Plutarco respecto a otros autores en el uso de prodigios y su subordinación a la caracterización de la psicología de los personajes en momentos críticos. En cuanto a los sueños, se destaca de igual manera su motivación psicológica, a menudo en relación con la ansiedad y, en este sentido, Brenk pone como ejemplo la escena de la vida de César en la que el héroe sueña que se acuesta con su madre antes de cruzar el Rubicón (*César*, 32), lo cual denota el sentimiento de transgresión y la infructuosidad final de su audacia. Otro breve capítulo contiene algunos apuntes acerca de la noción de retribución divina en las *Vidas* de Plutarco, tema que está por todas partes en estas biografías, de acuerdo con el pretendido sentido escatológico que Brenk les atribuye.

Pone el foco a continuación el estudioso en la inclusión del oráculo delfico en las *Vidas*, que se relaciona como es obvio con la condición de Plutarco de sacerdote de Delfos. Contesta Brenk a una supuesta manipulación de los hechos por parte del autor para incluir Delfos donde no estuvo presente, según defiende Fontenrose, y sigue más bien a Citti, para quien la dimensión sacral de los oráculos tiene que ver con la *areté* del hombre devoto que le permite seguir el designio divino, por lo que la inclusión

de Delfos tiene, una vez más, un sentido escatológico (además de propagandístico, claro). Cierra el artículo y esta primera parte de la monografía que examinamos un capítulo que gira en torno a las tres *Vidas* mitológicas que se conservan de Plutarco (*Teseo*, *Rómulo* y *Numa*) y que contiene algunos apuntes sobre el conocimiento y la utilización plutarquea de la religión romana. La conclusión del artículo permite a Brenk calificar la religión de Plutarco como platonizante, filantrópica y optimista.

El segundo de los artículos que recoge el volumen que analizamos está dedicado a la *Vida de Antonio* según hemos anunciado previamente. Contextualizándolo en su publicación original en la ANRW, aparece en el tomo dedicado a la lengua y la literatura en el Principado (II.36), concretamente en el último de los volúmenes dedicados a la literatura y los autores que florecieron en época de Trajano y los primeros tiempos de Adriano (6), volumen que, en la práctica, está consagrado exclusivamente a Plutarco. Así pues, el estudio de Brenk es de un tipo estrictamente literario y su inclusión en este volumen sirve a la verificación de los rasgos que Plutarco presenta como biógrafo, si bien adelantamos que los aspectos literarios de las *Vidas* son de nuevo insolubles del talento filosófico de su autor.

En este caso, el estudio de Brenk está dividido en cuatro grandes bloques que a su vez se subdividen en cuestiones más concretas a analizar: el trasfondo neroniano de la *Vida*; su comparación con la obra que Plutarco le opone como paralelo, la *Vida de Demetrio*; la narrativa de la obra y, finalmente, la verificación de algunos aspectos de estilo. En cuanto al primero de estos grandes bloques, la tesis de Brenk es que Plutarco concibe el relato de la vida de Marco Antonio a través de su experiencia de la época de Nerón. Deduce esto a partir del final de la *Vida*, donde comparece una

Nerogonía que sirve para poner de manifiesto el vínculo de sangre que une a Nerón con el antihéroe Antonio y que, por lo tanto, hace evidente la transmisión hereditaria del vicio entre los dos villanos. Según esta tesis, hay que leer (o, mejor dicho, los receptores originales leerían) la *Vida de Antonio* teniendo en mente a Nerón. Se establece, por lo tanto, un nexo temporal mediante el que el pasado tiene una funcionalidad en el presente. De hecho, la visión negativa de Nerón está repartida a lo largo de toda la obra de Plutarco, muy probablemente a la sombra del más horrible de los crímenes del tirano a ojos de nuestro autor, el asesinato del héroe estoico Trásea Peto. Trae a colación Brenk a este respecto el tratamiento satírico de la figura de Nerón en el *De sera* (567 EF), donde el alma de Nerón aparece reencarnada en una víbora (porque mató a su madre), pero una voz ordena que sea cómicamente transformada en una rana, cantora de pantanos y lagunas. Tras repasar todos los rasgos que sostienen la asimilación de Antonio a Nerón en la *Vida* (o de Nerón a Antonio), el estudioso concluye que esta obra es un ejemplo de la creencia plutarquea en la transmisión genealógica del vicio (y de la virtud, en su caso) y en la necesidad de realizar el castigo en los descendientes, ideas que aparecen especialmente desarrolladas en el *De sera*.

El segundo gran bloque del artículo trata de la comparación de Demetrio y Antonio en sus respectivas *Vidas*, según la noción plutarquea de vida paralela. Como no podía ser de otra manera, esta idea tiene un sustrato filosófico que Brenk se encarga de explicar. En primer lugar, es para él un error tratar las *Vidas* individualmente, puesto que la totalidad de ellas constituye un conjunto arquitectónicamente dispuesto donde las interreferencias y correspondencias son moneda común. Plutarco, biógrafo por el género que practica, es de vocación filó-

sofo, por lo que sus obras pueden ser calificadas como biografías filosóficas. Así, su marco teórico es la idea platónica de la reencarnación, que le permite, a través del examen de dos almas particulares (y aunque a veces es verdad que, como dice Brenk, se enmaraña en lo fenoménico), contemplar el espectáculo de la metempsicosis platónica y abstraer unas características comunes que le permitan advertir a sus lectores. Esto se ve especialmente en la sínclisis final de las dos *Vidas*, donde, por si no había quedado claro a través de la lectura de ambas, el autor hace explícito que lo que comparten Antonio y Demetrio son el vicio y la perversidad de sus psiques. Así pues, después de estas nociones iniciales se dedica Brenk en los siguientes apartados a examinar las características que permiten a Plutarco construir el paralelismo a través de las dos biografías. Así pues, para Brenk, Demetrio y Antonio son paralelos en vicio (motivo que justifica principalmente el paralelismo), paralelos en asimilaciones a divinidades (especialmente a Dioniso), paralelos en lugares recorridos, en contiendas batalladas y en su afición por el banquete, la bebida y las mujeres. El desenlace de ambos es su desintegración psicológica final en la bebida y el exceso. La sínclisis de ambas *Vidas* hace de la cualidad moral del alma un hecho más importante que los sucesos particulares de cara a la metempsicosis. En efecto, la mirada de Plutarco está siempre puesta en la muerte y en el más allá.

Otro gran bloque de este estudio está centrado en los rasgos del *Antonio* como texto diegético, como narración. En primer lugar, en cuanto al tiempo, la organización temporal de la *Vida* es extraordinariamente sencilla en comparación con otras obras de Plutarco, como el *De genio*. Trae a colación Brenk (a mi modo de ver de una forma un tanto artificiosa a este respecto) una serie de ideas antiguas acerca del tiempo, tales como los ciclos estoicos de conflagración

(*ekpýrosis*) y restitución (*apokatástasis*), la noción epicúrea de átomos en un universo que se desintegra y, por último, la idea platónica de reencarnación, la más influyente en las *Vidas*, a pesar de que la ficción biográfica haga necesario presentar la vida como un tramo único e irrepetible, cual es el caso del *Antonio*. Por otro lado, en cuanto al ritmo de la narración, se caracteriza por una velocidad frenética de los acontecimientos, donde hasta los momentos de descanso están marcados por la ansiedad. En cuanto a la urdimbre del relato, Brenk distingue entre una trama unificada y una trama episódica. La primera se refiere al desarrollo de la vida pública y privada de Antonio y a la coda final de los acontecimientos que suceden entre la muerte del héroe y la de Cleopatra y se caracteriza por su continuidad a lo largo de toda la narración y, dado el carácter del protagonista, por el movimiento constante y la huida. La trama episódica se distribuye a lo largo de toda la obra en forma de viñetas que revelan los rasgos del alma de Antonio, sobre todo en relación con su vida privada. La progresión decadente de estas escenas indica el declive general del personaje. Incide también Brenk en la riqueza de motivos y de referencias cruzadas con otras *Vidas* que albergan estos gags, y además en la presencia de tramas y personajes secundarios que hacen de este un texto complejo y fecundo. Este bloque acerca de la diégesis del *Antonio* se cierra con algunas reflexiones de Brenk acerca del punto de vista en la obra. Para este asunto toma el estudioso como punto de partida las teorías de Genette, distinguiendo, por una parte, entre diversos tipos de narrador y, por otra, entre varios tipos de perspectiva o focalización. Así, lo más habitual (aunque no la única posibilidad) en las *Vidas* es un narrador de tipo omnisciente y una focalización caracterizada como una visión «desde atrás» que revela las motivaciones

intrínsecas de los personajes (de las que quizá ellos mismos no son conscientes).

El último gran bloque que trata Brenk en torno a la *Vida de Antonio* está dedicado a cuestiones estilísticas. Debido a la magnitud del tema, el estudioso elige tratar este tema de una manera selectiva, a través del análisis de pasajes concretos en los que verificar aspectos representativos. No obstante, a nivel general Brenk encuadra el estilo de Plutarco dentro del Barroco helenístico, si bien puntualizamos que a nuestro parecer aplicar a un objeto antiguo nociones y denominaciones propias de otros tiempos y otras coordenadas puede llevar a malentendidos y malinterpretaciones. En todo caso, este período, que es a grandes rasgos propio de la era neroniana en la que se encuadran las *Vidas*, se caracteriza por la teatralización, la intensidad emocional y la crisis dramática, mediante las que se sobrepasan los límites y el equilibrio artístico propios del período clásico. En este sentido Brenk utiliza como ejemplo la narración de la huida del héroe en *Temístocles*, 24-25 frente al mismo relato en su fuente tucidídea (I, 136-137). La principal diferencia es la intensificación dramática a través del énfasis en la emocionalidad interna del personaje. Estos rasgos los aplica a continuación Brenk a diversos pasajes de la obra en cuestión, el *Antonio*, tales como la huida de las naves de Libón (7, 4-6), la batalla de Accio (66) y diversas secciones dedicadas a la pompa y el boato, como los picnics de Marco Antonio en torno a Roma (9), su entrada en Éfeso (24, 1-5) y la llegada de Cleopatra al río Cidno (26, 1-5). En cada caso, el pasaje se compara con otras fuentes antiguas referentes a los mismos acontecimientos para descubrir de esta manera la originalidad estilística en el tratamiento de Plutarco. También se pone de relieve la intertextualidad presente en estos textos, incidiendo en las relaciones

que se establecen entre partes diversas del *Antonio*, entre esta obra y su paralela, y también las que existen entre la obra y otros lugares del corpus plutarqueo.

La conclusión de Brenk califica a las *Vidas* como monumento de la cultura griega y romana y señala la condición paradigmática del *Antonio* como la que posiblemente fue la última de sus biografías y cuyo contenido coincide con el fin de la supremacía griega a través de la caída de su último baluarte en Alejandría. La segunda gran conclusión del autor curiosamente sirve también como conclusión *ante eventum* a la publicación que estamos comentando, puesto que incide en la carencia de sentido de la distinción entre *Moralia* y *Vidas*, que es moderna, dado que ambas partes del corpus plutarqueo responden al mismo plan filosófico mediante el que Plutarco aborda su principal foco de interés: el destino escatológico del individuo. En este sentido Antonio resulta ser paradigma del pensamiento filosófico-religioso de Plutarco tal y como Brenk lo analiza en el primero de los artículos contenidos en este volumen, cuyo sentido es precisamente, además de rendir homenaje al profesor norteamericano (emérito en un sentido etimológico del término), subrayar la necesidad de abarcar conjuntamente toda la producción plutarquea.

No me gustaría concluir esta reseña sin mencionar, a modo de estrambote, un rasgo que me ha resultado delicioso en los trabajos de Brenk, y es su fino sentido del humor y la ironía, del cual dejo un ejemplo a continuación. Refiriéndose al estilo plutarqueo en el relato de la batalla de Accio (p. 253), el profesor incide en el gusto desmedido de Plutarco por los dobles léxicos, al que ya ha aludido anteriormente. Entre hastiado y divertido por esta costumbre del queronense, Brenk afirma irónicamente: «Still, on occasions the revelation flashes before us all too clearly that God, or nature,

or destiny created Plutarch to see all things in parallel». Después de aducir los ejemplos correspondientes, Brenk todavía insiste en lo cómico de este exagerado gusto de Plutarco por la duplicidad: «With due respect for the most famous of biographers, even the protagonists appear in parallel». Aduce a continuación también ejemplos que demuestran lo dicho. Nos atrevemos a añadir que este gusto de Plutarco por lo doble no solo comparece en el léxico y en esta *Vida*, sino que está por todas partes en el corpus plutarqueo, y a él se refiere la misma noción de vidas paralelas. Sirva este detalle para poner de manifiesto el humor, prueba de inteligencia, del profesor Brenk, que se suma a sus otras virtudes: su vasta erudición, su talento y su inabarcable experiencia en el fértil campo de los estudios plutarqueos, que hacen de este un trabajo imprescindible en cualquier futura investigación en torno al polígrafo de Queronea.

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M. SANZ MORALES, R. GONZÁLEZ DELGADO, M. LIBRÁN MORENO & J. UREÑA BRACERO (eds.), *La (inter)textualidad en Plutarco. Actas del XII Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Cáceres, 8-10 de octubre de 2015)*, Universidad de Extremadura Servicio de Publicaciones – Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Cáceres – Coimbra, 2017, 397 pp. [ISBN de la Universidad de Extremadura 978-84-9127-002-7; ISBN de la Universidad de Coimbra: 978-989-26-1443-4].

El volumen, publicado en el año 2017 y editado por los profesores Manuel Sanz Morales, Ramiro González Delgado, Miryam Librán Moreno y Jesús Ureña Bracero, es un compendio de todas las colaboraciones que los especialistas versados en el mundo

plutarqueo del panorama nacional e internacional presentaron en el XII Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas, celebrado en Cáceres durante los días 8, 9 y 10 de octubre del año 2015.

Como se indica en el prefacio, el libro, titulado *La (inter)textualidad en Plutarco*, se ha estructurado siguiendo la temática que en su día se propuso para el XII Simposio Internacional de Plutarquistas. Además, incluye una dedicatoria de los editores a la memoria de la profesora Françoise Frazier, fallecida poco antes de la publicación de este trabajo y cuya colaboración se recoge de forma póstuma.

El volumen se articula en cinco apartados en los que, aunque el tema predominante es el de la textualidad e intertextualidad en Plutarco, también se dedica un espacio a otros aspectos relevantes como la pervivencia del autor en épocas posteriores o el análisis de las ideas de carácter político, religioso y moral que tanto abundan en la obra del Queroneense.

El primero de estos epígrafes se circunscribe al ámbito de la textualidad. En él se integran trabajos que nos muestran los avances de la crítica filológica durante los últimos años, desde el hallazgo de nuevos textos del autor (J. A. Fernández Delgado – F. Pordomingo, «Nuevos hallazgos papiráceos», pp. 15-28), hasta estudios críticos y exegéticos sobre aquellos pasajes controvertidos, dudosos o corruptos (A. Pérez Jiménez, «Las regiones fértiles de la tierra: nueva propuesta crítica a Plu., *De facie* 938D», pp. 43-50).

El segundo capítulo se dedica a la intertextualidad, concretamente a examinar los datos biográficos y pasajes de distintos autores griegos que se han transmitido a través de los escritos de Plutarco. Las colaboraciones que conforman esta sección nos permiten constatar el grado de erudición de Plutarco, conocedor de los motivos y

tópicos clásicos, los cuales utilizaba según sus exigencias literarias. De este modo se evidencia cómo se servía de la tradición anterior para retratar a los estadistas de las *Vitae*, paradigmas de comportamiento, como señala el profesor Clúa Serena al observar en la biografía de Pericles y de Alejandro el manejo de construcciones sintácticas similares a las que ya aparecían en Heródoto («El nacimiento de Alejandro en Plutarco (*Alex.* 2. 4, *Per.* 3. 3) y en Heródoto (6. 131. 2): intertextualidad y recepción», pp. 101-108). Igualmente, como preceptor del neoplatonismo, Plutarco perpetúa algunas de las teorías que Platón había promulgado en sus tratados filosóficos (B. Demulder, «The Old Man and the Soul. Plato's *Laws* 10 in Plutarch's *De Anima Procreatione*» pp. 141-152).

El siguiente conjunto de artículos se dedica a la aparición de Plutarco como modelo de erudición para otros autores de la Antigüedad. Las citas a sus doctrinas filosóficas se infiltran en las composiciones de estudiosos y gramáticos latinos como Aulo Gelio, como explica el profesor González Delgado en su aportación («Las citas de Plutarco en Aulo Gelio», pp. 187-194). Pero su obra biográfica y filosófica no solo contribuyó al desarrollo de la literatura pagana, sino que también tuvo una gran importancia en la codificación de la literatura cristiana, la cual en varias ocasiones se adueñó de algunos tópicos usados por Plutarco para ensamblar su propio discurso y engalanar a los héroes de esta religión incipiente, como señala el profesor Torres Guerra en su estudio sobre la comparación de la biografía plutárquea de Alejandro y la de Constantino creada por Eusebio de Cesarea («De Plutarco a Eusebio: Alejandro y Constantino, ¿dos vidas paralelas?», pp. 207-214).

El cuarto apartado de la obra revela que la pervivencia del polígrafo de Queronea

no se limita solamente a los autores antiguos. Un buen ejemplo del alcance de la influencia de Plutarco lo ilustra el profesor García Gual en su artículo titulado «Plutarco bifronte: notas y reflexiones sobre la recepción de su obra» (pp. 227-240), donde ofrece una panorámica sobre la repercusión del autor tras ser redescubierto por los humanistas, cuando comenzaron a proliferar los estudios y traducciones del corpus plutárqueo y un sinfín de literatos emularon su estilo conciso y elegante. Así, la fama lograda por Plutarco desde el siglo XIV hasta la actualidad ha permitido que se consolide como uno de los autores canónicos de la literatura griega.

En el último capítulo, a modo de miscelánea, se examinan aspectos significativos sobre cuestiones de índole sociopolítica, religiosa o filosófica, temas que aparecen constantemente en los escritos de Plutarco. Así se expone en trabajos como el del profesor Ramón Palerm, centrado en el estudio del vocablo irreligioso ἄσεμνος delimitando su concreción semántica («El término ἄσεμνος en Plutarco», pp. 365-370); o el del profesor Leão sobre la expresión político-filosófica πολιτεύμα y sus matices semánticos en los *Moralia* y las *Vitae* («Texto e contexto em Plutarco: o uso do termo *politeuma* nas *Vidas* e nos *Moralia*», pp. 357-364).

Finalmente, la publicación se cierra con un *index locorum* donde se ordenan los pasajes del queronense citados a lo largo del volumen, de forma que resulte más fácil al lector acudir a ellos.

Sin duda alguna, esta obra de conjunto supone una importante actualización científica sobre las investigaciones de Plutarco que se han venido desempeñando durante los últimos años.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION

ARTICLES

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2014

STEFANO AMENDOLA - CHRYSANTHOS CHRYSANTHOU - SERENA CITRO -
LUCY FLETCHER - ANNA GINESTÍ - DELFIM LEÃO - VICENTE RAMÓN - SILVIA
VERGARA - ANA VICENTE - PAOLA VOLPE

VOLUMES REVIEWED IN THIS SECTION

ABBREVIATIONS

- *A Companion to Plutarch* = M. Beck (ed.), *A Companion to Plutarch*, Malden- MA-Oxford-Chichester, Blackwell, 2014.
- *O sábio e a imagem* = C. Alcalde Martín, L. de Nazaré Ferreira (coords.), *O sábio e a imagem: estudos sobre Plutarco e a arte*, Coimbra-São Paulo, Humanitas, 2014.
- *Plutarco entre mundos* = P. Gómez Cardó, D. Ferreira Leão, M. Aparecida de Oliveira (coords.), *Plutarco entre mundos: visões de Esparta, Atenas e Roma*, Coimbra-São Paulo, Humanitas, 2014.
- *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica* = P. Volpe Cacciatore (ed.), *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica. Atti del XII convegno della International Plutarch Society, Sezione Italiana*, Napoli, D'Auria, 2014.

C. ALCALDE MARTÍN, «Actitud de Plutarco y sus héroes ante las artes plásticas», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 69-89.

Un estudio detenido de los pasajes relevantes permite inferir que la actitud de Plutarco sobre los mandatarios y las artes

plásticas revela una doble condición: por una parte, el héroe debe apreciar debidamente las cualidades estéticas de tales artes mas, por otra, procede que el goce de la contemplación sobre las artes plásticas quede supeditado al obje-

tivo cardinal del personaje, a saber, el ejercicio ponderado des sus virtudes político-militares. (V.R., S.V.)

- E. ALMAGOR, «The Aratus and the Artaxerxes», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 278-291.

La composición de estas Vidas parece tener un origen independiente, y no se cree que Plutarco fuese quien las asociase. Así pues, se presenta un análisis de ambas biografías, destacando la excepcionalidad de la segunda por el hecho de ser la más descuidada que conservamos y de ser la única de personaje ni griego ni romano. Por otra parte se lleva a cabo la recopilación de semejanzas y diferencias entre ambos personajes y sus Vidas. (A.V.)

- E. ALMAGOR, «Hold your horses: characterization through animals in Plutarch's 'Artaxerxes' 2», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 11 (2014) 3-18.

This paper focuses on Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes and deals with the subject of characterization through animals. It shows that allusions to the non-human living world serve to characterise the nature of the hero, portray its complex relation with nurture in moulding character, and even suggest the possibility of a change in it. (C.C.)

- S. AMENDOLA, «Storia di un'esegesi: nota a Plu., Ser. Num. 548B7-C4», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 11 (2014) 19-37.

Starting from Humanism this paper retraces the exegetical history of ser. num. 548B7-C and examines the semantic problems of the text. The main issue is the meaning of the verb ἀμύνασθαι, whose semantic value is determined by the anecdote, just-mentioned by Timon, about the Spartan king Brasidas. (Abstract Published)

- S. AUDANO, «La retorica dell'indeterminazione: spunti per una lettura della

Consolatio ad Apollonium», en *Plutarcho: linguaggi e retorica*, 15-27.

Comprendere Plutarco significa -dice Audano facendo sua l'affermazione di Antonio Garzya- approcciarsi alla sua opera in modo globale. Solo così e con uno studio sistematico si possono trarre alcuni segnali anche da un'opera, come la *Consolatio*, che, se non è di Plutarco, ha in sé elementi che riconducono alla sua 'scuola'. L'opera che può apparire viziata da un eccesso di 'indeterminazione' soprattutto di tempo e di quantità risponde «a strumento di una vera e propria retorica comunicativa «che, mentre sfuma alcuni dettagli, ne potenzia la loro capacità argomentativa. A dimostrazione Audano cita due passi che si leggono a 111C e a 117E in cui si riprende un concetto anche senecano: la vita è un istante a confronto con l'eternità. Altro tema interessante messo in luce dallo studioso è il continuo rifarsi plutarco agli antichi per riaffermare il nesso tra saggezza (λόγος) e temporalità remota. (P.V.)

- S. AUDANO, «Menandro consolatore tra Plutarco e Leopardi», en A. Casanova (ed.), *Menandro e l'evoluzione della commedia greca: atti del convegno internazionale di studi in memoria di Adelmo Barigazzi nel centenario della nascita* (Firenze, 30 settembre - 1 ottobre 2013), Firenze, 2014, 211-245.

Il monastico menandro «Muore giovane colui che al Cielo è caro» è la traccia lungo cui si dipana il saggio di Audano che esamina la *Consolatio ad Apollonium* (Mor. 10, 101F-122A). L'opera partendo dalla constatazione della instabilità della condizione umana, passa poi a considerare la morte come un bene, perché segna la fine di tutte le infelicità umane, e della immortalità dell'anima. Le tre considerazioni possono rendere meno

doloroso il distacco da una persona cara: la ragione (εὐλόγιστος) è l'unico farmaco più potente contro il dolore. È evidente che la morte è, in ogni caso, un bene perché essa porta alla μεταβολή dell'anima e lo è soprattutto per chi lascia la vita terrena quando si è giovani. Il monastico menandro idealmente passa da Plutarco a Leopardi. L'esame di Audano è molto interessante perché egli, partendo dal filosofo di Chersonese, esamina le fonti, le letture leopardiane della letteratura greca ma, soprattutto, discute la traduzione del monastico fatta da Adriani «In giovinezza muor quel che ama Iddio», dove si potrebbe ipotizzare che Iddio sia oggetto e non soggetto del verso. «Muor giovane chi al Cielo è caro « funge da epigrafe anche su di un antico basso rilievo sepolcrale, dove la protagonista è una giovane e bella donna morta nel fulgore della sua età e della sua bellezza. Non esiste nella poesia leopardiana l'elemento consolatorio perché nella vita l'unica certezza è la morte 'inconsolabile'. La consolazione di Leopardi, dunque, è inconsolabilmente diversamente da quella di Plutarco! (P.V.)

F. BECCHI, «Plutarch, Aristotle, and the Peripatetics», en A Companion to Plutarch, 73-87.

Relación entre Plutarco y el aristotelismo, tanto en lo que se refiere a las tradiciones que Plutarco aprobaba como aquellas contra las que polemizaba. Esta relación debe tener en cuenta el desarrollo del pensamiento filosófico entre Aristóteles y Plutarco. (A.V.)

M. BECK, «The Socratic Paradigm», en A Companion to Plutarch, 463-478.

Este capítulo trata de comprender la naturaleza precisa del paradigma socrático en las Vidas, especialmente en cuanto al lugar y las circunstancias

bajo las que aflora, al modo y la causa que impulsan su uso, a las intenciones que tiene Plutarco cuando lo emplea y al significado global de este paradigma socrático en relación con el mensaje político y filosófico de Plutarco. (A.V.)

J. BENEKER, «Sex, Eroticism, and Politics», en A Companion to Plutarch, 503-515.

El tratamiento que Plutarco otorga a la conducta sexual en la composición de sus Vidas Paralelas depende y se halla en relación directa con su intención programática de revelar el carácter de un hombre de estado. Para el Queronense el hombre de estado ideal posee autocontrol sobre sus impulsos sexuales y otros tipos de comportamiento privado, de modo que los episodios sobre conductas sexuales le sirven, por una parte, para narrar cómo un individuo posee o carece de autocontrol y, por otra, para mostrar las consecuencias de una acción privada sobre el curso de los acontecimientos públicos. La pareja de vidas Agesilao-Pompeyo sirve como caso de estudio para el desarrollo de este tema. (A.V.)

L. DE BLOIS, «Plutarch's Galba and Otho», en A Companion to Plutarch, 267-277.

Se determina cómo debe estudiarse esta pareja de biografías de forma unitaria, y se destacan los aspectos negativos sobre liderazgo y sobre conducta militar en el reinado de Galba, que serán aún peores en el de Otón. (A.V.)

M. BONAZZI, «Plutarch and the Skeptics», en A Companion to Plutarch, 121-134.

La comprensión de los problemas históricos y filosóficos que plantea el escepticismo es decisiva para una correcta valoración del pensamiento de Plutarco respecto de esta corriente. Los textos conservados y las contradicciones que presentan no facilitan la resolución

de los citados problemas, por lo que las opiniones de los estudiosos resultan divergentes en gran medida. Para poder aclarar la problemática expuesta y explicar tan discordantes conclusiones, se propone determinar con exactitud qué significaba para Plutarco «escepticismo». (A.V.)

B. BOULET, «The Philosopher-King», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 449-462.

Estudio de la influencia de la versión platónica del buen gobernante en la composición de las Vidas de Licurgo y Numa. Plutarco comparte con Platón el ideal del «rey-filósofo», el gobernante que puede convertirse en estudioso de la razón y la filosofía, pero presenta, asimismo, diferencias que lo distancian de su modelo. (A.V.)

E. L. BOWIE, «Poetry and Education», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 177-190.

Para comprender la relación entre poesía y educación en Plutarco ha de tenerse en cuenta la educación propia de su época y de sus circunstancias familiares, que él mismo recibió. Su intenso compromiso con la filosofía provoca que intente transmitir a la juventud pero también a la elite culta una correcta lectura de la poesía. En primer lugar el Profesor Bowie, merced a lo que sus obras nos transmiten, recoge los conocimientos literarios que Plutarco podía tener. A continuación, se ofrece de forma resumida el contenido de Cómo debe el joven escuchar la poesía, en el cual Plutarco explicita las enseñanzas y ventajas que cree pueden extraerse de la poesía. Determinados comentarios de este ensayo sugieren que ofrecía instrucciones igualmente para los adultos, algo que confirman otras referencias de sus Moralia, en los que, además, puede rastrearse la aplicación de los principios que Plutarco defiende.

Puede concluirse que la actitud de Plutarco hacia la poesía es en gran medida producto de su orientación filosófica y de su pertenencia a la elite intelectual griega; más difícil resulta saber con exactitud la opinión real que Plutarco y los otros miembros de esa elite tenían de la poesía clásica. (A.V.)

G. BRADEN, «Shakespeare», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 577-591.

Las obras de Shakespeare reflejan la influencia de las carreras y personalidades de las grandes figuras de la historia de Roma, tal como las analizó Plutarco en sus Vidas. Se presenta aquí de qué forma llegó la obra de Plutarco a Shakespeare, así como algunos de los rasgos principales de dicha influencia en sus obras. (A.V.)

U. BULTRIGHINI, «Cimone, sua sorella», en U. Bultrighini & E. Dimauro (eds.), *Donne che contano nella storia greca*, Lanciano, 2014, 441-528.

Nel suo saggio Bultrighini pone in evidenza il personaggio discusso di Elpinice, sorella di Cimone, che non era considerata da Plutarco una donna virtuosa, perché ella esulava dal modello femminile che il filosofo aveva, per così dire, ben chiarito in Mor. 142 D-E. Dopo un attento esame di alcuni luoghi della Vita di Cimone e della Vita di Pericle e del rapporto di Plutarco con Stesimbrotto, lo studioso conclude attribuendo ad Elpinice un ruolo non secondario nel processo tentato a Cimone dal suo rivale Pericle. Elpinice avrebbe sopperito alla mancanza di acume politico del fratello che, comunque, aveva mostrato doti di grande stratega. Davvero spiritosa ma piena di significato è la conclusione «ah, se Cimone avesse sempre lasciato fare il Cimone a sua sorella». (P.V.)

- J. M^a. CANDAU MORÓN, «Un mentor limpio de pasiones. El filósofo y la actuación política según el *De genio Socratis*», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 103-118.

La figura de Epaminondas que Plutarco ofrece en De genio Socratis se halla recorrida por una combinación de elementos históricos, en unas ocasiones, ficticios, en otras. El caso es que el papel eminentemente 'político' de Epaminondas es subsidiario de su consideración como filósofo, una faceta del héroe tebano que el de Queronea prefiere subrayar. Pues bien, en realidad tal retrato de Epaminondas es trasunto de la trayectoria intelectual del propio Plutarco quien, frente a otros prohombres de su época, opta por reivindicar su condición de filósofo, parcela que el nuestro moralista gusta de cultivar en mayor medida que la proyección política. (V.R., S.V.)

- A. CARAMICO, «'O machinatrix lynce versipellior': la traduzione latina di Xylander del fr. tr. adesp. 349 S.-K. (Plut., de aud. poet. 16D 8-9)», en *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica*, 29-45.

In de audiendis poetis 16A-F Plutarco afferma che i poeti mentono volontariamente e involontariamente, per rendere più gradevole l'ascolto della poesia. Per rafforzare la sua opinione, cita il fr. tr. adesp. 349N (=349S. -K.) ὃ μηχανήμα λυγρός αἰολώτερον. La citazione plutarchea -come argomenta Caramico- pone due problemi diversi ma complementari: il primo è dato da λυγρός, perchè il ms. Z (Marcianus 511) riporta la lezione σφίγγος, il secondo dall'aggettivo αἰολώτερον che, attribuito di μηχανήμα si riferisce all'animale. La studiosa esamina il valore di αἰόλος sinonimo di ποικίλος alla luce anche di occorrenze presso altri autori e ricorda che Xylander nelle Annotationes scri-

veva Lynce animal pelle habere multis maculis variegatum, notissimum est. Che sia lince o sfinge l'animale cui si fa riferimento, le molte macchie non fanno che connotare la poesia e in genere la letteratura che spesso occultano il vero significato delle cose. (P.V.)

- M. CAROLI, «L' eufemismo politico in Plutarco: note di commento a Sol. 15, 2», *QS 80* (2014) 121-163.

L'eufemismo nell'opera di Plutarco afferisce non solo all'ambito erotico-sessuale ma anche e soprattutto a quello politico. Un esempio interessante è offerto dalla Vita di Dione in cui Filisto / Eforo (l'attribuzione del pronome ὅς è molto problematica) ammantava di motivi dignitosi le azioni ingiuste. Il tema centrale del saggio di Caroli è offerto da Solone 15, 2, dove si dice che «alcuni νεώτεροι sostengono che gli Ateniesi vezzeggiano signorilmente gli aspetti sgradevoli delle cose, velando con nomi nobili e benevoli, chiamando le prostitute 'etere', i versamenti 'contributi', le guarnigioni 'corpi di guardia' delle città e le prigioni 'alloggi'. La trovata, a quanto sembra, la ebbe Solone per primo che aveva denominato 'sgravio' l'estinzione dei debiti». Partendo da questo testo plutarcheo, che è a tutti gli effetti uno spaccato di lessicografia storico-politica, lo studioso esamina i vari termini inserendoli in un quadro anche letterario. (P.V.)

- C. CARSANA, «Il Catone di Plutarco: da modello ad antimodello», in A. Gonzales, M.T. Schettino (eds.), *L'idealisation de l'autre. Faire un modèle d'un anti-modèle*, Besançon, 2014, 243-266.

Nella rappresentare la figura di Catone, il Cheroneo ricorre ad una serie di fonti sia favorevoli che ostili al Censore, ragion per cui il ritratto plutarcheo di Catone è offuscato da ombre che scal-

fiscono l'immagine idealizzata tramandata, in particolare, dagli scritti ciceroniani.

Dalla biografia plutarchea emerge una costante contraddizione tra ciò che Catone raccomandava ai concittadini ed alle generazioni future e la sua condotta che spesso non rispecchiava le sue parole. Plutarco pone in risalto il fatto che Catone, in età matura, si era mostrato fortemente ostile alla cultura greca ed alla sua diffusione a Roma; eppure la sua formazione culturale e morale era scaturita non solo dall'esempio dei suoi virtuosi antenati, ma anche dall'insegnamento del filosofo greco Nearco, che aveva contribuito a potenziare nel giovane la ricerca della frugalità e della moderazione. Analogamente, se da un lato Catone criticava quei condottieri e politici che gradivano di essere elogiati pubblicamente per le loro azioni, dall'altro proprio lui non attendeva occasione per autoelogiarsi. Ed ancora, praticò l'usura in tarda età, attività verso cui aveva in passato espresso forte disapprovazione. Questi ed altri tratti negativi del personaggio, come osserva la studiosa, si sviluppano soprattutto in età matura, in evidente contrasto con quanto si legge di Catone nel *De senectute* ciceroniano, ove egli incarna il modello di uomo che impronta i suoi comportamenti alla σωφροσύνη. Il modello edificante di Catone, che si era andato affermando particolarmente nella tarda età repubblicana, viene dunque ridimensionato da Plutarco, che ci offre un ritratto costellato di chiaroscuri. (S.C.)

G. CATTANEO, «Il 'De animae procreatione in Timaio' (Plut. Mor. 77), l'Aldina di Plutarco e il Marc. gr. Z. 523», *Medioevo greco* 14 (2014), 51-59.

Cattaneo dedica il suo studio al Mar. gr. Z. 523 (coll. 846), appartenuto al cardinale Bessarione, che contiene, tra le varie opere, anche il *de animae procreatione in Timeo* (Mor. 77). L'intento dell'autore è quello di collocare all'interno dello stemma codicum di Mor. 77 l'Aldina. L'esame è condotto sulla collazione dell'Aldina con i codici che tramandano tale opuscolo, evidenziando le affinità, le lectiones singulares, gli errori. Alla fine del suo studio rigoroso, Cattaneo propone uno stemma codicum per Mor. 77, che può essere considerato «una versione dello stemma proposto da Ferrari-Baldi», integrato appunto dall'Aldina che con e (Laur. plut. 70, 5) ed u (Urb. 99) discende dal subarchetipo siglato δ. (P.V.)

I. S. CHIALVA, «De Roma a Alejandría y viceversa. Mimesis del motivo del viaje en la Vida de Antonio de Plutarco», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 137-157.

El motivo del viaje Roma-Alejandría, ejemplificado paidéuticamente en la Vida de Antonio, sirve a la autora para articular la enseñanza didáctico-moral y político a propósito de un poder imperial al que no son ajenos el ejercicio del poder y la ambición político-militar como inductores de las acciones que impulsan los mandatarios codiciosamente deletéreos. Ello repercute en el cariz moralista del relato para beneficio e instrucción del lector. (V.R., S.V.)

A. CONCEIÇÃO RODRIGUES, «A figura do legislador em Plutarco: Recepção de um mito político», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 85-102. [«The figure of the lawgiver in Plutarch: reception of a political myth»]

This paper aims to contextualize Plutarch's contribution to the wide political and intellectual history of the

nomothetes. This contribution must first be understood in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition and, secondly, it must be read in his contemporary theoretical frame. If, on one hand, Plutarch's contribution continues and reproduces the Platonic nomothetes concept, on the other, it also follows the Roman-Graeco-Jewish tradition in which there was an association between the nomothetes and the Platonic philosopher-king in order to assimilate the Jewish narrative to the Greek intellectual tradition rather than to the Roman one, i.e. a statement of cultural precedence and superiority, an exercise of authority over the present. [from the published abstract]

C. COOPER, «Death and other kinds of closure», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 391-404.

Cooper takes three pairs of Lives and analyses their endings in order to assess how they function as a conclusion. He chooses pairs composed at different times within the series: Dem.-Cic. (probably the fifth in the series), Cim.-Luc. (probably second), and Nic.-Crass. (a very late pair). Cooper looks in most detail at Demosthenes and Cicero. His analysis shows how themes of the early parts of these Lives recur in the accounts of the subjects' deaths and the narrative which follows their deaths. He shows also the striking parallels between the death of Cicero and of Demosthenes. Cooper argues that the closing scenes of the Life are integral elements of the biographies which link thematically to earlier material. He sees Plutarch as interested in the hero's consistency in terms of choice and character; and he argues that the closing scenes reveal Plutarch's sympathetic and humane stance. The analyses of Cim.-Luc. and Nic.-Crass. are shorter but again consider the

endings of the four Lives, as well as also looking at the synkriseis. Cooper concludes that in the conclusions of his Lives, both in a Life and in the synkrisis, Plutarch tries to give a broader sense of the life lived. If, as Cooper argues, in the end Plutarch shows greater sympathy for Crassus than Lucullus, it may be a feature of his own old age at the time of writing. (L.F.)

J. DILLON, «Plutarch and Platonism», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 61-72.

Plutarco desarrolló un platonismo influido por tratamientos y formulaciones producidos alrededor de un siglo antes de su nacimiento. Este capítulo primero trata la ética de Plutarco, luego su metafísica y, finalmente, lo que nosotros conocemos como su lógica. (A.V.)

T. E. DUFF, «The prologues», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 333-349.

Duff's analysis of the prologues challenges and supersedes the earlier approach of Stadter (ICS 13.2 [1988], 275-295). Duff argues that a book is more than a pair of Lives; rather, it may also include a synkrisis (18 of the 22 books have one) and a prologue which introduces both Lives (13 books have one). Prologues, Duff suggests, operate at the level of the book and stand outside both Lives: they are the mirror image of the synkriseis. Duff discusses all of the prologues as illustrative examples. He identifies four functions of prologues: to introduce subjects; to set generic expectations; to establish the persona of Plutarch and the reader; and to arouse interest. He also argues for a two-part structure to prologues: the initial part is made up of generalized reflections and the second, shorter, section names the subjects, offers a rationale for the pairing and has a stronger narratorial presence. Duff considers variations in this structure

and the exceptional prologues to Alexander-Caesar and Nicias-Crassus. He discusses the use of first-person verbs in the prologues to establish the persona of narrator and reader, and the tendency also to contrast them with other writers and readers. Duff looks at how prologues conclude, showing examples of transitional sentences which mark the end of the section and the movement to the first Life. He argues that *asyndeton* is commonly encountered at the start of the first Life after a prologue which marks a distinct break that is stronger than most breaks between first and second Life. Finally, Duff looks at books which do not begin with a prologue. He argues that almost all Lives begin with a synoptic, non-chronological opening and that Lives without prologues begin simply with the first Life. The chapter ends with an appendix showing the constituent parts of a book of Parallel Lives. Duff (2011) CA 30: 213-78 offers further discussion. (L.F.)

- L. DE FÁTIMA OLIVEIRA, «O jovem Teseu: do reconhecimento paterno ao reconhecimento político», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 31-48. [«Young Theseus: from paternal recognition to political recognition»]

The paper discusses the paths taken by Theseus in Plutarch's Life of Theseus, from adolescence to adulthood, searching for paternal recognition and, consequently, political recognition. It starts by questioning the interpretation of an oracle by Pittheus, Theseus' maternal grandfather, which determines the circumstances of the hero's birth. Then, it analyses the power and knowledge acquired by Theseus in his terrestrial journey from Troezen to Athens and, afterwards, in his fight against the Minotaur in Crete. Finally, the paper shows

how Theseus instituted the Athenian democracy relating this to the paths he had taken earlier on. [from the published abstract]ç

- M^a. T. FAU RAMOS, «Legislar tenía un precio», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 49-70.

La autora presenta un estudio comparativo de la caracterización que observan ciertos héroes biografiados cuyo cometido en su acción legislativa genera efectos lesivos para los personajes implicados. Para ello, observamos un análisis eficaz de tres Vidas plutarqueas: Los pares 'Teseo-Rómulo', 'Licurgo-Numa' y 'Solón-Publicola'. (V.R., S.V.)

- D. FERREIRA LEÃO, «O legislador e suas estratégias discursivas: teatralidade e linguagem metafórica na Vida de Sólon», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 71-84. [«The statesman and his discourse strategies: theatricality and metaphorical language in the Life of Solon»]

Throughout his life, Solon intervened at different times in the Athenian political scene, usually against a backdrop of great social instability. Such was the case when he found a way to skirt legal impediments and to exhort his fellow citizens to recapture their own self-esteem, by exhibiting a fainted madness while performing the elegy for Salamis. The playful character of the statesman can also be detected in the way he decided to label his first emblematic reform – the *seisachtheia*, the revolutionary cancelling of debts, which he literally termed a 'shaking off of burdens'. This paper intends to discuss the way Plutarch displays some of his discrete irony when depicting a statesman as paradigmatic as Solon, as well as the latter's ambivalent behaviour during the opposition against Pisistratus. [from the published abstract]

- J. FINAMORE**, «Plutarch and Apuleius on Socrates' daimonion», en H. Tarrant, D. Layne (eds.), *The Neoplatonic Socrates*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014, 36-50.

Varios conceptos desarrollados a lo largo del corpus platónico se han visto sometidos a continuas reelaboraciones según las necesidades de los filósofos posteriores. Este es el caso del daimon socrático, un tópico que cobró especial interés en la época del platonismo medio y sobre el cual reflexionan dos autores de significativa importancia: en el ámbito latino, Apuleyo (De deo Socratis) se sirve del daimon de Sócrates para establecer una jerarquía entre los distintos daimones y crear una correspondencia con los genios inherentes a la religión tradicional romana; y en el ámbito griego, Plutarco (De genio Socratis) opta exclusivamente por definir la naturaleza de esa fuerza sobrehumana que asiste a Sócrates. (S.V.)

- F. FRAZIER**, «The Perils of Ambition», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 488-502.

Plutarco, como biógrafo histórico y filósofo, considera la ambición a la luz de los individuos que examina: para comprender completamente la concepción plutarquea de esta idea, en primer lugar, debe elucidarse la psicología y la ética de sus hombres de estado; para los propósitos de este capítulo la profesora Frazier describe en términos generales el ethos de los distintos periodos que Plutarco abarca en las Vidas y explora algunos ejemplos de figuras históricas ambiciosas. El concepto de ambición tiene cierta relevancia tanto en la vida pública de Plutarco como en su obra y, como ocurre hoy día, la noción clásica abarca un amplio espectro de valores éticos. Por ello, la Profesora Frazier examina el vocabulario relacionado con esta noción que se destila de la vida de

la ciudad a través de las inscripciones, así como la terminología procedente de la reflexión filosófica, tal como lo encontramos en textos literarios. La ambición, como factor esencial en la política, es una realidad psicológica que afecta inevitablemente a la conducta ética del individuo: Plutarco examinará la ambición de sus personajes desde un punto de vista tanto psicológico como ético. Por otra parte, en la naturaleza y grado de la ambición de un individuo pueden impactar numerosos factores, como el contexto político e histórico, o el ethos de su ciudad o periodo histórico, por lo que la Profesora Frazier establece distintas características en la cultura griega, según distintos ámbitos, como Esparta o Atenas, y diferentes periodos; de la misma manera estudia el tema de la ambición en la historia romana, especialmente el periodo de la conquista de Grecia y las Guerras civiles. Finalmente, se cierra el capítulo con el análisis de dos figuras especialmente destacadas en el estudio de la ambición, Alejandro Magno y César. (A.V.)

- F. FRAZIER**, «The Reception of Plutarch in France after the Renaissance», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 549-555.

Las traducciones de Vidas Paralelas y Moralia por Jacques Amyot en el siglo XVI jugaron un importante papel en el desarrollo del clasicismo francés. La filosofía religiosa y la concepción de la sociedad que se hallaban en las obras plutarqueas permitían un nuevo acercamiento a los asuntos espirituales y sociales, por lo que durante el siglo XVII tuvo Plutarco una extensa difusión. Se detecta la influencia del Queronense especialmente en dos géneros principales de este siglo, la tragedia y la novela. Del primero ya puede rastrearse la presencia plutarquea en la primera

tragedia humanista del siglo XVI, que se multiplicó en el siglo posterior; por otra parte, su proyección fue notoria sobre los novelistas del siglo XVII. Además, en el campo de la educación resultaron sin duda relevantes las obras de Plutarco. Con el tiempo la presencia de este autor en la literatura se fue desvaneciendo: el acercamiento a la historia contenido en las Vidas perdió peso tras la Revolución, pero también su papel en la filosofía moral se desvaneció entre los racionalistas de la Ilustración francesa. Si bien los filósofos de la Ilustración francesa perdieron el interés en Plutarco, sus obras tuvieron una nueva acogida entre las sensibilidades morales y estéticas del siglo XVIII, destacando especialmente Jean-Jaques Rousseau como profundo admirador del *Querouense*. En la época de la Revolución, los lectores encontraron en Plutarco cierto modelo regenerativo y la construcción paralela de sus Vidas supuso una inspiración para los revolucionarios a moldearse de acuerdo con las figuras históricas antiguas. El entusiasmo por las obras de Plutarco condujo a una nueva traducción completa a manos del abad Ricard hacia finales del siglo XVIII. A lo largo del siglo XIX se produce un declive de la influencia plutarquea, a pesar de la nueva traducción completa de Victor Bétolaud en 1870. Durante todo el siglo XX, debido a un renovado auge del interés por el género biográfico, se produjo un resurgimiento del interés por nuestro autor, que puede también rastrearse entre historiadores y novelistas. (A.V.)

J. GEIGER, «The project of the Parallel Lives: Plutarch's conception of biography», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 292-303.

Geiger offers an overview of the nature of the Parallel Lives and their conception of biography. He emphasises the innovativeness of the project. Although he

recognises Nepos as a potential forerunner of political biography and of serial, comparative biography, Geiger acknowledges the great originality of Plutarch's project. Geiger quotes from the prologues to Alexander-Caesar (1.1), Aemilius Paulus-Timoleon (1.1), Perikles-Fabius Maximus (1-2) and Demerios-Antony (1.1) for Plutarch's methods and aims and refers also to On the Malice of Herodotus 866A-F to suggest Plutarch saw the proper activity of the historian as recording noble actions and sayings. Geiger considers how the purpose of biographies differed from historiography and emphasises the importance of Plutarch's focus on character and morality. He sees this as of greater importance than any political dimension connected with paralleling Greeks and Romans. Geiger discusses the function of excursuses and sees them as resulting less from the proximity of the genres of history and biography than from the common education of the authors. Geiger suggests the importance of childhood material and of anecdotes for Plutarch's biographies. He also discusses the Coriolanus and the analysis of Russell (1963) to show Plutarch's reworking of his sources, as well as the work of Pelling (1979, 1980) on the Late Republican Lives to demonstrate the way Plutarch shapes his narrative to portray his subjects to their best advantage. (L.F.)

A. GEORGIADOU, «The Lives of the Caesars», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 251-266.

Georgiadou provides a comprehensive introduction to Plutarch's Lives of the Caesars, focusing upon the two extant Lives: Galba and Otho. In her introduction, Georgiadou suggests that it is only Augustus for whom we can gain any

insight into the picture of the emperor which Plutarch may have created in the lost Lives, since we find him featured in the Parallel Lives and in the Sayings of Kings and Commanders. In the main substance of the chapter, Georgiadou considers the date of the collection, the sources, parallel traditions, the genre of the Lives, and Plutarch's emphases. The first three sections summarise the scholarly debates on these subjects from the 19th century to the present. Discussion of genre suggests that the texts attempt to strike a middle ground between history and biography. Beginning from Galba 2.5 and the distinction Plutarch ambiguously draws between pragmatic history and his own narrative, Georgiadou discusses the ways in which Plutarch's narrative is both similar and different from typical history and his own biographical method. She focuses on the way in which the Galba and Otho are not interested in lives but reigns, omitting much of the typical biographical material concerning background and career outside of office. The final section of the chapter on 'emphases' draws out the philosophical, specifically Platonic, resonances in the Lives; the significance of decapitation; and the use of synkrisis. (L.F.)

- G. GONZÁLEZ ALMENARA, V.M. RAMÓN PALERM, «Heteras, concubinas y jóvenes de seducción: la influencia femenina en las Vidas plutarqueas de Solón, Pericles y Alcibiades», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 209-218.**

Con base en cuestiones de índole jurídica y de manera transversal, los autores revisan la ascendencia que una determinada tipología de mujeres ejerce en ciertos mandatarios fundamentales de Atenas. Esta caracterización, donde las mujeres correspondientes son tratadas de manera generosamente cortés por el

de Queronea, trasciende el papel que desempeñan las féminas para incidir en los modos sobrios del poder soloniano frente a los excesos desmedidos de la Atenas finisecular. (V.R., S.V.)

- M. GONZÁLEZ GONZÁLEZ, «El paisaje funerario griego a través de algunos textos de Plutarco (Solón 21.1, 5-7; Temístocles 32. 4-6; Foción 22.1-2)», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 91-109.**

Los pasajes objeto del presente estudio, correspondientes a tres mandatarios significativos de sendas épocas relevantes en el ámbito de la Antigüedad ateniense, permiten vertebrar el análisis que Plutarco modela sobre el arte funerario y establecer las características de la arqueología funeraria en la cultura del Ática, donde las indicaciones sobre este cometido artístico son complementarias de las reflexiones históricas, religiosas y morales que establece el Queroneense. (V.R., S.V.)

- E. GRITTI, «Come vela al vento: echi letterari e filosofici in alcune immagini dell'anima nei *Moralia* di Plutarco», en *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica*, 47-63.**

Le metafore e le similitudini non sono sempre aggiunte esornative, perché spesso intensificano il concetto espresso. Questo è il caso di due luoghi dei miti presenti nel de genio Socratis e nel de sera numinis vindicta. Nel primo opuscolo è Timarco a narrare la sua esperienza ultraterrena nel momento in cui «la percezione fisica lascia il posto a quella della sola anima che senza più restrizioni fisiche, può vagare mescolandosi all'aria tersa», simile ad una vela che si gonfia per il vento (590C). Più complesso appare il testo del de sera in cui l'anima sbalzata all'improvviso fuori viene paragonata ad un nicchiero sbalzato

fuori dalla sua nave (è necessario qui ricordare che Pohlenz propone di correggere κυβερνήτης, trádito dai codici in κολυμβητής). L'immagine del nocchiero richiama alla mente quella del naufragio che altro non è che il naufragio della ragione. (P.V.)

- G. GUARINO, «La simbologia dei ‘volatilia’ in Plutarco»** *Ploutarchos* N.S. 11 (2014) 57-85.

The animal's multifunctionality in Plutarch is irrefutable: the animal can be object of pseudo-scientific and ethological studies; it can be a symbol, a metaphor, the similitude's object, an instrumentum used to refute the ideas and to persuade the reader, a filo-animalistic object. Interesting is the zoological repertoire's re-use. In other words, the zoological repertoire is reused with a different meaning from its origin and is forced to take those characteristics fixed by the author. In this article I focus on the description of some birds that have their name (in the greek language) starting with the letter alpha, such as the eagle, the cormorant and the nightingale. (Abstract published)

- G. GUARINO, «La φιλοστοργία negli animali: l'exemplum plutarcheo del ἄρκτος»**, *Euphrosyne* N.S. 42 (2014) 49-66.

Il testo mira ad illustrare come una virtù quale l'amore per la propria prole possa appartenere anche alle bestie feroci. È l'orsa: essa è la bestia più selvaggia, spesso simbolo di violenza e di paura; ma quando partorisce, ella dà alla luce creature incomplete, deformate. Solo modellando le membrane con la lingua, quasi fosse uno scalpello, l'orsa giunge a dare forma ai suoi piccoli: l'animale quindi dà l'impressione non solo di generare i propri cuccioli ma anche di modellarli, forgiarli rendendoli idonei alla vita. (S.A.)

- A. GUEDES FERREIRA, «Por trás de um**

grande homem há sempre uma grande mulher? A influência de esposas e amantes sobre homens de Estado», en Plutarco entre mundos, 191-208. [«Behind a great man is there always a great woman? The influence of wives and lovers over statesmen»]

That the sociopolitical status of women in Greco-Latin antiquity is commonly described as inferior to man is something confirmed by the reading of Plutarch's Vitae, because none of them has a female figure as its protagonist. However, although the concept of gender equality was oblivious to the Greco-Roman worldview, it is consider that, as it happened over the centuries until women reached this alleged equality, some of them played a key role in political and social events of their communities. In this paper, is considered not only those who had a proactive role, acting behind their men, but also those who, having no psychological profile to intervene directly, were used as weapons of attack by opponents of their respective husbands, in either Greece or Rome. [from the published abstract]

- O. GUERRIER, «The Renaissance in France: Amyot and Montaigne», en A Companion to Plutarch, 544-548.**

En los siglos XV y XVI comienzan a abundar las traducciones y ediciones de las obras de Plutarco. En la recepción de las obras de Plutarco en Francia ocupa un lugar privilegiado la traducción de Amyot, quien en 1547 dio inicio a su versión francesa de las Vidas Paralelas, publicada en 1559, con diversas reediciones que dan fe de su inmenso éxito. Ello animó a Amyot respecto de los Moralia y en 1572 publicó su traducción, la cual, asimismo, fue reimpressa en numerosas ocasiones. Entre los lectores de Amyot destaca Montaigne, quien selecciona pasajes de Plutarco en más de

quinientas ocasiones y usa sus escritos con diversas finalidades. El Profesor Guerrier acompaña los datos de un riguroso análisis de las características de las ediciones y traducciones en Francia de la obra de Plutarco, así como de su éxito e influencia, donde ocupa un lugar preeminente la obra de Montaigne. (A.V.)

R. HIRSCH-LUIPOLD, «Religion and Myth», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 163-176.

Estudio de la posición respecto de los fenómenos religiosos e irreligiosos (superstición, ateísmo, etc) que Plutarco adopta y análisis de la teología que el *Queronense* elabora. Por otra parte, dado que Plutarco incorpora tradiciones míticas procedentes de diversos pueblos y religiones tanto en las Biografías como en los *Moralia*, se presenta aquí su forma, uso y función, así como la relación de estos relatos míticos con distintos aspectos intrínsecos de su obra. (A.V.)

F. JOURDAN, «Woher kommt das Übel?: Platonische Psychogonie bei Plutarch», *Ploutarchos* 11 (2014) 87-121.

According to Plutarch, the cause of evil is not the demiurge's will, that is the divine, nor is it matter or the World-soul, but the precosmic, ungenerated evil soul which is at the origin of the World-soul. This very original interpretation of a passage from the *Timaeus* in which Plato describes the formation of the soul (Tim. 35a) is not merely supported by a partisan interpretation of the famous pages of the *Laws* (X 896 E-898D). Its origin can be situated in a version of Plato's text circulating in the Old Academy since Xenocrates. The paper aims at throwing some light on the way in which this exegesis of *Timaeus* 35a - possibly inheriting from an already rewritten text - enables Plutarch to develop his views on the origin of evil:

on the cosmic as well as on the human levels, evil is always first, innate and already here, whereas the good, whose origin is divine and intelligible, is a gift coming from the outside. In the process, the paper also intends to give credit to Plutarch against Proclus and his attacks aimed at his exegesis. (Author's abstract)

E. KECHAGIA-OVSEIKO, «Plutarch and Epicureanism», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 104-120.

La filosofía epicúrea así como personajes adeptos a ella aparecen en numerosos escritos de Plutarco. Su actitud hacia esta corriente era generalmente hostil y los tratados conservados que Plutarco consagró por entero al epicureísmo son polémicos. Para aclarar la postura del polígrafo respecto de esta corriente y los esfuerzos que dedicó a criticarla, este capítulo analiza el trasfondo filosófico que subyace en la obra de Plutarco y el lugar que el epicureísmo ocupa en él, para lo cual estudia en profundidad los tres tratados anti-epicúreos conservados. (A.V.)

F. KLOTZ, «The Sympotic Works», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 207-222.

Comienza este capítulo con la importante obra sobre este tema, *Charlas de sobremesa*, y después se centrará en el Banquete de los siete sabios, tratado con una orientación distinta. Se analizan las características y rasgos que estas obras presentan así como las diferencias que entre ellas se perciben. (A.V.)

D. H. J. LARMOUR, «The Synkrisis», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 405-416.

Análisis de las comparaciones que, salvo en cuatro ocasiones, finalizan todas las parejas de biografías. Estas comparaciones están íntimamente ligadas a la experiencia vital de Plutarco como intelectual griego dentro de los confines del Imperio Romano y constituyen el eje del ambicioso e innovador proyecto com-

parativo de las Vidas Paralelas. (A.V.)

- L. LEURINI, «Il 'De Iside et Osiride' di Plutarco nel codice Ambrosianus 448, H 113 sup.», in A. Gostoli, R. Velardi & M. Colantonio (eds.), «*Mythologeîn*»: mito e forme di discorso nel mondo antico: studi in onore di Giovanni Cerri, Pisa, 2014, 355-359.

Lo studioso prende in esame il codice Ambrosianus 448, H 113 sup., in cui si legge anche il trattato plutarco De Iside et Osiride. Tale codice era stato copiato presumibilmente nel 1481 da Johannes Rhosus, il copista che già nel 1455 aveva approntato il codice Gr. 248 (m), che contiene alcune Vite e i Moralia. Il codice Ambrosianus 448, H 113 sup. risulta interessante, poiché il testo del De Iside presenta molti aspetti innovativi, che lo differenziano sensibilmente dai circa venti manoscritti del trattato, sinora studiati, probabilmente tutti riconducibili alla tradizione planudea. Leurini analizza dettagliatamente le discrepanze tra le lezioni dell'Ambrosianus e quelle che si leggono negli altri codici. Le possibili spiegazioni sono due: la prima è che il copista dell'Ambrosianus abbia avuto a disposizione un esemplare appartenente ad un ramo della tradizione non riconducibile a quella planudea; la seconda è che Rhosus si sia avvalso di un modello che apparteneva allo stesso ramo della tradizione del Vindobonensis phil. Gr. 46 (v), in virtù delle numerose lezioni comuni, anche se è da escludere un rapporto di dipendenza diretta dell'Ambrosianus H 113 dal Vindobonensis phil. Gr. 46. (S.C.)

- G. MATINO, «Plutarco e il latino», in A. De Vivo & R. Perrelli (eds.), *Il miglior fabbro: studi offerti a Giovanni Polara*, Amsterdam, 2014, 169-182.

Plutarco, che si era accostato tardi allo

studio dei testi latini, affermava di aver appreso la lingua latina maggiormente attraverso la pratica diretta; ma ciò non gli impediva di poter consultare e comprendere pienamente le fonti latine. In una fase storica in cui Greci e Romani erano strettamente connessi culturalmente e politicamente, un aspetto che premeva al Cheronese era quello di far conoscere e comprendere ai Greci usanze e specificità del mondo romano, che non sempre avevano un corrispettivo nella cultura greca; è il caso, ad esempio, del cognomen romano. Per esprimere concetti non noti al mondo ellenofono, Plutarco ricorre a tre espedienti linguistici, la transcriptio, la translatio e la comparatio; talvolta conia anche nuove parole che meglio possono esprimere tradizioni romane di cui non vi era un equivalente in Grecia. Inoltre Plutarco, come già aveva fatto Polibio, non ostacola, anzi favorisce il processo di acquisizione di termini stranieri in ambito letterario greco. (S.C.)

- A. M. MILAZZO, «Osservazioni esegetiche e testuali ai Moralia di Plutarco», in *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica*, 65-78.

L'autore del saggio conduce un esame ecdotico su alcuni passi dei Moralia proponendo nuove esegesi. Ad esempio, a Mor. 957F propone πάντοθεν al πάντοτε dei manoscritti, che non si addice alla comprensione del testo e di cui già Sandbach dubitava l'autenticità. Articolata è la discussione riguardante Mor. 985B, ove ricorre il termine Κρηθεύς forse per ὁ Κρητεύς συγγραφεύς. Probabilmente si tratta di Riano di Bene, contemporaneo di Eratostene, secondo Suda, e autore dei Messeniaka, al cui eroe principale, Aristomene, Plutarco aveva dedicato una delle Vite (fr. 12 Sandbach). Ancora Milazzo richiama l'attenzione su Mor. 777 D, un passo di difficile esegesi ma del quale

lo studioso dà una interpretazione convincente, su Parallela minora 310B e su Aetia Graeca 299C. Un passaggio del lavoro è, poi, dedicato al rapporto Plutarco ed Enea di Gaza. (P.V.)

L. MILETTI, «Il De laude ipsius di Plutarco e la teoria ‘classica’ dell’autoelogio», en Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica, 79-99.

Di certo l’autoelogio produce un effetto di odiosità e di fastidio, ma non è disdicevole il lodare sé stessi quando alcune circostanze lo richiedano. «Il primo motivo legittimo di autoelogio si dà nel contesto di una autodifesa (540C-541A) (...) quando si è in condizione di disgrazia (541A-C) (...) quando si è ricevuta una ingiustizia (541C-E) (...) quando si è biasimati per i propri successi». Tale autoelogio legittimo deve anche obbedire ad alcuni espedienti retorici che Plutarco enumera a 541F-544D e deve anche tenere conto dell’uditorio, se è un amico o un oppositore. Miletti prende poi in esame la περιавтоλογία in altri autori come Filodemo di Gadara e Elio Aristide, che considerano l’autoelogio del retore come uno spartiacque tra lui e il suo pubblico, là dove in Plutarco esso è un modo per creare un rapporto alla pari. (P.V.)

J. MOSSMAN, «Tragedy and the hero», en A Companion to Plutarch, 437-448.

Mossman initially outlines Plutarch’s use of tragic patterning to delineate character and as an heuristic for drawing moral lessons. She notes that Plutarch can also juxtapose tragedy in his Lives with other genres, such as Epic or Comedy, to give a more rounded characterisation, citing Alexander as an example, and that theatrical and tragic elements can be used less systematically to delineate a sense of pretence or to heighten the emotion of a moment. In the main body of the article Mossman discusses some of what she sees as harder cases of tragic patterning in

the Lives. She suggests that in Theseus tragedy is constantly introduced in order to be modified, corrected or rejected. In Themistocles she suggests that tragedy accents crucial moments (e.g. Salamis) rather than provides a tragic framework. She sees tragedy as present but not persistent in Alcibiades which she connects with Duff’s argument (Plutarch’s Lives 1999, 205-240) that Plutarch’s Alcibiades resists any categorisation. Lastly, the most extended discussion is of Nicias-Crassus in which she suggests tragedy is more persistent in Crassus than in Nicias. Mossman surveys the tragic elements in Nicias and comments that there are none in Crassus until the end. She suggests that across the pair tragic colouring becomes insistent only after the death of Crassus, and she analyses the ending of Crassus in detail. Overall, the article suggests Plutarch’s versatile use of tragedy and the way in which it contributes to the texture of the Lives. Mossman suggests that Plutarch’s use of tragedy also exposes an interrelation between life and art and the pattern of historical events. She concludes by noting the recognition of Plutarch’s dramatic imagery in the Renaissance and the way in which it was adopted by English readers of Plutarch. (L.F.)

J. MOSSMAN, «The Post-Renaissance Reception of Plutarch in England», en A Companion to Plutarch, 592-597.

Dada la complejidad y extensión del estudio de la recepción de los Moralia en Inglaterra, este capítulo se centra exclusivamente en las Vidas. La influencia de Plutarco sobre la composición del género de la biografía posee unas características definidas que la Profesora Mossman desgrana en diferentes autores ingleses. La más importante contribución de Plutarco al método biográfico en este período es

su moralismo y su defensa del uso de la anécdota y el detalle en la construcción de un carácter, lo cual fue ampliamente imitado en el siglo XVIII. Asimismo, este capítulo se detiene en la influencia del paralelismo con que Plutarco construía sus biografías. (A.V.)

- L. DE NAZARÉ FERREIRA, «Tapeçarias da História de Alexandre Magno no Museu de Lamego», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 123-152. [«Tapestries of the History of Alexander the Great at the Museum of Lamego»]**

Plutarch has been one of the greatest sources for Western literary and artistic culture, and many popular subjects of tapestry weaving are drawn from his writings. After a brief examination of Charles Le Brun's series of Alexander paintings, its sources and its transposition into tapestry cartoons, this study focuses on the series of tapestries History of Alexander the Great belonging to the Museum of Lamego, in order to discuss the selected iconographical themes and the influence of Classical sources. [from the published abstract]

- S. NEVIN, «Negative comparison: Agamemnon and Alexander in Plutarch's 'Agamemnon - Pompey'», *GRBS* 54 1 (2014) 45-68.**

This paper explores Plutarch's technique of comparing Agamemnon and Pompey with Agamemnon and Alexander. It argues for a negative comparison which stresses the failure of the two men to live up to the (moral) standards of their more successful counterparts, helping to demonstrate in particular the key theme of the pair: the personal and civic damage caused by the excessive desire for victory. (C.C.)

- S. T. NEWMYER, «Animals in Plutarch», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 223-234. Los tratados dedicados a animales**

han sido tradicionalmente ignorados o despreciados por la crítica, pero en las últimas dos décadas ha surgido una nueva perspectiva de análisis hacia estas obras, considerando que fueron compuestas no por un biólogo sino por un moralista, debido a lo cual las referencias a los animales en la obra de Plutarco deben estudiarse también desde dicha perspectiva. De este modo se analizan las características y objetivos de los ensayos plutarqueos sobre animales; ello lleva al estudio de las percepciones antiguas que sobre este asunto se daban; asimismo se trata la posición de Plutarco en cuanto a la cuestión de la racionalidad en los animales. (A.V.)

- J. M^a. NIETO IBÁÑEZ, «Plutarco y la crisis oracular del final del mundo antiguo», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 233-249.**

Verificamos un estudio concienzudo que, valiéndose esencialmente (entre otras fuentes notables) del ensayo Sobre la desaparición de los oráculos, ejemplifica una cuestión relevante: Plutarco, pese a su contribución al reverdecimiento de la religión del Apolo delfico, testimonia asimismo el declive de la práctica profética y la crisis de la actividad mántica entre los siglos I y II d.C. En efecto, la incredulidad hacia los oráculos y la conversión de los oráculos tradicionales en teológicos serán factores aprovechados por los Padres de la Iglesia para ilustrar el fin de los oráculos paganos. (V.R., S.V.)

- A. G. NIKOLAIDIS, «Morality, Characterization, and Individuality», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 350-372.**

El Profesor Nikolaidis explora en este capítulo la naturaleza del moralismo y los métodos de caracterización que aparecen en las Vidas, así como sus convicciones acerca de la virtud y el vicio en los Moralia. Comienza con un

breve repaso de los ensayos que, pese a su carácter retórico, revelan en gran medida los aspectos morales que Plutarco defendía. De cada una de estas obras se extraen y explican dichos rasgos morales y de qué modo el Queronense los entendía, todo lo cual aparece ilustrado por el Profesor Nikolaidis con ejemplos extraídos de las Vidas. Continúa el capítulo con el desarrollo del propósito moral de las Vidas, puesto que ofrecen algo más que una simple recopilación de datos sobre la época y el personaje, a saber, una profunda indagación e información acerca de su personalidad, a fin de que los lectores se sientan motivados a evitar o imitar los ejemplos con los cuales pueden reforzar su carácter moral y, por lo tanto, mejorar sus vidas; los protagonistas presentan vicios y virtudes, ya que Plutarco considera que la virtud absoluta es inalcanzable (aunque creía que el hombre por naturaleza se inclina hacia el bien), por lo que sus héroes se extraen de la vida real; lo inalcanzable de una perfección moral y la fragilidad de la naturaleza humana (las cuales Plutarco acepta y comprende en los héroes que describe) se confirman en las comparaciones que cierran la mayoría de las parejas de Vidas. Plutarco redactó sus Vidas con la intención de describir y transmitir caracteres, y los métodos y técnicas compositivas que empleó para revelar el carácter de sus personajes son tan variados que sus retratos biográficos evidencian la personalidad completa de aquellos. (A.V.)

J. OPSOMER, «Plutarch and the Stoics», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 88-103.

La relación de Plutarco con la escuela estoicista ha resultado siempre un tanto ambigua para los investigadores ya que, a pesar de compartir tanto doctrinalmente como respecto del concepto de filosofía

muchas características con el estoicismo, sin embargo, a partir de las obras dedicadas a la polémica anti-estoicista y de los títulos recogidos en el catálogo de Lamprias, da la impresión de ser totalmente hostil a esta escuela. Lo cierto es que el pensamiento de Plutarco es profundamente platónico e incorpora ideas y técnicas ajenas siempre que coincidan con las ideas y prácticas fundamentales del platonismo, por lo que cuando integra ideas estoicas las supedita al marco platónico. Para comprender la situación debe tenerse en cuenta que la afinidad entre platonismo y estoicismo posee complejas raíces históricas. De hecho, Plutarco se esforzó en acentuar las diferencias entre su pensamiento y el estoicista. El Profesor Opsomer destaca y revisa el trabajo de Daniel Babut, imprescindible para comprender la actitud de Plutarco hacia el estoicismo, y, a continuación, parcela su estudio en distintos apartados, comenzando por el profundo pensamiento religioso de Plutarco, para quien la naturaleza de lo divino y nuestra relación con ello son asuntos de los que se preocupa la filosofía; en segundo lugar, trata el determinismo y sus repercusiones sobre la responsabilidad moral; después, se refiere al conflicto entre Plutarco y los estoicos en relación con la composición del alma; a continuación desarrolla este último aspecto, la composición del alma, y su relación con la psicología moral; en quinto lugar, explica cómo el incisivo tono de las obras polémicas se halla en estrecha relación con el género de las mismas, y destaca como objetivos principales de Plutarco en las obras anti-estoicas mostrar las contradicciones de esa doctrina, la inconsistencia entre las vidas de sus seguidores y sus enseñanzas, e incluso la falsedad de algunas de ellas, siendo especialmente crítico con la

teología estoica; finalmente, desarrolla el tratamiento plutarqueo de la histórica disputa entre estoicos y académicos. (A.V.)

M. PADE, «The Reception of Plutarch from Antiquity to the Italian Renaissance», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 531-543.

Estudio de la recepción de la obra de Plutarco desde la Roma Antonina, especialmente a partir de las figuras del orador Frontón y de Sexto, sobrino de Plutarco, maestros ambos de Marco Aurelio y Lucio Vero. Para los escritores romanos resultaron especialmente interesantes los Moralia; por otra parte, en los siglos siguientes, la influencia de Plutarco puede detectarse a partir de la imitación de su lengua, estilo y formas literarias. Si bien de los siglos VII a VIII son más bien escasos los testimonios referidos a Plutarco, a partir de los siglos siguientes experimentó un gran auge la figura del Queronense y sus obras fueron leídas de forma continuada durante el período Bizantino. En Occidente no parece que sus obras estuviesen en circulación durante la Edad Media, aunque su nombre sigue apareciendo en algunos autores y, a partir del siglo XII, comenzó a surgir en contextos nuevos. A partir del siglo XIV comienzan a circular traducciones de obras de Plutarco, entre las que destaca la traducción de las Vidas al aragonés por parte de Juan Fernández de Heredia. Y es en el Humanismo italiano del siglo XV cuando la influencia del Queronense se expande ampliamente y adquiere gran popularidad. (A.V.)

P. PAYEN, «Plutarch the Antiquarian», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 235-248.

Aunque los escritos de Plutarco no se catalogan como obras anticuarias, sin embargo en su pensamiento y en sus composiciones se advierte la constante

presencia del conocimiento anticuario. En primer lugar se realiza en este capítulo un análisis del concepto de anticuario y cómo se ha entendido entre los antiguos y los modernos, para pasar, a continuación, a desarrollar la erudición anticuaria que subyace tanto en Vidas como en Moralia. (A.V.)

CH. PELLING, «Political Philosophy», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 149-162.

Plutarco utilizó la teorización política tradicional, especialmente la platónica, como base de datos para la composición de sus escritos. Los dos ensayos políticos más importantes, en los que se centra el desarrollo de este capítulo, son Sobre si el anciano debe intervenir en política y Consejos políticos, en los que, a través del análisis realizado, se percibe una mentalidad similar a la que se encuentra en las Vidas. (A.V.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «The Reception of Plutarch in Spain», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 556-576.

El Profesor Pérez Jiménez recorre la recepción de la obra de Plutarco desde su descubrimiento en España. Este estudio abarca sus límites geográficos actuales, sin abordar la rica influencia ejercida por el polígrafo en escritores o políticos nacidos en Latinoamérica, dado que precisaría un análisis propio y específico. En la Edad Media española había poca información disponible acerca de Plutarco. Sin embargo, pueden destacarse las figuras de Juan Fernández de Heredia y Alonso Fernández de Palencia, cuyas traducciones de Vidas Paralelas al aragonés y al castellano respectivamente abrieron el camino a una más intensa penetración de la influencia plutarquea en la literatura española. La creación de las primeras cátedras de Griego en las universidades españolas a principios del siglo XVI

impulsó en cierta medida la actividad traductora de la obra de Plutarco (puede leerse en este capítulo una revisión de las más destacadas entre los años 1500 y 2010). La influencia de Plutarco se revela importante en el campo de la pedagogía, la teología y el pensamiento filosófico y moral, dado que desde los Siglos de Oro destacaban en la educación tres tópicos, a saber, los niños, las mujeres y los políticos, asuntos sobre los que Plutarco compuso significativas obras. Además, cabe destacar la presencia de Plutarco en la literatura emblemática tan bien representada en España. Igualmente relevante resulta la influencia del polígrafo sobre los escritos de corte moral y filosófico, especialmente en relación con los tratados morales y teológicos y con la diatriba filosófica. Ello se explica por la aceptación que la Iglesia hizo de un autor pagano debido a la presencia del pensamiento conservador platónico y por haber sido leído por Padres de la Iglesia como Clemente de Alejandría, San Basilio o San Juan Crisóstomo. Es también señalada su presencia en la literatura ensayística desde los primeros cultivadores del género. Respecto de la biografía, el modelo plutarqueo puede rastrearse ya en las obras españolas desde el siglo XV, si bien la época dorada de este género tuvo lugar durante los siglos XVIII y XIX, donde Plutarco resultó de nuevo clave. Incluso en el teatro español desde el siglo XVI se muestra la fortuna de Plutarco, e igualmente tuvo un significativo impacto en los novelistas, como se aprecia en grandes figuras como Cervantes, Lope de Vega o Baltasar Gracián, una influencia que ha continuado presente en este género hasta nuestros días. Finalmente, incluso puede detectarse cierto reflejo

de los héroes y temas plutarqueos en la poesía española desde el siglo XV. Este capítulo se acompaña de una serie de imágenes de obras representativas que muestran pasajes ilustrativos de la recepción de Plutarco en España. (A.V.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «Plutarco y la iconografía monetaria antigua», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 31-68.

Mediante el análisis de los testimonios que, sobre la iconografía monetaria en la Antigüedad, Plutarco proporciona tanto en las Vidas como en los Moralia, detectamos el conocimiento que el Querense facilita sobre monedas griegas y romanas, sobre sus tipos y valores. Con todo, la familiaridad de Plutarco con las monedas y la iconografía trasciende el carácter anecdótico o de mera indicación que ofrece incidentalmente la fuente literaria. En efecto, las escenas presentes en las distintas acuñaciones monetarias pueden haber sugerido, secundariamente, la selección del material literario o incluso haber contribuido conscientemente a la redacción de algunos pasajes pertinentes. (V.R., S.V.)

A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «La filiación en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco. Interpretación ética y política de los hijos de los dioses», en P. de Navascués Benlloch, M. Crespo Losada, A. Sáez Gutiérrez (eds.), *Filiación. Cultura pagana, religión de Israel, orígenes del cristianismo*, vol. V, Madrid, 2014, 127-137.

Concebida la filiación familiar como una eusébeia cardinal ante los hombres y los dioses, Pérez Jiménez selecciona ejemplos pertinentes de las Vidas Paralelas que cobran importancia en el esquema de Plutarco, donde observamos tres funciones ético-literarias de relevancia incidental: la personalidad del padre explica parcialmente la etopeya del héroe biografiado; la semblanza

ética del héroe contrasta con la del padre; la filiación familiar estimula ciertas pautas de comportamiento en el personaje biografiado. Por lo demás, la posible o pretendida filiación divina de algunos héroes (el caso de Alejandro es paradigmático) resulta a menudo un aspecto racionalizado por Plutarco, donde la rentabilidad o propaganda política no es ajena a la circunstancia mencionada. (V.R., S.V.)

- A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, «Erasmus, un nuevo Plutarco del Renacimiento», *Academia y Humanismo. Las Academias y Reales Academias de Málaga*, Málaga, 2014, 144-163.**

Pérez Jiménez establece un sugestivo paralelismo entre la actividad biográfica e intelectual de Plutarco y la de Erasmo, al punto de que bien podrían conformar un esquema de 'Vidas Paralelas'. La efervescencia cultural de Plutarco y de Erasmo en sus correspondientes épocas, la repercusión cultural de su producción escrita, la combinación entre el compromiso filosófico-teológico y la libertad responsable de los seres humanos, el papel de instructores o consejeros políticos para los príncipes del Estado, todo ello permite establecer una conexión íntima entre la labor de Plutarco y la de Erasmo quien, como cabía esperar, se nutrió de la vastísima obra del Queroneense para su formación e intención didáctico-moral. (V.R., S.V.)

- J. PINHEIRO, «O valor da filosofia e da paideia: a construção moral e retórica de Plutarco», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 119-135. [«The value of philosophy and of paideia: Plutarch's moral and rhetorical constructions»] *Plutarch's Vitae and Moralia allow us to establish a very close relationship between paideia and sophia in politics.***

In fact, in the process of constituting the ethos, Plutarch values an individual's education, because paideia contributes to an active civic engagement. Having this in mind, we intend to reach a definition of the philosopher's qualities and paideia and to analyse the way he can help or even intervene in the politeia, once Plutarch's argumentation preserves the memory of the philosophers of the past who distinguished themselves by their influence on politicians. Plutarch, educator of Europe, offers us a social framework in which philosophy, through ethics, paideia and politeia, makes itself visible through its dynamics. [from the published abstract]

- S. POSTIGLIONE, «La struttura dialogica del Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum: ruoli e funzione dei personaggi», en *Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica*, 101-133.**

Il Non posse può essere ascritto al gruppo dei dialoghi plutarchei di carattere "diegetico", «nei quali la conversazione è riferita da uno dei partecipanti ed è lo stesso Plutarco che ha preso parte alla conversazione a riferirla a distanza di tempo». Nell'opuscolo, il filosofo di Cheronea intende riassumere i discorsi scaturiti tra gli allievi dopo la conclusione della lezione, usando una struttura argomentativa basata sulla presentazione di discorsi che prospettano differenti opinioni sul tema trattato e ponendo -secondo lo schema platonico- i discorsi più importanti e più vicini alla verità verso la fine del dialogo. Delle argomentazioni di Aristodemo e di Teone è Plutarco a farsi da garante, confortando le affermazioni dell'allievo con la propria autorità. (P.V.)

- S. POSTIGLIONE, «Il 'Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum': alcune note testuali», *Ploutarchos* N.S. 11 (2014)**

123-134.

This article is based on some text annotations related to parts of the first chapters of the anti-epicurean polemic work Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, written by Plutarch. Far from proposing a conclusive inference about some of the controversial interpretations made out of Plutarch's work, this article aims - on the contrary - to present some observations of the text for contributing to further discussions on this matter. (Abstract published)

- J. RIBEIRO FERREIRA, «As artes plásticas em Plutarco: três exemplos, quatro obras, três autores», en O sábio e a imagem, 19-29. [«The visual arts in Plutarch: three examples, four works, three authors»]**

The surviving original Greek sculptures are scarce, and even Roman copies are not numerous. Epigraphical and literary sources are thus fundamental, specially the later ones, because they provide helpful information on the authorship of works and their description. On this issue, the writings of Plutarch should not be dismissed. Since it is not possible to analyze all the works mentioned in the Plutarchan corpus, this study focus on a number of passages on three Greek sculptors, in order to examine four sculptures made in the period between the Fifth Century and the Hellenistic Era, but now lost: the Doryphoros of Polykleitos, the Theseus and the Jokasta of Silanion, and the portrait of Demosthenes made by Polyektos. [from the published abstract]

- C. J. RICHARD, «Plutarch and the Early American Republic», en A Companion to Plutarch, 598-610.**

Durante los principios de la era republicana americana Plutarco se consideró con frecuencia un valioso instructor en moralidad y en republicanismo. Las tra-

ducciones de las Vidas circulaban abundantemente, lo cual extendió el conocimiento de la historia griega y romana incluso a aquellos que no podían permitirse una rigurosa educación clásica y a quienes veían interrumpida o abreviada su educación por diversas circunstancias. Este capítulo establece el alcance de esa influencia en personajes relevantes de la época y las consecuencias posteriores que pueden observarse. (A.V.)

- R. ROCHA JÚNIOR, «A Esparta de Plutarco entre a guerra e as artes», en Plutarco entre mundos, 159-172. [«Plutarch's Sparta between war and the arts»]**

The city of Sparta is reputed to have been a highly militarized society. However, Sparta was not a city dedicated solely to war throughout antiquity. In the seventh century BC, Sparta was an important artistic center that attracted foreign poets and probably had its own talents. These two images are present in the work of Plutarch: in the Lives of the Laconian leaders Lysander, Agesilaus, Agis and Cleomenes, and in other writings from the Moralia dedicated to Sparta, on the one hand, and the book On Music, on the other hand. The author discusses selected passages in the Plutarchan corpus where may be found these two images of Sparta society. [from the published abstract]

- A. ROSELLI, «Un'imbarcazione agile e leggera. Plut. de tuenda sanitate e il regime salutare per uomini politici e intellettuali», en Plutarco: linguaggi e retorica, 135-153.**

Il de tuenda sanitate non si presenta come una raccolta di precetti, ma piuttosto è una guida per philologoi e politikoi che desiderano trovare «un punto di equilibrio tra l'ideale filosofico di un regime rigoroso ed austero (...) e il regime

disordinato e portato all'eccesso». L'opuscolo è diviso in due sezioni: nella prima si discute del rapporto medicina-filosofia, rapporto che aveva conosciuto momenti di conflittualità; nella seconda (capp. 16-27) vi è invece una trattazione più sistematica delle varie pratiche ritenute salutari, per rendere il corpo agile simile ad una imbarcazione che naviga libera senza zavorra. L'intento pertanto è quello di offrire insegnamenti per giungere a comportamenti giusti e idonei alla costruzione della propria personalità e, perché ciò si possa realizzare, si ricorre ad exempla, a citazioni poetiche, a gnomai e alle numerose similitudini che la Roselli evidenzia e discute nel suo lavoro. (P.V.)

G. ROSKAM, «Philanthropy, Dignity, and Euergetism», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 516-528.

Dado que los ideales políticos de Plutarco son sin duda relevantes para una completa comprensión de sus Vidas, debe prestarse atención a sus obras políticas, especialmente a sus Consejos Políticos. Además, en este estudio el Profesor Roskam señala que debe tenerse en cuenta la situación política que Plutarco vivió, ya que ésta influyó ciertamente sobre su perspectiva a la hora de componer su obra biográfica. En el siglo II las ciudades griegas se hallaban bajo dominio del imperio romano y, sin duda, preocupó a Plutarco lo que los políticos locales podían aprender o aplicar a partir de la lectura de las Vidas. Atendiendo a la situación histórica, Plutarco reparó en las obligaciones y conductas apropiadas del político rico por una parte y, por otra, del pobre. Así pues, debe analizarse cuál era el ideal político en opinión de Plutarco, donde resultaban esenciales la virtud personal y la retórica persuasiva; por otra parte, debe estudiarse la opinión

*del Queronense acerca del evergetismo y la forma en que debía aplicarse; además, debe repararse en que la adecuada mezcla de *semmotēs* y *philanthrōpía* representa el ideal plutarqueo. (A.V.)*

M. T. SCHETTINO, «The use of historical sources», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 417-436.

Schettino argues that for Plutarch the historicity of facts was not secondary to his moral/ethical concerns. She also suggests that we should not underestimate the credibility of Plutarch's reconstructions, and that the historical value of the Lives cannot be separated from their ethical and moral value. She identifies that Plutarch uses 135 historians in the Lives, of whom 100 wrote in Greek. Schettino surveys the Greek and Roman sources used for the Lives and argues that the reception of historians in antiquity influenced Plutarch's selection. Schettino considers Plutarch's knowledge of Latin, which she argues, on the basis of comparison between Plutarch and Sallust on Catiline, allowed him to read, critique and transpose important Latin passages. She uses the Crassus to demonstrate Plutarch's adaptation and interpretation of his sources. She shows that where multiple sources existed for Plutarch he used them but often in different ways (e.g. directly or indirectly), and that he showed a concern with considering opposing sources. She suggests Plutarch preferred contemporary sources for drawing his portraits, arguing from the use of Polybius in Philopoemen, and looks at where the same sources are used in different Lives. She considers the use of Aristotelian Constitutions, especially of Athens and Sparta, arguing that his ethical-moral portraits conditioned the use of these texts. Lastly, she compares Plutarch and Tacitus on the presentation of Galba. (L.F.)

T. A. SCHMITZ, «Plutarch and the Second Sophistic», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 32-42.

Schmitz discusses the relationship between Plutarch and the Second Sophistic. Beginning from Plutarch's apparent rhetorical education and training, evidenced in his surviving rhetorical and declamatory pieces, Schmitz goes on to argue that these works were marginal within Plutarch's corpus. Having defined the Second Sophistic, Schmitz shows that Plutarch was chronologically and geographically marginal to the existence of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, Schmitz shows that Plutarch was aware of the emerging trends which would develop into the phenomenon of the Second Sophistic. Schmitz surveys Plutarch's use of the term Sophist, and its cognates, to illuminate Plutarch's representation of these figures and their activities, as well as the influence of Platonic images of Sophists on Plutarch. Schmitz demonstrates the, that for Plutarch consistency of presentation was less important than the ideological concerns of particular works. Nevertheless, some consistent features are identified by Schmitz, who argues that for Plutarch the key features of Sophists are competitiveness and ambition. Associated with these are also a concern for empty pedantry at the expense of serious philosophical concerns. For Schmitz, Plutarch's physical displacement from the phenomenon of the second Sophistic is of less importance than his ideological detachment. Schmitz suggests that Plutarch constructs the Second Sophistic as a foil to serious philosophical pursuits such as his own and that the picture of the Second Sophistic, such as it is, in Plutarch's writings is a distorted one. (L.F.)

CH. SCHUBERT, «Die Method der Atthidographen: die Kleidemus-Fragmente

in der 'Theseus-Vita' des Plutarch», *Mnemosyne* 67 (2014) 930-952.

In the Life of Theseus Plutarch cites long passages from the Atthis of Cleidemus. These passages can exemplify the relationship between myth, fiction and historiography in the Atthides. The initial hypothesis of the present study was that the works of the Atthidographers may demonstrate a historical method, which gains its coherence from the description of cause and effect, the causal sequence of events and the chronological arrangement. This runs counter to the current opinion, which classifies the method of the Atthidographers as pseudohistorical or paradoxographical. This opinion is based on the fact that many, and to the last detail embellished, myths characterise the representations of Athenian history especially in the Atthis of Cleidemus. But if one compares the fragments of Cleidemus in Plutarch's Theseus-Vita with other fragments of Cleidemus (FGrH No. 323 F8 on the naucraries and FGrH No. 323 F21 on Themistocles), one can see that at least Cleidemus practiced in his Atthis an integration of myth and political history, that shows a consciously reflected methodological claim to historiography. (Author's abstract)

R. SCUDERI, «La coppia plutarchea Demetrio-Antonio: un antimodello», in A. Gonzales, M.T. Schettino (eds.), *L'idealisation de l'autre. Faire un modèle d'un anti-modèle*, Besançon, 2014, 285-310.

All'inizio della Vita di Demetrio Plutarco chiarisce che per il lettore non solo è utile conoscere gli esempi di uomini del passato che si erano distinti per virtù ed azioni encomiabili, ma è importante anche apprendere a quali sventure ed esiti rovinosi possa

condurre uno stile di vita improntato alla dissolutezza e alla mancanza di autocontrollo. Plutarco non disconosce la presenza di qualità apprezzabili in Demetrio ed Antonio, tuttavia tali note positive vengono gradualmente offuscate dal prevalere di eccessi nel vizio. Tra gli aspetti pregevoli della personalità di Demetrio si annoverano la devozione verso il padre ed i familiari, la generosità, il valore militare e la capacità di contrastare l'imprevedibilità della sorte con risolutezza e tenacia. Progressivamente, però, la condotta misurata ed equilibrata del Poliorcete degrada e si manifestano comportamenti caratterizzati dalla ὕβρις: disdegna le incombenze legate alla sua carica di re e si mostra sempre più incline alla sfrenatezza. Anche la personalità di Antonio si caratterizza per la presenza di contrasti evidenti tra virtù e vizi. Da un lato sono innegabili la liberalità, la perizia in ambito militare, la capacità di instaurare un rapporto di lealtà e fiducia reciproca con le truppe ed anche il saper reagire ai rovesci della sorte, al pari di Demetrio; dall'altro lato Antonio, sin da quando era un giovinetto, aveva mostrato di essere facilmente influenzabile dagli amici nelle sue scelte; ed è proprio l'incontro con Cleopatra, capace di orientare e condizionare lo stile di vita e le decisioni di Antonio, che determina la rovina del condottiero, oramai dedito ai piaceri sfrenati. In conclusione, anche in altre coppie biografiche si possono ritrovare episodi, in cui Plutarco evidenzia alcuni tratti deprecabili nel comportamento dei personaggi, ma la coppia Demetrio-Antonio incarna appieno un esempio di anti-modello. (S.C.)

N. SIMÕES RODRIGUES, «Alexandre entre paixões femininas e masculinas: di-

gressões plutarquianas pelo cinema», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 153-172. [«Alexandre between female and male passions: Plutarchean digressions in Cinema»]

The paper studies Alexander's sexuality representation in the cinema, more specifically in the films by Rossen (1956) and Stone (2004). Based on the Plutarchean Life of Alexander, these movies did not yet renounce to elements mentioned by other ancient sources, adapting the plots to the taste and interests of the times in which they were produced. Thus, after a review of the role of the women in the life of Alexander, the author also studies the presence of the male characters and the erotic-amorous relationships that the Macedonian general kept with them. Despite Love and Sexuality are not major themes in ancient biographies of Alexander, modern readings of the general's life did not renounce to the issue, by making readings and representations according to the tastes of contemporary audiences. [from the published abstract]

P. SIMÕES RODRIGUES & P. DELAYTI TELLES, «Alexandre e o corpo eterno do rei», en *O sábio e a imagem*, 113-121. [«Alexander and the Eternal Body of the King»]

Based on Ernst H. Kantorowicz's thesis of the King's two bodies, which separates the monarch's political, symbolical and immortal body of the natural and mortal, the authors discuss the iconic role of Alexander of Macedonia representations in the Visual Arts between the 16th and 18th centuries. They demonstrate how, in the considered time frame, the figure of Alexander embodied the qualities attributed by the political literature to the ideal King since the Late Middle Ages. The identification of Alexander with the figure of the ideal King led to a recurrent presence

of the episodes of his life, as recounted by Plutarch in the Parallel Lives and by other ancient authors, in painting and in tapestry, in which they were represented with a clear propagandistic intent of affirmation of the royal power. [from the published abstract]

C. SOARES, «Childhood and youth», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 373-390.

Soares surveys the terms which Plutarch uses to refer to children and youths, including: brephos, nepios, paidion, paidarion, pais, antipais, meirakion, neos, neanias, neaniskos, and ephebos. She demonstrates that the use of these terms is not systematic, but that many are used imprecisely and some synonymously. She also looks at Plutarch's view of life stages: pais, (meirakion – Alc. 1.4), aner, geron, and at terms for the abstract notion of childhood. Her subsequent concerns are not with education in childhood or with the portrait of a youth as a heuristic within an individual Life. Her concerns are sociological, considering Plutarch's views on the nature of children and young men. She sees Plutarch's presentation of his subjects' youth as conditioned in part by cultural factors and in part by his methodological considerations. Soares argues that Plutarch is especially interested in the appearance of children and the young. She also discusses the psychological portraits Plutarch draws, commenting upon a range of features which she sees as characteristic of the young in Plutarch. Some examples are philodonia, a proneness to violence, lack of courage, courage, impulsiveness, philoneikia, philotimia, a desire to please, and innocence. For Soares, in Plutarch youth is conceived as a formative process contingent upon experience. She sees in Plutarch's treatment of youth his ability to draw out universal traits and individual traits of different life stages. (L.F.)

PH. A. STADTER, «Plutarch and Rome»,

en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 13-31.

Este capítulo expone la relación de Plutarco con el mundo romano, el análisis de los objetivos y consecuencias de sus viajes a Roma, sus relaciones con personajes romanos y su influencia sobre griegos y romanos a partir de su sacerdocio en Delfos, con la ilustración de la imagen de Roma y de la forma de vida bajo el imperio romano en las Vidas Paralelas. (A.V.)

PH. A. STADTER, «Plutarch's compositional technique: the anecdote collections and the 'Parallel lives'», *GRBS* 54 4 (2014) 665-686.

Stadter considers Plutarch's anecdote collections and their relationship to the composition of the Parallel Lives. He argues that the Apophthegmata Laconica, is not a product of excerpting from Lives. For Stadter, the collection represents one of several types of preliminary research materials used by Plutarch in composing the Lives. A close study of the Megabates and Agesilaos anecdote in Xenophon, the Ap. Lac. and Plutarch's Agesilaos shows the careful shaping of the material by Plutarch in different contexts. Stadter also shows that 3 of the 40 anecdotes in Plutarch's Agesilaos have been moved from their location in Ap. Lac., giving greater prominence and a different interpretation to the anecdotes. Stadter argues that the Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum represents a different sort of text. For Stadter, this text is not simply a result of Plutarch's research, but a text polished and published by Plutarch; it would have itself resulted from the sort of collections of which Ap. Lac. is an example. Close analysis of examples in Lives and the Ap. Reg., are used by Stadter to show the flexibility with which Plutarch used his historical sources. Lastly, Stadter

suggests that Plutarch's procedure for preparing his historical narrative was likely similar to his method with the anecdotes: preparing his material and ordering it into a working draft which could be used also in arranging the narrative of a paired Life. (L.F.)

- Z. STAMATOPOULOU, «Hesiodic poetry and wisdom in Plutarch's 'Symposium of the Seven Sages'», *AJPh* 135 4 (2014) 533-558.**

Stamatopoulou examines the presentation of Hesiod and his poetry in Plutarch's Symposium of the Seven Sages. She begins by looking at the tradition of the contest between Homer and Hesiod as a precursor to analysing Plutarch's presentation of this episode in his Symposium. Stamatopoulou discusses the differences between Plutarch's presentation and the tradition and argues that the presentation in Plutarch praises Hesiod's wisdom but with reference to a custom which is shown to have become obsolete: riddle-solving. Plutarch, Stamatopoulou argues, therefore shows the custom to be of less importance than other intellectual customs and thereby shows the cultural and intellectual shift between the world of Hesiod and that of the sages. Hesiod is thus, she argues, both praised for his wisdom and simultaneously marginalised as limited and outdated. This in turn serves to bring into relief the new intellectual world of Plutarch's historical fiction. Stamatopoulou continues to consider the references in Plutarch's text to Hesiodic poetry. She argues that this too is shown respect and praise, but that it is used to set the sages of Plutarch's Symposium apart: Hesiodic advice in his poems is deemed valuable for some but not relevant to the intellectual world of Plutarch's sages. This article, then, argues that Plutarch's treatment of Hesiod in this

text is ambivalent: Hesiod is praised and respected but also marginalised. (L.F.)

- W. J. TATUM, «Antiquarianism and its uses: Plutarch's 'Roman Questions' and his 'Lives' of early Romans», *Athenaeum* 102 1 (2014) 104-119.**

This article examines different ways in which Plutarch employs antiquarian material in his Roman Questions and his biographies of early Romans. It is argued that Plutarch uses antiquarian material to evoke and to some extent imitate the literary texture of the Roman historians; to denote that Rome was more ancient than it was actually was; to punctuate his narrative and signal important aspects of the life or character of the heroes of his story; and to stress the extent to which the Romans' awareness of their origins is indebted to Greek learning. (C.C.)

- F. B. TITCHENER, «Fate and Fortune», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 479-487.**

Estudio de los usos y valores que Plutarco tenía del hado (tyche) y cómo lo utiliza a manera de tema y método de caracterización en sus Vidas Paralelas. Con esta intención, se revisa la utilización de este término en distintas parejas de Vidas y en sus comparaciones, así como de qué forma aparece en otros autores, y se relaciona, asimismo, con la capacidad de elección de los personajes. (A.V.)

- M. TRAPP, «The Role of Philosophy and Philosophers», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 43-57.**

Aclaración de determinados aspectos vitales de la filosofía en época imperial como elementos de la cultura greco-romana que resultan difíciles de comprender desde la perspectiva de las modernas nociones sobre la naturaleza y el papel de la filosofía: en este especial contexto desarrolló Plutarco su

particular teoría filosófica. (A.V.)

- K. M. TREGO, «Agesilaus the puppet ? : the effects of thematic development on Plutarch's story of the accession», ICS 39 (2014) 39-62.**

This paper examines Plutarch's narrative of Agesilaus' accession to the throne. Through a detailed analysis of the other sources for this event, mainly Xenophon's Hellenica and Agesilaus, both of which were used by Plutarch, and other Plutarchan Lives relating this event, it shows that Plutarch's version in the Agesilaus places emphasis upon Lysander's role and pares down Agesilaus' own involvement because of Plutarch's development of the theme of friendship throughout the Agesilaus-Pompey book. (C.C.)

- M. TRÖSTER, «Cimone come benefattore panellenico e campione di concordia: una proiezione di Plutarco?», RSA 44 (2014) 9-28.**

The image of Cimon as a historical figure is in large part determined by Plutarch's biographical narrative, which depicts him as an emblematic representative of the traditional aristocracy and as a champion of concord among his fellow citizens as well as the Greeks in general. This portrait lacks plausibility in so far as it does not match the political setting of the fifth century BC, i.e. the logic of Athenian 'imperialism' and the workings of the democratic system. Considering the scarcity of information on Cimon's career and the inherent contradictions of the historical tradition, it is unlikely, however, that Plutarch set out to distort greatly the limited data available to him; rather it appears that he sought to adapt and elaborate the material in such a way as to present a consistent interpretation relevant to his contemporary world.

(Abstract published)

- G. TSOUVALA, «Love and Marriage», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 191-206.**

Amor y matrimonio son tópicos esenciales en el pensamiento plutarqueo que tanto Vidas como Moralia reflejan. Encontramos aquí los rasgos y valores principales que ambos elementos tienen para Plutarco, teniendo en cuenta el aspecto político que el Queroneense les otorga. (A.V.)

- L. VAN DER STOCKT, «Compositional methods in the Lives», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 321-332.**

Van der Stockt has the following concerns in his article: the general architectonic design, structure and building blocks, identification of sources (both literary and non-literary), technique of manipulating sources, the intention of the author. Van der Stockt considers the context of the Lives' composition and suggests it was a time of crisis, in as much as Greece had fallen under Roman control. He discusses the question of whether the parallelism of Greeks and Romans has a political message, surveying some of the existing scholarly arguments. For Van der Stockt, issues of Greek and Roman identity are subordinate to the aim of providing ethical education in the Lives. He discusses the issue of pairings and how they were decided. He looks briefly at some of Plutarch's statements of purpose (Alex. 1.1; Nik. 1.5) and suggests that this purpose in part dictated the selection of subjects alongside the dictates of genre, as there were certain expectations about what should appear in a biography (e.g. origins, achievements and death). He argues the Lives are generally chronological but also include flashes forwards and backwards, which

generate tension and anticipation, and 'digressions', which have various functions. He moves on to discussing sources, and suggests Plutarch used sources carefully and with a clear concern for truth and likelihood. He considers parallel passages in different texts and suggests they reveal underlying hypomnemata. (L.F.)

L. VAN HOOFF, «Practical Ethics», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 135-148.

Conservamos unos veinticinco tratados cuyo contenido es el equivalente antiguo a los actuales libros de autoayuda, en los que principalmente se trata cómo conseguir la felicidad, alcanzar las propias ambiciones o calmar el estrés. Estos tratados los compuso Plutarco para el público general y su estilo nos hace replantearnos la relación del autor con la Segunda Sofística. Este capítulo contiene un estado de la cuestión sobre el estudio de esta particular forma filosófica, una visión general de las tres temáticas desarrolladas (el cuidado de uno mismo, las relaciones familiares y amistosas y las actividades profesionales) y sus principales métodos así como una reflexión acerca de nuestra valoración de Plutarco como filósofo teniendo en cuenta las características y naturaleza de estas obras. (A.V.)

F. VERGARA CERQUEIRA, «Música e educação em Atenas, segundo as biografias de Plutarco», en *Plutarco entre mundos*, 173-189. [«Music and education in Athens according to Plutarch's biographies»]

This study is dedicated to the Athenian musical scene of the late archaic and classical periods from a Plutarchan point of view, focusing on musical education in the sections on the childhood and youth of Athenian generals. The outlined framework shows that musical education was an outstanding

phase in the life of many notable men of the political and military spheres in Athens and Thebes. In order to verify the historical density of Plutarch's biographical narratives, we put in dialogue the Lives and iconographical evidence from vase-paintings produced in Athens during the period in question, based on three topics: development and institutionalization of musical education; musical educators; and the controversy about the aulos in the educational program. [from the published abstract]

A. V. ZADOROJNYI, «Kratein onomatôn: language and value in Plutarch», en *A Companion to Plutarch*, 304-320.

Zadorojnyi's article is about Plutarch's attitude to language and its relationship to his broadly philosophical interests. Zadorojnyi looks across Plutarch's corpus for disparate remarks on language. He suggests that Plutarch polarises linguistic form and essential 'meaning', and that it is the latter upon which Plutarch focuses. Zadorojnyi argues that Plutarch is nevertheless not uninterested in language and stylistics; he suggests, rather, that Plutarch sees in language interpretive and didactic potential, including for the profile of his biographical protagonists. It is in Philosophy that Zadorojnyi sees Plutarch's ultimate test for the relationship between language and meaning, and Zadorojnyi suggests that for Plutarch the possibility of a happy synthesis between wholesome content and attractive style was possible and welcome. Zadorojnyi describes Plutarch's own style as, 'copious and circumstantial, with a penchant for synonyms and abstracts as well as for subtle narrative patterning, and saturated with classical vocabulary, allusiveness, and metaphors.' (p.308).

Zadorojnyi quotes examples to show Plutarch's view that there is an inherent deficiency in all linguistic transmission, not merely the cynical or deceptive. He surveys Plutarch's appreciation of silence and succinct discourse. Zadorojnyi describes Plutarch's own lan-

guage as highly referential, which he connects with Plutarch's awareness of the limitations of language and the attendant value of language which has contiguity with the registers of socio-cultural memory and/or embeddedness in historical context (p.313). (L.F.)

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