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Gylippus in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*: Intratextuality and Readers*

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Abstract

Plutarch's portrayal of Gylippus is consistent both in the *Moralia* and in the *Parallel Lives*. In particular, Gylippus' main traits clearly recall the Spartans' virtues and vices described in the five Spartan *Lives*. Furthermore, the presence of Gylippus as a secondary character in the *Life of Pericles* and in the *Life of Nicias* creates a strong link between these biographies and the *Lives of Lycurgus* and *Lysander*. Different types of readers can variously actualise such intratextual connections. We can infer that the *Parallel Lives* require attentive readers willing to engage actively in the reading process and to interpret the narrative fruitfully, following the author's indications embedded in the texts and activating their history recollection.

Key-Words: Gylippus, Intratextuality, Readers, Aemilius Paulus-Timoleon, Pericles, Nicias, Sparta, *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch.

Introduction

Ancient Sparta is one of Plutarch's favourite topics in the *Parallel Lives*. Five biographies are devoted to Spartan heroes (*Lycurgus*, *Lysander*, *Agesilaus*, and *Agis and Cleomenes*) and discuss in detail the Spartan constitution, society, religion, and politics. In these *Lives,* Plutarch

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narrates the most crucial phases of the history of Sparta: the origin of the city and the foundation of its main political institutions, the end of the Peloponnesian War and its hegemony over the Hellenic world, the crisis in the fourth century BC and the attempt to restore its greatness in the third century BC. After reading these five Spartan *Lives*, one can reasonably infer that Plutarch tried to project a consistent image of 'Spartanness'.

Sparta and illustrious Spartans, however, are present in other *Lives* too. In particular, in some biographies the narrative 'features' Spartan political leaders and rulers as secondary characters in historical episodes 'starring' other (Spartan and non-Spartan) protagonists. In these cases, the relevance of the Spartan characters in the plot may not necessarily correspond to whether they played an important and yet subordinate role in the actual events or to whether they were only marginally involved in them. Sometimes, famous Spartans are even simply mentioned in comparison with the protagonist or some other character of a *Life*, without having any part in the storyline.

In this article, I examine the case of Gylippus, the great Spartan general who won glory against the Athenians during the Sicilian expedition in the fifth century BC, but was later forced into self-exile for embezzling part of the silver (or coined silver money) gained by Lysander as war booty after numerous victories in Asia and Greece[1]. In addition to the probably spurious *De liberis educandis* (10 B), Plutarch refers to Gylippus and his actions in several *Lives*, including the *Life of Lysander* (16-17.1), within both narrative passages and edifying comparisons. I aim to analyse these texts in order to understand which aspects of Gylippus' story are emphasised the most and the readers are more frequently prompted to think of. I will also discuss to what extent, from Plutarch's perspective, Gylippus' behaviour was consistent with the Spartan values portrayed in the

[1] On Gylippus, apart from Plutarch, the main historical sources are Thucydides (6.93.2-3, 104.1-2; 7.1-7, 11.2, 12.1, 21.1-5, 22.1, 23.1-4, 37.2, 42.3, 43.6, 46, 50.1-2, 53.1, 65.1-69.1, 74.2, 79.4, 81-83, 85-86, 8.13.1) and Diodorus Siculus (13.7.2-8.4, 28, 34.3-4, and, especially for the scandal and its consequences, 13.106.8-10), who was certainly influenced by Ephorus. Gylippus is also mentioned by Aelian (*VH* 12.43), Aelius Aristides (*Or*. 5 364, 366, 367, 372, 375; *Or*. 6 379 L.-B.; *Rh*. 1.13.2.1 S.), Isocrates (*Archid*. 6.53), Lucianus (*Hist. Conscr*. 38), Maximus Tyrius (21.3, 23.2), Polyaenus (*Strat*. 1.39.4, 42.1-2), Posidonius (in Ath. 233e-234e=*FGrHist* 87 F 48c), and Seneca (*Nat*. 1.1.14). See J.-F. BOMMELAER, 1981, pp. 36-37 and 201-202, P. CARTLEDGE, 1987, pp. 88-90, 2002[2], pp. 221-225 and 269-270, J. CHRISTIEN, 2002, pp. 174-179, T.J. FIGUEIRA, 2002, pp. 142-144, S. HODKINSON, 1994, p. 198, 2000, pp. 155-157, 165-167, and 172, A. POWELL, 1988, pp. 189-191.

five Spartan *Lives*. I shall investigate, therefore, whether Plutarch considered Gylippus a typical Spartan leader or an exceptional figure, different from the other rulers of Sparta, and how he presented his interpretation to the readers. In this regard, I will try to distinguish between Plutarch's actual readers and the ideal reader, as far as they can be reconstructed from the texts[2]. First, I will focus my attention on some 'isolated' references, which appear in texts whose main subject is neither Gylippus nor Sparta. Subsequently, I will concentrate on Gylippus as a secondary character in the *Lives of Pericles*, *Nicias*, and *Lysander*, where his presence acquires more considerable significance.

'Isolated' references

Gylippus' dramatic downfall made him look a tragic figure, a paradigmatic example of how a single wrongful act could ruin one's outstanding reputation, earned in years of heroic deeds and tremendous success. In this respect, Posidonius added an even more dramatic dimension to Gylippus' ruin by recording his suicide by starvation, a story unknown to the other literary sources and probably fabricated at Sparta for propaganda purposes (Ath. 233f-234a). As David thoughtfully commented, not only was the episode meant to be a warning against greed, but it also reaffirmed Gylippus' ultimate respect for the Spartan values, since he acknowledged his fault and inflicted capital punishment on himself, as decreed by the Spartan court[3]. In Posidonius' view, then, Gylippus embodied Spartanness despite his sad fate.

Plutarch, too, often portrayed Gylippus as emblematic of men's rise to prominence and fall into disgrace. We can begin our analysis of this approach to Gylippus' vicissitudes with the *De liberis educandis*, although this work is usually considered spurious by the majority of modern scholars (10 B):

> By putting their hands to wrongful gains, some men have wasted the good repute of their earlier lives, just as it happened to Gylippus the Spartan, who was banished from Sparta as an exile, because he had secretly undone the bags of money[4].

2 With ideal reader I indicate the image of the ideal recipient of Plutarch's works; the ideal reader "understands the work in a way that optimally matches its structure, and […] adopts the interpretive position and esthetic standpoint put forward by the work" (W. Schmid, 2010, p. 55). On the ideal reader, see U. Eco, 2006[10], pp. 50-66, W. Iser, 1978, pp. 27-38, W. Schmid, 2010, pp. 51-57.

3 E. David, 2002, p. 30.

4 Plu. *De lib. educ*. 10 B: Τὰς χεῖράς τινες ὑποσχόντες λήμμασιν ἀδίκοις τὴν δόξαν τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἐξέχεαν· ὡς Γύλιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὰ σακκία τῶν χρημάτων παραλύσας φυγὰς ἀπηλάθη τῆς Σπάρτης.

As one can notice, there is no introduction to Gylippus. The "bags of money", too, are taken as familiar to the readers: the misappropriation of money, that is, briefly summarised in one single sentence without any detail, is meant to be sufficient to identify the famous Spartan commander and to make him be recognised as an exemplary case of good repute destroyed. The text, then, demands the readers' ability to expand on the very limited data provided and to unpack Gylippus' story once the recollection of Spartan history has been triggered.

In the *Parallel Lives*, another passage in which not much information is given about Gylippus is *Dio*. 49.6. The Spartan Gaesylus' arrival in Sicily to assume command of the Syracusans and to join the admiral Heracleides in fighting against Dion is compared with Gylippus' very similar mission: the defence of Syracuse against the Athenians. In this case too, Plutarch employs a very brief formula: "As Gylippus had formerly done" (ὡς πρότερόν ποτε Γύλιππος). Yet these few words were evidently thought to be enough to remind the readers of Gylippus and to suggest that the Syracusans run the risk of facing the same situation created by the Spartan intervention in the fifth century BC. The parallel with Gylippus implies that the readers activate their prior knowledge of Greek history so as to 'decode' Plutarch's words. Conversely, uninformed readers might not be able to grasp the sense of Plutarch's reference due to its extreme conciseness, so that the sentence would remain obscure.

Analogous succinctness is used again in the formal *synkrisis* between Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon, where Plutarch, loosely citing Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 100c), writes that the Syracusans dismissed Gylippus due to his love of riches (φιλοπλουτία) and greediness (ἀπληστία) (*Comp*. *Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).4)[5]. Gylippus' greed is seen in correspondence with that of other commanders such as the Spartan Pharax and the Athenian Callippus in order to prove that at that time the Greeks, unlike the Romans, had corrupted military leaders who lacked discipline and did not follow the laws (*Comp*. *Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).2-6). In Plutarch's view, Sicily was the place where such moral weakness was completely exposed when the Greeks became directly involved in military interventions. By contrast, therefore, Timoleon's rule distinguished itself as much more virtuous than that of his predecessors (*Comp*. *Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).7).

5 Plu. *Comp*. *Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).4: "Furthermore, Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 100c) says that the Syracusans sent away Gylippus in ignominy and dishonour, as they found him guilty of love of riches and greed while he was general" (Τίμαιος δὲ καὶ Γύλιππον ἀκλεῶς φησι καὶ ἀτίμως ἀποπέμψαι Συρακουσίους, φιλοπλουτίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπληστίαν ἐν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ κατεγνωκότας). See n. 34, n. 39, and n. 41 of this article.

Thus, in the final comparison between Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon the reference to Gylippus aims to illustrate a tendency displayed by all of the Greek commanders of a historical period, and does not allude to a specifically Spartan trait. Interestingly, however, Plutarch uses the word φιλοπλουτία, which is employed again at *Lyc*. 30.5 and *Lys*. 2.6, where the reasons for Spartan decadence are thoroughly discussed. In both passages, Plutarch explains that, by sending to Sparta vast sums of silver and gold obtained in war, Lysander filled the city with love of riches and luxury (τρυφή), acting against Spartan society's long-established distaste for wealth (incidentally, Gylippus' scandal of booty is not cited). In *Agis/Cleom*. 3.1, moreover, even though without mentioning Lysander and Gylippus, Plutarch offers the same analysis of Spartan decay and applies the same or equivalent terms as in the other *Lives*[6]. In Plutarch's view, therefore, the concept of φιλοπλουτία is closely related to Sparta, a topic to which we shall return later in this article[7].

Yet, once again, an uninformed audience, reading only the text of *Comp. Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).4, can hardly regard Gylippus' φιλοπλουτία as a moral fault linked to Lysander's unwise decision and Sparta's decline. Rather, it is plausible to think that the actual readers may *primarily* (though not exclusively) consider the general moral implications of the remark concerning the Spartan *strategos*, without necessarily noticing Plutarch's adaptation of a typically Spartan argument to a broader (non-Spartan) context[8]. The *synkrisis* between

6 Plu. *Agis/Cleom*. 3.1: "After the desire for silver and gold first crept into the city, and also, on the one hand, greed and stinginess followed along with the acquisition of wealth, and, on the other hand, luxury, softness, and extravagance, too, with the use and enjoyment of it, Sparta fell away from most of her noble traits" (ἐπεὶ παρεισέδυ πρῶτον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀργύρου καὶ χρυσοῦ ζῆλος, καὶ συνηκολούθησε τοῦ πλούτου τῇ μὲν κτήσει πλεονεξία καὶ μικρολογία τῇ δὲ χρήσει καὶ ἀπολαύσει τρυφὴ καὶ μαλακία καὶ πολυτέλεια, τῶν πλείστων ἐξέπεσεν ἡ Σπάρτη καλῶν). See p. 16.

7 On φιλοπλουτία connected with Sparta or other Spartan characters, see also Plu. *Comp. Lys.-Sull*. 41(3).7, *Agis/Cleom*. 13.1; cf. *Apopth. Lac*. 239 F. Other literary sources on φιλοπλουτία at Sparta: Ar. *Resp*. 8.550d-551b, D.S. 7.12.8, X. *Lac*. 14. In the *Parallel Lives*, the only other figures characterised by φιλοπλουτία are Crassus (*Crass*. 1.5, 2.1-2, 14.5) and Seleucus (*Demetr*. 32.7-8). Note that Gylippus, the Spartans, and Sparta are never mentioned in the *De cupiditate divitiarum* (in Greek, Περὶ φιλοπλουτίας). See also n. 14 of this article.

8 Plutarch may have followed his typical method of work, using notes (*hypomnēmata*) and preparatory drafts about Sparta and the Spartan characters to write about Gylippus on multiple occasions. Cf. n. 34, n. 39, and n. 41 of this article. On Plutarch's method of work and *hypomnēmata*, see M. Beck, 1999, C.B.R. Pelling, (1979) 2002, 2002, pp. 65-68, P.A. Stadter, 2008, 2014a, 2014b, L. Van der Stockt 1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2004, 2014, pp. 329-330, B. Van Meirvenne, 1999.

Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon, nonetheless, also presupposes that the ideal reader can recognise the wider relevance of love of riches associated with Gylippus and Sparta, exploring it as a recurrent theme that runs through the series of the *Parallel Lives*, especially in the biographies of the Spartan heroes.

To sum up, these first passages, which we have discussed, recall very concisely the defining moments of Gylippus' life (particularly his role in the Sicilian expedition and his later fall), presenting him as a paradigm of military expertise and covetousness. The references to Gylippus can be concretely read with different degrees of understanding (depending on the readers' acquaintance with ancient history, the various literary sources, Plutarch's biographies, and so forth), but do not create *strong* intratextual connections within the *Parallel Lives*, not even with regard to the Spartan *Lives*[9]. Nonetheless, the way in which the comparisons and the comments involving Gylippus are framed postulates that the ideal reader is able to interpret so iconic a historical figure on the basis of a profound historical knowledge and in light of Plutarch's interpretation.

The Life of Pericles

In other *Lives*, Plutarch's comments on Gylippus assume greater significance. Let us take the case of the *Life of Pericles*, where Plutarch recounts the crucial episodes of Gylippus' existence (22.4):

> Cleandrides was the father of Gylippus, who made war against the Athenians in Sicily. Nature, as it were, seems to have passed love of riches on to him as a congenital disease, because of which he, too, being caught acting badly, was shamefully banished from Sparta. These facts, therefore, we have explained in the *Life of Lysander*[10].

The digression about Gylippus is inserted into a narrative section where Plutarch discusses Pericles' strategy against the Spartans. In particular,

9 In reference to the *Parallel Lives*, I prefer the term intratextuality to intertextuality, since I consider the whole series a macrotext, that is, a complex semiotic unit formed by different texts (the *Lives* and the pairs), which maintain their autonomy, but, simultaneously, are in close thematic and formal interrelationship with one another. This definition of macrotext is inspired (with major modifications) by that which M. CORTI, 1975, applied to Italo Calvino's *I racconti di Marcovaldo* and then G. D'IPPOLITO, 1991, applied to the entire Plutarchan corpus.

10 Plu. *Per*. 22.4: οὗτος δ' ἦν πατὴρ Γυλίππου τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμήσαντος. ἔοικε δ' ὥσπερ συγγενικὸν αὐτῷ προστρίψασθαι νόσημα τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἡ φύσις, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς ἐπὶ κακοῖς ἔργοις ἁλοὺς ἐξέπεσε τῆς Σπάρτης. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Λυσάνδρου δεδηλώκαμεν. Cf. n. 34, n. 39, and n. 41 of this article.

Plutarch claims that Pericles had success in avoiding going into open battle when the Spartans, led by Pleistoanax and his advisor Cleandrides, invaded and occupied Attica. By bribing the two Spartan leaders, Pericles made them retreat from the plain of Eleusis (446 BC) (*Per*. 22.1-3). According to some authors, Plutarch adds, this was a recurrent stratagem and every year Pericles used to pay ten talents to induce the Spartans to postpone the war, so that the Athenians could have more time to prepare for the conflict (*Per*. 23.2).

While celebrating Pericles' political shrewdness, Plutarch also directs the readers' attention towards the consequences faced by the Spartan rulers. The Spartans levied a very heavy fine on Pleistoanax, who could not pay it and was consequently exiled[11]. Cleandrides, on the other hand, fled from Sparta and received the death sentence in absentia (*Per*. 22.3). By mentioning Gylippus, Cleandrides' son, Plutarch places emphasis on the continuity between different generations of Spartan political and military leaders, who suffered from love of money (φιλαργυρία) – another key term, synonymous with φιλοπλουτία, which we encountered earlier in this article – as a congenital disease (συγγενικὸν νόσημα)[12]. In this case, therefore, love of money (or love of riches) is not viewed as a moral fault attributed to all of the Greek commanders, as in the *Life of Timoleon*, but as a family characteristic common to Cleandrides and Gylippus.

The cross-reference to the *Life of Lysander*, however, also opens up the possibility of a broader and deeper analysis of φιλαργυρία/φιλοπλουτία as the primary cause of Sparta's moral decadence and subsequent political and social weakness. For Plutarch does not seem to inform the readers only about the completion of an earlier biography where they can find more details about Gylippus, but encourages them to examine *Pericles* and *Lysander* in light of one another as complementary texts[13].

In the *Life of Lysander*, as we will see in the last section of this article, Plutarch offers a more exhaustive

11 On Pleistoanax' levy, cf. Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 193 (at *Scholia Ar. Nu*. 859).

12 Plutarch often described Spartan politics through medical metaphors and images of the body: e.g. Plu. *Comp. Agis/Cleom.-T.G./C.G.* 44(4).3, *Ages*. 3.7, 21.10, 30.1-2, 33.3, *Comp. Ages.-Pomp*. 81(1).2, 82(2).1-3, *Lyc*. 4.4, 5.3, 8.3, *Lys*. 22.11, *Comp. Lys.-Sull*. 39(1).2.

13 On the cross-references inviting to examine the *Lives* and the pairs in close connection with one another, see T.E. Duff, 2011b, pp. 259-262. On cross-references, cf. also A.G. Nikolaidis, 2005, C.B.R. Pelling, (1979) 2002, pp. 7-10. Attempts to read *Lives* and pairs together or against one another: J. Beneker, 2005 (*Caesar*, *Pompey*, and *Crassus* together), B. Buszard, 2008 (*Pyrrhus-Marius* against *Alexander-Caesar*), J. Mossman, 1992 (*Phyrrus* against *Alexander*), C.B.R. Pelling, 2006, 2010, P.A. Stadter, (2010) 2014.

account of how Gylippus tried to steal a large sum of the money that Lysander dispatched to Sparta, after establishing Spartan supremacy in Asia and Greece. He also explains how silver coinage (which bore the forgery of an owl because of the Athenians) was found in Gylippus' house thanks to a tip-off from a servant (*Lys*. 16). More importantly, in addition to Gylippus' exile after the eruption of the scandal, Plutarch describes the reaction of the Spartans (*Lys*. 17). Being worried that Lysander's silver and gold would ruin the entire Spartan body politic, altering irremediably Sparta's traditional aversion to luxury (which was reflected in the Lycurgan constitution), the most prudent (φρονιμώτατοι) of the Spartiates convinced the ephors to introduce an iron currency, which only the state could possess, and to threaten the death penalty to the citizens who accumulated money for private use. Plutarch, however, comments that Lycurgus was not concerned about money per se, but about the greed (φιλαργυρία) caused by it. The Spartans' solution, therefore, was useless, since it was merely based on the fear of the law, while they should have sought to strengthen their souls[14].

By reading *Pericles* in connection with *Lysander*, then, one can plausibly infer that the reference to Gylippus and the Sicilian expedition alludes to the Athenians' change of military strategy in a later phase of the Peloponnesian War and to their inability to exploit the Spartan rulers' love of riches and corruption, something that Pericles managed to do effectively. In Plutarch's view, that is, considering the later crisis of Sparta, Pericles' measures were wiser and more far-sighted than those of his successors, and gave Athens more chances of victory. Furthermore, Pericles was right in restraining the Athenians' immoderate desire to

[14] On the Spartans' radical rejection of wealth and Lycurgus' reforms in this matter, see Plu. *Agis/Cleom*. 5.2, 9.4, 10.2-5, 10.8, 31(10).2, *Lyc*. 8-10, 13.5-7, 19.2-3, 19.11, 24.2-4, *Comp. Lyc.-Num*. 23(1).7, 24(2).10-11, *Lys*. 30.7. On the attempt of Agis and Cleomenes to restore the Lycurgan austerity and to redistribute the land, see Plu. *Agis/Cleom*. 4.2, 6.1-2, 7.2-3, 8, 19.7, 31(10).7-11, 33(12).4-5, *Comp. Agis/Cleom.-T.G./C.G*. 42(2).4. On Sparta and luxury, cf. also n. 7 of this article. In general, on property and wealth in Sparta, cf. *Alc. I* 122d-123b, Ar. *Pol*. 2.1269b21-32, 2.1270a11-29, 2.1271a3-5, 2.1271b10-17, Pl. *Lg*. 3.696a-b, *R*. 8.547b-d, 8.548a-b, 8.549c-d, 8.550d-551b, Plb. 6.45.3-4, 6.46.6-8, 6.48.2-8, X. *Lac*. 7. Among modern scholars, however, there is no consensus on the literary evidence regarding Sparta's disdain for coinage. S. HODKINSON, 2000, especially pp. 155-182, has very convincingly argued that the literary sources (even retrospectively) 'invented' the tradition of Spartan prohibitions against currency because of the political turmoil at the beginning of the fourth century BC. A reassessment of this complex question suggests a situation of increasing inequality in property ownership and wealth among the Spartiates. Cf. also J. CHRISTIEN, 2002, pp. 172-185, T.J. FIGUEIRA, 2002, pp. 138-160. On Plutarch and wealth, see P. DESIDERI, 1985, C.B.R. PELLING, forthcoming.

conquer new territories (*Per*. 21.1-2), an impulse that proved disastrous on the occasion of the enterprise in Sicily (cf. *Nic*. 12.1-2)[15].

On the other hand, by highlighting that both Cleandrides and Gylippus had the same vice of φιλαργυρία and met the same fate, Plutarch also seems to urge the readers to reflect on how differently the Spartans responded to the same type of threat, which came from outside the city. While Pericles' money only influenced Cleandrides' decisions, in the case of Gylippus foreign money (perhaps even Athenian money) produced a major modification of the Spartan customs and broke the unity among the citizens, which Lycurgus' polity had maintained for centuries[16]. Thus, in Pericles's time Spartan society was stronger and readier to defend its values than in the fourth century BC. Yet, this also suggests that Sparta's decline, which was not unavoidable, derived from the Spartans' difficulty to adjust to their new role as hegemonic leaders of the Greek world, a theme that Plutarch develops in the Spartan *Lives* and may be further expanded through the comparison with fifth century Sparta as much as with Periclean Athens.

The analysis of *Per*. 22.4 allows us to draw some conclusions. While in the passages examined in the first part of this article the references to Gylippus have the nature of examples and a moralistic tone, in the *Life of Pericles* Gylippus' vicissitudes are viewed more closely in their historical context, though still from a moral perspective. In this case too, it is difficult to imagine whether and to what extent the concrete audience of the *Lives*

15 As P.A. Stadter, (1975) 1995, p. 160 thoughtfully noticed, honesty and caution in war are two of the qualities that characterised Pericles as much as Fabius, on which Plutarch based the parallelism of the two *Lives*.

16 In the Spartan *Lives*, the use of foreign money to conduct military operations abroad, even at the cost of betraying the traditional Spartan values, constitutes an extremely important issue with regard to the fourth century BC. See, Plu. *Ages*. 9.5-6 (the creation of a cavalry force at Ephesus with the help of the rich), 10.6-8 (the satrap Tithraustes gave Agesilaus money to leave Lydia), 11 (the controversial relationship with Spithridates), 35.6 (Agesilaus' search for money to continue the war against Thebe), 36.2 (Agesilaus fought as a mercenary for the Egyptian Tachus), 40.2 (Agesilaus accepted money from Nectanebo II), *Lys*. 2.8 (the anecdote of the dresses offered by Dionysius), 4 (Cyrus granted the 'economic means' for the Spartan fleet), 6.4-8 (Callicratidas' request for money from Cyrus), 9.1 (Cyrus gave Lysander money for the fleet). On the same topic, cf. also Plu. *Agis/Cleom*. 27(6).2 (Cratesicleia financed Cleomenes' campaign against the Achaeans), 40(19).8 (Cleomenes offered Aratus money to leave the custody of Acrocorinth), 44(23).1 (Cleomenes freed numerous Helots in exchange for money so as to continue the war), 48(27).1-4 (importance of money for war).

was capable of a careful and nuanced reading of the text, remembering and taking into account Plutarch's evaluation of Gylippus' actions and their effects in the *Life of Lysander*. We may assume that some actual readers did have a previous knowledge of fifth-fourth century Sparta as much as of Plutarch's opinion about its hegemony and later economic, social, and political difficulties, but others may not have had the same level of competence. Besides, the same applies to modern readers too. The cross-reference, moreover, does not provide any certainty about the publication of the *Life of Lysander* or the actual readers' real chance of reading it before the *Life of Pericles*, since it simply seems to indicate the phase of writing up. Indeed, the *Lives*' period of composition does not necessarily coincide with the time of their release[17].

Just as *Comp*. *Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).7, however, the text of *Per*. 22.4 also implies an ideal reader who is perfectly able to interpret and develop the correlation between Cleandrides and Gylippus, gleaning Plutarch's insight into the later development of Spartan history in order to make a more accurate assessment of the *Life of Pericles*. The employment of key words and concepts such as φιλαργυρία helps the implied reader recognise Gylippus' function as 'intratextual connector' between different *Lives*, which can stimulate the recollection of historical information as much as of Plutarch's reading of it. The cross-reference, in this respect, might even appear redundant. Its presence, nonetheless, can also make us reconstruct a second type of abstract reader in addition to the ideal recipient of the *Life*: a virtual addressee, a narratological category that implies the Roman politician Sosius Senecio (cf. *Dem*. 1.1, *Dion* 1.1, *Thes*. 1.1), but is certainly broader than the historically determined addressee of the *Parallel Lives*[18]. Indeed, as already suggested, it seems unlikely that such an addressee is someone who does not know anything about the *Life of Lysander* and needs to be advised to read it. Rather, the first person plural verb δεδηλώκαμεν appears to bind together the author and the addressee ('I' and 'you'), and serves as a reminder of the common reflection made elsewhere rather than as a form of *pluralis maiestatis* meaning the author's self[19]. The presumed addressee, then, will activate the intratextual connection established by the cross-reference and will combine Plutarch's analysis of

17 See A.G. NIKOLAIDIS, 2005, 286-287, C.B.R. PELLING, (1979) 2002, p. 9.

18 On the presumed addressee, see W. SCHMID, 2010, pp. 54-56.

19 In this case, the presumed addressee merges with the extradiegetic narratee; cf. G. GENETTE, 1983, pp. 260. C.B.R. PELLING, 2002, pp. 267-282 has examined many examples of complicity between extradiegetic narrator and narratee.

Gylippus in the *Life of Lysander* with that of Cleandrides in the *Life of Pericles*.

This, on the one hand, confirms that the various *possibilities* (considering the ideal reader and the presumed addressee) of reading the two *Lives* in light of one another are embedded in Plutarch's text. On the other hand, the relationship between author and implied addressee is not merely informative or didactic, nor includes step-by-step instructions, but leaves the addressee ample freedom to verify and investigate further the results of the author's historical research and moral evaluation. Such a strategy is confirmed by the choice of not contrasting explicitly the Spartans' handling of wealth before and after the Peloponnesian War.

The Life of Nicias

We can now turn to the *Life of Nicias*, where Gylippus is portrayed as Nicias' antagonist during the Sicilian expedition[20]. Gylippus is introduced into the narrative *in medias res*, while Plutarch discusses Nicias' initial successes as the only *strategos* of the Athenians, after Alcibiades' departure and Lamacus' death (*Nic*. 18.9):

> At that time, Gylippus, too, who was sailing from Sparta to help the Syracusans, as he heard during his journey their being walled off and their difficulties, even so completed the rest of the route, thinking, on the one hand, that Sicily had already been taken and, on the other hand, that he would guard the cities of the Italiotes, if that could happen in some way[21].

Gylippus' 'sudden' appearance in the *Life* is no surprise, considering that also in other biographies secondary characters who play an important role in the events narrated are presented in a similar fashion (e.g. Alcibiades in *Ages*. 3.1 and *Lys*. 3.1). In the *Life of Nicias*, moreover, one may safely assume that some knowledge of Thucydides seems to be taken for granted in the audience, as Pelling has convincingly argued[22]. Nonetheless, there is a correspondence

[20] According to C. Jones, (1966) 1995, pp. 106-111 (cf. also A.G. Nikolaidis, 2005, pp. 285-288) the *Lives of Nicias and Crassus* were probably published late in the series, after *Lycurgus-Numa*, *Lysander-Sulla*, and *Agesilaus-Pompey*, more or less in the same period as *Aemilius Paulus-Timoleon*. On Gylippus as Nicias' antagonist, see G. Vanotti, 2005, pp. 452-453. On Plutarch's interpretation of Nicias, see C.D. Hamilton, 1992, pp. 4213-4221, A.G. Nikolaidis, 1988, L. Piccirilli, 1990, F. Titchener, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2016. For a comparison between the *Life of Nicias* and Plutarch's historical sources, see L. Piccirilli, 1993, pp. xii-xiii and xvi-xxviii, G. Vanotti, 2005.

[21] Plu. *Nic*. 18.9: ὅπου καὶ Γύλιππος ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος πλέων βοηθὸς αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἤκουσε κατὰ πλοῦν τὸν ἀποτειχισμὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας, οὕτως ἔπλει τὸ λοιπὸν ὡς ἐχομένης μὲν ἤδη τῆς Σικελίας, Ἰταλιώταις δὲ τὰς πόλεις διαφυλάξων, εἰ καὶ τοῦτό πως ἐγγένοιτο.

[22] See C.B.R. Pelling, (1992) 2002, pp. 117-134. Cf. also F. Titchener, 2016, pp. 105-106.

between Nicias' indifference towards such a quiet 'entrance on stage' and his absolute confidence that he would soon obtain the capitulation of Syracuse, an atypical moment of courage that Plutarch does not hesitate to define as contrary to Nicias' nature (cf. *Nic*. 18.11: ὁ δὲ Νικίας εὐθὺς αὐτὸς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι ῥύμης καὶ τύχης ἀνατεθαρρηκώς), which was usually characterised by defeatism and cowardice (cf. *Nic*. 1.2, 2.5, 7.3, 8.2, 10.6, 11.1, 12.5, 14.2, 16.9). Being completely ignored, Gylippus could land in a secure location and could start assembling a large army, something that greatly surprised even the Syracusans, who were no longer expecting to receive help (*Nic*. 18.11-12).

Not only Nicias, however, but also the Athenian troops and the Siceliotes underestimated Gylippus. When first Gongylus from Corinth and then a messenger from Gylippus himself announced that the Spartan general was coming in support of Syracuse, the Syracusans found new hope and took up their arms, preparing themselves for fighting again (*Nic*. 19.1-2). Yet, when Gylippus sent a herald to the Athenians, asking them to leave Sicily, the reaction of the Athenian soldiers was of sarcastic derision. In particular, they mocked Gylippus' being alone with his threadbare cloak (τρίβων) and staff (βακτηρία), and made fun of his hair, which was shorter than that of the Spartan prisoners of Sphacteria, who were also stronger than him (*Nic*. 19.4)[23]. The Siceliotes, too, initially held Gylippus in no esteem (*Nic*. 19.5-6):

> Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 100a) says that the Siceliotes, too, made no account of Gylippus, later on, indeed, when they accused his despicable covetousness and stinginess, and, on the other hand, when they jeered at his threadbare cloak and hair as they saw him for the first time. Then, however, Timaeus says that, as Gylippus appeared like an owl, many flew to him, joining the army willingly. And this latter statement is more truthful than the first one. For perceiving the symbol and the reputation of Sparta in the staff and the cloak, they banded together. Not only Thucydides, but also Philistus, who was a Syracusan and an eyewitness of the events, says that the whole achievement is due to him[24].

[23] Cf. Plu. *Nic*. 7.1, 8.1, and especially 10.8: the captives were members of the noblest and most powerful Spartan families.

[24] Plu. *Nic*. 19.5-6: Τίμαιος δὲ καὶ τοὺς Σικελιώτας φησὶν ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν Γύλιππον, ὕστερον μὲν αἰσχροκέρδειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μικρολογίαν καταγνόντας, ὡς δὲ πρῶτον ὤφθη, σκώπτοντας εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα καὶ τὴν κόμην. εἶτα μέντοι φησὶν αὐτὸς, ὅτι τῷ Γυλίππῳ φανέντι καθάπερ γλαυκὶ πολλοὶ προσέπτησαν ἑτοίμως ‹συ›στρατευόμενοι. καὶ ταῦτα τῶν πρώτων ἀληθέστερά εἰσιν· ἐν γὰρ τῇ βακτηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ τρίβωνι τὸ σύμβολον

As one can notice, in chapter 9 of the *Life of Nicias* Plutarch draws Gylippus' portrait, but he does it indirectly from his opponents' point of view. Through the focalisation of the narrative on the Athenians the readers are reminded of some typically Spartan features[25]. In antiquity, both a threadbare cloak and a staff represented the symbols of the Spartan soldiers' frugality and moral strength, as is often pointed out in the *Parallel Lives*[26]. Similarly, the custom of keeping long hair and beard was first prescribed by Lycurgus to the soldiers (later it became a tradition) in order to make "the handsome more comely and the ugly more terrible" (τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς εὐπρεπεστέρους, τοὺς δὲ αἰσχροὺς φοβερωτέρους), as we can read in the *Life of Lycurgus* (22.2) and in the *Life of Lysander* (1.1-3)[27]. One can infer, then, that Plutarch shows the Athenians misreading Gylippus' signs of 'Spartanness' or, worse, not worrying about them at all, a mistake for which they later paid a huge price.

By describing the reaction of the Siceliotes, conversely, Plutarch summarises Gylippus' story. As in other texts scrutinised in this article, here too the usual topic of Gylippus' greed is mentioned. The terms employed by Plutarch are again very significant, as they echo the Spartan *Lives*. While in Plutarch's works αἰσχροκέρδεια (despicable covetousness) is not exclusively associated with Spartan characters, on the contrary, μικρολογία (stinginess) – a concept on which Plutarch often concentrates his attention – is repeatedly related to the image of Sparta and the Spartans[28]. In the *Life of Age-*

καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς Σπάρτης καθορῶντες συνίσταντο, κἀκείνου τὸ πᾶν ἔργον γεγονέναι φησὶν οὐ Θουκυδίδης μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλιστος, ἀνὴρ Συρακούσιος καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁρατὴς γενόμενος. See n. 34, n. 39, and n. 41 of this article.

25 Other instances of Plutarch's use of focalisation to explore cognition (what the characters see and understand) and emotion (how they react) and to encourage the readers' interpretative reflection is examined by C.B.R. Pelling, 2009, pp. 512-515 and 522-526.

26 On the threadbare cloak as a Spartan symbol, see Plu. *Ages*. 14.2, 30.3 (the dirty cloaks of the Spartan 'fearful'), *Agis/Cleom*. 37.7, *Lyc*. 30.2. On the staff, see Plu. *Lyc*. 11.2 and 11.10, *Apophth*. *Lac*. 227 A (Lycurgus hit Alcander with his staff). Cf. also Plu. *Phoc*. 10.1: Archibiades the 'Laconizer' always had long beard and wore a threadbare cloak. On other historical sources for these Spartan symbols of command, see L. Piccirilli, 1993, p. 293. Cf. also S. Hornblower, (2000) 2011.

27 See also Plu. *Apophth*. *Lac*. 228 E and X. *Lac*. 11.3. Cf. the ephors forbidding the Spartans to wear moustache: Plu. *Agis/Cleom*. 30(9).3, *De ser. num. vind*. 550 B.

28 Apart from the *Life of Nicias*, αἰσχροκέρδεια occurs only in Plu. *Cat*. *Min*. 52.8 and *De Stoic. rep*. 1046 C. Historical figures characterised by μικρολογία: Plu. *Aem*. 12.6, 23.9 (Perseus), *Alex*. 69.2 (Artaxerxes III Ochus), *Brut*. 39.2 (the Caesarians) *Cat*. *Ma*. 5.1, 5.7 (Cato the Elder), *Cat. Mi*. 22.3 (Catiline), *Crass*. 6.6 (Crassus), *Galb*. 3.2 (Galba), 19.3

silaus, we can read that, after losing Spithridates' support in Asia, Agesilaus was ashamed of the poor reputation of stinginess and illiberality (μικρολογία καὶ ἀνελευθερία), which was attached to him as much as to Sparta (*Ages*. 11.5). Similarly, as we have already anticipated, in the *Life of Cleomenes* stinginess (μικρολογία) and greed (πλεονεξία) are considered among the main causes of the crisis of Sparta in the fourth century BC. Finally, the resemblance with an owl, too, can be considered a veiled reference to the scandal of the silver coins, which Gylippus stole from Lysander's booty[29].

Indeed, by placing the signs of Gylippus' moral ambiguity together with the symbols of the Spartans' authoritative power and rigorous virtue (once again, the cloak and the staff), which the Siceliotes, unlike the Athenians, recognised and trustfully followed, Plutarch allusively evokes in a few lines a theme explored in greater detail in the Spartan *Lives*: Sparta's controversial hegemony over the Hellenic world. This hypothesis can be confirmed by the image of the Siceliotes joining Gylippus just as birds flying to an owl. Considering that the owl is one of the few animals that attack and eat their own kind, as Plutarch argues in the *Life of Romulus* (9.6) and, less clearly, in the *Life of Demosthenes* (26.6), this can be regarded as a powerful metaphor for Sparta's aggressive imperialism, its unwitting victims among the other Greek states, and its collapse provoked by the same factors that had made it rise.

Before Lysander or Agesilaus, that is, Gylippus too moved from Sparta to undertake an enterprise abroad (cf. *Lyc*. 30.5), which was successful from a military perspective, but had also negative consequences for the Greeks as much as for Sparta[30]. The values of the Lycurgan tradition, which permeated Spartan society, and the Spartan lifestyle could not be maintained intact and pure in non-Spartan contexts nor could be imposed to non-Spartan populations. Especially in times of war, the strict Spartan code of conduct could even be counterproductive to Sparta itself. For instance, in Asia the unscrupulous and

(Nero), *Luc*. 17.6 (the Roman soldiers), *Them*. 5.1 (Themistocles). Critical reflection on μικρολογία: Plu. *Comp. Arist.-Cat. Ma*. 31(4).3, *Pel*. 3.2, *De adulat*. 56 C, 60 E, 74 B, *De Alex. fort. virt*. 333 F, 337 C, *Amat*. 762 C, *De cup. div*. 525 E-F, 526 C, *De cur*. 515 E, *De Herod. mal*. 859 E (reference to Sparta), *Plat. quaest*. 1002 E, *De prof. virt*. 82 B, *Quaest. conv*. 634 B, 703 B, 706 B, *De tuend. san*. 123 C, 125 E, 137 C, *De virt. mor*. 445 A.

29 See pp. 23-25.

30 In this regard, it is noteworthy that in the *Life of Nicias* Plutarch omits to discuss how the Spartans, following Alcibiades' suggestion, decided to send Gylippus to Sicily; cf. *Alc*. 23.2. In the *Life of Nicias*, then, the narrative leaves it unclear whether Gylippus' intervention was only due to his decision or whether it was part of a Spartan strategy.

in many respects un-Spartan attitude of Lysander and Agesilaus about raising funds for war, establishing alliances with the Persians, and subjugating other Greek cities through the oligarchic regimes of the harmosts certainly contrasted with Callicratidas' virtuous (and perfectly Spartan) style of command (cf. *Lys*. 3-4, 6-9, 13-14, and *Ages*. 9-12). Yet, unlike Callicratidas, Lysander and Agesilaus – as much as Gylippus – were successful[31]. In Plutarch's view, this proves that Lycurgus' aim was not to make Sparta govern other cities, despite the Greek cities' desire to be ruled by the Spartans and to have Spartan leaders (ἡγεμόνες) (*Lyc*. 30.4-31.1). Indeed, from the beginning Sparta's hegemony's "taste was unpleasant and bitter" (εὐθὺς γὰρ ἦν τὸ γεῦμα δυσχερὲς καὶ πικρόν, *Lys*. 13.9).

Thus, in the *Life of Nicias* the description of the first impression created by Gylippus provides already an interpretive key to some critical issues that are developed in the course of the narration. In particular, it seems to suggest that in a crucial phase of the Peloponnesian war, which changed the destiny of the Greeks, Gylippus' vicissitudes anticipated the major political and cultural transformations of the period of Lysander and Agesilaus as much as Sparta's later decadence. Furthermore, by focusing on the point of view of Nicias, the Athenians, and the Siceliotes, Plutarch highlights their fault of misjudging Gylippus, without fully understanding the risks that his involvement in the Sicilian conflict posed[32]. As we shall see, the narrative will elucidate these topics in the last part of the *Life of Nicias*.

Thanks to his great military experience (ἐμπειρία), Gylippus managed to reorganise the Syracusan troops and led them to a first victory by simply modifying their tactics. Subsequently, he went from city to city to create a large coalition against the Athenians (*Nic*. 19.7-10). Despite the first successes (especially the conquest of Plemmyrium), however, many Syracusans were tired of and annoyed with Gylippus (*Nic*. 21.5). In fact, these difficulties of relationship, which remained present on the Syracusan side throughout the hostilities (cf. *Nic*. 26.1),

31 On the successes and moral ambivalence of Agesilaus and Lysander in Plutarch, see E. Alexiou, 2010, C. Bearzot, 2004a, pp. 15-30, 2004b, pp. 127-156, 2005, J.M. Candau Morón, 2000, T.E. Duff, 1999, pp. 161-204, E. Luppino, 1990, C.B.R. Pelling, (1988) 2002, pp. 292-297, P.A. Stadter, (1992) 2014a, pp. 258-269.

32 In *Lys*. 1 and *Ages*. 2, too, the portraits of Lysander and Agesilaus respectively are presented through internal focalisations and are characterised by the observers' difficulty in pinning down the two protagonists' exterior qualities (e.g. see the difficult identification of Lysander's statue at Delphi and Agesilaus' lack of images). These initial false impressions correspond to the Greeks' inability to understand and oppose the rule of Lysander and Agesilaus; cf. T.E. Duff, 1999, pp. 162-165.

did not make Nicias and the Athenians avoid their reverse.

Towards the end of the final battle between Athenians and Siceliotes, while the Athenians are being slaughtered at the river Asinarus, Nicias and Gylippus come into direct contact for the first time in the *Life*. Plutarch writes that Nicias pleaded for mercy and begged Gylippus to treat the Athenians with moderation and gentleness (μετρίως καὶ πρᾴως), just as the Athenians had previously done with the Spartans when they concluded the peace treaty (*Nic*. 9.4-9). Despite being moved by Nicias' words, Plutarch adds, the real reason that drove Gylippus to spare Nicias' life and to stop the massacre was a craving for personal glory (δόξα) (*Nic*. 27.5-6).

Indeed, throughout the *Lives of Nicias and Crassus* the theme of the search for glory is inextricably intertwined with that of the self-images and façades which the various characters project to or create of one another, generating a net of reciprocal hopes, ambitions, false expectations, and frustrations[33]. As we saw earlier in respect to his arrival in Sicily, Gylippus' exterior image conveyed an erroneous impression to the observers. His longing for δόξα too, then, continues this thematic thread. The reference to keeping alive the Athenian *strategoi* and bringing them to Sparta, moreover, forms a correspondence with the episode of the prisoners of Sphacteria, something that revels how different motivations were from Nicias' desire of peace and what different an outcome similar situations produced for the Athenians and the Spartans (*Nic*. 7-9). Gylippus, therefore, fits well in the *Life* as Nicias' Spartan counterpart: his behaviour also displays problematic traits analogous to those of the other characters.

Gylippus could not carry out his plan about the Athenian captives as he would have desired, since the Syracusans harshly rejected his proposal. As Plutarch claims, not only did they become arrogant after defeating the Athenians, but also they did not easily tolerate Gylippus' roughness (τραχύτης) and the Spartan style of authority (τὸ Λακωνικὸν τῆς ἐπιστασίας) during the war (*Nic*. 28.3). By focalising again the narrative on the Syracusans, therefore, Plutarch completes the outline of Gylippus' 'Spartanness', which started at *Nic*. 19, and emphasises how the Spartan code of conduct was incompatible with a different culture. Indeed, in non-Spartan environments such as Syracuse and Sicily, the traditional Spartan virtues were perceived as unbearable and were consequently rejected.

Interestingly, Plutarch follows up on the Syracusans' criticism against

[33] See Plu. *Nic*. 4.1, 5.3, 6.1-2, 6.7, 8.5, 9.8, 11.1, 11.3, 12.5, 15.2, 18.10, 20.7, 21.6, 23.5, 26.5, 30.3, *Crass*. 6.5, 7.2, 7.7, 10.1, 10.8, 11.10, 21.6, 21.9, 23.7, 24.1, 26.6, 33.8, *Comp. Nic.-Crass*. 36(3).5, 38(5).3.

Gylippus with the scandal of Lysander's booty and Gylippus' embezzlement of money (*Nic*. 28.4):

> As Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 100b)[34] says, the Syracusans accused Gylippus of a certain stinginess and greed, an inherited infirmity because of which his father Cleandrides too, being convicted of bribery, fled the country, and he himself, having abstracted thirty out of the thousand talents that Lysander sent to Sparta, and having hidden them under the roof of his house, after being later denounced, most shamefully forfeited everything. These things, however, are examined with greater precision in the *Life of Lysander*[35].

Plutarch resumes the idea of Gylippus' greed, which is present already at *Nic*. 19.4, as we saw earlier. In this case too, Plutarch's focus of attention is not only Gylippus but also Sparta. For the conclusion of Gylippus' story is narrated to discuss the aftermath of the Sicilian expedition, as is proven by the fact that at *Nic*. 28.5-6 we also learn about the death of Demosthenes and Nicias, and at *Nic*. 29-30 about the fate of the Athenian soldiers and the reaction of the Athenian citizens to the news of their army's annihilation. Furthermore, by recalling to memory

[34] In the *Life of Nicias* as much as in the *synkrisis* between Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon, as seen earlier in this article, Plutarch mentions Timaeus' historical work, whose negative tone probably reverberates across the *Lives*. Yet Timaeus' *FGrHist* 566 F 100c at *Comp. Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).4, *FGrHist* 566 F 100a at *Nic*. 19.5, and *FGrHist* 566 F 100b at *Nic*. 28.4, despite expressing very similar ideas and moral judgment on Gylippus and his relationship with the Syracusans, also show substantial differences of content (Gylippus banned from Syracuse vs Gylippus exiled from Sparta) and present different key terms (in particular, note φιλοπλουτία and ἀπληστία in *Comp. Aem.-Tim*. 41(2).4 vs αἰσχροκέρδεια and μικρολογία in *Nic*. 19.5 vs μικρολογία and πλεονεξία in *Nic*. 28.4). Similarly, *Nic*. 28.4 and *Per*. 22.3-4 (for which, too, Plutarch probably used Timaeus), the two passages that narrate Cleandrides' conviction, differ markedly: Cleandrides' escape vs Cleandrides' escape and death sentence in absentia; ἀρρώστημα πατρῷον vs συγγενικὸν νόσημα. This suggests that Plutarch re-elaborated Timaeus' text and variously adapted it to his biographies, depending on the context and purpose of each target section. The Timaean fragments within the *Lives*, therefore, should be considered quite loose references rather than verbatim quotations. See also n. 39 and n. 41 of this article. On Plutarch's knowledge and use of Timaeus, see J.M. Candau Morón, 2004/2005, 2009, 2013, pp. 30-35, F. Muccioli, 2000.

[35] Plu. *Nic*. 28.4: ὡς δὲ Τίμαιός φησι, καὶ μικρολογίαν τινὰ καὶ πλεονεξίαν κατεγνωκότες, ἀρρώστημα πατρῷον, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ καὶ Κλεανδρίδης ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ δώρων ἁλοὺς ἔφυγε, καὶ οὗτος αὐτός, ἀπὸ τῶν χιλίων ταλάντων ἃ Λύσανδρος ἔπεμψεν εἰς Σπάρτην ὑφελόμενος τριάκοντα καὶ κρύψας ὑπὸ τὸν ὄροφον τῆς οἰκίας, εἶτα μηνυθείς, αἴσχιστα πάντων ἐξέπεσεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ Λυσάνδρου βίῳ μᾶλλον διηκρίβωται.

Gylippus' father Cleandrides, Plutarch aims to explain the motivation behind Gylippus' behaviour, whereas at *Per*. 22.3-4 he places more emphasis on Cleandrides and the charge of bribery, which Gylippus also had to face. Indeed, Cleandrides' conviction and the definition of Gylippus' μικρολογία and πλεονεξία as inherited (πατρῷον, which can also mean 'of the fathers' or 'ancestral') hint that the causes of Gylippus' moral weakness concerning money derived from and were embedded in Spartan culture, a theme that the readers are encouraged to explore further by reading the *Life of Lysander*. Gylippus' trajectory, then, if inserted into the broader context of Spartan history, as the cross-reference invites the readers to do, can be considered the symbol of the ephemeral nature of Sparta's imperialism, which was destined to cause Sparta's social, political, and institutional crisis because of its intrinsic nature. Sparta was not well equipped to use money and riches nor to become a hegemonic state[36]. Ultimately, then, put in a wider perspective, the victory against the Athenians in Sicily did not yield the Spartans any long-term benefit.

Analogously to the *Life of Pericles*, the analysis of the *Life of Nicias* performed so far also shows that the numerous references to Gylippus imply an ideal reader capable of activating his/her prior knowledge of the facts so as to understand all of the aspects of the connection between Gylippus' story and Spartan history, and Plutarch's interpretation of them. Furthermore, the lack of background information on Gylippus, the employment of key words and concepts specifically related to Sparta's society, culture, and politics, the presence of signs and metaphors evocative of the Spartan world, the reference to Cleandrides and the cross-reference to the *Life of Lysander* are all textual elements that invite a process of 'decoding' and interpretation in light of Plutarch's view of Sparta. The various possibilities offered by such a process can be fully actualised by the ideal reader, as s/he is completely familiar with the *Parallel Lives* and is able to read them in combination with one another, following the intratextual links established by the character Gylippus.

As in the similar case of *Per*. 22.4, nonetheless, the cross-reference also entails a virtual addressee, whom Plutarch advises to continue studying Gylippus and Sparta through the *Life of Lysander*. In this regard, the passive verb διηκρίβωται conveys a lower sense of complicity between the narrator and the narratee than that of the cross-reference in the *Life of Pericles*, where Plutarch uses the plural form δεδηλώκαμεν. Yet διηκρίβωται expresses a greater need for the addressee to elicit the information contained in the *Life of Lysander* so as to integrate his/her supposedly imperfect

[36] Cf. pp. 10-11 and 22-25.

knowledge. Plutarch's text, therefore, creates a distance between the virtual addressee and the ideal reader, which corresponds to two slightly different levels and modes of reading and understanding.

The Life of Lysander

Finally, let us move to the *Life of Lysander*, the biography where Plutarch provides a more detailed account of Gylippus' involvement in the scandal of Lysander's booty (*Lys*. 16-17.1):

> After settling these matters, Lysander himself sailed away to Thrace, but what remained of the money and all the gifts, and crowns which he had himself received (since many people, as was natural, offered presents to a man who had the greatest power and was, in a manner, master of the Hellenic world), he dispatched to Sparta by Gylippus, who had held command in Sicily. Gylippus, however, as it is said, having undone the seams of the sacks at the bottom and having taken a large amount of silver from each, sewed them up again, not knowing that there was a small tablet in each sack indicating its sum. After coming to Sparta, he hid what he had stolen under the tiling of his house, but handed over the sacks to the ephors and showed the seals. When, however, the ephors opened the sacks and counted the silver, its amount did not match the written notes and the fact perplexed them, until a servant of Gylippus, speaking in riddles, pointed out to them that many owls were sleeping under the tiling. For because of the Athenians the mark of most of the coinage of the time, as it seems, was owls. Gylippus, therefore, having committed so disgraceful and ignoble an act in addition to his previous brilliant and great deeds, went into voluntary exile from Sparta[37].

We have already illustrated the political and social repercussions of Lysander's decision to send to Sparta the

[37] Plu. *Lys*. 16-17.1: ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος ἀπὸ τούτων γενόμενος, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἐξέπλευσε, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὰ περιόντα, καὶ ὅσας δωρεὰς αὐτὸς ἢ στεφάνους ἐδέξατο, πολλῶν ὡς εἰκός διδόντων ἀνδρὶ δυνατωτάτῳ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ κυρίῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀπέστειλεν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα διὰ Γυλίππου τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος περὶ Σικελίαν. ὁ δέ ὡς λέγεται τὰς ῥαφὰς τῶν ἀγγείων κάτωθεν ἀναλύσας, καὶ ἀφελὼν συχνὸν ἀργύριον ἐξ ἑκάστου, πάλιν συνέρραψεν, ἀγνοήσας ὅτι γραμματίδιον ἐνῆν ἑκάστῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν σημαῖνον. ἐλθὼν δὲ εἰς Σπάρτην, ἃ μὲν ὑφῄρητο κατέκρυψεν ὑπὸ τὸν κέραμον τῆς οἰκίας, τὰ δὲ ἀγγεῖα παρέδωκε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τὰς σφραγῖδας ἐπέδειξεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνοιξάντων καὶ ἀριθμούντων διεφώνει πρὸς τὰ γράμματα τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ παρεῖχε τοῖς ἐφόροις ἀπορίαν τὸ πρᾶγμα, φράζει θεράπων τοῦ Γυλίππου πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἰνιξάμενος ὑπὸ τῷ κεράμῳ κοιτάζεσθαι πολλὰς γλαῦκας· ἦν γάρ ὡς ἔοικε τὸ χάραγμα τοῦ πλείστου τότε νομίσματος διὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους γλαῦκες. ὁ μὲν οὖν Γύλιππος αἰσχρὸν οὕτω καὶ ἀγεννὲς ἔργον ἐπὶ λαμπροῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ μεγάλοις ἐργασάμενος, μετέστησεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος.

war booty captured during his military campaigns and how insufficient Plutarch judged the Spartiates' countermeasure, that is, the iron currency[38]. Now we can concentrate our attention on some aspects of the text and the way in which Gylippus is portrayed.

As in all of the other passages that we have examined, in the *Life of Lysander* too Plutarch introduces Gylippus into the narrative without providing many background details, except for the brief mention of his command in Sicily and the generic "previous great deeds". Once again, then, the readers are expected to have a sufficient historical knowledge to be able to identify Gylippus. Yet, while the sequence of Gylippus' actions and his theft of the booty money are described with great accuracy, Plutarch does not attribute to the Spartan *strategos* vices such as μικρολογία, πλεονεξία, φιλαργυρία, or φιλοπλουτία, which constitute his defining traits in other *Lives* (*Comp. Aem.-Tim.* 41(2).4, *Per.* 22.4, *Nic.* 19.4 and 28.4). This can be elucidated by the fact that, as we saw earlier in this article, in the Spartan *Lives* these concepts are employed to determine what causes and effects Lysander's actions had on Sparta. In the *Life of Lysander*, that is, the focus remains on Sparta and the Spartans' problematic relationship with money and wealth. Unlike the non-Spartan biographies, here Plutarch does not need to represent Gylippus with specifically Spartan characteristics nor to make him recognisable as a symbol of 'Spartanness', since he is already an integral part and expression of Spartan society. Indeed, the Spartans' faults and weaknesses are *naturally* Gylippus' too[39].

[38] See pp. 10-11 and 20. For an analysis of Plutarch's *Lives of Lysander and Sulla*, see E. ALEXIOU, 2010, J.M. CANDAU MORÓN, 2000, T.E. DUFF, 1999, 161-204, F. MUCCIOLI, 2005, C.B.R. PELLING, (1988) 2002, pp. 292-297, D.A. RUSSELL, (1966) 1995, pp. 90-94, P.A. STADTER, (1992) 2014a, pp. 258-269.

[39] With regard to the terminology used by Plutarch to identify Gylippus, we might also try to view the differences between the *Life of Lysander* and the non-Spartan biographies as due to the composition process of the *Lives*. First came the analysis of the crisis of Sparta in the Spartan *Lives*, where Plutarch closely related (and 'bound') certain words and concepts to the Spartan protagonists and Spartan society, but not to Gylippus, who only has a marginal role in the narrative of *Lysander*. Then came the connection between Gylippus and Sparta in non-Spartan biographies through meaningful terms already employed in the Spartan *Lives*. This would entail that the Spartan *Lives*, in particular *Lycurgus* and *Lysander*, were prepared before or roughly in the same period as the other biographies where Gylippus is mentioned, possibly with the use of preliminary notes on Sparta and Spartan characters and pre-publication drafts. The variations between the non-Spartan biographies, conversely, may be due to memory lapses or simple stylistic preferences. The complexity of Plutarch's method of work, however, and its many stages do not allow us to prove this hypothesis conclusively. The relative chronology of the release of *Lycurgus-Numa*, *Lysander-Sulla*, *Pericles-Fabius*, *Nicias-Crassus*, and *Aemilius Paulus-*

This interpretation can be confirmed by another remarkable difference between *Lys*. 16 and the other references to Gylippus in non-Spartan biographies: the absence of explanation for the stealing. Plutarch's moral evaluation of Gylippus is quite generic and there is no attempt to illuminate Gylippus' true motivations or the influence of his nature and character flaws upon his decisions (the adjectives αἰσχρός and ἀγεννής do not reveal the exact causes of ethically bad behaviour). Despite Gylippus' undeniable responsibility, moreover, in *Lys*. 17.2 we learn that the Spartiates placed the highest blame on Lysander. Indeed, the second part of the *Life* is devoted to scrutinise what passions drove the protagonist's political actions (e.g. *Lys*. 19.1-6). Thus, since Lysander and his relationship with Sparta are the centre of attention, Gylippus' embezzlement of money becomes an episode functional to this topic, without being investigated in its own right.

Gylippus' presence in the *Life of Lysander*, however, is still very significant. The ideal reader of the *Lives* cannot fail to notice that in Plutarch's view Gylippus represented an especially noteworthy antecedent of Lysander as a leader who successfully conducted military campaigns abroad and, more importantly, expanded the Spartan influence outside the Peloponnese at the expense of the Athenians. As we have already recalled, in the *Life of Lycurgus* Plutarch stresses the continuity between Gylippus, Lysander, and all of the other Spartan leaders who guided Greek cities (*Lyc*. 30.5). In the narrative of *Lysander*, then, the involvement of both Lysander and Gylippus in a political affair that radically changed Sparta is in itself emblematic of the strong similarity between their policies. Indeed, Lysander's conquests in Asia mirrored Gylippus' success in Sicily[40].

Timoleon is not of great help either. While *Lycurgus-Numa* probably preceded the other pairs, it is not clear which position in the series was occupied by *Lysander-Sulla*. C. Jones, (1966) 1995, pp. 106-111 placed it before *Pericles-Fabius*, *Nicias-Crassus*, and *Aemilius Paulus-Timoleon*, but his solution is disputed; cf. A.G. Nikolaidis, 2005, pp. 307-308, who believes that *Lysander-Sulla* was one of the last pairs to be published. Cf. n. 8 and n. 41 of this article.

40 Gylippus and Lysander may have truly shared similar political views, because they were both mothaces, but this hypothesis cannot be confirmed only by Plu. *Lys*. 16. Cf. U. Bernini, 1988, pp. 145-146 n. 477, followed by G. Vanotti, 2005, pp. 460-461: their arguments in favour of a political conflict between Lysander and Gylippus, as if Gylippus' embezzlement were part of a strategy to undermine Lysander's authority, seem highly speculative. The common origin and social status of Lysander and Gylippus, which is mentioned by Aelian (*VH* 12.43), is accepted by J.-F. Bommelaer, 1981, p. 36, P. Cartledge, 1987, pp. 28-29, 2002[2], p. 269, G.L. Cawkwell, 1983, p. 394, but is rejected by L. Piccirilli, 1991.

On the other hand, the very fact that Gylippus was the first Spartan 'contaminated' by Lysander's foreign money warns the readers that, according to Plutarch, all of the Spartans run the serious risk of compromising, if not losing, their traditional identity. In this sense, considering that in Plutarch's view the owl is an animal who eats his own kind (as we saw in regard to *Nic*. 19.5), the image of many owls sleeping under Gylippus' roof can be considered a metaphor for the Spartans in danger of starting a struggle for riches against one another. To strengthen the idea that Gylippus was attacked by the power of the money *destined to Sparta* (*Lys*. 17.2), Plutarch significantly omits Cleandrides' bribery and Gylippus' previous contrasts with the Syracusans, suggesting that Gylippus' greed, no matter whether it instilled an aggressive attitude towards the allies or whether it was useful to the Spartan interests abroad, could disrupt the balance among the citizens *at Sparta*. The menace lurking in Gylippus' house, therefore, may lead to the conclusion that in Plutarch's opinion, although Lysander was to blame, Gylippus' command in Sicily started the series of events (that is, the Spartan hegemony) that could alter the intrinsic nature of Sparta[41].

[41] Plutarch's account of Gylippus' scandal in *Lys*. 16-17 poses several historical problems: the time of the events (that is, Plutarch places the scandal after the end of the Peloponnesian war), Gylippus' unawareness of the tablets, the real amount of money stolen, the role of the servant; see J. CHRISTIEN, 2002, pp. 174-175, S. HODKINSON, 2000, pp. 172-173, L. PICCIRILLI, 1997, pp. 256-257. There are also remarkable discrepancies between *Lys*. 16-17, the other passages of the *Lives* where Plutarch writes about Gylippus (*Nic*. 19.5-6 and 28.4, *Per*. 22.2-4, *Comp*. *Aem*.-*Tim*. 41(2).7), and Diodorus' version (13.106.8-10). S. ALESSANDRÌ, 1985 – followed by L. PICCIRILLI, 1993, pp. 309-310, 1997, pp. 256-257, G. VANOTTI, 2005, pp. 460 n. 38 – formulated the hypothesis that both *Lys*. 16-17 and D.S. 13.106.8-10 derive from Ephorus. Diodorus, however, places the booty affair at the time of the siege of Samos, adds a digression on Gylippus' father (whom he calls Clearchus), does not narrate the intervention of the servant, and records the stealing of a much larger sum than in Plutarch. In Alessandrì's view, such differences are due to Diodorus' insertion of a Timaean *excerptum* (p. 1087) into his work. According to Alessandrì, moreover, Plu. *Per*. 22.2-4 would primarily follow Ephorus (on the basis of *FGrHist* 70 F 193 and D.S. 13.106.8-10), but the connection between Gylippus and Cleandrides would be Plutarch's reworked supplement. Finally, Plu. *Nic*. 19.5-6 and 28.4, and *Comp*. *Aem*.-*Tim*. 41(2).7 would primarily follow Timaeus, as Plutarch explicitly says (in particular, the reference to Cleandrides at *Nic*. 28.4 would be similar to the Timaean *excerptum* in D.S. 13.106.8-10). C.B.R. PELLING, (1992) 2002, 135 n. 6, argues that for the *Life of Nicias* Plutarch may have drawn from Timaeus more information and details than is usually believed, so that Timaeus' influence would not be simply limited to the citations. Both these theories are convincing and compatible with one another, *pace* L. PICCIRILLI, 1993, p. 309. In addition to them, one can stress that Plutarch's use of historical sources was not mechanical. In fact, it involved a considerable degree of selection and re-elaboration, and the ability to adapt the same or

Indeed, as for the other passages where Plutarch writes about Gylippus, the analysis of *Lys*. 16-17.1 too shows that the text requires a minimum level of historical knowledge. Otherwise, one can easily assume that an uninformed audience would find it difficult to identify Gylippus correctly or to understand completely his involvement in Lysander's story. Similarly, we can hypothesise that the ideal reader of the *Parallel Lives* is able to grasp the underlying meaning of the scene involving Gylippus, the theft, and the 'owls' through his/her general history recollection and acquaintance with the other Plutarchan *Lives*. Unlike the *Life of Pericles* and the *Life of Nicias*, however, in the passage of the *Life of Lysander* discussed above the intratextual connection with other *Lives* is not established by special 'memory triggers': as already said, key words or concepts, and a characterisation that highlights typically Spartan features or personality traits are absent. Rather, it is Gylippus the character himself that can direct the readers towards previous historical works as much as other Plutarchan biographies where he is mentioned. His presence in the *Life of Lysander* can allow the ideal reader to interpret the crucial episode of the crisis of Sparta in light of one the most important phases of Spartan history – the Spartan intervention in Sicily – and Plutarch's interpretation of it.

Conclusion

Coming to some conclusions, one can plausibly claim that in the *Parallel Lives* Gylippus is portrayed as a character coherent with the image of Sparta developed in and conveyed by the Spartan *Lives*. To be more accurate, overall Gylippus displays the same combination of purely Spartan traits and inconsistencies in 'Spartanness' as the other great Spartan leaders of his time, whom Plutarch examines in his biographies. His virtues and vices, that is, were ultimately not too different from those of Lysander, and for that matter of Agesilaus too.

Through Gylippus' presence as a secondary character in the *Life of Pericles* and in the *Life of Nicias*, Plutarch creates a strong connection between these biographies and the Spartan *Lives*, inviting the readers to examine them in light of one another. Thus, Pericles' strategy against the Spartans as much as Nicias

analogous contents to different contexts. This may have already happened in the early phases of the composition of the *Lives*. Thus, as we have tried to show in this article, the presence or absence of references to Cleandrides, the use of moral terms specifically related to Sparta, the employment of the medical metaphor, the emphasis on the image of owls, are all elements that, once found in Timaeus and Ephorus as described by Alessandrì, Plutarch may have decided to integrate into the narrative of the various *Lives* so as to offer a characterisation of Gylippus as credible, nuanced, and apt to each narrative situation as possible. On Plutarch's use of historical sources, see C.B.R. Pelling, (1980) 2002, pp. 91-115.

and the Athenians underestimating Gylippus can be better evaluated against Gylippus' quintessentially Spartan nature and the later crisis of Sparta. Similarly, the political and institutional changes that Sparta underwent because of Lysander can be more deeply understood by considering at the same time the involvement of Gylippus in Sicily and the very beginning of Spartan hegemony consequent to the victory against the Athenians.

This shows that in Plutarch's view history is a complex subject, which requires attentive readers willing to engage actively in reading and interpreting the texts so as to form personal views and to learn from the events assessed. Accordingly, the *Parallel Lives* imply a wide spectrum of readers. At one end, as repeatedly suggested in this article, one can assume that there are readers with a minimum level of historical knowledge, without which the references to Gylippus and Spartan history become hardly comprehensible. At the other end, as one can infer from the passages analysed earlier, one can find the ideal reader, who is fully able to actualise all of Plutarch's intratextual connections and to interpret the narrative fruitfully, having a thorough knowledge of ancient history as much as of Plutarch's views on it. One can reasonably presume that the actual readers of the *Parallel Lives* stand in between these two opposite poles. Following the author's indications embedded in the texts and activating their history recollection, the actual readers may be able to recognise the intratextual links between the *Lives* and to read the various biographies in combination with one another. Their competence may vary depending on their prior familiarity with Greek and Roman history as much as with Plutarch's works, but it can also gradually improve as the reading process continues. Indeed, the less prepared are the readers, the more necessary Plutarch's textual indications become.

As the cross-references can prove, however, Plutarch neither merely imposed his vision of the historical facts on the *Parallel Lives* nor restricted the readers' freedom of interpretation. In this regard, one cannot but agree with the recent scholarship that has emphasised how the collaborative effort between the readers and the author entailed by the *Parallel Lives* does not involve Plutarch's purely expository didacticism or explicit advices on how to approach the text, not even in places where one might expect them such as the prologues or the final *synkriseis*[42]. This aspect of the relationship between Plutarch and the readers, which has been usually related to the *Lives*' moralism and the readers' willingness and capability to draw moral lessons from them, can be extended

[42] See, in particular, T.E. DUFF, 2007/2008, especially pp. 13-15, 2011a, P.A. STADTER, 2003/2004.

to the analysis of history. Just as the readers, as they can be reconstructed from the texts, in general appear to share Plutarch's philosophical principles as a starting point for their own moral assessment of the characters, which they are called to conduct through a critical reading of the *Lives*, so by following Plutarch's interpretation of the historical events they are also encouraged to form their own judgment on the Greek and Roman past and on the complex interaction between great individuals and their cities and states.

Indeed, the case study of Gylippus' presence in the *Parallel Lives*, even in occasional 'isolated' references, shows the importance of intratextual connectors to make it easier to the readers the examination of history within and across the *Parallel Lives*.

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Plutarch the Multiculturalist: Is West always Best?

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Abstract

Is Plutarch a multiculturalist, recognising the value of non-Greek cultures along with Greek? Does he even go as far as Antiphon in the fifth century and deny any firm dividing line between barbarian and Greek? There are some traces of this, particularly an awareness that all may recognise the same gods; the Romans in particular may share some underlying traits with the Greeks while also showing differences. But Alexander the Great, even if the *On the Virtue or Fortune of Alexander* essays present him as unifying East and West, does so by imposing Greek values; the *Life* shows little interest in his learning anything from eastern values and philosophy. The alien culture to inspire most respect is that of Egypt, and the *Isis and Osiris* in particular accepts that there is much wisdom that Greeks share with Egyptians.

Key-Words: Multiculturalism, Polarities, Racism, Alexander, Gymnosophists, Egypt, Syncretism.

Plutarch, we feel, is one of us. He would be thoroughly at home in a convivial conference setting[1], this 'understanding and intellectually curious person, someone who is serious but not stuffy, aware of life in all its manifestations, yet deliberately avoiding the unseemly and trying to present the best side of his subjects'[2]: one can just see him in the bar late at night, surrounded by acolytes of a much younger generation, gently pleased by our interest and admiration, occasionally putting us right on so-

1 As so many of us felt ourselves at home amid the breathtaking scenery and warm hospitality of Banff. I have tried to preserve the feel of this genial occasion by keeping some of the informality of my original delivery. My second paragraph in particular prompted some lively audience participation.

2 Stadter, 1988, p. 292.

mething, but always doing so with gentle tact and making sure that no-one really misbehaved and the party went with a civilised swing. This is surely the second most attractive personality of classical antiquity. And a lot of his moral views, even if sometimes on the pompous side, are pretty attractive too. That is even true on gender issues: we may get impatient with debating whether heterosexual or homosexual love is the better in *Amatorius*, but equally I dare say most of us would be on the side he clearly favours when Ismenodora wants to marry young Bacchon: well, why not? Yes, this is the character I would second-most like to be like.

Second-most? Who then could beat him? Not Socrates, surely: no, I have enough people edging away from me in bars already. Thucydides? Oh, lighten up. Pindar? Nobody could understand a word I said. Cicero? Nobody else would ever get a word in. Caesar? Can't understand why I seem to be making people so nervous. Aristotle? There are *five* types of reason why one wouldn't want to be Aristotle…, one of them that we would have to deal with the young Alexander, who was surely a tough pupil. No, the one I would put ahead is Herodotus, for very much the same reasons – that unflagging curiosity, that strong projection of an amiable personality who is always eager for a new experience and a new conversation, that readiness to accept that wonder is so important and may always be there around the next corner…. Yes, he would fit in pretty well as well.

Herodotus, indeed, will be a lurking presence in a lot of what follows: for it is so tempting to want both Plutarch and Herodotus to be attractive on racial issues as well, people who are prepared to find virtue and admirability wherever they may be. After all, Antiphon in the fifth century could say that

> we are equally adapted by nature to be both Greek and barbarian… in all this, there is no firm dividing line between barbarian and Greek: we all breathe the same air through our mouths and noses, we all laugh when we are happy and cry when we are sad, we take in sounds through our hearing, we see with the same rays of light, we work with our hands, we walk with our feet (fr. 44B D–K)[3].

It was not impossible to think in that way, though we should also notice exactly what Antiphon says—not we are all the same, but we are all equally adapted to be the same, which is not quite the same thing. It still seems that Antiphon is insisting that the distinction between Greek and barbarian is a matter of νόμος rather than φύσις, very much what Aristotle famously denied.

[3] As supplemented by *POxy* 3647: see PENDRICK, 2002, ad loc.

It is not difficult to find Herodotus making his audience think critically about such distinctions. The familiar *locus classicus* is Darius' seminar on cultural relativism in Book 3: the king asked some Greek visitors whether they would eat their dead fathers, and met with shock and horror; then he asked some Indians whether they would be prepared to cremate them, and met with a similar response. If he had wished, Herodotus could have made this an example to show how primitive those Indians were in comparison with the morally sophisticated Greeks, and how Darius was not much better if he failed to realise that; but in fact the conclusion drawn is very different.

> So these practices have become enshrined as customs just as they are, and I think Pindar was right to have said in his poem that custom is king of all. (Herodotus 3.38.4, tr. Waterfield)

Herodotus is clearly on Darius' side, for that was surely Darius' point too in staging his demonstration. The story shows how all peoples think their own customs best, and (as Herodotus has just made explicit) 'only a madman' would scoff at what others do (3.38.2).

Just as important is the narrative subtlety of the context. Herodotus could have put this in many different places, but in fact puts it at the end of a sequence where Darius' predecessor Cambyses had indeed been showing himself a 'madman'—that 'madman' who would scoff. He had mocked Egyptian religious practices so spectacularly that he even killed the Apis bull, an animal that the Egyptians held particularly sacred (3.29). This is a point in the narrative when Greek listeners and readers might feel particularly superior at the expense of those brutal domineering Persians; yet it is here that we see this other Persian king, Darius, showing himself much more sensitive to cultural differences than the Greeks in the story, and presumably than many of the audience, who would largely have shared that horror at the Indian practices. It is the Persian who emerges as the man with cultural insight, not the Greek, and nothing could make it plainer that these foreigners—even these tyrannical Persian foreigners—are *not* all the same. That sets any complacent Greek readers or listeners back on their heels.

Can we find anything of the same in Plutarch? Yes, sometimes we can. The end of *Isis and Osiris* is very respectful to Egyptian ideas about religion (and we might remember that Plutarch's most revered teacher was the Egyptian Ammonius)[4]: the gods are the common possession of all humanity, and they do not differ among Greeks and barbarians

4 Jones, 1967; Swain, 1997, pp. 182-4; Opsomer, 2009; Klotz, 2014, pp. 214-7; Stadter, 2015, pp. 193-5.

(377C-E, cf. below); everyone has the same initial knowledge of them and honour for them, even if different peoples use different names (377D); and the greatest and most beneficial of humans have become gods, as 'we have come to think, not regarding different ones as belonging to different peoples, not some Greek and some barbarian and some northern and some southern, but common to all just as sun and moon are common to all' (377F)—not far, then, from the sort of argument that Antiphon was using. But then we can look also at all those passages collected so well by Thomas Schmidt, and discussed before him by Tasos Nikolaidis[5]. Schmidt's distribution of material is particularly interesting: five lengthy chapters on basically negative characteristics—savagery, over-confidence (θρασύτης), wealth and luxury, numerousness—not perhaps negative in itself, but almost always bringing out the superiority of the smaller numbers that defeated them—and simple worthlessness (φαυλότης); then a relatively short chapter on 'positive traits', including a few 'noble savages' (as Bessie Walker called them when talking about Tacitus)[6] and, interestingly, a disproportionate number of impressive women. Those proportions are very similar to the balance in Edith Hall's trail-blazing *Inventing the Barbarian* of 1989, not about Plutarch at all but concentrating on Greek tragedy, with lots of glances across to Herodotus (and Hartog, though Hall's and Hartog's emphases are rather different)[7]: four chapters, about fifty pages each, on polarities which are almost universally denigratory about barbarians; then an epilogue, half the length of the other chapters, on 'The polarity deconstructed'. Since then there has been something of an industry in deconstructing the polarity a good deal more, in both tragedy and Herodotus. Some of that scholarly action has been in the direction of regarding Herodotus and particularly Aeschylus' *Persians* as foundational texts not just of 'Orientalism', as Edward Saïd represented them, but also of the *critique* of Orientalism, at least occasionally making readers and listeners uneasy about any West-is-best complacency and providing them with some material that could challenge those prejudices as well as some that could feed them. I have had my own say there on both tragedy and Herodotus, though oddly enough my contributions have not reduced everyone else to a silence of stunned agreement[8]. Can't think why.

5 SCHMIDT, 1999; NIKOLAIDIS, 1986.

6 WALKER, 1952.

7 HALL, 1989; HARTOG, 1988. On those differences of emphasis see PELLING, 1997a.

8 Tragedy: PELLING, 1997c and 1997d: GARVIE, 2009, pp. x-xxii agrees; HARRISON, 2000 does not. Herodotus: PELLING, 1997a.

It would be welcome if we could say something similar of Plutarch—but there, immediately, lies the first warning: we know the temptation of finding what we want to find, and overemphasising or over-interpreting the bits that fit the picture that we like. None of us needs any warning that modern liberal approaches to racial differences are, indeed, very modern, as specific and maybe more specific to our own time and culture than any other. If we wanted any such reminder, it is salutary to recall that when the First World War was over, in all the idealism of the Peacemaking of 1919 and amid all the concerns to accommodate ethnic self-determination in the new map of Europe and the far East, one proposal that got nowhere was a mild suggestion from Japan that Woodrow Wilson's fourteen principles might be expanded to include a statement of racial equality. That was just a non-starter, and not just because Wilson was facing an election where the votes of the American south would be crucial. Japan attracted little support from anyone[9].

One thing is clear. By Plutarch's time there is not a simple Greek-barbarian divide, for one reason in particular: Rome and the Romans, 'those most powerful men above' as he calls them in a haunting phrase in *Advice on Public Life* (814C). As soon as the Romans start impinging on the Greek world, people can tell the difference. Pyrrhus looks across at the Roman army he faces and comments that 'that barbarian *taxis* is not barbarian: we shall see how it goes' (*Pyrrh.* 16.7). They did indeed see how it went, and for the next few hundred years Greeks learned not to be too dismissive. The world of the *Table Talk* is eloquent there, where sophisticated dinner guests may be local Greeks or may be visiting Roman grandees, and by then Roman grandees can come from anywhere: one of them, Lucius Sulla, is a Carthaginian. We have to be careful not to think of a total fusion into just one Greco-Roman cultural amalgam: it is better to think of 'code-switching', so that people can talk Greek and talk Roman, and indeed think Greek and think Roman in ways which go beyond the simple language that they happen to be speaking at the time. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill is very good on this in *Rome's Cultural Revolution*[10]. It is most interesting to see the ways that Romans behave at the Greek dinner table, as they code-switch too. They are in relaxed mode, so they do not play

9 Macmillan, 2001, esp. pp. 325-30. Particularly telling was the attitude of the British Foreign Secretary Balfour, not one of the major players on this specific issue: 'the notion that all men were created equal was an interesting one, he found, but he did not believe it. You could scarcely say that a man in Central Africa was equal to a European' (Macmillan, p. 326).

10 Wallace-Hadrill, 2008. See also now Madsen–Rees, 2014.

the 'powerful one above' too much; Greeks also know not to overstep the limit, and they too behave with proper tact; and Romans are careful to talk about topics appropriate to the Greek dinner table, matters of philology and culture rather than the best way to manage an army or an empire[11]. If I can be allowed an Oxford moment, it reminds me so much of what happens when a politician visits his or her old college: they are so careful at the dinner table to try to behave like dons rather than powerbrokers, and talk about all the good and intellectually demanding books they have read, not realising that when left on our own we are more likely to be talking about last night's football. It is all quite demanding.

So there are two worlds, but they know one another and they mesh: that is going to be true even if we accept that *Table Talk* has an element of the aspirational and idealising too, and that not every visiting Roman was so unboorish. At least those idealised Romans treat Greeks with respect. Contrast the Roman matron in Lucian, who has a tame Greek philosopher but uses him to take care of her pet bitch on a journey, and the animal nestles in his lap, licking his beard, pissing down his front, and finally giving birth to her litter under his cloak (*Philosophers for Hire* 34-5). And Plutarch, quite evidently, treats Romans and Roman culture with respect too. Otherwise he would hardly have written the *Parallel Lives*, after all, and the *Roman Questions* shows an utter fascination with Roman customs for their own sake. Still, there is not usually the radiant admiration of an Aelius Aristides, or even of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the proem to his history:

> My readers will learn from my history that Rome have birth to a multitude of virtues from the very moment of its foundation—examples of men whose match has never been seen in any city, Greek or barbarian, for their piety or their justice or their self-control in all their lives or their formidable prowess in warfare. (*Roman Antiquities* 1.5.3).

—though it is true enough that Dionysius too goes on to have some sharp things to say once the history is underway, especially when he glances forward to the late Republic. Plutarch certainly feels he can tell Romans some home truths. Coriolanus and Marius would have been so much more satisfactory if they had only had a proper Greek education: the Muses would have tempered all that bad temper and inability to acclimatise to political life. And what of all those great Roman successes on the battlefield? Doesn't that show how marvellous they are?

> That is a question requiring a lengthy answer for men who de-

[11] Cf. PELLING, 2011, pp. 209-10.

> fine 'advance' in terms of wealth, luxury, and empire rather than safety, restraint, and an honest independence. (*Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa* 4.12-13)

The reserve there is clear, and really rather bold.

The end of *Pompey* is particularly interesting here, that passage when the two armies are shaping up on the battlefield of Pharsalus and 'a few of the best of the Romans, and some Greeks who were there but not participating', reflected on the madness of it all[12]. Perhaps they are 'Greeks' simply because we are deep in Greece at the time, but the viewpoint is still marked as at least partly that of an outsider, even if there are a few of the best of the Romans there to think along similar lines. The thinking does not project the same reserve about Roman militarism as in the *Lycurgus and Numa* passage; here it is more a point about the way that militarism is directed, that 'plight to which greed and rivalry had brought the empire'.

> By now, had they wished to rule in peace and enjoy their past achievements, the greatest and the best parts of land and sea were already theirs, and open for them to do so; had they still wanted to gratify a thirst for trophies and triumphs, they could have drunk their fill of Parthian or German wars. Scythia too was a great task that remained, and India as well; and they had an excuse that was not inglorious for such greed, for they could claim that they were civilising the barbarians. For what Scythian cavalry or Parthian arrows or Indian wealth would have resisted 70,000 Romans attacking them in arms, with Pompey and Caesar in command, men whose name they had heard even before they heard of Rome? For such were the unapproachable and varied and savage tribes they had traversed in arms. (*Pomp.* 70).

That, then, is what they ought to have been doing, fighting the barbarian in the east; and there is not much doubt that it would be fighting for fighting's sake, or rather for the sake of greed. They might 'claim' that they were civilising the barbarians, but that is all it would be, a claim. We shall see later whether the similar civilising claims that were made about Alexander had more substance in them; and Alexander is very much a subtext in the background of this passage, that Alexander whom Caesar and Pompey could have played over again if only they had chosen.

So far this *Pompey* passage may look like the view of not just an outsider but a rather condescending one: if only these benighted Romans had been able

12 The following paragraphs expand some comments in a chapter in Titchener–Zadorojnyi, forthcoming.

to get their act together… But the pair of *Pompey* is *Agesilaus*; and Alexander had been in the air in *Agesilaus* too, most notably when Agesilaus is about to set off on an eastern conquest. This time it had been a matter of playing Alexander *ahead of* his time, and Agesilaus had even gone through the preliminary essentials at Aulis (ch. 6), though rather less messily than Agamemnon before him.

But at this moment Epicydidas the Spartiate arrived, announcing that a great Greek war was besetting Sparta, and so the ephors were summoning him and commanding him to help the people at home. 'You Greeks! You are the inventers of barbarian evils.' [Euripides, *Trojan Women* 764].

There may be particular bite in that Euripidean quotation, as in the original it is aimed by the captive Andromache against the brutal conquering Greeks—one of the ways, then, that Greek tragedy 'deconstructs the polarity', to go back to that chapter-heading of Edith Hall (above). Here, though, it is not a criticism aimed by an 'Oriental' against Greeks: it is one equally well-aimed but delivered by a Greek against other Greeks, just as it is Greek against Greek in the conflicts themselves.

> For what else could one call that jealousy and that combination and array of Greek forces against themselves? Fortune was on an upward surge, yet they laid hold upon her; they turned upon one another the arms that were levelled against barbarians and the war that they had driven out of Greece. I do not myself agree with Demaratus of Corinth when he said that those Greeks had been robbed of a great pleasure who had not seen Alexander sitting on Darius' throne; no, I think they would have done better to shed tears at the thought that this had been left for Alexander by those who had at that time expended the lives of Greek generals at Leuctra, Coroneia, Corinth, and in Arcadia. (*Agesilaus* 15.2-4)

So this capacity to shed the blood of those who should be your own people is not just a Roman thing. It is Greek as well, and this is not the only occasion on which Plutarch tells that home truth to the Greeks, pointing that perpetual tendency to conflict, *philoneikia*, and fragmentation[13]. On the Greek side it is more of an inter-city combat, on the Roman it is more the powerful individuals—even closer kin, in Caesar's and Pompey's case—who clash so destructively; but one can still see these as different versions of the same disease. We are not so far from the world of Thucydides, where different peoples again show differences. His Athens and Sparta contrast just as much as Plutarch's Greece and Rome, and for

[13] Especially at *Flam.* 11: PELLING, 2002, pp. 182, 243-4. Cf. *Pyth. or.* 15.401C-D, which I discuss at PELLING, forthcoming.

that matter as Herodotus' Greece and Persia. But national or civic differences also have their limits, and there may, in Plutarch as in Thucydides, be an underlying human nature that comes out in different but comparable ways.

So 'Plutarch the multiculturalist'? Yes, or at least 'biculturalist', in the sense of acknowledging and respecting the differences between Greek and Roman ways, here in their bad aspects as so often in their good and intriguing ones; but they still have an underlying basis of unity. When Plutarch looks at Rome at least, the Other is not as Other as all that. And that is very much what some of us have been saying about tragedy and Herodotus.

What we make of the *eastern* foreigners—not the Romans, but the Romans' potential victims in those might-have-beens of Pompey and Caesar—is another question. They do not seem to be getting much sympathy so far.

They may—or may not—get more sympathy if we turn to the man who did get his eastern act together, Alexander himself. The twinned essays *On the Virtue or Fortune of Alexander* essays used to be thought of as earlier than the *Life*, usually because their highly 'rhetorical' slant was dismissed as a sign of juvenility; the same has been thought of *On the Fortune of the Romans*, and in that case I think this is probably right anyway but for different reasons[14]. With the Alexander essays it is less clear-cut, and it is quite possible that his knowledge there of Alexander detail is precisely because he has just been researching it for the *Life*. We just cannot be sure.

Let us start with 'civilising the East', that notion that we noticed would just have been a pure sham on the Roman side. That is certainly in the air for Alexander. We know that that idea of Alexander as a 'philosopher in arms' was used in the Alexander account written by his steersman Onesicritus, who also—we can trace—was considerably interested in the customs that Alexander came across in the far East; that phrase 'philosopher in arms' in fact comes in a quotation in Strabo, describing the admiration for Alexander felt in those terms by an Indian sage[15]. Onesicritus is normally thought to be an important influence on Plutarch's Alexander essays, and indeed he is quoted both there and in the *Life*[16]. Certainly that idea of the philosopher in arms, the bringer of culture and benefit as well as conquest, is prominent in those essays, and if it is rhetoric it is sometimes wonderful rhetoric. He is arguing what he admits to be 'the most

14 Pelling, 2011, p. 211; and 2014, p. 154.

15 Onesicritus *FGrH* 134 F 17a = Strabo 15.1.63–5; cf. F 5.

16 Hamilton, 1969, pp. xxxi-xxxiii; and below.

paradoxical thing of all', that Alexander was not just a philosopher but a better philosopher than Plato and Socrates:

> Plato wrote one *Republic*, and persuaded noone to live like that because it was so forbidding; Alexander founded more than seventy cities among barbarian races and spread Greek culture through Asia, overcoming their uncivilised and savage habits of before. Hardly anyone reads Plato's *Laws*, but tens of thousands adopted Alexander's and still live by them today. (*On the Fortune of Alexander* 1.328D-E).

And more, much more. Rather a spot of the Macedonian white man's burden, in fact. A little later we get a view of him as leading the world to one government.

> He conducted himself like a man who was making the whole world subject to one rationality and one system of governments, wanting to bring all humans together as a single people. If the Heaven that had brought Alexander here had not snatched his soul back so quickly, a single law would have governed all humankind and they would have all been looking towards a single justice as they look on a single sun. (330D).

'Look on a single sun' rather along the lines of that trope we have already seen in Antiphon and in *Isis and Osiris*, 'just as we all breathe the same air …' and 'we see the same sun and moon'. There is a lovely essay of Arnold Toynbee on the theme 'What if Alexander had died old', purporting to be written by a court historian in Alexandria under the reign of Alexander LXXVI[17]: Plutarch got there first, and a bit less wordily. It is a picture that is developed (ch. 6, 329A-D) with another comparison with those cerebral philosophers, again to Alexander's advantage: Zeno argued that we should 'think of all humankind as our fellow-demesmen and fellow-citizens', ruled by a single law, but that was just a fantasy and a dream: Alexander turned it into reality. And he did not do what Aristotle commended, ruling the Greeks as a leader but the barbarians as a despot, treating one lot as friends and relatives and the other as animals or plants, but 'came as a shared *harmostes* and reconciler to everyone', 'mixing lives and characters and marriages and ways of life as if in a single *krater*, telling everyone to regard the world as their native country, the camp as their acropolis and garrison, the good as their kinsmen, the bad as their aliens'. Great stuff: no wonder that this was a key text for that rosy-eyed picture of 'Alexander the Great and the unity of mankind' famously argued once by W.W. Tarn, and just as famously demolished by Ernst Badian[18].

17 TOYNBEE, 1969.

18 TARN, 1933; BADIAN, 1958.

So: Plutarch the multiculturalist? No, not really. There is certainly that 'world as one village' aspect—though one can still ask if Plutarch, if he were not pushing this particular rhetorical line, would really commit to the downgrading of all those favourite philosophers, especially Plato. There is doubtless some drawing here too on later, post-Zeno ideas of cosmopolitanism, just as there is in *On The Fortune of the Romans*, there with the *Roman* empire as the boon of Providence to grant the world stability and bring the warring empires to harmony (316E–317C)[19]. But it is not just one village, it is one culture too, and it is *Greek* culture that Alexander is 'spreading through Asia' (328D-E, quoted above). That 'one village' passage culminates in an exhortation to judge Greek and barbarian not by dress but 'to define Greek in terms of *arete* and barbarian in terms of *kakia*' (329C), and that is what the fusion of blood and customs should lead to. But it is clear who is to be the boss: the subjects will be brought 'to accept the Macedonians as rulers rather than hating them as enemies' (330A, cf. 342A in the second essay), even if it is clear too at times that violence is going to be necessary for people's own good[20]. He is 'taming and softening them like wild animals' (330B). Thomas Schmidt is good on this: the glorification of Alexander is in fact an exaltation of Greek values[21].

That was the essays; what about the *Life*? The first thing to note is that there is virtually nothing of that 'philosopher in arms' notion, nor of the one-village idealism: Onesicritus is quoted (*Alexander* 8.2, 15.2, 46.1, 61.1, 65.2), but not for that. The marriages at Susa, so central to the fusion idea, are barely mentioned at all, and when they are the emphasis falls on the sumptuousness of the wedding feast (70.2)[22]. It is a

19 Swain, 1989, pp. 507-8; Pelling, 2007, p. 257.

20 I have here benefited greatly from discussion withÁlia Rosa Rodrigues, whose Coimbra dissertation ('The figure of the lawgiver in Greek political tradition until Plutarch') stresses how often violence is necessary if a dispensation is to last.

21 Schmidt, 1999, pp. 283-6, concluding 'Toutefois, le système de référence reste fondamentalement grec. La glorification d'Alexandre est en fait une exaltation des valeurs grecques.' Cf. Nikolaidis, 1986, p. 239: in the Alexander essays 'Plutarch makes a very general distinction between Greeks and barbarians to the effect that the former are good, whereas the latter are bad'.

22 Tarn, 1933 cited five passages for his 'unity of mankind' thesis: one of these does come from *Alexander* (as opposed to two from the essays), but it does not seem to support very much. This is the *legomenon* at 27.10, the idea that Alexander may have thought that God was the shared father of everyone but made the best of humans particularly his own, given as one of several possible explanations why Alexander may have seen Ammon as his 'father'. But does this go beyond Homer's presentation of Zeus as the 'father of gods and humans' but also having favourites?

particularly clear illustration of how Plutarch regards different ideas and themes, and arguably different standards of verisimilitude, as appropriate for that sort of essay and for works requiring the sober and analytic historical eye. It is magnificent, but it is not history, and therefore it is not biography either.

Philosophy is relevant, though, and that is where Aristotle comes in. He is recruited to take care of young Alexander's education, and this is allowed two chapters near the beginning (chs. 7–8). We are also given the impression there of an Alexander who is all set up to be that ambassador for Greek culture, with Aristotle's corrected version of the *Iliad* under his pillow every night, other Greek texts sent for when he is en route, and his remark that he loves Aristotle as much as his father (admittedly a mixed compliment in the circumstances), as he owes his life to his father but his good life to Aristotle. Those initial chapters also make clear that the relationship between the two later cooled, and one can trace that tepidity as the *Life* continues[23]; still,

> that enthusiasm and yearning (*pothos*) for philosophy, inborn in him and nurtured from those early years, was never lost from his soul: that is shown by the honour he paid Anaxarchus and the fifty talents he sent Xenocrates and the seriousness with which he took Dandamis and Calanus. (*Alexander* 8.5).

There is much that one could say about the way that the *Life* tracks through this later relationship to Hellenic culture, and much of it has been said in two recent treatments by Mossman and Whitmarsh[24]. But let us go straight to the end, and those final encounters with the Indian sages Dandamis and Calanus. They come immediately after Alexander's meeting with the strange Gymnosophists (chs. 64-5). Those chapters also have been much discussed, as there is some something about naked Indian philosophers that does capture the imagination: people have been most interested in whether this might all be true, and whether there is any authentic Indian wisdom embedded in the stories[25]. But, for the moment, let us just ask what they are doing in the *Life*, and particularly whether they really show that unimpaired 'enthusiasm and yearning for philosophy' that that early passage promised.

First, the Gymnosophists, these Indian philosophers who 'were thought to be particularly skilful and economical with their words in question and answer' (64.1). We should note that Alexander is going to put them to death, starting with the first

23 *Alex.* 17.9, 54.1-2, 55.8-9, 74.5, 77.3.

24 MOSSMAN, 2006; WHITMARSH, 2002.

25 See esp. STONEMAN, 1995.

one to answer wrongly, then all the all the others—a sort of Cyclops cave in reverse. True, these were the people who had been particularly active in stimulating a revolt, and so it is no wonder that he is a trifle cross: still, if this is knowledge meeting power, it is not a particularly sympathetic sort of power. One recent commentator describes Alexander as 'sardonic, savage, like a cat amusing himself with his prey…'[26]. He does let them off in the end, but that seems pretty whimsical too.

And *knowledge* meeting power? There does not seem a lot of knowledge in the Gymnosophists' answers, nor anything particularly eastern; if Alexander does not seem particularly interested in their answers' content, that is because there is not much content anyway. It all basically seems clever-clever, and not much more: 'which is the most intelligent animal ever born?' 'The one that humans have not yet found', presumably because they're so damned clever at concealing themselves. 'Which is the older, day or night?' 'The day, by one day?' Alexander is understandably bemused, but is simply told 'if the questions are difficult, so should the answers be'. It is pretty poor stuff: some have tried to find Cynic philosophy there, but it is hard enough to find any philosophy at all. We are a long way from the world of Aristotle.

Then there is the meeting with Dandamis and Calanus—or rather *not* the meeting in Dandamis' case: in Plutarch, as in Strabo but not in Arrian, Alexander has just sent someone to get him[27]. That envoy was in fact Onesicritus, and this is one of those passages that presumably go back to him. Here there is a little more interest in what they say, though there is rather more interest in the nakedness: Calanus insists that Onesicritus strip off before he talks to him. But what is difficult is to find anything distinctly *eastern* in what they say. Dandamis hears about Socrates and Pythagoras and Diogenes, and says that they seem good chaps, but far too conventional, far too respectful of *nomoi*. There may be a distant echo of the *Crito* here; but Diogenes conventional? That certainly conveys the way that we are in a different thoughtworld, but it also has the air of the moment in Herodotus when Anacharsis reports his impressions of Greece—all rather intellectually disappointing except for the Spartans, the only people who can give and receive *logos* (4.77). In each case the point is to set Greeks back on their heels, not to point out anything distinctive about the foreigner's own cultures. Dandamis also asks why Alexander should have come so long a way: that is not very different

26 Bosman, 2010, p. 192.

27 *Alex.* 65; Strabo 15.1.63-5; Arr. *An.* 7.1.5-6. On the divergences cf. Hamilton, 1969, pp. 179-80 and the *BNJ* commentary on Onesicritus *FGrH* 134 F 17a (M. Whitby)

from the exchange of Cineas and Pyrrhus (*Pyrrh.* 14)—what on earth is the point? Why not just sit back now, and enjoy a drink right away?

And so one could go on. When Richard Stoneman tried to find genuine Indian thought in all this he did get somewhere, but with the versions in other sources, not this one[28]. Plutarch just does not seem very interested in alien wisdom here, or really very much in anything that Indian thought has to offer beyond a spot of nakedness and bizarrerie: it is hardly radiating multicultural open-mindedness to what this fascinating world has to offer. Yes, odd things happen over there, none odder than when Calanus builds his own funeral pyre and self-immolates. But there does not seem much to *learn* from that. Whitmarsh argues that Plutarch is here 'test[ing] his own conceptions of Hellenism in the crucible of narrative' and offering 'a voyage of self-discovery (and in a sense self-destruction) for his readers as well as his subject'[29]; yet, as tests go, it is not that harrowing. This is not an episode to make any complacent Greeks lose their sleep.

The emphasis rests more on what has been lost, not on anything that is been gained. Mossman talks about the 'melancholy' aspects of those final chapters[30]: perhaps they are more than that, 'macabre', as Alexander's self-destruction reaches its climax—all that heavy drinking, all that excess of grief for Hephaestion and so on. Anything but a 'philosopher in arms' here, clearly. Part of that macabre tinge comes from Calanus, as he sets fire to himself: I shall meet Alexander soon, he says, in Babylon (69.6–7). *Caesar* too will end, memorably, with his own ghost telling Brutus that 'I will see you at Philippi': 'yes,' replies Brutus, 'I will see you there' (*Caes.* 69.11). Death is in the air, there as here: macabre indeed, and once again so very different from the clear philosophical air of Alexander's youth and of Aristotle. But eventually the impression is one of philosophy—Greek philosophy—gone wrong. There is nothing wrong or difficult with Hellenicity here, it is Alexander that has gone to pieces. It is all very different from the essays, and not at all multicultural. This work is just not very interested in the fascination of the East. But then this peculiarly rich *Life* has so many other things to be interested in, and they are points about Alexander the individual, not about the world he conquered.

One other thing that this suggests is the wisdom of Thomas Schmidt's sub-title—'la rhétorique d'une ima-

28 STONEMAN, 1995; cf. again the *BNJ* commentary on *FGrH* 134 F 17a.

29 WHITMARSH, 2002, pp. 191-2.

30 MOSSMAN, 2006, p. 292. I say more about this in PELLING, forthcoming.

ge'. Thankfully, we no longer use words such as 'mere rhetoric' to be dismissive, even in the case of works that seem intellectually underwhelming such as those Alexander essays: they are what they are, and the ideas are interesting ones. Perhaps the notion that Alexander is a greater philosopher than Plato and Aristotle can even set a complacent Greek back on his heels, rather like Dandamis' remark about those over-conventional figures Socrates and Diogenes. They make one think, perhaps think more deeply than the final chapters of the *Life*; or at least think about different things. But Plutarch's rhetoric can go in different directions, and his mindset is flexible enough not always to think the same things about racial differences or about anything else.

Let us end by going back to *Isis and Osiris*. The passages quoted earlier strike a different note from anything we have seen in any of the Alexander works. That essay as a whole is anything but dismissive: Egyptian ideas and Egyptian religious ceremonies are taken very seriously, in all sorts of ways: they may be obscure and strange, they may need a lot of decoding (and the decoding is often pretty obscure too), but they are certainly worth the effort.

> For there was nothing irrational or legendary or based on superstition, as some claim, among the foundations of their cults; instead some were based on moral and necessary causes, while others were not lacking in historical or physical intelligence. (*Isis and Osiris* 353E).

In *Herodotus' Malice* he waxes indignant at the way that Herodotus represented Greece as drawing so many of their religious ideas and customs from Egypt, "using the effronteries and legends of the Egyptians to subvert the most holy and sacred truths of Greek religion" (857C-E): but here he stresses instead that "the wisest of the Greeks", Solon, Thales, Plato, Eudoxus, Pythagoras and maybe Lycurgus too, themselves came to Egypt to learn what they could from the priests (*Isis and Osiris* 354D-E). Plutarch can even use Egyptian ideas to correct the notions of Democritus, Epicurus, and the Stoics about the destructive powers of nature (369A). In this mindset he is even generous in treating Persian ideas too, though not so generous as about Egyptian: he brings in some ideas about Zoroastrianism, for instance (369D-70E). Wisdom, it seems, is to be found anywhere and everywhere: whatever the cultural differences, those culturally formulated insights may each carry an element to illuminate a wisdom that everyone shares. 'There is nothing wrong with regarding the gods as common to all and not seeing them as peculiar to the Egyptians' (377C)—or, we might add, to the Greeks either: 'Isis and her associated gods belong to all humanity, and all humanity knows them' (377D).

That helps to explain the great effort that he expends in that work on investigating equivalences: Osiris *is* Dionysus, Sarapis is Pluto, and so on (often with a 'they say that', but Plutarch is quite ready to play the game himself too, e.g. 362B, 364D-E). That sort of syncretistic approach seems to us frankly odd. Why *should* different cultures have gods that they define in the same way? Why can't we say that one culture defines its gods and marks off their typical activities in one way and another in another? But that is basically because we are on the whole a godless lot, at least as far as polytheistic gods are concerned. We therefore assume that that attribution of characteristics is no more than *nomos*, and there is no reason at all why each culture should choose to picture their gods or demarcate their spheres in related ways. But if you really believe that those gods exist, are out there somewhere, then it makes better sense to say that different cultures might have inklings of the same gods even if they put them in different ways[31]. For all we know, George W. Bush's notorious claim that Christians and Muslims worship the same god may have been based on some similar thinking. Egyptians 'know about' a god and call him Osiris, the same god as the Greeks know about and call Dionysus. It is still true that this sort of approach, indeed like Bush's, implies a certain generosity, accepting that the Egyptians have not simply got it all wrong, and in this work in particular that generosity is clear. The Egyptian insight is just as good as the Greek, and may even be better.

So here we have a qualification of Thomas Schmidt's general conclusion, that Plutarch does not distinguish all that much between different types of barbarian; though I would rather emphasise again the wisdom of that subtitle, *La rhétorique d'une image*, and stress that Plutarch can think and argue in different ways at different times and in different mindsets. One recalls again how in *Isis and Osiris* he is more generous towards and interested in Persian wisdom than in the Alexander works, and much more ready to accept the Greek debt to Egyptian thinking than in *Herodotus' Malice.* Foreigners and foreign culture offer him a repertoire of possibilities and thought-prompts, and the issue should not be reduced to a single, monolithic 'what Plutarch thinks'.

Finally, why Egypt? What is so special about the country to inspire that generous, open-minded mindset (and not in *Isis and Osiris* alone, we might add[32])? Probably we should not be surprised. Egypt had always been

31 Cf. CHIAI, 2013, pp. 56–7, who puts this point particularly well.

32 Cf. e.g. *Numa* 4.1, 14.9, *On the Decline of Oracles* 429F, *God's Slowness to Punish* 552D, *Amat.* 764A-B.

like that, with all its suggestion of intriguing, ancient wisdom: this, after all, is the theme of Phiroze Vasunia's *Gift of the Nile*. It was that already for Plato and Aristotle; it is something special already in Homer, with that hint of the riddling and the enigmatic in the story of Proteus: it is enigmatic still for Plutarch, and it is interesting that it is when Cleopatra is at her most beguiling and seductive and dangerous that Plutarch calls her 'the Egyptian woman', τὴν Αἰγυπτίαν (*Antony* 25.3, 29.6, 31.4, *How to tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 61A). Virgil did something similar—*sequiturque (nefas!) Aegyptia coniunx* (*Aeneid* 8.688)—but the associations for Plutarch may be even more many-sided than they are for Virgil.

And of course Herodotus did all that too. Were there time enough to discuss how Herodotus uses Egypt, one could argue that he does do a lot more of the sort of thing that Whitmarsh finds in Plutarch's *Alexander* and I do not: using Egyptian customs and traditions not just to put Greek and Persian history in their chronological place, as Egyptian history goes back so much further, but also to ask searching questions about Greece, 'testing [his audience's] conceptions of Hellenism in the crucible of narrative' and ethnography. When Herodotus tells the Helen story (2.112-20), it is the Egyptian Proteus who has the moral high ground, not those wife-stealing and child-sacrificing Greeks: so much for any vaunted Greek moral superiority[33]. Even in *Isis and Osiris* we have not found anything quite like that, just a readiness to look for common denominators in Greek and Egyptian wisdom and use both as a path to insight. Perhaps Ammonius had taught Plutarch more than we think[34].

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33 Plutarch himself was (or affected to be) outraged by this: *Herodotus' Malice* 857B.

34 Including, perhaps, some of the dangers that attend such genial conferences along with the pleasures: at least, Ammonius found a tactful (though extreme) way of remonstrating with those who had lunched too well before an afternoon discussion (*How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* 70E). The food at Banff was excellent too, and so was the behaviour.

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Plutarch in Fifth-century Athens

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Abstract

This article explores Plutarch's contribution to our knowledge of fifth-century Athens through an examination of his biographies of *Kimon*, *Themistokles*, *Perikles*, *Aristeides*, *Nikias*, and *Alkibiades*. The article assesses the information that Plutarch conveys and, in addition, sets his work into its broader historical context through comparison with other ancient sources, and in particular with the history of Thoukydides.

Key-Words: Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, Aristeides, Nikias, Alkibiades, Thoukydides, Athens.

My plan in this paper is to look again at what may be called Plutarch's contribution—and it is a not inconsiderable one—to our knowledge of the personal side of fifth-century Athenian history. Even if history is not exclusively (as Thomas Carlyle maintained) the study of the great men (and women) of their periods, these were certainly important actors in the dramatic events in which, in the first part of the century, Athens almost met her demise and then, in the aftermath of her surprising repulse of the Persian threat, rose to greatness as *hegemon* of a far-flung and powerful coalition of mainly maritime states in the eastern Mediterranean. We leave her towards century's end just as her fleet, previously undefeated save for a setback in Egypt in the 450s, has suffered a series of devastating blows first in Sicily and then in a final, humiliating defeat at Aigospotamoi on the Hellespont in 405 BCE.

I examine the *Lives* of Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, Aristeides, Nikias, and Alkibiades. Plutarch is interested in these six men as public figures, generals who, to a greater or

less degree, involved themselves in the political events of their city. Beyond this, however, Plutarch strove to give his readers a feeling for them as individual personalities: the inventive and manipulative Themistokles; Aristeides the paragon of civic and personal virtue; Kimon a superlative general but a *bon vivant*, somewhat old-fashioned and probably a womanizer; Perikles, the aristocrat who, paradoxically, had almost irresistible appeal among ordinary Athenians; Nikias, a plutocrat who got involved in public events (if we are to accept Plutarch's view, based on a near-consensus of the sources he was drawing upon) almost in spite of himself and whose dithering cost Athens a victory in the Sicilian campaign; and, lastly, Alkibiades, the lion-cub who grew into one of Athens' most successful but also most self-centered (and most self-destructive) of generals.

I should add in full disclosure that I came to these *Lives* originally and still value them highly for their straightforwardly historical value. They are immensely rich treasure-troves of information about the events in which their subjects participated. Plutarch was an assiduous and careful researcher (however one is to define that term), and we should be grateful to him for his catholic tastes and the generosity he displays in sharing with his readers the results of his research. Beyond that, however, and more importantly for our purposes here he brings his subjects alive as persons. They are individuals, and, after reading what Plutarch has to say about them, we feel we have come to know them and (to use a somewhat hackneyed phrase), "where they are (or were) coming from".

1. *Kimon*

In the sequence of Athenian *Lives* that I intend to deal with here the pair *Kimon-Lucullus* were the earliest that Plutarch composed[1]. As we will see, the *Kimon* is in many ways similar to the *Aristeides*. Both men are characterized by Plutarch as being "aristocratic" in their political propensities[2]; they both had well-deserved reputations as generals and are presented by Plutarch as such, rather than, say, as political figures like Themistokles and Perikles. But the *Kimon* seems to me to be a more interesting and varied enterprise than the *Aristeides*. For one thing Kimon's career covered a wider time-period than Aristeides's, with important developments for Athens both internally and as a city bent on extending her influence far beyond Attika. Plutarch also had at his disposal, and appears to have made good use of, a wider range of

1 After some deliberation I have decided to discuss these *Lives* in the presumed order of their composition (see JONES, 1966, pp. 67-68; NIKOLAIDIS, 2005, p. 318) rather than a chronological sequence of their subjects' activities.

2 *Cim.* 10.8; *Arist.* 2.1.

source material, some of it contemporary. Thus, Plutarch delves into fifth-century elegy (Melanthios, Arkhelaos, Kritias), comedy (Kratinos, Eupolis, Aristophanes), travelogue or personal memoir (Ion of Khios), and political diatribe (Stesimbrotos of Thasos). The result is a fully rounded and convincing portrait of this perhaps somewhat underestimated fifth-century figure.

After a rather lengthy and somewhat rambling Proem, Plutarch launches into the *Life* proper with useful information about Kimon's family background—his Thracian origins on his mother's side (for which Plutarch cites as evidence "[elegiac] poems addressed to Kimon himself by Arkhelaos and Melanthios"). Plutarch then moves to Kimon's connection with Thoukydides the historian, whose gravestone, he tells us in an aside, could be seen in the Kimoneian burial grounds[3]. After a brief flashback to the sad end experienced by Kimon's father Miltiades[4], Plutarch gives his readers information about some of Kimon's personal qualities. In his youth he acquired a bad reputation for wild living and fondness for drink. In addition Plutarch reports on the authority of Stesimbrotos of Thasos—a contemporary witness, as Plutarch points out—that Kimon had no instruction in music (that is, poetry) or any other of the so-called "liberal" accomplishments, and did not have Athenian cleverness or the gift of the gab, but a nobility and candour, and what you might call a Peloponnesian kind of soul[5]. This gives Plutarch the opportunity of quoting a line from Euripides's *Likymnios*, where Herakles is described as "plain and straightforward, virtuous in the extreme"[6].

It's not clear how much of this Plutarch took directly from Stesimbrotos. What is clear is that we owe a debt to Plutarch for taking the trouble to look at his work *On Themistokles, Thoukydides [son of Melesias] and Perikles*. As A. W. Gomme points out, "Plutarch is the first known writer to have read him"[7]. Another writer whom Plutarch

3 *Cim.* 4.3. Plutarch returns to the Kimoneia burial grounds at the end of the *Life*, and implies that he has taken the trouble to look at them (μέχρι νῦν, *Cim.* 19.5). Cf. also Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc*. 17), who adds, "where the graves of Herodotos and Thoukydides can be seen". Herodotos locates them "outside the city [by the Melitides (most westerly) gate] beyond the road that is called 'Through the Hollow' (διὰ Κοίλης)" (6.103.3).

4 The tradition about Miltiades's death was confused (Hdt. 6.132-136, with the note of Blamire, 1989, p. 91, on *Cim.* 4.4).

5 *Cim.*4.5; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 4. The renumbering is by Engels, 1998a, who provides a measured and informative commentary on the fragments.

6 Fr. 473.1; translation of Collard & Cropp, 2008, p. 563.

7 Gomme, 1945, p. 37. He also notes that Athenaios is "the only other [writer] to have quoted from this pamphlet". He adds (p. 36, n. 2) that he has "no reason to doubt" that the

rescued from relative obscurity was Ion of Khios, a prolific and versatile contemporary author, whose work rather strangely entitled Ἐπιδημίαι, "Sojourns", would have fallen into oblivion but for Plutarch's antiquarian interest. He cites Ion for Kimon's physical appearance: a big man with thick, curly hair which he wore long[8]. Later in the *Life* Plutarch relates at some length a story told by Ion of how, while still a boy, Kimon came to Athens from Khios and was a guest at a dinner party given by a certain Laomedon. As part of the after-dinner entertainment Kimon was asked to sing and he acquitted himself well (οὐκ ἀηδῶς)—and this in spite of his having had no formal instruction, as Stesimbrotos maintained—whereupon one of the guests complimented Kimon as being cleverer than Themistokles, who used to boast that even though he had never learnt to sing or play the lyre, he knew how to make a city great (*Cim.* 9.1; Plutarch will mention Themistokles's riposte again in the *Themistokles*). Kimon then went on to relate a stratagem of his. When given a choice of keeping the spoils or the prisoners after a campaign he chose the prisoners—for whom their families were soon willing to pay large sums as ransom[9].

Plutarch picks up at various points in the narrative the theme of Kimon's roving eye. The poet Melanthios, he reports, wrote an elegy poking fun at Kimon for his involvement with a lady named Asteria, whose family were from Salamis, and another named Mnestra (which might, I suppose, be programmatic). We would know almost nothing about this poet Melanthios if Plutarch had not taken an interest in him. In the treatise *Conjugal Precepts* (144C), Plutarch reports that Melanthios ridiculed Gorgias of Leontini who discoursed on Concord at Olympia but could not bring harmony into his own life: his wife was jealous over Gorgias's involvement with a slave girl.

For all his womanizing Kimon, Plutarch insists, was genuinely fond of his wife—a woman programmatically named Isodike and a member of the genos to which Perikles belonged, the Alkmaionidai, and when she died consolatory elegies were written for

other stories in Plutarch about Kimon's relations with women, and of Elpinike's relations with Perikles and Polygnotos, are from Stesimbrotos. So, too, BLAMIRE, 1989, p. 6, citing *Cim.* 4.6, 4.8 and 15.3.

8 *Cim.* 5.3; *FGrH* 392 F 12. LEURINI, 2005, offers a succinct inventory of Plutarch's debts to Ion.

9 *Cim.* 9.1; *FGrH* 392 F 13. BLAMIRE, 1989, p. 5, suggests Ion as a possible source also of an anecdote involving Kimon's retort to a Corinthian heckler during the campaign against the revolting helots (*Cim.* 17.1-2), Kimon's judging of the dramatic competitions of 468 (8.7-9), Kimon and a Persian defector (10.9), and Perikles's "going easy" on Kimon at the latter's prosecution in 463 (14.3-5).

Kimon by the philosopher Arkhelaos[10]. Who would have known that this celebrated "physical" philosopher and alleged teacher of Sokrates also wrote elegies? For this fact Plutarch cites with approbation the Stoic philosopher Panaitios, whom we shall encounter again in the *Life of Aristeides*[11].

Not surprisingly we learn in this *Life* a fair amount about Kimon's sister or half-sister Elpinike[12]. The wags had it that Kimon started having sex with her "while he was still a *neos*", and that she was romantically involved as well with the mural painter Polygnotos, who allegedly painted her likeness on one of the figures in the murals of the Stoa Poikile[13]. In spite of, or maybe because of, all this, the family saw to it that she married well, to Kallias Lakkoploutos, the famous plutocrat whom we shall hear of again in the *Life of Aristeides*, and it was this lucrative marriage that, according to Plutarch, enabled Kimon to pay his father Militades's fifty-talent fine[14]. Elpinike's name crops up again in the aftermath of Kimon's successful suppression of the revolt of Thasos in 463 BCE. He was brought to trial on the somewhat improbable charge that he had taken bribes from King Alexander of Macedon not to invade his territory. Perikles was among the prosecutors and, according to a story Plutarch reports on the authority of Stesimbrotos, Elpinike pleaded with him to go easy on her brother, but Perikles just smiled and said, "You're too old for this sort of thing, Elpinike". Plutarch caps the tale by remarking that Perikles, who had been the "most vehement" (σφοδρότατος) accuser, did not press for a conviction but stood up just once to go through the motions of bringing an accusation[15]. (It is more than a little suspicious that a variant of this story occurs in the account of a proposal for Kimon's early recall from ostracism allegedly made by Perikles[16]).

In chapter 10 Plutarch draws the attention of his readers to certain initiatives Kimon took to boost his ratings with the Athenian voters[17].

10 *Cim.* 4.10. She was the daughter of Euryptolemos and granddaughter of Megakles, and so first cousin of Perikles's mother, Agariste.

11 *Cim.* 4.10, fr. 125 von Straaten; cf. Plut., *Arist*. 1.6-8, 27.4.

12 If half-sister, she would have been Miltiades's daughter by his first wife, not Hegisipyle.

13 *Cim.* 4.6.

14 *Cim.* 4.8. There were other, conflicting, versions of how Miltiades's fine was paid.

15 *Cim.* 14.5 (repeated at *Per*. 10.6, where Stesimbrotos is not named), *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 5.

16 *Per.* 10.5, with the note of Holden, 1894, p. 116.

17 In *Cim.* 10.1 Plutarch says Kimon was using the funds that accrued from his military operations, and note also 14.3: Kimon at his trial claimed to have "adorned the city by enriching her at her enemies' expense". (This, as we shall see, does not jibe with the implication in the *Perikles* that Kimon used his private wealth, whereas Perikles had to rely on the surplus in the imperial treasury.)

Among a variety of benefactions Plutarch reports that he removed the fences on his estates so that anyone who wished could come in and pick the fruits; he also laid on free meals in his home "so that the poor… would be able to concentrate on their duties as citizens". Plutarch then notes a discrepancy in his sources: Aristotle (*Ath.* 27.3) said these benefactions were available not to the Athenians at large (the version ascribed to Theopompos, whom, though Plutarch does not name, he appears to be following here[18]), but only to Kimon's demesmen, Lakiadai. Plutarch will re-use much of this material in the *Life of Perikles*, where Perikles is forced to introduce a variety of "demagogic" measures like kleruchies and the theoric allowance to compete with Kimon's largesses[19]. Plutarch moves on to list public works initiated by Kimon, and reports that he used the spoils of war for the south wall of the Akropolis, plane trees in the Agora, and rehabilitation of the Academy[20].

Theopompos was also behind Plutarch's account both in this *Life* and in the *Perikles* of Kimon's alleged involvement in the battle of Tanagra in Boiotia (c. 456 BCE). Kimon was living in exile because of his ostracism a few years before, but, seeing how hard pressed the Athenian troops were he allegedly turned up with his tribal contingent (Oineis) and offered his assistance; he was rebuffed (by the Boule in the *Life of Kimon*, by Perikles, of course, in the *Perikles*) but his 100 tribal colleagues all fell in the battle. When the Athenians suffered a decisive and humiliating defeat at the hands of their Peloponnesian adversaries, they passed a special decree of recall, moved by Perikles, so that Kimon could return five years early[21]. This whole story looks—to me, at any rate—somewhat fishy, not least because, in the parallel account in the *Life of Perikles*, Plutarch remarks that according to "some writers"—commentators think he had Stesimbrotos in mind—Elpinike again engineered the deal: her brother was to be recalled and the leadership of the Athenian forces divided between him and Perikles, Kimon to take command of two hundred ships (the figure is from Thoukydides 1.112) and pursue the campaign against the Persians by sea, while Perikles was to have supreme power in domestic matters.

Another major characteristic of Kimon's that Plutarch returns to several times in the *Life* was his Laconism. (We have already noted Plutarch's—or Stesimbrotos's—remark that his

[18] FGrH 115 F 89; cf. Athenaios (12.533A-B), citing Book 10 of Theopompos's Philippika.

[19] *Per.* 9.2.

[20] *Cim.* 13.5-7.

[21] *Cim.* 17.4-8; *Per.*10.1-4; *FGrH* 115 F 88.

temperament was more Peloponnesian than Athenian.) He famously named one of his sons, presumably his first-born, "Lakedaimonios". Plutarch reports that Kimon was so relentless in his praise of things Spartan that the Athenians got fed up with hearing him say, whenever he wanted to dissuade them from a course of action, "That's not what the Spartans would do"—this on the authority of Stesimbrotos[22]. Plutarch gives an account of the debate at Athens in the late 460s about whether to send aid to the Spartans when their helots had revolted and they appealed to Athens for help. Plutarch aptly cites the lines in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* describing the Spartan envoy—somewhat improbably named Perikleidas—sitting at the altar, all pale in his scarlet cloak, asking for troops[23]. And Plutarch once more draws on Ion of Khios for the report that Kimon won the Athenians over to his side by urging them "not to allow Greece to go lame or Athens be deprived of their yoke-fellow"[24]. Plutarch also cites Kritias's somewhat critical remark —in what work is not clear— that in pressing for a positive response to Sparta's appeal, Kimon "was putting his country's benefit second to Sparta's advantage"[25]. The Spartan request was opposed by Perikles's associate Ephialtes, who urged the Athenians "not to aid or raise up a city that was Athens' rival but leave her where she had fallen and let Sparta's pride be trampled down". If Plutarch's account can be trusted—he cites no authority for his view—Kimon attempted unsuccessfully to get the Athenians to repeal the reforms of c. 462 BCE that docked the powers of the Areiopagos[26]. The debate seems to have turned nasty, for Plutarch says that the democratic reformers dredged up the old slanders of Kimon's involvement with his half-sister and his Laconism, and it was this verbal sparring match that Plutarch says the comic poet Eupolis was referring to years later in the lines (from his play *Poleis* of c. 422 BCE): Kimon "was not a bad fellow, but he loved to tipple,

22 *Cim.*16.3; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 7. In Stesimbrotos's account of Kimon's trial after Thasos Kimon is reported to have boasted that, as a proxenos of Sparta (and unlike others who were proxenoi of wealthy Ionian and Thessalian cities), his admiration for their "economy and moderation" made it improbable that he would have yielded to an offer of money by the Macedonian monarch.

23 *Cim.* 16.8; Ar., *Lys.* 1137 ff.

24 *Cim.* 16.10; *FGrH* 392 F 14.

25 *Cim.* 16.9; Kritias *Vorsokr*. 88 fr. B 52. Plutarch had earlier quoted an elegiac couplet in which Kritias mentioned Kimon's μεγαλοφροσύνη as his distinguishing characteristic *(Cim.* 10.5, fr. 8 West).

26 *Cim.* 15.3.

and was an idler, and would sometimes make his bed in Sparta leaving Elpinike here all by herself"[27]. (To this Plutarch comments, rather huffily, "If an idle and drunk Kimon could capture so many cities and win so many battles, obviously no Greek before or after him could have surpassed his exploits when he was sober and paying attention").

Plutarch is the only other source besides Aiskhines in his speech *Against Ktesiphon* to record three celebratory epigrams erected to commemorate a signal victory won by the Athenian forces under Kimon in the first allied undertaking of the renewed hostilities against the Persians, who c. 476 BCE were driven out of Eion on the Strymon River in Thrace, and the inhabitants enslaved[28]. The Eion campaign was followed by an attack on the Dolopian inhabitants of Skyros in the Cyclades. "They enslaved the inhabitants and colonized the island themselves", is Thoukydides's dry comment (1.98.2). Plutarch fleshes out the episode with an account of how Kimon, following a convenient lead provided by the oracle at Delphi which he consulted, "discovered" Theseus's bones and organized their ceremonious return and reinterment at Athens. "This exploit", Plutarch remarks, "contributed more than any other to Kimon's high standing with the people"[29]. A few years later Kimon and the rest of the board of generals were given the unusual honour of being appointed extraordinary judges for the Dionysia when Sophokles, in his maiden appearance, won first prize, 469/8 BCE, and, according to Plutarch, Aiskhylos went off to Sicily in a huff and died there[30].

Kimon died while on campaign in Kypros c. 450 BCE, a sad event which Plutarch marks by a short passage from the comedy *Arkhilokhoi* of Kratinos[31], who praised Kimon as a "man who was godlike, most hospitable and by far the best leader of the Panhellenes"[32]. Plutarch follows up this quote from Kratinos with a *bon mot* by Gorgias of Leontini: Kimon "acquired wealth in order to use it, and used it in order to be honoured"[33].

In the *Life of Kimon* Plutarch provides a full and believable portrayal

27 *Cim.* 15.4, *PCG* fr. 221.

28 *Cim.* 7. 4-6; Th. 1.98.1, Aiskhines 3 *Against Ktesiphon*, 183-5, Tzetzes *Lykophron* 417 (see BLAMIRE, 1989, p. 113). Heroic resistance by the Persian governor Boges is reported by Herodotos (7.107), naming Kimon.

29 *Cim.* 8.5-7, also *Thes.* 36; Paus. 3.3.7; Schol. Ar., *Pl.* 627; Arist., *Ath.* fr. 4.

30 *Cim.* 8.7-8. The implied date of Aiskhylos's death is, of course, erroneous.

31 Dated by BAKOLA, 2009, p. 71, to "sometime between 435 and 422".

32 *Cim.* 10.4; *PCG* fr. 1.2-3.

33 *Cim.* 10.5; *Vorsokr*. 82 B 20.

of his subject. Readers come away with a clear view of Kimon's relatively uncomplicated character: gruff, likeable, something of a *bon vivant* and definitely a ladies' man. A man of action rather than a thinker, much less an amateur musician, he was a capable general, who could take bold steps when these were called for, even at the cost of his own political capital with Athenian voters (the Thasos campaign, the helot revolt). The narrative flows smoothly. Plutarch deploys a variety of relevant source-material, all the while following—when it was available—the narrative thread in his best source, Thoukydides (and falling back, when he needed to fill gaps, on respectable second-string players like Theopompos). All in all, the *Kimon* is the shortest, but also one of the most successful of these fifth-century *Lives*.

2. *Themistokles*

If we did not have Thoukydides's so-called "Excursus" on Themistokles at the close of Book I of *The Peloponnesian War*, we might be tempted to write off much of what Plutarch tells us about this extraordinary—I believe the modern term might be "conflicted"—hero as later fiction, the fevered ravings of a Douris of Samos, or material largely invented by the later writers of Athenian history, the so-called Atthidographers. But Thoukydides tells an exciting story of Themistokles's escape from Athens sometime in the later 470s—a rebuff by the Kerkyreans when he asked for asylum there, the theatrical appeal to King Admetos of the Molossoi, Themistokles clutching the infant prince as he made his plea, his threat to the sea-captain transporting him from Pydna to Ephesos via Naxos, his letter of appeal to Artaxerxes, and his final haven, a hero battered but unbowed, living out his last years as a Greek mini-potentate among barbarians in Magnesia, making promises to the Great King that he had no intention of ever carrying through. With Thoukydides providing this thrilling, faintly exotic, model, how could Plutarch's own imagination not be fired, if not to surpass at least not fall dismally short of his great predecessor? It is reassuring to us as we critically sift through this *Life* that in the *Themistokles* Plutarch cites both Herodotos and Thoukydides, the former three times and Thoukydides twice[34]. But from the number of times Herodotos's name appears in Ziegler's testimonia —some 34, apart from the direct citations—, it is clear that Plutarch's debt to Herodotos is far larger —indeed, pervasive. From his rich knowledge of the fifth-century poetic corpus Plutarch excerpts valuable material about Themistokles's personal relationship with Simonides[35] and—not

[34] Hdt. 7.6, 17.1, 21.1; Th. 25.2, 27.1.
[35] Simonides, *Them*. 1.4, 15.4.

a fan of Themistokles—Timokreon of Rhodes[36]. Of fifth-century prose writers he draws on Ion of Khios[37] and the censorious Stesimbrotos of Thasos[38].

Let's start with the poets. The most interesting—to me, at least—is the close relationship Themistokles seems to have had with Simonides. He has a fairly large presence in this *Life*. To establish Themistokles's connection with the genos of Lykomidai, whose telesterion, or initiation-house, had been burnt down during the Persian occupation, Plutarch reports, on Simonides's authority, that Themistokles had it restored and decorated with paintings at his own expense. (A probable inference is that the information was contained in some kind of celebratory poem, perhaps written for the occasion[39].) There are a couple of pleasant anecdotes connecting the two men in chap. 5. While serving in some kind of official capacity—Plutarch here calls him "general"[40]—Themistokles was approached by Simonides to do him a favour which Themistokles considered out of line (τι τῶν οὐ μετρίων). Themistokles refused: why would Simonides expect him to do something παρὰ νόμον when he, Simonides, would never consider singing παρὰ μέλος[41]? On some other occasion, Themistokles got a little personal in his banter, commenting that it did not make sense for Simonides to pour abuse on the Corinthians—when? where?—while he himself had portrait-busts made of himself although he was ugly to look at (ὄντος αἰσχροῦ τὴν ὄψιν)[42]. Much more substantial is the information Plutarch provides later when he paraphrases a poem of Simonides celebrating the "Sea-fight at Salamis", "no more brilliant action at sea had ever been undertaken by Greeks or barbarians" "thanks to the courage and zeal of the sailors, and the planning and cleverness of Themistokles"[43]. Much later in the *Life* Plutach quotes

36 Timokreon, *Them*. 21.

37 *Them*. 2.4. (cf. *Cim*. 9.1).

38 *Them*. 2.5, 4.5.

39 *Them*. 1.4. MARR, 1998, p. 72, suggests that it may have been a commemorative epigram, inscribed on the wall of the building after it was restored by Themistokles.

40 *Them*. 5.6. Plutarch repeats the anecdote elsewhere (*Reg. et imp. apoph*. 185D; *De vit. pud*. 534E; *Praec. ger.* 807B) where, as MARR, 1998, p. 82, points out, the office Themistokles held was the archonship.

41 This is a pun, for μέλος is a synonym for νόμος in one of its senses.

42 Cf. MARR, 1998, p. 82, on the background on this (for Plutarch's biographical purposes, slightly irrelevant) exchange.

43 *Them*. 15.4. I have adapted some of the translation of MARR, 1998, p. 111, citing also *De Her. mal*. 869C-871B.

three passages from Timokreon of Rhodes in which, as Plutarch remarks, the Rhodian poet attacked Themistokles rather bitterly (πικρότερον). The back story here appears to be (or so Timokreon claimed) that Themistokles promised to see that Timokreon was restored to his homeland after the war, and then went back on his word—after taking a bribe, according to Timokreon. Plutarch reports that Timokreon pursued his poetic vendetta still further, heaping insults on Themistokles when the latter had been condemned on a charge of Medism and was living in exile. (Interestingly, Timokeron also picked a poetic fight with Themistokles's friend Simonides, if verses under the poets' names in the Palatine Anthology are to be credited).

The other fifth-century lyric poet cited in the *Life* is Pindar, who celebrated the allied victory in the sea-battle off Cape Artemisium in northern Euboia in late summer 480 BCE as the place "where the sons of the Athenians laid the bright foundation of freedom"[44]. (Plutarch was evidently very attached to the phrase which he quotes in four other places in his works[45].) For the number of ships in Xerxes's fleet, what better source of information than Aiskhylos, who, as Plutarch says, "both knew and confirmed the number strongly", when he had the Messenger in *Persians* tell the Queen at vv. 341-43 that "The multitude of ships in Xerxes's fleet ... were no less than 1000, and those of outstanding speed 207" (1207 was to become the canonical number, repeated by all later writers: Herodotos, Isokrates, Diodoros—and here, in Plutarch).

Old Comedy, normally a rich source of gossip and bawdy invective, offered only slim pickings, probably because by the time comedies began to be performed at the Lenaia festival shortly before 440 BCE (they were included in the City Dionysia from the 480s) Themistokles was long off the local political scene, indeed, off any scene even on a late chronology. Plutarch did, however, remember that in *Knights* (presented at the Lenaia 424 BCE) the Sausage-seller refutes Paphlagon's claims to have done more for Demos than Themistokles, who "kneaded the Peiraieus on to the city" (v. 815). Plutarch quibbles with this: what really happened was that Themistokles "fastened the city on to Peiraieus and the land on to the sea"[46]. Almost at the end of the *Life* Plutarch adduces the valuable testimony of Plato Comicus, four lines which Diodoros, the third-century writer on topography, claimed supported his identification of a monument near the great harbour of Peiraieus as the "Tomb of The-

[44] *Them*. 8.2; Pi. fr. 77 Race; I quote his translation.

[45] *Apoph. Lac*. 232E; *Mul. virt*. 250E; *De sera num*. 552B; *De Her. mal*. 867C.

[46] *Them*. 19.4.

mistokles": "Your tomb, mounted high in a lovely spot where seafaring merchants will address it, in view of all who sail in or out, and itself a spectator at every trireme race"[47].

Of fifth-century prose writers Ion and Stesimbrotos—whom we have encountered already in the *Life of Kimon*—had some items to offer. Without naming Ion as his source, Plutarch recounts again how Themistokles, when at social gatherings he was put on the defensive by those who thought of themselves as more "cultured and refined", retorted rather brusquely (φορτικώτερον) that "even though he had never learnt to sing or play the lyre, he did know how to make a city great"[48]. The Thasian pamphleteer Stesimbrotos was the source Plutarch loved to hate. He cites him eleven times in these Athenian *Lives*, three of which are in this *Life*, and often Plutarch rejects—sometimes strongly—Stesimbrotos's testimony. Apart from its title (*On Themistokles, Thoukydides [son of Melesias] and Perikles*), virtually nothing can be asserted with certainty about the nature and date of publication of his book. What Stesimbrotos reported about Themistokles Plutarch found less than satisfactory. How could Themistokles have studied under Anaxagoras and Melissos the physical philosopher? Anaxagoras and Melissos, Plutarch says huffily, were contemporaries of Perikles, so Stesimbrotos has "got his chronology wrong"[49]. According to Stesimbrotos Themistokles had to get his plans to enlarge the Athenian fleet accepted by the people in the face of opposition from Miltiades (*Them*. 4.5; Plutarch does not comment, although his readers—and we—would know that with Militades off the scene by 489, this would have been another example of poor chronology). Finally, Stesimbrotos gave a strange variant of what happened to Themistokles after he left Greece. According to him, Themistokles went from mainland Greece to Sicily, where he sought asylum at the court of Hieron and offered to marry Hieron's daughter (the other item for which Plutarch cites Stesimbrotos is plausible enough, that Kimon brought a capital charge against the man who helped get Themistokles's wife and children out of Athens to rejoin him in exile[50]).

Five times in this *Life* Plutarch cites Phanias or Phainias of Eresos on Lesbos, who was a pupil of Aristotle and "a typical scholar and writer of the early Peripatetic school"[51]. Plutarch

47 *Them*. 32.6; *FGrH* 372 F 35; *PCG* fr. 199.

48 *Them*. 2.4 = *Cim.* 9.1; Ion *FGrH* 392 F 12.

49 *Them*. 2.5; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 1 οὐκ εὖ τῶν χρόνων ἁπτόμενος.

50 *Them*. 24.7; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 3

51 ENGELS, 1998c, 291. For an up-to-date treatment of various aspects of Phainias's life and writings see now HELLMAN and MIRHADY, 2015.

goes out of his way to praise him as "a philosopher and not unversed in literature"[52]. He draws on Phainias for a variety of items: Themistokles's mother was not Thracian, as generally believed, but a Carian named Euterpe[53]. With the fleet off Artemisium Themistokles used a particularly tricky scheme to prevent one of the ship captains from breaking ranks and sailing away[54]. As part of his Salamis narrative Plutarch tells at length the story of how some Persian royals, Xerxes's nephews, were taken captive and sacrificed to Dionysos ὠμηστής[55]. (This is where Plutarch stops to pay Phainias the compliment just mentioned. He will repeat the tale in the *Life of Aristeides*[56]). He cites Phainias again for variant versions of two minor details in the last, the Asian, part of Themistokles's life[57].

Plutarch cites Plato twice in this *Life*. In the *Laws*, Themistokles is faulted for turning Athenian "hoplites who stood firm"—μονίμων ὁπλιτῶν - into mariners and seafarers[58] and in *Meno* we are told that Themistokles's son Diophantos had been taught by his father, if nothing else, how to be a good horseman[59]. The Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens,* a ready source for many constitutional details in these *Lives*, is cited here for the eight-drachma stipend paid by authority of the Areiopagos to the Athenian sailors before Salamis[60].

In the *Nikias* Plutarch speaks with a note of justified pride of what he feels he can add to his written sources and the traditions he has inherited as a Greek man of learning: monuments, dedications, inscriptional evidence which he has himself examined. In this category are to be placed the votive plaque that Themistokles set up to commemorate his choregic victory in 477/6 with plays by Phrynikhos[61]. Plutarch mentions, very likely from

52 *Them*. 13.5; *FGrH* 1012 F 19.

53 *Them*. 1.2; *FGrH* 1012 F 17.

54 *Them*. 7.7; *FGrH* 1012 F 18: a one-talent "bribe" which, if the man, Arkhiteles, did *not* accept, Themistokles would denounce him for accepting bribes.

55 *Them.* 13.2-5; *FGrH* 1012 F 19.

56 *Arist*. 9.2.

57 *Them*. 27.8; *FGrH* 1012 F 20, Themistokles's meeting with the chiliarch Artabanos; *Them*. 29.11; *FGrH* 1012 F 22, two additional tributary cities to those mentioned by Thoukydides, Perkote for bedding and Palaiskepsis for clothing.

58 *Them*. 4.4; *Laws* 706C.

59 *Them*. 32.1; *Meno* 93B.

60 *Them*. 10.6; *Ath.* 23.1-2.

61 *Them.* 5.5, probably *Phoinissai,* allegedly a model for Aiskhylos's *Persians*.

autopsy, the shrine Themistokles had built near his own house in Melite, dedicated to "Artemis Best Counsellor", in which—much to the displeasure of the Athenians—he placed a bust of himself, which Plutarch says survived right down to his own time, καθ' ἡμᾶς. He describes dedications made to celebrate the victories at Artemision in N. Euboia; "the stone", Plutarch remarks, "when rubbed gives off the colour and odour of saffron" (*Them*. 8.4). Plutarch closes his *Life* with a short account of Themistokles's descendants. He adds valuable personal details of his dealings with the Themistokles who was a contemporary of his at Athens, and who was the beneficiary of certain honours that had been accorded Themistokles's descendants by the people of Magnesia where he ended his days.

Theopompos, thought to be an important though unnamed source in some of these *Lives*, is cited three times in the *Themistokles*, and Theophrastos twice. Theopompos's was the lone dissenting voice in Plutarch's sources for the way Themistokles managed the refortification of Athen over the opposition of the Spartans: Theopompos said Themistokles had bribed the Spartan ephors not to oppose his plan, whereas οἱ πλεῖστοι said it was by deception[62]. When Themistokles made his final escape to the Persian court, the value of his confiscated property was set at one hundred talents by Theopompos, eighty by Theophrastos[63]. Plutarch rejects Theopompos's report that when in exile Themistokles "wandered about" Asia. Instead, he accepts the common view that he settled in as a grandee in Magnesia[64]. From Theophrastos's "On Kingship" Plutarch retails the story of Themistokles arousing the ire of the spectators at the Olympic games against Hiero of Syracuse[65].

The structure of the *Themistokles* is relatively simple. Chapters 1 - 17 are "almost pure narrative"[66], covering the period to the close of the Persian Wars. There follows a bridge chapter 18 devoted to anecdotes and apophthegms, eight of each, a larger number in a single chapter than any Athenian *Life* except *Phokion*, where chapter 9 has ten anecdotes and apophthegms[67]. Then the narrative resumes, chapters 19-31 dealing with events from 479 BCE to Themistokles's death in 460/59 BCE on the high chronology or 450/49 BCE on the low[68].

62 *Them*. 19.1; *FGrH* 115 F 85.
63 *Them*. 25.3; *FGrH* 115 F 86; *FHSG* fr. 613.
64 *Them*. 31.3; *FGrH* 115 F 87.
65 *Them*. 25.1; *FHSG* fr. 612; MIRHADY, 1992, pp. 137-38.
66 See GOMME, 1945, p. 61.
67 PODLECKI, 2005, p. 273 and p. 275.
68 MARR, 1998, pp. 159-60, on the (unresolvable) problems.

Pelling called the *Themistokles* "not on the whole one of Pluarch's most thoughtful or incisive *Lives*"[69], but it remains a real treasure-trove to students of fifth-century Athenian history who have to look in unlikely places to reconstruct the details of this strange but fascinating individual[70].

3. *Perikles*

When Plutarch sat down to collect his thoughts for his *Life of Perikles* he knew he had a problem, several problems, in fact. Sources he could consult (or remember) were spotty and partisan. They offered him next to nothing about Perikles's early life, although he could of course fall back on traditions about the Alkmeonidai. In addition, many of the accounts with which he was familiar (Stesimbrotos, Theopompos) were actively hostile, and they singled out an unattractive characteristic of Perikles's personality, his aloofness (σεμνότης). Plutarch knew that he could deal with this by turning it into a positive virtue, μεγαλοφροσύνη, high-mindedness. Furthermore, although Perikles's background was one of privilege and he kept company with others of his kind, he became the προστάτης τοῦ δήμου with the best track record of all the other men who were later dubbed, sometimes with a slight tone of disparagement, δημαγωγοί. What could have impelled a man of (as Plutarch believed) a staunchly "aristocratic" background and temperament to initiate, at various points in his career, measures that were, or could be characterized as, shamelessly "crowd-pleasing"? Plutarch set himself the formidable task of trying to elucidate for his readers, and for us, the reasons why and the stages by which this unlikely transformation occurred, but in my opinion he was only partially successful in this enterprise, and the real motives behind some of Perikles's undertakings remain shrouded in mystery.

I shall start with an overview of the major sources Plutarch relied on in composing the *Perikles*.

For the last part of Perikles's career Plutarch sensibly relied heavily upon Thoukydides the historian, whom he cites by name five times: *Per.* 9.1 = 2.65.10, the famous *aperçu*, that Athens was "in name a democracy but in fact the *arkhê* of the foremost man"; *Per.*15.3, recapitulated at *Per.*16.3 = 2.65.8 praise of Perikles's incorruptibility[71];

69 Pelling, 1992, p. 29 (= 2002, p. 132).

70 It is worth quoting Gomme, 1945, p. 61, for an appreciation of Plutarch's achievement: "everything Themistokles did, both great and small, illustrates his remarkable, complex, but yet simply drawn, character, which for Plutarch is all high lights and darkness; and there was much material, full of interest if somewhat monotonous in tone".

71 Perikles's incorruptibility was a feature that clearly impressed Plutarch. He returns to it twice in the *Comparison* 30(3) 5 and 6. Interestingly, as Rhodes, 1988, p. 243, points out, Thoukydides has Perikles in his last speech make this claim in his own behalf (2.60.5).

*Per.*28.2 Thoukydides is named among historians who, by their silence, refute the charge laid by Douris of Samos that Perikles had dealt with the rebellious Samians with excessive brutality; *Per*.28.8 = 8.76.4 the Samians had come very close to defeating the Athenians in that revolt; *Per*.33.1 = 1.127.1, on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities the Spartans made the unrealistic demand that war could be averted if the Athenians should "drive out the curse" of Perikles's genos, the Alkmeonidai (viz., by exiling Perikles himself). To these specific citations, however, there should be added the numerous echoes of Thoukydides that Ziegler tabulates in his testimonia. A good example of this is Plutarch's comment at *Per.* 13.16 on the difficulty a historian faces in getting at the truth of past events = 1.22.3. (In passing, I note that this is similar to the way Plutarch uses Thoukydides in *Kimon*[72], where he cites the historian five times by name but follows him in a general way in his narrative of the period after the Persian Wars.) Another contemporary witness was Ion of Khios. His enigmatically titled *Sojourns* (*Epidêmiai*) was a potentially fruitful source of information, especially of a personal nature. As far as we can tell from Plutarch's citations, Ion was no friend of Perikles, but showed a strong bias towards Kimon. In a claim that savours of personal animus, Ion charged Perikles with having "a rather disdainful and arrogant manner of address, and…his pride had in it a good deal of superciliousness and contempt for others"[73]. (Kimon, by contrast, elicited Ion's praise for his "ease, good humour and polished manner"). In the account of the Samian Revolt later in the *Life*, and clearly chiming in with this rather sour account of Perikles's manner, Ion is cited for Perikles's boast that, whereas it had taken Agamemnon ten years to capture Troy, he had brought Samos to heel in nine months[74]. Stesimbrotos of Thasos likewise appears to have been no admirer of Perikles. Four times in this *Life* Plutarch cites his work *On Themistokles, Thoukydides [son of Melesias] and Perikles*, but little can be gleaned about it from the meagre remains and generally the tone is negative, even abusive. The reader is treated to scurrilous gossip about Perikles's involvement with the wife of his son Xanthippos (*Per.* 13.6, *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 10b), which Plutarch dismisses as "shocking and completely unfounded". These unsavoury rumors

[72] ZIEGLER, in the Teubner edition, notes this general similarity, pointing to *Cim.* 6 = Th. 1.94.5; *Cim.* 11 = Th. 1.99.

[73] *Per*. 5.3, tr. Scott-Kilvert, *FGrH* 392 F 15. To these charges of arrogance, disdain for others and superciliousness I shall return later.

[74] *Per.* 28.7; *FGrH* 392 F 16.

according to Stestimbrotos had been spread by Xanthippos himself and father and son remained unreconciled even to the death of the latter in the plague (*Per*. 36.6, *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 11). More promising as historical fact are a couple of items from the Samian campaign. In his epitaphios for the Samian War dead Perikles made the memorable comparison of the casualties to the immortal gods for, he said, "We cannot see the gods, but we believe them to be immortal from the honours we pay them and the blessings we receive from them"[75]. It looks as if Stesimbrotos had given a fairly full account of the Samian campaign, for Plutarch records a tactical detail (which, however, he rejects *Per*. 26.1, *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 8). Plutarch also recounts the story here of Kimon's sister Elpinike supposedly intervening with Perikles and pleading with him to show clemency toward her brother at the latter's trial c. 462 BCE, a detail he had already reported in the *Kimon*, where he names Stesimbrotos as his source[76]. Stesimbrotos may also be behind the story that Elpinike intervened yet again and brokered a deal with Perikles to secure her brother's early recall from ostracism (*Cim.* 17.8, *Per*.10.5, where Plutarch ascribes the story to ἔνιοι[77]).

In spite of Plutarch's professed distaste for and disapproval of Old Comedy[78], luckily for us he was not above enlivening his narrative with a barrage of the anti-Periklean invective to be found there. Students in any subsequent period are deeply indebted to his researches in this area for the light thrown on the social and cultural, as well as at times also political history of the period[79], Since I have explored the evidence at several reprises previously, I shall summarize the results in more or less tabular form[80]. Plutarch inserts into his narrative direct quotations (or in one instance, a paraphrase) from six comic poets, as well as three times excerpting from authors to whom he refers generically as οἱ κωμικοί, οἱ κωμῳδοποιοί, αἱ κωμῳδίαι *vel sim*. In the following table I list them in roughly chronological order with the number of passages quoted or referred to by Plutarch in curved brackets ( ),

75 *Per*. 8.9, trans. Scott-Kilvert; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 7.

76 *Per*.10.6; *Cim.* 14.5; *FGrH* 1002 [107] F 5.

77 Holden, 1894, p. 116.

78 *Comp. Ar. et Men*. 853B and following.

79 I sidestep here the knotty question of whether, and to what extent, Plutarch was directly familiar with the comic works from which he cites so appositely and amusingly (a pre-existing compilation cannot be ruled out, but for our purposes here the issue has no relevance).

80 Fuller discussions at Podlecki, 1973; Podlecki, 1987 [1990], pp. 81-88; Podlecki, 1998, pp. 169-76.

and an indication by understrike of whether the author in question is cited or mentioned in another *Life* and using boldface to indicate an occurrence in the Moral Essays (*Moralia*). After the name of each author I tabulate the section of the *Life* where the reference or citation occurs and where possible, the number assigned to the passage in Kassel-Austin *PCG*. Figures in square brackets [ ] following each citation refer to the introductory tabulation of themes touched on in the passage (in some cases, more than one), as follows:

1. Themes

[1] Perikles's alleged cranial peculiarity; [2] his liaison with Aspasia, and the notoriety this occasioned; [3] his Zeus-like, "Olympian" comportment; [4] "tyrannical" behaviour imputed to him; [5] his involvement with Athenian building projects; [6] external, imperial, initiatives; [7] other.

2. Authors

Kratinos (5) 3.5 from *Kheirons PCG* fr.258 [1] [4], from *Nemesis PCG* fr. 118 [1] [3]; 13.8 an unnamed play *PCG* fr. 326 [5]; 13.10 from *Thracian Women PCG* fr. 73 [1] [3] [5] [7]; 24.9 an unnamed play *PCG* fr. 259 [2].

Eupolis (2) 3.7 from *Demes PCG* fr.115 [1]; 24.10 also from *Demes PCG* fr.110 [2] [7].

Aristophanes (3) 8.4 *Akharnians* 531 paraphrase [3]; 26.4 from *Babylonians PCG* fr.71 [6]; 30.4 *Akharnians* 524-527 [2] [6].

Telekleides (2) 3.6 an unnamed play *PCG* fr.47 [1] [5]; 16.2 an unnamed play *PCG* fr. 45 [6].

Plato Comicus (1) 4.4 an unnamed play *PCG* fr. 207 [7].

Hermippos (1) 33.8 an unnamed play, possibly *Fates PCG* fr. 47 [6] [7].

οἱ κωμικοί (3) 7.8 *PCG* fr. 700 [6]; 13.15 *PCG* fr. 702 [7] 16.1 *PCG* fr. 703 [4]; 24.9 *PCG* fr. 704 [2].

Perusal of the above table confirms a preliminary impression that the comedians did not hesitate to look for easy laughs by alluding to Perikles's oddly shaped head: "head-gatherer", "squil-headed Zeus", Zeus the "head-god" (Kratinos, with a subtle side reference to his "Zeus-like" behaviour); "head-man [κεφάλαιον] of the Underworld-dwellers" (Eupolis); "with a big head-ache …in his eleven-couched head" (Telekleides). Aspasia too was an easy target. In an astonishing display of comedic παρρησία Kratinos had one of his characters say in an unnamed play, "Buggery gave birth to Hera-Aspasia, the bitch-faced concubine", where the reference to Hera would have had overtones of Perikles as Zeus, an identification which could also be evoked by comments such as Aristophanes's famous lines about the way Perikles "thundered and lightened" and "wore a terrible lightning bolt in his tongue". Perikles's "tyrannical" actions

could also be attacked more directly and more ominously: some comic writers whom Plutarch does not name referred to Perikles and his associates as "new Peisistratids". Of historical interest are Kratinos's jokes about Perikles "dragging his feet" in the completion of the "middle" Long Wall from the city to Peiraieus and ludicrously wearing the Odeion on his head, apparently just after escaping a vote of ostracism[81]. Plutarch quotes an excerpt from Aristophanes's first production, *Babylonians*, produced in 426 BCE: "How multi-lettered are the Samian people!" Plutarch places this in the context of the punishment of branding meted out to prisoners on both sides in the Samian campaign[82]. In the four-line snippet quoted from *Akharnians* Dikaiopolis produces a travesty of events that precipitated the Peloponnesian War: the real reason it broke out was some pranks by young hot bloods on both sides culminating in the Megarians capturing two of Aspasia's *pornai* and Perikles engineering the embargo on Megarian exports in retaliation. Plutarch names the comic writer Hermippos[83] twice, first and less reliably in chapter 32 as the sponsor of a decree charging Aspasia with *asebeia* with an additional charge of procuring free-born women for Perikles (this possibly from a comedy rather than an actual indictment[84]). Plutarch proceeds in the following chapter to quote a seven-line excerpt from an unnamed play in which one of Hermippos's characters addresses Perikles as "King of satyrs" and asks, "Why are you not willing to take up a spear [and fight], but keep offering frightening speeches about the war, but have the soul of a Teles?"—an individual otherwise unknown but clearly a by-word for cowardice—"You gnash your teeth when the knife-edge is sharpened on the hard whetstone, bitten by fiery Kleon". "King of satyrs" implies lecherousness, presupposed by stories given currency by the κωμικοί that some of Perikles's close associates

81 Plutarch quotes Kratinos's lines again in this context at *De glor. Ath*. 351A. It is not clear what wall Kratinos's joke referred to. If Plutarch was correct in citing Plato's *Gorgias* (455E) for the detail that Sokrates heard Perikles proposing the project, it cannot have been the Long Walls, which Thoukydides dates between 459 and 457 BCE (discussion at Podlecki, 1987, p. 47, and Podlecki, 1998, pp. 99-100, 170).

82 It is not clear how much credibility should be put in Plutarch's explanation: foreheads of the Samian prisoners tattooed by their Athenian captors with a *sêmaina*, a Samian warship, Athenian captives being branded with an owl.

83 Two additional fragments not in *Perikles*: *PCG* fr.69 "a head as big as a pumpkin"; *PCG* fr. 70 "Say, there, tickle my head, will you?"

84 In an interesting talk at the annual meetings of the Classical Association of Canada Prof. Ian Storey of Trent University suggested that the play was *Fates*, for which he proposed a date of 430 BCE.

acted as procurers[85]. The charge against Perikles that he "was all talk, but no action" reflects the pressure Perikles was under in the early years of the war to move from a defensive to an offensive stratgegy. And Kleon, his soon-to-be successor as *prostates*, appears here, as Gomme noted[86], for the first time in the historical record. The unnamed κωμῳδοποιοί whom Plutarch cites at chap. 7.8 charged that Perikles had given in to pressures for expanding the empire: the demos "no longer had the nerve to obey authority, but nibbled at Euboia and leapt on the islands", where the reference to Euboia is probably to be taken as an allusion to Perikles's speedy action in suppressing the island's revolt in 446 BCE (*Per*. 22.1, 23.3-4). Allegations that Perikles was arrogating to himself "tyrannical" power could be spelled out in detail, as in a trenchant three-line excerpt from an unnamed play by Telekleides quoted by Plutarch at *Per*. 16.2, where perhaps the Chorus are mocking the Athenians for handing over to Perikles "both tribute from the cities and the cities themselves, some to bind, others to loose [this appears to refer to various adjustments in the tribute-payments the allies were expected to pay annually to Athens], walls of stone, some to build, others to throw down again, treaties, power, force, peace, wealth and happiness". Eupolis's *Demes*, produced after Perikles's death (c. 412 BCE), had a scene in which various generals and statesmen of a bygone age were conjured from Hades, with Perikles emerging last. He asks the general Myronides, who had preceded him, "And my bastard, is he still alive?" —the audience will have recognized the allusion to his son by Aspasia, the younger Perikles— to which Myronides replies, "Yes, and he would have been a man long before now if he were not so scared of the blemish of the whore" (*Per.* 24.10).

As is his custom in these *Lives* Plutarch combs through traditions concerning philosophical "succession" and comes up with names of his subject's "teachers", those who exercised a formative intellectual or moral influence. He took over, somewhat uncritically, Plato's *jeu-d'esprit* that Perikles owed his "high-mindedness" to Anaxagoras's ethereal philosophizing[87]. Plutarch references Plato again in discussing the deleterious (from an aristocrat's standpoint) effects of the Areiopagos reforms of c. 461 BCE, like a cupbearer "pouring out undiluted freedom for the

85 *Per*. 13.15, Pheidias, Pyrilampes.

86 GOMME, 1956, p. 75.

87 *Per*. 4.6 - 5.1, 8.1-2, where Plutarch names Plato and paraphrases the passage (*Phaidros* 270A). The comment of YUNIS, 2011, p. 209, is apposite: "both the overall tone and specific terms used by S[okrates] are unmistakably ironic".

citizens"[88]. As already noted a passage in *Gorgias* provided the (somewhat problematic) information that Sokrates personally heard a proposal by Perikles regarding Athens' fortifications[89]. Plutarch cites Plato's *Menexenos* for the report that Aspasia "was reputed to have associated with many Athenians who wanted to learn rhetoric from her"[90]. Still probing for information about Perikles's teachers Plutarch turns to the Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens* (27.4) and comes up with the names of Damon (or Damonides) and the somewhat shadowy Pythokleides of Keos[91]. Plutarch also adduces the *Constitution* for the name of Ephialtes's assassin, Aristodikos of Tanagra, and uses it to counter the alternative (and scurrilous) version propagated by Idomeneus of Lampsakos that it was Perikles who orchestrated the removal of his erstwhile colleague in the Areiopagos reforms[92]. In his narrative of the Samian campaign Plutarch records two details from a work by Aristotle no longer extant: *Per*. 26.3, fr. 535 Rose, Perikles himself was defeated by the philosopher Melissos in an early sea battle and *Per*. 28.2, fr. 536 Rose, where Plutarch names Aristotle, along with Thoukydides and Ephoros, as sources which he says did not support the claim by Douris of Samos that Perikles brutalized Samian prisoners-of-war. Aristotle's pupil and successor Theophrastos is cited three times. For the first two Plutarch does not identify the treatise from which they are drawn: Perikles's alleged annual dispatch of 10 T to Sparta to stave off the war (*Per*. 23.2, *FHSG* fr. 615) and the name of Simmias as Perikles's accuser in summer 430 BCE (*Per*. 35.5, *FHSG* fr. 616)[93]. From Theophrastos's *Ethics* comes a story of how Perikles on his deathbed scoffed at his own gullibility in accepting an amulet to restore his health[94]. Plutarch

88 *Per*. 7.8; Pl., *R*. 562D.

89 See n. 81 above, with the comments of Dodds, 1966, p. 210, on the *Gorgias* passage, 455E.

90 *Per*. 24.7 = Pl., *Mx*. 235E. Plutarch recognizes that some (in fact, probably all) of this was μετὰ παιδιᾶς.

91 *Per*. 4.1-4 (with an apt citation from Plato Comicus [*PCG* fr. 207] in which someone addresses Damon as "the Khiron who brought up Perikles"—who is thereby being likened to Akhilleus) and *Per*. 9.2. Since Pythokleides's name occurs, along with Damon and Anaxagoras, in the Platonic *First Alkibiades* (118C), it is generally held that Plutarch's reference to Aristotle is an error.

92 *Per*.10.8; *Ath.* 25.4; Idomeneus *FGrH* 338 F 8.

93 Gomme, 1956, pp. 182-83, for some uncertainties surrounding this prosecution.

94 *Per*. 38.2; *FHSG* fr. 463.

castigates the scandal-monger Douris of Samos at *Per*. 28.2 for "magnifying Perikles's alleged brutality at Samos into a tragedy". (He cannot, however, refrain from retailing some of the grisly details from Douris's account, *FGrH* 76 F 67). The extent to which Plutarch drew on Theopompos is still a matter of debate among scholars[95]. At *Per*. 9.2 he repeats material he had presented in the *Kimon* (10.1-2) regarding Kimon's largesses, the popularity these gained for him, and the counter-measures Perikles took—allegedly on the advice of his "teacher" Damon/Damonides—to "out demagogue" his opponent. In his comment on the *Kimon* passage A. Blamire drew attention to Theopompos *FgrH* 115 F 89, which was "followed almost *verbatim*, but not named" by Plutarch[96]. A. Blamire further remarked that, although Plutarch does not cite Theopompos either there or in the *Perikles*, he "must be considered an important source for both"[97]. Theopompos had made Perikles a typical demagogue, a conclusion with which Plutarch had little sympathy, so Plutarch knew that he had to use the source with caution and do a little laundering, if necessary. Plutarch names Aiskhines the Socratic as his source for two items, Aspasia taking up with Lysikles "the Sheep-dealer" after Perikles's death (*Per*. 24.6) and Perikles's tearful appeal to the jurors to show clemency to Aspasia at her trial (*Per.* 32.5). From external evidence we know that it was another disciple of Sokrates, Antisthenes, who was behind the silly story that Perikles always kissed Aspasia when he left home in the morning and returned again at night[98].

From somewhere in his capacious memory (or notes) Plutarch came up with the excellent squib by Kritolaos (perhaps to be identified with the second century BCE head of the Peripatetic school) that Perikles, like the state galley Salaminia, "saved himself for great occasions"[99].

I want to move now to some problems that Plutarch had to face when he came to organize his material for

95 Thus CONNOR, 1968, pp. 114-15, sees him as the source of the demagogic measures that Plutarch enumerates in *Per*. 11, 13 and 34, possibly also Kimon's early recall from ostracism (*Per*. 10.4; *Cim.* 18.1 = *FGrH* 115 F 88).

96 BLAMIRE, 1989, p. 129.

97 BLAMIRE, 1989, p. 8. See also the terse but important discussion by WADE-GERY, 1958, pp. 235-38, with his conclusion that "Perikles the villain, not Kimon the hero, was the central figure in Theopompos".

98 Athenaios 13. 589E; *FGrH* 1004 Ff 7 a-b (*Per.* 24.9; with commentary at J. ENGELS, 1998c, pp. 104 - 105). For Plutarch's take on Perikles's relationship with Aspasia see BENEKER, 2012, pp. 43-54.

99 Kritolaos fr. 37 b Wehrli; *Per*. 7.7; *Praec. ger.* 811C-D, where Plutarch adds the name of the other state galley, Paralos.

the *Life of Perikles* and the strategies Plutarch used to address them. First, the sources said nothing about Perikles's early life. Plutarch does the best he can, mentioning his father Xanthippos's victories in the Persian Wars, and the dream that his mother Agariste had just before giving birth that she would "bring forth a lion"[100]. The explanation Plutarch came up with to explain his subject's absence from the public scene before the 460s was that he was keeping a low profile out of fear of being ostracized. What prompted this fear, according to Plutarch, was his "wealth, distinguished family and very powerful friends" (*Per*. 7.2) which might arouse a suspicion among the populace that he was aiming at tyranny (*Per*.7.4). But Plutarch introduces an additional explanation, which seems rather implausible: people thought Perikles bore a striking resemblance to the tyrant Peisistratos and there were old men who were amazed by another characteristic the two men shared, "a melodious voice, and a very fluent and rapid style of speaking". Peisistratos died in 527 BCE. Perikles will not have been heard speaking in public before the late 470s. The improbability of the story being true is obvious, and in fact an expanded version in Valerius Maximus faces the problem and tries, not altogether successfully, to bridge the gap. There it is "a very old man who in his youth" had heard Peisistratos and was in the audience when the young Perikles gave his first public speech[101]. Plutarch and/or his source appears to have been duped by passages from Old Comedy, such as the one at *Per*.16.1 already mentioned, where Perikles's followers are satirized as the "new Peisistratids" and he himself is called on to "swear an oath that he will not become a tyrant"[102]. Pressed to tell his readers something about Perikles's early years Plutarch can do no better than insist that "although he had taken no part in political affairs, he showed himself brave and careless of danger in military campaigns" (*Per*. 7.2; about which these might have been Plutarch is silent).

Another potential obstacle to his biographer was the uniformity with which the sources, when they addressed the topic of Perikles's personal qualities, put at the top of the list a characteristic

[100] *Per*. 3.2, closely paraphrasing Herodotos (6.136.2).

[101] Val. Max. 8.9 ext 2 (an adaptation of Shackleton Bailey's translation).

[102] One of the reasons Plutarch adduces for Damon's ostracism was that he was φιλοτύραννος. Also relevant in this context is Plutarch's report that Perikles's opponents claimed that his policies were a "terrible hubris and a blatant exercise of tyranny over Greece" (*Per*. 12.2). The eulogy with which Plutarch closes the *Life* returns to this theme: "Then it was [sc. after Perikles's death] that that power of his, which had aroused such envy and had been denounced as a monarchy and a tyranny, stood revealed in its true character as the saving bulwark of the state" (*Per*. 39.4 tr. Scott-Kilvert).

labeled variously as ὄγκος, σεμνότης, φρόνημα, ἀξίωμα or, if you were tolerant or even well-disposed, τὸ μεγαλόψυχον, μεγαλοφροσύνη (as we saw, detractors like Ion labeled it μεγαλαυχία, ὑπεροψία and περιφρόνησις τῶν ἄλλων). How does Plutarch deal with this uncomfortable datum? Well, it was because (as Plato insisted in the *Phaidros*) the young Perikles fell under the spell of Anaxagoras who instilled in him a love of "ethereal" matters, "rarefied" thinking and a corresponding "elevated" style of speaking (*Per*. 4.6, 5.1 and 8.1-2: "by applying this training to the art of oratory he far excelled all other speakers", Scott-Kilvert's trans). From Anaxagoras Perikles learned the importance of withdrawing from frivolous and time-wasting activities such as dinner parties[103], and adopting an ascetic lifestyle—like an athlete in training[104]. As a corollary benefit of this conversion, Perikles could delegate less pressing public business to trusted subordinates who would thus be made to feel they had an important role to play in his grand scheme[105]. Perikles could thus—to turn Kritolaos's barb into a compliment—"save himself for great occasions".

Finally, and this was perhaps the most challenging task Plutarch set himself, he had to account for the fact, which his sources made abundantly and undeniably clear, that this blue-blooded aristocrat was responsible for a host of crowd-pleasing, "demagogic" enactments, and that these seem to have been scattered over various points in Perikles's public career. What accounted for this apparent discrepancy between Perikles's beliefs and his behaviour? The short, and ultimately unsatisfactory, explanation Plutarch produces is that Perikles had to fend off opposition from other political leaders who at various stages in their careers presented a serious challenge to Perikles for προστασία τοῦ δῆμου. First, Kimon. His personal wealth, Plutarch says (returning to material that he had already used in the *Kimon*[106]), allowed him to initiate a variety of social welfare

[103] The theme of withdrawal from social events (*Per*. 7.5-6) is suspect, in part because Plutarch tells a similar story about Nikias, who, however, had different reasons for doing so (*Nic.* 5.1-2). The motif recurs in the *Themistokles* (3.4, a related story of Themistokles's "conversion" from youthful pranks and debauchery to serious statesmanship).

[104] Plutarch uses the image specifically in connection with the "training in political life" allegedly given Perikles by Damon (*Per*. 4.2).

[105] *Per*. 7.7. The ability to assign tasks to subordinates, Plutarch insists, was important for anyone aspiring to a career in public life (*Praec. ger*. 812C-D). Note that Perikles apparently went too far in the case of Metiokhos (*Praec. ger.* 811F citing three lines from an anonymous comic writer lampooning his officiousness, *PCG* fr. 741).

[106] Plutarch is effusive in his praise: his "unstinting generosity…surpassed even the legendary hospitality and benevolence of ancient Athens" (*Cim.* 10.6, tr. BLAMIRE).

programs. Finding himself thus out demagogued (καταδημαγωγούμενος) Perikles put into practice the advice of his mentor Damon to "give the people their own": he turned to a distribution of public property (πρὸς τὴν τῶν δημοσίων διανομήν *Per.* 9.2). But there is some incoherence in the way Plutarch presents the match-up between Kimon and Perikles in this respect. It is not at all clear that Kimon's largesse was totally paid for out of his own pocket. We are told that after his victory at the Eurymedon River in 468/7, the captured spoils were sold and "the people had ample funds available for various purposes"; the south wall of the Akropolis was "built from the proceeds of that campaign" (*Cim.* 13.5 tr. Blamire). In returning to this topic in chapter 10 he remarks, "Now that Kimon had ample funds at his disposal through the success of his military operations, he was able to spend what he had gained with honour from the enemy still more honourably upon the citizens of Athens" (*Cim.*10.1, tr. Blamire), and he proceeds to specific items of social welfare, removal of the fences from his estates, changes of clothing and hand-outs of money to the needy. In concluding his discussion of this topic in *Perikles* Plutarch mentions among Kimon's achievements that he had "won the most brilliant victories over the Persians and filled the city with money and treasure" (*Per*. 9.5, tr. Scott-Kilvert). The other side of the balance has some inconsistencies as well. Although Plutarch says Perikles could not afford to match the lavish scale of Kimon's largess, his *ploutos*, as we have seen (*Per*.7.2), made him susceptible to ostracism. Later in the *Life* when he is discussing the ambitious building program initiated by Perikles after the removal of his last serious opponent Thoukydides son of Melesias, Plutarch has him respond to the carping criticism that he was misusing surpluses in the imperial treasury to "tart up" the city with gorgeous temples and other public works, "Chalk it up to my own personal account —and let my name be put on the dedicatory inscriptions" (*Per*.14.1).

A further difficulty: the "demagogic" measures Perikles is alleged to have had to resort to against his "true" nature simply to outmaneuver his opponents exist for Plutarch in a kind of chronology-free cloud. In fact, they were not introduced as Plutarch suggests at specific crisis-points in Perikles's career (*Per*. 9.3, 11.4), but sporadically, spread out over the period 460-430 BCE. Plutarch implies that Perikles in his exercise of power in the uninterrupted succession of generalships after the removal of Thoukydides son of Melesias was following the promptings of his true, "aristocratic", nature and had left the popularity-buying tactics behind. But in discussing the pressures Perikles was feeling in the summer of 431 because of his "defensive" policy of keeping the Athenians cooped up within the city walls and refusing to bow to charges of inaction and even

cowardice from noisy critics like Kleon, Perikles reverted to measures that would assuage the people's anger: "to placate the people…he won back some of his popularity by giving them various subsidies and proposing grants of conquered territories" (*Per*. 34.2 tr. Scott-Kilvert). Plutarch returns to this topic in his summing up of Perikles's career in the Comparison: unlike Fabius, Perikles had the opportunity as general to "stuff the city with holidays and festivals" (ἐνεορτάσαι ... καὶ ἐμπανηγυρίσαι τὴν πόλιν *Fabius* 28 [1] 2).

We need to take Plutarch's view of the (relatively) smooth and steady trajectory of Perikles's development as a political leader with a measure of critical skepticism. I conclude with a brief summary of items which, for lack of a better term, I will call the pluses and minuses of this *Life*. I start with the minuses, items Plutarch asks his readers to accept with very little, if any, evidential support.

First, the campaign at Tanagra (spring 457 BCE; *Per*. 10.1-6, *Cim.* 17.4-9). Plutarch's narrative is riddled with improbabilities. Kimon, though in exile, shows up to prove that in spite of what his critics say he is a patriot. Perikles's buddies dismiss him for his pro-Spartan leanings and Perikles has to show how superior he is by fighting more bravely and even recklessly than usual. The people have a change of heart and so Perikles too, in a breathtaking volte-face, sponsors a decree for Kimon's recall. "Some sources" had it that the rapprochement was effected by Kimon's sister Elpinike and that hereafter there was to be a division of command, Kimon taking charge of the war at sea and Perikles given *carte blanche* to exercise power in the city. Obviously, little if any of this can be accepted as historical[107]. Concluding this episode in the *Kimon*, Plutarch remarks that Perikles's change of position vis-à-vis Kimon illustrates how "in those days partisanship had to give way to expedient compromise for the common good and ambition, that most powerful of human emotions, gave way to the exigencies of the state"[108].

The "Congress Decree" (chapter 17), too, has all the earmarks of a skillful fabrication, perhaps in the fourth century when so-called "universal historians" were looking for documents to inject some *realismus* into their narratives. There may be some solid

[107] Some of it may derive from Theopompos (*FGrH* 115 F 88). Athenaios (13.589E-F) reports that the "price" exacted by Perikles for engineering Kimon's early recall was having sex with Elpinike. Note that the "division of powers" motif is picked up again at *Praec. ger*. 812F: "one of them [Perikles] was more gifted for civic government, the other for war" (tr. Fowler).

[108] *Cim.* 17.9, tr. BLAMIRE.

facts in the farrago of gossip, innuendo and outright calumny in Plutarch's narrative of the run-up to the actual invasion by the Peloponnesians in spring 431, but I feel fairly safe in rejecting (or at least withholding assent from) all the theatrics surrounding the alleged "trials" of Pheidias, Aspasia and Anaxagoras in chapters 31 and 32[109].

It would be good to be able to distinguish fact from fantasy in the stories involving the troubled relationship between Perikles and his eldest son Xanthippos. Reports of a sexual involvement by Perikles with his daughter-in-law can safely be dismissed, as even Plutarch realized. What of the financial aspects, Perikles's parsimony and his daughter-in-law's resentment of it (*Per*. 36.2-6)? One would like to believe that Plutarch had a reliable source for Perikles's arrangements regarding annual income from his estates (*Per*.16.3-6), but again, introduction of the name of Perikles's house slave-manager, Evangelos, does not guarantee authenticity.

On the plus side of the ledger Plutarch frequently produces items that have the look of hard fact for which he gives no provenance. He lists settlements sent on Perikles's initiative to Khersonese, Naxos, Andros, Thrace and Thourioi (*Per*.11.5, with a further account of the Khersonese venture at 19.1). We are given a very full account of a major expedition to the Black Sea with Lamakhos as co-general and a subsequent settlement of Athenians at Sinope[110]. Not quite at mid-point but at a climactic position in the *Life* stands the famous panegyric to Perikles's vision for the educative role of Athens towards the rest of Greece embodied in the magnificent structures on the Akropolis (*Per*. 12) together with Plutarch's surprisingly detailed information about individual structural features and architects' names (*Per*.13.6-13). But for his interest we should not have known about Perikles's personal involvement in arrangements for musical performances at the Panathenaia (*Per*.13.11). As often, Plutarch includes items which, by implication, he has taken the trouble to search out and record: the marble slab on the Akropolis recording Pheidias's work on the Athena Parthenos (*Per*.13.14); the inscription on the forehead of the bronze wolf at Delphi certifying Athens' right of προμαντεία (*Per*. 21.3) and Perikles's nine victory trophies (*Per.* 38.3, *Comparison* [*Fabius*] 29 [2]. 1). To return briefly to the railery (and worse) against Perikles by the comic poets

[109] It is usually held that the naming of informers and accusers gives the accounts some credibility, but in fact these are as susceptible to fabrication as other circumstantial details.

[110] *Per*. 20.1-2 with the discussion of Gomme, 1945, pp. 367-68, where Theopompos is cited (*FGrH* 115 F 389). Discussing these settlements elsewhere in his *Commentary* Gomme (p. 379, n.1) allows himself to remark that Plutarch is "carefree… in chronological matters".

which Plutarch abundantly reports, we are grateful for the glimpse these extracts give us into what prominent (and not so prominent) public figures in fifth-century Athens were subjected to.

Gomme judged the *Perikles* to be "the most complex and the most interesting of these [Fifth-century] *Lives* (perhaps the most interesting of all), and the most valuable to the historian"[111]. Plutarch's admiration for his subject stands out on every page, and if this leads him to gloss over, or leave unexplained, some faults of character and inconsistencies of behaviour, that seems a small price to pay for the pleasure (and profit) to be derived from reading this specimen of ancient biography at its best.

4. *Aristeides*

It has long been recognized that Plutarch's main source for most of the historical material in the *Life of Aristeides* was Herodotos's *Histories*. Plutarch names him twice in the *Life*, one of these a quibble over Herodotos's figure for the fallen at the battle of Plataia[112]. This dependence on Herodotos is both a strength and a weakness of this *Life*: a strength because we can relax in the knowledge that the information purveyed about the tactics of the battles of Salamis in chapters 8 and 9 and Plataia in chapters 10 to 21 is reliable. But at the same time this very dependence on Herodotos makes us—at least sometimes—want to put Plutarch away and turn to the source nearer to the events being narrated. Presumably part of Plutarch's mission as he saw it was to save his contemporary readers the trouble of doing that (as well as, of course, to entertain them with some interesting facts about his subject).

Besides Herodotos Plutarch cites by name a handful of other sources and in the opening chapter he gives a virtuoso demonstration of his skill in deploying them. The theme here is, Because Aristeides was just, was he, as was generally believed, also poor? Demetrios of Phaleron in his treatise *On Sokrates*—a work Plutarch cites several times in this *Life*—used a variety of arguments to counter the "poor Aristeides" view. He owned an estate in Phaleron, where he was in fact buried; he held the office of archon—this was another contentious point that Plutarch returns to later—which was restricted to the top property class. He was ostracized, a procedure that, according to Demetrios, "was not inflicted on the poorer citizens, but only on members of the great houses whose family pretensions excited envy"[113] and he dedicated tripods in the precinct of Dionysos commemorating a choregic

[111] GOMME, 1945, p. 65: a rare but well-deserved accolade.

[112] *Arist*. 16.1, Hdt. 9.46; Plut., *Arist*. 19.7; Hdt. 9.85. In the *Comparison* he cites Herodotos's assigning the "finest victory" at Plataia to Pausanias (*Cato mai*. 29 [2].2; Hdt. 9.64).

[113] *Arist.*1.2, tr. Scott-Kilvert; *FGrH*. 228 F 43.

victory (which, Plutarch adds, "were pointed out even in our own day"). The first three "proofs" of Aristeides's non-poverty adduced by Demetrios Plutarch passes over in silence (and so shall we). He attacks the last argument by pointing out that choregoi often used not their own money but someone else's, like Plato[114], who was bankrolled in his liturgy of a dithyrambic chorus of boys by Dion of Syracuse, and Epaminondas, whose choregiai were financed by Pelopidas. Besides, Plutarch adds, there was some question about the identity of the victorious choregos mentioned in the inscription. The Stoic philosopher Panatios of Rhodes (c. 150 BCE), whom Plutarch will cite again later (*Arist.* 27.4), argued that the name Aristeides appeared twice in the choregic victor lists, but both were much later. Plutarch reports that Panaitios based his refutation on epigraphic as well as prosopographical grounds. The inscription was in Ionic letter-forms, therefore after 403 BCE, and the Aristeides named there appeared in connection with another poet, Arkhestratos, who was active not during the Persian War period but in the Peloponnesian.

I have gone into this first chapter of the *Life of Aristeides* at some length to illustrate the care Plutarch has taken with his source-material. He wants his readers to feel that they are in the hands of an industrious and careful researcher, who has consulted a variety of sources, presented evidence on disputed points fairly, and reached conclusions they should accept as being as near to the truth as one is likely to get[115].

After this impressive display of source-criticism Plutarch launches into his main theme in these opening chapters, the total dissimilarity, deep personal animosity and fierce political rivalry between the two towering figures of Athenian resistance to the Persians, the subject of the present *Life* and his arch-rival Themistokles, whose *Life* Plutarch had already completed and from which—not surprisingly—he re-uses some material (a point to which I shall return). The cleft between the two ran deep, to the level, in fact, of each man's *physis*, and this, Plutarch claims (on the authority of anonymous sources: ἔνιοι...φασι, *Arist*. 2.2), could be seen in the way they behaved even in their boyhood years. Themistokles's nature, "resourceful, daring, unscrupulous, and ready to dash impetuously into any undertaking", was in sharp contrast to Aristeides's, which was "founded

[114] Cf. Diogenes Laertios 3.3, citing Athenodoros (1st cent. CE Stoic philosopher in a work entitled *Peripatoi*, "Walks").

[115] I note the similar evaluation of Pelling, 2002, p. 144, that Plutarch in this section of the *Life* "is using his wide reading and general knowledge very effectively".

upon a steadfast character, which was intent on justice and incapable of any falsehood, vulgarity or trickery even in jest"[116]. The difference showed itself also in the way the two men discharged their public duties, and here Plutarch dips into his extensive stock of anecdotal material. When an unnamed Athenian commented to Themistokles that he would be a good magistrate provided that he was fair and impartial to all, Themistokles replied, "I hope I shall never sit on a tribunal where my friends do not get better treatment from me than strangers do" (*Arist*. 2.5). Aristeides for his part took a different tack. On one occasion, after having proposed a bill before the Assembly and having argued for it successfully so that it looked like it would pass, he nevertheless, after listening to the speeches by the opposition and being convinced that his bill was not in the best interests of the people, moved to have it withdrawn before a final vote was taken (*Arist.* 3.3). And there were times when he was prepared to bend his high principles and resort to subterfuges when he felt this had to be done to thwart some particularly dangerous initiative by Themistokles[117]. There were occasions when he would oppose a Themistoklean initiative simply to check his opponent's rise to power: "he thought it better that the people should lose out on some things that were advantageous to them rather than have his opponent's power grow through winning every contest" (*Arist.* 3.1). Plutarch claims—on what authority he does not say—that Aristeides would often use other men to bring his measures to the Assembly so that Themistokles would not oppose them just because they were Aristeides's initiatives (*Arist.* 3.4). In chapter 4 Plutarch describes an elaborate legal sparring match between the two men involving charge and countercharge over Themistokles's alleged embezzlement and misuse of public monies. Stripped to its bare essenetial, the story—where Idomeneus's name crops up for one of the details[118]—was that because Aristeides had uncovered financial malpractice by Themistokles the latter

[116] *Arist*. 2.2, tr. Scott-Kilvert. The contrast is adumbrated in the earlier *Life* where Aristeides is characterized as πρᾷος... φύσει καὶ καλοκαγαθικὸς τὸν τρόπον (*Them*. 3.3).

[117] Anecdotes illustrating the rivalry (not always harmful) between the two men had a long pedigree, such as the story Herodotos tells of Aristeides and Themistokles discussing how best to keep the Peloponnesian fleet from abandoning their position at Salamis and sailing away to the Isthmus (with Aristeides's telling comment, "Let the rivalry between us be now as it has been before, to see which of us shall do his country more good", 8.79. tr. Godley). As Plutarch tells it, in the run-up to Salamis, Aristeides "gave [Themistokles] all the aid he could both in advice and in action, and for the sake of Athens he helped his bitterest enemy to become the most famous of men" (*Arist*. 8.1, tr. Scott-Kilvert).

[118] I return to this point below.

got his claque to support a motion to have Aristeides removed from office and fined. The people then repented of their action and not only absolved Aristeides of the fine but restored him to his office[119]. Aristeides then laid an elaborate ruse to entrap those whom his investigations had shown to be the likely culprits. He pretended to turn a blind eye to their shady financial dealings and, when the proper moment arrived, he rose in the Assembly and denounced their misdeeds, saying, "When I acted in an upright way and did my job you condemned me, but now that I have connived at your misdeeds you praise me. I am more ashamed of your present honouring of me than of your former condemnation, and I am sorry for you because you think it more praiseworthy to cozy up to criminals than to keep a secure lock on public funds" (*Arist*. 4.7). It is a good story, and Plutarch takes evident pleasure in telling it.

At *Arist*. 5.9-10 Plutarch touches on the controversy of when if ever Aristeides was archon, and his discussion again allows him to display control of his sources. He starts with the assertion, found somewhere in his books (or his memory) that "Aristeides held the office of archon eponymous immediately [after Marathon]". *Per contra*, Demetrios of Phaleron held that Aristeides was archon "just a little before his death, after the battle of Plataia"[120]. Plutarch critiques this: "in the public records" there was no Aristeides listed after Plataia but there was an Aristeides named as archon in the year after Marathon. (It has been suggested that Plutarch consulted the list from the Atthis, not from examination of the records themselves, but no matter; he took the trouble of looking up the list of archons[121]). As Plutarch's discussion shows, his sources also betrayed confusion over whether Aristeides—if he was archon—was chosen by lot as Demetrios of Phaleron maintained (*Arist*. 1.2), or by election, as Idomeneus held (*Arist*. 1.8), therefore after 487BCE[122].

Plutarch was widely versed in the dramatic, lyric and elegiac poetry of his subjects' era, and seems, to judge from his citations, to have kept a sharp look-out for apposite material, which in many cases he used to liven up what may have struck some readers as rather bland narrative. But when he pressed the "Search" button in his library—or his memory—the results for "Aristeides"

[119] The whole tale shows suspicious similarities to the demos's treatment of Perikles in 430 BCE (*Per*. 35.4-5).

[120] *FGrH* 228 F 44.

[121] Discussion at Perrin, 1901, p. 275; I. Calabi Limentani, 1964, p. 26 (n. on *Arist*. 5.10). Plutarch's testimony is accepted by Develin, 1989, p. 57.

[122] Arist., *Ath.* 22.5, with the discussion of Rhodes, 1981, pp. 272-74.

were disappointing. He re-uses the tag from Aiskhylos's *Seven against Thebes* about the doomed prophet Amphiaraos, "He wanted not to seem, but to *be*, just, reaping the harvest from deep furrows of his mind, from which excellent plans develop"[123]. There is a passing reference to οἱ κωμικοί, the comic poets, making fun of descendants of the hugely wealthy Kallias, who was Aristeides's kinsman (*Arist*. 5.8), and a brief quote from an unnamed comic writer—Eupolis has been suggested—which slammed his rival Themistokles, "a clever man, but could not control his fingers" (*Arist*. 4.3, Eupolis [?] *PCG* fr. 126).

Not surprisingly, there are some duplications with the *Life of Themistokles*, which was written earlier. The two men were rivals in other respects but also because they were in pursuit of the same *eromenos*, Stesileos of Keos. In the *Themistokles* Plutarch had named his source, the Peripatetic Ariston of Ioulis on Keos (so the boyfriend was a local celebrity)[124]. Plutarch retails the story that some Persian royals captured in the sea-battles of 480 BCE were sacrificed to Dionysos ὠμηστής, an episode mentioned briefly at *Arist.* 9.2 and reported fully at *Them*. 13.2-5, where Plutarch names Phainias of Eresos as his source, and praises him as ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος καὶ γραμματῶν οὐκ ἄπειρος, "both a philosopher and not unversed in literature". He draws on Idomeneus of Lampsakos for several pieces of information. He is credited with works "On the Socratics" and "On Demagogues", and it is unclear from which Plutarch drew his information. As already mentioned, Plutarch identifies Idomeneus as his source for the story that Themistokles successfully prosecuted Aristeides for embezzlement after his year as ἐπιμελητὴς δημοσίων προσόδων, "Supervisor of the Public Revenues"[125]. Later in the *Life* Plutarch challenges Idomeneus's assertion that Aristeides himself went as ambassador to Sparta in spring 479 to get the Spartans on side to face the Persian invading force under Mardonios; Plutarch points out that in the actual decree authorizing the embassy the ambassadors named were Kimon, Xanthippos and Myronides[126].

[123] *Arist*. 3.5; *Seven against Thebes* 562-4; cf. *De aud.* 32D; *De cap. et inim.* 88B; *Reg. et imp. apoph.* 186B.

[124] *Arist*. 2.3; *Them*. 3.2. Ariston fl. 225 BCE probably from Ariston's Ἐρωτικὰ ὁμοῖα, "Erotic Examples" (see FORTENBAUGH & WHITE, 2006, p. 206). The story crops up again in Aelian, who does not name a source (*VH* 13.44).

[125] *Arist.* 4.4; *FGrH* 338 F 7. How much of this we can believe is unclear. The title is generally held to be an anachronism. GOMME, 1945, p. 76, n. 1, at least was dismissive of "the untrustworthy Idomeneus", but he allows that Idomeneus's source may have designated Aristeides simply as ταμίας.

[126] *Arist*. 10.10; *FGrH* 338 F 6; Plutarch's correction derives possibly from Krateros's *Decrees*.

On the other hand, in the confused and conflicting testimony about whether Aristeides ever held the eponymous archonship and, if he did, whether this was through election or sortition, it looks as if Idomeneus, who held that Aristeides was elected archon, was on the winning side against Demetrios of Phaleron, who plumped for allotment. Plutarch retails the anecdote with which Aristeides's name was ever after to be associated, the illiterate and uncouth voter at an ostrakophoria for whom Aristeides—uncomplainingly—inscribed his own name on an ostrakon[127]. Plutarch perhaps became conscious that his audience—like the unnamed fellow in the anecdote—might get fed up with always hearing Aristeides referred to as "the Just", so he calls in the testimony of Theophrastos—possibly from the περὶ καιρῶν—for the view that Aristeides may have been (as well as seemed) habitually just in private matters, but in public affairs he was prepared to go along with what was necessary for the general good of his country, even if this required, on occasion, a certain amount of injustice[128]. Elsewhere Plutarch reports that when the Athenians had to tighten their grip on the allies, Aristeides told them to act in whatever way suited their interests best, and put the blame on him (*Arist*. 25.1). In the *Comparison of Aristeides and Cato*, Plutarch comments that while Cato's frugality made him a model to others, Aristeides "was so poor as to bring even his righteousness into disrepute" (*Cato mai.* 3.2 tr. Perrin).

Information was to be gleaned from the abundant tradition concerning Aristeides's kinsman Kallias Daidoukhos, "Torchbearer" at the Eleusinian Mysteries. At *Arist.* 5.7-8 Plutarch tells a story how he (in stark contrast to Aristeides) enriched himself in a very discreditable way after the battle of Marathon, and so earned for himself and his descendants the unflattering epithet "Lakkoploutoi", "Pit-rich". Towards the end of the *Life* we are given a lengthy account of Kallias's trial on a capital charge. His accusers charged him with stinginess in not providing for his cousin Aristeides, so Kallias called him as a character witness to attest that his offers of material assistance had been frequent, and just as frequently refused, with the opportunity for a *bon mot* by Aristeides, that "he had better cause to be proud of his poverty than Kallias of his wealth". The voters left the court with the same sentiments: they would rather be poor with Aristeides

[127] *Arist*. 7.7-8. Plutarch tells the story again in the *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (186A). It had occurred already in Cornelius Nepos's *Aristeides* (3.1), which may suggest Theopompos as the source.

[128] *Arist*. 25.2; *FHSG* fr. 614.

than rich with Kallias. Plutarch cites as his source for this story Aiskhines the Socratic[129] and he goes on to mention that Plato singled out Aristeides among the famous fifth-century leaders for his refusal to pander to the demos[130].

Plutarch draws on personal experience and local traditions in an extended account of the aftermath of the battle of Plataia (*Arist*. 20-21). Eighty talents from the spoils were handed over to the Plataians, with which they rebuilt the sanctuary of Athena, set up the shrine and decorated the temple with frescoes which have remained in perfect condition μέχρι νῦν (*Arist*. 20.3). Arrangements were also made for an annual sacrifice to the fallen held by the Plataians, a ritual carried on, Plutarch says, μέχρι νῦν (*Arist*. 21.3, again at 21.8, "These rites have been observed by the Plataians ἔτι καὶ νῦν"). Plutarch then goes on to describe the celebrations. in full, and interesting, detail.

There is some new material, for which Plutarch does not name a source; how much credence should we give it? He says Aristeides was a ἑταῖρος of Kleisthenes the Lawgiver (*Arist*. 2.1[131]). Plutarch is also the only source for Aristeides's part in the battle of Marathon (*Arist.* 5), but he is probably wrong about Aristeides's tribe Antiokhis being drawn up next to Themistokles's tribe Leontis. He recounts an enquiry to the Delphic oracle on Aristeides's initiative before the battle of Plataia (*Arist*.11.3-9); this may or may not be historical. He also records a proposal by Aristeides after Plataia that archons be elected from the whole body of voters (*Arist*. 22.1), about which moderns have shown some skepticism.

Plutarch closes his *Life*, as with some others, by offering a dazzling array of information about Aristeides's descendants (and here again he mines material from the Socratic tradition). The items included are: a conviction at the end of Aristeides's life on the unlikely charge of accepting bribes from some of the Ionians during the tribute-assessment (*Arist*. 26.1, Krateros *FGrH* 342 F 12, but Plutarch says he was unable to find corroboration in the other works he consulted on how badly the Athenians treated their leading men); state-sponsored dowries to his daughters; a subvention in cash and property to his son Lysimakhos, on the motion of Alkibiades, and a daily food allowance to Lysimakhos's daughter

[129] *Arist*. 25.9 (from the dialogue Καλλίας); 75 [fr. 32] *SSR*. As we saw, Plutarch drew on Aiskhines for two items regarding Perikles and Aspasia (*Per*. 24.6; 66 [fr. 23] *SSR*, *Per*. 32.5; 67 [fr. 24] *SSR*).

[130] *Gorgias* 526B.

[131] Also at *Praec*. *ger* 791A, 805F. As CALABI LIMENTANI, 1964, p. 11, notes, if this connection is historical, Aristeides will have been born c. 520 BCE.

Polykrite (*Arist*. 27.3, Kallisthenes *FGrH* 124 F 48).

Plutarch's subject did not have peculiarities or depths of character that would call for analysis and explanation by a biographer intent on holding his audience's intention, not the austere and brooding profundity of a Perikles, nor the creative inventiveness and often charming egotism of a Themistokles, not Alkibiades's unpredictability and manic iconoclasm. Aristeides's signature virtue was εὐστάθεια, a dignified determination to maintain a steady footing once he had decided to take a stand that he considered to be in the best interests of those he had been called on to serve—not very exciting, perhaps, but admirable both in itself and for the rarity with which it was to be found in other leading figures of fifth-century Athens.

5. *Nikias*

Plutarch opens his *Life of Nikias* by telling his readers that he knows he has competition in choosing this subject. He cannot hope to match Thoukydides's magisterial account of the Sicilian expedition, which Plutarch eulogizes in glowing terms here and in the essay *Fame of the Athenians*[132]. Thoukydides's narrative, he says, is characterized by an inimitable vividness (ἐνάργεια) in portraying emotions and character, and with great variety, in a manner designed to arouse amazement and consternation in his readers—no, Plutarch does not want his work compared to that of the incomparable Master's. But the fourth century historian Timaios of Taormina, that's another matter. Plutarch is prepared to go head-to-head with him, with a little help from Philistos of Syracuse, who lived through the Sicilian campaign (as Plutarch tells us towards the end of the *Life*[133]) and whose work—of which little is known beyond what Plutarch has chosen to tell us—he accuses Timaios of churlishly disparaging.

So what does Plutarch say he can add to what had already been written about Nikias? He will not go over again at any length material already to be found in Thoukydides and Philistos, but he feels he must touch on the episodes briefly, if only not to seem, he says, careless or lazy. What he has looked for are items that have gone unrecorded by others or have been treated only haphazardly (σποράδην), such as information that was be found in ancient dedications and inscriptions. His purpose is to provide not a collection of useless stories, but material that will lead to a deeper understanding of Nikias's character and temperament. Let's see how well Plutarch has succeeded in this enterprise.

[132] *De glor. Ath*. 347A. Plutarch aptly cites the dictum attributed to Simonides, "painting is silent poetry, and poetry is painting given a voice".

[133] *Nic.* 19.6.

In a long and rather involved discussion of Nikias's characteristic cautiousness (εὐλάβεια) which could be read as timidity and defeatism, Plutarch tries to make the paradoxical case that this was really taken by οἱ πόλλοι as a virtue: the masses took his nervousness (τὸ ψοφοδεές) as a sign that he did not look down on them (although earlier in the chapter Plutarch had mentioned Nikias's "gravity", τὸ σεμνόν), but rather feared them. He formulates this—counterintuitive—view with an aphorism: "The masses can have no greater honour shown them by their superiors than not to be despised"[134]. Plutarch then mentions Nikias's efforts to outmaneuver his main political opponent, Kleon; he courted popular favour in a time-honoured tactic used by wealthy politicians, lavish expenditures on choral and athletic events such as Athens had not seen before. Plutarch then makes good on one of his promises to highlight new material. To testify to Nikias's opulent benefactions he cites two dedications which, he says, have survived to his own day (καθ' ἡμᾶς), a statue of Athena on the Akropolis (which, Plutarch adds, had lost its gold plating), and a shrine in the precinct of Dionysos surmounted by tripods commemorating Nikias's choregic victories[135]; these choregic monuments by Nikias and his brothers drew the attention also of Plato, who mentions them in the *Gorgias* (472A). Plutarch then gives his readers an expanded version of an event dealt with in more summary fashion by Thoukydides, the purification and re-dedication of the island of Delos winter 426/5[136]. Thoukydides does not mention Nikias by name but Plutarch naturally turns the spotlight on him. He outdid the show put on by the Samian tyrant Polykrates, that Thoukydides describes: he had joined the nearby island of Rheneia to Delos only by a chain; Nikias used a specially built bridge of boats over which at dawn he solemnly led a chorus chanting hymns. Among other lavish expenditures by Nikias Plutarch lists a bronze palm-tree (Leto was said to have held on to a palm tree on Delos when in labor with her twins) and an estate

[134] *Nic.* 2.6 (Perrin's trans. modified). Cf. *Nic.* 4.3: apparently because of his superstition, Nikias gave money to those who could harm him just as much as to people who deserved his benefactions; bad men made money from his cowardice (δειλία) and good men from his *philanthropia*.

[135] STADTER in WATERFIELD, 1998, p. 419, remarks that an inscription points to the dedication being by a later Nikias in 320/19 BCE.

[136] *Nic.* 3.5-7; Th. 3.104. GOMME, 1945, p. 415, says Plutarch "does not connect this [i.e. Nikias's organizing of choruses and other ceremonies] with the purification of Delos, of which he says nothing". But I think that is the natural supposition, that Plutarch had this event in mind.

whose annual revenues were made over to the Delians for their ritual purposes ("at which they were to pray to the gods for Nikias's welfare", Plutarch adds).

As chap. 4 opens you can almost hear Plutarch debating with himself over what could be taken as "vulgar and ostentatious displays". Were these aimed at increasing Nikias's prestige and satisfying his ambition? No, he decides; these were more probably the result of his piety (εὐσέβεια). Here he notes, naturally enough, Thoukydides's remark about Nikias's "excessive reliance upon divination" (7.50.4). Plutarch then inserts, on the authority of an exceedingly obscure Eretrian writer of dialogues named Pasiphon[137], an explanation *in malam partem*: Nikias kept a *mantis* at his house ostensibly for consultations on public matters but really to make sure he was investing his own money profitably. Perhaps the best known—and most regrettable—example of Nikias's δεισιδαιμονία influencing the course of history was his decision to delay the Athenian retreat from Sicily because of the lunar eclipse of 27 August 413 BCE. Plutarch remarks disapprovingly that Nikias "now became more and more oblivious of his other duties and completely absorbed in sacrifice and divination" (*Nic.* 24.1 tr. Scott-Kilvert). But Thoukydides is fairer to Nikias when he remarks that "most of the Athenians [i.e. in the army], taking the incident to heart, urged the generals to wait" (7.50.4, tr. Forster Smith).

After a brief glance at the source of Nikias's great wealth, the leases he held to the silver mines at Laureion and the army of slaves he used to work them, Plutarch moves on to some testimonies from Old Comedy. Three are otherwise unknown. The first is a passage from a play of Telekleides (title not preserved) in which the speaker alleges that Nikias paid a four-mina bribe to Kharikles, apparently a συκοφάντης, to cover up some unsavoury act. The second, from Eupolis's *Marikas* (421 BCE., a satirization of Hyperbolos), substantiates a characteristic of Nikias that Plutarch will take up in the following chapter, his reclusiveness. Third comes a line from Aristophanes's *Knights* where Kleon boasts about his ability to "shout down the speakers and rattle (ταράξω) Nikias" and fourth, a couplet from an unnamed play of Phrynikhos taking a shot at Nikias's bravery—or alleged lack of it[138].

In chapter 5 Plutarch describes at length how paranoid Nikias was about informers. We are told that he never dined out, or took part in discussions with friends, and indeed avoided social

[137] The claim was made that he tried to pass off his dialogues on famous figures as written by Aiskhines the Socratic (Diog. Laert. 2. 61).

[138] Telekleides *PCG* fr. 44; Eup. *PCG* fr. 193; Ar., *Eq.* 358; Phryn. *PCG* fr. 62.

contacts of any kind. When he had some official post, he would stay in the office from morning to night and, if there was no public business to attend to, he kept himself locked up at home with one of his friends guarding the door and sending away callers with the excuse that Nikias had no time for visitors because he was so deeply immersed in affairs of state. Plutarch names as Nikias's mentor in this weird (and somewhat dishonest) behaviour an individual called Hiero, about whom we know even less than the person whom Plutarch identifies as his father, Dionysios surnamed Khalkos, "Bronze (Bronzino)". This latter was a poet whose works survived (Plutarch implies that he had read them; about 25 of his elegiac verses are to be found in modern collections), and who was one of the colonists who went out to the Athenian foundation at Thourioi in S. Italy in 443 BCE. I would be prepared to accept some of this—maybe not all—but for the suspicious similarities with a story Plutarch tells also about Perikles who, as a young man, was afraid that the demos would think he had aspirations to become a tyrannos (Plutarch says people thought he looked like the tyrant Peisistratos). So, to avoid the risk of being ostracized, Perikles changed his habits entirely. "The only street along which he could be seen walking was the one to the agora or the Council Chamber". Perikles also, we are asked to believe, stopped accepting invitations to dinner with his friends. (Plutarch says he kept up this reclusive behaviour through all the years of his public life, with one exception, the wedding- feast given by his cousin Euryptolemos[139]). Plutarch then provides some salutary—to Nikias—examples of leaders whose successes got them into trouble with the people[140]. To escape envy Nikias made a point of attributing his successes to his good fortune and the gods' favour. Then, as if remembering his promise at the beginning of the *Life* to leave out nothing of importance, Plutarch provides a (very) abbreviated list of successes—and not in chronological order (*Nic*. 6.3-4).. To be noted in this connection is the verdict of Thoukydides that Nikias "did better in his military commands than anyone else of his time" (5.16.1[141]).

After giving a somewhat fuller account of operations in the Korinthiaka in 425 BCE (*Nic.* 6.4), Plutarch settles into his main narrative, Nikias's commands from Pylos (chapters 7 - 8)

[139] *Per*. 7.1-5.

[140] *Nic.* 6.1. For our purposes perhaps the most interesting is Antiphon of Rhamnous, whose downfall Plutarch attributes to ἀπιστίᾳ τῶν πολλῶν. His name will come up again in the *Alkibiades* (3.1).

[141] The follow-up is also of interest. Thoukydides claims that Nikias was pressing for peace in 422/1 BCE "while still untouched by misfortune and still held in honour" because he "wished to rest on his laurels, to find an immediate release from toil and trouble both for

to the Sicilian debacle (chapters 12 - 30), with side glances at the arrival of Alkibiades on the Athenian political scene (chapter 9), negotiations for the peace which bore Nikias's name (end of chap. 9 - 10 [τὸ Νικίειον 9.9]), and the infamous ostracism of Hyperbolos (ch.11[142]). All, or almost all, of this is straight out of Thoukydides. Why should Plutarch try to better what he acknowledges to have been done superbly well by the master, who he told us in chapter 1 treated the Sicilian campaign "incomparably, surpassing even his own high standards" (*Nic.*1.1)?

There are a few points, however, that seem to me worthy of comment. In retelling the events of the Pylos campaign, Plutarch says that Nikias gave up his command to Kleon "out of sheer cowardice" (δειλίᾳ *Nic.*8.2). This seems to me rather unfair. Thoukydides reports that "Kleon never thought Nikias would τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι the leadership" to Kleon[143]. Plutarch did not care for Kleon any more than Thoukydides did, and he comments on Kleon's boorish behaviour as a public speaker: he shouted abuse at his opponents, slapped his thighs, threw open his cloak, and paced about as he was speaking[144]. He also in this chapter treats his reader to two passages from Aristophanes, one known, from *Birds* (Dionysia 414 BCE) where Peishetairos tells Tereus, "It's no longer time for napping, or succumbing to Nikias-dithers (μελλονικιᾶν 638-9, where, according to N. Dunbar, the verb-form implies a morbid physical condition[145]). The other quote is from *Farmers* of

himself *and for his fellow citizens*, and to leave behind him the name of one whose service to the state had been successful from start to finish. He thought that these objectives were to be achieved by avoiding all risks and by trusting oneself as little as possible to fortune (ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὐτὸν παραδίδωσι) and that risks could be avoided only in peace" (5.16.1, trans. Warner; my italics).

[142] At *Nic.* 11.7 Plutarch quotes 3 lines from Plato Comicus (*PCG* fr. 203) accusing Hyperbolos of being a "branded slave", and at 11.10 he cites Theophrastos for the minority (and probably erroneous) view that in the notorious ostracism of 417 BCE it was not Nikias but a certain Phaiax who colluded with Alkibiades to secure Hyperbolos's removal (*FHSG* fr. 639, with discussion of Mirhady, 1992, pp. 196-200).

[143] Th. 4.28.2. Gomme, 1956, p. 468, comments that this was "characteristic also of *Nikias'* daring" (Gomme's emphasis). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that at *Nic.* 12.5 = *Alc.* 18.1, Plutarch gives τόλμα as *Alkibiades's* distinguishing characteristic as contrasted with Nikias's εὐλάβεια and προνοία.

[144] *Nic.* 8.6. This appears to be from the *Constitution of Athens* (28.3), referred to elsewhere by Plutarch but not here. In his *Life of Tiberius Gracchus* (2.2) Plutarch says that Gaius Gracchus declaimed in the manner of Kleon.

[145] Dunbar, 1995, p. 414.

the late 420s, where the implication is that Nikias offered a bribe of 1000 talents to resign his command at Pylos (fr. 102 Henderson). In his narrative of the negotiations that led to peace in 421 Plutarch cites Theophrastos (*FHSG* fr. 639), who maintained that Nikias used bribery so that the lot would fall against the Spartans, so they would have to go first, before the Athenians, in surrendering the territories they had captured in the Arkhidamian War[146]. In his discussion of the mutilation of the herms Plutarch lists among the omens that boded ill for the expedition that at Delphi crows pecked away at and defaced a gold statue of Athena mounted on a bronze palm-tree, a dedication by the Athenians from their *aristeia* in the Persian Wars (*Nic.* 13.5). Plutarch does not name his source here, but other evidence points to Kleidemos the Atthidographer[147].

At the end of chapter 15 Plutarch makes brief mention of Alkibiades's capture of the "barbarian stronghold" of Hykkara in Sicily in the winter of 415/14 BCE; among the captives taken was the courtesan Laïs, whom Alkibiades took back to the Peloponnese. It was this lady's mother, Timandra, who was with Alkibiades at the end, and wrapped his body in her own clothes for burial (*Alc.* 39.8). The story is reported by Athenaios (13.588C) as deriving from the 6th book of Polemon's "Against Timaios". Since Plutarch cites Polemon the Periegete[148] elsewhere (*Aratos* 13.2), he is very likely Plutarch's source here. Later Plutarch quotes a couplet which he ascribes to Euripides, characterizing it as an ἐπικήδειον, a lament sung before burial, "These men won 8 victories over men of Syracuse, as long as the gods' favour stood in equipoise for both sides"[149]. Plutarch indulges in a short exercise in source-criticism in chapter 19 when he quotes various authors—Timaios, Thoukydides and Philistos are named—for differing views about the impression made by the Spartan Gylippos and his effect upon the course of the fighting. Timaios held that the Sicilians did not think much of him, but Plutarch throws in his lot with Thoukydides and Philistos, whose view was that Gylippos's arrival in spring 414 BCE transformed the whole balance of the campaign, for he used

[146] *Nic.* 9.9.

[147] *Apud* Paus. 10.15.3. Levi (1971: 445 n. 99) gives some useful information. There are ten pages of fragments in *FGrH* III.B, 323; he published c. 350 BCE, and the only earlier Atthidographer was Hellanikos of Lesbos.

[148] Polemon of Ilion, fl. 190 BCE, a Stoic geographer, especially interested in monuments and dedications at Delphi, Athens and Sparta. The *Aratos* reference is to a painting of the tyrant Aristratos of Sikyon (c. 350 BCE) in which Apelles was said to have had a part.

[149] *Nic.* 17.4, fr. 1 Diehl, T 2 Kannicht.

the same resources of men, horses, and arms but with different—and decisively superior—tactics[150]. The fatal lunar eclipse of 27 August 413 gives Plutarch (chapter 23) the excuse for a learned excursus on eclipses, citing philosophers (Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Sokrates, Plato) and historical authorities (Philokhoros [*FGrH* 328 F 135], Autokleides [*FGrH* 353 F 7] and τὰ ἐξηγητικά, Commentaries). Plutarch tries to exculpate Nikias—somewhat—by noting, probably on Philokhoros's authority, that Nikias's household seer, a man named Stilbides, had recently died and so the brake this man normally put on Nikias's more extreme superstitious fears had been removed[151]. In his description of the final battle in Syracuse harbour, Plutarch rises, at least partially, to the emotive heights of his model: it "aroused as much anguish and passion in the spectators as in those who were fighting" (*Nic.* 25.2 = Th. 7.71). The *Life* ends with a personal reminiscence. Plutarch says he was told that an elaborately worked gold and purple shield said to belong to Nikias could be seen in a temple in Syracuse "to this day" (μέχρι νῦν 28.6) and in the final chapters he recounts the celebrated anecdote concerning some of the Athenian prisoners in the stone quarries who had been able to win their freedom by reciting verses from Euripides's plays; some survivors even made a point of visiting the poet when they got back to Athens and thanking him for the service he had, albeit unwittingly, rendered them. And in the final chapter (*Nic.* 30), the terrible news of the disaster brought to the disbelieving, and later grieving, people of Athens by the barber from Peiraieus[152].

As a fitting epitaph we may quote Plutarch's pithy observation: "No one could find fault with his actions, for once he got started he was an energetic doer; it was in getting started that he was a ditherer whose nerve failed him". (*Nic.* 16.9; it is more epigrammatic in Greek).

6. *Alkibiades*

"[T]he protagonist of the *Life of Alcibiades* is a very difficult character to judge because his behaviour is far from consistent"[153]. Plutarch's readers were—and are—fortunate in that for the public side of his subject's life,

[150] *Nic.* 19.5-6; Timae. *FGrH* 566 F 100 a; Philist. *FGrH* 556 F 56. Similarly, *Nic.* 28.4-5, where Plutarch sides with Philistos *(FGrH* 556 F 55) and Thoukydides (7.86), who reported that the generals were put to death on order of the Syracusans vs. Timaios (*FGrH* 566 F 100 b), who held that they committed suicide upon receiving a secret message from Hermokrates.

[151] *Nic.* 23.1; Th. 7.50.4 (see the helpful remarks by Andrewes in Gomme et al., 1970, pp. 428-29).

[152] *Nic.* 30 = *De garrul.* 509A.

[153] Verdegem, 2010, p. 419.

events in mainland Greece, the Aegean and Western Anatolia, he had at his disposal excellent sources, which he put to good use: Thoukydides until 411 BCE and Xenophon's *Hellenika* thereafter[154]. Since it appears that Plutarch was working on this *Life* at the same time as the *Nikias*[155], he could call on Philistos of Syracuse (whom he cites by name three times in *Nic.*, though not here in *Alc.*) for the Sicilian debacle. The amount of information—or was it misinformation?—regarding Alkibiades's alleged involvement in the Eleusinian Mysteries travesty and the herm defacement was enormous, and Plutarch does his best to navigate through the plethora of material, mainly oratorical but also in part documentary, purporting to be authentic, and credible. For Alkibiades's early years before his first appearance on the public stage there were family traditions of the Salaminioi and Alkmeonidai as well as a galaxy of anecdotal material illustrating his subject's rather unique personal qualities: the lisp, somewhat unusual oratorical style and at times exotic dress, and a lifestyle that could be termed flamboyant by those prepared to put up with it, or if not, shockingly outrageous. Plutarch names Thoukydides four times, but perusal of Ziegler's apparatus of testimonia shows that he was intimately familiar with what he clearly recognizes as his best source. He repeats the famous formulation regarding Alkibiades's basic character flaw, his παρανομία κατὰ τὸ σῶμα; (*Alc.* 6.3 = Th. 6.15.4). In chapter 11 Plutarch takes up the matter of Alkibiades's phenomenal success in the Olympic chariot races, probably those of 416 BCE. In the speech Thoukydides wrote for Alkibiades in which the latter explained to the Athenians why they should support his plan to annex Sicily, he referred to his having won first, second and fourth prizes (6.16.2), but Plutarch knows that the victory ode commissioned by Alkibiades from Euripides has his chariots coming in first, second and third[156]. Plutarch names Thoukydides twice again later, in connection with the notorious ostracism of Hyperbolos (*Alc.*13.4 = 8.73.3) and in the affair of the travesty of the Mysteries in 415, where Plutarch remarks that Thoukydides, unlike later

[154] Available to Plutarch and also probably consulted, if only sporadically, were the continuous accounts of Ephoros and Theopompos (filtered for us through the surviving narratives of Diodoros of Sicily and Cornelius Nepos respectively).

[155] In fact, the *Nikias* probably antedates the *Alkibiades*, and the apparent cross-reference to the *Alc.* at *Nic.* 11.2 may be an interpolation (RUSSELL, 1966, p. 37, n. 2).

[156] *Alc.* 11.3. To the three lines Plutarch quotes here he adds two more at *Dem.* 1.1 (Euripides T 91a - 91b Kannicht 2004; Page, *PMG* nos. 755, 756; cf. Isoc., 16.34). GOMME et al., 1970, pp. 246-47, give various attempts to resolve the conflicting versions.

writers, passed over in silence the names of Alkibiades's accusers.

Besides in connection with the victory ode Euripides's name comes up twice more. To him Plutarch attributes the remark, "For good-looking men even their autumn looks good" and comments that this was especially true of Alkibiades[157], Despite his show of frugality and simplicity of life while at Sparta, in his feelings and actions he was really, Plutarch says, adapting a famous line from Euripides's *Orestes* (v. 129, spoken by Elektra of the apparently grief-stricken Helen), "the same woman as of old" (*Alc.* 23.6).

Plutarch again dips into his repertory of *Komoidoumenoi* by poets of Old Comedy. From Aristophanes's *Wasps* (early 422 BCE) he cites three lines poking fun at Alkibiades's lisp (vv. 43-46[158]; *Alc.*1.6) and, in a more serious vein at *Alc.* 16.3, two passages from *Frogs* of 405 BCE, the celebrated maxim, "Best not to rear a lion in the city, but if you rear him to fully grown, make sure to play along with his habits" (1431-32), and reflecting what was probably the universal Athenian reaction to Alkibiades at this point in their history, "[the city] longs for him, but hates him, and wants to have him back" (1425[159]). From Eupolis's *Demes* he quotes a line describing Phaiax, one of Alkibiades's political rivals, as "an excellent prattler, totally unable to speak" (*Alc.* 13.2, *PCG* fr. 116). Plutarch then goes on to mention a speech that Phaiax composed "Against Alkibiades" in which he alleged that Alkibiades used the city's ceremonial gold and silver vessels for his own dinner parties[160]. Plutarch moves on to the infamous ostracism of 417 BCE and cites 3 verses from Plato Comicus about Hyperbolos, whose "actions deserved his fate, although the man himself and his slave tattoos [?] did not; ostracism was not invented for people like him"[161]. Later in the *Life* Plutarch quotes from the comic writer Phrynikhos a passage

[157] *Alc.* 1.5, repeated with slight variants at *Reg. et imp. apoph*. 177A and *Amat.* 770C (allegedly said by the poet at the court of Arkhelaos of Macedon, as he planted a kiss on the forty-year-old tragedian Agathon).

[158] With the clever pun κόλακος (flatterer) for κόρακος "crow" in v. 45. MacDowell, 1971, p. 134, in a useful note on v. 44, explains that Alkibiades's lisp was "a 'Chinese' form (*l* for *r*), which modern speech therapists call 'lambdacism'".

[159] A scholiast passes on the information that the line is adapted from Ion of Chios's *Guards*.

[160] *Alc.* 13.3. Scholars are divided whether it is this speech that has been transmitted as no. 4 in the works of Andokides (thus, [Pseudo-] Andokides IV), which may have furnished Plutarch with other items in the *Life*. Russell, 1966, p. 43, suggests Plutarch may have known the speech only indirectly.

[161] *Alc.*13.9, *PCG* fr. 203; the lines are repeated at *Nic.* 11.6-7.

of 5 lines to fill in some details of the charges brought against Alkibiades for allegedly desecrating the Mysteries. Thoukydides, Plutarch says, failed to give the names of Alkibiades's accusers, but in the passage he cites from Phrynikhos they are identified as Diokleides and Teukros[162].

Here and twice in the *Moralia* (*De prof.* 80D, *Praec. ger.* 804A) Plutarch describes Alkibiades's rather odd but apparently very effective style of public speaking, citing favourable evaluations by οἱ κωμικοί and Demosthenes (21 *Against Meidias* 145). He was an effective speaker (πάντων δεινότατος), but so deliberate in his choice of what he considered to be the *mot juste* that he would pause, often for long intervals, and thus gave the impression that he was at a loss for words. Both here and at *Political Precepts* 804A, Theophrastos is credited as the source for this piece of information, and Plutarch goes out of his way to praise him as "the most diligent in research and the best informed in historical matters of all the philosophers"[163]. At *Alc.* 16.8 Plutarch cites a certain Arkhestratos for the witticism that "Greece could not handle two Alkibiadeses", and when he returns to this in the *Life of Lysander*, Plutarch mentions that Theophrastros was his ultimate source for this piece of information[164].

Not surprisingly, the name of the rhetor Andokides comes into Plutarch's account of the Hermokopidai scandal. According to Hellanikos of Lesbos (whom Plutarch cites frequently in the *Theseus* but only here in these *Lives*) Andokides claimed descent from Odysseus[165]. From Antiphon[166] Plutarch reports two stories vilifying Alkibiades that Plutarch himself rejects, pointing out that Antiphon was prejudiced against Alkibiades. He cites Antisthenes the Socratic for the name of Alkibiades's Spartan nurse, Amykla, and it seems likely that Plutarch drew on him also for other items of *personalia*[167]. As

[162] *Alc.* 20.7, *PCG* fr. 61.

[163] *Alc.* 10.4 tr. Scott-Kilvert; *FHSG* fr. 705. RUSSELL, 1966, p. 43, n. 1, suggests it was from Theophrastos's περὶ ὑποκρίσεως. There is a parallel of sorts with Perikles, who was said to have prayed, before addressing the assembly, that "no expression that was not germane to the matters at hand should occur to him" (*Praec. ger*. 803F; Plutarch goes on to describe, on Theophrastos's authority, Alkibiades's halting delivery).

[164] *Lys.* 19.5; *FHSG* fr. 618.

[165] *Alc.* 21.1; *FGrH* 4 F 170 b (cf. *Nic.* 13.3 the "Herm of Andokides", so called because it was the only one spared by the mutilators).

[166] *Alc.* 3.1, fr. 66 Blass. Cf. Th. 8.68.1 with the discussion by A. ANDREWES in GOMME et al., 1981, p. 170 ("by far the most important testimony we have" regarding Antiphon).

[167] *Alc.* 1.3; *FGrH* 1004 F 2, with the extended discussion by J. ENGELS, 1998b, p. 97.

he had in the *Life of Kimon* Plutarch again draws on the "oligarch" Kritias, quoting three verses from an elegy in which Kritias claimed credit for having proposed the decree for Alkibiades's recall in 407 BCE[168].

Among Plutarch's named fourth-century sources priority belongs to Plato. Plutarch cites him for the name of Alkibiades's tutor, Zopyros[169], and draws on him again later for the description of how the "stream of beauty [from the lover]" flows into the beloved and "fills the soul of the loved one with love in return"(*Alc.* 4.4, *Phaidros* 255D). D. A. Russell noted that in describing Alkibiades's conflicted erotic attachment to Sokrates Plutarch drew heavily on a parallel passage in the *Symposion*[170]. Plutarch recounts the episode of Sokrates rescuing the wounded Alkibiades at Potidaia in 432/1 BCE (*Alc.* 7.3-4 from *Symposion* 220 E[171]) and a story in which the roles were reversed, with Alkibiades on horseback protecting Sokrates as he trudged along on foot after the Athenian defeat at Delion in 424 BCE (*Alc.*7.6, *Symp*. 221A). In the *Comparison* 42 [3]. 3 (a recap of the *Life of Coriolanus* 15.4) Plutarch quotes Letter IV (321C) for a description of the contrast between the two men in terms of αὐθάδεια, which Plato termed the "companion of solitude". It was a fault of Coriolanus that was conspicuously lacking in Alkibiades, who was famously affable and approachable.

Ephoros and Theopompos are each named once only, at *Alc.* 32.2, where we learn that they along with Xenophon—and unlike the theatrical Douris of Samos—were relatively sparing in their descriptions of Alkibiades's triumphal return to Athens in spring 407 BCE. Commentators have looked for signs of additional borrowings in passages where Plutarch provides information that can be paralleled in the accounts of Diodoros of Sicily and Cornelius Nepos, who have been seen as surrogates for, respectively, Ephoros and Theopompos[172].

Of various anecdotes connecting Alkibiades with his guardian and mentor

[168] *Alc.* 33.1, fr. 3 West. From fr. 4 West we learn that in his elegy *On Alkibiades* Kritias complained that, since Alkibiades's name would not fit into hexameters, he had to place it in the second, iambic, line of the couplet.

[169] *Alc.* 1.1 from the *First Alkibiades* (problematically ascribed to Plato), where the man is identified as a Thracian, whom Sokrates describes unflatteringly as "a tutor so old he was perfectly useless" (122B, tr. Hutchinson. Alkibiades's aversion from playing the aulos also probably comes from this dialogue (*Alc.* 2.5, Pl., *Alc.* 1 106E).

[170] *Alc.* 6; *Symp.* 216; see Russell, 1966, p. 40.

[171] Russell, 1966, p. 41, notes that Plutarch has modified Plato's account and added a few details which "have probably come from Isocrates 16.29".

[172] Thus (from Ziegler's testimonia), Diodoros (Ephoros) in chapters. 10, 12, 20, 22, 23, 25-28, 30-37 and 39; Nepos (Theopompos) in chapters 18, 19, 22-25, 32, 33, 35-39.

Perikles perhaps the most noteworthy is the story of how Alkibiades went to his guardian's house but was turned away on grounds that Perikles was too busy to receive him because he was preparing to make an accounting to the people, to which Alkibiades retorted, "Wouldn't it be better to see how you could not render an account to them?"[173].

The *Alkibiades* seems to me to be the most compulsively readable of these fifth-century lives, even more so perhaps than the *Themistokles* and *Perikles*, which are more varied and complex, and undeniably of greater value as historical documents. The task Plutarch had set himself was to present his readers with a clear and credible account of an important Greek personage, to be set off against a parallel Roman figure, in this case Coriolanus. Plutarch was remarkably successful in this enterprise[174]. If there was anything that might have presented a problem to a biographer, it was perhaps the over-abundance of source material about the personal side of his subject: what to include and what to reject from so many examples of his subject's self-important outbursts and bizarre behaviour? In the end of course, we cannot know what Plutarch left out, but what he gave his readers was a memorable portrait of this fascinating, strange and ultimately tragic personality.

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[173] *Alc.* 7.3. Variations of this at *Reg. et imp. apoph.* 186E, Diodoros 12.38.2-3, Val. Max. 3.1, ext. 1; Aristodem. 16.4. RUSSELL, 1966, p. 41, commented that this story "belongs to the mythology of the causes of the war".

[174] Concluding a characteristically erudite and helpful analysis of chapters 1-16, RUSSELL, 1966, p. 47, criticizes Plutarch's anecdotal style for its "loose structure, alarming in its incoherence". To me this seems rather harsh, and it is outweighed by the liveliness and readability of the finished product.

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Side by Side by Plutarch

by

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Abstract

Like many authors of his time, Plutarch associated specific characteristics and vocabulary with barbarians, notably superstition, great numbers, tremendous wealth, and the like. When he uses this language to describe non-barbarians, he is able to import a subtle negativity to his undertaking without distracting from his main narrative. The Life of Nicias furnishes a useful case study.

Key-Words: Barbarians, Comparison, Superstition, Wealth, Nicias.

Think Plutarch, think parallel[1]. Scholars of his biographies cannot get away from the idea of comparison: Greek to Roman, past to present, victor and conquered. Plutarch notably liked to use groups of people—Greeks, Romans, Spartans, kings and emperors, women—to compare against other groups of people or individuals. We should add barbarians to that list of groups since it is clear from his many uses of the related term that much like Americans and Canadians[2], Plutarch and barbarians in their many different forms were old friends[3]. That barbarians were another group whose thoughts, ideas, or sayings Plutarch wished periodically to represent as a whole, rather than one at a time, is clear from his lost *Quaestiones Barbaricae*[4]. We have a pretty good idea of what that work was like, extrapolating from the

1 Humble, 2010, *passim*.

2 I'd like to acknowledge the hard work and vision of my colleagues, particularly Noreen Humble, in bringing about this conference. A meeting of the North American sections has been long overdue.

3 Schmidt, 2002, counts over 950.

4 #139 Lamprias catalog.

Greek and Roman questions a series of questions with answers, touching on barbarian religious practices, institutions, and ways of living[5]. Building on the work of scholars who have identified a series of attributes or traits considered "barbaric" by Plutarch, I will agree with them here that Plutarch defines certain adjectives or attributes as "barbaric" and hence implicitly negative. I argue further that he at least sometimes uses them to add a negative flavor to his depiction of non-barbarian individuals, using *Nicias* and the *Nicias-Crassus* pair as case studies.

Barbarian behavior has been well-documented by Plutarch scholars for many years and Plutarch uses the terms barbarian, barbaric, barbarous, etc., to describe not only different nationalities, but also the behavior of individuals. Real barbarians were people like Persians and Gauls, but evidently not Macedonians or at least not always, nor, indeed Romans. T. Schmidt, for example, suggests that Romans did not count as barbarians, but rather as Greeks, for contrast purposes: "Plutarch's presentation of barbarians seems to agree rather with the idea of a conciliatory attitude of Plutarch towards the Romans (as defended e.g. by Jones 1971, Boulogne 1994, Sirinelli 2000) and not with the view that Plutarch's writings were a form of resistance against the Roman domination (see e.g. Swain 1996, Duff 1999)"[6].

Nikolaidis examined Plutarch's treatment of Greeks and barbarians, noting specific traits and attitudes. For instance, barbarians tend to be superstitious, show inappropriate and intense emotion, especially when mourning, crave excess wealth and luxury, and treat their captives savagely. He assembled a useful list of characteristics for Greece/Greek/in a Greek way, and barbarian/barbarian-like/in a barbarian way, emphasizing that "in making these distinctions Plutarch does not see Greeks and barbarians in black and white terms"[7]. Under "Greek" we are not surprised to see words like *arête, pronoia, praotes,* and *philanthropia*, while under "barbarian" we are equally unsurprised to see *kakia, thrasos, deisidaimones,* and *baruthumoi*.

In addition to the earlier mentioned traits including savagery, boldness, immense wealth, and overwhelming numbers, Schmidt adds a general group of traits he calls *phaulotes*, "vileness" which includes faithlessness, cowardice, wickedness, and superstition. But he, like Nikolaidis, also emphasizes that some barbarian characteristics have positive sides to them, in that barbarians can exhibit courage, intelligence, and

5 SCHMIDT, 2009, p. 171.

6 SCHMIDT, 2002, p. 70, n. 7.

7 NIKOLAIDIS, 1986, p. 244.

wisdom, making them a little more complicated[8]. Indeed, F. Brenk compellingly describes the mixture of attraction and revulsion we feel at the physical depiction of Gauls, with their Celtic faces, mustaches and wild hair, and their extreme solutions to problems (i.e. assassination): "The single Dying Galatian has a distinctive Keltic face, and hair treated and arranged in a disgusting fashion, at least to Greek and Roman taste. Also disruptive are the non-classical mustache and the distinctive torque around his neck". Who would not be in favor of Kamma, the heroine of the Celtic version of the Lucretia myth? Kamma was married to an important man among the Galatians, too important for the evil Sinorix to simply assault. After Sinorix murdered her husband and proposed marriage, Kamma prepared a poisoned wedding cup, drained half herself, and then watched her new husband drink the fatal draft. Having succeeded in murdering her aggressor, she spent the day and a half it took her to die dancing in victory after his demise, "a mixture of heroism and homicide, civilization, and barbarity"[9].

Despite this appreciation of the potential positive side of barbarian characteristics, Schmidt further argues that Plutarch is not actually interested in barbarians' political thought, but is simply trolling for good examples[10]:

With the barbarians, and especially the barbarian monarchy, Plutarch has set up a negative standard by which the Greek and Roman leaders are or may be judged. It works through exempla and may thus be deduced by the reader himself even without explicit statements by Plutarch. The barbarian monarchy is a powerful example of what a king should NOT be.

This predilection for exempla fits in well with the accepted notion of Plutarch's use of foils as a device, particularly in the *Parallel Lives*, as pointed out by many scholars, many times, including myself, most notably in connection with the life of Nicias[11]. Schmidt astutely notices in connection with *De fort Alex.* (328A-329A), that "… Plutarch uses the barbarians—the savage and lawless populations of Asia—as a foil to bring out the great achievements of Alexander and the superiority of the Greek political system"[12]. But since we are on the subject of Nicias, let us look at foils, or comparison, or parallelism in that biography and in the *Nicias-Crassus* pair.

8 Schmidt, 2002, p. 58, and 1999, pp. 239-70.

9 Brenk, 2005; the two quotations are from pp. 94 and 98.

10 Schmidt, 2004, p. 235.

11 See Mossman, 1988; Titchener, 1996; Titchener, 2013; Zadorozhnyi, 1997.

12 Schmidt, 2004, p. 230.

The Life of Nicias.

Throughout his biography, Nicias is actively contrasted with another individual. In the earliest part of the biography, it is Pericles (3.1). After Pericles' death, Nicias is "put up against" Cleon (*antitagma*, 2.2) until the latter's death (9.2), at which time Alcibiades becomes Nicias' foil. Plutarch first contrasts Cleon and Alcibiades (9.1). It is clear that Alcibiades will take up where Cleon left off being a thorn in Nicias' side: "Once freed from Cleon, Nicias had no opportunity at all to lull and pacify the city, but having safely set matters on the right track, stumbled badly, and was immediately shoved into war by the power and impetuosity of Alcibiades' ambition" (9.2). Later (11.1) Plutarch refers to the feud between Nicias and Alcibiades becoming so intense that ostracism was invoked. After Alcibiades' recall, Nicias faces off against Lamachus (15.1). However, after an explanation of why the two generals were not equals (15.3-4), Nicias becomes the sole actor on the stage until Lamachus' death (18.3). Nicias' solo, as it were, coincides with the dramatic climax of the life, and the peak of his success.

When Gylippus enters the scene (18.5), however, almost halfway through the narrative, Nicias' fortunes decline rapidly. In the latter portion of the biography, Nicias is contrasted both with his fellow general Demosthenes, and with Gylippus also. These subpairs occur elsewhere in the life: at the beginning, Pericles is contrasted with Thucydides, as well as Nicias, and Cleon is contrasted first with Brasidas, and then with Alcibiades. In an interesting parallel, toward the end (26.1-2), Gylippus himself is contrasted with his Syracusan counterparts, and then Gylippus and Hermocrates together are contrasted with Eurycles and the popular front.

Contrast continues to be an overt device at the end of chapter twenty-seven, where Nicias laments the contrast between the Athenians' glorious intentions and ignominious end, and his men lament the unfair irony of Nicias dying in command of an expedition from which he more than anyone else had tried to dissuade the Athenians, and the discouraging failure of his many expensive religious services. But contrast is also a more subtle framing device, as can be seen through Plutarch's discussion of Nicias' piety. Most of chapter three is concerned with Nicias' outlay of wealth on dedications and choruses, whereas the beginning of chapter four discussed his obsession with divination. Yet the end of chapter twenty-three and the beginning of chapter twenty-four present Nicias' piety as ignorant, useless, and ultimately dangerous superstition. We admire Nicias' piety at the beginning; by the end we sneer at his superstition.

I suggest that Plutarch uses these and traits like them not only to compare

his subjects to one another (Nicias and Crassus) and to various foils (Crassus and Parthians; Nicias and Hiero), barbarian and otherwise, but also to add dimension to a biographical subject who may or may not be a barbarian himself (i.e. Nicias). Schmidt, indeed, has noted how "With remarkable consistency, the negative characteristics of barbarians are used as a foil to bring out the good qualities of the Greek and Roman heroes"[13]. The more of these traits a biographical subject possesses, or the more Plutarch chooses to focus on those traits, the more uncomfortable we feel, and the more uncertain about what we are meant to emulate.

The Nicias-Crassus pair.

To what extent does this barbarian-style language or signifiers make the biography of Nicias the way it is, i.e. unpleasant? Nicias is unpleasant enough that I wondered in the past why Plutarch even wrote about him. I concluded at the time[14] that a pair was needed for Crassus, already underway as part of the simultaneous preparation for the Roman Lives so brilliantly illuminated by Chris Pelling (1980). Nicias is a very hard guy to like, even if one sympathizes with him, but it's hard to pin down why that is. This pair has been seen by some as negative, like *Alcibiades-Coriolanus*, or *Antony-Demetrius*. This is a little confusing in that Nicias, conspicuous for religious piety, should be a tragic figure whose fate was ἥκιστα ἄξιος ("least worthy") because of his devotion to religion. Surely Crassus, whose money came from proscriptions, fire sales and slave trading was worse than Nicias. But that is not really clear.

To look closely at how Plutarch compared his two subjects, I suggest we look at *Nicias* side-by-side as part of a Duff-style book[15], separate the proem, compare it closely with its parallel life, *Crassus*, and then conclude with the *Synkrisis*. We will then see a pervasive structure dependent on both the biographies, which throws the true themes into deeper relief. This structure has been seen before. R. Seager noted it particularly in *Crassus*, although he attributes it to Plutarch's failure to appreciate complicated narrative[16]: "So in general the life leaps from one landmark to the next: Spartacus, the consulship, the coalition, the second consulship and finally Carrhae". Further, concerning Plutarch's source material for the *Nicias*, Duff notes that while *Alcibiades*

13 Schmidt, 2002, p. 58, and p. 70 where he notes that "Dio makes the same rhetorical use the barbarians as a foil, although with less insistence than Plutarch".

14 Titchener, 1991.

15 See Duff, 2011.

16 Seager, 2005, p. 110.

uses Thucydides sparingly, *Nicias* relies heavily on Thucydides despite the promise to be useful and not redundant[17].

Both of these observations can be explained by the organization of the *Nicias-Crassus* book. Plutarch is controlling his material so that his sequences are parallel. The major themes of personality type are established, cowardly (Nicias) and greedy (Crassus). There is a significant military action that acts as an exemplar of the military career (Pylos for Nicias, the Servile War for Crassus), and then the catastrophic final campaigns (Sicily for Nicias, Parthia for Crassus), followed by a kind of coda. There are framing pairs of bad omens in the same places of each biography.

Introduction to the Book: *Nicias* 1: "Since we agree that it is not out of line to compare Crassus to Nicias, and the Parthian disaster to the Sicilian", then on to source criticism on Thucydides, Philistus, and Timaeus.	
Nicias	Crassus
2: personality = timid	2: personality = greedy
3: Nicias used money in lieu of rhetorical powers like those of Pericles	3: Crassus used hard work and preparation to overcome those more naturally gifted (Caesar, Pompey, Cicero)
7: Cleon as foil. Pylos episode: theme of cowardice and dangers of catering to the base	7. Spartacus as foil, but: "This was the beginning of his rivalry with Pompey."
7-9: Pylos episode; enter new foil, Alcibiades	8-12: Servile war; enter additional foil, Caesar
12: Nicias does not want to go to Sicily	16: Crassus is elated to go to Mesopotamia
13: BAD OMENS: Meton, Altar of the gods; Adonia; Herms; Socrates	16-17: BAD OMENS: Ateius, cursing lunatic (w. incense); trips over Publius who has fallen outside Ishtar's temple
14: Athenians arrive in Sicily	18: Parthian campaign begins
23: BAD OMENS: eclipse	23: BAD OMENS: wrong cloak; heavy standards
28: Nicias' death	31: Crassus' death
29-30: prisoners' fate; news reaches Athens	32-33: Parthian production of Bacchae

In the *Synkrisis* Plutarch recapitulates the themes of both *Lives*, in the same order as in the biographies, establishing these points of comparison:

• Money: How they got it and what they did with it.

• Political career: Nicias was subservient to the base and obsessed with

[17] DUFF, 1999, p. 24.

safety; Crassus was violent but contended against worthy opponents; however, he can't compete with the Peace.

• Base Motives: Nicias let Cleon in and abandoned Athens to the inferior. That's how he got stuck with Sicily. He didn't want war, but got it. Athens sent Nicias out unwilling, and his city hurt him. Crassus did well against Spartacus because there were good men running things. He wanted war, but didn't get it. He hurt his city.

• Public Stance: Nicias was right to warn about Sicily; Crassus was wrong to push for Parthia.

• Military conduct: Nicias came close; disease and envy overcame him; Crassus didn't give fortune a chance to help him.

• Divination: not a factor because although Nicias was devout and Crassus an unbeliever, they both died the same way.

• Manner of death: Nicias was led by false hope to surrender, and Crassus was led by false hope to destruction.

Final Judgement

Nicias' personality, timid and cowardly, in the end made his death more shameful than Crassus' personality, greedy and grasping.

That's a pretty half-hearted denunciation of Nicias, who seemed to be winning (or losing) the race up to that point. What's the coffin's final nail? One clue may lie in *Quomodo Adolescens*. About half-way through that essay, Plutarch cautions young people to pay close attention to their teachers so that they not miss the hidden fruit on the vine. He advises study of the differences between the language the poets use for good and bad characters, providing many examples from Homer. He ends this chapter curiously, saying:

> 30C: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ διαφορᾶς, ἂν μὴ κἀκεῖνο βουλώμεθα προσλαβεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Τρώων ἑαλώκασι καὶ πολλοὶ ζῶντες, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποπεπτώκασιν ἔνιοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἄδραστος, οἱ Ἀντιμάχου παῖδες, ὁ Λυκάων, αὐτὸς ὁ Ἕκτωρ δεόμενος περὶ ταφῆς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἐκείνων δ᾽ οὐδείς, ὡς βαρβαρικοῦ τοῦ ἱκετεύειν καὶ ὑποπίπτειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὄντος, Ἑλληνικοῦ δὲ τοῦ νικᾶν μαχόμενον ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν.

This is enough on the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans; and that of the Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus, the sons of Antimachus, Lycaon, and Hector himself begging Achilles for burial, but of the Achaeans none, because of their conviction that it is a trait of barbarian peoples to make supplication and to fall at the enemy's feet in combat, but of Greeks to conquer or to die fighting.

Plutarch is done with examining the differences between "good" and "bad" Homeric figures, and the coda he chooses to add has to do with surrendering. Plutarch carefully puts this sentiment

into the mouths of the ancient Greek warriors, but he has gone to some trouble to do so. The "fall at the feet" verb, ὑποπίπτειν, is based on the same verb used in Nicias (προσπεσὼν, 27.4).

But is it possible to use a *Moralia* quote to illuminate something in the *Lives*? Is there only one Plutarch, or not? Is there a parallel Plutarch, an anti-Plutarch? I have heard both sides of this question argued with great eloquence by the most learned of scholars. Unitarians say that one way or another, Plutarch is Plutarch, and distinctions between *Lives* and *Moralia* cannot be categorically assigned[18]. Separatists say that *Lives* and *Moralia* are written for different purposes entirely, and that the rhetorical nature of the *Moralia* makes it difficult to transfer inferences thus derived. Yet some essays seem to have plenty of connection to the *Lives* or their subjects, such as *An Seni* or *Praecepta*. The *Quaestiones* may be notebooks or kinds of outlines (hypomnemata) for use in *Lives*. The disagreement is the same when it comes to examining Plutarch's use of sources. So, for example, it has been argued that Plutarch's use of Thucydides is very different in the *Moralia* than in the *Lives*, and that this difference stems from the genres themselves[19]:

> In light of the differences in Plutarch's aim and method, discussions of his use of Thucydides should differentiate between the two genres, since "The threads used as the warp in the composition of the *Moralia* become the woof in the *Lives*, and those yarns which form the warp in the *Lives* are found again in the woof of the *Moralia*.

and

> In the *Parallel Lives*, Thucydides is a source of information. In the *Moralia*, he is, additionally, a source of ornamental quotations. Therefore, it is my contention that it is frequently Thucydides the stylist whom Plutarch cites in the *Moralia*, but almost always Thucydides the historian that Plutarch cites in the *Parallel Lives*. There can be no question of Plutarch's appreciation of Thucydides as an artist, and there can be no question of Plutarch's fondness for the liberal use of γνωμολογίαι. Perhaps Plutarch felt that the simultaneous use of Thucydides as historian and ornament was somehow distasteful—that one or the other was appropriate but not both. Perhaps he felt that Thucydides' eloquent writing style would interfere with the point

[18] For discussion on this subject, see NIKOLAIDIS, 2008, especially the Introduction, Section 2.a (*How Plutarch deals with other genres*), and Section 3 (*Moralia in vitis*).

[19] The first quotation is from BABBITT, 1927, p. xii, the second from TITCHENER, 1995, pp. 194-5.

of the biographies, whereas it would enhance the flow of the essays. The best explanation is that in the *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch used Thucydides as a primary source, while in the *Moralia* he is one of many secondary sources, frequently consulted in one of Plutarch's notebooks, where his admiration of Thucydides' writing style made the historian an important ingredient in Plutarch's own version of *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*.

Here I suppose that I have shifted the argument to whether or not there is only one Thucydides, but I am comfortable with the idea of one Plutarch who has different facets, and so I will press the point that I want to apply Plutarch's comment in *Quomodo Adolescens* to the final sentence of the *Synkrisis* between Nicias and Crassus. I think part of the "negativity" in Nicias, certainly in the oddly flat final judgment of the *Synkrisis*, comes from Plutarch's deliberate use of characteristics and language typically associated with barbarians. Great wealth, superstition, and cowardice signified barbarians, not Greeks. The end of the *Synkrisis*, with its specific reference to surrender making his death more shameful, reinforces the idea that Nicias was an individual who did not fit in with aristocrats like Pericles and Alcibiades, or street-fighters like Cleon and Hyperbolus. Wealthy, superstitious, and cowardly, the general's surrender in Sicily was the deciding factor in who was the more shameful, the bigger barbarian, Crassus or Nicias. Crassus, as a Roman, had a definite barbarian flavor to him which Plutarch and his contemporaries would have considered natural. But for Plutarch, barbarian attributes in a Greek were harder to overlook or forgive, and his characterization of Nicias using those attributes condemns the general in an oblique and disconcerting way.

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NOTES & *VARIA*

1. *NECROLOGICAE*

El año 2016 ha sido especialmente duro con la *International Plutarch Society*. Aunque esperadas, las pérdidas de nuestro primer Presidente, Italo Gallo, en el mes de abril y de Françoise Frazier, en diciembre, han ensombrecido la actividad de todos nosotros, especialmente de quienes tuvimos la suerte de conocerlos y aprender de su ejemplo como personas y de su magisterio como servidores rigurosos de la Filología. Con Italo Gallo el destino ha sido particularmente cruel, aquejado por una larga enfermedad que anuló una de sus más preciadas cualidades, su brillante capacidad racional. En cuanto a Françoise, quienes hemos convivido con ella en los últimos años y sabíamos de sus problemas de salud, admiramos aún más su férrea voluntad para agarrarse a la vida y su energía, ilusión y disciplina para dejarnos a todos los plutarquistas dos magníficos trabajos que sin duda serán un referente y mantendrán viva su memoria durante muchos años. Uno es la reedición revisada de su libro sobre las *Vidas* de Plutarco, reseñado en este mismo volumen por Carlos Alcalde (*infra* pp. 124-127). Y el otro es el libro que abrirá la nueva colección plutarquea de Brill y en el que se reúne parte de sus *opera minora* (menores en extensión, pero no en mérito y valor). *Ploutarchos n.s.* se honra de haber contado con ambos en su equipo de dirección (Italo Gallo durante los primeros años) y de redacción (Françoise Frazier hasta el último día, cuando aún revisaba las pruebas de la Bibliografía de 2012 que son en este volumen un canto a su fortaleza). Como responsable de redacción y en nombre de todo el Comité de la Revista, agradezco a Paola Volpe y a Olivier Guerrier y Olivier Munnich las palabras dedicadas al recuerdo de Italo y de Françoise, respectivamente, en unas hermosas páginas que sin duda todos los miembros de esta comunidad plutarquista compartimos.

Aurelio Pérez Jiménez

I. "RICORDO DI ITALO GALLO" (Padula, 20 aprile 1921 – Salerno, 24 aprile 2016)

Ricordare Italo Gallo non è per me compito facile: la commozione è ancora tanta perché Egli ha lasciato a tutti noi, studiosi e plutarchisti, una eredità di conoscenza e di affetto che sarà impossibile dimenticare.

Egli cominciò la Sua attività di docente nella scuola secondaria superiore e fu impareggiabile professore prima a Cava dei Tirreni (SA) - dove più tardi tornò da preside - e poi al liceo Tasso

di Salerno. Dall'esperienza scolastica ricavò profonda consuetudine con i classici greci e latini, ma anche l'*habitus* mentale di tenere sempre presente il complesso rapporto fra la cultura latina e gli ascendenti greci: l'insegnamento nei Licei gli conferì inoltre la rara capacità di illustrare anche i testi più complessi con limpida ed esemplare chiarezza. Divenuto nell'allora Magistero professore di Civiltà greca e poi di Papirologia nella nascente Facoltà di Lettere dell'Università di Salerno, e, più tardi, ordinario di Letteratura greca nell'Università Federico II di Napoli e poi nuovamente nell'ateneo salernitano in quest'ultimo, Italo Gallo fu il promotore non solo della costituzione del Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Antichità, ma anche del dottorato di ricerca in Filologia classica, nonché organizzatore di convegni e seminari di livello internazionale.

Complesso e infinitamente ricco è il Suo itinerario culturale, ma qui mi vorrei soffermare su tre aspetti della Sua ricerca e produzione scientifica: la biografia, il teatro greco ellenistico e, infine, il nostro Plutarco.

ln *Nascita e sviluppo della biografia greca* Gallo affermava che era necessario associare alla ricerca testuale una approfondita analisi storico-culturale dei contenuti, non trascurando quelle che Egli definiva "implicazioni sociologiche e comunicazionali" di questa forma letteraria.

Venendo al teatro, in uno studio dal titolo *Un dramma satiresco arcaico in testimonianze vascolari del territorio salernitano*, egli sottolineava come la documentazione vascolare potesse in alcuni casi rivelarsi particolarmente fruttuosa per l'esegesi e, a volte, finanche indispensabile: prendendo in esame le pitture di un cratere attico a volute dissepolto a Padula e intrecciando l'iconografia con la letteratura, Gallo, ad esempio, avanzava l'ipotesi che più di un *Eracle satiro* si potesse parlare di *Saturoi kleptoi* pre-eschilei. Nel volume *Teatro ellenistico minore* Gallo ha esaminato lo stretto rapporto fra commedia nuova e filosofia, pubblicando i frammenti di Batone, Damosseno, Sositeo satiresco e Macone: con una punta di orgoglio, ma anche di non comune umiltà - che è dote sincera degli uomini di vera cultura - amava ricordare che proprio il Suo Sositeo era stato segnalato negli *addenda* dei *Tragici minores* di B. Snell.

Ed ancora e soprattutto Plutarco, testimonianza - Egli diceva sempre - ricca, varia, poliedrica della cultura e della vita greca - e non solo - in tutte le sue espressioni e in tutto l'arco storico da Omero ai suoi tempi. A Plutarco Gallo ha dedicato più di venti anni. È stato presidente della *International Plutarch Society*, fondata nel 1984, promotore della "Red tematica Plutarco", che vede oggi impegnati studiosi di undici università europee, e della pubblicazione del *Corpus Plutarchi Moralium*. Ricordo il *I Convegno di studi*

su Plutarco (Roma 23 novembre 1985) dove furono gettate le basi di questo audace progetto editoriale che sembrava allora difficilmente realizzabile: di ottanta opuscoli del Cheronese bisognava dare una traduzione italiana (e in alcuni casi si trattava della prima), un commento filologico, storico e letterario, e allestire un testo critico che richiedeva necessariamente una nuova e accurata collazione dei codici, volta a completare e perfezionare le ricognizioni precedenti. Un lavoro lungo, articolato e difficile quello dell'editore plutarcheo immaginato per il *CPM* e Gallo, come era Sua abitudine, volle essere il primo a mettersi in gioco, pubblicando (insieme a Emidio Pettine) il *De adulatore et amico* e indicando così a noi altri la strada da seguire, il metodo soprattutto per la stesura degli apparati delle varianti e delle congetture e delle fonti. Una strada quella tracciata da Gallo che, come detto, aveva un traguardo tanto chiaro quanto ambizioso: fare del *Corpus Plutarchi Moralium*, iniziativa scientifica voluta e finanziata da tre importati Università del Mezzogiorno, (Salerno, Napoli - L'Orientale e Palermo), una eccellenza italiana e, grazie anche al contributo di numerosi editori e esegeti europei, internazionale, meritevole perciò di affiancare nelle biblioteche e sulle scrivanie degli studiosi i volumi di collane celebri quali Teubner, Loeb e Les Belles Lettres. Di questi volumi lo stesso Gallo aveva evidenziato frequentemente i pregi, ma anche le immancabili carenze, che proprio il *CPM* avrebbe dovuto colmare. Un traguardo, quello intravisto fin da subito da Italo Gallo, che oggi possiamo dire - non senza un pizzico di orgoglio e di soddisfazione - raggiunto. Dopo il *De adulatore et amico*, numerosi altri opuscoli sono stati pubblicati: oggi siamo in attesa dell'uscita del n. 51, a cura - forse non è un caso - di un giovane studioso salernitano, di quella Salerno che Italo Gallo tanto ha amato e alla quale tanto ha lasciato. Di Italo Gallo voglio infine ricordare anche i Suoi studi sulla storia di Salerno e della sua provincia perché l'amore per la classicità è andato in Lui sempre di pari passo con l'amore per la Sua terra e per la grande tradizione culturale che ad essa ha fatto onore: a Lui infatti dobbiamo ancora la rifondazione della *Società di Storia Patria* e la ripresa delle pubblicazioni della rinata *Rassegna storica salernitana*.

Italo Gallo era un uomo dotto, equanime, ricco di una profonda *humanitas*, fatta di cultura e signorilità, che abbiamo ricordato e onorato nel momento in cui la nostra comunità di colleghi e - permettetemi - di amici è stata colpita dalla notizia della Sua scomparsa. In pochissime ore di quel doloroso 24 aprile 2016 anche la *mailing-list* della *International Plutarch Society* è andata colmandosi dei messaggi di tanti che non hanno voluto far mancare una testimonianza sincera di dolore e di affetto o un aneddoto, quasi sempre utile a sottolineare la grandezza dello stu-

dioso, ma ancor più dell'uomo e del maestro. "Guida intellettuale, fonte di ispirazione e anima", così lo ricorda in un messaggio l'amico Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, una presenza vivissima in tutti i convegni plutarchei, anche se età e malattia lo avevano già costretto a restarne lontano, ma mai assente. Saggio, generoso, aperto verso i più giovani e verso ogni iniziativa capace di unire sedi universitarie e docenti di molteplici località, "un gigante degli studi plutarchei" - così lo ricorda affettuosamente Philip Stadter - che mancherà tantissimo a tutti noi, ma che, come detto all'inizio di questo ricordo, ci ha lasciato in dono un'eredità di contributi e di lavoro che dovremo, dobbiamo proseguire non senza di Lui, ma per Lui.

Paola Volpe Cacciatore

II. Francoise Frazier
(Paris, 17 février 1959 - Paris, 14 décembre 2016)

Françoise Frazier s'en est allée le 14 décembre 2016, des suites d'une longue maladie, et elle laisse son entourage, tous les plutarquisants et encore plus particulièrement notre Réseau européen, la RED, dans une indicible solitude.

En 1978, elle intègre brillamment l'École Normale Supérieure de Jeunes Filles (ENSJF) du Boulevard Jourdan – ou « ENS Sèvres ». Première à l'agrégation de Lettres Classiques (1981), elle soutient, trois ans plus tard, sa thèse de doctorat (*Plutarque et la narration biographique : composition et signification des « grandes scènes » dans les* Vies), sous la direction de celui qui restera, toute sa vie, son « patron » : Jean Sirinelli. Après avoir assuré des cours pour les pré-agrégatifs de l'ENSJF (1982-1987), et avoir été pensionnaire de la Fondation Thiers (1984-1987), puis avoir été nommée Maître de Conférences à l'Université Stendhal-Grenoble III (1989), elle soutient en 1991 son Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches, sur un dossier portant sur les *Vies*, avec un travail original *Morale et Histoire dans les* Vies Parallèles. En 1997, elle est élue Professeur à l'Université Paul Valéry-Montpellier III, puis en 2006 à l'Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense. En 2012, elle est nommée membre senior à l'Institut Universitaire de France (IUF).

Françoise Frazier est l'auteur d'une œuvre philologique et scientifique de première importance. Elle est d'abord une des meilleures spécialistes de Plutarque, qu'elle n'a cessé, tout au long de sa vie, de pratiquer. On lui doit en particulier, outre des dizaines d'articles, de nombreuses éditions et traductions de Plutarque (Collection des Universités de France, Classiques en poche, Garnier Flammarion), et surtout *Histoire et Morale dans les* Vies Parallèles *de Plutarque*, dont elle avait souhaité, en 2016, proposer une seconde édition, revue et augmentée. Sa bibliographie, ses séminaires et ses cours montrent également qu'elle s'est

préoccupée de toute la tradition et de tous les genres, d'Homère à Plutarque, et au-delà : la poésie (épique, tragique, comique, bucolique), l'histoire (Thucydide, Polybe), les orateurs, la philosophie (Platon, Aristote, Philon d'Alexandrie, Epictète et Plotin), le roman (Achille Tatius), la littérature grecque chrétienne. En témoigne notamment son livre *Poétique et création littéraire en Grèce ancienne* (Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2010).

Elle avait la passion de la transmission, dans cette exigence mêlée d'humilité qui caractérise les plus grands professeurs. Elle incarnait ce que l'école des hellénistes français a produit de meilleur, et fournit à cette communauté une œuvre qui doit servir de base à ceux qui s'inscriront dans son champ.

Elle était également très engagée dans le Réseau européen Plutarque et l'International Plutarch Society, dont elle ne manquait que rarement les congrès. Correspondante pour la France à Montpellier puis Nanterre, elle permit à l'un des auteurs de ces lignes et à l'Université Jean Jaurès de Toulouse de rejoindre la RED. On le dut à son intérêt de toujours pour la réception européenne « moderne » de Plutarque, qui l'avait conduite à collaborer dès son début en 2003 à l'entreprise d'édition des *Œuvres morales et meslées* d'Amyot (1572), dont elle devint très vite le fer de lance et à bon droit la co-responsable. Ce travail entre hellénistes et seiziémistes autour d'un texte majeur, socle de journées de travail et de colloques, manifesta une autre qualité qui caractérise les très grands savants : la capacité, sans démagogie, à sortir de ses études premières pour s'ouvrir à des domaines nouveaux, au point que Françoise était également devenue une spécialiste de la Renaissance à part entière.

On gardera d'elle avant tout l'expression d'une éthique, au meilleur sens du terme, nourrie de ses chers Grecs autant que d'une foi profonde, par laquelle tout instant avec elle était lesté de plénitude et de grandeur, d'une gravité qui allait de pair avec la gaité, dans une conciliation sans cesse harmonieuse du passé et du présent. Chaque rencontre mêlait le travail le plus intense à des conversations, ensuite, sur l'art, la musique, les voyages, le tout autour de mets choisis et de champagne, dans la droite ligne des *Propos de table*. Et cela toujours avec une exceptionnelle attention aux autres, une façon de se mettre à la place, si rare ; Françoise Frazier possédait deux des plus belles vertus humaines : la délicatesse et l'élégance.

Le dernier colloque de la RED à Paris (Ulm et Nanterre), en septembre 2016, intervint au moment où la maladie accentuait ses ravages. Françoise tint à tout organiser elle-même, à recevoir jusqu'au bout ses amis français et étrangers. Elle ne put qu'ouvrir, par une admirable conférence rue d'Ulm, ces journées, qu'elle avait conçues comme

« testamentaires ». Il y eut alors de la solennité, mais aussi – elle le sut – de la joie. En ses derniers mois, ses proches assistèrent à une fin où elle confortait ceux qui allaient rester, et qui fut ponctuée par un dernier livre, *Quelques aspects du platonisme de Plutarque. Philosopher en commun. Tourner sa pensée vers Dieu* (à paraître chez Brill), tout ceci constituant sa mort, et donc tout ce qui l'avait précédée, en exemple absolu, à l'antique. Dans le texte d'hommage qu'elle écrivit lors de la disparition de Jean Sirinelli, le 14 septembre 2004, elle mentionnait le titre du dernier chapitre de *Plutarque de Chéronée – Un philosophe dans le siècle* « La Paix du Soir ». Françoise s'est éteinte une nuit, prématurément, mais sans doute en paix. Ceux qui l'aimaient et qu'elle aimait sont aujourd'hui orphelins ; mais ils sont également responsables, face à son immense héritage.

Olivier Guerrier

Olivier Munnich

2. NOTE BY F. B. TITCHENER

The three contributions of Pelling, Podlecki, and Titchener, along with that of Philip Stadter in the most recent volume of *Ploutarchos* (12 (2015) 65-82), were presented at the first meeting of the North American Sections of the International Plutarch Society, held in Banff, Calgary, Canada, 14-16 March, 2014. The complete program may be found here: http://www.usu.edu/ploutarchos/banff.htm.

3. A PROPÓSITO DE UNA TESIS DOCTORAL SOBRE PLUTARCO

Álvaro Ibáñez Chacón, *Los* Parallela minora *atribuidos a Plutarco (*Mor.*305A-316B): introducción, edición, traducción y comentario*, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Málaga, 2014. Editada por el Servicio de Publicaciones y Divulgación Científica de la Universidad de Málaga y depositada en su Repositorio Institucional (http://riuma.uma.es/xmlui/handle/10630/8488).

En octubre de 2014 se defendió en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Málaga la tesis arriba citada de Álvaro Ibáñez Chacón, docente de lenguas clásicas en Educación Secundaria y Bachillerato y profesor asociado en el Departamento de Historia Medieval y Ciencias y Técnicas Historiográficas de la Universidad de Granada. El trabajo, dirigido por quien suscribe estas líneas, obtuvo la máxima calificación del tribunal juzgador, compuesto por los Dres. Aurelio Pérez Jiménez y Jorge Martínez Pinna (Universidad de Málaga), José Luis Calvo Martínez (Universidad de Granada), José María Candau Morón (Universidad de Sevilla) y Vicente Ramón Palerm (Universidad de Zaragoza), y desde poco después puede consultarse en acceso libre en el Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga (RIUMA).

Como es sabido, el opúsculo conocido con el nombre de *Parallela minora* se ha transmitido dentro del

corpus de los escritos morales de Plutarco, pero su contenido (41 pares de narraciones emparejadas con criterios poco ortodoxos y trufadas de anacronismos e incongruencias respecto a la tradición cultural grecolatina) ha suscitado continuas sospechas entre los estudiosos, que lo han considerado tradicionalmente como pseudepígrafo, es decir como falsamente atribuido al Queronense. Partiendo de esta *communis opinio*, el trabajo de Ibáñez Chacón dedica su extensa "Introducción" (pp. 7-129) a la aplicación de determinados criterios modernos para la indagación pseudepigráfica, una metodología ya empleada por otros estudiosos del texto y que confirma la inautenticidad de la obra; sin embargo, la investigación se diferencia de las precedentes no sólo en el orden de la exposición de los criterios de análisis, sino también en el estudio detallado de los posibles referentes indirectos, en la ubicación de la obra en su contexto sociocultural y literario, con especial atención al *Corpus Plutarcheum*, y sobre todo en la consideración, no siempre observada, de la naturaleza epitomada del texto tal cual se ha conservado. En general, las conclusiones del estudio no difieren mucho de las opiniones vertidas por la mayoría de los plutarquistas, pero aportan un valioso análisis en detalle de las circunstancias que propiciaron la incorporación de los *Parallela minora* al conjunto de las obras del Queronense, lo que sirve al autor para sostener la hipótesis de que el opúsculo pudo transmitirse de forma anónima y acabar adscribiéndose a Plutarco durante el proceso de recopilación de los *Moralia* a causa de sus semejanzas argumentales y narrativas.

Esta parte introductoria del trabajo es el resultado de un análisis pormenorizado del texto de los *Parallela minora*, que se presenta editado, traducido y comentado en lo que constituye el núcleo del trabajo (pp. 131-486). Respecto al texto, se trata en realidad de una revisión (más que una *editio editionum*, como lo llama el autor) a partir de las ediciones aparecidas desde el siglo XVIII, con la que no se pretende reconstruir un supuesto original hoy perdido, sino evidenciar la naturaleza resumida y entrecortada del opúsculo tal como se ha transmitido[1], es decir, con numerosas lagunas, corruptelas e inconsistencias propias de un texto epitomado (aunque debemos señalar que, si aplicamos un concepto de obra abierta, en algunos pasajes concretos podría

[1] Según sabemos por comunicación personal, el autor, tras una serie de artículos publicados con posterioridad a su tesis y que desarrollan diversos aspectos de ella (transmisión textual, tradición ecdótica, pervivencia), está trabajando actualmente en una verdadera edición nueva del texto de los *Parallela minora* a partir de la colación de todos los manuscritos conocidos, tal como se le recomendó en su día por parte del tribunal juzgador.

hablarse de adición más que –o en vez de– epitomación). En cuanto a la traducción, es correcta en general y trata de reflejar de modo fiel el estilo tosco y desgarbado del texto griego, salvo casos puntuales en que se hace necesario retocarlo para una mejor comprensión del sentido original. Tras la traducción, ofrecida en páginas enfrentadas junto con el texto griego y su aparato crítico, se incorpora a cada narración un comentario de sus aspectos esenciales, que permite sopesar el lugar ocupado por el pseudo-Plutarco en la tradición literaria grecolatina, teniendo en cuenta, sobre todo, la singularidad de la mayor parte de lo narrado en el opúsculo y relacionándolo con géneros o subgéneros afines como la paradoxografía, las compilaciones de *uariae historiae* y la historiografía más sensacionalista.

El trabajo se completa con un apéndice final (pp. 487-640) que presenta un estudio de un interesante ejemplo de la tradición de los *Parallela minora* en la literatura española: la tragedia *Ciane de Siracusa o Los bacanales*, compuesta por Cándido María Trigueros a mediados del siglo XVIII a partir del argumento de una de las *narrationes* pseudoplutarqueas (en concreto *Par. min.* 19B). La tragedia, que se conserva manuscrita en varias bibliotecas españolas (una de ellas privada) y permanecía inédita hasta la fecha, se ofrece pulcramente editada, con notas abundantes y en general atinadas y un amplio análisis introductorio de todos sus elementos (argumento, estructura formal, métrica, espacios, escenografía, etc.) desde la perspectiva de la poética neoclásica española, de la cual su autor fue un gran teórico, poco estimado en su época y prácticamente olvidado en la actualidad. Este apéndice podría de entrada antojarse superfluo, en el sentido de que no parece encajar con facilidad en una tesis que consiste básicamente en una edición y comentario histórico-literario a los *Parallela minora*, pero, muy al contrario, consigue convertirse en una aportación novedosa y curiosa desde el punto de vista de la pervivencia de la obra, como muestra casi única de la tradición del tratado pseudoplutarqueo, más allá de los comentarios existentes sobre las traducciones humanísticas de los *Moralia* en general y de los *Parallela minora* en particular, en un camino iniciado por la versión latina de Guarino a finales del siglo XV y continuado por la de Gracián un siglo más tarde y luego también por algunas tragedias neoclásicas italianas que tienen como argumento precisamente la *narratio* pseudoplutarquea en la que se basa la tragedia de Trigueros. Del valor de este amplio apéndice del trabajo de Ibáñez Chacón para el campo de los estudios de tradición clásica en general y para un mejor conocimiento del teatro neoclásico español del siglo XVIII y de la figura de Trigueros en particular, es buena prueba el hecho de que, apenas un año después de defendida la tesis, fue publicado como monografía in-

dependiente por el Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz[2].

Cierra el trabajo un nutrido apartado de "Referencias bibliográficas" (pp. 641-749) que relaciona estructuradamente la amplísima bibliografía manejada, aunque se echa en falta una mayor jerarquización de esa bibliografía en el apartado de *Varia*, así como, por la cantidad de fuentes primarias y secundarias concernidas, algunos índices específicos (al menos un *index locorum*, deseablemente también un *index nominum et rerum notabilium*) que hubieran facilitado la consulta o búsqueda de pasajes, ideas o nombres concretos en un estudio de tanta envergadura.

Esta última crítica, a la que podemos añadir unas pocas erratas (no más de tres o cuatro detectadas, en una obra de más de 750 páginas) y un pequeño despiste en la numeración de las notas (a partir de la página 81, de manera imprevista aunque con efectos evidentemente benéficos, la numeración corrida se convierte en nueva numeración en cada página) no consiguen empañar en absoluto el valor de este imponente trabajo de Ibáñez Chacón, al que en junio del pasado año concedió la Sociedad Española de Estudios Clásicos con todo merecimiento el 2º premio a la mejor tesis doctoral correspondiente a 2014. Un trabajo que sin duda deberán tener muy en cuenta a partir de ahora los estudiosos de los *Parallela minora*, al haber logrado conjugar con notable acierto tres aspectos esenciales de la investigación literaria: el análisis de la obra en sí misma tras una revisión profunda del texto transmitido, el estudio del contexto sociocultural que la produjo, y la investigación de su repercusión en la tradición occidental.

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[2] Cándido María Trigueros, *Ciane de Siracusa o Los Bacanales*, estudio preliminar y edición crítica de Álvaro Ibáñez Chacón, Cádiz: Editorial UCA, 2015.

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Book Reviews

Jann Bremmer, *Initiation into the Mysteries of the Ancient World*, De Gruyter, Berlin-Boston, 2014, 256 pp. ISBN 978-3-11-029929-8.

Los cultos mistéricos disfrutaron de gran difusión durante más de un milenio a lo largo y ancho del Mundo Antiguo. El entorno de secretismo que los caracterizaba, sin embargo, parece haberlos protegido de los curiosos, por lo que hoy contamos con poca información específica sobre sus ritos y usos. J. Bremmer, profesor emérito de la Universidad de Groningen y gran especialista en Religión Griega y Cristianismo Primitivo, tiene amplia experiencia en el tema, como demuestran sus muchas publicaciones: «Greek maenadism reconsidered» (1984), «Manteis, magic, mysteries and mythography: messy margins of polis religion?» (2010) y «The place of performance of Orphic Poetry (OF1)» (2012) pueden servir como botón de muestra.

En *Initiation into the mysteries of the ancient world*, Bremmer ofrece una panorámica de cómo eran y cómo evolucionaron los ritos de varios cultos iniciáticos: los misterios de Eleusis (capítulo 1), los cultos de Samotracia (cap. 2), los ritos órfico-báquicos (cap. 3), los misterios de origen griego durante época Helenística y Romana (cap. 4), los cultos a Isis y Mitra (cap. 5) y, finalmente, la influencia de este tipo de religión en el desarrollo del Cristianismo (cap. 6). Como apéndices, añade dos estudios que profundizan en aspectos concretos, como el culto a Deméter en Mégara (ap. 1), o las fuentes órficas, eleusinas y helenístico-judías que confluyen en la composición del libro VI de la *Eneida* (ap. 2).

El resultado de ese panorama general es especialmente perspicaz debido a que Bremmer se apoya en testimonios de la más diversa índole para corroborar o refutar las variantes cultuales que se han atribuido a los ritos mistéricos. Por un lado presenta numerosos testimonios literarios. Dentro de esta categoría encontramos autores paganos de la Antigüedad, como Heródoto, Aristófanes, Platón, Sófocles, Diodoro Sículo, Plutarco, Teón de Esmirna o Máximo de Tiro –la mayoría de ellos a menudo disculpando la falta de información detallada debido a la imposibilidad de exponer el contenido secreto de los misterios–, y autores cristianos de la Antigüedad tardía, como Clemente de Alejandría y Gregorio Nacianceno –que suelen criticar o menospreciar los cultos que describen–. Por otro lado recurre a numerosos testimonios iconográficos, epigráficos y numismáticos que concretan y definen mejor su análisis de los diferentes procedimientos cultuales –sirvan de ejemplo «Distorted ideals in Greek vase-painting» (2009), «Panegyris Coinages» (2008), o «A law in the city Eleusinion concerning the Mysteries» (1980), aunque la extensa y actualizada bibliografía final ofrece muchos más–.

Obviamente, Bremmer no podía prescindir de las grandes monografías sobre los cultos mistéricos del s. XX. Las referencias

a G. E. Mylonas (*Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries*, 1961) o W. Burkert (*Ancient Mystery Cults*, 1984), con los que concuerda o discrepa según la ocasión, son continuas a lo largo del libro. Pero lo interesante, desde mi punto de vista, es que la erudición de Bremmer no se limita a estudios sobre el entorno griego y oriental en el que se desarrollaban estos cultos. Incluye en su trabajo numerosas referencias a estudios que solo tangencialmente tienen conexión con su tema, pero que, sin embargo, contribuyen a que su análisis sea mucho más fino y depurado. En el capítulo que dedica a los misterios eleusinos, por ejemplo, repara en el estado eufórico que podían presentar los participantes tras completar el recorrido que separa Atenas de Eleusis, apoyándose en un estudio neurológico sobre los valores liberadores de una larga caminata (p.7).

Entre las fuentes antiguas a las que recurre Bremmer, Plutarco ocupa un lugar importante. No podía ser de otro modo, pues el interés de nuestro autor por la religión de su época y contexto histórico-cultural (Grecia bajo el Imperio Romano) es amplio y en su obra; y no menos se refleja en ella su curiosidad por los cultos de iniciación y particularmente por religiones más o menos ligadas a la cultura grecorromana, pero en cualquier caso muy populares en su época, como la egipcia. De ahí que a él debamos en gran medida nuestro conocimiento de muchos detalles concernientes a misterios como los de Eleusis y Samotracia, o a divinidades como Isis o Dioniso (en cuyos misterios él y su mujer estaban iniciados, según sus propias palabras en 611D).

De las casi 50 referencias a la obra de Plutarco que aparecen a lo largo del libro, la gran mayoría son de *Moralia*, como era de esperar. Su testimonio sirve para aclarar aspectos cultuales tales como: la importancia del mistagogo como maestro y guía de los van a ser iniciados (765A y 795E); el tipo de vestimenta reglamentaria (353DE); el uso de ciertos símbolos o formulas secretas (611D); el papel fundamental de la música en determinadas etapas de los ritos (759B); la alternancia entre gritos y silencio entre los participantes (81D); la abstención de ciertos alimentos por parte de los sacerdotes (352F, 353DF); las preguntas sobre el tipo de vida ética seguida por los que iban a ser iniciados (con respuestas cargadas de ironía en boca de espartanos, en 217D, 229D, 236D); o las normas de etiqueta a que estaban sujetas las mujeres durante su participación en los misterios (842A).

Un texto que sobresale entre aquellos en los que Plutarco trata el tema de los cultos mistéricos es el fragmento 178 (Sandbach). Encierra una espléndida descripción de las contradictorias emociones que sentían los iniciados durante y después del proceso de iniciación. Quizá Plutarco se sentía suficientemente cómodo para hacer una descripción tan detallada porque en este texto, en realidad, alude a las almas que alcanzan su destino final: establece un paralelo entre los verbos morir y ser iniciado (τελευτᾶν - τελεῖσθαι) y compara la experiencia *post-mortem* de las almas con la que tienen los que van a ser iniciados en los misterios, usando emociones tales como el terror, los escalofríos, el sudor y la admiración –esta descripción puede ser puesta en correlación con otra que aparece en 943C, donde nuevas emociones (confusión, alegría, esperanza) se suman al catálogo–. Es el texto de Plutarco más recurrente en el libro que estamos reseñando: Bremmer lo utiliza cuatro veces en distintos capítulos y subraya con acierto su plástica y cautivadora exposición de sentimientos.

Es interesante notar la firme postura que mantiene el autor sobre el secretismo de estos cultos. Una postura que, por otra parte, ya reflejó en su trabajo «Religious secrets and secrecy in Classical Greece» (1995),

hace más de dos décadas. En su opinión, el ambiente de secretismo que rodea a estos cultos representa únicamente el carácter religioso y ritual de los mismos, y no tiene relación alguna con su contenido. En sus propias palabras: «It is the very holiness of the rites that forbids them to be performed or related outside their proper ritual context. […] Contrary to what many moderns seem to think, there was no esoteric wisdom to be found in the ancient Mysteries, no Da Vinci Code to be deciphered» (p. 18).

He de reconocer que me cuesta compartir su opinión a este respecto. A lo largo de varias décadas se ha desarrollado una viva polémica en torno al posible contenido esotérico en los campos de la filosofía y la religión griega; especialmente en lo que concierne a las doctrinas no escritas de Platón o a los sucesos acontecidos en este tipo de cultos mistéricos de los que no se podía hablar ante los «no iniciados». Referencias a un contenido esotérico, a una verdad superior, alcanzable únicamente por aquellos que habían cumplido con su deber y habían ascendido a las más altas etapas de la iniciación, aparecen ya en la obra de Platón (*Banq*. 210-211, *Fedón* 69c, *Fedro* 250c, *Teeteto* 155e-156a), por lo que parece que la relación entre filosofía, iniciación y teleología existía ya desde el siglo IV a. C. Es cierto que, en sus inicios, los cultos mistéricos no debieron estar relacionados con una experiencia cercana e individual con la divinidad ni con la vida más allá de ultratumba. No obstante, con el paso del tiempo el contenido ritual fue siendo alegorizado, y el saber teológico y filosófico pasó a formar parte de estos ritos iniciáticos, como el propio Bremmer apunta (p. 99). Por otra parte, creo que el hecho de que se mantuviera de manera rigurosa a lo largo de tantos siglos el secretismo que conllevaba la participación en estos rituales −aspecto destacado por numerosos autores que no osaban revelar detalles por miedo a ser denunciados o castigados−, así como el hecho de que existan casos de enjuiciamiento por una revelación indebida o por mofa de los rituales –como fue el caso de Alcibíades y la mutilación de los Hermes–, aboga en contra de la postura defendida por Bremmer.

Plutarco es uno de esos autores que no osan desvelar más de lo que les está permitido (364E) y su obra refleja la existencia de interesantes nociones esotéricas en los cultos iniciáticos. En 352D, al hablar de los auténticos iniciados en los misterios de Isis, Plutarco expresa la importancia de aplicar la razón para estudiar y analizar la verdad que subyace en los ritos. Con ello parece indicar que el mero hecho de participar en ellos no es suficiente, sino que hay que investigar e interpretar el auténtico significado de su contenido –algo que, obviamente, no estaría al alcance de cualquiera y para lo que sería necesaria cierta preparación−. En 382DE equipara el más alto grado de iniciación (ἐποπτεία) con el más alto grado en el estudio de la filosofía, afirmando que quien supera ambos llega a un estado de comprensión total, instantánea y permanente de la verdad absoluta. Parece, por tanto, que Plutarco tampoco compartiría la postura defendida por Bremmer.

Dejando a un lado estas opiniones personales en un debate aún controvertido, creo que el único aspecto que podría criticarse en el análisis de Bremmer es cierta tendencia a extrapolar determinados usos de un culto, que conocemos por los testimonios conservados, a otros cultos de los que no se conserva documentación alguna relativa a esos usos en concreto. Con ello no insinúo que la información que ofrece sea errónea, pues es muy probable que la mayoría de los cultos compartieran rasgos en sus procedimientos −el propio autor alude a este fenómeno («It is a fair

assumption that Greek initiations learned from one another», p.14)−. No obstante, la extrapolación que Bremmer hace en ocasiones no cuenta con soporte textual o de otro tipo y, aunque pueda ser sugerente, no me parece metodológicamente aceptable para el historiador de las religiones. Por mencionar un ejemplo: Bremmer propone que los misterios dionisíacos probablemente empezaban con un baño, dado que así sucede en los misterios de Eleusis y Samotracia; pero previamente ha asumido que no tenemos indicio alguno sobre la pureza de los participantes en este culto (p. 104).

En cualquier caso, y salvo estos pequeños detalles de menor importancia, creo que *Initiation into the mysteries of the ancient world* posee un alto valor científico y está escrito de una manera clara y con un lenguaje accesible a un público amplio al que sin duda llega en sus pretensiones divulgativas. La manera con la que el autor expone el contenido, directa y sin complicaciones, cercana a la actualidad y con no pocas referencias a la cultura popular, acerca con éxito un tema tan especializado, como es el de los misterios antiguos, al público moderno. La comparación de una participante que enseñó sus pechos durante los rituales con el desafortunado incidente de Janet Jackson en un concierto hace unos años (p. 7) o la alusión al *best seller* de Dan Brown (p. 18), mencionado líneas arriba, son buenos ejemplos de ello. El historiador de elas religiones encuentra en este libro una síntesis clara de los logros de Bremmer a lo largo de muchos años de crítica e investigación sobre la realidad de los misterios antiguos; el estudioso de Plutarco encuentra en él acertados análisis de bastantes pasajes del Queronense pertinentes al tema de las religiones de iniciación; y el lector común, no especializado, tiene en este libro una buena oportunidad para descubri uno más de los ricos perfiles con que la religión del Mundo Antiguo ha fascinado siempre al hombre moderno.

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Françoise Frazier, *Histoire et morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2016, 505 pp. ISBN 978-2-25-132895-9.

Este libro es en lo esencial el que, con el mismo título, publicó la autora el año 1996, también en la editorial Belles Lettres. Presenta, sin embargo, importantes novedades que comentaremos al final: un "Préface à la seconde édition" y un "Appendice : L' écriture biographique et les hommes de Plutarque".

De la edición de 1996 he conocido dos reseñas a través de http://www.persee.fr: una de Jacques Schamp en *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 76, 1 (1998), Antiquité – Oudheid, pp. 226-228, y otra de Alain Martin en *L'antiquité classique* 70 (2001), pp. 262-263. Ambos, aunque echan de menos algunos aspectos que no se tratan en el libro, coinciden en elogiar su importante aportación a los estudios plutarqueos por la profundidad de la investigación, su excelente calidad científica y acertada estructura, además del elegante estilo de Mme Frazier. Se añade a esto la utilidad del *index locorum* y de la nutrida (y en la nueva edición, actualizada) bibliografía.

La de Martin es muy breve y esquemática. La de Schamp, bastante más amplia, ofrece un buen resumen y comentarios, en general acertados, por lo que no daré cuenta pormenorizada del contenido del libro y solo destacaré algunos de sus aspectos más relevantes.

En la primera parte del libro, titulada "Entre histoire et biographie : le *bios*, genre moral original", F. Frazier analiza con acier-

to y perspicacia los rasgos que hacen de las *Vidas paralelas* un género moral original al que llama *bios*, siguiendo la denominación del propio Plutarco (cf. *Alex*. 1.2), con el significado de "modo de vida"; es decir, no es una biografía en sentido moderno con una secuencia cronológica lineal y permanente en la que se puede observar la evolución de un personaje, sino una biografía moral con intención ejemplarizante en la que la cronología (aunque haya una sucesión temporal básica, que también adquiere valor moral) carece de importancia y es alterada con frecuencia para configurar mejor el retrato moral del personaje. Tal falta de atención a la continuidad cronológica y a la causalidad, esenciales en la historiografía, diferencian también de este género las *Vidas* plutarqueas. La relación con la historiografía es, sin embargo estrecha, pues Plutarco toma de ella los hechos relacionados con el personaje, pero seleccionándolos, manipulándolos y modificándolos, aislándolos y focalizándolos en la acción del héroe con independencia de su contexto histórico. De esta forma, los datos de la historiografía se transforman en "material biográfico" igual que los pequeños detalles y las anécdotas que revelan el carácter del personaje. Todos los elementos de la biografía giran en torno a él y se focalizan en su acción. A través de estos materiales, Plutarco escruta los vicios y las virtudes del hombre de Estado que ejerce su actividad en su ciudad. El *bios*, en suma, es la narración y la descripción de la acción política y del comportamiento moral del héroe. Esos son los dos aspectos analizados con minuciosidad en la segunda y la tercera parte del libro, tituladas respectivamente "La peinture d' une action politique : principes moraux et civiques dans les *Vies*" y "La peinture d' un comportement moral : vertus et individualisation des héros".

Como se puede deducir solo por los títulos de los capítulos, la autora centra su estudio en la figura del héroe protagonista (aunque también tiene en cuenta a los personajes secundarios), método considerado por J. Schamp algo simplista; pero, dado que coincide con los procedimientos de Plutarco en la construcción de las biografías, no puedo considerarlo sino acertado.

Un aspecto importante no señalado en las reseñas precedentes es que el examen de las *Vidas* de F. Frazier tiene como base fundamental el texto. Esto es algo evidente en la tercera parte del libro, en la que la autora realiza un estudio de todos los matices de las virtudes junto con un análisis detallado del léxico (lo que J. Schamp reconoce). Pero la atención al léxico es constante a todo lo largo del libro (incluidas las partes añadidas en la nueva edición), y no solo en el campo semántico de las virtudes y los vicios. La autora observa todas las expresiones lexicales, a menudo de carácter formular, con las que Plutarco estructura la narración, como las partículas o palabras con las que introduce un tema, un comentario o unas conclusiones, o que organizan una secuencia, y que con frecuencia inciden en el valor moral del contenido. A menudo llama también la atención sobre los elementos sintácticos que contribuyen a la focalización en la acción y el carácter del héroe (como verbos principales y sujetos) y relegan a otros personajes o hechos históricos al papel de mero contraste o de marco escénico en el que tiene lugar la acción del héroe (participios apositivos, genitivos absolutos, oraciones subordinadas). También se pone de manifiesto la contribución de las expresiones concretas y de la sintaxis al valor moral de las biografías, pues resaltan las acciones y los rasgos del carácter del héroe que se ofrecen como ejemplo.

La "Conclusion" al final de las tres partes en que se estructura el libro ofrece un excelente y breve resumen del mismo, desemboca en la apreciación de los grandes héroes del pasado como los grandes

servidores de su patria, por lo que las virtudes que Plutarco observa en su carácter son siempre virtudes cívicas. Mediante esos modelos del pasado que presentan las *Vidas paralelas*, Plutarco nutre el ideal cívico contemporáneo con una visión greco-romana de la civilización que es heredera del pasado y a la vez totalmente de su época.

El "Préface à la seconde édition" ofrece, como dice el subtítulo, un "bilan et perspectives de la recherche sur les *Vies Parallèles*". Frente a quienes toman las *Vidas paralelas* como obra historiográfica, la autora afirma su lectura de las mismas como obra moral pues, aunque admite la posibilidad de su uso como documento histórico, la voluntad del autor no es hacer una obra histórica. Coincide con otros estudiosos de Plutarco en la dimensión literaria y moral de las biografías pero, frente a las limitaciones que ve en los estudios narratológicos, propone una reflexión que sintetice todos los aspectos estilísticos, antropológicos, políticos y morales que forman parte de cada *Vida* no como un esquema fijo sino con la flexibilidad que requiere cada personaje según su carácter y virtudes. Por todo ello, F. Frazier invita a leer los capítulos del libro reflexionando sobre la escritura y el sentido que la creación textual tiene para el autor y para el lector.

El otro componente nuevo del libro es el apéndice, constituido por dos artículos que la autora había publicado con anterioridad, y que son una profundización y matización de temas ya tratados en los capítulos del libro original. El primero lleva el título "*Bios* et *Historia*. L' écriture biographique dans les *Vies Parallèles*". La autora, que va a centrar su estudio en los prefacios de tres *Vidas*, parte de la consideración de la biografía como un género flexible tanto en sus múltiples formas como en sus relaciones con la historiografía, con la que puede compartir su carácter moral e incluso ser uno de sus elementos. Pero la diferencia fundamental estriba en que lo primordial en las biografías de Plutarco es el estudio del carácter. En ellas, el cuadro histórico es necesario porque constituye la situación exterior a la que debe responder el héroe, pero el retrato de este se centra en su carácter, la manifestación de sus virtudes y defectos, que se muestran en los grandes hechos y sobre todo en los pequeños detalles. Tal relación entre la historia y la moral, y la importancia del carácter en el *bios* destacan en los prefacios de la *Vida de Alejandro* y de la *Vida de Nicias*. Otro prefacio al que F. Frazier da una importancia especial es al de la *Vida de Paulo Emilio*: la historia de los grandes hombres es como un espejo en el que el autor se mira para conformar su propia vida a la imagen de las virtudes de aquellos. Gracias a su familiaridad no solo con la Historia, sino también con la práctica de escribir, acoge la memoria de los hombres mejores en su pensamiento y lo dirige hacia los ejemplos más bellos. La enseñanza moral, por tanto, alcanza primero al autor y después al lector de las biografías.

La escritura de Plutarco atiende a todos los detalles que constituyen la textura de la vida humana y todos los elementos de su situación en el mundo. La originalidad de su obra moral va más allá de la mera moralización, y da una visión de los acontecimientos que se centra en un carácter (*ethos*) y a la vez está llena de matices, pues es sensible tanto a los diversos rasgos de las virtudes que conforman la individualidad de los héroes como a las particularidades de todas las circunstancias que reclaman una respuesta determinada por parte del héroe. La práctica de la escritura es una invitación a comprender un comportamiento humano y a reflexionar sobre el propio comportamiento, invitación válida tanto para el autor como para el lector, que puede sacar sus propias conclusiones.

El otro artículo del apéndice "Histoire et Exemplarité. Les Hommes de Plutarque", vuelve a definir y matizar la noción de *Bios*, de raíz filosófica, como "modo de vida", por lo que se centra en la descripción del carácter del personaje que se manifiesta ante los demás. La integración del personaje en la sociedad humana hace que la fama de sus acciones inspiradas por su virtud provoquen una admiración que induce a imitarlas, pues el carácter, a la vez que se manifiesta, también se forma en las acciones. Pero, más que héroes ejemplares, las *Vidas* presentan momentos ejemplares en los que se muestran las virtudes (y también los defectos, ya que Plutarco es consciente de la imperfección del ser humano). Las *Vidas*, en opinión de la autora, representan los "combates de la virtud" con todas las circunstancias exteriores subsumidas en la noción de *tyche*, que abarca todo lo que el hombre encuentra y debe afrontar. A los "hombres de Plutarco" se les puede caracterizar como "grandes naturalezas" propensas a las grandes aciones y a bordear lo sublime y a veces lo trágico. La cultura literaria de Plutarco se muestra no solo en su arte como narrador, sino también en la manera de presentar a sus héroes como encarnación de la civilización helénica, sentida como algo común para griegos y romanos, por lo que pertenecen a un imaginario histórico, moral y literario representativo de toda "la Antigüedad"; y, además de constituir ejemplos por una actitud determinada, ofrecen una imagen de la humanidad a la vez próxima y lejana.

El juicio global sobre esta nueva edición del libro coincide plenamente con el que vertió J. Schamp sobre la primera edición: "Le livre jette un vif éclairage sur la technique de composition et la signification des *Vies*. Ingénieux et brillant, il est, de surcroît, fort bien écrit … **Incontestablement, Mme Frazier a bien mérité de Plutarque**.

La complejidad, rica variedad y profundidad intelectual del libro son imposibles de abarcar en esta breve reseña, que es un homenaje muy modesto, pero también muy sincero, a la eminente helenista y excelente persona que fue la profesora Françoise Frazier. El sentimiento de tristeza por su pérdida queda en parte mitigado por el recuerdo de su generosidad y por la permanencia de sus obras admirables y fructíferas.

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New Collective Publications (2015-2016)

This section notifies immediately Plutarchists the content of recent collective works, the review of which should consist of summaries of each contribution and would only anticipate and make useless their later review in the Bibliography section.

Erratum.

Dans le recueil d'articles de P. A. Stadter, signalé dans le numéro de l'an dernier, *Plutarch and his Roman Readers,* Oxford University Press, 2015, l'Auteur nous indique une correction à apporter aux pages 73 n. 19 and 233 en lisant, non pas L. Mestrius Florus Plutarchus, mais L. Mestrius Plutarchus.

R. Ash, J. Mossman & F. B. Titchener (eds), *Fame and Infamy. Essays for Christopher Pelling on Characterization in Greek and Roman Biography and Historiography,* Oxford University Press, 2015, ISBN: 9780199662326, 448 pages.

Le vaste éventail d'intérêt de Christopher Pelling se reflète dans le volume que lui ont offert ses collègues et les études sur la caractérisarion dans l'historiographie et la biographie antiques, une question, qu'il a grandement contribué à faire avancer, couvrent ici un large espace de temps, d'Hérodote à Dion Cassius, côté grec, de Cicéron à Suétone et au-delà côté latin. Pour

n'être donc pas consacré au seul Plutarque, un quart du volume (6 chapitres sur 24) est consacré au Chéronéen :

Chapter 6: Plutarch, Herodotus, and the Historian's Character *by John Marincola*.

Chapter 9: Aspect and Subordination in Plutarchan Narrative *by Timothy E. Duff.*

Chapter 10: Dressed for Success? Clothing in Plutarch's Demetrius, *by Judith Mossman.*

Chapter 11: 'The Love of Noble Deeds': Plutarch's Portrait of Aratus of Sicyon *by Philip Stadter.*

Chapter 12: Plutarch's *Numa* and the Rhetoric of Aetiology *by Matthew Fox.*

Chapter 13: Plutarch and Dio on Cicero at the Trial of Milo *by Lynn Fotheringham.*

J. Opsomer, G. Roskam & F. B. Titchener (eds), ***A Versatile Gentleman. Consistency in Plutarch's Writing. Studies offered to Luc Van des Stockt on the occasion of his retirement*****, Leuven University Press, 2016, ISBN 978 94 6270 076 5, 304 pages.**

Dans l'introduction, F. B. Titchener rappelle tout ce que Plutarque et les Plutarquistes doivent à Luc Van der Stockt, à commencer par la création en 2007 de la collection *Plutarchea Hypomnemata*, qui accueille ce volume d'hommage, pour continuer avec sa Présidence à la tête de l'International Plutarch Society de 2008 à 2011 et les nombreuses rencontres par lui organisées (à Leuven en 1996, 2001, 2006, 2009 et 2013, à Delphes en 2004). Sont ensuite présentés les sujets variés traités par les contributeurs, en accord avec la diversité des intérêts de l'auteur ancien et de son spécialiste moderne. Sont ajoutées en appendice la liste des élèves de L. Van der Stockt et leurs publications.

On trouve encore en fin de volume la bibliographie et un *index locorum*.

I. Plutarch's Versatile Philosophy

Plutarch the Philosopher and Plutarch the Historian on Apatheia, *by John Dillon.*

The Dividing Line: Theological/ Religious Arguments in Plutarch's Anti-Stoic Polemics, *by Rainer Hirsch-Luipold.*

The Cruel Consistency of *De sera numinis vindicta*, *by Jan Opsomer*.

Psyche in Plutarch's Works, *by Paola Volpe Cacciatore*.

II. Literary Versatility

Plutarch's Simonides: A Versatile Gentleman?, *by Ewen Bowie*.

Plutarch's Flawed Characters: The *Personae* of the Dialogues, *by Frederick E. Brenk.*

Dionysus and the Structure of Plutarch's *Table Talk, by Judith Mossman.*

Tragic Colouring in Plutarch, *by Christopher Pelling*.

III. The Versatile World of the *Lives*

The Serio-Comic *Life of Antony, by Mark Beck*.

The Nature of Virtue and the Need for Self-Knowledger in Plutarch's *Demosthenes-Cicero, by Jeffrey Beneker.*

"This Topic Belongs to Another Kind of Writing": The Digressions in Plutarch's *Life of Coriolanus, by Geert Roskam & Simon Verdegem*.

Sulla's Three-Thousand-νοῦμμοι Apartment: Plutarch's Problematic Code-Switching, by *Philip A. Stadter*.

IV. A Versatile Paideia

Who Was Eucles? Plutarch and His Sources on the Legendary Marathon-Runner (*De gloria Atheniensium* 347CD), *by Lucia Athanassaki*.

De Plutarchi Malignitate, by *Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp*.

Consistency and Criticism in Plutarch's Writing Concerning the Laws of Solon , *by Delfim F. Leão*.

Selenographic Description: Critical Annotations to Plutarch, *De facie* 944C, *by Aurelio Pérez Jiménez*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION

ARTICLES

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2012

Stefano Amendola - Serena Citro - Mariella De Simone - Timothy Duff - Françoise Frazier - Angelo Giavatto - Rainer Hirsch-Luipold - Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta - Luisa Lesage-Gárriga - Delfim Leão - Vicente Ramon Palerm - Fabio Tanga - Maria Vamvouri - Ana Vicente

VOLUMES REVIEWED IN THIS SECTION

ABBREVIATIONS

- *As artes* = L. de Nazaré Ferreira, P. et N. Simões Rodrigues (eds), *Plutarco e as artes. pintura, cinema e artes decorativas*, Coimbra, 2010, 2e éd. 2012. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/exlibris/aleph/a21_1/apache_media/54HX2MA4ST388SVY5A4B4KE1QUB7GE.pdf
- *Harmonia* = G. Bastianini, W. Lapini, M. Tulli (éds.), *Harmonia. Scritti di filologia classica in onore di Angelo Casanova,* Firenze, 2012.
- *Lash of Ambition* = G. Roskam (ed.), *The Lash of ambition. Plutarch, Imperial Greek literature and the Dynamics of "Philotimia"*. (Collection d' études classiques. 25), Louvain [u. a.]: Peeters, 2012.
- *N., K., D.* = J. R. Ferreira, D. Leão & C. A. Martins de Jesus (eds*.), Nomos, Kosmos & Dike in Plutarch. XII International Congress of the "Réseau Thématique Plutarque",* Coimbra, 2012.
- *Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIXe s.* = O. Guerrier (ed.), *Plutarque de l'Âge classique au XIXe siècle. Présences, interférences et dynamique*. Actes du Colloque international de Toulouse (13-15 mai 2009), Jérôme Millon, Grenoble, 2012.
- *Religious and Philosophical Discourse* = L. Roig Lanzillotta, I. Muñoz Gallarte (éds), *Plutarch in the Religious and Philosophical Discourse of Late Antiquity*, Brill, 2012.

S. Amendola, «Un *nomos atopos*? Gli Efori e i baffi degli Spartani. Nota esegetica a *De sera num. vind.* 4.550B», *in N., K., D.*, 121-136.

Nelle opere superstiti di Plutarco è citato tre volte il singolare divieto, promulgato a Sparta, che proibiva agli Efori spartani, entrando in carica, di lasciarsi crescere i baffi: nella Vita di Cleomene *(*Cleom. *9.3), nel* De sera numinis vindicta *(550B), nel fr. 90 Sandbach (= Arist. fr. 539 Rose), appartenente al perduto commentario plutarcheo agli* Erga *di Esiodo. La lettura parallela dei tre testi mostra, da un lato, il* modus citandi *plutarcheo; il Cheronese, infatti, riadatta l'episodio dei baffi degli Efori a seconda del contesto in cui è inserito, e della funzione diversa che esso svolge nel* Bios *e nel trattato morale. Dall'altro, consente una discussione filologica sulla tendenza degli editori moderni a uniformare quanto più possibile i tre testi, scelta che appare quantomeno discutibile considerate appunto le differenze tra i contesti e le tipologie testuali.* (M.D.S.)

M. G. Angeli Bertinelli, «I centurioni romani secondo Plutarco», *in* B. Cabouret, A. Groslambert et C. Wolff (éds), *Visions de l' Occident romain. Hommages à Yann Le Bohec*, Paris, 2012, 347-374.

Quale premessa all'analisi dei passi in cui Plutarco fa menzione di centurioni, la studiosa introduce una questione terminologica di non trascurabile importanza, relativa al modo in cui tale carica veniva indicata nella tradizione letteraria greca. Se per i termini κεντουρίων e ἑκατοντάρχης, rispettivamente traslitterazione (o prestito) e traduzione del latino centurio*, non sorgono incertezze, più problematica è l'identificazione del centurione con il λοχαγός ed il ταξίαρχος, termini che gli autori greci adoperano per riferirsi anche ai centurioni, ma non esclusivamente ad essi. Anche in Plutarco si riscontra un uso talvolta ambiguo dei termini, per cui non sempre è possibile riconoscere il grado dell'ufficiale militare di cui l'autore sta parlando; all'origine di tale incertezza terminologica per definire una medesima carica vi potrebbe essere, da parte dell'autore, una conoscenza piuttosto approssimativa delle distinzioni gerarchiche all'interno del sistema militare romano. Vengono quindi presi in esame i passi delle* Vite *e dei* Moralia*, in cui i centurioni si rendono protagonisti di azioni memorabili; è il caso, ad esempio, nella* Vita di Cicerone*, del centurione Erennio, che per ordine di Marco Antonio uccide Cicerone e gli recide la testa e le mani; emerge dalla narrazione dell'episodio la fedeltà incondizionata del centurione nei riguardi del suo superiore; ed è la fedeltà, insieme allo spirito di abnegazione e al coraggio, uno dei valori che il Cheronese pone maggiormente in rilievo nel delineare il profilo dei centurioni di cui riferisce vicende ed aneddoti. Il giudizio positivo di questi uomini, di cui si evidenzia la capacità sia di percepire gli umori dei soldati sia di relazionarsi efficacemente con gli ufficiali, è solamente in parte offuscato da alcuni episodi riferiti nei* Moralia*.* (S.C.)

E. Argaud, « Peut-on "demeurer d'accord" sur Plutarque ? Réflexions sur la notion de superstition dans les *Pensées diverses sur la comète* », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 233-246.

Écrit par une spécialiste du XVII^le^ siècle, dont l'objet premier est la pensée de Bayle, cette communication montre comment celui-ci, en appuyant sa réflexion sur la traduction des Œuvres morales et meslées *d'Amyot mais aussi sur la traduction plus récente du Traité de la superstition proposée par l'érudit protestant Tanneguy Le Fèvre (Saumur, 1666), donne aux Pensées diverses sur la comète l'allure, au moins de prime abord, d'un nouveau traité de la superstition. E. A. rappelle à quel point le texte de Plutarque est alors loin de faire consensus et le tour de force que constitue la mise en accord sur le* Traité de la superstition *des auteurs, éditeurs, préfaciers, et Père de l'Eglise. Il s'agit ainsi de tenter de mesurer les enjeux exacts du texte de Plutarque et du statut de la*

superstition dans le développement de l'argumentation baylienne. (F.F)

E. Avocat, « Plutarque l'Intempestif, des hommes de la Révolution à Jaurès », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s*, 263-274.
E.A nuance les critiques acerbes des détracteurs de l'anticomanie révolutionnaire dénonçant le recours massif à l'auteur des Vies parallèles *comme symptomatique du double régime d'illusion dont elle procède – illusion sur la nature du modèle et sur son application – et choisit de se tourner vers « une affinité d'un autre ordre », la forme du parallèle, qui fonde une dialectique de la répétition, de l'invention et de l'émulation sur laquelle les révolutionnaires s'efforcent de bâtir leur propre rapport à l'Antiquité : « le corpus des* Vies *s'est aussi présenté à eux comme une œuvre ouverte, à récrire ». Dans ce jeu des réécritures de Plutarque, qui s'attache à corriger le dévoiement des idéaux et des principes révolutionnaires »(265), E.A. distingue les articles de Camille Desmoulins – en particulier dans le dernier numéro (non publié) du* Vieux Cordelier, *où sont sollicités* Solon, Cicéron, Caton d'Utique *et* Antoine *(265-266) – et la tragédie de Marie-Joseph Chénier,* Caïus Gracchus *(266-268). Il montre enfin les prolongements de ce dialogue chez Jaurès qui, à la fin de son* Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, se réclame de « la triple inspiration de Marx, de Michelet et de Plutarque » (268) et, dans la forme même, reprend le parallèle (272).* (F.F.)

F. Badelon, « Lectures anglaises de Plutarque au XVIII^e^ siècle. Interférences et dynamique », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 247-261.
Spécialiste de la philosophie morale et politique anglaise du XVIII^e^ s., F. B. rappelle que « dans la première décennie du XVIII^e^ s., une rencontre intellectuelle se produit en Angleterre entre l'œuvre de Plutarque et une réflexion religieuse, morale, politique et esthétique sur l'enthousiasme » (247). Le Chéronéen inspire tout d'abord le « mythe du Caton anglais » dont témoigne le succès de la pièce d'Addison en 1713. À travers ce personnage emblématique de Caton (enrichi de traits de Cicéron) se construit une représentation dont la critique du De stoic. rep. *permet aussi de montrer les contradictions internes. Mais la question plus propre au climat anglais, celle de la pluralité des religions, joue aussi pour actualiser la référence à Plutarque. Dans la* Lettre sur l'enthousiasme *de Shaftesbury, on trouve une citation « très classique » du* De superstitione *comparant la liberté intellectuelle de l'athée à celle du croyant ; l'idée, épicurienne, qu'un cœur débarrassé de toute passion religieuse, serait plus conciliant amène à la distinction de deux enthousiasmes, celui, dévastateur, du fanatisme, mais aussi celui, plus prometteur, du philosophe, où est sollicité aussi le* Non posse. *John Trenchard de son côté développe un concept nouveau d'« histoire naturelle de la religion » dont F. B. montre qu'il s'inspire aussi d'une relecture de la référence à Plutarque. Enfin, la diversité de l'œuvre du Chéronéen, à égale distance de la littérature, de l'histoire et de la philosophie, lue comme une transgression du genre, sert de paradigme pour « interroger l'identité de la philosophie morale et politique ».* (F.F.)

F. Becchi, «La nozione di giustizia nel suo sviluppo storico: la giustizia come valore primario del pensiero etico e politico di Plutarco», *in N., K., D.*, 139-151.
Fin dai tempi di Omero, l'ideale di giustizia è sempre stato a fondamento del pensiero dei Greci. Con Platone e Aristotele, in particolare, esso giunge alla sua più chiara formulazione: il primo considera la giustizia 'virtù dell'anima', il secondo ne sottolinea il carattere politico. A operare una sintesi delle due visioni alla luce delle più moderne teorie stoiche e aristoteliche è

Plutarco, il quale considera la giustizia un ideale tanto etico quanto politico, una virtù tra le più perfette, che consente al politico di agire a vantaggio della comunità, e di riconoscere ciò che è bene e ciò che è male sulla base di principi morali che un'appropriata educazione ha reso ben saldi. (M.D.S.)

F. Becchi, «The Doctrine of Passions; Plutarch, Posidonius and Galen», in *Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 43-54.
Plutarch's view of the passions was also clearly Platonic-Aristotelian, since he conceived of them as arising in the irrational part of the soul when rationality appears to have lost control of the soul complex. On Moral Virtue*, for example, he even distinguishes between practical and theoretical virtue on the basis that the former exclusively deals with the irrational part of the soul and with taming emotions. This, of course, implies his view of the passions as important contributors to the tonus of the soul and of* metriopatheia *as the only way to deal with passions in a proper way. In* On Moral Virtue*, Plutarch frequently refers to Aristotle's* Nichomachean Ethics *in order to assess his view of virtue as a* mesotes*. Admittedly, his position is sometimes far from clear, often due to Plutarch's active involvement in the philosophical discussions of his time: sometimes Plutarch purposefully used Stoic terminology to turn it polemically against them; other times, the lack of clarity results from the tradition he is following, be it Stoic, Cynic or other.*
Francesco Becchi's article on Plutarchean ethics, "The Doctrine of the Passions: Plutarch, Posidonius and Galen", intends to tackle difficulty. As a scholar with a profound knowledge of Plutarch's ethics, to which he has devoted numerous studies, Becchi attempts to determine Plutarch's position on ethics more clearly. As he affirms, Plutarch's ethical affiliation was mainly that of a Platonist and as such he regularly adopted a clear anti-Stoic attitude. Despite this, it is possible to find the influence of Stoic doctrines in his work, an issue which, as Becchi rightly claims, still needs a satisfying explanation. This is especially noteworthy in regard to the passions, where we find strictly Platonic positions beside notions of a clear Stoic matrix: even as he openly criticized Chrysippus' view of passion as a mistake, Plutarch nevertheless appears to have combined a Platonic view of affections with the Stoic doctrine of diastrophe*, which explained how due to weakness of the mind, passions may appear to drive people to vice. Indeed, Plutarch attacked his contemporaries for being in a state of 'mental poverty' brought about by their false opinions; allowing first for bad habits, this state forms at the end a second nature that prevents people from being free from error. According to Becchi, Plutarch did not actually contradict himself: in line with Posidonius but anticipating Galen, Plutarch asserted that ignorance and bad habits may sometimes incline to passions even those people who lack violent passionate impulses and have a sound rational part of the soul. Becchi's analysis of numerous passages from* Moralia *and* Lives *provides an overview of Plutarch's view of passions as "affections causing pain and fear in men not prepared by reason to bear bad luck". In fact, lack of philosophical training may cause inconsistencies and anomalies both in people with good natural qualities and in great characters. Wisdom should therefore be revered as most important and perfect art, as the culmination of both good reputation and all human endeavors.* (L.R.)

M. Beck, «Plutarch», *in* I.J.F. de Jong (ed.), *Space in Ancient Greek Literature. Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative,* Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2012, 441-462.
Dans ce troisième volume des Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative *dirigées par I. de Jong, après* Narrators, Narra-

tees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature *(Mnemosyne. Suppl. 257), 2004 et* Time in Ancient Greek Literature *(Mnemosyne. Suppl. 291), 2007, M. Beck reprend une étude de l'espace déjà esquissée dans un article de 2011 «Plutarch as a transmitter of space in the* Lives*» recensé dans le précédent numéro de* Ploutarchos *(vol. 12, 2015, 96-97), où, dans la suite de la thèse de J. Banta sur Romulus et Numa, il insistait sur le modèle bakhtinien. L'espace ici, avec les monuments qui l'occupent, n'est pas vu sous une lumière documentaire, mais dans son exploitation littéraire. Il revient donc d'abord sur le passage qu'il juge capital pour la conception de l'espace de Plutarque,* Per. *1-2 (complété par 13, 1-2) et qui, jouant du double sens possible d'ἔργα et μίμησις, conférerait aux monuments de Périclès (et non de Phidias) une même valeur incitative à la vertu qu'à ses actions. Sur ces bases sont traités, comme illustrant les relations entre espace et législateurs, d'abord «Theseus, Romulus and Numa» (445-450) puis «Solon and Lycurgus» (450-452), l'accent étant à chaque fois mis sur les traces laissées par leur action dans l'espace de la cité. Si les héros suivants sont regroupés sous le sous-titre, «Space and Generals» (452), l'analyse excède de loin cette annonce. Thémistocle et Camille sont l'un et l'autre des sauveurs de la patrie, pour lesquels l'espace de celle-ci et les (re) constructions ont joué un grand rôle. À un moindre degré, Cimon a aussi contribué à l'embellissement d'Athènes. Avec Caton l'Ancien, l'accent est mis sur une certaine distorsion entre espace public et espace privé, tandis que les rêves de conquête d'Alcibiade marquent sa φιλοτιμία. Suivent Alexandre (458-459) et l'imitation manquée d'Antoine durant la campagne parthique, où, selon une très jolie formule, «Space conquers Antony, he is not conqueror of space» - j'ai dans le même esprit suggéré que le temps lui échappe à partir de la rencontre avec Cléopâtre et du ch. 28, 1. En conclusion, M. B. revient sur l'influence que ses propres voyages ont pu avoir sur Plutarque et met en avant le rôle de patron des arts dévolu par lui aux hommes d'État (Périclès, Cimon, Solon, Lycurgue en particulier) dont l'action se voit encore dans leurs cités – sur l'importance contemporaine de ce type d'évergésie, voir M. Piérart,« Restaurer et embellir pour la plus grande gloire des dieux » recensé in* Ploutarchos, *vol. 11, 2014, 180), et les oppose aux excès d'ambition d'un Alcibiade ou d'un Antoine, Alexandre constituant une figure exceptionnelle.* (F.F.)

C. Bevegni, «Espressioni della *humanitas* in Angelo Poliziano: presenze e riusi delle *Quaestiones Convivales* di Plutarco nei *Miscellanea*», *in* L.S. Tarugi (ed.), Feritas, Humanitas, Divinitas *come aspetti del vivere nel Rinascimento*, Firenze, 2012, 105-116.

Nei Miscellanea *(nella* Centuria prima *e più diffusamente nella* Centuria secunda*) si ravvisa lo spiccato interesse di Angelo Poliziano per svariati ambiti della conoscenza, quali le discipline scientifiche e le res antiquariae. Nella sua attività esegetica l'umanista fa ricorso ad una molteplicità di fonti greche e latine, non solo profane, ma anche cristiane, aspetto, quest'ultimo, di significativa rilevanza e innovazione, come ben evidenziato da Bevegni. In particolare, nel contributo viene esaminata attentamente la presenza e il riuso, nei* Miscellanea*, dell'opera plutarchea* Quaestiones convivales, *di cui lo studioso ha individuato almeno sette citazioni. Il contenuto di tali citazioni non è limitato ad un unico campo di indagine, ma spazia dalla musica, alla medicina, ai mores. Nella* Centuria prima *Plutarco viene citato da Poliziano tre volte, nel primo caso per indagare sull'origine del termine* naulium*, afferente alla sfera musicale; nel secondo caso al fine di approfondire una problematica medico-scientifica re-*

lativa all'uso del vino quale antidoto contro la cicuta; infine per soffermarsi su una curiosità di carattere antiquario riguardante gli hieronicae*. Nella* Centuria secunda *le* Quaestiones *vengono citate per analizzare, ad esempio, questioni filologiche quali l'uso del termine* rechedipna *in un verso di Giovenale, emendato dall'umanista in* trechedipna*; ed ancora, Plutarco è citato per spiegare alcuni termini e tradizioni legati al contesto del simposio, quali il sostantivo* symbola *e l'uso traslato di* umbra*. In definitiva, lo studio di Bevegni consente di osservare che nei* Miscellanea *Poliziano, maturato come uomo e studioso, non solo si mostra, come in passato, attento a questioni di interesse antiquario, ma estende ed approfondisce le sue ricerche in ambito scientifico, ragion per cui la sua filologia può essere definita "totale".* (S.C.)

A. Billault, « Modèles historiques et analogies biographiques: César, Alexandre et Plutarque », *in* B. Cabouret, A. Groslambert et C. Wolff (éds), *Visions de l' Occident romain. Hommages à Yann Le Bohec*, Paris, 2012, 399-412.

La question posée dans cet article est de savoir « si la rivalité entre César et Alexandre alléguée par Plutarque se reflète dans la composition des Vies qu'il leur a consacrées et si elle ne s'y traduit pas par des analogies narratives induisant des comparaisons implicites. » (p. 400). Selon l'auteur, la réponse est : oui. Il le prouve en examinant en parallèle les deux Vies *en question selon les grands thèmes suivants : la formation des deux héros, leur rapport à l'argent, les liens avec leurs soldats, leur attitude face au pouvoir absolu et, enfin, les circonstances de leur mort. Il apparaît ainsi que tantôt l'un des deux héros est supérieur à l'autre et vice-versa, tantôt ils se valent, mais que le lecteur est constamment invité à faire des comparaisons entre les deux sur la base du récit de Plutarque, qui se révèle en fin de compte comme une sorte de syncrisis géante (l'expression est de nous), remplaçant celle qui manque à la fin des deux* Vies*, sans qu'il soit précisé laquelle des deux trajectoires est préférable.* (T.S.)

M. Bonazzi, «Theoria and Praxis: On Plutarch's Platonism», *in* T. Bénatouil (ed.), *Theoria, praxis, and the contemplative life after Plato and Aristotle* (Philosophia antiqua. 131), Leiden, Brill, 2012, 139-162.

Il lavoro mira a mettere in luce una specificità del platonismo di Plutarco, vale a dire la rivendicazione dell'importanza e dell'utilità pratica della filosofia oltre i limiti del mero dibattito accademico. Contrariamente ai platonici suoi contemporanei, Plutarco rinuncia ad assegnare alla theoria *il ruolo di fine in sé, senza per questo implicare una difesa a oltranza della vita attiva. In effetti, l'essenza del platonismo risiede ai suoi occhi proprio nel fatto di trascendere i limiti del problema e sostenere la necessità dell'unione di* theoria *e* praxis*. Coerentemente con lo spirito polemico che percorre una parte consistente della produzione plutarchea, tale posizione emerge in maniera contrastiva attraverso la critica dello stoicismo (nel* de stoicorum repugnantis*) – accusato di limitarsi alla mera teorizzazione dell'impegno politico o di realizzarlo in maniera contraddittoria – e l'epicureismo (alla fine dell'*adversus Colotem*). In questo senso, le due scuole rivali sono associate nella misura in cui l'esaltazione del* bios scholastikos *operata dalla prima rimanda a un ideale egoistico e distaccato assimilabile all'*hesychia *epicurea. I platonici, invece, fedeli all'ideale collettivo del* nomos*, propongono una forma di attività che è coerente con i contenuti teoretici della loro filosofia, giudicata dottrinalmente superiore allo stoicismo e all'epicureismo. In questo senso, Plutarco difende un'autentica identificazione tra il* bios theoretikos *e il* bios praktikos*, ancorata all'autentico fondamento della vita umana, la teologia. Si*

può così parlare di «teologia politica». Essa è fondata sul principio dell'assimilazione al divino che costituisce un punto cardine del platonismo imperiale e che si realizza nello sforzo di perseguire la conoscenza e la virtù proprie al divino per il tramite della riflessione filosofica: quella del filosofo diventa così agli occhi di Plutarco una figura di riferimento della vita politica. (A.G.)

M. Bonazzi, «Plutarch on the Difference between Academics and Pyrrhonists», *OSAPh*, 43 (2012) 271-298.

Lo studio affronta la questione del rapporto di Plutarco allo scetticismo nella coscienza che chiarirlo permette di illuminare la natura del suo platonismo. La questione è complicata dalla divergenza degli specialisti sullo scetticismo di Plutarco, che esitano tra l'escluderlo dalla sua filosofia, attribuirlo a una fase limitata della sua carriera o definirlo come cifra caratterizzante del suo pensiero. Dopo un riferimento alla complessità semantica e storica dell'idea stessa di 'scetticismo' nell'Antichità, l'autore affronta la posizione di Plutarco rispetto all'Accademia ellenistica quale doveva emergere in particolare nel trattato perduto Sulla differenza tra pirronisti e accademici *(*CL *64), servendosi di passi di opere tramandate, come le* Questioni conviviali *e soprattutto il* Contro Colote*. Quest'ultimo scritto mostra in particolare che l'empirismo epicureo, giudicato come inevitabilmente scettico da Plutarco e parzialmente associato al pirronismo, è criticato dagli accademici, secondo Plutarco, sulla base del dualismo platonico, filtrato, quest'ultimo, attraverso l'interpretazione plutarchea di Arcesilao secondo cui l'esistenza del mondo intelligibile è necessaria per giustificare la possibilità stessa della vita umana, vita che sarebbe impossibile la dimensione sensibile fosse la sola realtà. Lo scetticismo del platonismo accademico, di natura «metafisica», è dunque agli occhi di Plutarco coerente con la filosofia platonica e ha come scopo di fornire un'adeguata difesa rispetto alla fiducia nella sola evidenza sensibile, propria dello scetticismo ontologico ed epistemologico a cui si oppone.* (A.G.)

P. A. Bos, «Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul and the Waking Intellect and Aristotle's Double Entelechy Concept», in *Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 25-42.

In this article, P.A. Bos affirms that Plutarch's corpus *allows us to assess the extensive influence of Aristotle's published and unpublished writings. In this and other previous works, Bos also asserts that Plutarch's testimony is essential to disproving the developmental view of Aristotle's thought that reigned in the twentieth century due to the influence of W. Jaeger and F.J.C.J. Nuyens. As a matter of fact, Plutarch affirms the fundamental unity of Aristotle's published and unpublished works, showing that there was no contradiction or opposition between the views Aristotle explored in his published dialogues and the theories he more systematically exposed in the lectures contained in the corpus. The analysis of particular Aristotelian echoes in the works of Plutarch provides enough material to support this view. This is particularly the case in Bos' revision and redefinition of Aristotle's definition of the soul. Taking the myth of a "dreaming Kronos" at the end of Plutarch's* De facie *as a starting point, Bos engages in a far-reaching analysis of Aristotle's view of the soul as a double entelechy. After reviewing Aristotle's famous definition of the soul as the "first entelechy of a natural body which potentially possesses life and is organikon", Bos shows that the "natural body" is nothing but the vital heat, which Aristotle frequently referred to in a variety of ways, and that it serves the soul as an instrument for its typical psychical functions. The term* organikon *in the quoted definition should therefore not be translated as "equipped with organs" but rather as "serving as an*

instrument", a translation for which an interesting passage of Plutarch's Platonic Questions *also provides good support. In order to explain in which way the soul is the entelechy of this natural body, Bos launches a full analysis of the double sense with which "entelechy" is used in* On the Soul *2.1, which shows that Aristotle conceived of the soul as an entelechy in a double way: when described as "asleep" the soul is seen as forming a unity with its instrumental natural body; when the intellect is referred to as "waking entelechy" it is because it is free of any bodily covering.* (L.R.)

F. E. Brenk, «Plutarch and "Pagan Monotheism"», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 73-84.
Brenk ofrece una panorámica actualizada de la influencia que el platonismo y el estoicismo ejercieron en la plasmación y desarrollo del monoteísmo. En tal sentido, un examen atento del tratado Isis y Osiris *revela la interpretación platonista que Plutarco adopta sobre la figura de Osiris, al que denomina 'la inteligencia y la razón'. En síntesis, Plutarco reduce lo divino a un solo Dios al cual quedan subordinados los dioses tradicionales. Asimismo,* Sobre la E de Delfos *patentiza en buena medida (hechas las diferencias oportunas) una posición similar. Con todo, si esos postulados doctrinales fueran particularmente importantes para Plutarco, habríamos esperado la presencia de los mismos en otros ensayos de la producción plutarquea.* (V.R., A.V.)

R. Caballero, «The Adventitous Motion of the Soul (Plu., *De Stoic. repugn.* 23, 1045B-F) and the Controversy between Aristo of Chios and the Middle Academy», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 55-72.
Il lavoro riguarda il dibattito tra lo stoicismo e l'Accademia di Arcesilao intorno alla questione cruciale del destino e dell'azione umana. Esso si concentra in particolare sul § 23 del de stoicorum repugnantis *(1045B-F), che fa riferimento a un critica crisippea rivolta ai filosofi che teorizzano la presenza di un movimento (*kinêsis*) o di una facoltà (*dynamis*) «accidentale» o «contingente» (*epeleustikê*) dell'anima. Si tratterebbe di una sorta di movimento localizzato nell'*hêgêmonikon *dell'anima che sarebbe in grado di realizzare degli impulsi in seguito all'intervento di cause esterne. L'autore del lavoro considera che tali filosofi siano da identificare con gli accademici, contrariamente a quanti ipotizzano che si tratti di altri stoici o di epicurei. In questo senso, la critica di Crisippo non è rivolta ad Aristone di Chio e ai suoi seguaci, promotori della nozione di* epeleusis*, ma piuttosto ad Arcesilao e ai suoi successori, che elaborarono la propria teoria dell'azione in polemica con Zenone e con i suoi discepoli, finendone per integrare, a scopo dialettico, la terminologia.* (A.G.)

I. Calero, «Plutarco y su interpretación de algunas leyes griegas concernientes a la familia y propiedad», *in N., K., D.*, 53-65.
En ciertas obras, Plutarco se pronuncia sobre leyes de época greco-arcaica y clásica, La profesora Calero revisa los testimonios oportunos y concluye que, en la exégesis de los nómoi agamíou, de las disposiciones sobre la exención otorgada a los hijos para alimentar a los padres, de las leyes sobre la ilegitimidad aneja a los hijos de matrimonios mixtos y de la normativa sobre los daños causados por animales, Plutarco combinó la interpretación correcta de los datos con explicaciones anacrónicas o ausentes de rigor jurídico. (V.R., A.V.)

G. Cammagre, «Plutarque dans l'Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert», *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 191-202.
G. M. présente sa réflexion comme une tentative « d'évaluer au travers du prisme de l'Encyclopédie l'intérêt que présentait Plutarque pour les rédacteurs

d'un vaste ouvrage, composé sur près de vingt ans, qui avait la double ambition d'être un conservatoire des savoirs et de changer "la façon commune de penser" (Diderot) ». L'étude s'engage d'abord sous un angle matériel et quantitatif. Cité dans 513 articles -dont 366 de Jaucourt, chargé à partir du tome V de l'histoire et de la géographie-, Plutarque est le quatrième auteur antique le plus sollicité, après les deux Pline -essentiellement Pline l'Ancien, mais les deux ne sont pas explicitement distingués-, Strabon et Cicéron, devant Pausanias, Tite-Live et Tacite, alors qu'il est à peu près absent des deux grands dictionnaires historiques de l'époque, le Moreri et le Trévoux. Dans les citations - explicitement référées ou non - les Vies Parallèles dominent largement, tandis que parmi les Moralia, viennent, par ordre décroissant, les Quaest. Rom. *(20), les* Quaest. conv. *(10), le* De Iside *(7). On trouve aussi le* De def., *le* De exilio, *le* De facie, *le* De superst. *Les avis divergent déjà sur l'authenticité du* De placitis *et le* De musica *est toujours cité à partir de la traduction de M. Burette. Pour les traductions, celle d'Amyot est aussi diversement jugé, fruste pour Voltaire, pleine de charme pour Jaucourt. Cité comme historien-géographe, écrivain et penseur, Plutarque lui-même fait l'objet de réserve surtout sous l'angle religieux, où la quantité de prodiges rapportés participe au mieux du défaut de rationalité des hommes de l'Antiquité (Jaucourt), au pire d'une crédulité bien peu philosophique (D'Alembert). Jaucourt, dans une veine proche de l'antiquomanie, voit en lui une source qui permet de faire revivre l'Antiquité et les exemples et anecdotes étoffent ses articles d'une matière romanesque. Il y reprend avec beaucoup d'émotion tel ou tel passage des* Vies parallèles *(199-200). Enfin, si le style de Plutarque n'est l'objet d'aucune critique, il n'est, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, qu'un nom secondaire au bas de la liste des nouveaux platoniciens de l'époque impériale (« Platonisme »), mais ses traités de polémique et sa réfutation des Stoïciens sont mis à contribution à une époque où le stoïcisme antique est en passe d'être annexé par les matérialistes. L'ensemble montre que, dans les années 1750-1765, Plutarque reste une des lectures favorites de l'élite.* (F.F.)

H. Campagne, « Poétique de l'Instant tragique; la place et l'influence des *Vies* de Plutarque dans la définition du tragique en France 1600-1650 », in *Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 55-68.
H. C. rappelle d'abord la méfiance, toute platonicienne de Plutarque vis-à-vis de la tragédie, du théâtre, et du drame (cf. Demetr. *19,* De laude *545F -rectifier le 745F de la n. 4, p. 55,* De malign. Her. *870C). Il n'en fut pas moins aussi une source inépuisable de personnages et de situations tragiques, production qui s'accompagne dans la période 1600-1660 de toute une série de débats portant sur les formes et la fonction de la dramaturgie et d'Aubignac, dans La pratique du théâtre (dans la seconde moitié du siècle), le place, aux côtés de Lilus Giraldi et d'Athénée, dans la catégorie des auteurs qui « en plusieurs endroits ont touché les plus importante maximes du Theatre ». Pour étudier les optiques variées dans lesquelles les auteurs dramatiques classiques du XVII^e^ s. ont relu* Vies *et* Moralia, *H. C. s'appuie sur un corpus d'une dizaine de pièces écrites entre 1600 et 1645, en particulier* Les Lacènes de Montchrestien *(1601), inspirés de* Cléomène *(56-59),* Coriolan, Aristoclée *–inspirée des* Amat. narr.- *et La mort d'Alexandre de Hardy (59-63 et 64-65), Crisante -inspirée du* Mul. virt.- *de Rotrou (63) et enfin Le grand Timoléon de Saint-Germain (1641) et* La mort de César *de Scudéry (1637) qui emprunte à César et Antoine, et comporte un « prologue en forme de dialogue allégorique, où le roi Louis XIII*

est explicitement comparé à Alexandre, tandis que Richelieu fait figure de nouveau César ». (F.F.)

C. Carasco, « La Conjuration des Gracques de Saint-Réal (1695) ou l'imposture du concept de liberté de Plutarque au Grand Siècle », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 145-160.
La Conjuration des Gracques (1695) est une œuvre sans doute apocryphe, parue dans la seconde partie des Œuvres posthumes de Saint-Réal et réimprimée sous son nom jusqu'au milieu du XIX^e^ siècle. L'auteur a pris de nombreuses libertés face au modèle de Plutarque. Tout en conservant le cadre narratif des Vies de Tiberius et de Caïus Gracchus*, il a infléchi l'intrigue dans le sens de la manipulation machiavélique et de l'amertume augustinienne. Embellissement du texte plutarquéen par des discours inédits, des parenthèses moralisantes du narrateur ou par l'amplification, voire la dramatisation de certains épisodes, cette monographie sur les frères Gracques témoigne des choix politiques et moraux de Saint-Réal.* (D'après le résumé de l'auteur) (F.F.)

A. Casanova, «La giustizia nel *Grillo* e la conclusione del dialogo», *in N., K., D.*, 181-189.
Nel dialogo Bruta animalia ratione uti, *detto anche Gryllus, manca del tutto una sezione dedicata alla giustizia, una delle quattro virtù fondamentali sia secondo Platone sia secondo Aristotele. Tale assenza, tra le altre cose, può supportare l'ipotesi, formulata da alcuni studiosi, che l'opera sia incompleta, e che il finale sia andato perduto. Tutta l'argomentazione del dialogo è tuttavia paradossale, e come tale non ha bisogno di essere dimostrata, né seriamente confutata. La possibilità di confutare con argomentazione seria è probabilmente affidata agli alunni, e forse agli stessi lettori.* (M.D.S.)

A. Casanova, «Plutarch as Apollo's Priest in Delphi», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 151-158.
El profesor Casanova efectúa una revisión crítico-textual de importancia sobre los pasajes plutarqueos en los cuales el Queronense menciona su actividad (aceptada en la tradición filológica más acreditada) como sacerdote de Apolo en Delfos. (V.R., A.V.)

E. Chayes, « La référence à Plutarque dans l'œuvre de L'Accademia degli Incogniti de Venise », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 9-28.
En 1635, les Académiciens vénitiens appelés Incogniti publient une série de Discours qui gravitent autour de l'inconnu, de l'indéfini et du principe du contraire, et dont le dernier, celui de Marino dall' Angelo, parle de « La gloire du néant ». Nous proposons une analyse des références que les Incogniti font à Plutarque et essayons de mettre en lumière sa fonction dans ces Discours subversifs, témoignant d'une libertas philosophandi *étonnante. Douze ans après la parution de leurs Discorsi, apparurent les Glorie de gli Incogniti, o vero gli huomini illustri dell'accademia de' signori Incogniti di Venetia.* (Présentation de l'Auteur)

Ph. Chométy, « La réception de Plutarque dans la poésie d'idées au XVII^e^ siècle », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 29-44.
L'auteur se propose « d'éclairer les transformations de (la) représentation (de Plutarque) en philosophe » et de tracer quelques pistes s'inscrivant « dans le projet plus vaste d'une étude sur la réception des sciences et des philosophies de l'Antiquité dans la poésie d'idées ». Une première partie (29-34) s'attache à sa figure, bien établie, de grand philosophe (dont l'origine est peut-être AP *XVI 331) et montre que cette représentation « n'est pas seulement significative de la survivance de l'humanisme, mais aussi de l'appropriation mondaine de son œuvre » (34). Une seconde partie, davantage en*

forme de répertoire, le considère comme source philosophique et envisage à la fois l'usage fait de certaines traductions sentencieuses d'Amyot ou la pratique plus originale de La Fontaine dans ses Fables *[*Cor. *[6, 3-5] et Les Membres et l'estomac [*Fables *III 2],* Cras. *et La besace [I 7], Démosth. et Les Loups et les Brebis [III 13] -P.C. ne donne pas les références précises de Plutarque]; d'autres rapprochements, sont suggérés avec* Conv. Sept. sap., Quaest. conv., V. X orat., De garrul., De lib. educ., Apopht. lac., An seni *(36); pour la philosophie naturelle, Plutarque participe au débat sur l'âme des bêtes, en particulier avec* De soll. anim. *et* Bruta animalia*, qui font l'objet de controverses de Montaigne à Descartes. Face à l'apparition de l'esprit cartésien, Plutarque est encore pris au sérieux - moyennant une christianisation du savoir transmis - par La Mesnardière (utilisant* De plac. *II 20) et Saint-Martin (*Crass.*). Enfin le commentaire de Goulart à La Sepmaine de Du Bartas reflètent l'encyclopédisme de Plutarque.* (F.F.)

D. N. Clay, «In the wake of Atlantis. The continuators of Plato's *Atlantikos Logos* from Theopompos to Plutarch», *in Harmonia*, 233-248.

El Atlantikos Logos *de Platón atrajo a filósofos, historiadores y escritores de ficciones utópicas. En efecto, sirvió de modelo a otros autores como Teopompo, Evémero o Jámbulo, autores griegos que comenzaron la colonización de islas y tierras imaginarias (Meropis, Isla de Pancaya, Islas del Sol) con el descubrimiento de sociedades en las que Grecia podía verse reflejada en la distancia. El alcance de la Atlántida de Platón puede recogerse igualmente en algunos ecos en* De facie in orbe lunae *de Plutarco.* (V.R., A.V.)

M.-F. David de Palacio, « L'"anti-Plutarque": Variations germanique, américaine et française entre 1860 et 1925 », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 319-336.

A partir de trois œuvres : le Plutarch Restored : an Anachronatic Metempsychosis *de Thomas Worth (1862), le* Zürcher Plutarch *de Hugo Blümner (1909) et l'*Anti-Plutarque *de Jean de Pierrefeu (1925), se dessine, au tournant des XIX^e^-XX^e^ siècles, un « nouveau Plutarque ». Quelques citations peuvent être utilisées dans les deux premiers, qui ressortissent à la parodie, et présentent la caractéristique d'être illustrés, mais il s'agit avant tout, plus largement, de remettre en cause le culte des grands hommes, soit que l'on s'en prenne directement à Plutarque, soit que l'on saisisse ce modèle pour tourner en dérision de prétendues gloires contemporaines, soit encore, au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale, avec Pierrefeu, que l'on remette radicalement en question la possibilité même de « plutarquiser ».* (D'après la présentation de l'Auteur) (F.F.)

K. Demoen & D. Praet, «Philostratus, Plutarch, Gorgias and the End of Plato's *Phaedrus*», *CQ* 62 (2012) 436-438.

Les auteurs, après avoir rappelé les discussions d'authenticité suscitées par la Lettre 73 de Philostrate, consacrée à la gloire de Gorgias, dont Platon lui-même aurait été un émule, reviennent sur l'appel final lancé à la destinatrice, Julia Domna, de « persuader Plutarque » de se rallier au même avis, faute de quoi il méritera une épithète peu flatteuse que Philostrate tait. À partir de la proposition d'Anderson de rapprocher cette invitation curieuse à convaincre un mort de la fin du Phèdre *(269b-c et surtout 278b-e, où Socrate se dit chargé par les Muses d'une commission pour Homère et Solon), ils proposent comme épithète dévalorisatrice λόγων συγγραφέα (278e1-2) que mérite celui qui se rend indigne d'être appelé φιλόσοφος.* (F.F.)

P. Desideri, «Plutarco e la storia: una lettura obliqua dei dialoghi delfici», in *Harmonia*, 295-307.

Constatato come Plutarco abbia praticato nel contempo la storia ed altri tipi di scrittura letteraria e quanto sia raro e sorprendente che le sue opere si siano ampiamente conservate, Desideri pro-

pone una lettura dei Dialoghi Delfici *in vista di una comprensione dell'origine e dei caratteri degli interessi storiografici dello scrittore di Cheronea. Attraverso l'analisi di alcuni significativi passi di* De defectu oraculorum, De E apud Delphos *e* De Pythiae oraculis *lo studioso offre anche una interessante interpretazione delle* Vite Parallele, *lasciando emergere con dovizia di suggestioni quelli che possono essere considerati i principi ispiratori dell'attività storiografica di Plutarco. Nel dettaglio, in qualità di sacerdote delfico, il Cheronese sarebbe stato protagonista di una partecipazione attiva alla vita organizzativa del santuario di Apollo che si configurava non solo quale valorizzazione di un importante monumento alla grecità, ma anche in maniera complementare come ferma volontà di riorganizzare da una parte il passato, e dall'altra il futuro della Grecia.* (F.T.)

P. Desideri, «Silvestro Centofanti et la philosophie de Plutarque», *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 309-318.
*Le dossier n. 748 du Fondo Manoscritti de la Biblioteca Universitaria di Pisa contient 571 papiers de différents formats, qui font partie du consistant legs de Silvestro Centofanti, professeur d'histoire de la philosophie à l'Université de Pise du 1842 au 1849, mort à Pise le 6 de janvier 1880. Les 481 premières pages de ce dossier contiennent des matériaux se rapportant au travail que le professeur pisan a dédié à Plutarque sur plusieurs dizaines d'années : un travail dont le résultat le plus important fut la publication, en 1850, d'un S*aggio sulla vita e sulle opere di Plutarco. *L'examen de ces papiers permet de mesurer l'ampleur et la profondeur des intérêts de Centofanti pour les écrits philosophiques de Plutarque, et sa capacité de les utiliser en fonction de son objectif politico-culturel prééminent : bâtir un fondement idéologique à la construction d'une nation italienne.* (Présentation de l'Auteur)

G. D'Ippolito, «Motivi antifisiognomici nella cultura greca da Omero a Plutarco», *in Harmonia*, 315-328.
Riconosciute grosso modo due fasi (una etica, l'altra parascientifica) nello sviluppo del pensiero fisiognomico nella Grecia antica, il contributo di G. D'Ippolito intende mostrare come un vero pensiero antifisiognomico traspaia solo anteriormente al consolidamento teorico della disciplina, riconoscendo in Plutarco una forma di fisiognomica 'dinamica'. A tal proposito, citati svariati esempi omerici, teognidei, euripidei, di Clemente Alessandrino e del comico Filemone, senza dimenticare il cosiddetto cerchio della letteratura socratica, l'autore giunge a delineare, anche tramite il riferimento a ritratti (coerenti o paradossali) stilati da Plutarco nelle Vite*, l'idea plutarchea, mutuata dalla tradizione socratico-platonica, della possibilità di realizzare coerentemente la virtù etica anche superando le caratteristiche naturali negative attraverso ragione, educazione ed esercizio.* (F.T.)

L. de Nazaré Ferreira, «A lenda de Aríon e a influência de Plutarco na Arte Ocidental», in *As artes*, 15-68.
[«The legend of Arion and the influence of Plutarch in western art»]
*After a fist part dedicated to the representation of the dolphin in Greek art (in particular Minoan frescoes, coins, and vase painting), this study focuses on the literary and iconographic sources of Arion's legend, with special attention to Herodotus (*Histories *1.23-24) and Plutarch (*Banquet of the Seven Sages *18.160E-19.162B). In the third and last part, the author discusses the influence of Arion's legend on Western art, based on the selection of four examples: the tapestry entitled The Island of Fortune (from The Honours series), the emblems of Alciatus, an Indo-Portuguese quilt from the National Museum of Ancient Art in Lisbon, and Arion & the Dol-*

phin, a libretto for opera written by Vikram Seth. The study includes two annexes: the first one assembles the literary sources of Arion's legend, and the second provides a brief note on the influence of Plutarch's works on Flemish tapestry. (D.L.)

M. Durán Mañas, «Pericles, ¿un modelo de ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ?», *in N., K., D.*, 23-40.
Para comprender el significado del concepto de justicia en Plutarco se lleva a cabo un análisis de los usos en las otras Vidas *y también en la propia de* Pericles*. Si bien su biografía comienza destacando este principio moral en Pericles, resulta que Plutarco desarrolla en mayor medida otras virtudes suyas, por lo cual señalar este principio moral en sus personajes constituía un tópico. De hecho, en relación con Pericles, destaca más su moderación, indicada igualmente al comienzo de la* Vida*, que su justicia.* (V.R., A.V.)

E. Foulon, « Le Plutarque de Dacier », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 161-172.
Après Amyot, Dacier, qui a consacré une trentaine d'années aux Vies, ouvre le premier volume de sa traduction, par une « Epistre au Roy » et une Préface chargées de réhabiliter et promouvoir Plutarque et les Vies*. La première, à un niveau pratique, montre comment tirer profit des* Vies*, miroir du Prince, tandis que la seconde, à un niveau plus théorique, montre « comment concevoir et se représenter, sinon même évaluer et juger les* Vies *de Plutarque ». C'est sur elle que porte l'analyse, sous quatre rubriques : «le genre des Vies : histoire et poésie » (164-166, où Dacier se souvient d'avoir traduit la Poétique et voit en Plutarque la synthèse des deux contraires que sont histoire et poésie), « Plutarque père de la petite histoire » (166-167, où il résout par l'idéal de vérité et la représentation de la vie-même le paradoxe de donner à l'histoire une dimension universelle en faisant l'histoire des hommes illustres « dans le particulier »); « Plutarque critiqué pour la forme, mais loué pour le fond » (167-169, qui distingue l'imperfection de la langue et du style « si mal arrangés » du sens « bien assis »du texte et du génie créatif de l'auteur dont sont louées imagination et raison, tandis que les reproches devenus traditionnels -crédulité, embellissement- soulignent un trait antique qui n'engage pas la véracité des auteurs); enfin, « Plutarque et le comparant comparé » (169-171, où est affirmée la préférence de Dacier, pour les* Vies *contre les* Moralia*, et, à l'intérieur des premières, pour les* synkriseis*). Il en ressort une lecture didactique, traditionnelle, mais non sans nuances, puisque cette valeur didactique est tantôt positive et tantôt négative. Loin de toute « plutarchomanie », Dacier participe plutôt d'une culture « romanocentrique » et, pour lui comme pour l'ensemble des classiques, Plutarque reste d'abord le plus romain des auteurs grecs.* (F.F.)

F. Frazier, « Le "dialogue" de Joseph de Maistre et de Plutarque. Quelques remarques textuelles sur la version maistrienne des *Délais de la justice divine* », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ siècle*, 289-305.
« *Traduction libre, et, sur quelques points, expressément maistrianisée* **»** (J. Moubarak)**,** *les* Délais de la justice divine *apparaissent en effet à l'examen comme le fruit d'un passionnant travail d'appropriation, clairement exposé dans la préface : « il était essentiel, y est-il expliqué, de ne point m'exposer à lui faire tort en mêlant mes pensées aux siennes », d'où l'adjonction en fin de volume de la traduction d'Amyot, la la mise entre astérisques de « tout ce qui n'est point de Plutarque » et en italiques de ce qui, dans ces expansions, lui est emprunté à Plutarque ; ont été aussi supprimés quelques passages «nullement essentiels et dont la substance même a été conservée », mais surtout la forme*

même du dialogue. Les conséquences, importantes, en sont d'abord étudiées : création d'un nouveau « portail maistrien » (293-297), puis manière dont Maistre articule la discussion et le gouvernement de la Providence, sans plus s'appuyer sur telle ou telle intervention, mais en exploitant l'élargissement de la perspective temporelle présente dans le texte grec, du châtiment immédiat au châtiment dans l'au-delà (297-299). Entre les deux, Plutarque s'est attardé sur la vie de remords aux chapitres 10-11: totalement repensés par Maistre ils sont, à titre d'exemple, étudiés en détail, texte, ajouts et notes, pour illustrer la méthode de lecture de Joseph de Maistre et son dialogue avec le texte (299-304). (F. F.)

F. Frazier, « Ordre et désordre dans la pensée de Plutarque. Réseaux lexicaux et problématiques philosophiques autour de δίκη, κόσμος, νόμος », in *N., K., D.*, 215-242.

F.F. ilustra el concepto de orden en Plutarco a través de un estudio léxico de los términos δίκη, κόσμος, νόμος y sus respectivos antónimos. Partiendo de la concepción clásica de estos términos y analizando los pasajes en los que Plutarco los usa en sentido abstracto, la autora muestra su evolución y destaca el valor que adquiere para nuestro autor la idea de la necesidad de orden (y de "puesta en orden", simbolizada a menudo por un estado previo de caos y desorden). Esta idea se ve reflejada en todos los ámbitos, tanto en los planos cosmológico y metafísico, como en los campos de la psicología, la política y la ética, que afectan directamente al ser humano. F.F. concluye su análisis describiendo los casos en los que Plutarco utiliza la expresión Ζεὺς ἀριστοτέχνας (donde Zeus, demiurgo platónico, cumple con su función de creador y ordenador del mundo y de la realidad humana), puesto que en ellos confluyen varios de los ámbitos arriba mencionados y permiten esclarecer los diferentes niveles de ordenación necesarios en cada uno de ellos. (L.L.)

D. Futter, «Plutarch, Plato and Sparta», *Akroterion* 57 (2012) 37-51.

D. F. part du constat que Plutarque dans la Vie de Lycurgue *présente la constitution mixte de la cité spartiate comme un idéal social et politique pour Platon. Or, dans la* République *c'est un régime d'aristocratie méritocratique que Platon met en avant, un régime incompatible avec une constitution mixte. Plutarque aurait-t-il mal compris la philosophie politique de Platon ? D. F. s'efforce de résoudre cette antinomie en s'appuyant sur la signification du mot ὑπόθεσις (*Lyc. *31.2) pour dire que d'après Plutarque la construction de la cité idéale de Platon est une sorte d'idéalisation et de projection de la Sparte de Lycurgue. D. F. se penche aussi sur la signification du mot πολιτεία (*Lyc. *31.2) en expliquant que le terme recouvre aussi des institutions sociales et économiques mises en place par Lycurgue non restreintes à la seule forme du gouvernement spartiate. Il examine ensuite ces institutions à Sparte qui parfois présentent des aspects démocratiques et démontre qu'il existe des différences notoires au niveau de l'organisation de deux cités. Cela dit des correspondances apparaissent également entre l'organisation économique et sociale de Sparte de Lycurgue d'un côté, et la cité de Platon de l'autre. La cité platonicienne peut être vue comme une extension idéalisée de Sparte de Lycurgue telle que Plutarque la représente. D'après D. F., les affirmations de Plutarque au sujet de la parenté des deux régimes obéissent à une logique rhétorique de sa part.* (M.V.)

A. Gefen, « Les écrivains contre Plutarque: Détournements, critiques et réécritures des *Vies parallèles* aux XIX^e^ et XX^e^ siècles », in *Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 337-350.

À tant de siècles de distance, ce n'est plus guère le texte, mais un certain modèle plutarquien qui joue un rôle

déterminant dans la constitution, entre le XIX^e^ et le XX^e^ siècle, de contre-modèles d'écriture biographique servis en contrepoint à l'historiographie positive (de Han d'Islande *de Victor Hugo aux* Hommes Illustres *de Jean Rouaud en passant par les railleries de Bouvard et Pécuchet ou les* Vies *imaginaires de Marcel Schwob, de la contre-historiographie romantique à la pensée par cas des sciences de l'homme contemporaines, en passant par les géométries obliques de Michel Foucault). Moquées, déconstruites ou réinventées, les* Vies parallèles *servent tour à tour d'exemple des puissances de la spéculation littéraire sur les détails et les variations des existences particulières, de lieu de rêverie poétique, d'empathie associative, et, d'autre part, de repoussoir face aux dangers de l'héroïsation officielle et aux spectres des téléologies morales.* (D'après le résumé de l'Auteur) (F.F.)

S. Grémy-Deprez, « Plutarque dans les *Dialogues des Morts* de Fénelon », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^* s., 131-144.

La source plutarquienne domine largement dans l'œuvre de Fénelon (37 dialogues sur 53 sont inspirés du Chéronéen), mais, au-delà de ce constat quantitatif, S.G. étudie comment, dans un contexte historique de réévaluation du héros, liée à la contestation du « roi de guerre », le précepteur du fils du Grand Dauphin déplace l'éclairage moral sur les Vies *les plus célèbres afin de battre en brèche la gloire du roi conquérant et de préciser les devoirs du souverain, étayant son propos sur « une réflexion souterraine sur le genre littéraire le plus approprié pour exposer cet idéal, et la confrontation entre le genre du dialogue des morts et de la vie » (133). Prenant pour exemples des dialogues mettant en scène Alexandre, Thésée et Hercule (soit II « Hercule et Thésée », XXV, « Alexandre et Aristote », XXVI « Alexandre et Clitus », XXVII « Alexandre et Diogène » et XLIV « César et Alexandre »), S. G construit une première partie autour de la « Désacralisation de l'éthos héroïque guerrier » (134-139), qui se décompose en « Alexandre : subversion de la figure du conquérant » (134-138), « Hercule et Thésée : remise en cause de la figure du héros » (138-139), avec, en appendice, « Disqualification ironique des tentatives de divinisation », et enfin « Alexandre et la promotion de nouvelles valeurs » (139-140 -il est à noter que le spécialiste de Plutarque y reconnaît des traits déjà soulignés par le Chéronéen, même s'ils sont mis ici au service de la définition d'une monarchie moderne). La seconde partie, plus propre à l'auteur classique, s'intitule « De la vie au dialogue des morts : infléchissement d'un genre et refus de l'exemplarité » (140-144). Intégrant au genre lucianesque, souple et peu codifié, du dialogue des morts le parallèle plutarquien, réinterprété dans une perspective de rivalité et de surenchère qui met en lumière les aspects les moins recommandables des héros, Fénelon condamne de facto l'exemplarité « qui était de mise dans les* Vies *»(142) - ou que, du moins, la lecture courante, et en particulier classique, croyait y voir.* (F.F.)

J.-L. Guichet, « Rousseau et Plutarque, l'influence "moderne" d'un ancien », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 221-232.

Centrée sur la « modernité » de l'influence de Plutarque, dont la présence « n'est pas massive et continue, mais presque toujours émiettée à l'extrême », cette étude s'efforce de préciser la forme de cette influence. Sans se limiter à un simple usage rhétorique des nombreux exempla fournis par le corpus *plutarquien (en premier lieu par les* Vies*), Rousseau leur confère aussi une très haute charge émotionnelle et en fait une source active et constante de méditation, non pas « simple magasin d'exemples et de modèles », mais « magasin d'idées » (225), matériau anthropologique sur lequel fonder sa réflexion. Surtout la référence à Plutarque permet au citoyen de*

Genève de prendre de la distance avec la société parisienne de son époque et de projeter un modèle anthropologique et politique en rupture, annonciateur de la Révolution et de la République. De cette « libre inspiration », J-L.G donne pour exemple l'utilisation de Caton l'Ancien *où Plutarque « est d'abord le témoin saisissant d'une réalité éthique et politique opposable aux raisonnements captieux et aux objections relativistes qu'on lui adresse » (228-229), et surtout la longue citation dans le livre II de l'*Émile *du* De esu carnium *(non référencée) à l'introduction révélatrice : « Quoique ce morceau soit étranger à mon sujet je n'ai pu résister à la tentation de le transcrire ».* (F.F.)

E. Hamon-Lehours, « Plutarque, Source d'inspiration de l'iconographie féminine », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 89-102.

L'étude se concentre sur deux œuvres picturales d'Elisabetta Sirani, Timoclée (91-94) et Porcia (94-97), dont le sujet eut une abondante postérité dans la suite du siècle. Un regard sur la peinture française dans les siècles postérieurs montre que la fortune iconographique de Plutarque se répand en France majoritairement entre le XVIII^e^ et le XIX^e^ s. et y est alors plus vigoureuse qu'en Italie (97). elle ne compte cependant que peu de femmes, présentées en groupe ou en couple, comme Coriolan et sa femme, Antiochus et Stratonice, Antoine et Cléopâtre -cette dernière étant la seule à figurer souvent seule. La comparaison met en relief l'originalité d'E. Sirani, dont les œuvres émanent d'une connaissance de l'ouvrage plutarquien d'une part, et d'une volonté de faire émerger une écriture artistique philogyne d'autre part. (F. F.)

M. Herrero de Jáuregui, «*DIKE* y otras deidades justicieras en la obra de Plutarco», *in N., K., D.*, 161-180.

Acerca de las principales divinidades de la justicia que aparecen en la obra de Plutarco, desvela este estudio que deidades comunes en su época como Dikaiosyne, Themis *y* Nomos *no se encuentran en la obra conservada salvo en las citas, mientras que hay otras que utiliza con frecuencia: Adrastea, las Erinis, Poiné, Nemesis y Dike. Las divinidades y personificaciones aparecen del modo consagrado por la tradición, distribuidas de modo desigual entre* Vidas *y* Moralia*, con un uso particular mediante el que Plutarco pretende exponer su idea de la justicia divina.* (V.R., A.V.)

H.-G. Ingenkamp, «Ploutarchos *symphilotimoumenos*», *in Lash of Ambition*, 19-30.

À partir de l'utilisation du mot symphilotimoumenos *par Plutarque, l'auteur se livre à un certain nombre de réflexions ponctuelles, accompagnées de remarques de critique textuelle, sur la signification de ce terme (a) pour Plutarque lui-même (sur la base d'un passage du* De E apud Delphos*, 385A-B), (b) en lien avec un contexte politique plus large (à partir d'un extrait du* De laude ipsius, *542B) et (c) en accord avec les principes rhétoriques de la Seconde Sophistique (en comparaison avec un texte d'Apulée tiré des Florides, XVI, 17-18).* (T.S.)

Gh. Jay-Robert, « Ulysse et Circé réinventés par Plutarque: d'un savoir divin à un savoir naturel », in **A.N. Pena (ed.), *Révélation et apprentissage dans les textes grecs et latins*, Lisboa, 2012, 177-185.**

C'est sur le dialogue satirique Gryllos *de Plutarque que se penche l'auteur de cet article pour le comparer dans un premier temps au chant X de l'*Odyssée *dont il s'inspire et qu'il réécrit de façon ironique. G. J-R montre que ce dialogue est une « création d'une péripétie inédite » dont le protagoniste est Gryllos, un tout nouveau personnage. Ce compagnon d'Ulysse transformé en porc prend le contrepied d'Hermès tout en se servant, comme lui, de la parole pour convaincre son interlocuteur et parvenir à ses fins. L'auteur démontre, dans un*

deuxième temps, que le point nodal de cette réécriture est le logos ainsi qu'une nouvelle définition du savoir. Gryllos utilise plusieurs procédés rhétoriques car l'enjeu pour lui est de vaincre par la parole qui, dans ce traité, devient apprentissage, « presque un exercice d'école ». Contrairement à Hermès dont la parole prend la forme d'une révélation, Gryllos fait l'usage d'une parole sophistique et démonstrative qui est justement du côté de l'apprentissage. Quant au savoir, il tire sa force de la capacité à développer de façon naturelle les vertus propres à chaque espèce. Gryllos défend la supériorité de l'inné sur l'acquis en niant l'importance de l'instruction. Mais un paradoxe surgit, d'après l'auteur : Gryllos se sert du logos *tout en soulignant son inutilité.* (M.V.)

A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, «Jueces, premios y castigos en el Más Allá de Plutarco», in *N., K., D.*, 243-260.
En numerosos pasajes plutarqueos se trata la inmortalidad del alma y las formas de existencia después de la muerte. En primer lugar destacan los juicios de Minos, Radamantis y Éaco, que determinan si las almas van a la Isla de los Bienaventurados o al Tártaro. A éste último van las almas injustas que deben rendir cuentas ante divinidades vengadoras y sufrir castigos de purificación; por otra parte, las almas justas reciben un merecido reconocimiento y recompensa por sus acciones en la otra vida. La autora proporciona una comparación con los textos previos que trataron estos asuntos, entre los que destaca indudablemente la escatología platónica, estableciendo sus semejanzas y diferencias, puesto que Plutarco configuró su propia concepción de la vida en el Más Allá desde el punto de vista literario, filosófico y religioso. (V.R., A.V.)

A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, «Iacchus in Plutarch», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 125-136.
Un análisis pormenorizado de los cinco pasajes plutarqueos que traen a colación el nombre de Yaco, en comparación con las fuentes literarias que documentan el nombre, permite inferir que, en los Misterios de Eleusis, la identificación entre Yaco y Dioniso resulta fehaciente. Ello justifica que, en los pasajes correspondientes, Plutarco cite a la divinidad por el nombre que juzgaba más apropiado en la procesión eleusina: Yaco. (V.R., A.V.)

D. F. Leão, «The Eleusinian Mysteries and Political Timing in the *Life of Alcibiades*», in *Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 181-192.
Como es sabido, la Expedición a Sicilia del 415 a.C. se vio precedida de sendas manifestaciones impías en que Alcibíades fue inculpado por sus enemigos políticos. En lo concerniente a la Mutilación de los Hermes, Leão acepta las explicaciones de Tucídides y de Plutarco, en la idea de que constituyó un fenómeno de vandalismo callejero convenientemente explotado por los sectores anti-Alcibíades (quienes desearían involucrar al estadista como conspirador del régimen democrático). En cuanto a la Profanación de los Misterios, se habría tratado de una celebración sacrílega, un grave delito de impiedad, habida cuenta que la 'representación' de los Misterios se habría efectuado en un contexto religiosamente inapropiado. El caso es que nuevamente los enemigos de Alcibíades explotaron la situación para (ligando las dos acciones aquí citadas) justificar el carácter provocativamente irreligioso, híbrico, de Alcibíades. (V.R., A.V.)

G. Lepan, « De la Morale à l'Ethique: Plutarque dans *Emile* et *Les rêveries* », in *Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 203-220.
Des deux lectures de Plutarque par Rousseau, celle du citoyen et celle du « philosophe de l'âme, penseur-explorateur de l'intimité » (H. Arendt), G.L. choisit de se consacrer à la seconde, « tout en livrant des clés de sa possible conciliation avec l'usage "politique" »,

*à partir d'un corpus limité: « le livre IV d'*Emile*, occupé par le traité des passions et l'éducation de la pitié, et les* Rêveries *III et IV », l'unité de ces textes pouvant se faire « autour de la notion de "vie" et d'"histoire d'une âme", âme nécessairement singulière dont l'identité est à interroger » (203). Elle relève d'entrée que les* Vies *ne sont pas cantonnées à un usage politique ou historique et que la méditation des* Œuvres morales *est « tout aussi prégnante en général, et même plus importante à la fin de sa vie » (204). Une première partie traite de questions de méthode (204-208), articulées autour des notions d'universel et de singulier d'une part, de morale (réduisant l'homme à la raison) et éthique (prenant en compte raison et sensibilité) d'autre part. Est ensuite examinée « la vie d'Émile »(208-213) -avec une insistance portée sur la liberté morale, l'usage moral de l'étude des « vies particulières », l'histoire, les bagatelles (où chacun est vraiment soi) et les héros (ce que tous ne sont pas, et qui de toute façon ne doit pas empêcher Émile d'être lui-même). Enfin viennent « les* Rêveries*: "l'histoire de mon âme" » (213-219), dont la III^e^ porte en exergue le célèbre vers de Solon, « Je vieillis en apprenant toujours », tandis que la IV^e^ prend appui sur une lecture du* De cap. ex inim. util. *Plutarque apparaît ainsi, non comme un maître, mais plutôt comme un interlocuteur permanent, voire à de certains moments, un consolateur.* (F.F.)

C. A. Martins de Jesus, «*Kosmos* and its derivative in the Plutarchan works on love», *in N., K., D.*, 87-99.
Estudio del uso que Plutarco hace del término kosmos *y sus derivados, que manipula a fin de servir a sus intereses para caracterizar la posición de las mujeres en contextos de relaciones amorosas. Este análisis desvela los principios morales y filosóficos que alentaban a Plutarco, muestra la influencia de la teoría platónica y se centra en su presencia en las siguientes obras:* Amatorius, Amatoriae Narrationes, Coniugalia Praecepta, Mulierum Virtutes *y* Consolatio ad Uxorem. (V.R., A.V.)

Ch. Mazouer, « Les *Mulierum Virtutes* de Plutarque et la tragédie française du XVII^e^ siècle », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 45-54.
Entrant en résonance avec l'exaltation entre 1630 et 1650, avant la Fronde, de la femme forte et de l'héroïsme féminin, le Mulierum virtutes *a été la source de la dernière décennie du XVI^e^ s. à 1661 d'un peu moins de dix pièces de théâtre. C. M. distingue sept pièces autour de quatre héroïnes : Arétaphila (Pierre du Ryer,* Arétaphile*), Camma (Jean Hays,* Cammate*; La Caze,* Cammane*; Thomas Corneille,* Camma, reine de Galatie*), Chiomara (Rotrou,* Crisante*) et Timocléia (Alexandre Hardy,* Timoclée, ou La Juste Vengeance*; Morel,* Timoclée, ou La Générosité d'Alexandre*). Il s'agit de montrer comment ces dramaturges passent du récit bref à la forme théâtrale, les déplacements opérés (48-51) et les figures d'héroïnes qui s'en dégagent (51-54).* (F. F.)

M. Meeusen, «Matching in Mind the Sea Beast's Complexion. On the Pragmatics of Plutarch's *Hypomnemata* and Scientific Innonvation on the Case of *Q.N.* 19 (916BF)», *Philologus* 156 (2012) 234-259.
L'auteur de cet article se penche sur le Quaestiones Naturales *de Plutarque, un traité qui, d'après lui, mérite un examen plus approfondi. Il avance l'hypothèse que ce traité est une sorte de « cahier de notes », composé de plusieurs ὑπομνήματα destinés à être incorporés dans d'autres traités. Il se penche aussi sur les caractéristiques et la fonction pragmatique d'un tel « cahier de notes » tout en se demandant s'il a été composé pour un usage personnel ou pour publication. Il pose aussi la question de sa place dans le corpus des œuvres de Plutarque. A partir de la question* Q. N. *19 (916BF) qui concerne l'habileté de l'octopus de changer de*

couleur, M. M. montre en quoi consiste le travail de l'auteur : les explications relatives au phénomène se basent sur les travaux de différents philosophes tels Théophraste, Empédocle, Démocrite, Platon etc. Mais on y trouve aussi certains éléments novateurs. L'originalité de Plutarque consiste dans l'utilisation conjointe de deux théories existantes pour expliquer le phénomène et dans la prise en considération d'un autre élément d'explication : la texture de la peau de l'octopus. M. M. examine par la suite l'utilisation par Plutarque de ce phénomène de metachrosis dans d'autres textes. Son intégration est faite dans l'optique d'une évaluation morale des personnages plutarquiens, plus précisément dans des cas de changements de caractère et d'attitude. M. M. avance l'idée que les résultats de l'enquête étiologique de phénomènes naturels étaient vraisemblablement des τόποι à utiliser dans d'autres textes ; quant au traité, il était sans doute pour l'auteur un ouvrage de référence dans son travail d'écriture. (M.V.)

M. Meeusen, «Salt in the Holy Water: Plutarch's *Quaestiones Naturales* in Michael Psellus' *De omnifaria doctrina*», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 101-124.

The author delves into the encyclopaedic work of the medieval scholar Psellus, in order to identify and analyse Plutarch's presence in it. Psellus deals with Platonic psychology and metaphysics, for which his main source is Proclus, and with physics, physiology and astronomy, topics all related to the sensible realm for which he draws from Plutarch's Quaestiones Naturales. *In the following chapters, M. M. analyses how Psellus worked with his source, for a thorough investigation from a textual perspective will allow to understand his working methods and will show how he understood and dealt with* Quaestiones Naturales. *In this sense, his adaptation of both form and content was meant to fit into the anti-Hellenic context in which he lived, in an effort to re-establish contact with the exegetical tradition of Greek philosophy.* (L.L.)

A. M. Milazzo, «Contributi al testo dei *Moralia* di Plutarco», *in Harmonia*, 547-552.

L'autore si sofferma su alcuni passi estrapolati dai Moralia *plutarchei (in particolare da* An virtus doceri possit, De sera numinis vindicta, Maxime cum princ. philos. disserendum, De sollertia animalium, De esu carnium *e* Bruta ratione uti*) cercando di portare il proprio contributo ecdotico e congetturale. Tra le altre proposte, particolarmente interessante risulta la soluzione di aplografia per omoteleuto prospettata per* De sera *551BC ed ipotizzata per* De sollertia *968A. Inoltre pare convincente la congettura proposta per* An virtus doceri possit *440A come anche la modifica della punteggiatura suggerita per* De sollertia *959C, mentre l'intervento su* De esu carnium *994AB è prodotto di un lecito sospetto di corruzione testuale.* (F.T.)

I. Muñoz-Gallarte, «The Colors of the Soul», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 235-248.

Israel Muñoz Gallarte's chapter shows the value of Plutarch's treasury of echoes of notions vaguely or firmly held in late antiquity. Muñoz Gallarte focuses on an intriguing subject that is strictly connected with the widely attested belief of the soul's descent from the divine region into the world of movement and decay. In fact, this view can be found in a variety of contexts covering the very wide spectrum from Plato to the Chaldean Oracles. More specifically, the focus of this chapter is the belief—derived from the intersection between myth, religion, astrology and philosophy—that during the soul's descent through the planetary spheres, the planets give the soul different powers, traits, vices or passions that, depending on their positive or negative character,

help or bother the soul during its earthly life. Muñoz Gallarte focuses on the association of passions with certain colors which turn up in pagan, Christian and Christian apocryphal texts with a view to determining the extent to which we can establish a common background for views that are clearly related. (L.R.)

M. Nerdahl, «Exiling Achilles: Reflections on the Banished Statesman in Plutarch's *Lives*», *CJ* 107 (2012) 331-353.

Michael Nerdahl part du constat que dans les Vies de Camille, d'Aristide *et* de Coriolan *de Plutarque, les personnages principaux sont comparés à Achille lorsqu'ils se trouvent sur le point d'affronter l'exil ou lorsqu'ils rentrent de l'exil. Le retrait du héros homérique du combat constitue ainsi une toile de fond qui permet de mieux saisir l'évaluation morale des chefs plutarquiens. La comparaison entre Achille et Camille révèle leurs différences du point de vue de leur vertu et met en évidence la modération de Camille; Aristide est, quant à lui, présenté aux antipodes d'Achille lorsque, alors qu'il est sur le point de quitter Athènes pour partir en exil, il prie pour que les Athéniens n'affrontent jamais une situation aussi catastrophique et qu'ils se souviennent de lui. De son côté Coriolan, face à l'exil, ressemble à Achille et réagit même de manière plus excessive que lui. Il subit par ailleurs une mort prématurée à l'instar d'Achille.*

D'après Nerdhal, le paradigme d'Achille constitue un « baromètre » qui permet une plus subtile évaluation morale des héros. Ainsi, les vertus de Camille et d'Aristide sont mises clairement en évidence alors que Coriolan apparaît comme un exemple négatif. Nerdhal avance l'hypothèse que les réactions différentes des trois héros se justifient par leur origine : Plutarque cherche probablement à montrer qu'un Athénien réagit différemment d'un Romain. Quoi qu'il en soit, Nerdhal démontre clairement que grâce à la comparaison avec Achille Plutarque établit indirectement une interrelation entre ces trois chefs militaires. (M.V.)

M. R. Niehoff, «Philo and Plutarch as Biographers: Parallel Responses to Roman Stoicism», *G.R.B.S.* 52 (2012) 361-392.

Maren Niehoff diskutiert Philon als einen wichtigen Vorläufer der ethischen Biographie Plutarchs. Vergleichend interpretiert sie beide im Kontext der kulturellen und philosophischen Debatten im 1.Jh. als Antwort auf das in Rom gängige stoische Paradigma, wobei sie bei Plutarch Alkibiades *und* Nikias, *bei Philon die vita Mosis exemplarisch herausgreift. In einem abschließenden Teil sucht sie im Anschluss an Richard Sorabji (unter Heranziehung programmatischer Aussagen Senecas) den fundamentalen Einfluss des römischen Stoizismus auf die Biographieschreibung der beiden griechischen Autoren zu erweisen.* (R.H-L)

M. R. Niehoff, «Philo and Plutarch on Homer», *in Ead.* (ed.), *Homer and the Bible in the eyes of ancient interpreters* (Jerusalem studies in religion and culture. 16.). Leiden [u. a.]: Brill, 2012, 127-154.

In ihrem Vergleich kennzeichnet Niehoff das (Wieder-)Einführen eines kanonischen Textes als Grundlage philosophischer Überlegungen als entscheidende Neuerung, die es Philon erlaubte jüdische Tradition und platonische Philosophie miteinander ins Gespräch zu bringen. Poetische (Homer), philosophische (Platon) und religiöse Tradition (Moses) werden so auf der Suche nach der Wahrheit nebeneinander gestellt. Dies gelingt durch eine aristotelische inspirierte Interpretation. Die Untersuchung Plutarchs konzentriert sich auf De audiendis poetis. *Der Aufsatz schließt mit einigen kontrastierenden Bemerkungen zu Ps.-Plut.* Über Leben und Dichtung Homers. (R.H-L)

A. G. Nikolaidis, «Aspects of Plutarch's Notion of *Philotimia*», *in Lash of ambition*, 31-54.
La φιλοτιμία se desarrolla especialmente en los ámbitos de los hombres de estado y generales, por lo que Plutarco la detalló pormenorizadamente en sus Vidas*. Así, se presenta aquí un análisis de la naturaleza de la φιλοτιμία en los representantes por excelencia de esta cualidad, especialmente Tito Flaminio, Fabio, Agesilao, Temístocles, Alcibíades, Coriolano, los Gracos y César, a fin de comprobar las afirmaciones de los prólogos de la* Vida de Foción *y* Mulierum virtutes, *sobre si las diversas manifestaciones de φιλοτιμία se deben a las diferencias de caracteres o a las distintas condiciones políticas y sociales. A través del pormenorizado análisis de los variados ejemplos desvela el Profesor Nikolaidis algunas características de esta cualidad, el uso que los personajes hacen de ella, y el valor conferido por Plutarco, de modo que circunscribe su consideración como virtud y como pasión destructiva y también constructiva.* (V.R., A.V.)

J. Opsomer, «Plutarch on the division of the soul», in R. Barney, T. Brennan § Ch. Britten (eds), *Platon and the Divided Self*, Cambridge Univ. press, 2012, 311-330.
Lo studio intende ricostruire la teoria dell'anima di Plutarco a partire dai testi che affrontano il tema in maniera discorsiva e non dialogica – le Questioni platoniche*,* La generazione dell'anima nel Timeo *e* La virtù morale *– ma si appoggia anche su opere quali* Il volto della luna *e* Il demone di Socrate*. L'analisi segue due assi principali. Il primo riguarda il rapporto di continuità tra psicologia e cosmologia, tra l'anima individuale umana e l'anima del mondo: la prima condivide in particolare la struttura della seconda e possiede come quest'ultima tanto una dimensione cinetica quanto una dimensione cognitiva. Il secondo affronta invece il rapporto di Plutarco alla tripartizione platonica dell'anima, in particolare nella* Virtù morale*. In questo scritto la posizione platonica è ritenuta conciliabile con il dualismo psicologico plutarcheo nella misura in cui la parte irascibile e la parte concupiscibile sono ricondotte alla parte non razionale dell'anima. L'identificazione di tale parte è cruciale per assicurare il ponte tra la psicologia e l'etica: lo sforzo morale dell'individuo deve concentrarsi nel tentativo di limitare gli eccessi passionali di tale sfera essenziale della sua persona.* (A.G.)

V. Paci, « Le rôle et l'influence de Plutarque dans la composition des *Annales Galantes de Grèce* de Madame de Villedieu », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 103-114.
Si la source majeure à laquelle Mme de Villedieu a puisé pour la composition de ses Annales galantes de Grèce est sans aucun doute Hérodote, l'influence de Plutarque (et, en particulier, du De mulierum virtutibus*), bien qu'il ne soit jamais cité, doit aussi avoir été décisive. Elle est sensible, dans l'incipit justificatif légitimant qu'on « di(se) aujourd'hui quelque chose des dames » — on sait en effet que, plus largement, son œuvre a contribué à répandre les idées féministes dans les années 1630-1650, et que les Apophtegmes comme les Vertueux faicts des femmes (Amyot) ont aidé l'affirmation du concept de vertu héroïque au féminin. Dans le détail, il sert de source, pour la récupération de « l'histoire secrète » de Solon, qui part de Solon 10 avant de basculer dans l'imaginaire et surtout fournit au personnage fictif majeur, Praxorine, des traits d'Arétaphila.* (F.F.)

M. Pade, «The Fifteenth-Century Latin Versions of Plutarch's *Lives*: Examples of Humanist Translation», *in* J. Glucker & C. Burnett (eds), *Greek into Latin from Antiquity until the nineteenth century* (Warburg Institute colloquia. 18), London, 2012, 171-186.
Questo saggio va ad aggiungersi a diversi altri rilevanti interventi che la

studiosa ha dedicato alle traduzioni umanistiche plutarchee e alle peculiarità dell'arte versoria di diversi interpreti, che nell'Umanesimo si sono cimentati nel rendere in latino le biografie del Cheronese. In particolare, il contributo delinea con efficacia il quadro entro cui avviene la ricezione e la fruizione del testo plutarcheo nel XV secolo e specialmente in Italia, dove le Vite *si affermano come una delle letture preferite e quindi tradotte dal greco con maggiore frequenza: in questa notevole diffusione delle biografie del Cheronese e delle rispettive* versiones *gioca un ruolo fondamentale l'opera del dotto bizantino Emanuele Crisolora e della scuola che si raduna intorno al suo magistero. Venendo alla parte del saggio dedicata alle diverse tecniche versorie adottate dagli esegeti delle* Vite*, di grande interesse e originalità risulta l'analisi dell'uso e riuso di termini e/o espressioni tratti dai classici latini e impiegati nelle traduzioni plutarchee per rendere con più efficacia e in una forma maggiormente accessibile al pubblico dei lettori il lessico e il contenuto dell'originale testo greco.* (S.A.)

J. N. Pascal, « Plutarque de la Jeunesse. Plutarque des Jeunes Demoiselles, Plutarque Français… Quand Plutarque signifiait "dictionnaire biographique" à visée éducative (1760-1850) », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 173-189.

Comme l'indique le titre, dans l'abondante production de dictionnaires biographiques, entre 1750 et 1850, les différents «Plutarque de la jeunesse» («Plutarque des jeunes gens», «Plutarque des demoiselles», etc.), qui ne sont pas loin de constituer une catégorie à part entière et, à l'évidence, une catégorie foisonnante du livre pédagogique de jeunesse, ne conservent du Chéronéen que le nom, synonyme de collection de biographies. (F.F.)

C. B. R. Pelling, «Plutarch on Roman *Philotimia*», *in Lash of Ambition*, 55-68.

L'auteur commence par préciser qu'à l'époque de Plutarque, la philotimia *(l'ambition) est largement reconnue comme une caractéristique romaine, même si, dans le corpus de Plutarque, elle est statistiquement davantage présente dans les* Vies *grecques et joue un rôle particulièrement important dans celles des héros spartiates. Il nous offre ensuite une sorte de parcours historique à travers la* philotimia *des Romains. Débutant par Flamininus, il montre que la* philotimia *de celui-ci est avant tout une ambition personnelle, qui lui fait préférer une paix signée sous son nom à une victoire militaire remportée par d'autres (une attitude qui aurait pu être favorable à la Grèce, si la* philonikia *des Grecs n'avait pas conduit celle-ci à sa perte). Poursuivant avec les Gracques, l'auteur voit chez eux une* philotimia *d'ordre politique, assez naturelle en soi, mais dont l'excès s'avérera fatal. En ce sens, elle préfigure la crise de la République, marquée par la philotimia de grands hommes comme César et Pompée, qui les pousse à se battre entre eux aux dépens de l'État. Toutefois, selon l'auteur, si l'acclimatation des Romains aux grands hommes ambitieux a d'abord été destructive, elle les a finalement conditionnés pour accepter cette nouvelle forme de pouvoir et, dès lors, être prêts pour la monarchie, contrairement à la Grèce, qui n'a pas survécu aux excès de* philotimiai*.* (T.S.)

A. Pérez Jiménez, «Fatalismo, providencia y responsabilidad humana en las *Vidas* de Plutarco», *in Harmonia*, 697-707.

Pérez Jiménez analiza el papel distinguido con que ciertos héroes y estadistas de la Vidas *acometen sus empresas a tenor de la religiosidad inherente a los mismos y su enfoque de la concepción divina y de la fortuna. De este modo, los personajes positivamente religiosos, de* eusébeia *contrastada (como Fabio), hacen primar la responsabilidad de las acciones humanas sin desdén de la divinidad; mientras que los líderes sometidos a una* deisidaimonía *negativa (el caso de Nicias es paradigmático) muestran una*

pasividad en su inacción política, víctimas de su miedo y superstición erróneos. En síntesis, Plutarco acepta la existencia de la Providencia y del Destino pero no el fatalismo : es la responsabilidad o la irresponsabilidad de los dirigentes políticos la que, en última instancia, resulta determinante. Finalmente existe un número de personajes (entre otros, Temístocles o Alejandro) los cuales actúan contra las manifestaciones divinas o las readaptan a voluntad propia. (V.R., A.V.)

A. Pérez-Jiménez, «*NOMOΣ* como criterio de valoración ética en las *Vidas Paralelas*», *in N., K., D.*, 5-21.
En el esquema doctrinal de Plutarco, la justicia es reputada como la más divina de las virtudes humanas. La ley, su correlato esencial, comparece en la producción del Queronense como categoría jurídico-filosófica y, asimismo, como criterio literario para definir las características político-morales de un mandatario. De este modo, la atención a legisladores como Licurgo, Solón y Numa posibilita analizar la condición de la actividad legislativa. Por añadidura, una selección de testimonios relativos a dirigentes de importancia revela la atención de los personajes sea a la justicia, sea a la conveniencia coyuntural ; ya al respeto del nómos*, ya a intereses estrictamente personales.* (V.R., A.V.)

A. Pérez-Jiménez, «Plutarch's Attitude towards Astral Biology», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 159-170.
Mediante el análisis de ciertos pasajes pertenecientes a los Moralia *(particularmente a* Isis y Osiris *; y al* Comentario sobre los 'Trabajos y los Días' *de Hesíodo), el autor efectúa una propuesta de lectura renovada donde se patentiza la influencia astral (especialmente del sol y de la luna) que, al decir del Queronense, repercute en la biología de plantas y de animales. En tal sentido, los planteamientos de Plutarco, sin contradecir sus convicciones de platonista sobre la Providencia divina, se corresponden en buena medida con las opiniones que los contemporáneos de Plutarco sostenían sobre estos fenómenos.* (V.R., A.V.)

J. Pinheiro, «O sentido de *dike* nas biografias de Aristides e Catão Censor», *in N., K., D.*, 41-51.
[«The meaning of dike in the biographies of Aristides and Cato-the-Elder»]
The biographic pair Aristides-Cato-the-Elder *allows a comprehensive analysis of the meaning of dike and other words with the same etymological root. Given the context in which these terms are used, we propose to evaluate their value in shaping the profile of both characters as members of a community, and the ways in which Plutarch combines the individual level of analysis with the need for the society to identify and respect the principles related to dike.* [Published Abstract, slightly revised]

A. Rodrigues, «Political reforms in the *Lives of Lycurgus and Numa*: divine revelation or political lie?», *in N., K., D.*, 67-83.
Se trata de un análisis de los pasajes pertinentes de Plutarco que, en principio, explican las innovaciones legislativas de Licurco y de Numa como normas sancionadas por inspiración divina. En realidad, es probable que nos hallemos ante una mistificación de índole política cuya práctica Plutarco no parece reprobar: el antecedente ideológico de tal asunción debería remitirse a Platón quien, en La República (389 c-d), plantea la posibilidad ética de asumir una instrumentalización de estas características siempre que el objetivo sea noble, es decir, que redunde en beneficio de la ciudadanía. (V.R., A.V.)

J.-M. Rohrbasser, « Les *Délais de la Justice divine*: la théologie noire de Joseph de Maistre », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 275-288.
Centrée sur la pensée de Joseph de Maistre, cette communication rappelle

d'abord le texte grec de base et décompose la réfutation de la thèse épicurienne en sept étapes, puis dessine quelques grands traits de réécriture, en insistant sur les ajouts dont chaque type (insérés dans le texte entre astérisques, en notes de fin de texte, en notes de bas de page) a une fonction spécifique, les premiers, philosophiques, étant les plus intéressants. Après avoir sélectionné et examiné au fil du texte les thèmes qui lui semblent importants (« dogmatisme », « retard », « remords », « instrument », « exemplarité », « transmission », « ordre », « prescience » et « déterminisme »), J.-M. R. conclut en avançant la notion de « théodicée noire », entendant par là la conception d'une Histoire déterministe fondée sur la nécessité du mal. (F.F.)

L. Roig Lanzillotta, «Introduction: Plutarch at the Crossroads of Religion and Philosophy», in *Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 1-13

Plutarch of Chaeronea, who was born to a wealthy family in 45ce, received the best education at home and abroad. He frequently traveled to Rome, Alexandria and Athens; while in Athens he probably attended the lectures of Ammonius, who influenced his adoption of Platonism. However, he spent most of his life in his hometown of Chaeronea, where he later founded a sort of philosophical school or academy in which family, friends and pupils could meet and discuss philosophical issues. Due to his social provenance and education, he developed a rich political career and social life in which he was acquainted with most of the prominent political and cultural figures of the period. He is therefore a first-rate witness to the cultural life of late antiquity. The works of Plutarch, notably his Moralia *but also his* Lives*, provide us with exceptional evidence, since they cover both the insider and outsider perspectives. As a priest of Apollo at Delphi he witnessed pagan religion and ancient religious experience; as a Middle Platonist he was also actively involved in the developments of the philosophical school and provided unique testimony for conceptual issues that would only achieve definitive form in Plotinus and Neoplatonism. As an observer, Plutarch was a sensitive chronicler of events he experienced in a less direct manner and often provided a more detached point of view about the numerous religious practices and currents that permeated the building of ancient pagan religion and the philosophical views of other schools.*

Plutarch's testimony therefore is essential to reconstructing and understanding the philosophical and religious worlds of late antiquity. The copious quotes or allusions to his person and work in antiquity bear witness to his central importance in the philosophical map of antiquity. Plutarch's role in the history of ancient religiosity is as central as the one he plays in the history of ancient philosophy, since his testimony also reveals itself to be essential for the assessment of numerous general and particular religious issues, as with philosophical issues. (L.L.)

L. Roig Lanzillotta, «Plutarch's Idea of God in the Religious and Philosophical Context of late Antiquity», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 137-150.

It is well known that in The Malice of Herodotus *(857F–858A), Plutarch rejected Herodotus' motto* pan phthoneron kai tarachodes *and accused the historian of blasphemy and malice. According to the traditional interpretation, Plutarch was reacting against a view of the gods as "utterly envious and always ready to confound us". However, such an interpretation clearly misses the point of Plutarch's criticism: first of all, the traditional interpretation seems to rely on an over-interpretation of Herodotus' conception of the divinity that interprets as "envious" (*phthoneron*), which we may perhaps rather translate as "avaricious, stingy". In the second place, for a*

thinker such as Plutarch who was so well versed in the Timaeus *and who had such a refined and elevated view of the divine, the attack on Herodotus' misconception of the divinity—and his labeling Herodotus nota bene as blasphemous and malicious—must concern some more fundamental aspect of the divinity than the sheer attribution of envy to god.*
Taking this passage from The Malice of Herodotus *as a starting point, Roig Lanzillotta illuminates numerous aspects of Plutarch's role as an interpreter, a theologian and a philosopher. Comparing this work with other Plutarchean passages that comment on the divine helps us to clarify both Plutarch's point of criticism and his view of the divinity. Plutarch's views on the divine should be placed in the context of the Middle Platonists' reception of* Timaeus *29E, the locus classicus for the definition of God's goodness and his implicit creative activity. More specifically, his views should be placed in the context of Middle Platonic theodicy that denied any divine responsibility for the appearance of evil or imperfection in the realm of creation. In echoing and commenting upon Plato's words, Middle Platonists were mainly concerned with God's creative impulse, the stainless goodness behind it and the impossibility of making him responsible for anything imperfect that resulted from his activity.* (L.L.)

G. Roskam, «Socrates and Alcibiades: A notorious skandalon in the later Platonist tradition», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 85-100.
La conexión entre un filósofo y un estadista constituye una circunstancia tradicional en la cultura universal. Sucede que el consabido amor que Sócrates albergó por Alcibíades fue un tópico largamente explorado habida cuenta la idiosincrasia de los protagonistas. Con la presente contribución, Roskam estudia la valoración del mencionado tópico en dos platonistas tardíos : Plutarco y Proclo. La interpretación al respeto de ambos autores resulta esencialmente acorde, si bien se observa en Proclo un enfoque más sistemático de carácter filosófico (V.R., A.V.)

R. Scannapieco, «*Mysteriodes -theologia*; Plutarch's fr. 157 Sandbach between Cultual Traditions and Philosophical Models», in *Religious and Philosophical Discourse,* 193-214.
Plutarch's role in the history of ancient religiosity is as central as the one he plays in the history of ancient philosophy. One may even contest the separation of philosophy and religion in his work, claiming that such a distinction reveals itself to be artificial. This idea may perhaps also be extrapolated to the whole historical period of late antiquity, in which the confluence between philosophy and religion or religion and philosophy marks off spirituality. This blend comes to the fore in Rosario Scannapieco's chapter. The analysis of fr. 157 Sandbach is the starting point for a wide-ranging study of Plutarch's view of myth and his eclectic approach to its interpretation. It shows Plutarch's interest in the theme of conjugal love, which was also present in his dialogue On Love *and which also underlies the Egyptian myth in* On Isis and Osiris. *The author uncovers close ideological connections between the texts by analyzing the rhetorico-formal structures of the fragment in which Plutarch seems to have suggested a mystico-religious interpretation of reality* (L.R.)

T. A. Schmitz, «Sophistic Philotimia in Plutarch», *in Lash of Ambition*, 69-84.
Establece la diferencia que existía para Plutarco entre la ambición propia de un personaje y la ambición que el autor personalmente denomina sofística, para cuya definición proporciona un listado de elementos que caracterizarían esta competitiva conducta. Esta sofística philotimia *se desarrollaba en ámbitos públicos e institucionalizados, pero también en niveles privados. A través de una serie de pasajes de la obra plu-*

tarquea se expone este fenómeno y el modo en que Plutarco lo conocía y entendía que debía ponerse en práctica (V.R., A.V.)

A. Setaioli, «The *Daimon* in Timarchus' Cosmic Vision (Plu. *De Genio Socr.* 22, 590B-592E)», *in N., K., D.*, 109-119.
In the Timarchus' myth in Plutarch's De genio Socratis*, the daimon is conceived as the highest part of the human soul, currently referred to as "intellect" (νοῦς) and wrongly believed to be internal. By contrast, in two speeches preceding and following the myth (by Simmias and Theanor, respectively), the daimon is a superior entity assisting each man in multiple ways. This is Plutarch's way to harmonize Plato's different pronouncements concerning the personal daimon –an attempt anticipating later developments found in Plotinus.* [Published Abstract]

Mª de F. Silva, «Registo e Memória. Arriano e Plutarco sobre Alexandre», *in* J. A. Ramos & N. Simoens Rodrigues (eds), *Mnemosyne kai Sophia*, Coimbra, 127-148 (https://bdigital.sib.uc.pt/jspui/handle/123456789/134)
Con base en sendos textos relativos a la figura de Alejandro (el histórico de la Anábasis de Alejandro*, de Arriano, y el biográfico de la* Vida de Alejandro *plutarquea), la autora se propone indagar en el manejo respectivo que ambos escritores efectuaron sobre las fuentes orales, los documentos escritos, los testimonios plásticos y arqueológicos pertinentes. Esta pesquisa permite verificar una comparación sobre los postulados metodológicos y la posición que, en consecuencia, adoptan Arriano y Plutarco. Así las cosas, Arriano prima los criterios historiográficos y estético-literarios para conformar su composición, con distinción de los testimonios creíbles de los inverosímiles. Por su parte, Plutarco, de un modo más general, jerarquiza las fuentes disponibles (citando profusión de autoridades) en función de su fiabilidad documental.* (V.R., A.V.)

N. Simões Rodrigues, «'Least that's what Plutarch says'. Plutarco no cinema», *in As artes*, 139-272.
[«'Least that's what Plutarch says'. Plutarch in cinema»]
Many of the movies that the film industry has devoted to Antiquity, especially to Classical Antiquity, owe their basic arguments to the works of Plutarch. Such is the case of Julius Caesar *(J. L. Mankiewicz, 1953),* Spartacus *(S. Kubrick, 1960),* Cleopatra *(J. L. Mancкiewicz, 1963),* Alexander *(O. Stone, 2004), and* 300 *(Z. Snyder, 2007). This paper analyzes the relationship between the scripts of these films and Plutarch's texts, both the* Vitae *and the* Moralia*, concluding that the work of the author of Chaeronea was as fundamental to Western culture during the medieval times and modernity, as it is in the contemporary period.* (D.L.)

N. Simões Rodrigues, «*Nomos* e *kosmos* na caracterização do António e da Cleópatra de Plutarco», *in N., K., D.*, 101-107.
[«Nomos and kosmos in the characterization of Plutarch's Antony and Cleopatra»]
Although words like nomos *and* kosmos *are almost absent in Plutarch's biography of Antony and Cleopatra, the concepts they imply support the author's construction of the* Life*. The "bigamist" relationship between Antony, Octavia and Cleopatra as well as Antony's uncontrollable passion for Cleopatra are examples of the absence of law and order in Mark Antony's life.* [Published Abstract]

P. Simões Rodrigues, «Um percurso temático no tempo: As *Vidas Paralelas* de Plutarco e a pintura europeia do século xvi ao século xix. Primeiras abordagens», *in As artes*, 69-138.
[«A thematic path in time: Plutarch's Parallel Lives *and the European paint-*

ing from the 16th to the19th century. First Approaches»]
The chapter analyzes, in a long-term perspective, Plutarch's Parallel Lives *as a thematic source for the history of European painting. The analysis is carried out by two complementary approaches: the contribution that themes based on literary sources gave, on the one hand, to the representation of an idea of history and, on the other, to the consolidation and prestige of the history of painting between the 16th and 19th centuries.* (D.L.)

P. J. Smith, « "Notre cher Plutarque". Madame de Charrière lectrice de Plutarque », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e s.*, 115-129.
P.J.S. souligne l'importance qu'a eue Plutarque pour Isabelle de Charrière (1740-1805) au point de lui inspirer, à la fin de sa vie, en réponse à l'annonce d'un abrégé ds Vies, le projet (jamais réalisé) d'une « extension de celles de ces vies qui me paroissent les plus intéressantes », à commencer par celle de Cicéron. La supériorité qu'elle lui accorde « tient sans doute au fait qu sa lecture peut s'appliquer à la vie (mondaine) contemporaine » et il lui sert de référence pour juger figures et événements de son temps. Il est aussi une des principales sources d'information sur l'Antiquité, un modèle de discours historique, fait de modération et tout en nuances, un exemple de réussite stylistique (elle le lit en traduction française ou en anglaise), une aide thérapeutique, voire une source de consolation. Mais, si sa « lecture partagée meuble une sociabilité », elle ne peut susciter cette « intimité heureuse » que procurent les classiques français, La Fontaine, Molière et Mme de Sévigné. (F.F.)

P. A. Stadter, «The Philosopher's Ambition: Plutarch, Arrian and Marcus Aurelius», *in Lash of Ambition*, 85-97 (Reprinted, with minor changes, in P. A. Stadter (2015), *Plutarch and his Roman readers*, Oxford, 199-211).
Après avoir rappelé en introduction ce qui factuellement peut unir les trois personnages retenus, P. A. S. souligne l'essentiel pour son propos : leur ambition d'inscrire la philosophie dans l'exercice de leurs responsabilités publiques -si différent qu'en soit le niveau. Il examine ensuite les motivations de chacun, en s'appuyant sur leur carrière et leurs écrits, d'abord pour Marc-Aurèle (à partir des Pensées), puis pour Arrien (en accordant une importance particulière à l'Anabase), enfin pour Plutarque (pour lequel sont mises en avant les Vies, qui participent de l'ambition de contribuer à créer l'esprit nouveau voulu par Trajan en haussant la sensibilité morale de la classe politique). Il rappelle enfin que l'ambition n'est pas sans provoquer des tensions internes : Plutarque s'expose, en cultivant de hautes amitiés romaines, à des contraintes peu compatibles avec la philosophie, l'ambition d'Arrien, comme le montre sa carrière, n'est pas exempte d'un esprit de compétition et de succès qui s'écarte de l'esprit de service prôné par Épictète, gloire et immortalité reviennent constamment dans les Pensées. C'est cependant la noble ambition qui, dans les trois cas, l'a emporté. (F.F.)

P. A. Stadter, «Plutarch cites Horace: *(Luc.* 39.5)», *in Harmonia*, 781-793 (Reprinted, with minor changes, in P. A. Stadter (2015), *Plutarch and his Roman readers*, Oxford, 138-148).
It is generally assumed that Plutarch's reference to Horace, Epistles *1.6* at Luc. *39.5, his only explicit citation of a Latin poet, cannot have been based on direct reading. This article, building on an earlier one about an allusion to Cicero's* Lucullus *in* Luc. *42.4 (Stadter in Studies devoted to Professor Frederick E. Brenk 2010, 407-418) argues on the basis of Plutarch's knowledge of Latin, and of the context of the citation in Plutarch's* Lucullus*, that Plutarch had indeed read Horace directly, probably recording the passage in his notes for later use. An appendix argues that, in Plutarch's famous statement about his knowledge of Latin in* Dem. *2.4, he claims that he*

*is able to appreciate Latin style. Two examples (*Caius Gracch. *17.9;* Caes. *50.3-4) show Plutarch's sensitivity to features of Latin style and desire to capture them in Greek.* (T.D.)

P. A. Stadter, «Staying up late: Plutarch's reading of Xenophon», *in* F. Hobden, Ch. Tuplin (eds.), *Xenophon. Ethical Principles and Historical Enquery*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2012, 43-62.

Partant du constat qu'il existe entre Plutarque et Xénophon de grandes similitudes en tant qu'auteurs, penseurs et citoyens engagés, cet article très bien structuré examine, dans l'ensemble du corpus plutarquéen, les mentions (citations ou allusions) que le Chéronéen fait des œuvres de l'Athénien (dont il était manifestement très familier), en particulier le Banquet*, la* Cyropédie, *les* Mémorables, *l'*Economique*, la* Constitution des Lacédémoniens*, l'*Anabase *et le* Cynégétique*. Il ressort de cette analyse détaillée que Xénophon est bien plus qu'un modèle stylistique ou une source historique pour Plutarque, mais que le Chéronéen se réapproprie l'œuvre de son illustre prédécesseur et la transforme pour l'inclure dans son propre discours et l'adapter au contexte de son époque, usant à cette fin de techniques telles que la construction intertextuelle, l'usage d'exempla, la réappropriation de citations, la mise en contexte d'informations ciblées, le recours à des phrases ou des images particulièrement frappantes pour soutenir sa propre argumentation, les allusions à des anecdotes bien connues, et bien d'autres. À cet égard, selon l'auteur, Plutarque se révèle un digne représentant de la Renaissance grecque des deux premiers siècles de notre ère.* (T.S.)

M. Tozza, «Animali parlanti e giustizia in Plutarco ed Omero», *in N., K., D.*, 191-200.

Nel dialogo Bruta animalia ratione uti *Plutarco non solo dimostra una conoscenza ampia e approfondita del testo omerico, ma è in grado di utilizzarlo, attraverso frequenti rimandi letterari, per rafforzare il suo intento satirico nella dimostrazione della superiorità degli animali sugli esseri umani, evidenziata sul piano fisico, etico e intellettivo: più degli uomini, gli animali si avvicinerebbero a caratteristiche che le stesse divinità posseggono. Il riferimento omerico al cavallo di Achille, in particolare (19, 408-417), dimostra come l'animale, cui Era aveva dato il dono della parola (dono che avrebbe perso a causa delle Erinni), sia portatore di un ideale di giustizia in tutto coerente con la categoria del 'giusto' in Omero.* (M.D.S.)

M. Tröster, «Plutarch and mos majorum in the *Life of Æmilius Paullus*», *AncSoc.* 42 (2012) 219-254.

Plutarch's Aemilius gives a favourable portrait, praising the subject's qualities as a wise and traditionalist statesman at home and a philanthropic and philhellenic benefactor abroad. Although his policies are characterised as distinctly 'conservative', Aemilius succeeds in winning universal popularity, thus bridging the divide between Senate and people. Only his unruly troops, led astray by demagogues, temporarily disturb the general consensus. Throughout the narrative, Aemilius strives to educate the people around him: his sons and his peers, Roman citizens and soldiers, foreign peoples and leaders. While many of these features can also be found in the wider historical tradition, Plutarch adapts them to suit his own interests and objectives. The same applies to his representation of Roman political life in the Middle Republic, which sometimes resembles a golden age of ancestral virtue and at other times is characterised by decay and indiscipline. Aemilius upholds and enforces the political and moral standards cherished by Plutarch and by the Roman tradition of mos maiorum. (Published abstract, slightly shortened) (T.D.)

M. Vamvouri Ruffi, «Physical and Social Corruption in Plutarch», *in* P. Bosman (ed.), *Corruption and integrity in ancient Greece and Rome* (Acta classica. Supplementum. 4.). Pretoria, 2012, 131-150.
Dada la complejidad de la noción de "corrupción" en la Antigüedad, la autora limita el estudio al campo semántico del verbo διαφθείρω en las obras de Plutarco, en las que indica corrupción tanto física como moral o política. De este modo, se sirve Plutarco de metáforas fisiológicas de la corrupción moral y, asimismo, recomienda remedios fisiológicos y sociales. Mientras que la corrupción física conduce a la enfermedad y a la muerte, y la corrupción moral aparece descrita como una enfermedad, no la trata de ese modo necesariamente en el caso de corrupción política. Plutarco la desaprueba pero en ocasiones la considera oportuna, especialmente cuando atañe a una actuación por el bien de la ciudad y no concierne directamente a sus ciudadanos. (V.R., A.V.)

L. Van der Stockt, «*Economia* in heaven and on earth. Plutarch's *nomos* between rhetoric and science», *in N., K., D.,* 203-213.
El profesor Van der Stockt examina los testimonios en los cuales el Queronense estudia la importancia mayor de la religión y de la filosofía comparadas con las medidas legislativas en el ámbito de la política. Sucede que, al decir del platonista Plutarco (y como se desprende de Sobre la cara de la luna *927 A-B), el cosmos es responsabilidad de un creador, el soberano Zeus, artista y orfebre cuya 'persuasión' (la cual se juzga un agente divino) se impone a las leyes de la naturaleza y debiera constituir sencillamente una recurso modélico para los legisladores.* (V.R., A.V.)

L. Van der Stockt, «Plutarch and Apuleius; Laborious Routes to Isis», *in* W. H. Keulen (ed.), *Aspects of Apuleius* Golden Ass*. The Isis Book. A Collection of Original Papers,* Groningen, 2012, 168-182.
Wie kann man das Verhältnis von Plutarch und Apuleius bestimmen? Van der Stockt konzentriert sich auf das jeweilige Interesse an der ägyptischen Göttin Isis. Zwar bleibt der Leser nach seiner Analyse mit keinerlei klar identifizierbaren Parallelaussagen zurück, die einen Weg von Plutarch zu Apuleius zeichnen ließen. Die kontextuelle Deutung des gemeinsamen Interesses an Isis erweist die beiden Darstellungen aber ein Ausloten zweier Hemisphären innerhalb des einen mittelplatonischen Koordinatensystem. (R.H-L)

G. Van Kooten, «A Non-Fideistic Interpretation of *pistis* in Plutarch's Writings: The harmony between pistis and knowledge», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 215-234.
«In this paper I would like to challenge the straightforward applicability of modern categories such as "belief" in the study of ancient philosophers such as Plutarch». Sur ces bases, après avoir admis [216] l'existence de passages où l'on peut trouver ce que nous appelons un sens "fidéiste" –affirmation sur laquelle, tout en souscrivant à la déclaration de principe initiale, j'aurais pour ma part quelques réserves : voir F. Frazier, « Philosophie et religion dans la pensée de Plutarque. Quelques réflexions autour des emplois du mot πίστις », Études platoniciennes *V (2008) 41-61, recensé in* Ploutarchos n.s. *9 (2011/2012) 124) – G.v.K. se livre à un réexamen systématique des sens de πίστις (dont le principe de classement pourrait être plus nettement indiqué), soit successivement « The "Religious" Meaning of Πίστις » (217-222, à propos de* De frat. amor. *483C,* De Is. *377B-C,* De superst. *170F,* Amat. *756A-C,* De Is. *359F-360A,* Non posse *1101A-C,* De adul. *35E-F); «Two Forms of Πίστις: Misfounded Faith and Strengthened Faith» (223-224, avec* Qu. conv. *624A et* Sept. sap. Conv. *151F, auxquels s'ajoute Arist.* Rhet. *1355b35); « Πίστις as Persuasion » (224-226, avec* De garr.

503D, Adv. Col. *1114D-E); «Πίστις in the Sense of Trust» (226-227, avec* Sept. sap. conv. *160E,* Non posse *1099D,* Qu. conv. *627E,* Sept. sap. conv. *164D); «The Philosophical Use of πίστις and πιστεύειν» (227-233:* Cons. ad ux. *610B-D, 611D, 612A-B; fr. 178; De* Alex. fort. *328A-B;* Qu. conv. *627E;* Sept. Sap. conv. *164D,* Amat. *756B, 756C-757C, 763B-C, 764A, 763E,* De Is. *369B-E).* (F.F.)

P. Volpe Cacciatore, «La giustizia del saggio: una polemica di Plutarco contro gli Stoici», *in N., K., D.*, 153-160.
La studiosa rilegge la concezione plutarchea della Giustizia attraverso un serrato confronto con le interpretazioni che di Dike *si ritrovano in Platone, Aristotele e specialmente nel pensiero stoico. In particolare, in base all'esegesi dei frammenti 35-39, viene evidenziato il valore politico della giustizia - intesa come la più alta delle virtù civiche - e il rapporto che essa ha con la vita della polis e con le leggi che tale vita sono chiamate a regolare. Una visione politica della giustizia, quella proposta dal Cheronese, evidentemente lontana da quella stoica, che pone costantemente in risalto come* Dike *sia invece legata a quella legge naturale capace di tenere insieme l'intera umanità.* (S.A.)

P. Volpe Cacciatore, «"Cicalata sul fascino vulgarmente detto jettatura": Plutarch, *Quaestio convivalis* 5. 7», *in Religious and Philosophical Discourse*, 171-180.
A partire da una ricognizione degli echi classici presenti nell'opera settecentesca Cicalata sul fascino volgarmente detto jettatura *dell'intellettuale e giurista napoletano Valletta, un trattato che suscitò tra l'altro l'approvazione di Benedetto Croce, la studiosa indaga il fenomeno della* baskania *come descritto da Plutarco nella* quaestio. *Nella trattazione di un argomento così peculiare quale il malocchio il registro storico s'intreccia costantemente con quello filosofico-etico. Nello scritto plutarcheo, inoltre, è possibile cogliere la ripresa di temi e immagini che il Cheronese ha affrontato anche in altre opere: in particolare, l'indagine condotta sulla* quaestio *dedicata alla* baskania *pone in risalto il legame - tematico e lessicale - con i frammenti 1 e 2 (detti "Tyrwhitt") nei quali Plutarco tratta delle passioni che toccano il corpo e/o l'anima. Anche il malocchio ha una dimensione etica/interiore fortemente legata a quella fisica/esteriore: l'aspetto dello jettatore, infatti, altro non è che una proiezione del male e della malvagità che inquina la sua psyche.* (S.A.)

S.A. Xenophontos, «Plutarch's Compositional Technique in the *An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit*: Clusters vs. Pattern», *AJPh* 133 (2012) 61-91.
La presencia de grupos de pasajes paralelos en An seni respublica gerenda sit *y* Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum *desvela, de acuerdo con las teorías de la escuela de Lovaina, un fuerte «cluster» que, en opinión de la autora, podría estar indicando que, de las obras estudiadas, la primera obra tomó como fuente a la segunda. Por otra parte, el elaborado patrón de pensamiento compartido por* An seni respublica gerenda sit *y* Praecepta gerendae reipublicae *no constituye un «cluster» sino que Plutarco reutiliza un mismo material ajustándolo a diferentes contextos, de forma que ambas obras se complementan.* (V.R., A.V.)

A. Zadorojnyi, «Mimesis and the (plu)past in Plutarch's *Lives*», *in* J. Grethlin & C. B. Krebs (eds), *Time and Narrative in ancient historiography. The "plupast" from Herodotus to Appian*, Cambridge, 2012, 175-198.
A.Z applique à l'œuvre de Plutarque le concept de «plupast», par quoi il faut entendre ce qui, dans un ouvrage historique, renvoie à un passé antérieur à celui du récit, et l'inscrit dans la perspective de la Seconde Sophistique en mettant en avant les notions, centrales à cette époque, d'exemplarité et de mimesis. Il en résulte un exposé en trois

parties, la première passant en revue l'ensemble des emplois de mimesis chez Plutarque, la deuxième proposant une typologie des passages qui signalent l'imitation par un homme d'un autre qui lui est historiquement antérieur ("intradiegetic mimesis") distinguant les cas (A) où cette imitation est revendiquée par le ou les personnage(s), (B) où les gens de l'époque interprètent ainsi son comportement, (C) où ce jugement est porté par le narrateur ou sa source. Enfin, la troisième analyse un cas d'intertextualité, la description du camp fastueux des Pompéiens (Pomp. 72, 5-6), qui serait inspirée du récit d'Hérodote après Platées (9, 80, 1 et 9, 82, 1-2). Tout en reconnaissant que ce motif est devenu un topos -ce qui fragilise le rapprochement-, A.Z le pousse néanmoins en arguant que "the plupast yields an occasion for metahistorical mimesis between comparable situations" (195) et suggère la création par là d'un parallèle entre César et Pausanias, dont le relais ("the intertextual bridge") serait Alexandre, lui-même placé dans une situation comparable et modèle de César et plus encore de Pompée. L'auteur de ces lignes avoue peiner à ne pas voir là une surinterprétation abusive, entraînée par la thématique du volume. Mais, plus généralement –et c'est un défaut que risquent tous les ouvrages thématiques de ce genre– c'est le prisme du "plupast" et le cadre large de la réflexion sur l'identité grecque qui frustrent quelque peu le spécialiste de Plutarque, car ils amènent à ne plus tenir assez compte ni des contextes particuliers (importants dans la deuxième partie), ni de l'anthropologie de Plutarque (essentielle pour sa conception de la mimesis morale).

En annexe, je voudrais profiter de ce résumé pour esquisser une explication du contraste entre historia et mimesis de Per. *2.4, prétendument en contradiction avec* Per. *2.2 (181); or, dans les deux passages, la construction et donc le sens sont différents : ζῆλον ... ἀγωγὸν εἰς μίμησιν fait de l'imitation l'action à laquelle on est porté, ἠθοποιοῦν οὐ τῇ μιμήσει τὸν θεατήν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου τὴν προαίρεσιν παρεχόμενον la présente comme le moyen par lequel le bien provoque cette action et forme le caractère; la notion essentielle dans cette seconde phrase est celle de προαίρεσις, le choix volontaire, fruit d'une connaissance de l'action, opposée à une simple réaction imitative du spectateur, et étape nécessaire d'un passage à l'acte délibéré : elle renvoie à l'anthropologie de Plutarque, telle qu'il l'expose e.g. in* Cor. *32,7.* (F.F.)

E. Zanin, « Dramatisation et Moralisation des *Vies* dans la tragédie moderne », *in Plutarque de l'Âge cl. au XIX^e^ s.*, 69-87.
L'importance de Plutarque comme source de sujets tragiques à partir de la Cléopâtre captive de Jodelle étant bien connue, E.Z. se propose d'« esquisser des hypothèses pour expliquer cette influence, qui tient sans doute au grand succès que connut l'œuvre de Plutarque, d'abord dans ses versions latines et ensuite dans la traduction d'Amyot » (69), mais qui peut tenir aussi à la forme et à la structure même des Vies. *Elle en prend pour exemple* Antoine *(qui pose en particulier la question de la* metabasis*, 70-76) et* César *(pour lequel est examiné le problème de la causalité, 76-79). Revenant sur* Antoine *(79 sq), E.Z essaie enfin de montrer comment les* Moralia *(*De sera, De fato, De fortuna*) ont contribué à fonder dans un premier temps une morale de la tragédie, morale ambiguë qui révèle une causalité complexe (81), mais tend à se simplifier à partir des années 1630 et à évoluer dans le sens d'une plus grande clarté.* (F. F.)

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Constitution for the International Plutarch Society

1. **Purpose of the Society**. The Society exists to further the study of Plutarch and his various writings and to encourage scholarly communication between those working on Plutarchan studies.
2. **Organization.** The Society is constituted of national sections formed by the members of the Society living in each country. The national sections may function as independents units, with their own officers, constitutions and by-laws.
3. **Duties of the Officers**. The President is the official head of the Society and is responsible for planning and implementing programs to further the Society's goals. His chief duty is to see that regular international meetings are planned. The responsibility for hosting and organizing the details of the meetings belongs to the national society hosting the meeting.
4. **The President of the Society** is selected by the heads of the national sections from among their own number, for a term of three years. The Editor of *Ploutarchos* & of *Ploutarchos, n.s.*, the Secretary-Treasurer, and the President-Elect are likewise chosen by the heads of the national sections for a term of three years. The terms of the Editor and Secretary-Treasurer may be renewed. The heads of the national sections serve as an advisory board to the President.
5. **The President-Elect** assists the President, and succeeds automatically to the Presidency at the end of his three-year term. The outgoing president will remain as Honorary President for the following period of three years.
6. **The Editor of *Ploutarchos*** is responsible for the preparation and production of *Ploutarchos* (electronic Bulletin) and *Ploutarchos, n.s.* and arranges for its distribution, either directly to members or through the national sections. The Editor and the President jointly appoint the Book Review Editor.
7. **The Secretary-Treasurer**, who may be identical with the Editor, is responsible for the general correspondence of the Society, for maintaining the membership list, and for collecting dues and disbursing money for expenses. The chief expense is expected to be connected with the distribution of *Ploutarchos, n.s.*
8. **Amendments.** This constitution may be amended, or by-laws added, by a majority vote of the national representatives.

XIth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society.
The Dynamics of Intertextuality in Plutarch
(University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

1) From 10 to 13 May 2017, the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) will host the XIth of the IPS. The conference will focus on the dynamics of intertextuality in Plutarch. Its aim is to explore the various aspects and functions of intertextuality in the works of Plutarch (*Parallel Lives* and *Moralia*) from a literary, historical, philosophical, moral, religious and scientific perspective.

The conference is open to the members of the International Plutarch Society and to any person interested in the topic, from the academic world or the general public, as well as to PhD students and junior researchers working on Plutarch or on intertextuality.

2) Organizers: Thomas Schmidt (Fribourg); Maria Vamvouri Ruffy (Lausanne); Rainer Hirsch-Luipold (Bern).

3) Scientific board: Mark Beck (South Carolina); Aristoula Georgiadou (Patras); †Françoise Frazier (Paris X - Nanterre); Delfim Leao (Coimbra); Chris Pelling (Oxford); Aurelio Pérez Jiménez (Málaga); Geert Roskam (Leuven); Paola Volpe Cacciatore (Salerno).

4) Topics: It is widely recognized that Plutarch's works aim to bring the readers to reflect upon and thus to improve their own existence and way of life. It is also well known that this educational goal is achieved by constant hints of, or references to, philosophers, historical and mythical figures, authors and traditions that Plutarch invites the reader to (re)discover. In so far as they integrate this rich historical, literary, philosophical, religious, medical and more widely scientific heritage, Plutarch's works are a mine of knowledge of the past. In this perspective, intertextuality is an indispensable part of the study of his works. The conference will focus on the various aspects and functions of intertextuality in Plutarch. In their abstracts and communications, the participants will be asked not only to indicate the aspect of intertextuality they are interested in, but also to specify the functions of intertextuality, interdiscursivity, intratextuality or intergenericity, used as interpretative tools.

I. Aspects of Intertextuality

A. In his works, Plutarch uses specific intertextual devices such as quotation, reference, allusion, pastiche and intertextual play with various authors (Homer, Xenophon, Plato, etc.) as well as with various traditions presented by those authors.

B. Plutarch's works include frequent references or allusions to other texts within the Plutarchean corpus. This intratextuality is a precious tool for the interpretation of anecdotes, exempla, traditions, arguments, terminology, etc.

C. At places, Plutarch's texts closely follow certain types of discourse without referring to a specific author or text. In such cases, it is preferable to speak of interdiscursivity, i.e. about the presence of medical, religious, judicial and political discourse in Plutarch's texts. These discourses disclose themselves in the use of specific lexical fields, metaphors, comparisons, etc.

D. Plutarch's works make use of, or reference to, different so-called literary genres (intergenericity). By integrating or gesturing towards one or several of these genres within a specific work, Plutarch enriches his texts as an author (auctorial genericity).

II. Functions of Intertextuality

A. The educational goal and the rhetoric of proof: to what extent do references, quotations or allusions to specific texts, discourses or literary genres, work for Plutarch's educational program and for his argumentation? It becomes increasingly clear that Plutarch reworks the material he uses in order to adjust it to his educational/argumentative goal which may even include twisting the meaning of – for instance originally Stoic – terminology.

B. The construction of the Self: a) to what extent does a specific aspect of intertextuality depict and emphasize self-representation and self-exploration? Plutarch uses intertextual material not only to construct an image of himself – as a person, an author, a priest, a philosopher and so forth - but also to create a certain vision of the intellectual and social community. b) Does Plutarch's allusiveness create an impression of the ideal reader that the real reader may feel flattered by or inspired to emulate?

C. The delight of the reader: how does intertextuality promote the delight and the pleasure of the interlocutor or the reader?

D. The memory of the reader: this deals with reception and the dynamics of Plutarch's intertextuality that the reader himself constructs. Which Plutarchean allusions does the reader use in order to construct the intertextual links in cases where intertextuality is not clearly indicated by the author?

E. The constitution of the text itself: to what extent are intra- and intertextuality necessary to resolve critical problems concerning the textual transmission of Plutarch's works?

5) Registration: The registration for the congress will start in December 2016. All practical information (programme of the congress, hotel bookings, registration fees, etc.) will be communicated at that time.


Ligurgus