HOW COULD ARISTOTLE HAVE READ THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES? FRANCISCO DE TOLEDO, FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND MANUEL DE GÓIS ON ARISTOTLE’S ‘DE ANIMA’ II 7 -12 COMO TERIA LIDO, ARISTÓTELES, OS 'EXERCÍCIOS ESPIRITUAIS? A LEITURA DE 'DE ANIMA' II 7-12 POR FRANCISCO DE TOLEDO, FRANCISCO SUÁREZ E MANUEL GÓIS

For the first time ever, this paper aims at answering to the hypothetical question of the title dwelling on how three eminent Aristotelian Jesuit philosophers, Francisco de Toledo (+1596), Manuel de Góis (+1597), and Francisco Suárez (+1617) read one particular section of Aristotle’s’ De Anima II. Firstly, from the contribution of the Aristotelian doctrine of the senses, emerges an ontology of a consistent and diversified world. Dealing with the necessary passage from ontology to semiotics, the presence of the world to the senses will come out and hence the shift from psychology to cosmology. Such a shift, though in its version of a creatural metaphysics, will let us face anew the relationship between imagination (of the world) and a worldly or incarnated spirituality.

Differently from the spiritual theology which is, indisputably, the correct horizon for reading the Exercises, Francisco de Toledo (+1596), 5 Manuel de Góis (+1597), 6 and Francisco Suárez (+1617) 7 explicitly commented on the Aristotelian philosophical doctrine of the senses (i.e. De Anima II 7 -12). For historical and philosophical reasons, we will be obliged to dwell on two other Jesuits: Cosme de Magalhães (+1624), for, closely related to Góis, he wrote on the senses as well, 8 and Sebastião do Couto (+1639), the author of the semiotic theory that, in our view, underlies the Aristotelian Jesuit doctrine of the senses. 9 There is no doubt that all these Jesuit thinkers considered their philosophical work as structurally Aristotelian 10 .
There are, of course, on this particular subject, i.e. the Aristotelian doctrine of the senses, some differences among our Jesuit commentators, mostly due to contextual or idiosyncratic reasons. Toledo Castellote, Tomo 2: d. 2, q. 7 -d. 7, q. 16. (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1981); cf. also Salvador Castellote, "Introduccción", xxxix -xli, in Francisco Suárez. Commentaria una  Argyropolous' translation of De Anima 11 and the number of Toledo's "texts" on the senses -being "text" the technical name given to the clauses that divided the Aristotelian Latin translation, following Averroes' editorial tradition -is bigger than the number of Góis'. In his own way, Góis approaches Aristotle's oeuvre from a much more sophisticated philological point of view, whereas Toledo prefers to pinpoint the various difficulties presented throughout the chapters of the De Anima. 12 Finally, Suárez distinguishes himself from Toledo and Góis, since he reduces the number of questions to be dealt with the subject matter, and seems to be more willing to break free from the authoritative text, although, as he admits, the text is to be followed systematically and "as far as possible" according to its original order. 13 The state of the art related to the general doctrine of the external senses seems to indicate that a common thought may be expected. 14 However, this should not be taken as if looking for any differences was superfluous.
Another caveat is needed. The deliberated limitation of the present paper to the sensorial realm is not to be interpreted as if we underestimate other layers of the De Anima. Suffice to mention that the Exercises aims at a good reasoning as well as at a good affection, ascribing rumination to the intellect, and deepening the emotions to the will (Ex. 50, 6). 15 Many interpreters are still discussing over which the exact key (being of an intellective or an affective nature) in which to read the Exercises. 16 Likewise, the conjoint treatment 11 Cf. Mário S. de Carvalho, "Nótulas para o estudo da presença de Aristóteles no Portugal do século XVI" in Manuel C. de Matos (coord.), A Apologia do Latim. In honorem Dr. Miguel Pinto de Meneses (1917. Vol. I (Lisboa: Edições Távola Redonda, 2005), 291 -2. 12 Cf, Toledo, Commentaria… I, c. 1, tt. 4 -9, fol. 10vb -12ra, as a possible example, among many others. 13  in what follows, we aim at something different. First, we shall try to bring forward the Jesuit philosophical contribution to the Aristotelian doctrine of the senses. We will see how, from a plural "cartography of the senses" ( § 1), emerges an ontology of a consistent and diversified world. Afterwards, in accordance with a well known Thomistic principle -every "thing is not signified as it actually is (res ut est), but rather as it is in the measure of our apprehension (pro mensura nostrae apprehensionis)" 18 -the necessary passage from ontology to semiotics will be dealt with ( § 2). (Let us repeat something trivial, as far as Jesuit though is concerned: in the effort to read Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas' oeuvre would be a good companion, not a refined bibliographical luxury.) Permeating the spiritual goal one is supposed to attain by doing the Exercises -namely, "to desire and choose only that which is more conducive to the end for which we are created" (Ex. 23, 7) -, semiotics could not be the last stop, if basic Jesuit Aristotelianism was to be followed with consistency. Accordingly, the necessary presence of the world to the senses will emerge as an integration of the world into spirituality and spirituality will acquire a new dimension. The shift from psychology to cosmology, in the very form of an incipient creatural metaphysical anthropology, will let us face anew the relationship between imagination (of the world) and a worldly or incarnated spirituality ( § 3). If this is the correct rhythm to answer the hypothetical question put forward in the title of this paper, one is obliged to say that Aristotle's De Anima II is unrecognisable to the Philosopher's eye but very much responsive to the anthropological sensibility of the 16 th and 17 th centuries.

An Aristotelian Jesuit cartography of the senses
According to Aristotle, as well as experience, as Francisco Suárez repeatedly insists, all knowledge begins with the senses. 19 De Anima II 7 -12 is a treatise on the dematerialisation of sensory perception, but it would be unfair not to recognise the radical empiricism at the basis of a conception of perception as a physical and physiological dimension; with Aristotle's own words: "… all sense -perception is a process of being so affected." 20 In order to see in imagination, for example, "the length, breadth, and depth of hell" (Ex. 65, 3), or "the synagogues, villages, and castles through which Christ our Lord passed as he preached" (Ex. 91, 3), according to Aristotelian terms and method, first, one would have progressed from the objects of the senses (the constituents of the world) to their individualized five powers or potencies (the first characteristic of living beings). Since, according to Aquinas' authoritative words: "…obiecta sunt praevia potentiis", 21 let us look first at those objects.

Hierarchies of the five senses
Already from the method of the five points mentioned by the Exercises, it is clear that the order Ignatius follows to introduce sensorial examples parallels the importance or the perfection of the five senses 22 : seeing the fires of hell, hearing the cries, perceiving the smoke, experiencing the tastes, and feeling how the flames touch the souls and burn them (Ex. 65 -70). There were several ways of presenting the hierarchy of the senses. This problem is not completely outside the scope of today's philosophy, especially if envisa- ged within a program that aims at clarifying the epistemology of evidence, eventually asserting that the senses of smell and taste are of a more affective than cognitive nature. 23 Let us however return to our 16 th century Jesuits. From the point of view of the utility (utilitas) of the senses, smell -which, according to Toledo, is inferior by nature to the sense of taste 24 -is the more imperfect sense, according to Suárez, and it is immediately followed by the sense of taste; with the exception of the sense of seeing, on the highest position, the other three senses are more or less equivalent. 25 Now, from the point of view of learning (per disciplinam): due to the large number of the objects the senses may experience, touch and -seeing are the most important, incidentally followed by the sense of hearing, hence the more universality of the sense of seeing, "ex parte obiecti", and of the sense of touch, "ex parte subiecti." 26 From the point of view of the pleasure the senses may give to humans, Suárez recognizes the preference of touch and taste, even if he places the sense of seeing in a different spectrum. 27 In some circumstances, as again in learning, Suárez says, hearing gives more pleasure than seeing. 28 Seeing and hearing have a relevance of their own. Regardless of the imperfection of the qualitative being (in esse qualitatis) of sound, due to its sensible being (in esse sensibilis), hearing is, Suárez says, "… much more perfect than the other three senses, due to the eminent mode of the stimulation attached to it." 29 Hearing is thus the second most important external sense. No sense whatsoever overcomes vision in perfection (perfectissimus sensus), which Suárez justifies as follows: i) its object, the light, is of the noblest quality; ii) light is capable of travelling the longest distances; iii) noble too is the way vision responds to light; iv) vision knows its objects in greater quantity and perfection, attains the sky, its movements and constellations; v) the eye is a perfect organ, hence the possibility of being easily injured. 30

The cosmological stuff of the senses
"If objects come before the potencies of the knowledge," it would be impossible to address the senses one by one disregarding their respective objects. Light, colour, sound, smell and tastes, as well as dimensional objects, are all qualities of primary substances and it is precisely because of this ontological condition that the world is perceived by humans. The senses of touch and flavour are particularly worth mentioning, clearly due to the fact that they do not exhibit the qualities that exist in the sensorial organs but those presented in real things. 31 Suárez follows Plato's cartography (Tim. 65b -66c), as regards the eight categories of taste: sweet, bitter, greasy, salty, insipid, intense, spicy and acidic; as to the sense of smell, he also distinguishes between fragrant and foul, and between a severe and an acute odour as well. 32 For his purposes, Francisco de Toledo lists the "sweet, bitter, neutral smell, sour, and strong," a palette that, again, is said to contribute to delight as well as displeasure. 33 Thereupon, and not taking into consideration other physical conditions that could interfere with meditation -e.g. listening is supposed to become sharper if one temporarily restrains from inhaling air 34 -, we may better understand the importance of the world for meditation, by simply taking into consideration the luxurious language inspired by primary substances. Consider the following words of Ignatius of Loyola: "by my sense of smell I will perceive the smoke, the sulphur, the filth, and the rotting things" (Ex. 68, 1).
It is possible to delve into this rich and diversified world of sensorial qualities. Toledo mentions seven or nine categories of taste, whereas, following Plinius, Manuel de Góis' counts thirteen, even though he testifies only to eight: sweet (in honey, figs, and ripe grapes), bitter (in bile, opium, absinthe and dyer's broom), greasy (in butter, milk and olive oil), salty (in salt and salty water), acrid (in pepper and garlic), sour (in unripe fruits and the fruit of the myrtle), spicy (in vinegar and radish) and acid (in oils). 35 Whereas Toledo mentions four objects of the sense of touch -rough, smooth, harsh and soft 36 -Góis follows the Aristotelian list of qualities and elements -hot, 31 Suárez, Commentaria… d. 7, q. 13, § 3, 722. 32 Suárez, Commentaria… d. 7, q. 10, § 7, 696. 33 Toledo, Commentaria… II, c. 9, t. 95, fol. 95vb and Id., ibid… II, c. 9, q. 24, fol. 97ra, respectively; see Magalhães,Tractatio… s. 3,§ 23,554 [Port. transl.:272]. 34 56 (2019) cold, dry, and moist 37 -and dwells on how such a sense is crucial to preserve life, either in pain, pleasure, hunger or even tickling! 38 Without ignoring the role of sound in music (extensio/melos/chordis/ fides), Toledo and Cosme de Magalhães mention several types of sound: like sharp and bass sounds, according to Toledo;39 or the whistling, tinkling, clank or the buzz, according to Magalhães. 40 Suárez alludes to several possibilities of classifying the sounds: perfect (voice) and imperfect sound (noise), direct and reflex sound (echo), sharp and bass, and also, natural and artificial sound. 41 Finally, as regards the sense of seeing, Góis sustains that by gazing into the sky the wonderful colour palette of nature, between white and black, is revealed 42 -white being perfect, for it increases light and "signifies purity, wisdom and eternity." 43 It is difficult not to be surprised by the appeal of such subject matter to thinkers of the 16 th and 17 th centuries. Due to the contribution that the state of the art of Optics gives to the religious dimension of light, the pages dedicated to its objects, namely the transparent, and especially the colours, are of a very rich content. Góis mentions five, and Suárez six categories of main colours -blue, orange, yellow, red, green, and purple 44 -which Góis further develops into other subdivisions: three kinds of purple (rose--coloured, violet, amethyst); several kinds of red (carmine, light brown, wine colour, orange, sanguine and five others); of yellow (honey colour, resin colour, light yellow, citrine, saffron, gold, and thirteen other subcategories); of green (verdigris, grass colour, garlic clove colour, yellowish green); and of blue (greenish blue, plumbeous, sea -green, and Venetian blue). Note that all these names (verba) reveal qualities of real nature (res) or signal (signa) real things or objects of the world. As with colours and coloured things, the same 37 Góis,Commentarii…II c. 11,explanatio H,252 [Port. transl.: 397] 38 Góis,Commentarii…II c. 11,q. 2,a. 2,; Suárez, Commentaria… d. 7, q. 15, § 6, 760 as regards the sense of touch conceived as the most fundamental of all of them but nevertheless greatly imperfect. 39  naming process occurs with herbs (pink, saffron, and sky blue), metals (sky blue, bronze, silver and gold), and animals (the eagle colour and ivory). 45 To sum up the cartography of the senses, from the point of view of humans' singular experience of the world, nothing would be less true than to interpret the exercise of the imagination as a "negative power", as Roland Barthes does. He seems to miss the point of realism and empiricism when he talks about "a radical imperialism of the image." 46 What one sees, hears, smells and so on is, first and foremost, what a varied created world can offer to ones' experience. Also, it would not even be fair not to take into consideration the physiology, anatomy or the mechanics of these processes of experiencing the world. Quite astonishing, even a commentary on Logic does not bypass the physiology nor the anatomy of speech and hearing (or of any other senses for that matter). 47

The spirit in the senses
Of course, there is no "other way to make an object intentionally present than through its image." 48 Indeed, objects of the world affect humans through their "species". Men and women are responsible for a process of dematerialization of a hard world of objects (cosmology) into a soft world of signs (semiotics), and the person who gives, or mainly the person who does the Exercises, seems to abandon the world in order to enter into herself or himself. It is true that senses cannot err, as regards their proper objects, but they, nevertheless, can fall into error, according to Aristotle and Francisco Suárez 49 (and to all our other Jesuits as well). Hence, in his Coimbra practical addresses of 1561, Jerome Nadal insisted upon the triple solution of speaking spiritu, hearing corde and saying practice. 50 It seems, as if at this stage, and with the two first solutions, the objects of the world are in brackets 45 56 (2019) (as happens with the natural world in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology 51 ). Surely, we may find Suárez insisting that experience shows that even species come from the objects, 52 even though they are, cognitively speaking, images of things known. 53 Since "an image must be expressed, at least in an extrinsic formal or exemplar way by what it represents", 54 the whole spectrum of existent beings or prime substances -the world -is going to be read with the lenses of formal entities. 55 From the start, the "Principle and Foundation" that structures the Exercises -God, human beings, and the other things on the face of the earth (Ex. 23, 1 -7) -is fully permeated by Augustine's doctrine of the signs, viz. the perspective according to which all things signify. 56 Sebastião do Couto explicitly adds the tradition, that comes from Bonaventure, according to which, as happened with species, signs too have two dimensions, namely, in relation to a thing signified and to a potency for which signifies. 57 Continuing his distinctions, Couto divides the signs into natural and instituted signs (it is to be noticed that, from the point of view of Creation, all nature is considered to be instituted, viz. a product of God's will). 58 Whereas natural signs put the stress on nature -for they suppose "nothing in the knower" but, in themselves, they have "a nature which is fitted and sufficient for drawing the potency to the thing signified" -signs for institution put the stress on the subject, for they require nothing in themselves but, in the knower, they require "a memory of its signification and of the thing signified." 59 Just like the intellective memory (seated in the soul's substance) will add a layer into the dematerialization of the sensitive memory (seated in the brain), 60 imagination does the same as regards the senses and their objects. Returning to the Exercises, it is as if the retreatant is restaging (Ex. 20, 2 -3) Francis Petrarca's dramatic ascent of Monte Ventoso on April 26, 1336. 61

When sensing is acting
Still, without merging completely into an inner solitude, the existential "homo interior" who confesses God as "interior intimo meo", 62 can be interpreted, in keeping with our language of the senses, as if hearing (with its social dimension, especially to the Society of Jesus keen on education) is to be overcome by seeing (as chiefly an individual process). From now on, any sense but seeing will have this capacity of turning thoughts into things, thus becoming the paradigm of evidence, epistemologically speaking, and announcing, ontologically speaking, the "irrefutable strength of the real." 63 This partition -seeing/individual act vs. hearing/social act -is, of course, disputable. The retreatant is supposed to hear herself or himself but, from the point of view of the objects of the senses, light and sound do point to two concepts as different as "intuition" (index sui) and "injunction" (index veri), respectively. 64 Anthropology, too, could not be unconcerned with differences such as these. Understandable enough, all our Jesuits thinkers recognise the importance of hearing in faith, not the least due to the authority and to the social dimension there implied. 65 Note the relevance Manuel de Góis concedes to hearing in regard to the arts, sciences, apprenticeship, eliciting emotions and faith (fides disciplina). 66 Following Aristotle, on several occasions, Couto parallels the social nature of man and women with their use of speech, 67 which necessitates hearing as its condition. This is quite an Aristotelian commonplace but, amid the dispute between Jerome Cardan and Jule Scaliger, we seem to notice Cosme de Magalhães taking sides with the latter and, with only seven reasons, he testifies to a farewell to the sense of hearing. In the third of Magalhães' seven reasons, it seems as if all the poignancy of hearing is attributed to it: thanks to the voice, there is a kind of reality in what one pp. 411-432 Revista Filosófica de Coimbra -n. o 56 (2019) hears, whereas what one sees is always abstract. Besides, hearing is not as faster or light as seeing. Necessarily then, Magalhães concludes that the objects seen are less attached to the mind and, with the only exception of intuitive knowledge, the spirit is more deeply impressed with what it only hears. 68 The alleged consistency of things heard (concrete vs. abstract, slower vs. faster) deepening the spirit in meditation also may be interpreted as the emergence of the significance of seeing (the power of seeing in Modern philosophy is well known). The current model for the transformation of the semantics of hearing is within the realm of "intuitive knowledge", meaning the concreteness (the alleged quality of hearing) and the actual presence of the object before the beholder. Tangentially, it could be inferred that the Jesuits thinkers would not agree, if they only could know it, with Diderot's dialogue concerning the skill of the blind to see through touching because, for them, the invisible is yet an object for the sight. 69 It would be fair to say, at least, that the presence of the world that is supposed to found "evidence", still avoids the modern trap of interpreting "intuition" (be it in hearing or in seeing) as a mere cognitive or intellectual process deprived of any relation to the world. That would allow us to read Nadal's "hearing corde" (or any other of his solutions) precisely as he intended, as if hearing/seeing was doing or acting. 70 Considering Ignatian anthropology, not without reason, as a mystagogy, some scholars interpret the act of sense  : Gallimard, 1951). 70 Pláticas espirituales… # 12. "Decir o oír corde no quiere decir que sea sólo del órgano natural, que es sólo carne y vale poco para lo que queremos, sino que proceda del de la caridad y afectuoso amor de Dios, que son el verdadero corazón. Querría yo que procediese todo lo que hablase, y todo lo que hiciese o pensase deste suavísimo corazón; y por ello querría que se moviesen y aparejasen todos para oir y se poder 1 aprovechar. Esto es el buen corazón que deseo que tengamos todos, haciendo de él muchos actos de amor del Señor, afectuándonos a El, y procurando de unirnos con El; y desta unión venir a las cosas en que tratáremos, o sea estudio, o cocina, o predicaciones, o confesiones, o cualquiera otra; porque, viniendo desta manera, el estudio, el leer, los oficios bajos y todo será con suavidad, con alegría, con aumento de gracia, con gran deseo de servir y con mérito contentar en ello a la Divina Majestad, con quien se tiene unido el que lo hace. Y esto es hacer las cosas corde." (el sentir) as the possibility of unifying affection and imagination in order to gain a deeper entrance into the inner self (lo interno). 71 The problem is that the inner self -imagination, memory, reminiscence, will and intellectdemands the experience of the world provided, firstly, by the senses. 72 Ultimately, for the intellect may reason and the affective acts may spring from the will (cf. Ex. 3, 1 -2), imagination must be beforehand triggered accordingly. All this can be interpreted, historically, saying that it was as if Aristotle could correct or complement Augustine, and, philosophically, recognizing that there is an inextricable linkage between imagination and being in the world. Or in other words: such a linkage represents a challenge to semiotics, for instead of the imagination becoming a world, the world is to become an opened task for the imagination.
Any relations that the Exercises might have with the ethics of action, say "the life of the mind", to give an echo to Hannah Arendt's title, would necessarily emerge here, too. Consider the method of the composition of place (Ex. 47, 1). George Ganss recalls reading a passage from the Spiritual Diary of Saint Ignatius (1544 -1545) in which, after struggling with distractions, he wrote: "I composed myself for Mass." 73 Used thirteen times in the Exercises, 74 the Spanish word, "composición", is not only an allusion to modesty (as in "compostura"), or to the art of finding harmony and equilibrium (as with sculpture, photography or painting). As happens with its verbal locution -as in the expression here used, "composición de lugar" -it has also the sense of considering all the circumstances that may lead one person to a plan correctly oriented; note that, semantically, the Spanish "lugar" may be used either with time or space. Ultimately, this is precisely what Nadal had in mind, and it would even be possible to find one philosophical or ethical clarification of the method of "composition" in Góis' commentary on Ethics, when he deals with the rule of prudence. Remember that, according to this rule, the "medium", which is the core of the rule, may be said to be in accordance with our condition (comparatione nostri), but must also take into consideration the nature of the thing itself (ex natura rei). 75 71 Cf. Melloni, S.J., La mistagogía… 75. 72 Suárez,Commentaria… d. 5,q. 1,§ 5,290. 73 Góis,Commentarii… II c. 9,explanatio B,; Suárez,Commentaria… d. 7,q. 16,§ 8, 56 (2019)

The anthropological shift
In order to better understand the extent to which semiotics is not fully succeeded in the process of dematerializing the world -Georges Berkeley will do it by 1710 76 -we have to return to the point in which the world of the senses (but also the world and the senses) is distinctiveness for humans. This implies a return to Aristotle by sticking rigorously to the approach advocated by the Coimbra Jesuit, Pedro da Fonseca, when he talked de ratione philosophandi Aristotelis, namely aiming at the wider consideration of the "Christiana Respublica." 77 And since, according to the book of Genesis, the created world was given first and foremost to human beings (Ex. 23, 3), the root of the "anthropic" principle could not be but the very theological design of the senses in the world 78 . No anthropology is possible separated from one's imagination of the created world -that is the ultimate meaning of Nadal's "speaking spiritu", 79 at least if interpreted previously to any kind of intellectual or affective consciousness. As we have already seen, and we will again reiterate in the final paragraph, no anthropology of the senses would be complete leaving the cosmology or the ontology of their objects aside.
Distinctive from other animals, in humans, the sense of touch is much more perfect, the sense of taste has a bigger capacity of discernment, the sense of smelling has its own perfection for it concerns noble objects, and even the sound nuances, being natural or artificial, are wider. 80 Consider Magalhães' physiological argumentation in order to praise the human ultimate sense: in the evolution of nature, the eyes are the last organs to appear. 81 Consider Couto too: "… even though brutes received more words from nature than men and women have, this does not derogate from human dignity. For he or she has received art and reason, by which he or she has been able to procure for himself or herself speech." 82 Or Suárez, finally: if the five senses in men and women are of the highest rank, this is due to the fact that their sensitive nature is connected to the intellective nature. 83 This is an exact interpretation of Thomas saying that at the human level, the capacity of sensing is involved in the thinking capacity. 84 The fragile argument to overcome all the obvious and numerous difficulties tied up with a discussion aiming at distinguishing the emergence of the species "Human" from the genre "Animal" is the following (De Anima plus Parva Naturalia): even though humans, on some occasions, do not have senses as accurate as other animals, they can, nevertheless, sense with a more penetrating superiority. We have, finally, met the crossroad of the "presence of the spirit in the senses": the necessary genetic or physical origin of cognition (upwards) and its metaphysical or anthropological expression (downwards), without being incompatible or heterogeneous, are not to be confused. Suárez and Góis would allow us to signal these two dissimilar ways the Jesuits used to talk about the presence of the spirit in the senses, the latter (upwards) alluding to the middle role of the imagination, between the senses and the intellect, 85 the former (downwards) saying that "the absolute degree of perfection that human sensitive nature possesses derives from its being connected to the rational soul." 86 The crossroad of the two perspectives does not allow us to state, without qualification, that the "language of the sensible is eminently not intellective." 87 At least from the point of view of the Aristotelian as well as the Thomistic natural theologies, this cannot be entirely correct because, from the start, -to put it into a much more modern language -consciousness or the self is tied up to one's imagination of a world filled with material substances.
Although we do not have time to dwell on this problem, note too that the anthropic shift has an anatomical as well as an intellective version. They run more or less in parallel, as the following two quotations may prove: as regards the sense of smell, Suárez follows Galen's theory according to which smell is processed in the brain, 88 and Góis explicitly writes that such a sense pp. 411-432 Revista Filosófica de Coimbra -n. o 56 (2019) is due to the human eminent form, viz. the intellective power. 89 If contrary to Themistius, the sense of smell may be useful to cognition, Góis insists, this is precisely due to the sensitive dimension of the intellectual form. 90 Suárez, too, teaches that the pleasure provided by the sense of hearing is spiritual in a way (delectatio quaedam, quodammodo spiritualis). 91 Finally, and again, due to the state of the art of physiognomy, it would even be a temptation to cross anatomy and senses with ethics. 92

A creatural metaphysical anthropology
All Jesuits partake of the eulogy of the "scientia de anima" whose nobility lies in the middle role of humans in the bosom of all reality. Dislocated from its exclusively ethical as well as Augustinian core, the Socratic rule, "Know thyself", 93 is interpreted as participation of two dimensions: the physical (men and women are the noblest of all living creatures) and the metaphysical or spiritual (they are independent of matter, are intelligent and willing). For the Jesuits, as well as for the Peripatetic tradition, this topic is closely related to the two Aristotelian definitions of the soul (De An. 412a20 and 413b12) but also to the notion of hierarchy of one's science, following Pseudo -Dionysius -two topics we shall not have time to dwell on. 94 Like Thomas Aquinas' decision on the nature of sensibility and worldly condition, the Jesuits who are commenting on Aristotle's doctrine of the senses needed to make their own decision as well. Remember that to the Averroistic, as well as Neoplatonic conceptions of the world as a mere occasion to thought, Aquinas had insisted upon the presence of "the spirit in the world", Geist in Welt, if we were to pay homage to Karl Rahner's beautiful title of 1936. Now, for our Renaissance Jesuits, the necessary presence of the world through the senses may be of a spiritual nature provided the one who is seeing, hearing, smelling and so on has already taken a philosophical and ontological stance on one's place in the world. It is perhaps too obvious to say that Aristotle and Aquinas were to our 16 th century Jesuits as Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Maréchal were to Karl Rahner in the 20 th century 95 .
Teaching that human beings are placed between the material and the spiritual, 96 Francisco de Toledo, Manuel de Góis, and Francisco Suárez share this common creatural anthropology and, as far as the doctrine of human senses is concerned, imagination/phantasia (with its double feature ever since Aristotle's text) 97 could not but be at its core. With his usual length (not to say, prolixity), Góis dwells on this very middle nature explicitly mixing the Aristotelian "metriopatheia" and "eudaimonia", the Augustinian "deo et anima scire cupio", as well as the Renaissance topic of the soul as "summa totius mundi". 98 Since they were not incompatible, there was no need to decide between an anthropology derived from the topic of the middle nature of the intellective form (Toledo/Suárez/Góis) or an anthropology aimed at reuniting several dimensions as Aristotelian ethics, Augustinian religion, or Renaissance cosmo -anthropology (Góis).
A dynamic between ethics and metaphysics would also be quite obvious, and we have already alluded here to the former. Consequently, let us conclude with the metaphysical side of this dynamic. The attendance of God one might expect by looking, hearing, even touching and tasting… 99 is likely to be interpreted as a committed overcoming of oneself provided the full condition of the world, and thus of oneself in the hierarchy of the world, is duly taken into account. The one who imagines the world accordingly to one's ontological presence or belonging to the world cannot but be led to the conclusion that interpretation and transformation are inseparable. It is pp. 411-432 Revista Filosófica de Coimbra -n. o 56 (2019) probably not too speculative to add that the cosmological condition of this "Aristotelian -Thomistic spirituality", previous to any distinction affective/ /intellectual spirituality (let us call it "Modern or psychological spirituality"), and its importance to our 21 st century in need of urgent commitments is easy to understand. Suffice to say that, spiritually speaking, the application of the senses requires the world as an ontological necessity, or that the process of transcending the world is illegitimate regardless of its integration. Furthermore, because it is up to anthropology, not to psychology, to ground an incarnated or embodied spirituality -while the former emerges from the whole of a created nature, the latter emerges from itself or from only a part of nature -, there can only be spirituality where there is imagination pierced by transcendence, which is, in our view, the very ontological principle of difference for humans in the world. 100