

CARLISM AND NATIONALISM

No other political force in modern Spain - not even anarchism - seems so uniquely Spanish as Carlism. The Carlists were staunch defenders of tradition and of *españolismo* generally, which might be considered basic ingredients of a Spanish nationalism, and indeed Carlists have thus been sometimes considered the most extreme of Spanish nationalists. Yet Carlists very rarely called themselves nationalists and, though the modern term "nation" did enter their vocabulary during the middle of the nineteenth century, self-references to "nationalism" were normally absent from their discourse. Carlists constantly invoked the defense of *patria* - ultimately the leitmotiv of Carlist doctrine - and an implicit distinction between patriotism and nationalism would seem to lie at the heart of Carlist political thought.

This is of course related to the debate over the relationship between tradition, essence and nationalism in contemporary studies of nationalism. If modern nationalism does not rest on deeper, pre-modern historical and cultural roots* ⁽¹⁾, then those such as Benedict Anderson who understand nationalism to be primarily a product of modernity and the modernist

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⁽¹⁾ Anthony Smith, it may be remembered, does emphasize the pre-modern institutional and cultural roots of nationalism in his *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford, 1979 and *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, 1986. This is also developed by Josep R. Llobera, *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe*, Oxford-Washington, D. C., 1994 and in more historical terms by John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill, 1982.

politico-cultural imagination would presumably be correct®. It might then be inferred that Carlism was reluctant to embrace the terminology of nationalism because the later would have been viewed as a modernist heresy of *españolismo*.

Tradition is always something of a problem for nationalists, who are faced with the issue of how they are to interpret, reinvent and make use of tradition, and similarly it is probably a mistake to try to divide interpretations of nationalism too rigidly into opposing camps, for most of the modernists readily agree that there is a relationship between tradition and nationalism, even if fanciful and fictive. In the case of Spain, as in most others, there was always the problem of which tradition, or which aspects and institutions of tradition, were to be accepted as national and/or *españolista*. The first Spanish system of the Trastámaras and Habsburgs was after two centuries replaced by the reformed system of the Bourbons, even though it retained key institutions of the former. This has produced a situation in which the institutions of the reformist and rationalist eighteenth-century are those which, *mutatis mutandis*, have been embraced by Catholic and anti-rationalist traditionalists, though this was not done without criticism of the decay of tradition even in the eighteenth century and proposals for rectification. Traditionalists in the lands of the former Crown of Aragon, particularly, would refer to the institutional structure which existed prior to 1716.

The affirmation of Spanish tradition in general first developed during the eighteenth century itself, in opposition to incipient changes and the criticism of modern rationalist thought. This first took the form of vigorous endorsement of the old order of Spanish institutions and culture®, and secondly during the latter part of the century incorporated the further rational and new discourse of foreign traditionalists, primarily French, which denounced the Enlightenment critique®. It should be further noted that this was also the time of the first modern studies ^{2 3 4}

(2) There is a tendency in all the "modernist" and "modernizationist" theories to discount any significant traditional basis for nationalism, as evidenced by such contrasting theorists as Ernest Gellner and Liah Greenfeld.

(3) See Francisco Puy, *El pensamiento tradicional en la España del siglo XVIII (1700-1760)*, Madrid, 1966.

(4) Aspects of this have been studied in Javier Herrero, *Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario español*, Madrid, 1988.

and eulogies of the remaining structures of traditional particularism in Spain, in the cases of the Basque provinces and of Navarre. The first major panegyrist of Basque institutions, the Guipuzcoan Jesuit Manuel de Larramendi, was also a staunch defender of *españolismo*, the Spanish monarchy and of Spanish institutions in general, considering them the finest and most Catholic in the world⁽⁵⁾. Larramendi and other Basque writers denounced the Valencian polymath and moderate decentralist reformer Gregorio Mayans Sisear and by the close of the century Basques had gained a reputation as among the most extreme partisans of the traditionalist position.

If we follow the most common interpretation, we find the concept of "Ta nación española" - smaller than the empire but larger than Castile, including all the peninsular territories as well as Balearics and Canaries - emerging during the course of the eighteenth century⁽⁶⁾. In 1732 the Real Academia's *Diccionario de la Lengua* defined "nación" as "la colección de los habitantes en alguna Provincia, País o Reino", "but the application to Spain remained incipient, and the alternate traditional usages of the term might refer to other entities smaller than Spain. Without the slightest intention of invoking any new political change, Larramendi had referred to Guipúzcoa as a "nacioncita" and the Basque writer Manuel de Aguirre in 1780 used the term "naciones vascas" in defense of the foral privileges of the three Basque provinces⁽⁷⁾.

The invocation of the "nación española" first became standard with the liberal reformers of the Cortes de Cádiz, and a common interpretation credits the *doceañistas* with having developed the first project of a modern Spanish nationalism, involving the transformation of the state into a new centralized civic structure of common representation and

⁽⁵⁾ Manuel de Larramendi, *Autobiografía y otros escritos*, San Sebastián, 1973; *Corografía o Descripción general de la Muy Noble y Muy Leal Provincia de Guipúzcoa*, San Sebastián, 1969; and *Sobre los fueros de Guipúzcoa*, San Sebastián, 1983.

⁽⁶⁾ Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española el siglo XVIII*, Madrid, 1955, pp. 41-43, and José Antonio Maravall, "El sentimiento de nación en el siglo XVIII: la obra de Forner", La Torre, Puerto Rico, 1967, pp. 25-55, the latter cited in Javier Fernández Sebastián, *La génesis del fuerismo: Pensamiento e ideas políticas en la crisis del Antiguo Régimen (País Vasco, 1750-1840)*, Madrid, 1991, p. 213.

⁽⁷⁾ This speech has been published among the *Cartas y discursos del Militar Ingeniero al "Correo de los ciegos"*, ed. Antonio de Elorza, San Sebastián, 1973, pp. 253-66.

participation for a common Spanish citizenry. The traditional term for the homeland in Castilian had of course been "patria", and the terms "patria" and "nación" were used interchangeably by the Cádiz liberals. Conversely the term "nacionalismo" will rarely be found, and will remain rare throughout the nineteenth century, probably because the builders of the liberal nation in Spain were internally focused and not directed in terms of chauvinism or ethnocentrism against the external world. "La nación" figured most prominently of all in the language of the Exaltados of 1821-23, probably because their more radical liberalism involved a somewhat more extreme form of modern nation-building. Nineteenth-century liberalism nonetheless came to be dominated by the Moderates, repressing any Jacobin pattern of a radical and totally centralized nation.

Traditionalist spokesmen at Cádiz sometimes followed what was becoming standard usage in speaking of "la nación" and "la nación española", but the neologism had come to have more specific political overtones and in the future would generally be avoided by traditionalists. In the years that followed they would regard the language of "la nación" as modernist and *afrancesado*, devoted to the destruction of traditional institutions, "national sovereignty" being an innovative and radical concept as opposed to "royal sovereignty". Thus traditionalists came to employ almost exclusively the terminology of "patria" and "patriótico", as consistent with past usages and opposed to modernist heresies⁽⁸⁾.

By the time that Carlism took full form in the 1830s, it was devoted simply to the defense of those institutions and cultural practices which currently existed, or at least had existed prior to 1833. Within only a few years this became concretized in the slogan "Dios, Patria y Rey", to which might later be appended the term "Fueros". "Nation", by contrast, was the modernist discourse of liberalism⁽⁹⁾, and Carlism was opposed to this concept of "nation" and, hence, of modern nationalism.

⁽⁸⁾ This difference in terminology has best been studied in the work by Fernández Sebastián cited above.

⁽⁹⁾ The literature on Carlism is massive, but normally ignores the issue of Spanish "nationalism" per se. The best exposition of Carlist thought is Alexandra Wilhemlsen, *La formación del pensamiento político del Carlismo (1810-1875)*, Madrid, 1995, and the most recent one-volume general history that of Gabriel Alférez. *Historia del Carlismo*, Madrid, 1992, supersedes preceding accounts of the first and

During the middle third of the century liberalism became more fully established and hesitantly sometimes even tried to elaborate a sort of nationalist project, though this remained feeble in practice. Carlism, by contrast, could no longer simply stand for the defense of the existing order, since the latter had to an increasing extent disappeared. By the 1860s Carlism was much more in the position of liberalism thirty years earlier, now advancing a new project of its own against the newly established order. It had to develop its own ideology more fully, and thus a new Carlist ideologue such as Magín Ferrer would propose a more elaborate new framework, with a reformed Cortes based on a more innovative corporatist structure, in a decentralized royalist system which would also feature a regional Cortes in each major region. With the beginning of the Catholic revival, Carlism was also reinforced by the spokesmen and publicists of "Neo-Catholicism", by the end of the 1860s incorporating such figures as Juan Aparisi Guijarro and Cándido Nocedal⁽¹⁰⁾.

Thus in the rebellion against the democratic monarchy (and subsequently the anti-clerical Federal Republic), which began in 1872, the ideological appeal of Carlism had incorporated further characteristics. This made much more use of the term "nacional" - though not "nacionalista" - as it emphasized as much or even more than in the past that Carlism was the ultimate in *españolismo*. In 1873 the Asturian Rosas hailed it as "el glorioso movimiento nacional"⁽¹¹⁾, while three years later the Catalan Alíer y Sala declared that Carlists were the only real Spaniards⁽¹²⁾. Other Catalan Carlists insisted that Carlism was the only truly Spanish national movement, just as the Vizcayan Jesuit Goiriena defined it as the all-out struggle against foreignism⁽¹³⁾.

most important of the liberal/traditionalist civil wars, but see also *Las guerras carlistas*, ed. Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza, Madrid, 1993.

(iº) Begoña Uriguen, *Orígenes y evolución de la derecha española: el Neo-Catolicismo*, Madrid, 1986.

⁽¹¹⁾ *La Reconquista*, Jan. 16, 1873, quoted in Vicente Garmendia. "Carlismo y nacionalismo(s) en la época de la última guerra carlista", in Bullón de Mendoza, ed., *Las Guerras Carlistas*, p. 104.

⁽¹²⁾ In the pamphlet *El partido carlista y la revolución española*, cited in *ibidem*, p. 103.

⁽¹³⁾ Antonio Pirala, *Historia contemporánea. Anales desde 1843 hasta la conclusión de la última guerra civil*, Madrid, 1876, vol. IV, p. 205.

By the 1860s and 70s Carlism had begun to define a broader Spanish neo-traditionalist project, a new "nacionalidad" based on "la idea católica". National talent had to be fostered and cultivated in order to rid Spain of destructive foreign influences, which meant not merely a strong new protective tariff for the protection and development of the national economy, but attention to the more modern forms of culture as well, the *Almanaque Carlista* of 1871 calling for the creation of a national opera in Madrid to overcome the spell of the French and Italian schools.

Carlism was not merely strongly imperialist in the standard Spanish sense of preserving the Antilles and the Philippines, but expansionist as well. It now encouraged the direct recovery of Gibraltar and military conquest in northwest Africa, as well as the restoration of hegemony over Portugal, which one Guipuzcoan Carlist termed in 1873 "esa nación liliputiense que ha sido y debe ser una provincia española"⁽¹⁴⁾. At one point the Carlist leadership offered the liberal government a truce in the civil war until the Cubans had been defeated.

For Carlos VII, the new pretender, the significance of Carlism extended well beyond Spain itself, for Carlism bore a mission for Europe and indeed for the entire world. Admittedly such rhetoric became overblown, and Carlos VII particularly concentrated on the role of Carlism in Latin Europe. He became a strong advocate of the concept of "la raza Latina", which he believed should recover the dominant role in Europe. Don Carlos was less impressed by nineteenth-century ideas of nationalism *per se* than by the newer concepts of racial development and struggle that were emerging in the second half of the century, writing in his diary that "ha pasado el tiempo feudal; se acaban las naciones y de las razas es el porvenir"⁽¹⁵⁾.

But Carlism was locked in constant struggle with the liberal system and had little opportunity to advance such grander ambitions. Its concept of Spain was indeed more traditional, not in the eighteenth-century, but in the sixteenth-century sense, in which Spain led a broader Christendom and a broader empire. Though Carlism strongly emphasized the ethnically Spanish, its sense of Spain transcended that of the ethnic nation *per se*. Mere national Spain was held to be the project of liberalism,

⁽¹⁴⁾ Quoted in Garmendia, p. 105.

⁽¹⁵⁾ *Diario y memorias de Carlos VII*, quoted in *ibidem*, p. 106.

whose fatal flaw was to concentrate on a reductionalist and centralized concept of a foreshortened national Spain dominated by a Madrid gripped by destructive foreign doctrines of the modern liberal and centralized nation-state, tyrannical, godless and not truly Spanish.

In this sense Carlism was opposed to modern nineteenth-century "Madrid projects", whence flowed all of Spain's ills. It was quintessential[^] an anti-Madrid movement in the modern sense, absolutely opposed to all modern, centralized, Jacobin nationalism, and this made it impossible to embrace any direct form of modern nationalism. True Spanish government was monarchist, formalist and the realm of de-centralized concrete liberties. Spain was no statist monolith on the French pattern, but the land of decentralized, regional and formalist institutional freedom. Carlism mirrored Federal Republicanism in the sense that it held absolutely to a pluralist concept of a national Spain. Well after mid-century Spanish coins had ceased to use the monarchist inscription of "Rex Hispaniorum", Carlos VII would still call himself "Rey de las Españas".

Foralism and the defense of regional liberties had been part of the Carlist creed from the very beginning.

At the start of the First Carlist War, little was made of this issue *per se* even in the Basque provinces and in Navarre, for it was simply understood that formalism formed part of the traditional system. As the first war had continued and Carlism became politically more self-conscious, formalism was increasingly made an official and strongly emphasized part of the political program⁽¹⁶⁾.

The foralist banner became even more prominent in the final war of 1872-76, as a particular appeal was made in the Basque provinces on the basis of Carlism's staunch defense of foral institution. Basque Carlists raised the banner of foralism to, if possible, even a higher level than before, embraced all the myths of Basque history and institutions that had been developed since the sixteenth century, exaggerating the "perfection" of Basque institutions and the complete "liberty" which allegedly obtained under the traditional Basque systems. At that time, of course, the only real "Basque party" were the Carlists, and Basque

⁽¹⁶⁾The most objective discussion of this issue will probably be found in John F. Coverdale, *The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist War*; Princeton, 1984.

Carlists eagerly sacralised Basque institutions, while accusing Madrid of "aggression" and "invasion" of the Basque Country in its prosecution of the current civil war, sometimes claiming that the goal of the central government was to "destroy" the Basque provinces. This particularist rhetoric had reached the point of occasionally threatening a declaration of Basque "independence" even during the final Basque phase of the First Carlist War in 1838-39 and such flourishes reappeared from time to time in the final conflict. It was alleged in 1870 that Basque Carlists sought to make the three provinces "una nacionalidad casi independiente"⁽¹⁷⁾, and D. Alfonso Carlos, younger brother of the Pretender, at one point even obliquely raised the question of separatism. Between 1873 and 1876 the embryonic Carlist state⁽¹⁸⁾ was in fact little more than a sort of Basque state, and it was very easy for the majority of Basques who supported Carlism to see in civil war its major phase as essentially a war of Spain against the Basque provinces and Navarre. The extreme terms and rhetoric of the last Carlist war thus played an important role in preparing the way for the birth of Basque nationalism a decade later⁽¹⁹⁾, though this was far from the actual intentions of Carlos VII and the main Carlist leaders.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Quoted in Garmendia, in *Las Guerras Carlistas*, p. 108.

⁽¹⁸⁾ The principal study of the state in the final war is Julio Montero Díaz, *El Estado carlista: Principios teóricos y práctica política 1872-1876*, Madrid, 1992.

⁽¹⁹⁾ The main treatment is Vicente Garmendia, *La ideología carlista (1868-1876). En los orígenes del nacionalismo Vasco*, Zarautz, 1985. See also José Extramiana, *Historia de las Guerras carlistas*, San Sebastián, 1879, vol. two, and His "Originalidad y papel del carlismo vasco en la España del siglo XIX", in J. C. Jiménez de Aberásturi, ed., *Estudios de historia contemporánea del País Vasco*, San Sebastián, 1982, pp. 27-50. A leading non-Carlist Moderado foralist such as the Alavese Ramón Ortiz y Zárate had by 1870 begun to make quite a different kind of proposal for federation of the three provinces. The most extreme position, however, was taken by the heterodox sometime Carlist Juan de Tellitu Antuñano, who moved from advocating the creation of an autonomous super-region of the three provinces of Navarre to proposing in 1873 the creation of an "Estado independiente vasco-navarro". His letters are quoted in Mikel Urquijo Goitia, *Liberales y carlistas. Revolución y fueros vascos en el preludio de la última Guerra carlista*, Bilbao, 1994, pp. 361-362.

Politics and ideology played a more prominent role in Carlism during the 1870s than in the 1830s, religion on the one hand and decentralization and *fueros* on the other being major themes. Conversely the Pretender himself, though a much more charismatic and effective leader than his grandfather, was rather less the center of the movement ideologically than in the earlier war. Though Carlist leaders were sincere in their stress on decentralization, there was no interest in encouraging the most extreme statements of Basque Carlist formalism, which were normally not echoed by the top leadership.

After the final defeat in 1876, followed by the loss of most *fueros* privileges soon afterwards, Carlist political groups in the Basque Country advanced the slogan "Jaungoikua eta Foruak" (God and the *fueros*), emblematic of the two most salient aspects of the Carlist creed. They won the Spanish Cortes elections of 1880 in the three provinces, despite the restoration of liberal *caciquismo*, returning 28 deputies to 22 for the liberals, but in the years that followed were unable to sustain this position. Those Basque Carlismos whose primary concern was foralism later joined other groups, while those Basques who remained Carlist in the later years of the century ceased to give foralism the same prominence. Though Carlism would in general remain foralist to the end, Basques still loyal to the traditionalist banner invoked foralism only in conjunction with the other Carlist principles, and largely ceased to participate in the accelerated folklorist activities and protonationalist politics of the last part of the century⁽²⁰⁾. When Arana Goiri founded the Basque Nationalist Party in 1895, he would regard Carlism as among his primary foes, precisely because there was so much overlap ideologically between Carlism and the highly clerical, culturally conservative nationalists, and because both forces competed primarily for the support of the same social sectors: the rural population and the urban and small town lower middle classes. Arana Goiri was unable to improve on the basic Basque Carlist slogan, but changed the wording to differentiate slightly Basque nationalism, invoking "Jaungoikua eta Lagi-Zarra" (God and the old laws), in place of "God and the *fueros*".

⁽²⁰⁾ See Javier Real Cuesta, *El carlismo vasco 1876-1900*, Madrid, 1985.

As Carlism weakened and shrank in the last years of the century, it confronted two other major formulations of *españolismo*: the dominant one was the quasi-nationalism of the elitist liberalism and imperialism of the Restoration, as defined and led by Cánovas del Castillo, and the other the sense of Catholic Spain that was parallel to but not synonymous with Carlism, stemming from the Catholic revival and, among others, from the writing of the polymath Menéndez Pelayo. Canovite *españolismo* by the 1890s was founded almost exclusively on the *status quo*, bolstered by official religiosity⁽²¹⁾, and in some respects found itself in a situation analogous to that of the original D. Carlos and his followers in 1830. Right-wing Catholic *españolismo* was a diffuse sentiment, on the other hand that might take several different forms. On the one hand, it overlapped with Carlism, and on the other, with the right wing of Canovism. Alternately, it might take an apolitical pietist form or even prefer a new form of right-wing Catholicism more modern and flexible than Carlism but more conservative yet than Canovism.

Carlism's prospects were further dimmed by the schism between orthodox Carlists and Integrists in 1885, followed by the second schism during World War I between the orthodox *jaimistas* (followers of Don Jaime, the next Pretender) and the ultra elements, who rallied around Juan Vázquez de Mella y Fanjul. The latter became the leading ideologue in the movement, playing an active role from 1889 on. For Vázquez de Mella, the Spanish nation was a "federación histórica", la Nación primero y el Estado central después han sido la resultante de la unión de varias regiones que antes eran independientes"⁽²²⁾. He was not reluctant to refer to the Spanish nation and the "central state", though never in a centralist way. Spain was an organic and indissoluble union, but formed of regions which possessed their own "subsidiary" sovereignty, which must be protected and never abridged by the sovereignty of the crown and the Spanish state. Subsidiary sovereignty was based on the federation of municipalities, districts (*comarcas*) and regions, paralleled by other natural institutions such as guilds, schools and universities, which also

⁽²¹⁾ The best treatment of the concept of nation and nationalism in Cánovas is Carlos Dardé, "Cánovas y el nacionalismo liberal español", in Guillerno Gortázar, ed., *Nación y Estado en la España liberal*, Madrid, 1994, pp. 209-238.

⁽²²⁾ Juan Vázquez de Mella, *Discursos parlamentarios*, Madrid, 1928, vol. I, p. 40.

possessed "subsidiarity" of their own. Beyond royal sovereignty and secondary subsidiarity lay the highest sovereignty, which pertained to God. He insisted, like Aparisi, that there was nothing "absolutist" about Carlism, whose ruler possessed no right to modify any of the prerogatives of the regions without their consent. Spain indeed exerted a "national will", but this was based on the traditions created by many successive generations of Spaniards, who had developed the traditional constitution of Spain.

The emergence of Vázquez de Mella coincided with the last generation of old-style Carlism, from 1897 to 1907, during which the last small military *partidas* formed, and were as quickly abandoned. In 1898, as during the last civil war, the Carlists stood staunchly for the integrity of the empire, and even temporarily offered their support to the Regency, even as they also vainly conspired to replace the Restoration monarchy in the event of disaster. By this time Basque Carlists had even begun to cooperate with the oligarchic liberals (themselves increasingly *españolista*) in the Basque provinces, in the face of the Basque nationalists.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Carlists still refused to embrace a Spanish nationalism *per se*, for nationalism remained a radical cause, a typical modernist heresy that ignored true, historically-founded subsidiarity. Carlist economics encouraged if anything a tariff even steeper than the duties which already existed - one of the highest in the world - but Carlism was uncomfortable with modern, largescale capital. Together with corporative regulation, it continued to support the restoration of the communal properties confiscated by liberalism in earlier decades.

If Carlism had played a crucial role in the pre-development of Basque nationalism, the same might be said to a lesser degree of its role in the genesis of Catalanism⁽²³⁾. The Catalan movement soon proved more powerful, and in 1907 Catalan Carlists participated fully in the Solidarity movement of regionalists and republicans. The Carlist leader Miguel Junyent was one the governing triumvirate of the Catalan Solidarity coalition, which swept the parliamentary elections of 1907, breaking

⁽²³⁾Among the most recent work on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Catalan Carlism, see Jordi Canal, ed., *El Carlisme. Sis estudis fonamentals*, Barcelona, 1993; Josep Ma. Solé i Sabaté, ed., *El Carlisme com a conflicte*, Barcelona, 1993; and Solé i Sabaté, ed., *Literatura, cultura i carlisme*, Barcelona, 1995.

forever the dominance of the Spanish oligarchic liberal parties in Catalonia. Carlists, as usual, were not the ultimate beneficiaries, for the hegemony of the all-Spanish parties was replaced by that of the Catalanists, whose own liberal regionalism was ultimately unacceptable to Carlists. Even so, as late as 1919 young Carlist activists might occasionally be found joining forces with radical Catalanists in street demonstrations and affrays against centralist *españolistas* in Barcelona. As Carlism split in three between Integrists, moderate jaimistas and more doctrinaire mellistas, unity of action or even of doctrine had disappeared.

The most unique Carlist offshoot in the years after World War I were the *Sindicatos Libres* of Barcelona. This non-leftist trade union movement was initially organized at a Carlist center in the Catalan capital but was never officially allied with Carlism, though it was always friendly toward Carlism and many of its original leaders and militants were of Carlist background. The *Sindicatos Libres* were formed in opposition to anarcho-syndicalist domination of the CNT in Catalonia. Contrary to the propaganda of their enemies, the *Libres* were never merely a scab or yellow union, but represented a worker force determined to preserve Catholic and other values challenged by the anarchists⁽²⁴⁾.

The *Libres* reflected the ambivalence toward Catalanism of the region's Carlist, who by the beginning of 1920 were "dividing into *españolista* and Catalanist currents"⁽²⁵⁾. Their stand in favour of genuine worker economic interests in 1921 attracted the *Joventut Nacionalista Obrera*, a group of dependientes or commercial employees organized by the *Lliga Regionalista*, the main Catalanist political group. They "quit that party and joined the *Libres*, complaining that right-wing Catalanists were still preaching Christian resignation as the remedy for all social ills"⁽²⁶⁾. The *Libres* in fact rejected any direct political cooperation with Catalan nationalists, proclaiming nationalism in general to be "the greatest religious and civil heresy of the twentieth century, "deleterious to the cause of both proletarian and Catholic internationalism", an anti-Christian innovation of "despots" and "Nietzschean supermen"⁽²⁷⁾.

⁽²⁴⁾ The key study of the *Libres* is Colin M. Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain, 1900-1936*, Princeton, 1985.

⁽²⁵⁾ *Ibidem*, p. 161

⁽²⁶⁾ *Ibidem*.

⁽²⁷⁾ *Ibidem*, p. 160.

The establishment of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship created a new challenge in 1923, though one that was initially embraced by many Carlists. Within two years, however, Don Jaime publicly broke with the dictatorship, declaring that a system of centralized authoritarianism could never be accepted by Carlists. When his followers began to engage in a certain amount of opposition activity in 1927, they were vigorously repressed by the regime.

Conversely, the mellistas and the Sindicatos Libres directly collaborated with the dictatorship, the later becoming, after the Socialist UGT, the second most important labour force to participate in the regime's system of arbitration. Reorganized into a Confedeción Nacional de Sindicatos Libres (CNSL) in December 1923, the Libres released a "Fundamental Declaration" which declared their opposition to statism and centralization, and their affirmation of corporatism and *obrerismo*⁽²⁸⁾. At this point, however, the Libres began to move decisively toward a form of *españolismo*, their core leadership in Barcelona proclaiming the Hispanic identity of Catalonia and decrying the radical turn taken by political Catalanism in 1922. They defined themselves as "the sole worker organization of autochthonous *seny*/common sense/, corresponding to the old racial spirit of Catalonia"⁽²⁹⁾.

Under the dictatorship the Libres swelled briefly to their peak membership of 200,000, and increasingly championed Spanish unity. The initial outspoken leader of a pro-Fascist orientation, Augusto Lagunas Alemany (the Libres' Secretario de enlace from 1922 to 1924), espoused a position of revolutionary national syndicalism, but proved emotionally unstable and soon dropped out of the movement altogether⁽³⁰⁾. By the latter part of the decade, however, a significant sector of the movement began to adopt this orientation, speaking of permanently eliminating the domination of the liberal system and of unregulated capitalism through a populist, cross-class national syndicalism. The more radical sector of the Libres insisted that they were not opposed to the purely economic principles of socialism and communism, but to the later's rejection of Catholicism and Spanish cultural values. Between 1929 and 1931 they adopted more and more of the trappings of fascism, affirming

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 258-264.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 243

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 161-162

charismatic leadership, virilism, youth and violence in terms similar to Italian Fascism⁽³¹⁾. This in turn created a contradiction with the Libres' own Catholic religious and cultural values which they could not resolve.

With the coming of the Second Republic, the CNSL virtually collapsed, and was severely repressed by the FAI-CNT. The remnants of the Libres then aligned themselves with the monarchist radical right (*Renovación Española*) and the military organization of the UME, making a clear choice for right-wing corporatism and in opposition to the genuine Spanish fascism which emerged in 1933 with the organization of *Falange Española*. The Libres, in turn, were scathingly denounced as mere rightwing, yellow syndicates by José Antonio Primo de Rivera and other Falangists. They tended to follow the orientation of José Calvo Sotelo and added to the earlier "national syndicalism" (the standard labor principle of their Falangist rival) terms such as "totalitarian corporatism" and "totalitarian syndicalism"⁽³²⁾, which in turn added to the cognitive dissonance of the movement, but by this time it had ceased to have any importance.

Just as the introduction of a democratic monarchy followed by an anticlerical Federal Republic had stimulated Carlism in the 1870s, the establishment of the anticlerical Second Republic in 1931 revived a movement which many had considered moribund. Not merely did Carlism gain new vigor, but was fully reunified for the first time in nearly half a century when jaimistas, mellistas and Integrists joined forces to form the *Comunión Tradicionalista* in January 1932. The new political situation was much more complex than in the past, not merely because the introduction of effective democratic suffrage resulted in the emergence of numerous competing forces, but also because the Carlists no longer held a monopoly of the anti-liberal right, as had been the case for a century. By the following year the largest single political party in Spain was Catholic CEDA, a largely anti-Republican but nonetheless not officially monarchist party which stood for the introduction of a corporatist regime, rather like the nascent *Estado Novo* of Salazar in Portugal. Supporters of the exiled Alfonso XIII also moved sharply to the right, and by 1932 the main sector had abandoned the parliamentary-type

⁽³¹⁾ On 1 April 1931, one of their organs insisted: "We love violence for the love we have for life". *Ibidem*, p. 281.

⁽³²⁾ *Ibidem*, pp. 312-322.

monarchy which had governed Spain for a century in favour of "neo-traditional" monarchy, an authoritarian and corporative system. Thus the *alfonsinos* claimed that they had basically accepted the historic doctrines of Carlism, and urged the latter to join then in unified support of the "neo-traditional" restoration of the exiled king⁽³³⁾.

This shift to the right by alfonsino monarchists was welcomed, but failed to convince the vast majority of Carlists. Attempted dynastic reunification quickly broke down as each branch once more claimed primacy. Carlists had no high opinion of D. Alfonso and claimed that his nominal conversion could not necessarily be trusted, while purists doubted that alfonsino neo-traditionalism fully embraced Carlism, questioning its post-liberal centralized authoritarianism.

By this point the strongest Carlist base lay in Navarre, where Navarrese, together with Basque, Carlists temporarily joined forces with the Basque nationalists of the three provinces in 1931-32 to defend beleaguered Catholic interests and create a new system of Basque-Navarrese autonomy. This limited alliance quickly broke down in 1932 when it became clear that the Republican regime would not permit a conservative and Catholic system of autonomy and the Basque nationalists demonstrated their willingness to work with Madrid under the liberal democratic Republican system.

As early as 1918, it had become noticeable that the interests of Basque nationalists and Navarrese Carlists did not really coincide on the autonomy issue, and this had led to the emergence of what would later be called *el navarrismo político*. Navarrese Carlism was strongly autonomist but also politically *españolista* to the extent of ultimately embracing a rightist and traditionalist Spanish nationalism⁽³⁴⁾. By October 1932 the Navarrese Carlist Junta had decided to support an autonomy statute for Navarre alone, though subsequent conditions made it very

⁽³³⁾ The principal study of the neo-traditional *viraje* of the alfonsino monarchists is Julio Gil Pecharromáin, *Conservadores subversivos: La derecha autoritaria alfonsina (1913-1936)*, Madrid, 1994.

⁽³⁴⁾ Martin Blinkhorn, the chief student of Carlism under the Republic, concluded that in the case of the Navarrese Carlist "over the years it became clear that clericalism, monarchism and a broad social conservatism were the principal ingredients of what was actually a particular form of Spanish nationalism". *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939*, Cambridge, 1975, p. 35.

hard to pursue this goal, which soon became secondary to overriding Carlist concerns⁽³⁵⁾.

At this point the main leadership of the *Comunión Tradicionalista* lay in the hands of the relatively pragmatic and possibilist Conde de Rodezno and the former jaimistas of Navarre, together with their allies in other parts of the country. They formed a beneficial alliance with the alfonsino monarchists for the parliamentary elections of 1933, and in March 1934 a small delegation of Carlist and alfonsino leaders signed an agreement in Rome by which the Italian government pledged financial aid, military equipment and training facilities to support a monarchist for the parliamentary elections of 1933, and in March 1934 a small delegation of Carlist and alfonsino leaders signed an agreement in Rome by which the Italian government pledged financial aid, military equipment and training facilities to support a monarchist overthrow of the Republic⁽³⁶⁾.

Practical opportunity for such a blow was lacking, however, while any agreement with the alfonsinos was far from complete. The more intransigent former mellistas and Integrists were increasingly critical of the tendency of the pragmatic Rodezno leadership to ally with the alfonsino right. The neo-traditionalists had clearly adopted the banner of a right-wing Spanish nationalism, but their new emphases made them only slightly more palatable to hard-core Carlists than the liberal quasi-nationalists of the past century. In mid-April 1934 D. Alfonso Carlos awarded power to the intransigents, appointing the latter's leading figure, a 40-year old lawyer from Seville, Manuel Fal Conde, Secretary-General of the *Comunión*, a status raised to that of Jefe-Delegado within Spain at the close of the following year.

(35) On the relations of Navarrese Carlism with Basque nationalism, see my articles "Navarrismo y españolismo en la política navarra bajo la Segunda República", *Príncipe de Viana*, vol. 166-167, May-Sept. 1982, pp. 895-905, and "Navarra y el nacionalismo vasco en perspectiva histórica", *ibidem*, vol. 171, Jan.-April 1984, pp. 101-113.

(36) phg_{most} thorough account of Mussolini's policy toward the Carlists and other Spanish political forces will be found in Ismael Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República: Hostilidad, conspiraciones, intervención (1931-1936)*, Valencia, 1986.

For the new Carlist leadership, neither a modernizing radical right in the form of alfonsino neo-traditionalism nor the extremist fascist nationalism of the nascent Falange could become more than circumstantial allies. The semi-clandestine training of thousands of new Requeté militia volunteers in Navarre and elsewhere made the Carlists the most keenly wooed civilian auxiliaries as General Emilio Mola developed his military conspiracy to overthrow the government during the spring of 1936. Fal Conde, however, remained obdurate, refusing to commit Carlists to a politically pluralist revolt, however nationalist in rhetoric, that did not have as its principal goal the installation of a Carlist monarchy. As conditions deteriorated and Spanish affairs became increasingly tense and violent, Rodezno and other Navarrese leaders took the initiative in breaking the impasse, negotiating a compromise more on the terms of Mola than of Fal Conde. The new successor to the dynasty, François-Xavier de Bourbon-Parme, nephew by marriage of Alfonso Carlos and after the sudden death of the latter the acting Regent of Carlism, accepted this agreement, though Fal Conde sought to the very last to improve its terms⁽³⁷⁾.

In the Civil War which followed, the supporters of the military rebels soon became known "los Nacionales", though the precise political character of what was called "Nationalist Spain" for several months remained in doubt. Fal Conde and his collaborators formed their own Junta Nacional Carlista, which during the first six months of the conflict sought to build what Javier Tusell has termed a "Carlist Proto-State"⁽³⁸⁾. General Franco esteemed both Carlist doctrine and Carlist military valor, but after he became Generalísimo and Chief of State on 1 October 1936, he found Fal Conde's initiatives increasingly intrusive, exiling him from the Nationalist Zone early in December.

⁽³⁷⁾ The most complete account by a participant is Antonio Lizarza Iribarren, *Memorias de la conspiración*, Pamplona, 1969. See also Francisco Javier de Lizarza Inda, "La conspiración antirrepublicana de 1936. El general Mola y la Comunión tradicionalista", in *Las Guerras Carlistas*, pp. 259-76; Jaime del Burgo, *Conspiración y guerra civil*, Madrid, 1970; and Tomás Echeverría, *Como se preparó el alzamiento: El general Mola y los carlistas*, Madrid, 1985.

⁽³⁸⁾ Javier Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, Barcelona, 1992, pp. 46-49. This is the best single political history of the Nationalist zone, as well as of Carlist politics during the Civil War.

The two largest and most active politico-military forces on the Nationalist side were the Carlists and the Falangists, and in the early months of 1937 it became increasingly clear that Franco would not tolerate for much longer the *facto* political pluralism within his territory. Despite their deep differences, Carlists and Falangists found some common ground in their mutual militancy and in certain common principles of anti-liberal and anti-leftist nationalism. Nonetheless, mutual negotiations between the traditionalists and the much larger Falangist organization failed, and this left the initiative to Franco, who in April 1937 merged the two groups into his new state party, the *Falange Española Tradicionalista* (FET). Nearly all Carlists accepted this forced marriage in violation of their basic principles, out of deep patriotic dedication to the war effort, but many had increasing misgivings.

It soon became clear that there was very little Carlist about the new *partido único*, for the FET adopted the fascist program of the original *Falange* as its own, and veteran Falangists dominated most of the positions of leadership. Carlist figures were awarded control of the party leadership only in Navarre and a few other provinces. Rodezno became minister of justice in Franco's first regular government formed in January 1938, where he worked effectively to eliminate all the Republic's anticlerical legislation, but became disgusted with his collaborators in the new regime. As he bluntly complained to Franco in a personal conversation of 1938, "My general, Traditionalist doctrine is not that of fascism"⁽³⁹⁾.

The Civil War of 1936-39 was the first which the Carlists won militarily, but they came increasingly to feel that they had lost the peace and any opportunity for political leadership. Both the Prince-Regent and the *Jefe-Delegado* had been expelled from the Nationalist zone by Franco, and Falangists dominated the FET. When Carlist leaders complained to Franco, he blandly replied that they and the Falangists should simply work out their differences.

The sense of alienation was most pronounced among the top leaders, particularly the regent D. Javier (as this Franco-Belgian aristocrat had been known since 1936) and *Fal Conde*. In 1939 the former, appalled by the increasingly fascist orientation of Franco's political, economic and

⁽³⁹⁾ Quoted in *ibidem*, p. 298.

diplomatic policies, conferred with an official of the British Foreign Office to express his sharp disagreement. The Carlist leaders believed that Franco had betrayed the genuine tradition of Spain and its national interests. Don Javier would have preferred a pro-British orientation in both diplomatic and economic affairs, but drew little sympathy from his British interlocutor, who was inclined to dismiss the Carlists, as he put it, as "medieval reactionaries".⁽⁴⁰⁾

A large number - though far from all - Carlists felt increasingly oppressed by a new and more radical form of Spanish nationalism, whose content they believed was in fact much more central European than Spanish. The high point of Carlist dissidence during the Franco regime occurred between 1940 and 1942, as Carlists, other rightists and many army officers challenged the increasingly prominent role of the Falange. This conflict culminated in a lengthy series of street incidents during the spring and summer of 1942, climaxed by the "Begoña affair" in which Falangists threw two hand grenades into a crowd of participants in a Carlist religious service in a suburb of Bilbao. The anti-Falangist cause was championed by Lt. Gen. José Enrique Varela, since 1939 minister of the army and the only important Carlist in the cabinet. Though Varela was forced out, the radically fascist sector of the FET was checked, and steadily waned further with the course of World War II.

The Spanish dictatorship drew somewhat nearer Carlism with the political metamorphosis of the regime initiated by Franco in 1945. Its semi-fascist structure was now theoretically transformed into a system of Catholic corporatism, supposedly based on the "subsidiary" institutions of Catholic society a little along the lines of the doctrine of Vázquez de Mella. Franco even wrote an enthusiastic prologue to a new edition of *El Estado Nuevo*, the most sophisticated summum of Carlist ideology ever written, first published by Víctor Pradera in 1935. Most Carlists rallied to the regime amid the international ostracism which followed World War II, and their ranks were also divided by the effort of one sector to promote one surviving member of the dynasty as "Carlos VIII". Since 1936 the direct male line was at an end, but regime leaders sought to exploit the transitory candidacy of a Carlist pretender ⁴⁰

⁽⁴⁰⁾ See the references in *ibidem*, pp. 359-360.

of uncertain legitimacy to lessen pressure from the main sector of non-Carlist monarchists.

But the form of monarchist succession established by Franco was the very opposite of traditional legitimism, and the authoritarianism of his regime introduced only limited features of the Carlist program. Though Carlist Navarre and Alava enjoyed limited autonomy, it was the most centralized and for long the most despotic in Spanish history.

Though Carlism was in some respects the most *españolista* movement in modern history and came to develop by the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries its own form of a nationalist project, it was largely at odds with all the primary forms of modern Spanish nationalism. All forms of liberal nationalism, from the most moderate to the most radical, were anathema, and modernist rightist centralism was not attractive, either. The entente with Falangism was only briefly accepted because of extreme national emergency.

Nationalism is a typical form of political modernity which has normally tended toward juridical and political levelling, and a new centralized structure of leadership. It has taken a variety of different forms, but because of these inherent features none was really acceptable to Carlism. The traditionalist movement had more than a little influence in modern Spain, but its principles precluded acceptance of any of the standard forms of nationalism, and its own strength and appeal were too limited for it to replace the dominant forces. Without Carlism modern Spain would probably have been rather less Catholic, and would have been institutionally and politically less conservative, but the movement's role was that of resistance, without the capacity to effect a project of modern transformation of the kind which usually lie at the heart of nationalism itself.