Elenchos and Eros: The Case of Socrates and Agathon at Symposium 199c–201a
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_14_8Keywords:
elenchos, eros, Symposium, Plato, SocratesAbstract
Here I aim to survey the key-concepts and main lines of reasoning in the elenchos between Socrates and Agathon at Smp. 199c-201a as well as their main links to the theory of eros which is developed at Socrates/Diotima’s speech afterwards. In this respect I analize in this section of the Symposium: a) the linguistic resources through which the question about eros’ nature is established in a precise, well-thought way; b) the implications of the main assertions which are made about eros as a first answer to these question: its intentional char-acter; its inherent lacking condition because of its necesarily intwining in temporality; its tendency towards the beautiful and the good. Afterwards, I add a consideration of this par-ticular example of elenchos in the light of various points of debate about elenchos in general. In this assessmet, among other things, I reflect on the links between elenchos and eros insofar as the first one is an appropriate tool both to establish the foundations of Plato ́s theory of eros and to awaken in the interlocutor the love for truth.
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