Slave Emotion. Anger, Reason and Moral Responsibility in Aristotelian Ethics

Authors

  • Esteban Bieda Universidad de Buenos Aires – Buenos Aires – Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_33_22

Keywords:

Aristotle, Rationality, Emotion, Slavery

Abstract

In this paper I will analyze, first, the way in which Aristotle understood the link between reason and emotional actions –particularly angry ones– in order to show that it is due to this link that emotions are ethically relevant and not a mere uncontrolled reaction. For this, I will begin by making a brief examination of the Aristotelian psychic mereology, in order to locate the seats of reason and emotion in the human soul. Then I will analize the kind of knowledge that an emotional action supposes. Finally, after analyzing the repeated analogies that Aristotle uses between reason as master and anger as slave to explain the link between the two, my specific contribution to the subject will consist of inverting this analogy and, instead of using it as an example of the link λόγος-θυμός, making the latter an example of the δεσπότης-δοῦλος link as described in Politics I. If my hypothesis is plausible, establishing the slave's own actions and virtue will help us shed light on the morality of angry actions.

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References

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Published

2023-11-20

How to Cite

Bieda, E. (2023). Slave Emotion. Anger, Reason and Moral Responsibility in Aristotelian Ethics. Revista Archai, (33), e03322. https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_33_22

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Section

Articles