Pequeno esboço sobre a prohairesis e a dignidade humana em Epiteto

Authors

  • Janyne Sattler Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, Brasil

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_12_12

Keywords:

Epictetus, Wittgenstein, prohairesis, moral person, stoicism

Abstract

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the ‘willing subject’ from Epictetus’ complex notion of ‘prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of ‘moral person’ and ‘human dignity’ as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’ and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of ‘prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude – or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

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References

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Published

2025-11-29

How to Cite

Sattler, J. (2025). Pequeno esboço sobre a prohairesis e a dignidade humana em Epiteto . Revista Archai, (12), 113. https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_12_12