Human capital and corruption: a microeconomic model of the bribes market with democratic contestability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-203X_23_4Abstract
To overcome market failures society creates common laws that stimulate or penalize individual actions, the enforcement of which depends on the actions of public authorities who may be susceptible to corruption. We model this behaviour for an autocracy versus a democracy, using a microeconomic framework. We assume that in an autocracy rulers have a monopoly over the bribes market, whereas in a democracy conflicting groups compete in the bribes market. The models constructed produce results that are compatible with the well-known stylized facts, namely that (1) in a democracy the level of corruption is lower than in an autocracy, although still positive, that (2) in environments where the level of human capital is higher, regimes are closer to democracies and the level of corruption is lower, and that (3) the level of corruption is higher in more regulated economies.Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
Downloads
Published
2006-06-22
Issue
Section
Articles
License
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows sharing the work with recognition of authorship and initial publication in Antropologia Portuguesa journal.