Myth, virtue and method in Plato’s Meno

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_24_1

Keywords:

Recollection, Myth, Virtue, Socratic Elenchus, Method of Hypothesis

Abstract

This paper challenges the prevailing interpretations about the role and the function of recollection in Plato’s Meno by suggesting that recollection is a cognitive process inaugurated by a myth. This process sets out the methodological and epistemological context within which two transitions are attainable: on the one hand, the methodological transition from the elenchus to the method of hypothesis, and on the other hand, the cognitive upshift from opinion(s) to knowledge. This paper argues, furthermore, that Socrates uses the myth of recollection just when Meno begins to object and tries to give up on their inquiry. Socrates’ myth accordingly imprints on Meno’s soul a true belief that facilitates the process of recollection by emboldening Meno to continue the inquiry.

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Published

2023-05-31

How to Cite

Giasoumi, A. (2023). Myth, virtue and method in Plato’s Meno. PLATO JOURNAL, 24, 7-19. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_24_1