Callicles’ Critique & the Argumentative Structure of Plato’s Gorgias

Abstract

In his great speech in Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles mounts a critique of Socrates’ earlier argument that doing injustice is worse than suffering it. The nature of this critique has not much preoccupied commentators, a neglect that this paper aims to remedy. A second aim of this paper is to address the issue of why Plato returns us, armed with Callicles’ critique, to an earlier argument. I argue that Plato sends us back because he intends subsequent discussion to address the critique. In this sense, Callicles’ critique is agenda-setting for subsequent discussion. However, this creates a puzzle, for Socrates only directly responds to the critique once and that response fails. Subsequent discussion appears to forget all about the critique as well as the claim that doing injustice is worse than suffering it. I argue that this appearance is misleading: subsequent discussion does address the critique but does so indirectly. It proceeds by attacking the underlying basis of Callicles’ critique, namely, his views on temperance and the good life. I argue that Callicles’ views about temperance and the good life shape and inform his critique. By attacking that basis, Socrates responds to the critique and disarms it.