Triangles, Tropes, and τὰ τοιαʋ ̃τα: A Platonic Trope Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_2Keywords:
Particulars; Tropes; Plato; Timaeus; Substance; Metaphysics; Greek PhilosophyAbstract
A standard interpretation of Plato’s metaphysics holds that sensible particulars are images of Forms. Such particulars are fairly independent, like Aristotelian substances. I argue that this is incorrect: Platonic particulars are not Form images but aggregates of Form images, which are property-instances (tropes). Timaeus 49e-50a focuses on “this-suches” (toiauta) and even goes so far as to claim that they compose other things. I argue that Form images are this-suches, which are tropes. I also examine the geometrical account, showing that the geometrical constituents of the elements are also Form images. Thus everything in the sensible world is composed of tropes.
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