What are the Objects of Dianoia?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_4Abstract
In this paper, I examine the problem of the so-called Mathematical Objects within the context of the Divided Line. I argue that Plato believes that there are such objects but their distinctness and the mode of cognition relative to them can only be understood in relation to the superordinate, unhypothetical first principle of all, the Idea of the Good. The objects of mathematics or διάνοια are, unlike the objects of intellection or νόησις, cognized independently of the Good.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows sharing the work with recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal.