Unpacking care and virtue from narrative ethics

Abstract

The present research deals with the concepts of care and virtue, by emphasizing the branch of studies known as the ethics of care and the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics seen as narrative ethics. In the first part, I explore the essential features of “care” with special regard to the early works of Mayeroff, Ruddick, Gilligan and Noddings. The second part focuses on the interest in the concept of virtue sparkled within Analytic philosophy after a long period of neglect, by referring briefly to the inquiries of Anscombe, Geach and Foot. The main
focus will be, however, upon MacIntyre’s view on virtue. In the wake of Aristotle’s concept of virtues as moral excellences MacIntyre argued for a down-to-earth approach to moral agency and moral decision-making. In the last part of the work, I will unpack care and virtue from both narrative ethics by identifying some possible areas of dis/agreements. A special emphasis will be laid on the narrativity underpinning both views.