Are There Really “Tragic Cases”?
A Critical Analysis of Manuel Atienza’s Proposal
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14195/2184-9781_4_6Keywords:
Easy, Hard and Tragic cases, Theory of legal argumentation, Positive Law, Claim to correctness, Rationality, Democratic Rule of LawAbstract
The aim of this article is to critically analyze the concept of the tragic case proposed by Manuel Atienza, starting from the same basis – the work of Robert Alexy –, but reaching very different conclusions. In the light of the parameters presented by Alexy (correctness, rationality, legal argumentation, human rights), the inadmissibility of some of Atienza's central assertions about tragic cases is exposed (such as the absence of a correct answer, the limitation of legal rationality, the option for the lesser evil), as well as the unsustainability of the very notion of tragic cases itself.
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