Living as if there were gods

Evil and Philosophy in Plato

Abstract

Plato does not see the theme of evil as a central theme. For this reason, we do not find a systematic and comprehensive answer. Rather it seems to be configured as a necessity: answering the question of evil only as an element of the sensitive world, having no relevance to the real world (the world of ideas). Thus, starting from the reading of Theaetetus 176a-177a, we will seek to find the details of the Platonic vision that allow us to identify the notion of κακός as a supplement to the notion of the sensible world and, in contrast, with the good (ἀγαθὸς). The first notion to emphasize (and which will have repercussions in the Middle Ages) is that evil is neither a matter of destiny nor a divine creation (or in itself a supernatural essence). Thus, unlike some Christian and Gnostic heritages, when evil appears clothed in a positive structure, that is, a force that influences the world with its teleology, but an imperfection, a lack, an ignorance, an absence of good. Now, each of these aspects can be considered details of evil: imperfection is a metaphysical issue, without pinching God's creation, since only good and all good things emerged from it; a fault, or corruption of the soul (as presented in the Phaedo, 79c) and how the body is what provides evil; ignorance, as itself a factor of evil (here, how can we not remember the division into different types of knowledge (Book VII, Republic) since only education can free man; the absence of good, that is, the lack of the influence of form of good in the world. Thus, good and evil, despite not having the same essence, and this being above all absence, still leads Plato to a kind of Manichaeism avant la lettre, where the bad join the bad (κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, Theaetetus, 177a) and philosophers, who must seek to live like a god.