Searle’s Dispositional Theory and the Problem of Unconscious Mental Causation

Authors

  • Tárik de Athayde Prata Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14195/0872-0851_61_4

Keywords:

Unconscious, Dispositional theory, Mental causation, Aspectual shape

Abstract

Exactly as Descartes, Searle sees consciousness as essential to mental phenomena. In order to make this (1) Cartesian view of consciousness compatible with (2) the acceptance of the unconscious, he holds (3) a dispositional theory: unconscious states exist as dispositions to the production of conscious states. However, his argument for the connection between the mental and consciousness is based on the thesis that the aspectual shape does not exist in objective phenomena, which is incompatible with unconscious mental causation. In order to be causally efficacious, an unconscious state has to be an occurring aspectual shape, which belies the dispositional theory and exists independently from consciousness, contradicting the Cartesian view.

Key-words: Unconscious, Dispositional theory, Mental causation, Aspectual shape.

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Published

2022-03-23

Issue

Vol. 31 No. 61 (2022): Revista Filosófica de Coimbra Vol. 31 Nº 61

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Filosófica de Coimbra

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